MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): CONTROL OF NAVAL FORCES UNDER MODERN CONDITIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP10-00105R000100920001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 16, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 18, 1974
• Content Type: MEMO

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
18 November 1974
MFMDRANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT MILITARY THOUQ}fT (USSR) : Control of Naval
Forces Under Prod emCaiditions ?
1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is part of a
series now in preparation based on the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense
publication Collection of Articles of the Journal 'Military Thou t". This
article examines a pro em o organizing control ooffleet Forces engaged
in operations. The author recommends a continuously operating fleet
control system consisting of operations, command and communications
elements, and stresses the need to relieve the fleet coumder of
non-operational functions. This article appeared in Issue No. 5 (66) for
1962.
2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive, this
document should be handled on a strict need-to-blow basis within recipient
agencies F r ease of reference, r is from this publication have been
assigned 50X1-HUM
William E. Nelson
Deputy Director for Operations
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Distribution:
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Assistant to the Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Department of the Army
The Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Intelligence)
Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
U. S. Air Force
Director, National Security Agency
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Deputy Director for Science and Technology
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
for National Intelligence Officers
Director of Strategic Research
Director of Weapons Intelligence
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TOP SECRET
Intelligence Information Special Report
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COUNTRY USSR
DATE OF
INFO. Late-1962
DATE 18 November 1974
SUBJECT
MILITARY THW ff (USSR): Control of Naval Forces Under Modern Conditions
Documentary
Summary:
The following report is a translation from Russian of an article which
appeared in Issue No. 5 (66) for 1962 of the SECRET USSR Ministry of
Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military
Thought". The author o s attic a is are ra u. y. This
artic a examines the problem of organizing control of fleet forces, which
he feels had not kept pace with weapons and other developments. He
recommends a continuously operating fleet control system, consisting of an
operations staff, a command post network and communications centers. The
fleet commander should be relieved of non-operational functions, and organs
which do not directly affect operations should be removed from the chain of
command.
End of Summary
50X1-HUM
The SECRET version of Military Thought was published three times
annually and was distributed to the level of division commander. It
reportedly ceased publication at the end of 1970.
ar ra u. Ladinskiy authored an article entitled 'Maintaining
Stability in the Canmland of Naval Forces in a Nuclear/Missile War,,
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Some Problems in Controll' Naval
ones Under rn tions
by
Rear Admiral Yu. Ladinskiy
The major changes in the means and methods of armed combat at sea have
as yet had little impact on the system of controlling the forces of the
navy. But, at the same time, the effectiveness of the combat employment of
the all-arms naval forces, and the use by them of new types of weapons, is
directly dependent on the forms and methods of control of the forces and on
the state of the technical means of control. The more completely and
comprehensively the methods of control are developed, the more improved the
organizational forms and structure of the operational staffs will be;
likewise, the higher their degree of preparation and equipping with the
newest technical means of control becomes, the greater is the reason to
expect better results from the combat actions of submarines, naval
missile-carrying aviation, and surface ships.
The control of naval forces always has been a creative process in the
activity of the command and staffs of all levels. This process has now
become extremely complex; this complexity increases together with the
qualitative change in naval weapons and their delivery vehicles.
Now the cam-and and staffs, in order to successfully direct the
actions of the forces, must have a distinct conception and thorough
understanding of the nature and special features of armed combat at sea, an
excellent knowledge of modern combat and technical means, and the
operational-combat capabilities not only of the arms of naval forces, but
also of coordinating large units (units) of the air forces, rocket troops,
ground forces, and air defense forces.
In controlling naval forces, the commanders (commanding officers) and
staffs have to know how to organize the delivery of powerful nuclear
strikes against the enemy in a timely manner, and to skilfully and quickly
exploit the results of the strikes of the strategic rocket troops and the
actions of long-range aviation for the most rapid and complete achievement
by the navy of its assigned goals. Of great importance is the
comprehensive support of the actions of the naval forces participating in
an operation (battle), primarily submarines and missile-carrying aviation,
TOP
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operating on the ocean at great distances from their basing points against
a highly mobile enemy, whose main forces are strike aircraft carriers and
nuclear submarines armed with missiles.
