MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): WAYS OF INCREASING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE INFORMATION SERVICE OPERATIONAL AND TACTICAL RECONNAISSANCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP10-00105R000201290001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 5, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 23, 1975
• Content Type: MEMO

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Ways of Increasing the Effectiveness of the Information
Service in Operational and Tactical Reconnaissance
by
Colonel Z. Mbseyev
The highly mobile nature of troop combat actions in modern operations
and the rapid and abrupt changes in situations require the well-coordinated
performance of the information service within the military reconnaissance
system. The organization of timely collection, processing, recording,
analysis, evaluation, and delivery of reconnaissance data (especially on
the missile, nuclear, chemical, and bacteriological weapons of the enemy)
to the command elements and interested staffs occupies an important place
in the practical activities of reconnaissance at all levels.
The development and utilization of computers and computer systems is
considered the principal approach to shortening the time required to
process reconnaissance data. This approach, however, is not the only one.
In our opinion, much can be done to increase the effectiveness of the
information service even at the present time within the framework of the
existing tables of organization and capabilities of the reconnaissance
organs.
The work of the information service is the concluding phase of all
reconnaissance organization measures and it is the most important function
of every staff. Experience shows that the quality of the work of the
entire operational and tactical reconnaissance system is reflected in the
work of the information service. Without well-coordinated information, the
purposeful organization and conduct of reconnaissance is inconceivable.
Its planning is possible only on the basis of data obtained earlier.
In comparison with the World War II period, the volume of work of the
information service and the demands made upon it within the operational
reconnaissance system have changed significantly. The experience of the
staffs of the border military districts and groups of forces, command-staff
exercises and games, and tactical-special exercises of reconnaissance units
indicate that the rhythm and volume of this work increases sharply,
especially with the introduction of a threatening situation and during the
course of an operation. In the latter instance, the intelligence
directorate of a front staff will receive daily an average of 200 to 250
different information and reconnaissance reports which contain more
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precise or new data on important enemy targets and actions.*
Each report on the average contains two or three sentences of text,
and some contain more. No less than 65 to 70 man-hours are spent on
processing all the informational materials. About 70 to 80 percent of all
the reconnaissance reports require immediate processing (study, collation,
analysis, etc.) and 20 to 30 percent need rapid clarification and
reverification.
Research on the results of command-staff exercises, troop exercises,
and tactical-special exercises of reconnaissance units conducted in the
Odessa Military District from 1963 to 1966 confirms that the passage and
processing time of reconnaissance data could be sipificantly reduced by
good organization and more accurate information wors at all levels. For
example, during the course of operations, data could go from a division to
the front staff, omitting the army level**, in 0.3 to 0.5 hours; aerial
photiTiaThy data transmitted by direct secure communications channels and
high-frequency channels took 0.5 to one hour (using wet negatives, 25 to 30
minutes). If the crews and radio operators are trained, division and army
(corps) staffs can receive data with the use of simplified tables within
two to three minutes from onboard a reconnaissance aircraft which is
conducting reconnaissance by visual observation; from front radio and
radiotechnical reconnaissance utilizing coding equipment and secure
communications equipment, it took 30 to 40 minutes; information transmitted
by radio from special-purpose reconnaissance groups (detachments) and from
front agent collection directly to the control post of the chief of
intelligence took 1.5 to two hours (from the moment the order was issued).
*It has been established that of this number there are approximately 25 to
30 reports from air reconnaissance; 20 to 30 from radio and radiotechnical
reconnaissance of the front; 35 to 40 from special-purpose reconnaissance
groups (detachments) of the front; 25 to 30 from agents; 10 to 15 reports
from the study and processing donedirectly in the intelligence directorate
of various materials and captured enemy documents; 10 or 11 from prisoner
interrogation reports and the interrogations of deserters and local
inhabitants; 40 to SO reconnaissance reports from army (corps) and
individual division staffs; 10 to 12 from the staffs of branch arms and
services; 10 to 12 from adjacent fronts (fleets); three or four from an
airborne division and amphibious landing forces from the enemy rear; and 10
to 12 reports from other sources (rear services organs, staffs of
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**With the simultaneous delivery of the reports to the army and front
staffs.
