MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): WAYS TO REDUCE THE TIME REQUIRED TO PLAN THE MOVEMENT OF TROOPS OF AN ARMY OVER A GREAT DISTANCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP10-00105R000201300001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 5, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 24, 1975
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/05: CIA-RDP10-00105R000201300001-0
R
50X1 -HUM
Next 3 Page(s) In Document Denied
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/05: CIA-RDP10-00105R000201300001-0
Adz,
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/05: CIA-RDP10-00105R000201300001-0_
OX1-HUM
Page 4 of 10 Pages
Ways to Reduce the Time Required to Plan the Movement
of Troops of an Army over a Great Distance
by
Lieutenant Colonel S. Yefimenkov
The necessity of immediate movement of troops of operational
formations at high rates of speed from the interior of the country for the
purpose of their timely arrival at an area of combat operations to
reinforce the first operational echelon urgently requires that such a
movement be planned in advance, even in peacetime.
However, the experience of operational-strategic exercises and war
games shows ;...hat with the beginning of military operations, especially when
they begin with surprise massed nuclear strikes, the situation can be
altered abruptly and as a result there is required not only a more precise
definition of the plan worked out beforehand but also the adoption of a new
decision and planning for the movement of large units and units of
combined-arms and tank armies. Under such conditions planning will most
often be carried out in an extremely limited time parallel to bringing
troops to full combat readiness and eliminating the aftereffects of enemy
nuclear strikes.
The efficiency of the work of the commander and staff of the army and
of the subordinate commanders and staffs during this period must be such as
not to delay the beginning of the movement of troops. During the time of
bringing forces to full combat readiness, it is necessary to plan out the
movement as a whole and to convey the tasks to the units and subunits. In
this way the forces can immediately begin movement into the area of combat
operations without being exposed to danger of contamination from enemy
nuclear and chemical weapons in combat alert assembly areas.
Calculations and the experience of exercises conducted in different
military districts in 1963 to 1967* show that in all four to five hours are
needed to bring divisions kept at wartime TO & E to full combat readiness,
but planning the movement of the troops of an army takes, on the average,
14 to 15 hours. In this time troops could advance 200 to 250 kilometers,
accomplishing a march of a day's march in depth. This is why research into
ways to reduce the time and increase the efficiency of the work of the
*During our preparation of this article, materials of nine command-staff
exercises and six war games were analyzed.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/05: CIA-RDP10-00105R000201300001-0
50X1 -HUM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/05: CIA-RDP10-00105R000201300001-0
Page 5 of 10 Pages
50X1-HUM
commander and staff of the army in planning the movement of forces over a
great distance takes on special urgency.
Analysis conducted with the aid of network models of the functioning
of control organs at the army - battalion level shows that after receiving
the directive of the front, generals and officers of the army field
headquarters and the subordinate commanders and staffs do not immediately
set to work.
In the actual practice of operational preparation, the army commander,
receiving a front or district directive for movement, studies the task
together with the chief of staff and the chief of the operations department
and determines the concept of the movement. Then an operations briefing of
the command personnel of the field headquarters takes place, and
instructions are issued about the preparation of data and calculations for
making a decision. Only after this, usually after three to four hours and
sometimes more have passed, do the chiefs of the staff departments, of
branch arms, and special troops and their subordinate officers set to work
in organizing and planning the movement. Given such methods and work
sequence, the loss of time in the staff of an army can reach 240 to 320
man-hours, and in the field headquarters of an army 720 to 960 or more,
which constitutes 30 to 35 percent of the total working time, lost on the
organization and planning of a movement.
Research shows that in the departments of the staff and the field
headquarters of an army a significant volume of work on the organization
and planning of the movement of troops can be already completed before the
operations briefing conducted by the commander or chief of staff of the
army. Thus, roughly, out of over 500 kinds of calculations and jobs, about
140 of the most important of them can be completed after familiarization
with the task of the army without waiting for a decision to be made. This
will allow the expenditure of work time in the staff of the army to be
reduced to 40 to 50 man-hours, and in the field headquarters, to 120 to 160
man-hours, i.e., six to 6.5 times less.
Knowing the task of the army, the chiefs of the staff departments,
branch arms, and services can, even before the operations briefing, prepare
their working maps and plot on them the necessary data indicated in the
directive of the front; study the task received; specify the tasks and work
places of subordinate officers; collect data about the position and status
of large units and units, and inform their commanders and staffs about the
nature of the task before them and the time of preparation for departure;
determine the number and condition of routes and the nature of large
50X1 -HUM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/05: CIA-RDP10-00105R000201300001-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/05: CIA-RDP10-00105R000201300001-0
Page 6 of 10 Pages
50X1-HUM
natural boundaries in the zone indicated; specify the make-up of the enemy
grouping and the nature of its possible operations; organize the work of
subordinate officers in the preparation of calculations and suggestions for
the decision to be made; prepare preliminary calculations of the march;
organize communications with the staffs of cooperating operational
formations; and carry out other tasks.
