MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS OF A FRONT TO THE ENTIRE DEPTH OF A THEATER OF MILITARY OPERATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP10-00105R000201480001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 16, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 14, 1975
• Content Type: MEMO

fnx1 -HI Ind
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
MEMJRANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): Offensive Operations
of a Front to the tire Depth of a Theater
of Military Operations
1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is part of a
series now in preparation based on the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense
publication Collection of Articles of the Journal "Milita Thou ht". This
article proceeds from a brief examination o capabilities and intentions in the European theater in assessing front tasks and
capabilities in offensive operations to a depth 7 7,-000 kilometers or
more. The authors describe the role of strategic means, naval and air
defense forces, long range aviation and ground forces elements in
developing a single offensive operation to the depth of a theater. The
requirements for nuclear warheads and other ammunition and materiel are
examined within the context of a deen offensive, This article a e red in
Issue No. 2 72 for 1964.
2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive, this
document should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within recipient
agencies For of reference, re its from this publication have been
assigned
William a on
Deputy Director for T rations;
Page 1 of 19 Pages
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The Director of Central Intelligence
The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Assistant to the Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Department of the Army
Director of Naval Intelligence
Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
U. S. Air Force
Director, National Security Agency
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Deputy Director for Science and Technology
Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence
for National Intelligence Officers
Director of Strategic Research
Director of Weapons Intelligence
Pa e 2 of 19 Pages
To~
P ET
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COUNTRY USSR
DATE OF
INFO. Mid-1964
Intelligence Information Special Report
Page 3 of 19 Pages
DATE14 November 1975
MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): Offensive Operations of a Front to the
tire Depth of a Theater of Military Operations
SOURCE Documentary
Summa :
The following report is a translation from Russian of an article which
appeared in Issue No. 2 (72) for 1964 of the SECRET USSR Ministry of
Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal 'Military
Thought". The authors of -this art icle areColonel General v and
ene al -Mayor V. Yemelin. This article proceeds from a brief examination
o7 NATO capabilities and intentions in the European theater in assessing
front tasks and capabilities in offensive operations to a depth of 2,000
kilometers or more. The authors describe the role of strategic means,
naval and air defense forces, long range aviation and ground forces
elements in developing a single offensive operation to the depth of a
theater. Within that single front operation, there may be immediate,
subsequent and further tasks wiwhich may be accomplished by successive army
operations. The requirements for nuclear warheads and other ammunition and
materiel are examined within the context of a deep offensive.
End of Summary
Headquarters Comment: 50x1-HUM
Ivan Semenovich h Glebov had been identified as a professor at the
Academy of the General Staff since 1965. V. Yemelin was identified in Red
Star in February 1968 as receiving the award of Hero of the Soviet Union.
Comments on this article by Colonel A. Vol ov,
opposed to the successive army operations favored by the authors, were
contained in
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Offensive Operations of a Front to the Entire Depth of
a Theater of Military erations
by
Colonel General I. Glebov
General-Mayor V. Yemelin
Soviet military art has always devoted much attention to the conduct
of deep offensive operations, looking upon them as the most important form
of decisively routing an enemy.
The theory of a deep operation, developed in the 1930's and employed
brilliantly in World War II, was based on exploiting all the power and
operating range of the means of destruction available to a front --
artillery, aircraft, and particularly the shock power and maneuverability
of tanks, which were used primarily for exploitation of success. Under
these conditions, when a front could count only on its own forces, the
depth of a front offensive operation ranged from 200 to 300 kilometers.
After World War II (before our armed forces were equipped with nuclear
weapons), as a result of the complete motorization of the army, the
increased operating range of aircraft, the extended range of artillery, and
the equipping of our forces with tanks having improved combat
characteristics, it became possible to increase the depth of a front
offensive operation up to 400 or 500 kilometers. But this dept
formerly, was based on the use of only those means available to a front.
