MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): STRONG AND WEAK ASPECTS OF THE TACTICAL AVIATION OF OUR PROBABLE ENEMIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP10-00105R000201520001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 16, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 26, 1975
• Content Type: MEMO

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
26 November 1975
MEMO2ANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
SIJBJECT MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): Strong and Weak Aspects
of the Tactical Aviation of Our Probable Enemies
1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is part of a
series now in preparation based on the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense
publication Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought". This
article proceeds from a discussion of developments in ITS and NATO air
forces, including multipurpose tactical fighters, all-weather
fighter-interceptors, tactical bombers, tactical reconnaissance aircraft
and tactical cruise missiles, in defining the tactical aviation
capabilities of the capitalist countries. The author examines readiness
levels, sortie rates and massed strike tactics, leading to the conclusion
that the tactical aviation of the probable enemies has rather significant
massed strike capabilities and uses advanced combat methods. Air combat
entails enormous losses', however, because of limited dispersal and maneuver
capabilities, and the increased air defense strength of the socialist camp.
This article anneared in Issue No. 5 (66) for 1962.
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2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive, this
document should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within recipient
agencies. For ease of reference, reports from this publication have been
assigned
William E. Nelson
Deputy Director for Operations
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Distribution:
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The Director of Central Intelligence
The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Assistant to the Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Department of the Army
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
U. S. Air Force
Director, National Security Agency
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Deputy Director for Science and Technology
Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence
for National Intelligence Officers
Director of Strategic Research
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COUNTRY USSR
DATE OF
INFO. Late 1962
Intelligence Information Special Report
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SUBJECT
DATE
26 November 1975
//r---
NIIIITARY THOUGHT (USSR): Strong and Weak Aspects of the
Tactical Aviation of Our Probable
Enemies
SOURCE
Documentary
Summary:
The following report is a translation from Russian of an article which
appeared in Issue No. 5 (66) for 1962 of the SECRET USSR Ministry of
Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal 'Military
Thought". The author of this article is Colonel P. Plyachenko. This
article proceeds from a discussion of developments in US and NATO air
forces, including multipurpose tactical fighters, all-weather
fighter-interceptors, tactical bombers, tactical reconnaissance aircraft
and tactical cruise missiles, in defining the tactical aviation
capabilities of the capitalist countries. The author examines readiness
levels, sortie rates and massed strike tactics, leading to the conclusion
that the tactical aviation of the probable enemies has rather significant
massed strike capabilities and uses advanced combat methods. Air combat
entails enormous losses, however, because of limited dispersal and maneuver
capabilities, and the increased air defense strength of the socialist camp.
End of Summary
Headquarters Comment:
After 1962 the SECRET version of Military Thought was published three times
annually and was distributed down to the level of division commander. r2?X1 -HUM
reportedly ceased publication at the end of 1970.
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Strong and Weak Aspects of the Tactical
Aviation of Our Probable Enemies
by
Colonel P. Plyachenko
Tactical aviation of the major capitalist countries consists of units
armed with tactical and all-weather fighters, light bombers, reconnaissance
aircraft, and operational-tactical guided cruise missiles. These flying
means are capable of using all types of conventional and nuclear weapons
and of performing diverse tasks both in close cooperation with, and in
support of, the ground forces, and independently. Tactical aviation
constitutes one of the principal strike forces in a nuclear offensive to
gain nuclear superiority and air supremacy in the main theaters of military
operations in the initial period of a war. It is considered to be the most
important means of cutting off the flow of fresh forces from the depth to
the area of combat actions, and of supporting the ground forces on the
battlefield, as well as a means of conducting aerial reconnaissance.
When there is extensive use of means of mass destruction and the
combat actions of the ground forces are proceeding at a rapid pace on
separate, nonadjacent axes, the role of tactical aviation as a means of
support for the troops not only does not decrease, but, on the contrary,
becomes greater since other fire means can prove less effective during
highly mobile military actions.