For example, in one operational-strategic exercise of the Red Banner
Far East Military District, the officers of the field headquarters of the
15th Army (in the game) set to work on the organization and planning of a
movement 35 to 40 minutes after, and in the 12th Tank Army (in the game) in
an exercise of the Belorussian Military District in 1965, 25 to 30 minutes
after receiving a directive of the front. Incidentally, in the 15th Army,
two copies of the directive of the TiBRI' were received. The commander of
the army, the chief of staff, and the chiefs of the operations department,
intelligence, and engineer troops worked with one copy, and the chiefs of
the primary staff departments, branch arms, and services worked at the same
time with the other. The commander of the 12th Tank Army familiarized the
chiefs of the primary staff departments, branch arms, and services with the
contents of the directive of the front in the course of 15 to 20 minutes
after its receipt. With this method loss of working time in the control
organs of the army was almost fully prevented and the period of organizing
the planning of the movement could be shortened to six to ten hours.
A significant reduction in the period of planning the organization of
a movement is attained by carrying out parallel planning at all levels of
control. For this it is necessary to get the extremely necessary
TiTTIEihary data for planning to subordinate commanders and staffs in good
time. These data include primarily the method, axis, and routes of
movement, time of preparation for the march and departure times, the area
of the first day-time rest and the time of the beginning of the march.
The division commander and staff, knowing the method and axis of a
movement and the time of preparation, can indicate the basic measures
concerning the preparation of the routes and the forces and means necessary
for this, determine the grouping of forces and means on the march and in
the rest area, make calculations for the march, study the nature of large
natural boundaries, take note of methods and times for negotiating them,
make a decision, plan out the march along general lines, organize
reconnaissance and the traffic control service, send out a reconnaissance
group to the rest area, and begin preparing the units for the march. soxl-Hum
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/05: CIA-RDP10-00105R000201300001-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/05: CIA-RDP10-00105R000201300001-0
Page 7 of 10 Pages
50X1-HUM
The significance of the above-mentioned preparatory data becomes even
greater for commanders and staffs of regiments and battalions. A battalion
commander, knowing the time of readiness and the axis of movement over a
great distance can take steps to prepare for the march, including drawing
up the column.
Preliminary orders with an indication of the method, axis, and
readiness time for movement will not exceed 15 to 20 words in number (10 to
15 groups). To decode and convey them to units and large units requires,
accordingly, 30 to 60 minutes.
Consequently, within 1.5 to two hours after the army receives a
directive of the front, preparation for a long march can be begun
immediately in sailErs as well. At the same time staffs of large units
and units will be carrying out work on the organization, planning, and
preparation for the movement.
An important way to reduce the period of planning a movement and
increase the working efficiency of the commander and staff of an army is
the allocation of tasks to the large units without excessive detail.
According to the experience of exercises and war games, for a division for
each day's march there are determined and indicated: the main and
alternate routes of march or zones of movement; the line of departure and
movement phase control lines after two or three hours' advance and the time
of crossing them; the daytime (night-time) rest area and time of arrival at
it; areas and times of long and sometimes of short halts; the order and
times of crossing large natural obstacles.
With such a detailed treatment of the task of a division advancing,
for example, by two routes, it is required for the depth of a day's march
to indicate 30 to 40 local features and up to ten times for crossing
designated boundaries and. arrival at assigned areas. As a result, the
movement of a division having a march formation on the order of about 100
kilometers long is with unjustified frequency regulated as to place (every
30 to 60 kilometers) and time (every two to three hours). All this not
only hampers the independence and initiative of the subordinate commanders
and staffs but also greatly increases the volume of work and expenditure of
time on the preparation of calculations in the staff of the army and the
subordinate levels of control. At the same time, during the movement of
forces over a great distance, such strict regulation of the movement of
large units as to place and time is not required. 50X1-HUM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/05: CIA-RDP10-00105R000201300001-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/05: CIA-RDP10-00105R000201300001-0
Page 8 of 10 Pm7 -HUM
The division commander and staff are fully able to plan the movement
of units independently, especially for the first days' marches, when
contact with enemy ground forces groupings and his large-scale airborne or
amphibious landing forces is not very likely. For this it is necessary to
inform them of the routes (zone) of movement and the beginning of the
march, the rest area and the arrival time there, and also the security
measures according to the army plan. Movement of large units under these
conditions in the interests of fulfilling the operational plan is regulated
in sufficient detail by the size and period of the day's march.
