MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): SOME PROBLEMS OF THE CONTROL OF TROOPS OF A FRONT IN A MOVEMENT OVER A LARGE DISTANCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP10-00105R000201170001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 3, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 23, 1975
• Content Type: MEMO

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Intelligence Information Special Report
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DATE 23 July 1975
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MILITARY THOU(-1T (USSR): Some Problems of the Control of Troops
of a Front in a Movement over a Large Distance
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Some Problems of the Control of Troops of a
Front in a Movement over a Large Distance
by
General~~Mayyoor~r of Tank Troops P. Nazarov,
Colonel G. Cherkas, and
Colonel V. Savelyev
The organization of the movement of troops over a large distance has
been set forth in a series of texts and in periodical literature. In an
article based on war games conducted in 1966-1967, they examined the
problems of ensuring continuity of control of troops which, in our view,
demand comprehensive discussion and soluFTon.
The control of troops of a front during their movement from th-e
interior-of the country has substantial special features: it is necessary
to control troops in the departure area, on the routes of movement, and in
the new concentration area almost simultaneously.
It is practically impossible to ensure control in such cases with only
the command posts, forward command posts, and rear control posts of a front
and armies which are moving with troops. It is necessary to set up
temporary auxiliary control posts, place them along the whole depth of
movement, and more widely use the traffic control service.
In exercises, operations groups from the headquarters of formations
were set up for this purpose. They facilitated control considerably and
assisted in the achievement of continuous command of troops from the main
posts while these were located in place or being relocated.
Operations groups were set up using personnel of the main control
posts and in a way became "control points" on certain lines and in certain
areas. They brought about an immediate monitoring of the order of movement
in accordance with the decision of the front troop commander, summarized
the situational data, and, maintaining constant communications with the
command posts or forward command posts, reported to their formation
commander or chief of staff, and when necessary amplified the tasks for the
troops and took measures to fulfil them.
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The composition of such a group was made up of officers from the
operations directorate, the staff of the rocket troops and artillery, the
engineer directorate, the chief of the air defense troops, and the
directorates of the chemical troops, military transportion, the rear, and
communications, as well as the forces and means of communications, engineer
subunits and security subunits. Officers of the intelligence directorate
were also assigned to the group being sent to the staff of the forward ~~'
operating front.
Operations groups were usually sent to the boundary of the state
border, to major water obstacles, to staffs of forward operating
formations, and to the final concentration area. Specifically, in one of
the war games, Operations Group No. 1, with _a element of 2Sine id
headed by the deputy chief of staff of the front, was sent to the state
---------
border with-- the task4f directing the trans loadiinq of
European-gauge and passing the marching columns of troops through the
traffic control points. The group had communications with the command
posts of the front and armies, with the traffic control areas, and with
operations groups of the armies which also were located in the border area.
Operations Group No. 2, with eight men headed by the deputy chief of
intelligence of the front, was sent to the staff of the forward operating
formation to gather information on the enemy and his troops and to organize
cooperation.
Operations Group No 3 located at a major water obstacle, directed
the troop crossing an .
organized the maneuver with water crossing means; it
had communications with control posts of the front and armies, with organs
of the traffic control service and also with o~ cal military and civilian
administrative organs in the territory of the other country. The group was
composed of 29_=nand headed by the deputy chief of the operations
directorate of the front.
Operations Group. No. 4, made up of ZQ-men under the direction of the
deputy chief of the operations department of the operations directorate of
the staff of the front, was sent o the_final concentration area of tie'
troops of the front with the goal of reconnaissance of the area,
preparation of-Me-area for the siting of control-posts, and the
organization of the traffic control service. Operations groups were sent
to designated areas after the declaration of a combat alert and stayed
there until the completion of the troop movement through the specified
area.
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In all, the forming of the operations groups in the case we are citing
required 73 men which amou is to 'bo t 1. percent of the overall complement
and s of the field headquarters of (without
of t?e generals-
counting the personnel directorate, the secretariat of the military
council, the finance department, and the military censorship element).
Thus, 60 to 70 percent of the overall complement remained at the command
post and 20 to 25 percent at the forward command post.