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Practice shows that in peacetime, in order to reduce the time required
for the initial and subsequent detailed processing of reports, it can be
carried out rapidly and accurately in the intelligence collection organs
themselves, in the staffs and command posts of reconnaissance units, in the
intelligence sections of staffs of large units, and in the departments of
staffs of operational formations. This method of operation is expedient in
wartime as well. As a result, on important information, the intelligence
directorate of a front staff receives at first short and then, depending on
the rate of processing and the need, complete and expanded reports with the
documents obtained appended. In a case where the data are of great
importance, the front staff can demand that it be reported immediately or
that all the material on the target be sent for direct processing by the
intelligence directorate. Such a work scheme guarantees effectiveness and
quality processing, and it also helps avoid unnecessary correspondence and
questions, and unproductive expenditure of time. As a result, the refined
and verified data in the coded message comprise only a few groups and the
senior staff personnel are freed from superfluous work.
All incoming information reports are entered into the targets file, in
logbooks, and on information maps, and recorded on magnetic or punched
tape. If the data are extremely important, formal reports for the command,
reports for the General Staff, and information reports for cooperating
staffs and adjacent units are prepared. Such painstaking, persistent, and
creative work of the information service in peacetime, which often goes
unnoticed by others, subsequently, as a rule, pays off handsomely,
especially in introducing corrections into operations plans, in preparing
operations in short periods of time, and in the selection of targets for
the initial nuclear strike.
With the initiation of combat actions, however, the rhythm of this
work increases approximately eight to ten times. It seems to us, moreover,
that it can be sustained during the first few days of an operation only if
the information service has been efficiently organized during peacetime, if
there has been a delineation of the functional responsibilities among the
officers (including those temporarily allocated from other departments of
the intelligence directorate to reinforce the information work), and if the
chief of intelligence of the front has a technically equipped control post.
At the tactical level, particularly in a division, the volume of
information work is very high. Thus, based on the results of division
exercises and tactical-special exercises of reconnaissance battalions
conducted in the district in recent years, it has been established that the
staff of a division conducting combat actions, on the average, may receive
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125 to 165 reconnaissance reports and diverse information reports
(comprising 370 to 450 phrases or 1,100 to 1,500 groups of characters)* per
day.
In addition, during one day of combat, a division staff allocates 10
to 15 supplemental reconnaissance tasks, makes 10 to 15 reports to the
higher staff, and sends five or six information reports to adjacent,
cooperating, and subordinate staffs.
All this indicates that such a volume of work cannot be accomplished
by an intelligence section of a division staff consisting of three or four
men. An analogous situation exists in an army corps staff. Here,
obviously, just as in the case of operational reconnaissance, it is
necessary to allocate officers of other staff departments and sections, and
part of the work devolves upon the staffs of reconnaissance units. One is
forced to conclude that the information service, like the entire
reconnaissance system, should be maintained in peacetime fully manned and
in a high state of combat readiness.
Moreover, in order to increase the effectiveness of the work of the
information service in operational and tactical reconnaissance, it would be
expedient, in our view, without further postponement, to adopt the
following basic measures.
Having scientifically determined the appropriate criteria based on the
time, importance, and volume of information, and on the nature of the
activities of the work force, to allocate the sequence and content of the
work among the departments and sections of corresponding staffs of
MI-Rations and large units, and also among the staffs of reconnaissance
units.
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*This includes: from three or four deep reconnaissance groups, 12 to 15
reports; from four or five division reconnaissance groups, 20 to 30; from
division units, 20 to 25; from the reconnaissance by the branch arms and
services, 10 to 15; from radio and radiotechnical reconnaissance 16 to 20;
from captured documents and prisoner of war interrogation reports, six to
eight; from coded reports from reconnaissance aircraft, 25 to 30; from
adjacent, cooperating, and higher staffs, 10 to 15; and from other sources,
six or seven.
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To separate, for example, information on important targets from the
general mass of information and to transmit short reports (three or four
groups on the name, coordinates, and time of observation of a target)
initially only to interested echelons (to army and front staffs); to
strictly delimit the submission time for information on important and
secondary targets; to "cut off" at a lower level data which are not of
practical significance to higher echelons. Where it is expedient, for
example, in radio and radiotechnical reconnaissance, to do the initial
processing of information rapidly and with a high degree of quality in the
organs that obtain it. To regulate the "flow of information" and, having
allocated its primary and secondary channels, to combine the reconnaissance
control and data receiving channels. It is necessary to equip the
information service with tape recorders, projectors, and video-recording
and other technical equipment.
The following could be proposed as one of the variants in the
allocation of basic fields (functional responsibilities) in information
work. In a front -- enemy weapons of mass destruction; ground forces, air
forces, air defense, and navy; and engineer preparation of theaters of
military operations. In an army -- enemy weapons of mass destruction;
ground forces, tactical aviation, ship groupings in a coastal zone (during
operations of the army on a coastal axis); and combat lines, communications
centers, and basic elements of the road network in the depth of the army
operation. In a division -- enemy missile/nuclear weapons, his opposing
ground units, defensive lines, and natural obstacles.