The command of the US Air Force believes that significant numbers of
tactical aircraft should be deployed in peacetime in the immediate vicinity
of the territory of the probable enemy in order to be able to deliver a
surprise strike in cooperation with strategic aviation based within and
outside the continental US, and with intercontinental and medium-range
ballistic missiles.
It estimates that in a modern war more than half of all potential
enemy targets will be located within the operating radius of tactical
aviation means. Therefore, it is considered particularly important that
large tactical aviation forces be continuously maintained in a state of
combat readiness in the more probable theaters of military operations, and
he capable of delivering the first strikes in the shortest possible time
against vitally important enemy targets in the operational-tactical depth.
As is known, more than half of the combat strength of its tactical aviation
is based permanently outside the continental US.
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The capitalist states, in particular the US, have concentrated the
largest grouping of tactical aviation in Western Europe near the borders of
the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist camp. This grouping
consists of the combined air forces of NATO and aviation units and large
units subordinate to countries of the NATO bloc.
What is the present nature of the tactical aviation of our probable
enemies, and what are its strong and weak aspects?
To answer this question we will first briefly discuss trends in the
development of this branch arm of the air forces.
The changes that have taken place in recent years in opinions on the
conduct of combat actions under conditions of a missile/nuclear war, the
further development of aviation equipment and the improvement of
air-launched nuclear warheads, and considerations of a purely economic
nature have caused the capitalist countries to arrive at the concept of
developing a multipurpose combat aircraft for tactical aviation, one that
could be used to perform tasks of both an offensive and a defensive nature.
These countries have been engaged in the development of multipurpose
tactical fighters for several years, and individual models have already
been built and put into service with tactical aviation.
The basic requirement made of these fighters is that they be capable
of performing the following tasks: the interception of enemy supersonic
bombers flying at low, medium, and high altitudes; the air support of
ground forces on the battlefield and on the approaches to it; the
maintenance of air supremacy in the zone of combat actions; the delivery,
using conventional and nuclear means of destruction, of strikes against
ground targets in the zone of combat actions and against enemy lines of
communication; and tactical air reconnaissance.
To successfully perform these tasks, tactical fighters must have
excellent technical and combat specifications: they must have a wide range
of flight speeds -- from the minimum possible to supersonic; they must
engage in combat actions at minimum and maximum altitudes; and they must
have a large tactical flight radius and powerful, general-purpose armament
(small arms, rockets, and bombs, including nuclear bombs). In addition,
these fighters must be mobile, must not depend on vulnerable, costly air
bases and, finally, must be comparatively low-cost.
It should be observed that certain types of tactical fighters that
have recently been put into service with the tactical aviation of the US,
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Great Britain, France, Italy, Federal Republic of Germany, and, to some
extent, the combined air forces of NATO, basically satisfy these
requirements. For example, the latest modifications of the American
F-101C, F-104G, and F-105D tactical fighters; the French Super Mystere IVB2
and Mirage III multipurpose fighters; the British Hunter F-6 multipurpose
fighter; and the Italian Fiat G-91 fighter have sonic and supersonic flight
speeds, a ceiling that ranges from maximally low to 15 to 20 thousand
meters, and a tactical operating radius ranging at medium and high
altitudes from 400 to 1,200 kilometers and at low altitudes from 200 tr,5 Ann
1-
kilometers; and they have powerful small arms, rockets, and bombs. 0X HUM
By now, many of the new tactical fighters that have been put into
service with -lir forces units have essentially been converted into light
bombers.
Instead ot bombs, tactical fighters may carry a large
number of rockets: for example, the American F-100 tactical fighter can
carry up to 42, and the F-105 - up to 167, free rockets of 70mm caliber or
up to four guided micsiles of the Bullpup type. For actions against air
targets, the majority of tactical fighters are armed with two to six guided
missiles of the air-to-air type, such as Sidewinder, Falcon, etc. Besides
the above weapons, tactical fighters have cannons (four 20mm cannons on the
F-100 and F-101, and one six-barreled cannon with a firing rate of 4,000 to
6,000 rounds per minute on the F-104 and F-105).
