MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): AIR SUPPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP10-00105R000201370001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 16, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 14, 1975
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/16: CIA-RDP10-00105R000201370001-3
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
ME'URANDEIM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): Air Support
1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is part of a
series now in preparation based on the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense
publication Collection of Articles of the Journal "Milita Thought". This
article continues a discussion of air support matters from previous
articles in Military Thought, placing the emphasis on the mission of front
aviation in joint actions with the ground forces. The author, who
characterizes front aviation as the most effective and maneuverable means
of supporting troops in operations, dwells at length on the planning of the
allocation and centralized employment of aviation resources in support of
cri -i fi r unite Thi c arti r-l a nnnaarPA in Tccna Mn r7n) fnr 1 QIi'~
2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive, this
document should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within recipient
agencies; For ease of reference, renorts from this publication have been
assigned
William F. Ne
Deputy Director for
Page 1 of 11. Pages
on
erations
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/16: CIA-RDP10-00105R000201370001-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/16: CIA-RDP10-00105R000201370001-3
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Assistant to the Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Department of the Army
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
U. S. Air Force
Director, National Security Agency
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Deputy Director for Science and Technology
Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence
for National Intelligence Officers
Director of Strategic Research
Page 2 of 1 Pages
TOP SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/16: CIA-RDP10-00105R000201370001-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/16: CIA-RDP10-00105R000201370001-3
Intelligence Information Special Report
Page 3 of 11 Pages
50X1-HUM
COUNTRY USSR
DATE OF
INFO. Late 1963
MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR) : Air Support
N
SOURCE Documentary
Summa The following report is a translation from Russian of an article which
appeared in Issue No. 3 (70) for 1963 of the SECRET USSR Ministry of
Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal "Milita
Thou ~ht". The author oftiis article isGeneral-Mayor of Aviation V.
1nZ ovyev. This article continues a discussion of air support matters from
previous articles in Military Thought, placing the emphasis on the mission
of front aviation in joint actions with the ground forces. The author, who
characterizes front aviation as the most effective and maneuverable means
of supporting troops in operations, dwells at length on the planning of the
allocation and centralized employment of aviation resources in support of
specific units. End of Summary
The two 1962 articles to which it refers are:
"Actions o ron viation in the Initial Front Offensive Operation in the
Initial Perioo -of War" by S. Shimanskiy an-TV Povarkov in Issue No. 2
(63) and "Air Support of 50X1-HUM
Ground Forces and ontro 0 Combat Actions o ont Aviation" by I.
Pst o N. Ganichev and N. Reshetnikov in Issue No. 5 (66)
The SECRET version of 50X1-HUM
Military Thought was published three times annuany and was distributed
down to the level of division commander. It reportedly ceased publication
at the end of 1970.
DATE 14 October 1975
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/16: CIA-RDP10-00105R000201370001-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/16: CIA-RDP10-00105R000201370001-3
TOP S//RET
Page 4 of 11 Pages
Air Support
by
General-Mayor of Aviation V. Zinovyev
The question of air support of troops has recently become the subject
of extensive discussion. However, it still has not, in our opinion,
received the proper resolution. In particular, different interpretations
of air support continue to prevail, its content and significance have not
been fully brought to light, and some authors attempt to deny in general.
the necessity for such support of combined-arms large units and formations
in modern conditions of conducting a war. A differing understanding of air
support, naturally, cannot promote the working out of correct views among
combined-arms commanders on the role and place of front aviation in the
operations of ground troops.
In this connection, we consider it necessary to continue the
discussion of this question begun on the pages of the Collection of the
Journal "Military Thought".* In this article we should like to express our
views on certain questions of air support, in the process setting forth its
content as it appears to us.
The rapid development of missile technology and the perfection of the
means of air defense have, as is known, led to some revision of the role
and significance of aviation in a missile/nuclear war. The experience of
the large-scale exercises of recent years and the theoretical study of the
questions of conducting a missile/nuclear war have firmly established the
position of aviation among all of the branches of the armed forces, and it
is now clear to everyone that the ground forces, even in a missile/nuclear
war, need active air support.
In revealing the essence of the mission of front aviation, as is
known, two basic views prevail. The adherents oe n point of view
consider that the real mission of front aviation is support of the troops
of the front in the operations con ud cted by them and, consequently, that
all the tasks which aviation accomplishes on behalf of the troops of the
front (with the exception of aerial reconnaissance, the covering of troops,
and transport of troops and cargo) are included in the content of air
support. Adherents of the other point of view consider that the basic
50X1-HUM
*Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought", No. 5 (60),
1961, No. 2 (63) and No. 5 (66), 1962.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/16: CIA-RDP10-00105R000201370001-3 --
 ~nv1 _urrna
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/16: CIA-RDP10-00105R000201370001-3
TOP ,RET
Page 5 of 11 Pages
mission of front aviation is in its joint actions with the troops of the
front. By joint actions here are understood both relatively independent
acct ns within the framework of an operation of troops, and actions having
direct supporting significance for troop formations or their large units
which are part of the front formation. In other words, the defenders of
such a view attempt in general to deny air support as such, considering it
a factor that has lost its force.
