MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): FORTIFICATION IN MODERN WARFARE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP10-00105R000201130001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 16, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 9, 1975
• Content Type: MEMO

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
9 July 1975
MEMIJRANIKIM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR) : Fortification in
Modern Warfare
1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is part of a
series now in preparation based on the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense
publication Collection of Articles of the Journal "Milita Thou ht". This
article deals with recent changes in fortification, describing t e
fortification of US missile sites as an example. The theory of
fortification is influenced by such factors as competition between the
developing means of destruction and means of fortification, the
impossibility of full-scale tests, and the danger of inefficient
expenditure of resources. The author examines the protection requirements
and functions of fortified structures, along with the need to reduce the
vulnerability of equipment being protected, and cites research on the
destructive effect of enemy nuclear weapons being conducted in an effort to
solve the problem of providing an efficient degree of protection. This
article appeared in Issue No. 1 (80) for 1967. 5OX2-WMD
2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive, this
document should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within recipient
agencies. For ease of reference. retxkts from this publication have been
assigned
William E. Nel on
Deputy Director for erations
Page 1 of 14 Pages
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Distribution:
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Assistant to the Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Department of the Army
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
U. S. Air Force
Director, National Security Agency
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Deputy Director for Science and Technology
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
for National Intelligence Officers
Director of Strategic Research
Director of Weapons Intelligence
Page 2 of 14 Pages
ToP SE ET-
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THIS DOCUMENT MAY NOT BE REPRODUCED
Intelligence Information Special Report
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COUNTRY USSR
DATE OF
INFO. Early 1967
MILITARY THaJGHF (USSR): Fortification in Modern Warfare
SOURCE Documentary
9 July 1975
Summary:
The following report is a translation from Russian of an article which
appeared in Issue No. 1 (80) for ] of the SECRET USSR Ministry of
Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military
Thought". The author of this article is Engineer Colonel artsumyan.
s article deals with recent changes in fortification, describing the
fortification of US missile sites as an example. The theory of
fortification is influenced by such factors as competition between the
developing means of destruction and means of fortification, the
impossibility of full-scale tests, and the danger of inefficient
expenditure of resources. The author examines the protection requirements`
and functions of fortified structures, along with the need to reduce the
vulnerability of equipment being protected, and cites research on the
destructive effect of enemy nuclear weapons being conducted in an effort to
solve the problem of providing an efficient degree of protection.
End of Summary
An A. L. Ambartsumyan was identified as a professor at the Military
Engineer Academy in 1968. The SECRET version of Military Thought was
published three times annually and was distributed down to the level of
division commander. It reportedly ceased publication at the end of 1970.
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Fortification in Modern Warfare
by
Engineer Colonel A. Ambartsumyan
Military-technological superiority over the probable enemy must be
achieved not only in the area of armament but in the means and methods of
implementing this superiority in armed combat; and these become
particularly apparent in modern fortification.
Fortification possesses the means and methods to provide and maintain
a constant high combat readiness and an effective utilization of the
bran es of the armed forces at the very beginning and the course of a
war.
The fortification preparation of the territory of the major countries
of the world by way of their advance engineer preparation for war has been
given a great deal of attention in the past, also. In all previous wars,
fortification was widely employed for the preparation of positions, siting
areas, and troop disposition areas while the war was already in progress;
and it was usually done by the troops themselves and often during combat
actions by the enemy. For that time, the theory of fortification was
thoroughly worked out.
The role of fortification in maintaining a constant combat readiness
and combat capability of the armed forces under modern conditions is
increasing immeasurably. Permanent-fortification assures high combat
effectiveness and combat readiness of the strategic means of armed combat,
and field fortification assures the fulfilment of operational-tactical
tasks during combat operations of all branches of the armed forces.
Several questions on fortification have already appeared in Collection
of Articles of the Journal "Milita Thought"* and on the pages of the
Journal.** However, in our view, this problem has not been fully resolved
antic should be further elaborated. We will attempt to express our views on
a series of questions on the theory and the practice of modern
fortification.
*Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought", 1961, No. 1 (56)
and 5 (60), 1962, No. 6 (67).
**"Military Thought", 1964, Nos. 1 and 7.
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The fortification preparation* of the territory of a country in
support-of strategic forces and means is primarily conducted in peacetime:
positions and areas of troop dispositions (basing), command posts,
arsenals, etc., are set up in advance.
