MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): PROVIDING SECURITY OF RADIO COMMUNICATIONS WHEN MOVING FORWARD THE TROOPS OF A RESERVE FRONT OVER LONG DISTANCES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP10-00105R000201490001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 16, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 17, 1975
• Content Type: MEMO

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Providing Security of Radio Communications when Moving
Forward. the Troops of- a Reserve I over Long Distances
by
Colonel General of Communications Troops A. Frolov
Colonel. A. Ovchinnikov, and
Engineer Colonel I. Pomashnev
Radio is the primary means of communications and is capable of
satisfying the most important requirements for troop control under the most
difficult conditions. However, at the same time, radio communications is
also the most important source of information for the enemy. Therefore,
coming to the forefront, along with the need to provide reliability of
radio communications, are problems concerning the security of radio
communications. This security determines the viability of command posts,
the degree to which radio communications are protected against enemy
jamming, and, as a result -- the reliability of control.
In order to adopt a sound decision for the organization of radio
communications and to establish the radio traffic routine, it is not enough
to evaluate, from the qualitative aspect only, the capabilities of enemy
radio reconnaissance. Such an evaluation, even of the same conditions, may
often lead to completely opposite views, thereby influencing the routine
adopted: from a complete prohibition. of transmitting operations by radio
means to a permission to operate without any restrictions whatsoever. In
the first case, troop control is significantly impaired; and in the second
case, the enemy is given the opportunity of obtaining important
information, thereby- adversely affecting the success of combat operations.
Therefore special quantitative methods of evaluating enemy radio
reconnaissance capabilities are required.
This article examines the methodology for quantitatively evaluating
the security of shortwave radio coniLazi.cations and also lists some data
which will allow the commands of operational formations and large units to
adopt sound decisions concerning the e to .lent of radio communications for
control of the troops of a reserve . when moving them orwar over a
Tong distance. 50X1-HUM
The experience gained from a series of command-staff exercises and war
games on maps conducted by the troops and by military academies over the
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last five to six years shows that starting from the moment the troops of a
border military district which is being deployed as a front are alerted,
troop control must ensure the accomplishment of a number of difficult
tasks. These include refinement of the tasks of the troops, control of the
forward movement so as to accomplish it in the shortest possible time while
retaining the combat effectiveness of the troops, and organizing commitment
of the troops to action, etc.
Control of the troops of a reserve front when they are accomplishing
assigned tasks, is carried out from the command post, the forward command
post, and the rear control post. The complexity of troop control during
this period is caused by the following: by the need to provide continuous
control throughout the entire depth of the zone of movement and also after
the troops are committed to action; by troop control difficulties which
arise when control posts of a front, of armies, and of large units
subordinate to the front are on the move; by the requirement to ensure the
security -- from all types of enemy reconnaissance -- of both the movement
forward of the troops and the areas where troops are concentrated and
prepared for commitment to action; and lastly, by the diversity of the
tasks of troop control.
In view of these difficulties, there has arisen a need, in addition,
.to detach operations groups of the front which can be deployed at the
national border and major water obstacles and also in the final
concentration area for the front troops.
The front command post and forward command post can be relocated by
"leapfrogging : one of them is moved forward ahead of time with the
calculation of leaving the troops, as a rule, a day's march behind.
Control posts of the armies can be relocated by "successive displacement":
the forward command post is moved forward and provides control from its
position during the first day's march, the command post is moved with the
troops of the army and then is set up in the area of that day's halt some
distance away from the forward command post, and then the forward command
post again is moved forward.
To provide control when the troops of the reserve front are moving
forward, taking into account the above-indicated condition's f movement and
deployment of control posts, it is possible to employ all means of
communications: wire, radio-relay, messenger means, and radio.
However, wire and radio-relay means organic to front and army
communications units can be used only in areas of a day's halt. They are
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essential for setting up a communications system during the commitment of
the troops of the front to action and during the course of combat
operations.