In the case where large units and units subordinate to the army or
front move forward immediately after a division, it is advisable for the
division to determine the beginning of the movement, periods of crossing
large natural boundaries, times or areas of halts and one to two movement
phase control lines for the movement to prevent bunching up of troops,
especially before "bottlenecks".
A significant reduction of the number of fixed lines and areas for
large units, as well as the times for crossing them will sharply reduce the
length of planning in the army and the time of conveying tasks to the large
units.
In the practice of operational preparation, the movement of an army is
planned in detail for the entire depth by day's marches. The planning of
each of them cannot be equally complete, as it is difficult or even
impossible to foresee in every detail the probable changes of the situation
in the area of combat operations and on the routes of the movement,
especially towards its completion.
Abrupt and rapid changes in the situation in the zone of movement will
necessitate the introduction of substantial changes in the plan,
amplification or assignment of new tasks to the large units and units,
especially for getting around or over extensive zones of contamination,
areas of massive destruction, zones of flooding and large natural barriers.
Therefore it is advisable in the army, based on the concept of the
commander, at first to plan the movement of forces in detail only for the
first two or three days' marches and along general lines for the subsequent
marches. The tasks for te large units and units are assigned for one
march and they are briefed on the axis of movement for the subsequent day
or two. 50X1-HUM
This will allow tasks to be defined and conveyed to large units and
units for the first day's march significantly before the movement of the
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/05: CIA-RDP10-00105R000201300001-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/05: CIA-RDP10-00105R000201300001-0
Page 9 of 10 Pages
50X1-HUM
troops of the army is planned for the entire depth. In this case, the
beginning of a movement is not made to depend on the completion of the
entire plan, and the goal and concept of the army's move also are kept
secret. Experience with a series of exercises shows that the first day's
march of the troops can be planned in 2.5 to three hours in an army, and in
a division in 4.5 to five hours after receipt of a directive of a front.
This time does not exceed the periods of bringing large units to full
combat readiness.
In the work of the control organs of the army and division during
planning of a move over a great distance, considerable time has usually
been taken up by the making of various calculations, especially of the
depth of the march columns, the time of crossing designated lines and the
time of arrival at the assigned areas. The special feature of these
calculations is that the initial data needed to make them are relatively
constant in value. Therefore, the staff of the army and the division
staffs can prepare beforehand tables, schedules and nomograms with which to
speed up significantly the making of calculations in planning a movement.
Thus, having data on the number of vehicles in subunits, units, and large
units, it is possible to calculate beforehand the depth of their columns
depending on the speed of movement and the amount of distance between them.
Time for calculations of the march is thereby reduced by about 15 to 20
percent.
Estimates show that the general volume of work by the staff of an army
in making all the necessary calculations for a day's march will constitute
roughly 350 to SOO mathematical operations, and for the entire depth of the
movement 1,750 to 2,500. With manual computations it has to take a
significant number of officers a long time. So recently various
calculators have been used more and more for calculations of the march.
The effectiveness of employing keyboard calculators and especially
electronic computers in these calculations is confirmed by the following
examples. In the exercise ELEKTRON, to estimate the depth of the columns
of the march foimation of an army manually required two hours. The same
calculations were performed on a keyboard calculator in 40 minutes, that
is, three times as fast. In one of the practical problems in the Military
Academy i/n M. V. Frunze the march of a tank division for a 600-kilometer
depth was calculated with the aid of an electronic computer in 20 to 25
minutes; at the same time, the manual method took about eight hours, that
is, 19 to 24 times as long. It is also well known that calculations of the
march performed with the aid of the electronic computer enjoy a high de OX1 -HUM
of accuracy.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/05: CIA-RDP10-00105R000201300001-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/05: CIA-RDP10-00105R000201300001-0
Page 10 of 10 Pages
50X1 -HUM
At the same time, experience in using electronic computers in
combined-arms staffs has revealed that officers of combined-arms staffs do
not always have the necessary practical skills in the preparation of
problems for solution on the electronic computer. Therefore, not
uncommonly, the time lost in programming the problems and fulfilling the
preliminary operations exceeds machine time ten to 15 times and more. The
paramount task of staff officers is the quickest possible mastery of
existing and forthcoming computers, which will facilitate a sharp increase
in the working efficiency of organs of control.
In conclusion, we stress that the ways we have looked at to reduce the
time required for planning a movement of troops of an army can to a
definite degree contribute to a significant reduction of the gap that has
developed between the period of bringing large units and units to full
combat readiness and the time spent by control organs in the organization
of the movement.
50X1-HUM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/05: CIA-RDP10-00105R000201300001-0