The US can be taken as an example of the quantitative and qualitative
changes that have recently taken place in the sphere of fortification. By
1957, the Americans prepared only exposed surface launching sites for the
Atlas-D missile. By 1958, after the appearance in the USSR of effective
means for hitting targets at any point on earth, the US shifted to the
fortification protection of intercontinental ballistic missile sites by
constructing surface shelters of the horizontal type for launchers,
providing protection against an overpressure of 1 kg/cm2 from a travelling
shock wave from a surface nuclear burst. Toward the end of 1959, they
began to build these shelters in pits, which increased the degree of
protection in them to 1.75 kg/cm2.
Then a fundamental change was required in the fortification
preparation of missile launch sites. From 1960, for the Titan-I and Atlas
missiles, they began to build silo structures which were completely dug
into the ground to a depth of 50 to 55 meters. These silos should provide
protection against a shock wave pressure of 7 kg/cm2 and diminish the
overloads from the seismic effect of a burst from 50 to 3 'g's (a 'g' _
9.81 m/sec --one unit of acceleration of gravity). At the end of 1960, a
silo of a new design was built for the Titan-II missile, which permitted
the missiles to be launched directly from the silo. The protective
properties of such a structure are specified as a pressure from a 50X2 wMD
travelling wave of 7 to 14 kg/cm2.
In recent years the US has made the most widespread use of silos with
reduced dimensions, measuring 26 meters in depth and 3.6 meters in diameter
for the Minuteman missile; these silos provide protection against a shock
wave overpressure of 14 to 21 kg/cm?. There are other structures which
make up a launching system: structures for the command post, the power
station, etc. The degree of protection of command post structures,
according to foreign data, reaches 30 kg/cm2. Such are some of the
qualitative characteristics.
*It should be noted that in recent years, for some incomprehensible
reasons, historically established terms are no longer used in theory and
practice: "fortification", "fortification structure", "advance
fortification preparation" have been replaced by such one-sided and diffuse
terms as "protective structures", "capital construction of the Ministry of
Defense", etc.
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TOP SECRET
WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND
METHODS INVOLVED/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED
DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/THIS INFORMATION IS NOT
TO BE INCLUDED IN ANY OTHER DOCUMENT OR PUBLICATION
FIRDB-312/01934-75
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As for quantity, the total volume of fortifications of ICBM sites
provided for in the US includes 950 structures for the Minuteman missile,
108 for the Titan I and II missiles, and 99 for the Atlas-E missile. These
works are part of the vast program of engineer preparation of the terry*--,
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ll
of the US for war and on which is spent of a military appropriations of the federal budget yearly. 50X2-WMD
The effectiveness of fortifications in providing a constant combat
readiness of strategic weapons under conditions of enemy combat actions
against them can be seen in the following simple example. In order to
achieve 90 percent probability in putting out of operation a rrussr. e W ich
has Teen se t-p-in -a- for- tided silo rate___ -or a shock wave overpressure of
2 T m~, it based on a roxima
1
'
9
1 accurate A
merican data,,
-up to
1
r-6
to-1
with
kilometers. And, in order to achfeve a 1Wpe`rcent--gwarantee i -' 50X2-WMD
destruct!-on of an enemy missile, it is necessary to carry out a
considerably greater number of launches. In order to have a 100 percent
guarantee of putting out of operation an unprotected missile, it is enough
to expend one missile with a nuclear warhead of 50X2-WMD
The recent tendency toward the employment of mobile missile systems
cannot completely exclude the employment of such strong and reliable
shelters for missile launches as the silos are.
an average circular error probable from the aiming point of
Thus, fortification under conditions of a missile/nuclear war is
becomin the most ortant means of ensuring high combat effectiveness for
all the branches of the armed forces and, ic
forces (the Strategic Rocket Forces, the Air and Missile Defense Forces of
the Country, the Air Forces, and the Navy).
In connection with this, the role of the theory of fortification is
growing sharply in further research into the pro lems of increasing the
combat effectiveness of the armed forces. The development of this theory
is influenced by many important features stemming from the conditions of
nuclear warfare. We will list only three of them.