A large role in improving the quality of information work may be
played by the control post of the chief of intelligence, if the data
obtained are collected and processed in it. This post must be improved with
regard to table of organization and equipment. It seems to us that it must
be subordinated to the information department of the front staff
intelligence directorate charged with supervising the -information work,
analyzing reconnaissance data, and preparing basic reports and documents.
Practice has demonstrated that there must be a strict centralization
of command of all reconnaissance activities in a single organ, i.e., in the
intelligence directorate of a front staff and correspondingly in the
intelligence department of an army staff. The real center for the
assembling of information and the processing of data should be, first of
all, the intelligence sections, departments, and directorates of the
combined-arms staffs which are capable of consolidating the efforts of all
reconnaissance forces and means and of providing the command and the cfnffc
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with all the information necessary for making decisions, particularly5
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concerning the employment of weapons of mass destruction.
This is also confirmed by the fact that during exercises
reconnaissance information, in the majority of cases, and particularly in
the detection of a surprise enemy attack, comes in even to the front in the
form of direct and indirect reconnaissance indicators, which in themselves,
without analysis and comparison with other data, cannot sufficiently define
a specific event or target. The skilful processing of information and the
analysis of various correlations between phenomena may be successfully
accomplished, specifically, in the control posts of chiefs of intelligence.
In addition to the centralization of command of reconnaissance, we
should also eliminate a certain discrepancy between the numerical strength
of the information service (especially at the division-army level) and the
structure of the intelligence collection organs, i.e., one information
officer is usually assigned to three or four fields.
Staffs of large units and formations should have, in our view, a
sufficient amount of standard eq4pment: ultra-shortwave band
reconnaissance receivers for receiving data from onboard reconnaissance
aircraft, and receivers which can be switched into the network of
combined-arms staffs for the purpose of mutual information about the enemy.
Within the system of receiving data from reconnaissance aircraft, it
is necessary to simplify the signal tables, the coding of maps, the
allocation of data transmission bands and methods (especially at long
distances). "Air-to-ground" type television equipment should be. improved '
so that it can provide the exact coordinates of targets and so that the
interpretation of the latter might be facilitated, especially in the case
of those which are concealed or well camouflaged.
In our view, it is necessary to improve further the status of radio
communications with reconnaissance units and, likewise, the procedure and
precedence of radio traffic. Subordinate staffs should not delay the
transmission of important information.
Successful information work will be greatly facilitated by the timely
allocation of concise and specific tasks to the executors, realistic time
limits for their accomplishment, anTTHE sequence and periodicity of data
reports. To do this will require that the system of working out tasks be
regulated, that there be created integrated forms of documents
(reconnaissance instructions, reports) in which there is strict
specification of a standardized procedure for the presentation of tasks and
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the distribution of the text, which will, in turn, ensure their rapid
encoding and transmission by communications means. In addition to this,
information documents should not be too bulky or overloaded with general
formulations, or with information which has no practical significance or
does not pertain to the evolving situation. The use in the staffs of
various standard forms of short information documents, index cards, and
blank maps, and the extensive utilization of the system of textual
abbreviations which has been devised, will make it possible to speed up the
work process.
The training of information personnel also plays an important role
The creation and-integration of an information service within the
reconnaissance of a military district (front) staff requires, as experience
shows, five to six months. The officer complement of the staffs of
reconnaissance units and the commanders of reconnaissance organs must be
skilled in the initial processing and concise formulation of reports on the
information obtained. The absence of such skills results in needless
inquiries and refinements and sometimes even in the inaccurate preparation
of information documents (the time, the source of information, etc., are
missing).
The level of special training of information officers is of especially
great importance in processing and analyzing reconnaissance information. In
this process, in addition to experience and theoretical knowledge, a role
is played by intuition, professional perception, a creative approach, and
self-discipline in work. In order to have this, it seems to us, the
service of the officers must alternate between the information and the
collection organs (experience shows that the training of an officer for
information work requires significantly more time).
Personnel of reconnaissance units and subunits of large units should
have sufficient skill to determine the coordinates of targets with high
precision, particularly at a considerable distance from the targets (1,500
to 2,500 meters), and to know the reconnaissance indicators of enemy
armament, equipment, and combat activity, especially those which reveal the
preparation for the use of weapons of mass destruction. Reconnaissance
groups and deep reconnaissance groups must be equipped with improved
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The implementation of all the above-mentioned measures, which do not
require great materiel expenditure or long periods of time, it seems to us,
will improve the quality of the information service and increase its
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effectiveness even during peacetime.