The movement of the operations groups required about 35 vehicles (10
passenger cars, 15 command-staff and staff cars, and 10 trucks) which
amounted tQ_ I percent of the overall quantity of means of transportwhich -k
is calculated-
command post by organic mean
The experience of exercises shows that the op,
b~sed_ mainly on permanent comet n Car; ons ; n on the state
communications system and on the communications system of the Stavka of the
Supreme High Command; they will also be within the communications system of
friendly countries, using cable and overhead lines, radio-relay lines, and
radio communications centers. However, to perform a number of tasks in
troop control, it-is necessary that the groups are provided with a certain
minimum, of radio relay, wire, and radio communications means r om the
organic units of the front Thus, to provide radio means to the indicated
groups, 29 ra io sets of various types were provided by drawing on the
communications re ig menu of the front command post. Of these, four sets
were in the 1st operations group, 16 in the 2nd, drawing on the means of
the alternate position of the command post; four in the 3rd; and five in
the 4th. Besides this, each operations group was allocated part of the
radio-relay and wire communications means.
As a result, detaching several operations groups from the complement
of a field headquarters facilitates improving the control of troops during
their movement. Therefore, it is necessary to select officers beforehand
and to prepare them for work within the complement of operations_g__ro_ups and
to prepare the main control posts to work with a somewhat reduced
complement. 50X1-HUM
As has already been stated, operations groups of like composition and
technical equipment handle their own responsibilities and accomplish some
of the tasks of the main control posts. Some decrease in the composition
of the latter as a result of the detachment of operations groups does not
have an effect on its activity because the volume of tasks accomplished by
these posts in the course of movement will obviously be less (especially
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until the use of weapons of mass destruction by the enemy) than during the
carrying out of an operation. Besides that, the presence of a far-flung
network of control organs, which are located great distances from each
other and along the whole depth of the movement of troops, provides a
steadier movement, even in the case when the enemy employs weapons of mass
destruction.
It is necessary to note that the variant we have shown is_near the
maximum in terms of the quantity of operations groups, their composition,
.mod equipment.
Thus,_the_control system for troops of the front moving over a large
distance will include: the main control osts (command post, forward
command post, rear control post) and auxiliary posts represented by
operations groups of varying composition and purpose.
A system of control posts must be made ready in advance, in peacetime.
The deployment of the main posts to prepared areas should be executed when
the troops are brought to full combat readiness. With this, the main
complement of a field headquarters goes quickly to the designated area --
as the directorates and departments are made ready -- not waiting for the
general assembly. In the first instance, the command post and rear control
post deploy in the departure area. During the period when the troops are
brought to an increased state of combat readiness, it is advisable to
dispatch small operations groups preliminarily to the deployment area of
the command post and rear control post.
At the forward command post, usually headed by the deputy commander of
the troops of the front, there will be officers from the primary
directorates and departments and representatives of the branch arms and
special troops. The forward command post is set up in accordance with the
situation and the selected method of relocation of main control posts. For
instance, with relocation-by--the "successive displacement" method, the
forward command post must already be one day's march ahead of the command
post before the movement of troops begins. It follows that, in this case,
it is necessary to set up the forward command post at the same time as the
command post and the rear control post. In other cases it can be set up
somewhat later.
Operations groups will move to their designated areas as the troops
begin to be brought to an increased state of combat readiness and will stay
there until their tasks are fulfilled.
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The control of troops in the course of their movement is fundamentally
accomplished by the forward command post and the command post which, as a
result, either are relocated or take control themselves, being broadly
supported in this by the auxiliary control posts. The commander of troops
of the front, in our opinion, must be in the command post, as a rule; but
he must have the capability of transferring to a different control post --
including to an operations group -- where the situation for the troops has
become most critical at any given time.
Let us look at the sspecial features of the work of operations groups
in the control of troops in the course of a movement.
The control of the loading of troops in the loading areas, which is
usually carried out by an operations group, deserves special attention. It
is composed of operations officers, officers of the Military Transportation
Service, the rear staff, and other departments and services of the field
headquarters of the operational formation. The group has the appropriate
means of communication and regularly reports to the command post or forward
command post during the course of the loading and dispatch of trains.