All new tactical fighters are equipped for toss bombing at low
altitudes. Moreover, they are equipped with a system to guide them to
ground targets in actions under difficult weather conditions and at night,
and have the equipment needed for instrument landing. All this, taken
together, demonstrates that modern tactical fighters possess sufficiently
great combat and technical capabilities; this is indisputably one of the
strcngest aspects of tactical aviation.
Also attracting attention is the fact that recently a number of
capitalist states have been giving particularly serious consideration to
the problem of developing new tactical fighters-delivery vehicles for
nuclear weapons with vertical take-off and landing and short take-off and
landing distances. A number of NATO countries have found a practical
solution to this problem. There already are a number of designs for such
take-offs which have been presented by the NATO command. New devices that
permit a reduction of approximately ten percent in aircraft landing speed
are already being used by some American, British, and French aircraft; this
substantially decreases the distance of their landing run at airfields. As
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for the take-off of tactical fighters, they have begun to extensively use
various launchers. A new experimental tactical fighter model (P-1127) with
vertical take-off and landing and a number of other aircraft are being
tested. All this indicates that the capitalist countries are devoting a
great deal of attention to the problem of developing aircraft that do not
require airfields, particularly tactical fighters.
One of the most important requirements made of tactical fighters at
the present time is that they effectively negotiate the enemy air defense
system.
It is the opinion of the military specialists of the capitalist states
that manned aircraft, and particularly tactical fighters, will have greater
success in destroying targets if they fly at a maximally low altitude
(throughout their entire route or during specific parts of it). The reason
for this is that the present level of development of air defense means does
not ensure that effective countermeasures can be taken against low-flying
aircraft, while not one of the existing aircraft can with impunity break
through to the strike target at medium and high altitudes.
As is known, if aircraft are to be used at low altitudes, they must be
equipped with special navigation and bombing equipment, and the structural
strength requirements for them are higher. For this reason, before
intensive training for actions at low altitudes was begun, a great deal of
work was done to modernize the aircraft inventory of tactical aviation.
For example, in the tactical aviation of the US, the F-101A long-range
fighter and the F-104 fighter were modified, respectively, into the F-101C
and the F-104G versions, intended for carrying out tasks of an offensive
nature at low altitudes.
Those tactical fighters that were put into service with the air forces
of a number of capitalist states were designed and equipped from the
beginning to allow for low-altitude combat use. For example, the US
fighter-bomber Republic F-105D Thunderchief was designed to operate at high
and low altitudes. The bombing system, which combines the AN/ASQ-19 aiming
system and the R-14A radar, ensures blind automatic bombing from a glide
and from a vertical maneuver at low altitude. The Mirage III (French) and
Fiat G-91 (Italian) multipurpose fighters, which were adopted into service
by several countries, can also be used to negotiate air defense systems at
low altitudes.
The problem of preparing tactical aircraft for combat actions at low
altitudes is considered of grave importance. These preparations
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substantially increase the capabilities of the aircraft to negotiate air
defenses and to perform tasks of destroying various installations and
targets located both on the battlefield and in the tactical and operational
depth.
Thus, the basic means of the tactical aviation of our probable enemies
are multipurpose tactical fighters.
The present predominance of several types of obsolete subsonic
aircraft should be mentioned as a shortcoming of tactical fighter aviation.
Such aircraft comprise an average of 60 percent of the total in units
operating in the main theater of military operations and a considerably
higher percentage in other theaters.
As was noted above, in addition to tactical fighters, tactical
aviation includes units of all-weather fighters, light bombers, tactical
reconnaissance aircraft, and tactical cruise missiles. Military
specialists in the West believe that the need for such types of aircraft
has increased rather than decreased, with the possible exception of light
tactical bombers which, as many recognize, may be totally supplanted by
tactical fighters and tactical cruise missiles.
