MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): EXPERIENCE IN THE CONTROL OF THE ROCKET TROOPS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP10-00105R000201470001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 2, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 14, 1975
• Content Type: MEMO

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Intelligence Information Special Report
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COUNTRY I1SSR
~AT~1.4 November 1975
MILITARY THOUQ-iT (USSR): Experience in the Control of the Rocket Troops
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Experience in the Control of the Rocket Troops
f
Y
General-Mayor of Artillery S. Pogudin,
Colonel A. Monakov, and
Lieutenant Colonel A. Timoshenko-Lavrov
In the Transcaucasus Military District a great deal of attention is
being devoted to the all-round improvement of the control of the rocket
troops. In addition to command-staff exercises and war games in which the
staffs of missile brigades and mobile missile technical bases take part,
exercises on the control of the rocket troops are being systematically
conducted. Those participating in these exercises are: the staff of the
rocket troops and artillery and an operations group from the directorate of
missile and artillery armament from the military district headauarters, and
the staffs of the rocket troops and artillery and departments of missile
and artillery armament from the armies. The staffs of missile brigades and
battalions (with the commands of the launch batteries) and the headauarters
of mobile missile technical bases also always participate in these
.exercises. As a rule, all of the above staffs are located during the
exercises about 50 kilometers from their permanent deployment areas; and
communications are maintained with them by radio, telephone and permanent
communications lines.
The exercises, which usually last two days, cover problems pertaining
to the control of the rocket troops during preparations for the first
nuclear strike, and during its delivery as well as during the delivery of
nuclear strikes in the course of an operation. N!hat are the aims of these
exercises? First of all, we test the stability of control of the rocket
troops under conditions when the distance between them and their staffs
corresponds to that which would exist in a combat situation. Secondly, we
teach effective decision-making to staffs at all levels. Thirdly, we
carefully adjust the radio net (since radio stations and radio operators
permanently assigned to military district and army communications units are
working in the exercises). And finally, we are able to determine the
actual time spent on the passage of commands and signals from the staff of
the rocket troops and artillery of a front to the batteries. The
systematic conduct of exercises has sig ~icantly increased the
effectiveness of control at all levels of the rocket troops of the military
district. Based on the experience of these exercises convenient forms for
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planning documents and combat instructions have been developed.; and a
brevity code chart has been compiled for the transmission of commands to
twits and subunits on delivering strikes with nuclear, chemical and
conventional missiles. While the coded message used previously for the
transmission of a command contained about 20 groups, the present one
contains no more than nine groups.
In exercises the staffs of the rocket troops and artillery and the
staffs of missile units derive complete solutions to all problems of the
planning of combat actions, the employment of forces and means and the
control of units and subunits in a situation approximating combat
conditions.
Unfortunately, we have not been able to obtain the same results in the
control of missile technical traits. Various shortcomings continue to exist
in this area. The main reason for this lies in the lack of sufficient
experience in using mobile missile technical bases and in certain omissions
made in manning these bases.
How is experience in controlling missile technical units actually
acquired? In a majority of cases it is acquired only in command-staff
exercises and war games, where all problems concerning the control of these
,traits are worked out on maps. But it is one thing to make all the
calculations for missile technical support on paper (which is usually done
correctly and rapidly) and another to actually supply units with missiles.
The work of the staffs of mobile missile technical bases in training
resembles most of all work during command-staff exercises. This is
explained by the fact that the subunits of mobile missile technical bases
do not carry out the technical preparation of delivery vehicles and
warheads and do not actually deliver missiles to missile units.
Combined exercises conducted at the present time with missile and
missile technical units at the brigade and mobile missile technical base
level do not give a complete picture of missile technical support because
of the small number of troops participating and, therefore, make it
impossible to form well-fotmded conclusions on the actual operation of army
and front staffs with respect to the control of mobile missile-technical
bases.
In this connection we would like to make the recommendation that
special tactical exercises of the rocket troops be conducted periodically
on a district-wide scale. In our opinion, precisely this type of exercise
would be the best method to check the readiness of the rocket troops, to
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reveal capabilities for preparing and delivering missiles and missile
propellant to them, to clarify certain theoretical propositions and
calculations, and to find practical solutions for all other problems which
arise pertaining to the preparation of missiles for launch.