The adoption into service of missile/nuclear weapons and other modern
military equipment when radical changes occurred in the building of armed
forces and in the nature of armed combat established fundamentally new
conditions for the conduct of front offensive operations whose depth now is
not based solely on the combat capabilities of front troops. These
conditions may be revealed most fully in a strategic operation in a theater
of military operations where the tasks of routing an enemy are achieved by
the joint efforts of all branches of the armed forces, with the strategic
rocket forces having the decisive role.
The fundamental factors which determine the conditions for conducting
a front offensive operation to the entire depth of a theater are: strikes
by strategic means, operations by the navy (when the front is attacking on
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a coastal axis), combat actions by Air Defense Forces of the Country and
the airborne troops, the combat capabilities of the front, the nature of
enemy actions, and also the characteristics of the t efi ater of military
operations. All of these are closely interrelated and interdependent.
This relationship is manifested most fully in the correlation between the
nature of enemy actions and the other factors. Therefore we consider it
expedient, when examining the influence of the aforementioned factors on
the organization and conduct of a front offensive operation, to initiate it
precisely with an analysis of probable enemy actions, and above all, of his
"nuclear attack".
According to the experience of a number of exercises conducted by the
NATO command in recent years concerned with the European Theater of
Military Operations, during a nuclear attack in the zone of the front from
250 to 350 nuclear warheads may be employed. In so doing, three percent of
the delivery means participating in the nuclear attack have a range from
140 to 320 kilometers, 76 percent have a range of 400 kilometers or more,
and 21 percent have a range exceeding 700 kilometers. Aircraft, comprising
80 percent of all the means of employing nuclear weapons, are still the
primary delivery means.
Therefore, if the enemy succeeds in carrying out a surprise nuclear
attack, estimates show that up to 50 percent of the front's troops may be
subjected to his strikes and will find themselves isolated from the
interior of the country in the very first hours of a war. Consequently, so
that a front may successfully conduct an operation, the enemy's nuclear
attack must be disrupted at the very inception of war. But obviously a
front is not in a position to accomplish such a task solely with its own
oorces.
Based on the ground forces groupings of NATO, the enemy is capable in
the first days of a war of opposing an attacking front with 17 to 25
divisions, that is, with approximately as many as t ere will be in the
front's composition, and subsequently could augment with as many again by
transferring large units from national commands and from other continents.
Therefore it is necessary, at the initiation of military actions, to
inflict a decisive defeat on the enemy's ground forces groupings and
achieve superiority over them, and then prevent him from rel
As
for the second task, its accomplishment requires actions by the strategic
rocket forces and the navy.
At present, and to a greater degree than in the past, the actions of
an enemy fleet can affect the conduct of a front offensive operation. As
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J Ufl_L IIUIU
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Page 6 of 19 F5OX1-HUM
In fulfilling specific tasks, naval strike forces will apparently be
used to a wide extent to deliver strikes against troop groupings and
important operational-strategic targets in land sectors. This has been
corroborated by the FALLEX-60 exercise, where more than nine-tenths of all
nuclear warheads were used by carrier strike large units to destroy targets
in the land portion of the theater at distances of 500 to 600 kilometers
from the coast. Thus, unless these strike forces are destroyed or at least
decisively hit, the offensive of the fronts may be gravely impaired. 5OX1-HUM
f
is very i ticuit~ a r e, f
such a deep enemy air de e nse system in a theater of military operations.
As a result of this brief examination of the possible composition of
the enemy and the nature of his actions, we may conclude that the offensive
of a front to the entire depth of a theater of military operations will be
successful only if the enemy is decisively struck in the theater by
strategic means with the participation of naval forces and front-area
formations of the Air Defense Forces of the Country.