Proportionally, all-weather fighter-interceptors are in second place
in tactical aviation. For example, quantitatively they constitute 33
percent of the strength of the air forces in the main theater of military
operations. An overwhelming majority of these aircraft have sonic and
supersonic flight speeds, a service ceiling on the order of 18 to 20
thousand meters or more, and a tactical operating radius of 750 to 800
kilometers; they are armed with guided missiles and free rockets and, in
some cases, cannons. They are equipped with special search and fire-control
aircraft radars for use against air targets (Which tactical fighters do not
have) and are capable of combating subsonic and supersonic air targets
under difficult weather conditions during the day and night. This also
constitutes one of the strong aspects of the tactical aviation of our
probable enemies.
The military command of the major capitalist states is devoting a vast
amount of attention to the development of surface-to-air guided missiles.
Although it has assigned them an important place in the air defense system
in theaters of military operations, it nevertheless believes that the role
of fighter aviation, and particularly of all-weather fighters, has not
declined. It is recognized that since the capabilities of enemy means of
air attack have increased greatly, there arises a need for extremely close
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coordination of the combat actions of fighter aviation and ground air
defense means. For this reason units of ground air defense means, and in
particular guided missiles, are included in tactical aviation large units,
and their actions are controlled from common air defense operations centers
set up at the joint operations centers of tactical aviation and the ground
forces. As the experience of exercises in foreign armies has shown, such a
system is fully warranted and deserves attention.
Tactical bomber aviation constitutes only six percent of the total
number of aircraft in the air forces of the main theater of military
operations; and there are no tactical bombers at all in the air forces of
the other theaters. Little attention has been paid to the development of
this means in recent years. This is evidenced by the fact that the
tactical air forces of the major capitalist states continue to retain in
service tactical bombers with relatively poor flight and tactical
specifications. For example, the US B-66, the British Canberra B-8, and
the French Vautour IIB, which now are the principal light bombers in the
tactical aviation of capitalist states, have a maximum flight speed on the
order of 970 to 1,100 kilometers per hour and a ceiling of 13.5 to 20
thousand meters; are not adequately adapted for actions at low altitudes;
have no missiles; and, with the exception of the B-66, their bomb load does
not exceed that of tactical fighters. Therefore, under modern conditions,
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A positive combat characteristic of tactical bombers is their great
tactical radius of operation, which for the above models is 2,000 to 2,300
kilometers at medium altitudes and up to 1,000 to 1,100 kilometers at low
altitudes.
Tactical reconnaissance aircraft constitute 12 percent of tactical
aviation in the main theater of military operations, and considerably less
in the other theaters. Until recently, modernized fighter-type and
bomber-type aircraft with inadequate flight and tactical specifications
have been used as tactical reconnaissance aircraft. In recent years, new
types of reconnaissance aircraft have begun to be developed on the basis of
new fighters and the more advanced bombers, for example: the US RF-101,
which has a maximum flight speed of more than 900 kilometers per hour and a
radius of operation of over (?) kilometers; the ITS RB-66, which has a
maximum flight speed of more than 1,100 kilometers per hour and a radius of
operation of about 2,400 kilometers; and a number of others, including
special unmanned tactical reconnaissance aircraft. These aircraft are
equipped with special new devices for performing visual, photographic, and
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radioelectronic reconnaissance.
In recent years, tactical reconnaissance aviation has begun to
develop, during combat training, various methods of conducting aerial
reconnaissance, including low-altitude aerial photography flights. In
aerial reconnaissance competitions conducted by NATO in 1960, the best
aerial photograph, for example, was acknowledged as one taken by the crew
of an American RF-101C from an altitude of 15 meters. The crews of the
Canberra PR-9 aircraft of the British air forces also are systematically
mastering the techniques of low-altitude flight. For this purpose the
crews are assigned several routes having photo reconnaissance targets of
different types. Minimum flight altitudes of 25 meters have been attained
for the purpose of aerial photography. The measures taken to improve
tactical aerial reconnaissance means will undoubtedly strengthen this still
weak aspect of tactical aviation.