According to the experience of exercises and war games, the direct
control of troops during transit of a state border can be effected by an
operations group of the front staff. Some o its officers can be located
along the more important routes of movement of the troops and at railroad
stations. The group must be supported by its own forces and means and
besides that, by the organs of the traffic control service and the border
guard troops.
The traffic control units on a state border usually set up traffic
control areas; apart from their immediate responsibilities, they
participate in the control of troops moving through a system of traffic
control and movement control posts. The border guard troops set up their
check points with communications means on every route of the movement of
the operational formation and large units, and on rail lines which crogq
the border. 50X1-HUM
Speaking of the possibility of using the border guard troops and thei
means for control of the troops of the front, it is necessary to note that
this question must be thoroughly thought through in advance -- in peacetime
-- and coordinated with the appropriate border guard troop organs. It is
known that, with the onset of combat operations, the border ward its can
become operationally subordinate to commanders of the troops of the border
military districts for a defined period. Thus, the use of border guard
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units and their means in support of control of troops will be a completely
natural thing and absolutely not detrimental to the fulfilment of their own
fundamental duties.
Duriinnegotiation of major water obstacles by the troops in the
course of their movement, their control will be carried out, in the main,
by an operations group specially designated for this. Dispatches on the
passage of troops through river lines, and on their status and location in
the given period will be received by the group from its officers,
commandants of the crossings, commandants of the traffic control areas, and
from the commanders of the large units and units. On the basis of an
analysis of the situation, the operations group will take effective
measures in support of timely negotiation of river lines by the troops;
they will, in particular, amplify individual tasks for the units, give
instructions, set up auxiliary crossings by drawing on the reserves,
activate back-up crossings, etc. The data on the situation and the
measures taken in support of a rapid crossing of the troops will be
transmitted to the command post or forward command post for the report to
the front troop commander.
The control of troops of the first echelon during their approach to
the final concentration areas, and before the arrival of the main control
posts in these areas, is advisably handled by an operations group which has
been sent especially for this purpose. At this point the situation can
change abruptly and require the establishment of a new grouping of troops.
Under these conditions one of the most important tasks for the operations
group will be the amplification of the tasks for the troops in accordance
with the commander's decision and in accordance with the situation; the
tasks include implementing monitoring of their fulfilment, rendering
assistance, and coordinating with the staffs of the forward operating
formations in respect to the areas and order of deployment of the troops.
In exercising control, the group relies on information received from the
designated staff, its own representatives, and the traffic control service
organized from the means of the front and armies.
Besides this, in the case where main control posts are put out of
operation or unable, due to the conditions of the situation, to exercise
control, the operations groups can temporarily fulfil their functions or /
serve as the basis for the restoration of one o them. This is completely
confirmed by the experience of exercises and war games. Thus, in the
course of one of the war games, part of the troops of the front moving up
from the interior came to a river line and crossed to the opposite shore
where a large part of them were cut off by a nuclear barrier and could not
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continue the negotiation of the river crossing in the order envisaged in
the plan. As a result of the destruction of transportation centers and
bridges, a significant number of troops moving by rail transport continued
the march by organic means or were temporarily delayed in occupying areas.
The forward command post of the front was destroyed; the command post was
on the move in zones with high levels of radiation.
Such a complex operational situation demands the organization of
control of troops in the minimal amount time. The only correct solution
was to temporarily transfer control to the operations group which was
controlling the troops crossing the water obstacle. Since the withdrawal
of the command post from zones with high levels of radiation and deployment
in a new area took a significant amount of time, the commander, with a few
generals and officers, arrived at this group by helicopter and took control
himself. The group received additional__,Q~ntm ations means from the
-,reserve. The advisability of such a solution was conditioned by the fact
that the specified operations group had data available on the location and
status of the grouping of troops moving toward the river line, had
communications with them and direct contact through their own
representatives, the traffic control service, and engineer units
maintaining the crossing.
Extraordinarily complex conditions for the provision of control of
troops of the front in the course of a movement occurs in the case when
both the command post and forward command post are put out of operation
simultaneously. In such a situation, as experience shows, the control of
troops can be taken over, first of all, by the commander and staff-f one
of the armies moving forward in the second echelon or one wh ch-has-t-een
designated for operations on the main axis.