Strikes by strategic means must: destroy the enemy's strategic as
well as operational-tactical means of nuclear attack located beyond the
range of front missiles and aircraft; strike his principal groupings of
armed forces and reserves in the interior of the theater; destroy
governmental and military control organs, major naval and rear area bases,
and military-economic targets; and disrupt all types of transportation;
i.e., accomplish the main tasks of routing the enemy. 5OX1-HUM
TOP CRET
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The next important condition for a successful front offensive into the
entire depth of a theater of military operations will he the timely
destruction by strategic means of the enemy's main ground forces groupings
and his new contingents and reserves located in the central areas and main
part of the theater beyond the range of front means. We believe that
putting out of action at least half of time -complement of these groupings
will be sufficient for a front to successfully develop its attack in the
depth of a theater. It is also important for strategic means to destroy
the enemy's governmental and military control posts in a theater of
military operations, which deprives him of the opportunity of carrying out
organized nuclear strikes with his remaining means of attack against forces
of the attacking front and also of using his surviving troop groupings,
including air defense troops, to counteract the offensive. Destroying and
demolishing the enemy's principal air defense installations, naval bases,
ports, and rear installations will give rise to a corresponding freedom of
action for front and naval aviation, it will lead to a disruption of the
enemy's measures to reinforce his troops at the expense of other theaters
of military operations and continents, and furthermore, it will disrupt the
organized supplying of his forces with all necessities.
Strikes against the enemy's military-economic centers naturally will
result in colossal casualties among the population. Estimates indicate
that small countries having an area slightly greater than 30 thousand
square kilometers with an average population density of 150 to 500 persons
per square kilometer, and in some areas of 1,000 to 3,000 persons per
square kilometer, may lose an average of 25 percent of their population as
the result of a strike by approximately five one-megaton warheads.
Consequently, right after the first strikes by strategic means, several
countries in the enemy camp may be forced to withdraw from the war.
Thus, the successful fulfilment of tasks by the strategic means will
be the decisive condition for a front to conduct an offensive operation to
the entire depth of the theater. So that a front may fulfil its task of
routing an opposing enemy grouping in a short period of time, it will be
TOP
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advisable to deliver the nuclear strikes of strategic means as near as
possible to its own troops.
For the nom, the most important task will be to destroy the enemy's
carrier large units and his missile-carrying submarines and surface ships.
Destroying even 50 percent of the forces of the carrier strike large units
may cause the enemy to give up striking at front troops or at least may
make him use an extremely limited number of nuclear warheads for this
purpose. The navy must also cut off the theater of military operations
from the influx of fresh forces and means from other theaters and
continents, and especially from the bringing in of nuclear weapons.
The Air Defense Forces of the Count can exert immediate effect on a
frontoffensive by the actions of t eh it front-area large units and
Tor-nations; as these accomplish the task of covering installations in the
interior of the country, they can, at the same time and in cooperation with
the field air defense, fulfil the tasks of covering troop groupings and
rear installations of the attacking front. Estimates indicate that a
front-area formation of the Air Defense Forces of the Country will
approximately double the capabilities of a front to repel enemy air
attacks.
The combat capabilities of the troops of a front of present-day
organization are characterized first of all by the presence of powerful
missile/nuclear weapons and the high mobility of the combined-arms and tank
armies, by the ability to inflict heavy losses on the enemy with chemical
and conventional means of destruction employed by aircraft, artillery, and
tanks, and also by the increased capabilities for supporting an operation.
In the front rocket troops, including the organic missile large units
and units of thethree combined-arms armies and one tank army, with a total
of 20 to 25 divisions, there are up to 100 launchers which are capable of
simultaneously employing 100 nuclear warheads with a total yield of 2,650
to 3,100 kilotons to a depth of 400 to 500 kilometers. With such a nuclear
strike we can destroy 20 to 25 batteries (battalions) of enemy
operational-tactical missile launchers, 65 to 70 percent of the personnel
of eight to ten divisions, and destroy or demolish the principal control
posts and rear installations of an army group.
Upon the initiation of military actions, front rocket troops may be
used entirely (excluding the tactical missiles of reserve and
second-echelon divisions) to rout an opposing enemy grouping to the entire
depth of its disposition. However, taking into consideration that only a
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minor portion of a front's missiles have a range greater than 250
kilometers, it is advisable to entrust strategic means with the
responsibility of destroying targets at such a depth.
The capabilities of a. front air army permit it to use up to SO nuclear
warheads with a total yield of over 5,000 kilotons in a single sortie.