Wire channels of the state communications systems of the USSR and the
people's democracies -- used primarily for communications between the
organs of the Military Transportation Service, or the road traffic control
areas, and the operations groups, and also between operations groups and
the control posts of the front -- may be allocated to the front within its
zone of movement. To provide wire communications with troop columns within
the zone of movement it will be necessary to set up telephone points every
50 to 70 kilometers on each of the through routes. From 1,000 to 1,500
military communications personnel will be required at the front level to
service these points and to staff the communications komen aturas of the
stationary communications centers which are allocating the above-mentioned
channels. In addition, a considerable quantity of personnel and cable
means will be needed to lay connecting lines from stationary communications
centers to telephone points and also to operations groups or to control
posts of the front. It is extremely difficult to prepare a wire
communications system in the short time period before the movement forward
of the troops begins. If a system like this one is prepared beforehand, it
can be damaged to a considerable degree when combat operations are
initiated and too much time will be required to restore it.
Naturally, messenger means of communications will be widely used to
control troops while they are moving forward. However, it is apparent that
these means will not be able to make up for the lack of other
communications means.
All of the enumerated factors lead one to the conclusion that in a
complex operational situation radio is the primary means of communications
for providing control of the troops off a reservefront when they are moving
forward over long distances. During this period, ra io communications must
above all satisfy, along with other requirements, requirements for
reliability and speed in the passage of information throughout the overall
communications system. It is also very important to satisfy, in the
interest of security of communications, radio camouflage requirements,
which impose severe restrictions on the operation of radio communications
means and result in decreased reliability in radio communications and
reduced speed in transmitting information. 50X1-HUM
Radio camouflage measures are determined with consideration of enemy
radio reconnaissance capabilities. An analysis of these capabilities in
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range of detection and in accuracy of location by direction finding of our
radio and radio-relay sets, allows us to arrive at the following
conclusions.
First, operation by reflected wave of R-102M2 and R-118M3 shortwave
radio sets can be reconnoitered by the enemy throughout the entire depth of
the front zone of movement; operation by ground wave (on frequencies below
lowest applicable frequencies -- within the 1.5 to 2 megahertz band) can be
reconnoitered from distances of 200 to 250 kilometers under ordinary
conditions, and from distances of 300 to 400 kilometers when there are
high-altitude nuclear bursts. Therefore transmissions by reflected wave
should, as a rule, be forbidden or restricted and transmissions by ground
wave should be permitted only with consideration for the operating range of
enemy radio reconnaissance. Transmissions by shortwave radio sets on radio
links using secure communications devices should, as a rule, be forbidden
since this type of operation is a typical reconnaissance indicator of
communications centers of operational formations. During a period when the
troops are moving forward, radio sets should operate only in an
amplitude-modulated, continuous-wave telegraphy mode.
Second, the enemy's range of assured reconnaissance of our R-104M and
R-112 radio sets operating by ground wave with the four-meter whip antenna
in the daytime is 30 to 40 kilometers and at night is 20 to 25 kilometers;
when there are high-altitude nuclear bursts it averages 60 to 80
kilometers; and when operating by space wave it is from 200 to 1,000
kilometers (depending on the altitude of the F-layer). Despite this, the
cited radio sets may be permitted to operate while front troops are moving
forward since the enemy will not be able, on the basis of operational
reconnaissance indicators, to determine their subordination from among the
large number of radio sets of these types which are in the hands of front
troops (2,500 to 3,000 sets). Furthermore, the operation of these radio
sets will mask the activities of R-102M2 and R-118M3 radio sets since there
are only several tens of them in front and army radio nets and they
transmit in the same amplitude-modulated telegraphy mode as R-104M and
R-112 sets.
Third, from the ground the enemy can have assured reconnaissance of
our R-105 radio sets equipped with amplifier units and operating on
ten-meter whip antennas, from a distance of 40 to 50 kilometers; assured
reconnaissance of those operating on four-meter whip antennas, from a
distance of 25 to 30 kilometers; and assured reconnaissance of those
operating without amplifier units, from 15 to 18 kilometers away.
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The range of assured reconnaissance from the ground of R-401M and
R-405 radio-relay sets operating on the main, side, and back lobes of their
antenna radiation pattern amounts to 50 to 80 kilometers; and of the R-400M
and R-404 sets operating on main lobes it is 60 to 70 kilometers, on side
lobes it is 30 to 40 kilometers, and on back lobes it is 25 to 30
kilometers. The range at which the enemy can detect ultra-shortwave radio
sets and lightweight radio-relay sets increases as reconnaissance equipment
is borne higher up into the air. Under these conditions, however, when
R-400M and R-404 sets are operating on the back lobes of their antenna
radiation pattern, the range at which they can be detected does not
increase for all practical purposes.