The great fluidity of combat actions at sea requires quick reaction to
all changes in the situation. This requires exceptional speed in
evaluating the situation, making decisions, conveying tasks to executors
and constantly checking their execution. The commanders of operational
formations and the commanding officers of large units, ships, and units
frequently have to make decisions instantly, in the literal sense of the
word, without preliminary preparation of their decisions by the appropriate
staffs.
In connection with this, the control of naval forces, especially of
those which already are deployed on the ocean (sea), must be established on
the principle of strict centralization, combined with the broadest
initiative of the commanders in the selection of methods of completing
their assigned tasks.
We will find the role of commander initiative increasing continuously
in the future. The experience of fleet exercises shows that every
commander, to a greater extent than previously required, must always be
ready to make a responsible decision independently and quickly, in keeping
with the concept and intentions of the senior commander, and corresponding
to the situation which has developed.
The control of naval forces under modern conditions assumes a new
character. The reliability of control must be assured by a control sy~stem
which is continuously operating in the navy and capable of withstanding the
effects of weapons of mass destruction, having maintained stability and
continuity in the process. A continuously operating control system is a
major element in the high readiness of the naval forces to carry out combat
actions, especially in the initial period of war, and it must be thoroughly
worked out in peacetime.
The control system for naval forces includes an operations staff, a
network of command posts, and communications centers. The o erations staff
is the main and only organ for controlling the forces which is directly
subordinate to the fleet commander.
Only the operations staff is capable of a comprehensive and objective
evaluation of the situation, a continuous account of its changes, a
determination of the operational-combat capabilities of our own and enemy
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Tov-seeeE-T-
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forces, a draft of proposals for the most desirable disposition and
deployment of forces to perform the tasks assigned to the fleet, a
determination of the targets of the strike and the composition of strike
and support groupings, the distribution of the allocated resources of
nuclear munitions, and a comprehensive coordination of the efforts of the
formations and large units of the fleet and of the forces supporting it.
The operations staff plans and organizes the conduct of naval
operations. We see this activity as a single, centralized process, which
encompasses all aspects of the development of all events in the sea (ocean)
theater of military operations and in which, besides line operations
officers, representatives of all arms of the fleet forces and weapons
specialists must participate. Organizationally it is desirable to combine
them into one organ--the department of operational planning.
The operations staff ensures control of the forces during operations
(combat actions). This requires constant knowledge of the situation. The
collection, processing, and reporting to the command of all data on the
situation must be concentrated in the staff information center, to which
these data are sent directly from all sources o ormation and which are
reported to the command in collated form. This system eliminates various
intermediate and parallel echelons, greatly shortens the time required to
pass the information, and ensures quick reaction by the command to changes
in the situation.
The criterion for evaluating the efficiency of the operation of this
staff organ is the time required to collect and process information on the
situation. The executive activity of the information center must be
carried out in the least possible amount of time, measured in a number of
cases not just in minutes, but in seconds.
The information center, however, only determines the situation and
represents it on maps, plotting boards, screens, or in summaries. Besides
this, careful and thorough analysis of all situation data, and conclusions
from it based on calculations, are required, as is a draft of proposals to
the command.
This work must be performed by the appropriate elements (departments)
of the operational and intelligence organs of the staff, which subsequently
have the task of working out the details of the decisions and instructions
formulated by the commander, conveying the tasks to the executors, and
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organizing and monitoring the execution of these tasks.
Some doubt may arise as to the propriety of having independent staff
operations organs - planning and executive. This is like creating two
centers which are parallel to a certain extent, one of which plans and the
second, relying on the data of the information center, deals with the
problems of firsthand direction of combat actions. Naturally, this leads
to the necessity of coordinating the work of these organs, and for this
reason they should be combined under one leadership--the chief of the
operations directorate (department) of the staff.
It should be pointed out that the practice of major fleet exercises,
meanwhile, has not rejected the presence of separate planning (department
of operational preparation) and executive organs within the operations
directorate of a fleet staff.