The first feature. The competition between the means of destruction
and the means o ortification protection continues. Thus, if in the past
the destructive effect of a rifled artillery shell increased in 30 years
(1885-1914) by 50 to 80 percent and the destructive effect of an aerial
bomb increased in more than 20 years (1920-1941) by 100 to 150 percent,
then the yield of nuclear warheads grew by several orders of magnitude in
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20 years (1945-1965) from
more.
i.e., 1,000 times, and
Accordingly, there has been an increase in the degree of protection
afforded by fortification structures, particularly against the shock wave
of a nuclear burst; in the last seven or eight years it has grown from 0.14
to 20 kg/cm2. The time factor has acquired especial significance under
these conditions. The military engineers had not had time to complete the
research and design study for protection from an overpressure of 2 kg/cm2
when the need arose for a higher degree of protection -- from a pressure of
5, 7, 14, 20, and even 30 kg/cm2.
The temporary balance which has been achiev_ed at the present time
between the destructive effect of nuclear warheads and the methods of
fortification protection of strategic missiles can be upset by an increase
in the accuracy of hitting the target, by the use of nuclear warheads which
penetre the ground and burst underground, and for other reasons. For
this reason, fortification preparation, particularly of missile system
sites, must be implemented rapidly and improved continuously. This can
only be achieved through a well worked out then of fortification
protection, which will permit all practical tasks to be accomplished
quickly.
The second feature. Before the appearance of nuclear weapons, the
military engineer designed standard fortification structures based on
relatively simple calculations and then tested them under full-scale
conditions on the proving ground. TQday,_full-scale tests under conditions
of surface nuclear. bursts are impossible
besides which the costs
associated with these- te&ts-are extraordinarily _reat. Under these
conditions, the only practicable approach remaining is theoretical research
with a subsequent check on the results of the theory on test benches and in
wind tunnels, and in experiments with small-scale models supported by the
theories of simulation. At best, some results can be verified through
urderground nuclear bursts. 5ox2-wMD
The third feature. The construction of structures with a "margin" of
strengt ut wit out a sufficiently well-grounded choice of the degree of
necessary fortification protection without constructive decisions~ani
without regard for other conditions associated with the advance
fortification preparation of-strategic installations, may result in
inefficient and unwarranted expenditures of large amounts of government
resources. Under these conditions, a scientifically well-grounded-approach
is needed to the volume of material expenditures which is tied in with the
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economy of the country and also with the efficient utilization of allocated
funds based on a developed theory of fortification.
Thus, the development of a theory of fortification and the
introduction of its achievements into the practice of fortification
construction is the most important element in the struggle for
military-technical superiority over the armed forces of the principal
imperialist countries.
Historically, before World War II the practical application of
fortification belonged primarily to the ground forces, and its theory was
worked out in military engineer, scientific educational, and scientific
design centers, which were directed by the Chief of the Engineer Troops of
the Red Army.
Under the conditions of nuclear war, fortification has a far wider
application in all branches of the armed forces. Naturally, the question
arises concerning the feasible ways of organizing the development of modern
fortification, and primarily of its theory.
It is necessary to establish beforehand the distinctive features which
emerge in fortification as a science in its application in a given branch
of the armed forces, and what remains as the general science of
fortification. This has not only a theoretical but a great practical
significance as well.
Fortification fulfils its tasks by erecting fortification structures
either in advance or in the course of combat operations. Ona ig y
important feature distinguishes them. The usual engineer structures
(bridges, tunnels, hydrotechnical structures, factory buildings, etc.) must
satisfy only the requirements of the technology of that process for which
they were constructed. In the design as well as in the construction of a
fortification structure, besides the functioning of the installation,
primary consideration must be given to the need for the protection of
armament, the means of control, equipment, and personnel in the structure
against the effects of weapons of mass destruction.
The requirement of protection against modern means of destruction, in
the broad sense, is understood to be the reduction of the probability of
.damage~erhich the enemy is trying to inflict. The accomplishment of such a
task can be achieved, within definite limits, by dispersal (redundancy), by
concealment from the enemy of the actual installation and through the
display of a dummy one (through camouflage methods), and, finally, by
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direct or fortification protection, i.e., protection in the literal sense
of the word.
All of these methods are not mutually exclusive; rather, they
supplement one another. In this regard, the better the enemy is informed
then the greater the_importance of fortification Protection. But after the
installation reveals its location (for instance, by the first salvo, by a
radio signal, etc.) the reliability of fulfilling its subsequent combat
task is completely determined by its fortification protection and dispersal
(redundancy).