Tactical cruise missiles, put in service with tactical aviation, still
do not represent a primary means of fire. The relative proportion of them
in tactical aviation is small. For example, if we assign a value of 100
percent to all the nuclear warhead delivery means available to tactical
aviation in the main theater of military operations (on the basis of
exercises), tactical fighters would represent 71 percent, tactical bombers
- 22 percent, and tactical cruise missiles - seven percent. In other
theaters of military operations, tactical aviation large units are entirely
without cruise missiles. Up to now, the tactical aviation of the
capitalist states has not accumulated sufficient experience in the combat
employment of cruise missiles, or, particularly, in their cooperation with
other means of fire. Also, it is important to point out that, to our
knowledge, the Matador and Mace cruise missiles have inadequate tactical
and technical specifications and can be effectively destroyed by modern air
defense means. All this indicates that the tactical aviation of our
probable enemies still has gained no significant increase in fire power
from the use of surface-to-surface missile means or, in particular,
tactical cruise missiles.
And, finally, the chief factor determining the strength and might of
tactical aviation and its combat capabilities to perform the basic tasks
assigned to the air forces in a theater of military operations is the
availability of delivery aircraft for nuclear bombs. In the preceding
paragraph we noted what percentages of the delivery means the various types
of tactical aviation constituted. From this it can be seen that tactical
aviation as a whole has an enormous number of delivery aircraft. In order
to estimate the number of such aircraft that could participate in combat
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actims in the initial period of a war in the main theater of military
operations, we shall use the experience of the FALLEX-60 exercises in which
of 1,500 tactical fighters and light bombers, about 600 aircraft, not
counting cruise missiles, took part in the delivery of nuclear strikes in
the entral European Theater of Military Operations. Without doubt, this
is one of the strongest aspects of tactical aviation.
Let us turn to an analysis of the combat readiness and the basic
opei Itional-tactical norms of the means of tactical aviation.
First of all, it should be observed that the maintenance of the means
of air attack in general, and of tactical aviation in particular, in a
constant state of increased combat readiness constitutes the chief
day-to-day concern of the military command of the capitalist states. The
combat readiness of tactical aviation is based on existing permanent norms
for the serviceability of the materiel of aircraft with full crews that are
located in line units, for the readiness of nuclear warheads and other
means of destruction for use, etc. Aircraft that are ready for take-off
without repair or additional equipment, and have everything required to
carry out the combat task assigned to the aviation unit are also combat
ready. It is assumed that in tactical aviation units, the following number
of combat aircraft with full crews must be constantly ready to carry out
combat actions: tactical fighters and air defense fighters -- 75 percent;
tactical and light bombers -- 70 percent.
On the whole, in operational calculations the nuMber of combat-ready
aircraft is assumed to be equal to 70 percent. This percentage of
combat-ready aircraft may be considered fully realistic.
All combat-ready aviation forces are divided into aircraft on alert
and combat-ready aircraft. Aircraft and launchers on alert are on alert
status and are prepared for take-off or launch at the declaration of a
combat alert within the period of time prescribed by the specific degree of
combat readiness. The combat-ready forces consist of all the rest of the
70 percent of the aircraft and cruise missiles not forming part of the
alert forces. They may take a longer period of time to take off for a
combat task or prepare for launch -- the amount of time needed for the
personnel to assemble and the materiel to be readied.
Aircraft assigned to alert forces can be on alert at airfields in the
prescribed degree of readiness or in the air patrolling a set area.
Airfield alert is considered the basic method of maintaining the combat
readiness of all types of aviation. The degree of readiness of alert
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forces on alert at airfields ray be delimited as two, five, ten, 15 or 30
minutes.
Airborne alert is considered the highest degree of air forces combat
readiness. The areas assigned to tactical aviation and to air defense
aviation for airborne alert usually are located near the forward edge of
their troops, on the most probable axes of enemy aviation operations, or in
the areas where their reconnaissance aviation operates.