The first opinion, in our view, is clearly incorrect. The second, in
the part about the mission of aviation, is more accurate, and it has found
its reflection in a whole series of guiding documents of our armed forces.
Adhering to the second view on the mission of the front aviation, we cannot
agree with the denial. of the concept of air support nd we consider that
assistance embraces both independent actions and actions directly
supporting troops, which together constitute air support.
Designating front aviation for joint actions with the ground forces
fully meets the requirements of conducting very dynamic and decisive
actions on the main axes of armed conflict. Aviation along with the rocket
troops is capable of delivering nuclear weapons on a target; and employing
them during a front operation, it can accomplish a number of operational
and tactical to ks independently and in many cases play a leading, and not
at all subordinate, role in accomplishing them. Those who deny this
position deliberately accept the erroneous contention that the nuclear
weapons of aviation are employed exclusively for the purpose of fire
support of troops, i.e., according to the principle of using artillery and
aviation in the last war. The employment of nuclear weapons allows
aviation independently to accomplish important tasks in crushing part of
the enemy forces.
Our military doctrine provides for the employment of conventional
means of destruction, too, in a nuclear war. Moreover, it is especially
emphasized in it that the final objective in armed conflict is attained by
the joint efforts of all branches of the armed forces and branch arms
employing both nuclear weapons and conventional means of destruction.
Therefore, it is not out of the question that a whole series of important
tasks will be accomplished with limited use of nuclear weapons or
altogether without them, and that what will have the determining importance
in completing the destruction of enemy groupings in these instances will
not be nuclear weapons so much as powerful strikes of the motorized troops
and, primarily, of their tanks. The other branches of the armed forces
(aviation), the navy and the branch arms participating in the
accomplishment of this task direct their main efforts toward assisting the
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/16: CIA-RDP10-00105R000201370001-3
 50X1-HUM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/16: CIA-RDP10-00105R000201370001-3
TOP . AtT
Page 6 of 11 Pages
ground forces.
The most effective and maneuverable means of supporting troops in the
operations being carried out by them, in our opinion, is front aviation.
Its combat characteristics allow it to appear quickly over battlefield
and hit, with great effectiveness and in a short time, small-size mobile
targets whose location up to the moment the task is assigned may only be
presumed. It can also, without great preparatory measures, switch its
strikes from one target to another or quickly switch its actions onto new
axes. Consequently, the combat. characteristics of aviation give it the
capability of accomplishing varied combat tasks in operations of the ground
forces in the most varied conditions of the situation. This is quite
convincingly confirmed by the experience of the Second World War, and we
should not forget it. The experience of postwar exercises, though, serves
as a good basis for further working out the theory of the art of employing
aviation under the conditions of a nuclear war.
The main efforts of the air army of the front will always be directed
toward carrying out the kind of tasks loose successful accomplishment
promotes achievement of the goals of the operation of the front in the
shortest possible time: destroying the operational-tactical
missile/nuclear weapons of the enemy and combating his aviation and deep
operational reserves. In the course of carrying out these tasks, aviation
will be employed according to the plan of the front in a centralized way
and, as a rule, in cooperation with the rocket troops. The method of
employing it is successive concentration of efforts against the most
important targets and on the main axes. Actions will be conclusive if
aviation employs nuclear warheads and expends the greater part of the
aviation resources for accomplishment of the assigned tasks. Along with
this, the aviation will turn out to be capable of accomplishing other
tasks, including air support of separate groupings of front troops.
Air support can be appraised from different points of view, and the
depth of understanding of air support itself depends on how comprehensively
this category of the operational art of the air forces is viewed. We
consider it most correct to conduct research on the question from the point
of view of the tasks to be accomplished by the air army in an operation.
In this case air support takes on the form of an operational task of the
air army in an operation. In fact, if we analyze the assignment of tasks
to the air army by the commanders of front troops on the basis of the
materials of exercises and war games ca- ed out recently, among the tasks
of the air army we will find such ones as support of the offensive of a
certain army (corps). Here is usually indicated the time (period.) for
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/16: CIA-RDP10-00105R000201370001-3
 5(1X1 -HT TM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/16: CIA-RDP10-00105R000201370001-3
TOP CRET
Page 7 of 11 Pages
accomplishing this task and the resources to be allocated.