With conventional warheads it is capable of delivering a bomb strike of 250
to 650 tons, and by using chemical weapons, it can destroy enemy personnel
in an area of approximately 200 square kilometers. In doing so, its depth
of action ranges up to 300 kilometers for fighter-bomber aircraft and up to
800 kilometers for bomber aircraft. The relatively limited penetration
capabilities of front aviation can be compensated for by including TU-16
aircraft in its composition.
The maneuver actions of front troops acquire special importance for a
front offensive operation to Me -entire depth of a theater.
These maneuver actions are based on the timely and full use of all the
power and long range of nuclear, chemical, and conventional means of
destruction, and also on the high mobility of rocket troop large units
(units), aviation large units (units), combined-arms large units, air
defense troops, and other branch arms and services. The nature of highly
maneuverable actions under present-day conditions is: the organization and
conduct of nuclear strikes in the shortest permissible periods of time to
accomplish the principal tasks; the conduct of an offensive by troops in
the wake of these strikes at the highest possible rates of speed; the
timely advance and shifting of all other forces and means, exploiting their
march capabilities to the limit when necessary; and also the rapid
deployment and shifting of troops from certain dispositions to others in
conformity with the situation that has developed.
Maneuver is an integral part of the essence of an offensive operation.
Precisely because of this, an offensive operation is defined as the sum
total of the nuclear strikes of rocket troops and front aviation to the
entire depth of the enemy's operational disposition, and of the actions of
forces exploiting the results of the nuclear strikes by strategic and
operational-tactical means with the aim of rapidly completing the
destruction of the opposing enemy and speedily developing the offensive to
a great depth. In an offensive operation, maneuver is a means of
fulfilling tasks more rapidly. Maneuver is used to concentrate efforts on
routing the enemy's main groupings and on advancing front troops rapidly to
the entire depth of the theater of military operations.
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In accordance with requirements of the Ministry of Defense, 90 percent
of the tanks of motorized rifle and tank large units are kept with a
minimum mileage reserve of 2,000 kilometers. This will permit a front to
conduct an offensive operation to a depth of 1,000 kilometers or more, but
does not ensure that it will be able to develop it to the entire depth of a
theater of military operations when this depth ranges from 2,000 to 2,500
kilometers.
The capability of conducting an operation to such depths can be
achieved by carrying out a number of measures, with the following being
fundamental, in our view: firstly, by fully equipping the large units
designated to develop success to the entire depth of the theater of
military operations with latest model tanks having the appropriate mileage
reserve; secondly,fl y organizing in a timely manner during the operation
the delivery and replacement of tank tracks for the large units which have
been designated to develop the offensive and which have been fully equipped
with tanks having a 2,000-kilometer mileage reserve (true, this measure
requires involving a large number of transport vehicles to haul the tracks,
which will not always be possible, and therefore there is no guarantee that
these latter will be delivered to the troops in a timely manner); and
thirdly, by redesigning and modernizing tracks to provide tanks with an
increased mileage reserve of fromt3,500 to 4,500 kilometers
If the air defense troops of the front have in their complement up to
eight medium-range ("S") surface-to-air missile regiments, approximately
twenty short-range ('If") surface-to-air missile battalions, more than ten
separate antiaircraft artillery regiments (57-mm), and the corresponding
radiotechnical units, in a single firing cycle of the surface-to-air
missile units employing nuclear warheads and one firing of the antiaircraft
artillery expending 1.5 units of fire, they can destroy up to 230 enemy
aircraft and cruise missiles. These capabilities are increased when the
ZSU-23-4 and ZSU-57-2 gun mounts available in large units participate in
repelling enemy air attacks. By using 50 percent of these mounts, an
additional 50 to 60 air targets can be destroyed.
Thus, if we assume that the enemy nuclear attack will not prove to
have been broken up and that from 800 to 1,300 of his aircraft will be
operating in the front's zone, then front air defense troops, jointly with
the front-area formations of the Air Dense Forces of the Country, will be
able to destroy up to 65 to 70 percent of the aforementioned aircraft. But
if approximately 50 percent of the enemy's aircraft are destroyed by the
strikes of strategic means, then an attack by the remaining forces of our
air enemy can be repelled successfully. Therefore, to prevent the serious
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effects of enemy air power against front troops, we must inflict a decisive
defeat on his tactical, carrier-based, and strategic aircraft by the
strikes of our strategic rocket forces, naval forces, and long range
aviation.