One of the exercises, for example, provided for the transfer of
control to the command post of an army moving forward in the second echelon
throughout the entire zone of the front along several axial routes and 50X1-HUM
using the front communications channels located along the routes. The
commander of the army under such conditions had available the necessary
data on the situation in the zone of movement of the front.
For the provision of control of the formations and large units of_ the
front, a commander of an army designated as a deputy commander ofthe
-troops of the front, familiarizes himself in detail with the plan of
movement and the system of control during the planning process. A second
copy of this plan may be sent to the staff of the army. The chief of
communications of this army may receive for his use a large amount of
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communications means by drawing on the reserve. Besides this he
familiarizes himself with the communications system in the entire zone of
movement of troops of the front.
The conditions of the situation always determine the order for taking
on control. However, in all cases it is first necessary to provide for
control of rocket large units, the air army, and the air defeflse troops of
the front, and then for control of the troops of the first and second
echelons,-fereserves, and the rear.
In the conditions being considered, one should not exclude the
possibility of transferring control to the rear control post. In our
opinion, however, this should be done op __inthe extreme circumstance
where no command post, not even of just one of the armies, will be in a
position to take over control of the troops of the front.
Considering the incomplete complement of the rear control post, from
which part of the officers of the rear move to operations groups, the
availability of a limited quanta of organic communications means at the
rear control post, and the extremely complicated conditions for control of
troops of the front during their movement (the great dispersal of groupings
of troops, the varying nature of movement, etc.) one can maintain that it
is doubtful that the rear control post can cope with this task. One cannot
count on a timely reinforcement of the rear control post by operations
officers and the necessary communications means under the given conditions
of the situation.
As exercises and war games have confirmed, the determination of the
process of exchange of information between the troops and control posts is
of great importance for increasing the efficiency of the control of the
troops and, first of all, the efficient use of existing communications
means. By proceeding from anticipation of the conditions of the situation,
the following were determined first: communications lines for information
in the various stages of movement of troops (from whom, to whom, and what
reports, instructions, summaries, and other data should be sent or
received), the nature of this data, its possible volume and transmittal
time periods. ` /
ft`
Due to the limited_capabilities oftechnicalcommunications means, the
quantity of reports, situation reports, and orders _was liimited. For
instance, the only obligatory situation reports were those from the troops
on crossing state borders, wide river lines, and phase lines, on the
departure time of trains, their passage through major railway junctions,
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and on the movement of formations and large units to areas of the day's
halt and final concentration areas as well. The routine situation reports
on the status and location of troops were reduced to a minimum and were
given to the staff of the front only two times in a 24-hour period and
situation reports to the bra arms and services, once per 24-hour period.
The comprehensive working out of a process of exchange of
non-scheduled information is extremely complex. To this relate situation
reports on sudden changes in the situation and on the employment by the
enemy of means of mass destruction, various kinds of discussions of the
persons in charge, requests, inquiries, and mutual informing of staffs and
troops about about the situation. After a highly detailed study of this
question and a determination of what belongs to scheduled and what to
non-scheduled information, and the general process of exchange of it, it
remains to be determined among which levels they should be transmitted.
The question of the mutual exchange of information was investigated in
war games at the following levels: Stavka of the Supreme High Command --
front; front -- army (large units, units f front subordination); command
post --ward command post; command post and forward command post --
operations groups. An _analysis_of theflow of information shows that its
volume may reach 10,000 groups or more at the Stavka of the Supreme High
Command -- front level, and 12,000 to 15,000 groups or more at the front --
army level, in one 24-hour period. Of course, such a volume puts a levy
load on the existing communications system and calls for efficient planning
of its utilization.
It seems to us that this gives rise to the necessity of working out a
schedule for exchange of information between staffs and all control posts
which is coordinated with the movement times of troops and also with the
relocation of the control posts themselves. The lines of transmission of
information, the quantity of information sources, their nature, and
transmission frequency should be reflected in this schedule.
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The problems considered in the article, in our view, have a practical
significance and call for further research and testing in the course of
exercises and war games.
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