Consequently, a fortification structure, or a complex of them, fulfils
two fundamental, inseparable functions: maintaining the prescribed combat
technology of one or another type of weapon and providing protection
against enemy means of mass destruction.
Combat technology is wholly determined by the purpose of the
installation. In connection with this, it is possible to distinguish
principal groups of fortification structures with essentially identical
technology, even though they are constructed under different conditions and
by various methods: control posts of different sizes, sites for various
types of missiles, sites for radiotechnical means, sites and locations off
various types of combat and transport equipment, and others.
The technological plan of the function of an installation, in each of,
these cases, is the initial dimension and, as a rule, it is not possible to
change it to any extent in the process of work. At the same time, when
selecting the means and methods of implementing this technological plan,
the requirements of fortification must definitely be taken into account.
Consequently, one of the functions of fortification--the maintenance
of the prescribed combat technology of the installation--can be correctly
fulfilled only under conditions of close contact between the designer of
the fortification structure and specialists of a given type of weapon or
combat technology.
As a result of such joint work, it is possible, while still in the
development stage of any new combat equipment, to resolve at the very
outset the question of how_to increase its resistance to the effects of the
means of destruction and the degree to which fortification protection is to
be adopted. For instance, how should a gun, tank, armored personnel
carrier, and other types of equipment be strengthened directly and what
should be done by the means of field fortification? Or, analogously, to
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what degree should combat equipment of a missile launch site, the equipment
of large control posts-, and other installations themselves be strengthened,
made antiseismic~ and protected from the effects of electromagnetic
induction, penetrating and thermal radiation,_etc., and to what extent is
it necessary to protect them with the means Qf permanent -.forti_ficatinn?
In other words, combat equipment, equipment of control, and other
equipment must be developed with due regard for the possibility of reducing
their degree of vulnerability and for the requirements of fortification
protection. A combined solution of the problem is possible only through
the direct participation of military engineers in those organizations which
are developing this equipment and its combat technology. For example, the
development of new types of missile weapons should proceed simultaneously
or jointly with the design of fortification structures for them in order to
come up with an efficient distribution of the function of seismic
protection between shock-absorbing devices and the structure itself, or to
ensure protection from electromagnetic induction either through the aid of
special shields or by the design of the structure.
For a sound solution of this problem it is necessary to clearly
understand another function of fortification--the function of protection.
Two fundamental lines of activity are included in this function: the
determination of an efficient degree of fortification protection and the
development of engineering means and methods to provide this protection.
We will look at these two lines of activity in greater detail.
What should an efficient de ee of fortification protection of an
insta a ion a in order that, under the assumed conditions of a com at
situation and with minimal expenditures of forces and means on its erection
and maintenance, this installation will be able to fulfil its function with
prescribed reliability? This problem is an engineer-tactical (or an
engineer-operational) one and may be solved by the application of
mathematical devices on the basis of a deep knowledge of the nature of the
modern battle and operation and with consideration of the capabilities of
the economy.
With the availability of suitable basic data, there is a real
possibility of establishing p model of a battle and an operation. They can
be played out so that the degree of protection is figured as the variable
value. Thereby, it is possible to determine an optimal balance between the
degree of maintenance of the vital activity of an installation (for
instance, the combat effectiveness of a weapon) through fortification
protection on the one hand and the expenditure of forces, means, and time
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for such protection on the other.
A prescribed degree of maintenance of the vital activity of an
installation simplifies somewhat the task which confronts the military
engineer. In this case, the optimization of the task can be carried out
either on the basis of the time needed to establish a given degree of
fortification protection or on the basis of forces and means or material
expenditures.
Theoretically, any- de ee of maintenance of the vital functions of an
installation can be provided by dispersal of its elements with a very low
degree of fortification protection. However, practically, that is far from
the case. Dispersal (if the nature of tie installation allows it)
substantially complicates control. Thus, in a field fortification where
coordination of fire, visual communication and sometimes even communication
by voice between elements of a position of a subunit have a definite
importance, the possibilities for disperal are substantially limited.
In permanent fortification, the limits of dispersal are not limited
technically; however, the relatively high cost of communication routes
necessary for reliable control among elementsfthe installation, and the
vulnerability and complexity of their operati_oon, necessitate__c mbining a
considerable degree of fortification protection with minimal dispersal._
Some notion of the relationship between dispersal and fortification
protection can be had from an examination of the data given in the
following table:
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Thus, with a relatively low degree of protection, a dispersal of
elements of the installation to such great distances is required that
control of them will be greatly impeded.