To exploit the results of the nuclear strikes delivered deep in the
enemy defense, to develop combat actions in this depth, and to develop an
attack at high rates of speed in the zone of advance of the front, we can
use tactical and multi-force operational airborne landings, with the latter
type of landings often used by order of the Supreme High Command.
Tactical landing forces will be landed according to the front troop
commander's decision at the depth of the task of the day. Opera nal
landing forces may be dropped in areas to be possibly arrived at within two
to three days by attacking forces, and major landing forces may be dropped
in those areas which will be arrived at within three to four days by the
forward large units of a front's first echelon. It is most expedient to
use these airborne landings wF le completing an immediate task or after
fulfilling it, when the enemy will have been disorganized and his air
defenses demolished.
The means of destruction available to fronts and their combat
capabilities as a whole allow us at present to conduct offensive operations
to depths of up to 1,000 kilometers or more. However, in this
circumstance, fronts will not be exploiting fully the results of the combat
actions of other -forces and means, and primarily the results of nuclear
strikes by the strategic rocket forces and long range aviation. To exploit
the results of strikes of the strategic rocket forces on axes where the
depth of the theater of military operations amounts to 2,000 kilometers or
more, that is, which considerably exceeds our accepted depth for a front
offensive operation (1,000 kilometers), our theory of operational art
envisions that fronts will conduct two, and possibly three, successive
offensive operations without pause, as occurred frequently in World War II,
or that reserve fronts will be used to develop an offensive to the entire
depth of the theater. It is also assumed that under certain aspects of the
situation, the entry of front troops into the central areas of a theater,
that is, the conduct of a gsinle offensive operation to a depth of 1,000
kilometers, may predetermine the outcome of an entire operation in a
theater of military operations. However, it is obvious that it is hardly
possible to accept these factors as being the rule in modern war.
Examining the basic recommendations of our theory on developing an
offensive to the entire depth of a theater (conducting successive
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operations and using fronts which are moving forward from the interior), we
cannot help noticing, first, that in their essence, these recommendations
do not orient fronts -- from the very inception of combat actions by a
first echelon -- toward the full utilization of their combat capabilities
to carry out an offensive to the entire depth of a theater. These
recommendations mechanically transfer World War II experience to
present-day conditions and establish grounds for having fronts conduct
successive methodical actions, rather than highly mobile a tc ions pushing
forward to the maximum possible depth. Secondly, there is no assurance
whatsoever that under conditions of a mutual use of nuclear weapons, front
troops will be able to proceed to fulfil successive operations without any
delays or pauses whatever. This is aggravated by the fact that the
transition to a successive operation is linked to the necessity of
incorporating fresh forces into the composition of the front.
While we do not reject the possibility of having a front conduct a
successive operation, at the same time we believe that such operations do
not fully ensure the timely and complete exploitation of the results of
nuclear strikes by strategic means, nor the achievement of objectives in
short periods of time.
The use of fronts moving forward from the interior to develop an
offensive to the7ZE'tire depth of a theater of military operations also does
not fully correspond to the nature of a present-day strategic operation.
This use requires fronts to advance from the interior of the country over
long distances by organic ianian means under conditions of enemy actions from the
air and of having to negotiate extensive zones of radioactive contamination
and destruction. In such a situation, there are no guarantees at all that
troops will arrive in time at the designated areas and engage in battle.
Hence, the continuity of an offensive may be disrupted. Furthermore, by
executing an advance over a long distance, fronts may expend to a
considerable extent the mileage reserve of motors and tracks and suspension
of tanks and armored personnel carriers. In this connection, there arises
the apprehension that a portion of their forces will prove to be in no
condition to develop the offensive to the entire depth of the theater
unless provisions are made to carry out special measures.