The remaining subunits which currently are organizationally organic to
the fleet staff and which have no direct relation to the direction of the
operational and combat activity of the fleet forces, in our view should be
assigned to the system of independent fleet directorates (departments), and
be made subordinate, depending on the functions to be fulfilled, either to
the first.deputy fleet commander or to the deputy fleet-commander for the
rear.
We think this simplification of the control structure will
considerably relieve the fleet commander and chief of staff of daily
administrative chores and numerous organizational problems, and will be
conducive to increasing the efficiency and stability of the control of
fleet forces.
The second element of the control system involved in the
organizational structure of the control organs, is the network of fleet
command posts.
The increasing importance of the control of fleet forces under modern
conditions provides the basis for believing that the operations staffs will
become one of the main targets the enemy will try to destroy as quickly as
possible in the initial strikes at the beginning of a war. Therefore, the
organization of the operations staffs has to ensure first and foremost,
that these staffs are highly viable and capable of maintaining continuity
of control in any situation, even the most complex.
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Under conditions in which weapons of mass destruction are used
extensively, this may be achieved by creating a far-flung network of
command posts in constant readiness for action, dispersed in the theater,
equipped with the necessary communications and control means, protected
from the effects of nuclear bursts, and thoroughly camouflaged from enemy
observation.
These control posts must always have the appropriate operational-
combat documentation to ensure control of fleet forces in the event of
surprise onset of combat actions.
This problem is resolved at the operational level of a fleet by
establishing main and alternate shore flag command posts, and also
auxiliary and rear control posts.
The fla command post of a fleet, at which the entire main complement
of the subunits of the operations staff is located under combat conditions,
is the center ensuring direct control of forces during the preparation and
conduct of operations (combat actions) at sea.
The organization of the flag command post may have its own special
characteristics, depending on the tasks to be performed-by the fleet.
Thus, when naval forces are participating in operations conducted by ground
troops on coastal axes, a ground situation post will have to be established
to supplement the organic elements of the flag command post. While combat
actions are in progress to protect our sea communications, the availability
of a naval commmications post, etc., may become necessary.
The structure of the alternate fla command post must be similar; this
post, while smaller in terms of the number of personnel assigned to it,
nevertheless must also be an organ capable of fully assuming control of
fleet forces in the event the main command post is put out of action.
In order to use electronic computers and other means of automation and
mechanization, there must be a corresponding group of computer equipment
specialists at the main and alternate fleet command posts.
Fleet forces also may be controlled from the auxiliary control
post, which usually is deployed on the main axis off e1 et forces actions in
an operation, in those instances in which control from the main command
post is hampered or impossible. The auxiliary control post may be deployed
under field conditions, located on a special ship equipped with the
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necessary communications and control means; and it also may be located at
the command post of one of the operational formations or large units of the
fleet, for example, at the flag command post of the naval base, and
completely equipped with the appropriate technical means to ensure the
control of fleet forces in the operation.
The proper selection of a location for the command posts is of great,
importance in providing continuity of control of the forces under modern
conditions. In particular, the auxiliary fleet control post, in our
opinion, is most desirably located on a special control ship, which is
capable of relocating throughout the sea theater, by the same token
eliminating the main deficiency of any stationary command post--its
immobility. This makes it very difficult for the enemy to deliver strikes
aimed at destroying the auxiliary control post, provides great viability to
the latter, and consequently also ensures stability of control.
During exercises conducted by some fleets, they practiced organizing
an auxiliary control post on a submarine located in the ocean near the main
submarine deployment area in the operation. On this control boat, as the
fleet command called it, there usually was a commander of a large unit of
submarines with a small operations group. The task of this auxiliary
control post was to relay the orders of the fleet commander to the
submarines during the operation, and reports from the latter to the address
of the fleet staff. The capability of controlling submarines directly from
this boat also was provided for, but this was not actually carried out.