In exchanging experience on improving the methods of controlling the
rocket troops, we would like to touch upon the opinions of various authors
whose articles have dealt with the control of missile technical units. It
is a fact that mobile missile technical bases cannot be treated as ordinary
rear units. Therefore, they should not be controlled from the rear control
post. Evidence of this is the experience accumulated in our military
district. In all front and army exercises, the chief of the directorate
(department) of miss- e and. artillery armament is located, together with an
operations group (the second department of the directorate and part of the
fourth department), at the command post, from which all mobile missile
technical bases are controlled. What functions are performed by the
operations group of this directorate?
During the period in which an operation is planned, together with the
planning group of the staff of the rocket troops and artillery, it
considers the most suitable procedure for missile technical support in a
particular situation, plans the deployment areas of missile technical
.units, and determines possible variants in their movement. Since the chief
of the rocket troops and artillery and the chief of the directorate of
missile and artillery armament are present at the front (army) command
post, all problems relating to deviations from the p ans for supplying
missiles (because of changes in the situation) are solved efficiently and.
effectively, bypassing intermediate levels. All other problems (for
example, the supply of conventional ammunition, the recovery, repair and
supply of equipment, etc.) fall under the authority of_ the missile and
artillery service and are solved at the rear control post since close
cooperation between this service and the staff of the rear is required. It
is true that even a control procedure of this type has its negative
aspects. But if they are compared with the positive aspects, in the final
analysis it turns out that the chief of the directorate of missile and
artillery armament should still be located. at the front command post.
As is known, the readiness of the rocket troops to deliver the first
strike (as well as to deliver strikes in the course of an operation)
depends most of all on the times required for the preparation and delivery
of missiles. i'nder the conditions of our mountainous theater of military
operations, the factor which has the main influence on the readiness times
of large units and units to deliver a strike is the time required to
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deliver missiles from the mobile missile technical bases to them.
however, the width of a front offensive zone reaches 1,000 kilometers,
and it is not always possible to attach a mobile missile technical base to
each missile brigade. The experience of exercises shows that frequently one
mobile missile technical base supports two missile brigades. At the
indicated width of an offensive zone, the missile supply distance can
extend 250 to 300 kilometers or more.
It requires 25 to 30 hours to deliver missiles by motor vehicle
transport under such conditions, even if the mountain roads are in good
repair. This time may be shortened considerably, as we are doing in
exercises, by using MI-6 helicopters. True, under certain conditions this
is not an entirely reliable method of delivering missiles since in the
mountains poor flying weather (rain, dense fog, snow), which prevents the
flight of helicopters, occurs more often than on flat terrain. Therefore,
in order to guarantee the delivery of missiles and. to shorten the time
required to transport them, it obviously is best to bring the missile and
warhead assembling and preparation areas closer to the missile brigades.
In some exercises we attached an assembling group from a mobile missile
technical base to a missile brigade. In this case, the entire cycle of the
preparation of the missiles and warheads took place directly in the missile
brigade. Because of this, the time required to deliver readied missiles to
a launch battery was reduced, and delays along the way were eliminated. We
also believe it would be advisable to have a mixed army mobile missile
technical base capable of readying both tactical and operational-tactical
missiles.
An army mobile missile technical base of this type will make it
possible not only to shorten the delivery times for missiles, but also to
increase the responsibility of the chief of the rocket troops and artillery
and the chief of the department of missile and artillery armament of an
army for the delivery of missiles to the brigade and for their timely
readiness for launch. By planning missile deliveries only to the army
mobile missile technical base, the staffs of the rocket troops and
artillery and the directorate of missile and artillery armament of a front
will automatically improve the conditions for the control of the front
mobile missile technical bases.
Experience gained from exercises also shows that the communications
means available in missile and missile technical units cannot fully satisfy
control requirements. For example, a mobile missile technical base has two
R-118 radios and five R-108 radios. This does not permit a base to
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organize stable control. over missile transports or to organize monitoring
of their movement. In fact, the chief of the mobile missile technical base
can only inform the brigade commander of the time of departure and. the type
of transport. The missile transport is uncontrolled while under way. This
is a very dangerous situation if we consider that during the time the
transport is on the road (from four to 30 hours), conditions change often
and abruptly, and the chief of the mobile missile technical base or the
commander of the missile unit cannot pass instructions to the chief of the
tr