Thus, our theoretical propositions on the conduct of successive
offensive operations by fronts and on the use of fronts advancing from the
interior to develop an o ensive do not completely solve the problems of
conducting an offensive to the entire depth of a theater of military
operations and of exploiting the results of nuclear strikes made by
strategic missiles and long range aviation. There has arisen the need to
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search for a way in which a front can conduct a single offensive operation
to the entire depth of a theater cif military operations.
Obviously, the given problem can be solved most effectively by a
further and considerable increase of the fire power of troops, by
decisively increasing the mobility and maneuverability of large units and
the protection of personnel against weapons of mass destruction, and by
improving the table of organization structure. But all of this requires a
relatively extended period of time,
However, even with the existing organization of a front, the
capability of conducting a front offensive operation to the entire depth of
a theater can be sought, in our opinion, by exploiting to the maximum the
forces and means of a front with the present-day organization. The
practicability of conduc g such operations resides in the presence of
strategic rocket forces and long range aviation whose strikes can establish
the conditions for routing the enemy in a theater of military operations in
the course of a single offensive operation.
An important question in conducting a front offensive operation within
the entire depth of a theater of military~ operations is its support. Of
all types of support, let us consider only materiel support.
As shown by tentative estimates, the following are required to conduct
a front operation to a. depth of 2,00" kilometers or more: more than 230 to
270tthousand tons of fuels and lubricants; over 115 to 12S thousand tons of
all types of amm mition; 12 thousand tons of rations; and over 60 thousand
tons of other cargo. The total amount of materiel and technical means has
been determined to be with.i_n the range of 400 to 500 thousand tons. The
primary problems in t}}s~ work of the rear services will be those of
providing troops with nuclear warheads, fuels and lubricants, and
conventional ammunition. A problem which has become particularly acute is
that of organi.:ing the supply to troops during an offensive when they
become separated by great distances from their bases,
The problems of pre aria and conductia front offensive operation
to the entire depth of a theater of military operations naturally willhave
a number of specific aspects. Let us examine some of them.
The priority task. of a front in such an operation, as also in an
operation conducted to a lessore- F epth, must be to destroy the
operational-tactical means and opposing groupings of the enemy, including
his immediate operational reserves. This will comprise the essence of a
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front's immediate task.
In developing a rapid offensive, a front must seize or destroy the
enemy's remaining nuclear attack means and rout his deep reserves or
complete their rout in the central portion of the theater. This may be the
substance of a front's subsequent task, which we believe must be defined.
Front troops which continue the offensive to the depth of the theater
of mill atarry operations must also rout surviving strategic reserves, or
those approaching from other theaters and continents, and seize the areas
or installations which constitute the objective of the operation. This may
become the substance of a front's further task.
Under familiar conditions (we have in mind first of all the successful
massed use of nuclear weapons by strategic means), routing opposing
groupings and completing the rout of deep reserves in the central portion
of the theater of military operations may constitute the essence of the
immediate task, and developing the offensive to the entire depth of the
theater of military operations may be the essence of the further task.
Thus, it may be possible to attain the objective of a front offensive
operation to the entire depth of a theater of military operations by
accomplishing two or three intermediate tasks.
Taking into account the fact that initially a front must by itself
rout opposing enemy groupings in the immediate depth and then complete the
rout of surviving troops and advance rapidly to the entire depth of the
theater, it must accordingly have two types of groupings in its operational
disposition: one to rout the opposing enemy and the other capable of
developing the offensive rapidly to the entire depth of the theater of
military operations.
In this case, the operational disposition of front troops must not
only conform to the chosen axes of the main strike antic the methods of troop
actions, but must also have groupings capable of fulfilling the immediate,
the subsequent (if there are such), and most importantly, further tasks.
It is advisable to have in the first echelon tank and motorized rifle
troops capable of fulfilling the immediate and subsequent tasks. To
accomplish these tasks, the composition of this echelon should include
those tank and motorized rifle divisons whose mileage reserve on tracks and
mileage reserve on motors before the next scheduled overhaul will ensure
they can operate to a depth of 1,000 kilometers or more.