The sense of this task comes down to this, that the commander of the
front troops assigns part of the operation to the commander of the
combined-arms formation that is carrying out the main or basic task for a
definite period of the operation, and the aviation, with its units (large
units), carries out combat tasks exclusively on behalf of just the one
formation. The striking force of this grouping of troops is thereby
strengthened and, by the same token, conditions are created for it to
conduct successful combat actions. The necessity of allocating the forces
of the aviation directly to the commander of the combined-arms army is
occasioned by the presence on the battlefield and in the immediate rear of
the enemy of a large number of mobile and small-size targets, which for the
time being are effectively destroyed only by aviation.
According to the concept, the aviation resources of the air support
are to be expended exclusively to accomplish only particular tasks, only on
behalf of the given formation (large unit), and only according to the
decision of the commander of this formation (commander of the large unit).
'Inasmuch as almost no air-delivered nuclear warheads will be placed at the
disposal of commanders of armies and corps commanders, air support will
begin being carried out, as a rule, without employing them.
Thus, the practice of the combat and operational training of our armed
forces confirms not only the existence of air support but also its
necessity in modern armed conflict. Therefore, there is no basis to deny
it or to replace the term "air support" with something else.
There can be different variants of planning resources for air support.
We shall dwell on one of them which appears most correct to us.
Before making a decision, the commander of the front troops, on the
basis of conclusions from appraising the situation and the projected
concept of the operation, determines the tasks of the aviation and the
procedure for the combat employment of the air army in the operation of the
front. In the process, a conclusion must be drawn about what part of the
aviation resources should be assigned to carry out the overall tasks of the
front and what part should be allocated to provide air support to the
armies (corps) of the front. Then the air support requirements of each
army (corps) of the front and our air capabilities are determined so that
it is possible to plan the procedure for carrying out air support, i.e.,
whether it will be carried out in a centralized way (by the decision of the
commander of the front troops) by the process of satisfying requests from
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/16: CIA-RDP10-00105R000201370001-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/16: CIA-RDP10-00105R000201370001-3
TOP >RET
Page 8 of 11 Pages
the armies, or whether aviation resources for support will be placed at the
disposal of the corresponding commanders of armies (commanders of corps).
In his decision regarding the employment of the large units of the air
army, the commander of troops of the front indicates which armies, when,
and with what expenditure of aviation resources, are to be supported by the
aviation, and the procedure for carrying out this support. The commander
of the air army determines what combined-arms armies of the front will be
supported by what specific aviation large units, the time of -accomplishing
this task, the expenditure of resources, and the procedure for control of
the aviation large units allocated for air support. The commander of the
combined-arms (tank) army at whose disposal the corresponding air resources
are placed assigns specific tasks to the aviation (indicates targets), time
of action (strike delivery), and expenditure of resources (composition of
forces). In case air support is accomplished by the decision of the
commander of troops of the front without previously placing aviation
resources at the disposal of t e commander of troops of the combined-arms
formation (army), i.e., it is accomplished in the process of satisfying
requests from the army, the commanders of the armies in their requests must
indicate the installation (target) for an air strike, its location, and the
time of the strike itself.
The procedure for carrying out air support depends on many factors,
which must be considered in planning the combat actions of the air army in
the operation of the front. Basic among them are the aviation capabilities
of the front. If they are great and the air army is relatively powerful in
strength, ten a good part of the resources planned for air support should,
in our opinion, be placed at the disposal of the corresponding commanders
of armies (commanders of corps) of the front. This will greatly simplify
the organization of combat actions of the aviation large units, and
guarantee more effective and flexible employment of the aviation and
control of it. With a low strength in fighter-bombers (not more than one
division in an air army), air support should be carried out in a
centralized way, controlled by the decision of the commander of troops of
the front on the procedure for satisfying the requests of the armies.
Lately there has emerged the opinion that in placing aviation
resources for air support at the disposal of the commander of an army, the
resources are to be indicated not for the whole operation, but by parts: a
day for the combined-arms army, two or three days for the tank army. The
reasoning is that the situation will change drastically during a modern
operation and that it is impossible to foresee everything and,
consequently, it is not out of the question that the aviation resources
TOP EGRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/16: CIA-RDP10-00105R000201370001-3
 5(1X1 -HT TM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/16: CIA-RDP10-00105R000201370001-3
TORP, DFT
Page 9 of 11 Pages
will have to be redistributed frequently among the armies. One should not,
it seems to us, agree with this opinion. It throws in doubt the
advisability of planning an operation at all.