It seems to us that such use of a submarine is hardly desirable under
actual conditions, since it will quickly attract enemy antisubmarine forces
to the area in which it is located; these enemy forces will not give it the
least opportunity to fulfil the control tasks assigned to it. However, the
idea of establishing an auxiliary control post on a submarine is in itself
worthy of attention.
Close coordination at the control posts plays a major role in the
direction of fleet forces operating at great distances on the ocean.
Precise organization of their work will ensure quick reaction of the
command to the events taking place and the necessary monitoring of the
actions of the forces; and it will make it possible to attain a high
capacity for results in the use of all the means of armed combat at sea,
primarily missile/nuclear weapons from submarines and aircraft. An
important organizational aspect is a well-conceived and smoothly operating
system of transferring the control of the forces from, one command post to
another.
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The considerable distances separating the combat action areas of the
main fleet forces--submarines and aviation--from their permanent basing
areas is the reason why it is necessary to have technical means of control
with an operating range that would ensure continuous and reliable control
of the forces.
To use the technical means of control, communications centers are
organized; these are the third component element of the contro system.
The organization of communications with submarines is of special
importance. To control submarines, a single, continuously operating
communications system is used with submarines on a Navy-wide scale; this
ensures the capability of controlling them from the fleet command posts and
from the center, the continuity of communications when transferring control
of submarines from one command post to another, the interchangeability and
reserving of the communnications means of the fleets and the center, and the
security of submarine actions, by using ultra-high-speed automatic
communications and other modern technical means.
The existing cammnm.ications system, which is being developed in all
fleet exercises, basically satisfies modern requirements; however, there
still is need for improvement, since the experience of the exercises
revealed a number of separate organizational defects in it.
Improving the control system of fleet forces by reorganizing
operational staffs and extensively introducing electronics, telemechanics
and automation, will greatly increase the efficiency of all control organs
and, to a large extent, will affirm the principle that the commander
controls the forces personally and through his staff.
However, this alone does not produce a final solution to the problem
of controlling fleet forces. It seems to us that successful control of
fleet forces under modern conditions requires maximm simplification of the
chain of command, eliminating from it all superfluous elements, and freeing
the operations chief (forces cammnder), insofar as possible, from having
to fulfil administrative-rear services and support functions.
The main function of the fleet commander must be purely an operational
one, primarily the control of fleet forces, especially those operating on
the ocean.
We cannot be confident about the state of such a vitally important
question as the control of the forces, as long as the fleet commander
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spends, as he now does, the bulk of his time on rear services problems of
all kinds, digressing from his main function--operational direction and
planning.
The fleet commander, insofar as possible, must be relieved of such
chores as providing for the basing of ships and units, supplying them and
bringing them up to strength, repair, theater preparation, and shore
construction. All these problems should be fully entrusted to his deputy.
The fleet commander has to create the conditions which are the most
conducive to fulfilling his most important responsibility--directing the
planning of naval operations and controlling the forces while these
operations are in progress.
The fleet commander is obligated to personally direct the combat
actions of the main fleet forces--submarines and missile-carrying aviation,
controlling the former directly and through the fleet staff; and aviation,
including long-range aviation supporting the fleet, through his assistant
for aviation--the commander of fleet aviation. All other intermediate and
parallel levels and echelons of control must be eliminated.
Thus, we arrive at the conclusion that there is a real requirement for
maximum simplification of the chain of command in relieving the commander
insofar as possible of all problems not directly connected with the control
of the fleet forces.
What must the activity of the commander and operations staff involve
in the preparation, and during the conduct, of naval operations under
modern conditions? We have the following conception of it.
The fleet commander, when making a decision on.an operation,
determines the main axis of actions, designates strike targets, distributes
among them the forces and the nuclear munitions allocated for the
operation, sets the lines and time and establishes the sequence for the
delivery of strikes by the main groupings of forces, allocates tasks, and
organizes the coordination of forces.
When the forces begin to deploy to conduct the operation, the fleet
commander personally directs the deployment of submarines and their
guidance to enemy groupings of fleet forces or convoys, directly
controlling the actions of each submarine screen and tactical group, and
individual submarines. In the guidance process the commander makes the
strike targets more precise for the submarines, and organizes and
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implements submarine maneuvers in accordance with changes in the situation.