However, it goes without saying that the existing system of
collecting, processing, analyzing, and delivering reconnaissance data to
interested echelons at the division-front level without the use of
electronic information systems cannot meet the ever-increasing requirements
for conducting modern operations. In our opinion, it is first necessary to
create and introduce into reconnaissance, at least on an experimental
basis, semi-automated and completely automated information-reconnaissance
systems and subsystems. In addition to this, it is extremely desirable to
continue the development and introduction of other technical means and
equipment, particularly for the automatic encoding and transmission of
reconnaissance information from maps, the printed page, voice, magnetic
tape recordings, automatic secure communications devices, reproduction
machines, communications receiving and transmitting equipment (radio,
telegraph, facsimile, television) -- all of these will ensure speed,
precision, security, and reliability in the transmission and receipt of
reconnaissance information.
In our opinion, at the division-army-front level, a combined automated
information-reconnaissance system (ground-77)?for collecting, transmitting
processing, recording, and distributing reconnaissance data would be most
acceptable in the immediate future. The structure and basic technical
means of such a system, and of the subsystems entering into it,will take
the following general form.
Subsystems are intended for supplying information within the types of
reconnaissance and the reconnaissance units. Stations of subsystems can be
included in the basic automated system. The stations of the system, which
are mounted on either an amphibious tank base or on a motor vehicle base
with cross-country capability, should be located at the intelligence
sections, departments, and directorates of staffs; and the central (main)
station, at the command post of the chief of intelligence of the front.
They should have equipment for receiving all types of reconnaissance
information (television, television photography, infrared, radar, ground
and aerial photography, diagrams, maps, etc.), radio reconnaissance and
radiotechnical reconnaissance data (from OSNA2 units and from aircraft
equipped with radiotechnical reconnaissance equipment), aerial
reconnaissance data, and data from adjacent, higher, and cooperating
staffs.
The system and subsystems must have at their disposal telecode and
facsimile communications means and must ensure the automation of the
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receiving, processing, registration, partial analysis, recording, and
distribution of reconnaissance information with the aid of special plotting
boards, maps (the land, air, and sea situations; and the location of
missile/nuclear weapons), and special illuminated screens for the overall
situation.
This system, in our opinion, must include the aerial
photoreconnaissance processing and interpretation center located in the
vicinity of the airfield where an operational reconnaissance air regiment
and its staff are based. The center will carry out rapid photo processing,
interpretation, determination of the coordinates of the elements of
targets, and the preparation and reproduction of reconnaissance photo
documents. All data should be transmitted by facsimile and secure
communications, and with the aid of aircraft, helicopters, and motor
vehicles to the air army staff and to the intelligence directorate of the
front staff and, on instruction from the latter, to the army staffs.
Every station of the system and subsystem should permit the input of
reconnaissance data from various sources (special-purpose reconnaissance
groups, deep reconnaissance groups, reconnaissance aircraft, radio and
radiotechnical reconnaissance, etc.).
This system as a whole, it appears to us, will be capable of ensuring
the automated collection, processing, registration, and distribution of
reconnaissance information on the enemy situation; the production of
necessary estimates connected with reconnaissance planning, the evaluation
of the combat strength and capabilities of the enemy, and the compilation
of information documents; the delivery of queries and answers to them to
the appropriate echelons; and the monitoring of the execution of
reconnaissance tasks. The introduction of the system would permit the
resolution of basically technical problems; and it would facilitate the
appraisal of the enemy situation and the analysis of it by the information
departments of the intelligence directorate of the front staff and of the
army staffs.
In posing the question of the importance and timeliness of developing
and introducing such a system, we do not exclude the fact that in the
initial phases certain shortcomings are possible. For example, it is not
capable of eliminating errors introduced into the system through the fault
of the collecting organs (sources), which in combat reconnaissance practice
comprise eight to ten percent. The full processing cycle will be
protracted, especially when data accumulation is slow (depending upon the
intensity of the work of the sources); the equipment of the system is bulky
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and vulnerable; and a certain deviation from the anticipated results is
possible due to the input of an insufficient quantity of data into the
information system. In many cases there may not be a critical approach to
the initial data on the basis of which the enemy is assessed.
Nevertheless, the use of such a system will have indisputable advantages.
In conclusion, let us note that all of the reconnaissance activity is
focused in the information service. At times, the basis of success and the
cause of failure of reconnaissance as a whole resides in the very
organization of its work. The precise organization of the information
service within the operational and tactical reconnaissance system requires
constant attention and monitoring by the chiefs of staffs and the chiefs of
intelligence of the military district (front) and the armies; this will
permit the effective utilization of all -EIFting reconnaissance forces and
means.
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