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The second echelon of a front must have tank and motorized rifle
troops capable of developing the offensive to the entire depth of the
theater and reserve large units must have in their complement motorized
rifle and tank large units with varying mileage reserve on motors before
the next scheduled overhaul and on tracks and suspension so that some of
them can be used to reinforce the troops or replace large units that have
lost their combat effectiveness while accomplishing the immediate and
subsequent tasks, and others can be used when carrying out the further
task.
To fulfil the tasks of a front offensive operation, armies of the
first operational echelon, it seems to us, will conduct two and sometimes
three successive offensive operations. They will have to conduct one
operation at the beginning of military actions to accomplish the immediate
and subsequent (if there is one) tasks of the front to a depth of
approximately 1,000 kilometers. This depth is considered an exception for
an army offensive operation under present-day conditions and is assigned
only under certain conditions, but in operations to the entire depth of a
theater of military operations it will become a standard feature.
However, to fulfil the immediate and subsequent tasks of a front, an
army may also conduct two operations. In this case the depth of the
initial army operation will correspond to the depth of the front's
immediate task.
The subsequent offensive operation by the first-echelon armies should
be carried out without any delays or pauses whatsoever. In this case, the
depth of such operations can vary greatly for each army and may be governed
by the results of strikes by strategic means, by the importance and depth
of the operational axis, by the army's combat capabilities at the end of
the preceding operation, by the nature of enemy actions on the given axis,
and also by the intended use of the front's second echelon and reserves.
When an army successfully fulfils the tasks of the preceding
operation, it can be assumed the enemy will be completely demoralized and
will prove to be hardly able to conduct organized actions, as he could at
the beginning of the operation. Therefore, the task of an army may be to
destroy isolated enemy groupings and to seize important areas and
installations in the depth of the theater; and in a different instance-- to
advance rapidly and occupy specific areas. Finally, we cannot rule out the
fact that an army may be given the task of destroying the surviving enemy
groupings and of ensuring the rapid advance of the front's second echelons
and reserves committed to action so that they may quietly enter those areas
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and installations whose capture achieves the objective of the front
operation.
An army (corps) of a front second echelon, intended to develop an
offensive to the entire depth of a theater, should be assigned an immediate
task and a further task. When allocating the immediate task, we must
contemplate seizing areas and installations which ensure the rapid advance
of army troops to the entire depth of the theater. The essence of the
further task will often consist of seizing those areas and installations
whose capture completes the front offensive operation to the entire depth
of the theater of military operations.
In the operation we have considered, the requirements for nuclear
warheads will be increased considerably. They may amount to 500 warheads
or more. The major portion of them will have to be used to achieve the
immediate and subsequent tasks. Estimates reveal that when fulfilling
these tasks, it will be necessary to use at least 250 to 300 nuclear
warheads, i.e., approximately 60 percent or more of the total number of
them allocated to the operation, in order to destroy the enemy's
operational-tactical nuclear means and inflict destruction on 70 to 80
percent of his troops. In this case, it is important to inflict decisive
damage on the enemy in the initial massed nuclear strike of the front so
that troops may advance rapidly in the first hours of a war and not get
involved in protracted battles and engagments. To this end, we should not
allow nuclear warheads to be scattered among numerous targets in the
front's initial nuclear strike, as has occurred in a number of instances in
actual operational training. It is advisable to consider that the main
task of the strike is to destroy the operational-tactical nuclear means and
main groupings of the enemy.
Worthy of special attention is the delivery, during the operation, of
preemptive nuclear strikes by strategic and operational-tactical means, as
these strikes will allow us to achieve maximum destructive results against
the enemy's groupings, to disrupt his troop control and air defense system,
to deprive him of the opportunity of using nuclear weapons, and to restrict
and impose our initiative on him.
Fulfilling the tasks of the initial nuclear strike and the
advisability of delivering preemptive nuclear strikes during an operation
require the use of nuclear warheads on a large scale by
operational-tactical means. Consequently, this category of nuclear
warheads should take up the greater relative proportion of the total number
of nuclear warheads allocated to a front.