Ordinarily, six to eight aircraft are assigned from each aviation wing
of tactical fighters and light bombers to tactical aviation alert forces
based in the main theaters of military operations; they must be ready to
take off within 15 to 20 minutes after an alert has been declared_ In a
Matador tactical cruise missile wing, one squadron, consisting of four
launchers ready to launch six missiles within 15 to 25 minutes after
receiving the order, usually is assigned for this. A squadron that is
armed with Mace cruise missiles has great combat capabilities and is able
to effect 12 launchings of cruise missiles from 12 launchers within the
same period of time.
Tactical aviation units based in the main theaters of military
operations may go to increased combat readiness even before the beginning
of combat actions. Units or subunits that are composed primarily of
tactical fighters usually are organized by echelons. The first echelon is
made up of groups that are on alert status at airfields on five-minute
readiness. The second echelon consists of groups undergoing flight training
in permanent basing areas. These groups may be brought to combat readiness
within two to 2.5 hours after the declaration of the combat alert. The
third echelon may include crews of groups that are on leave or are
undergoing training on firing ranges. The period of time for bringing them
to combat readiness has been fixed at approximately three to 3.5 hours.
Thus, the Americans and their allies estimate that within three to 3.5
hours from the moment the alert is declared all combat-effective crews of
tactical aviation units in the Western European theaters of military
operations can be brought to combat readiness.
The air forces commands of the United States and other capitalist
states plan the conduct of tactical aviation combat actions in the main
theaters of military operations at a maximum sortie rate, an intensive
sortie rate, and a normal sortie rate, intended for an extended period of
time. They intend to use tactical aviation at the maximum sortie rate
primarily during the first operations of the initial period of a war. The
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n-ience of exercises conducted in recent years shows that in the first
thi'?e days each combat ready aircraft carried out the following number of
solties: three sorties for 7.actical fighters and two sorties for tactical
bombers on the first day; 1.8 and 1.5 sorties, respectively, on the second
day; and 1.2 and one sorties, respectively, on the third day.
The calculation of the sortie rate of tactical aviation is based on
the following information. The tactical fighter is used primarily for
combat actions during daylight hours, and the tactical bomber for actions
at night. It is assumed that there are 12 hours of daylight and ten hours
of darkness. The average combat task flight time of the F-100 tactical
Fighter (which is assumed to be the standard aircraft), including time
spent over the target, has been established. as 2.5 hours, and 1.5 hours are
allotted to preparation for a repeat sortie. It is therefore assumed that
a tactical fighter can make a maximum of three sorties during the 12 hours
of daylight.
It has been determined that the average combat task flight time of the
8-66 tactical bomber is three to 4.5 hours, and three hours are given to
preparation for a repeat sortie. Under these conditions, a tactical bomber
can make one or two sorties during the ten hours of darkness.
This is considered a rather high sortie rate and is acceptable, on the
whole, for the first day of operations in the initial period of a war if,
of course, there is an adequate number of reserve crews. In US tactical
aviation, for example, it is anticipated that there will be 1_3 crews per
aircraft.
At intensive and normal sortie rates of tactical aviation on the
subsequent days of an operation, the following numbers of sorties are
considered the norm for each combat-ready aircraft (the intensive rate is
given in the nimierator and tile normal rate the denominator):
- tactical fighters and air defense fighters -- 1.5/1 sorties
per day;
- tactical bombers -- 1 sortie per day/1 sortie every 1.5 days.
Thus, the accepted norms for the combat sortie rate of tactical
avation in the air forces cf the US and the other capitalist states are
rather high, particularly or the first day of combat actions. This
significantly increases the aggressiveness and continuity of aviation
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actions and its capabilities to destroy a large number of targets of
operational and tactical imp)rtance.
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As was noted above, tactical aviation represents the main striking
file means of the command of the armed forces in a theater of military
operations. It is therefore very important to examine: the capabilities of
the basic types of tactical aviation to deliver massed strikes in the
initial period of the war in the main theater of military operations; the
operational uses of tactical aviation; and the tactics of combat actions.