Thus, ultra-shortwave R-105 sets and all types of radio-relay sets can
be allowed to operate when they are 100 to 150 kilometers or more away from
the national border since they cannot be detected by enemy ground
reconnaissance means. In addition, when these sets are reconnoitered by
airborne means a considerable amount of time is required to carry out this
reconnaissance, and linear errors in direction finding will amount to
approximately plus or minus 30 kilometers. There is no doubt that
transmissions by ultra-shortwave, low-power shortwave, and radio-relay
radio sets are permissible only by strictly adhering to communications
discipline and regulations for secure troop control.
Taking into consideration enemy reconnaissance capabilities, these are
the basic recommendations which can be proposed concerning the use of
ultra-shortwave, radio-relay, and low-power, and medium-power shortwave
radio sets operating by ground wave.
Reliability of radio communications when troops of a reserve front are
moving orwar will be achieved primarily in those instances where the
operating range of radio sets matches the distance at which it is
necessary, in the majority of cases, to maintain radio communications.
When the front command post and forward command post are relocated by
"leapfrogging"t,, he distance between one of these in position and the
control posts of armies and large units subordinate to the front will
fluctuate between 80 and 400 kilometers. The operating range of R-102M2
and R-118M3 radio sets operating by ground wave, a mode which can be used
in accordance with the requirements for radio camouflage, is, in summer,
100 to 150 kilometers in the daytime and 60 to 90 kilometers at night; in
winter, it is 110 to 180 kilometers in the daytime and 80 to 110 kilometers
at night. 50X1-HUM
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From the data presented it follows that the operating range of radio
sets adhering to radio camouflage measures will not ensure that direct
control over troop movement can be exercised from the command post or
forward command post of the reserve front. This situation makes it
necessary to use the communications systems of the organs of the road
traffic control service and the Military Transportation Service, and of
operations groups. However, it is necessary to keep in mind that even when
time and means are available to set up a road traffic control service radio
communications system, its transmitting capacity remains rather low. This
feature may lead to intolerable delays in transmitting information about
the progress of troop moves to control posts and in transmitting
instructions to march column chiefs. Therefore, at present, a road traffic
control radio communications system, when it is providing control over
march columns, can be looked upon as merely an auxiliary system.
Efforts to use operations groups for direct control over troop
columns, bypassing road traffic control service organs, run up against the
same difficulties. When there are three front operations groups which have
been separately dispatched ahead of time to the national border zone, to a
large water obstacle, and to the final concentration area, the distances
between them may range from 400 to 500 kilometers or more, and between any
of them and the front troop columns the distances may range from 250 to 300
kilometers, whicR-aTso prevents continuous shortwave radio communications
by ground wave.
In the future, when not only operations groups but also auxiliary
communications centers of the General Staff and. communications centers of
communications system are use to control troops of a reserve
front moving forward, a system of base radio communications centers,
operating by ground wave, may be established to maintain communications
with control posts of the front and of armies and troop columns. The
capability of operating base radio communications centers by ground wave
can be achieved by having six to eight base radio communications centers in
the zone of movement, when the distance between centers is 200 to 500
kilometers and the distance from troop columns and the control posts of the
armies to the nearest base radio communications center is 100 to 150
kilometers.
At the given distances it is also possible to use ultra-shortwave "t_W
radio communications. For this purpose it is necessary to have R-972 50X1-HUM
helicopter-borne communications centers at the base radio communications
centers. When a helicopter rises to an altitude of 1,500 to 2,000 meters,
the R-105 radio sets found in these helicopters can provide reliable radio
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communications with ground sets of the same type at distances from 150 to
180 kilometers. When the communications range is 100 kilometers, it will
suffice to have the helicopter go up to an elevation of 400 meters. Enemy
ground radio reconnaissance can detect the operation of helicopter-borne
radio sets, but at ranges of 80 to 100 kilometers and more the operation of
ground radio sets will not be detected.
However, it is necessary to keep in mind that it is not always
possible to ensure the security of front shortwave radio communications by
utilizing ground waves alone. Thus, in wT :ntertime, especially at night, the
lowest applicable frequencies are those below 1.5 megahertz, i.e., those
lying outside the frequency band limits of R-102M2 and R-118M3 radio sets.