The method of solving the problem of ascertaining an efficient means
of fortification protection is a common one and is not dependent upon which
branch of the armed forces fortification is used for. Some distinctions
which are peculiar to field and permanent fortifications do not affect the
essence of the method, even though they call for an independent examination
of the two types of fortification.
Consequently, parallel research in the various branches of the armed
forces on the method of determinin an efficient degree of fortification
protection-Us not objectively called for. It is completely possible to
conduct such research in the interests of all of the armed forces
centrally.
The exceptional importance and_responsibility.._o_such researcli_is
caused by the fact that, on the one hand, the slightst increase in 11e ' .
degree of protection very Iceptiblyraises the__costof-fortification
preparation and, on the other hand, underestimating the degree of
protection can bring to naught the basic mission--the maintenance of the
ability of the armed forces to strike immediately and effectively at the
enemy under any situational conditions.
After the determination of the necessary degree of fortification
protection, the question naturally arises about efficient methods of
implementation of this protection with a minimum expenditure of forces,
means and time, i.e., it is necessary to establish the engineer methods.
The continuous improvement of the method of accomplishing
fortification protection is connected with the very great volume of
theoretical and experimental research and embraces, first of all, research
on the destructive effect of all types of enemy weapons on personnel,
equipment (combat equipment, transport equipment, communications means,
guidance means, etc.) and also on structures; secondly, establishment of a
theory of calculation and planning of fortification structures.
The destructive effect of modern means of armed conflict, as is known,
is extremely varied: the mechanical action of a nuclear burst (the
atmospheric shock wave, the waves produced by it in the ground, seismic
waves and others), the thermal and mechanical actions of thermal radiation,
the action of radioactive radiation, of electromagnetic induction, of
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TOP .LT PIC?
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chemical agents, of bacteriological warfare agents, etc.
All of these specific actions must be considered in the theory and the
practice of fortification. Thus, how much depends on a correct estimate of
the effect of the means of destruction, in particular on an estimate of the
mechanical action of a nuclear burst, can be shown in the following
example. The effectiveness of the burst of a nuclear warhead delivered to
the target by means of a missile delivery vehicle- greatlydeenon the----
magnitude of the circular error probable, "E". The latter affects the
required yield of the nuclear warhead, which-1--s-apparent from the data 5oX2 wMD
presented in the following table:
As is apparent from the table, a twofold reduction on the average in
the value of "E", raises the effectiveness of the action of a nuclear --
warhead fivefold to tenfold.
The magnitude of "E" is substantially dependent on the accuracy of the
determination of the coordinates of the missile site location. With an
enemy nuclear burst in its vicinity, a silo receives definite residual
displacements, including slewing in azimuth and tilting. Inadequate
calculation of these displacements in calibrating the trajectory of one's
own missile can change the value of "E" severalfold and, in this way, the
effectiveness of action of the burst of the warhead on the enemy
installation can be reduced to zero. 50X2-WMD
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For a determination of the change in the position of a silo which can
occur after the action of a burst of a nuclear warhead of an expected yield
(estimating, according to calculations, that the essential structural
strength of the silo will be maintained), skill is needed to sufficiently
accurately forecast the possible slewing in azimuth and tilting of the
silo. And that can be done only on the basis of quantitative analysis of
complex phenomena arising in the ground as a result of all of the waves
passing through it, produced by the mechanical action of an enemy nuclear
burst.
Thus, for the preservation of the capacity to strike by missile means,
it is necessary not only to ensure the prescribed degree of strength of the
silo but also to predict the probable deviation of the missile from its
original position as a result of the possible effect of an enemy nuclear
strike.
In solving the problem of fortification protection, it is necessary to
have a methodology of calculation for structures and their elements of the
effect of the destructive factors of modern types of weapons. These
methods in principle are common for all fortification structures and not
dependent on which branch of the armed forces employs them. It is our deep
conviction that parallel theoretical and experimental research for the
establishment of a methodology of calculation for fortification structures
in several branches of the armed forces is not scientifically based and not
justified from an economic point of view.
Successful development of a theory of fortification without lagging
behind the continually growing demands of practical work can be ensured
with a relatively small expenditure of forces and means only if the
fimdamental efforts of theoretical and practical research are carried out
centrally on the level of the Ministry of Defense and not scattered among_
the branches of the armed forces.
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