An analysis of exercises and maneuvers held in recent years in the
Wet shows that an air operation conducted in the main theater of military
operations at the beginning and in the course of a nuclear offensive may
include: three or more massed strikes by the tactical aviation delivered in
cooperation with strategic aviation; aggressive massed actions during the
period between massed strikes, carried out chiefly by tactical fighters;
and intensive aerial reconnaissance.
There are various alternative ways of carrying out each massed strike;
however, many military specialists believe, and the experience of exercises
has shown, that the most likely actions by tactical aviation during massed
strikes delivered in the zone of a front operating in the main theater of
military operations may be the following:
-- flight by air attack means to targets on one axis in a
zone 100 to 150 kilometers wide;
-- flight by air attack means to targets on two or more axes,
one of which is the main axis;
-- flight by aircraft over a broad front.
As a rule, a massed strike begins with surprise actions by
medium-range ballistic missiles and cruise missiles against airfields and
other important targets. However, there may be cases in which diversionary
groups of aircraft can appear 15 to 20 minutes before the strike for the
purpose of causing our fighters to scramble prematurely.
After the scrambled fighters have returned to their airfields, one can
expect the first wave of the first echelon of tactical fighters to attack
with the task of neutralizing radar stations. At the same time, or
somewhat earlier, ballistic missiles and Mace cruise missiles (from low
altitudes) can hit the airfields. Depending on the situation, up to 120
tactical fighters (groups of four to six aircraft flying primarily at low
altitudes) and 10 to 12 Mace cruise missiles (one launching of a squadron)
can participate in this attack. The attack by the first wave of aircraft
can last up to ten minutes.
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Directly behind the first wave (after an interval of two to three
minutes) a second wave will follow. Its task will be to neutralize
aircraft at airfields that have not been subjected to the strike by
ballistic missiles and cruise missiles. Up to 150 tactical fighters (in
groups of four to eight aircraft) and up to 10 to 12 Matador cruise
missiles can take part in the second wave. The flight altitudes of the
tactical fighters will depend on the distance to the targets: low altitudes
will be used for flights to close targets, and variable flight profiles for
flights to more distant targets. The second wave can also last up to ten
minutes.
Within five to seven minutes after the first echelon, the second
echelon, the so-called air combat echelon, can appear; its task will
include clearing the airspace of those fighters that have been able to take
off to intercept air targets, in order to protect the flight of the third
echelon -- the strategic bombers. The second echelon may include up to 168
tactical fighters (in groups of eight to 12 aircraft at medium and high
altitudes). The remaining tactical fighters and all-weather fighters will
be in a state of readiness to repel enemy aircraft and to provide direct
support for their own ground forces.
The third echelon may contain up to 75 to 100 strategic bombers, and
at the same time there may be a second launching of Mace cruise missiles
against airfields*.
In addition to the above-mentioned air attack means, special aircraft
for active and passive jamming (up to 25 percent of the forces taking part
in the attack) and individual reconnaissance aircraft will be flying as
part of the echelons and groups.
Thus, up to 100 to 150 small groups and individual air targets, flying
at different altitudes and from different directions, can appear in the
course of one to two hours ii a front zone during a massed strike. Up to
30 to 40 percent of these tai gets fly to their targets at maximally
low altitudes.
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*The tactics of actions of strategic aviation are not considered in this
article.
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After massed strikes, tactical aviation usually conducts aggressive
echeloned actions using small groups, and occasionally single aircraft or
pairs of aircraft, against individual targets or installations that have
survived the massed strike or are newly detected. These actions are
carried out both on the inmediate battlefield and in the depth, throughout
the entire radius of operation of the aircraft. In these strikes both
conventional and nuclear means of destruction are used.
According to the experience of exercises, tactical fighters usually
conduct echeloned actions in groups of four to eight aircraft. They break
through the air defense system and enter the target area at both high (nine
to ten thousand meters) and low (approximately 300 meters) altitudes.