In this case the use of whip antennas merely degrades the quality of
communications, and the radio sets will be reconnoitered by the enemy.
In this connection there arises the necessity for a quantitative
evaluation of enemy capabilities to reconnoiter the shortwave radio sets
located at the control posts of the front, the armies, and operations
groups, and operating by reflected wave. This evaluation will vary in
accordance with the operating routines of the radio sets and the volume of
information the radio sets transmit.
When evaluating the security of shortwave radio sets operating by
reflected wave, the range and the accuracy of direction finding of enemy
radio reconnaissance have to be considered, as do also the presence of
reconnaissance indicators and time parameters (duration) of the emissions
of our own radio sets.
When developing methods of evaluating the security of the operation of
the shortwave radio communications of the operational level of control, we
used the following basic data:
-- to conduct radio reconnaissance the enemy uses a shortwave radio
reconnaissance site, drawn from the complement of an Army Security Agency
group and located 40 to 60 kilometers away from the national border or the
line of contact of the opposing sides; a similar site may be set up 200 to
250 kilometers away in the second echelon. These sites obtain
direction-finding data upon request or provide synchronous direction
finding. The shortwave radio reconnaissance site is made up of 60 to 75
search and tracking posts and up to 15 receiver-indicator direction-finding
sets borne by receiver-indicator vehicles of radio reconnaissance;
-- in the operation of R-102M2, R-118M3, and R-103M front troop radio
sets, at distances of up to 300 to 500 kilometers the average width of the 50X1-HUM
reflected wave band segment lying between lowest applicable frequency and
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maximum applicable frequency ranges from 2 to 8 megahertz;
-- to hamper enemy radio reconnaissance efforts all radio sets are to
operate in the amplitude-modulated, continuous-wave telegraphy mode, but
the range of the radio reconnaissance covers the entire zone of movement of
the front troops;
-Meld direction finders have a built-in technical angle error in
direction finding that is on the order of AT O= ? 1 - 2?, and a practical
operating angle error that averages A n ? = (1.5 - 2) A T ? ; and the magnitude
of the linear error in direction finding (in kilometers) can be determined
approximately by the formula L = 0.042R (where R = radio reconnaissance
range in kilometers);
-- the durations of single emissions by army and front radio sets
during the period when the troops are moving forward were established as
equaling 1 to 2, 2 to 4, 3 to 9, 6 to 12, and 12 to 24 minutes; the average
duration of the main bulk of emissions was 4 to 6 minutes;
-- allowance was made for band loading by distant emissions in the
radio frequency range and also by the emissions of sets being
reconnoitered, enemy radio sets, and radio sets ahead of the active front.
We developed a model of the shortwave radio reconnaissance site in
operation during the search period when there is a relatively reduced load
on each radio reconnaissance post and the duration of emission by the radio
sets being reconnoitered was long enough to permit the enemy to carry out
radio reconnaissance by the "traverse" method (monitoring a limited number
of detected frequencies).
Data obtained from the model will permit solving practical problems in
evaluatin the security of radio communications after an officer of a
communications directorate, section, or unit, w o is making calculations,
becomes convinced that a particular radio set can be detected by enemy
radio reconnaissance and located with sufficient accuracy by direction
finding. Such problems include the following.
Determination of the probability that a radio set operating by single
transmissions can be reconnoitered (Pm). An approximate determination can
be made by using the formula
P tr - A T P
Tnp
(when tr < Tnp ),
(1)
where tr is the average duration of a single emission by the radio set;
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AT is the average time necessary to identify a radio set and locate
it by direction finding;
P is the operating reliability of the direction-finding net;
.p is the average retuning time for a search post receiver within
Tn
its assigned segment of the frequency band.
AT=ti+t2+t3+At ,
where tl is the average time spent by the radio reconnaissance operator in
preliminary monitoring and identification of the set (determining the type
of operation of the set);
t2 is the average waiting time for the direction finder;
t3 is the average time spent by the local direction finder in fixing
the set by direction finding;
t3 + At is the average time spent by the direction-finding net in fixing
the set by direction finding.
The value of AT , obtained on an electronic computer by modeling the
enemy's radio reconnaissance system, amounts to 1.5 minutes for synchronous
systems and to two minutes for non-synchronous systems. The magnitude of Tnp
was also determined by modeling on an electronic computer and amounts to 18
minutes approximately. The given data may be used for approximate
calculations by formula (1).