No doubt, in the conduct of modern operations, the situation will
change drastically and often. This will require introducing the
appropriate corrections in the previously adopted decision and plan of
operation. It is not out of the question that it will be necessary not
only to redistribute aviation resources, but also to transfer combined-arms
(tank) large units from one army to another, change the zones of the
offensive and the axes of the main strike, as well as redistribute the
means of reinforcement among the armies. In spite of this, the armies will
still, obviously, plan their operations, and, to counter any eventualities,
the reserve in the hands of the commander of the front will be employed.
Therefore, we consider that, if the decision is made to place aviation
resources for air support at the disposal of the appropriate commander of
an army, then it is necessary to assign them to this army for the whole
operation and not provide them piecemeal for each day. This will permit
the commander and staff of the army in planning the operation to take
fuller account of all their capabilities and to employ the aviation against
such targets and at such times as its actions will have the greatest effect
on the success of the operation of the army. We believe that such an
organization of support will also facilitate to a significant degree the
conduct of the combat actions of the air army.
The aviation resources allocated for air support of each army of the
front are determined by a number of circumstances. According to the
experience of exercises of recent years, in a front having within its
composition three or four armies, direct air support is usually carried out
on behalf of one or two armies. In order to provide direct air support to
these armies and accomplish the overall tasks of the front, the air army
must have up to two divisions of fighter-bombers and one division of
bombers. The aviation resources placed at the disposal of the commanders
of these armies must be determined on the basis of the concrete situation
and the combat capabilities of the other fighting means available within
the composition of the armies.
Under the conditions of the contemporary situation in the Western
Theater, the enemy is able to concentrate up to three or four divisions in
the first echelon and one or two divisions in the second echelon of the
offensive zone of an army. On the second or third day of the operation,
the composition of the army may be reinforced with another two or three new
divisions. In each of these divisions, there are one or two batteries of
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/16: CIA-RDP10-00105R000201370001-3
 F. nV II _UT TT\,r
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/16: CIA-RDP10-00105R000201370001-3
Page 10 of 11 Pages
tactical missiles and nuclear artillery. Besides this, there may be in the
army zone up to one or two battalions of operational-tactical missiles.
So, in all, among the troops of the army on the offensive, it comes to 13
to 20 batteries (battalions) which will employ nuclear and chemical
weapons.
Let us assume that 50 percent of these targets will be deployed in
positions and will be destroyed by missiles, but the other half will be on
the move and can be destroyed only by aviation. Then combating the
missile/nuclear groupings of the enemy will require approximately seven to
nine fighter-bomber squadrons.
Other targets in the course of support will be the tactical and
immediate operational reserves (in our example, up to three to five
divisions). They are best destroyed by the combined efforts of the troops
of the army and the aviation (of the latter up to 2.5 to four divisional
sorties of fighter-bombers are required). Thus, in the circumstances we
have assumed, for an army operation five to six days long it is necessary
to allocate up to four or five divisional sorties of fighter-bombers. This
may be considered an approximate average norm of aviation forces necessary
for the support of an army.
The zone of combat actions of the aviation in air support is defined
along the front by the boundaries of the offensive zone of the given army,
and in depth by the distance away of the targets against which the aviation
must operate. These will be the targets located on the line defining the
depth of the day's task of the army and even a little further. Translated
into the language of numbers, air support of a combined-arms army must be
carried out to a depth of 80 to 100 kilometers, and of a tank army to 100
to 150 kilometers. Hitting more distant targets, which may affect the
actions of other armies of the front to an equal degree, is the
responsibility of the commander-7-troops of the front.
Some are inclined to think that the introduction of more powerful
weapons, primarily tactical missiles, into the armament of the ground
troops excludes the necessity of air strikes in immediate proximity to the
troops. One cannot agree with this, either. In a modern war there will be
large zones of destruction and contamination, across which missiles and
artillery will not be able to move forward to our troops in time to offer
the necessary fire support or deliver a strike against the enemy. In such
cases, aviation, utilizing its high maneuverability, can and must do that
which under ordinary conditions the fire means of the ground forces would
do.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/16: CIA-RDP10-00105R000201370001-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/16: CIA-RDP10-00105R000201370001-3
TOP , /LCRET
Page 11 of 11 Pages
In local wars and in conducting combat actions with limited employment
of nuclear weapons, the significance of air support grows substantially.
The ground forces will play the main role in crushing the enemy, but their
successful actions will depend greatly on air support. Front aviation in
these wars is designated for joint combat actions with the troops of the
front. Such a mission enlarges the sphere of combat activity of front
av ation and more fully reveals its combat capabilities.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/16: CIA-RDP10-00105R000201370001-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/16: CIA-RDP10-00105R000201370001-3
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/16: CIA-RDP10-00105R000201370001-3