Radiotechnical guidance systems are extensively used to bring the aircraft
to the target area. In certain cases, tactical fighters using conventional
ammunition stayed over the target up to 30 minutes and made three or four
passes. The basic method of delivering a strike is to have the entire
group attack simultaneously from a dive. For this purpose, the aircraft
regroup from a "wedge" combat formation to a "front" or "bearing" combat
formation. When the target was not covered by air defense means, the
tactical fighters stayed in a "circle" and each made a separate dive. They
came out of the attack by performing a chandelle and climbing to 1,200 to
2,600 meters. If the target of the actions was covered by enemy fighters,
the tactical fighters divided into two groups; one acted as a strike group
and the other as a covering group.
When using atomic bombs to destroy targets, tactical fighters
operated, as a rule, from low altitudes (100 to 400 meters), toss bombing
from angles of 60 to 90 degrees and from the upside-down
"over-the-shoulder" position.
As a rule, tactical bombers do not conduct echeloned actions during
the daytime. They are used chiefly at night to deliver strikes against
large fixed targets, located primarily in the operational depth. Cruise
missiles are used in basically the same way.
In summing up this question, we may conclude that the tactical
aviation of our probable enemies has rather significant capabilities to
deliver massed strikes in the main theaters of military operations during
operations in the initial period of a war, and uses advanced methods of
combat actions. This undoubtedly can be considered one of its strong
aspects which we should constantly take into consideration. 50X1-HUM
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It should also be kept in mind that under modern conditions the combat
actions of tactical aviation will entail great losses on the ground and in
the air.
On the basis of the experience of the exercise of the combined armed
forces of NATO conducted in the spring of 1959 under the code name MAXIMUM
STRESS, the average daily losses in aviation during the first three days of
the initial period of the war were at least 12 to 15 percent. About 20
percent of the total number of aircraft available at the beginning of
combat actions were lost on the first day, 12 to 15 percent of the total
number available at the end of the first day were lost on the second day,
and up to 10 to 15 percent of the number remaining at the end of the second
day were lost on the third day.
It is believed that as the belligerents' means of combat improve,
losses both on the ground and in the air will increase year after year. In
this respect the maneuvers conducted by the combined armed forces of NATO
in the autumn of 1960 under the code name FALLEX-60 are typical: as a
result of seven days of combat actions, the combined air forces lost up to
80 percent of their tactical aviation, up to 60 percent of their air
defense aviation, and up to 60 percent of their airfield maintenance
equipment.
Such enormous losses are projected primarily because of the increased
strength of the air defense forces and rocket forces of the armed forces of
the socialist camp, and because of the limited capabilities of tactical
aviation in the main theaters of military operations to disperse and to
maneuver from one airfield to another. As an example, we can cite material
taken from exercises of the 2nd Allied Tactical Air Force, which forms part
of the air forces in the Central European Theater of Military Operations
and operates in the zone of the Northern Army Group on the northern coastal
and Ruhr operational axes.
A total of 37 air squadrons are based on the 19 airfields occupied by
this command, an average of one wing per airfield. It is the practice to
disperse the aircraft at the beginning of combat actions, basing no more
than one squadron at each airfield. There are approximately 40 airfields
suitable for use by jet aircraft in the zone of combat actions of the 2nd
Allied Tactical Air Force, and therefore the capability to disperse
available aviation forces and base them by squadron exists. However, there
are no additional airfields essential for moving aircraft away from a
strike by enemy nuclear means. As a result, the main body of the tactical
aviation could be destroyed on the airfields by missiles in the very first
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minutes of the war, slice the first strikes usually are delivered against
all known airfields, r(gardless of whether they are occupied by aircraft at
the time. The lack of a sufficient number of airfields to permit
wide-scale maneuver of aircraft along the front and into the depth, and the
dependence of aircraft on permanent airfields are the weakest aspects of
tactical aviation.
As a general conclusion, one can note that the military commands of
the capitalist states devoting a great deal of attention to the
development of tactical aviation, regarding it as the main striking fire
means of the armed forces in a theater of military operations and equipping
it with the newest means of air attack -- aircraft and cruise missiles, a
large percentage of which are equipped to employ nuclear means of
destruction.
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