The probability that a radio station can be reconnoitered is
determined by formula (1) by assuming that the instants of entry of the
enemy's reconnoitering receiver onto frequencyf [1] and the instants when
our station begins to operate on this frequency are not correlated random
events, but that the process in its entirety is fixed. These conditions are
fulfilled if the radio set is transmitting for the first time,or after it
shifts radio operating data,and does not have characteristic reconnaissance
indicators.
Determination of the number N of periods of transmission over which a
radio set can be reconnoitere wit probability The magnitude of N can
be calculated by the formula
log (1-d)
log (1-PM)
(2)
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For convenience in calculations a table may be drawn up to permit
determining N according to the values assigned to d and PM.
Determination of the time re uired to reconnoiter a radio set with a
prescribed reliability -- a reliability obtainable over N periods of
transmission -- can be done by the formula
Td = N (tr + t5) ,
(3)
where is is the time interval between periods of transmission.
When the values of security of communications and the number of
periods of transmission are given, the duration of a single emission of a
radio set can be determined by the formula
tr = (1- Vi - d) Tnp + AT.
p
(4)
When the operating routine is given for each of the M radio sets of
the communications center, and there is a requirement to determine the
probability P that the enemy will not reconnoiter during the time of
operation more than m radio sets out of the M sets and will not obtain a
reconnaissance indicator of a command ost,.then Table 1 is used to permit
determining M (m)in accordance with the calculated value of
X m - Md
Md(1-d)
Table 1 also permits solving other problems in calculating the
security of a radio communications system.
As a result of solving the above-mentioned problems in evaluating the
security of front and army shortwave radio communications used to control
the troops ofa reserve front moving forward over a long distance, one can
then offer the following practical recommendations:
-- to evaluate the security of radio communications when an order or
report with a specific number of text groups and priority level must be
transmitted without fail despite the fact that it is a period in which the
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use of radio communications is restricted in accordance with the conditions
of the situation;
-- to calculate the amount of information, coming in from staff
sections, which can be transmitted during a specific time period over
shortwave radio channels, when the level of radio communications security
has been strictly prescribed due to the requirements of radio camouflage.
Under these conditions non-priority information can be transmitted on
shortwave radio channels only upon instructions from the chief of staff;
-- to establish and then report to the chief of staff the periods
during which a given volume of non-priority information can be transmitted
to large units (units), allowing for the prescribed security and the status
of radio communications;
-- to evaluate the security of the operation of radio groups at
communications centers of control posts of operational formations when
radio means are operating unrestrictedly or to make calculations to
determine the restrictions to be placed on radio communications loading
with a given degree of security of the radio communications of the control
posts and with consideration of the time the latter are to be in a
particular area;
-- to calculate how effectively enemy radio reconnaissance has been
deceived by the operation of communications means at dummy control posts
deployed in accordance with the plan of operational camouflage;
-- to calculate the probability of enemy reconnaissance detecting our
radio communications and jamming them at the start of combat operations,
and also to evaluate our capabilites to jam enemy radio means.
To solve the problem of quantitatively evaluating the security of
radio communications, a problem which is very important not only when front
troops are moving forward but also when troops are engaged in all types
routine and combat activities, the authors of this article have sought to
apply the statistical sampling method using an electronic computer. The
results of this research should undergo verification in practice and
further improvement from the standpoint of refining the systems and their 50X1-HUM
methods of functioning, and also refining the initial data under various
situational conditions.
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Table 1 values of P M (m) as a function of X
PM (m)
-2.5 0.006
-2.4 0.008
-2.3 0.011
-2.2 0.014
-2.1 0.018
-2 0.023
-1.9 0.029
-1.8 0.036
-1.7 0.045
-1.6 0.055
-1.5 0.067
-1.4 0.081
-1.3 0.097
-1.2 0.115
-1.1 0.136
-1 0.159
-0.9 0.184
P M (m) I x
0.212
0.242
0.274
0.308
0.345
0.382
0.421
0.46
0.58
0.62
0.655
0.69
0.72
0.73
0.79
2.3
P M (m)
0.82
0.84
0.864
0.885
0.92
0.93
0.945
0.955
0.964
0.97
0.977
0.982
0.986
0.989
0.992
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