The submarines are guided until the moment they come in contact with the
enemy.
A special concern of the fleet commander will be to concentrate the
main efforts of the submarines and missile-carrying aviation to deliver
powerful nuclear strikes against the main enemy targets at the beginning of
the operation.
While the operation is in progress the cammander watches changes in
the situation closely; when necessary, he redistributes the forces in terms
of axes of actions and strike targets; maintains coordination among the
main groupings of forces; and monitors the fulfilment of the assigned
tasks. Serious attention must be devoted to the problems of organizing
operational and combat support to the actions of the strike groupings.
The missile submarines carrying out the tasks of destroying enemy
shore installations are given specific main and alternate points of aim,
areas of fire positions, boundary lines with adjacent tactical groups or
individual submarines, time of arrival in waiting areas, main and alternate
passage routes, and reporting procedures.
In this way, simplifying the chain of command results in the fleet
commander becoming personally the one directly exercising control of the
forces in every way.
The practice of fleet exercises fully corroborates the desirability of
freeing fleet commanders from direct supervision of those organs of the
overall fleet organization which are not involved in the problems of
controlling forces in an operation. The proposed reorganization of the
chain of command increases the responsibility of the deputy fleet
commanders, who have quite specific responsibilities in the support of the
combat activity of the fleet and become real assistants to the operations
chief, relieving him of non-operational functions.
Briefly about the work of the staff in controlling the forces.
The operations staff, while ensuring the control of fleet forces in
operations and while combat actions are in progress at sea, continuously
keeps track of all the changes in the situation, and prepares and presents
to the commander proposals regarding the axes on which to deploy the
forces, strike targets, the location and time for delivering the strikes,
the composition of the strike groupings, and the distribution and
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redistribution of nuclear munitions. While the forces are being deployed
and in the combat actions areas, the staff organizes reconnaissance,
neutralization of the enemy antisubmarine and air defense systems,
camouflage, and radio countermeasures. When strikes are being delivered
against enemy shore installations, the staff transmits the orders of the
coamnander to the missile submarines to occupy fire positions and deliver
the strike, and, when necessary, retargets them and aviation against other
targets.
During combat actions the staff monitors the fulfilment of assigned
tasks by the forces and, specifically, organizes special reconnaissance to
determine the results of the delivery of nuclear strikes. The staff
devotes special attention to the problems of ensuring the stability of
control of the forces, systematically verifying the organization and use of
long-range communications and radiotechnical means of surveillance.
As evident from the foregoing, the former functions of a staff
basically have been maintained under modern conditions as well. But the
methods of its work will be radically different from those to which we have
become accustomed through the experience of World War II.
All the cumbersome written and graphic documentation must be
eliminated. The control of forces will be implemented only by short
instructions and signals. All operational-tactical calculations must be
automated.
We have not touched, in this article, upon a concrete statement of the
question of automating the processes for controlling the forces. The
importance of this factor and the main ways of accomplishing it already
have been dealt with in sufficient detail in the pages of the military
press. As to the practical aspect of the matter, it can be pointed out.
that the process of introducing computer technology already has begun in
the fleets; this substantially facilitates the activities of the command
and staffs in controlling the forces and organizing all types of support to
them. However, the development of this field of military affairs is
hampered by the slow solution of the technical problems of automating the
processes of the control of fleet forces. For example, there still is no
equipment to collect and process data on the enemy (composition, cruising
and combat disposition, courses and speed of movement), to collect
information on friendly forces (location of submarines deployed at sea,
readiness of the boats and aviation for actions), to forecast the weather,
to collect and process data on the radiation situation, etc. It is
particularly important to obtain visual representation of the continuously
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changing situation. Information transformed into visual form substantially
accelerates and facilitates the.whole process of controlling the forces.
The fastest solution of the problem is the first priority task of the
scientific-research organizations of the Navy.
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