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The great spatial scope of an offensive operation conducted to the
entire depth of a theater of military operations and the somewhat different
approach to the employment of forces and means in it will naturally give
rise to unique conditions and require the appropriate use of familiar, or
possibly even new, methods of conducting an operation.
In such a operation the immediate task of the front troops will
obviously be accomplis e t o same methods as are used in operations
conducted to a depth of up to 1,000 kilometers.
In our opinion, to fulfil the immediate task in short periods of time,
a significant role can and must be played by the tank army, the tank
divisions of the combined-arms armies, and the tank regiments of
first-echelon motorized rifle divisions. They are the ones most capable of
operating rapidly in the wake of the nuclear strikes to speedily complete
routing the enemy and penetrate deeply into his rear. They are more
resistant to nuclear strikes and their good radiation protection allows
them to conduct highly mobile actions in zones of radioactive contamination
and destruction.
Therefore, in a situation when the enemy may employ nuclear weapons on
a large scale and oppose our offensive with his groupings -- which will be
most likely while front troops are accomplishing their immediate task --
the tank army, the an divisions of the combined-arms armies, and the tank
regiments of the motorized rifle divisions will be the leading force on the
respective main axes of the front, armies, and divisions when splitting
(breaking up) the opposing groupings of the enemy in the wake of the
nuclear strikes in order to enter his deep rear.
When accomplishing a subsequent task, if one should evolve from the
content of the immediate task, the actions of the troops of the front first
echelon will more and more acquire those characteristics which are typical
of developing an offensive involving the overcoming of centers of
resistance on certain axes. In this situation, motorized rifle troops
become more important since they possess greater mobility over roads than
tank troops and can advance rapidly on those axes where there are no
centers of resistance or bypass these to seize important installations and
areas in the central part of the theater of military operations.
Obviously, the fulfilment of the further task will occur under a
situation differing completely from the one when fulfilling the immediate
task and even subsequent task. It is to be supposed that when troops of
the front first echelon enter the central areas of the theater, it will be
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found that the enemy's centralized control over those troops which retain
their combat effectiveness has been disrupted, that his nuclear power and
air defense system have been demolished or seriously weakened, and that his
rear has been thoroughly disorganized. While exploiting the offensive to
the depth of the theater, front troops may encounter resistance from
individual enemy groupings stily organized from reserves or shifted over
from other theaters of military operations. In such a situation, the
leading role in rapidly pressing home the operation will pertain to the
second-echelon troops committed to battle and also to those motorized rifle
divisions of combined-arms armies which formerly had been active in the
first echelon of the front. What will be of decisive importance will be
precisely their rapid affiance to those installations and areas whose
seizure achieves the objective of the operation. Also, the second-echelon
troops committed to battle and operating on axes should not get themselves
involved in battles and engagements, but should bypass surviving groupings
of enemy troops and break through rapidly to the assigned areas.
Motorized rifle troops of the armies previously operating in the
complement of the first echelon will move forward and concentrate their
efforts on completing the rout of enemy groupings and of surviving and
bypassed troops, and developing the offensive to the depth of the theater
of military operations.
In several cases, motorized rifle troops may seize important areas and
installations in the depth of the theater without the participation of
tanks. First-echelon tank troops, having expended the mileage reserve of
their tracks and suspension and motors, will remain in the areas seized to
consolidate the success and in the coastal sectors of the front to
establish an antilanding defense.
Forward detachments consisting entirely of motorized rifle troops may
be of great importance when an offensive is being developed rapidly to the
depth of a theater. The presence of such highly mobile detachments will
allow us to accomplish the tasks of capturing road junctions, bridges,
crossing sites, passes, and other types of defiles in order to ensure the
rapid advance of the main forces of the front second echelon and their
entry into the depth of the theater of mil air't iy operations.
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TOPIECRET
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Working out the problems of organizing and conducting an offensive
operation by a front to the entire depth of a theater of military
operations is an exceedingly urgent and, at the same time, complex task.
Therefore, it is to be fully understood that this article does not exhaust
the entire substance of the topic raised.
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