MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): COMBAT WITH ENEMY TACTICAL MEANS OF NUCLEAR ATTACK IN OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP10-00105R000100890001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 4, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 25, 1974
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/04: CIA-RDP10-00105R000100890001-8
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:HH8 B-1- RA.* NOT E PEPRM CED
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
25 October
MEMORANDi1M FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): Combat with Enemy Tactical
Means o clear Attack in Offensive Operations
1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is part of a
series now in preparation based on the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense
publication Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought". This
article assigns to the front the task of destroying enemy operational-
tactical and tactical meansof nuclear attack f'Qllowing an initial massive
nuclear strike. Because of their rapid deployment capability, tactical
means must be destroyed while they are still located at a distance
exceeding their range. The author gives various possible formulas for the
destruction of tactical nuclear means and examples of how such tactical
means have been deployed by the enemy in Vietnam. This article appeared in
Issue No. 1 (80) for 1967.
50X2-WMD
2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive, this
document should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within recipient
agencies. For ease of reference, reports from this publication have been
assigned the Codewor
50X2-WMD
William E. Nelso
Deputy Director for Operations
FIRDB-312/03013-74
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1974
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7oraeeRFr
Distribution:
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Assistant to the Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Department of the Army
The Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Intelligence)
Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
U. S. Air Force
Director, National Security Agency
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Deputy Director for Science. and Technology
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
for National Intelligence Officers
Director of Strategic Research
Director of Weapons Intelligence
Page 2 of 12 Pages
-TOP SHUT
FIRDB-312/03013-74
TS #205581
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Intelligence Information Special Report
COUNTRY USSR
DATE OF
INFO. Early-1967
SUBJECT
Page 3 of 12 Pages
FIRDB- 312/03013-74
DATE 25 October 1974
MILITARY IIWGIT SSR : Combat with Enemy Tactical Means of Nuclear
ttacc in offensive rations
SOURCE Documentary
Summa
Me following report is a translation from Russian of an article which
appeared in Issue No. 1 (80) for 1967 of the SECRET USSR Ministry of
Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal 'TMilita
Thou t" The authors of this article are General-Leytenant etrenko,
Lo lone V. Ryabchuk and Colonel M. Belovskiy. is article assigns to the
front the task of destroying enemy operational-tactical and tactical means
oonuclear attack followin._g an initial massive nuclear strike. Because of
their rapid deploymentcapability, tactical means must be destroyed while
they are still located at a distance exceeding their range. The author
gives various possible formulas for the destruction of tactical nuclear
means and examples of how such tactical means have been deployed by the
enemy in Vietnam. End of Summary
Comment :
enera - enant V. Petrenko wrote several articles for the
Collection of Articles-
ic es of the Journal "Military Tho t", the most recent
was: Issue No. 1 (86) or . Colonel V. Ryabchuk
and Colonel M. Belovskiy co-authored an article "Combat with the Tactical
Means of Nuclear Attack of the Enemy in Offensive Operations", Issue No. 1
(80) for 1967. Colonel V. Ryabchuk also wrote an article in
Krasnaya Zvezda 20 July 1967, "Logic of a Commander's Decision".
version of Military Thou It was published three times
SECRET annually and was distributed to the level of division commander. It
reportedly ceased publication at the end of 1970.
TS #205581
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Combat with En Tactical means of Nuclear Attack in
Uffensive Operations
by
General-Le tenant V. Petrenko
colonel ya uk
Colonel M. Belovskiy
The re tive destruction of enemy nuclear attack means plays a major
role in the successful conduct of a ground forces offensive and in
effecting the total defeat of an enemy under the conditions of modern war.
This mission will undoubtedly be carried out in the initial massive nuclear
strike of a front.
But, as training exercises and calculations show, far from all of the
enemy operational-tactical, and particularly his tactical, nuclear means
may be put out of action simultaneously by such a nuclear strike. Under
these conditions, undestroyed nuclear means can only be destroyed by the
front in the course of combat operations.
When this is the case, a different approach is necessary in the
organization of combat with operational-tactical and tactical nuclear
means. The point is that operational-tactical means have a great range,
but it takes considerable time for them to prepare a strike from their
launch site. Mst tactical nuclear means can fire (launch) literally in a
few minutes after occupying their firing (launch) site. However, because
of their limited range of fire, they have to draw near our forces before
firing. A fundamental deduction follows from this. In order to preempt
the delivery of strikes by tactical nuclear means, we must strive to
destroy them while they are still located at a distance exceeding their
range.
It seems to us that in order to carry out this task it is advisable to
define three lines of danizer or of approach, which we have as yet
designated only tentatively.
Line No. 1 (sketch 1) will probably extend from the enemy forward
edge to a distance somewhat greater than the range of the tactical nuclear
means having the greatest range (if the enemy has Honest John rockets, the
distance will be about 30 kilometers, and with the adoption of the Lance
TS #205581
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missile system it will be 60 kilometers). Before the troops of our first
army echelon advance to this line, our reconnaissance must discover, and
our rocket troops and supporting aviation destroy, a large part of the
enemy nuclear means whose range extends to this line. A front has at its
disposal the means necessary to accomplish this.
Line No. 2 will obviously be 8 to 12 kilometers from the forward edge
of the enemy defense, i. e., at a distance equal to the range of his
nuclear artillery. Before the large units of the first echelon of our
attacking forces advance to this line, a large part of the remaining enemy
nuclear artillery within the zone of the front must be destroyed or
reliably neutralized. This task, too, can befully accomplished if there
is efficient and timely concentration of the efforts of the reconnaissance
elements and the means of destruction of the divisions, the armies, and the
front.
Line No. 3 can be fixed at 2 to 3 kilometers from the line of contact
of the two sides, i. e., at a distance equal to the range of weapons of the
Davy Crockett . This is also the line of attack for our forces. With
their advance to this line, our attacking forces must use all of their fire
means to destroy the tactical nuclear antitank means which have survived
our nuclear strikes and must go over to a vigorous attack in order to
effect a total rout of the enemy.
Thus, before the large units of the first echelon of our attacking
forces approach to within 60 to 65 kilometers of the enemy, tactical
nuclear means of the Lance type must be revealed and destroyed; this
distance is respectively 30 to 35 kilometers for the Honest John and 10 to
14 kilometers for most of the 155-mm howitzers. In this case, then
successive destruction, starting with the long-range means, will enable us
to preempt the enemy delivery of nuclear strikes and to preserve our forces
and means.
As long as our probable enemies had an insignificant number of
tactical nuclear means, our side correctly considered the division to be
the focal point for operating against them. Now, however, when the
quantity of these means has increased sharply and they have become a factor
of operational importance, it is possible to carry out the preemptive
destruction of enemy tactical nuclear means (those which survive our
initial nuclear strike) only through the combined efforts of
operational-tactical forces and means. In this case it is advisable to
establish the army as the level for grganizing and carrying on combat not
only against enemy operational-tactical nuclear means but also against his
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subunits of tactical missiles and nuclear artillery.
The methodology we propose for organizing combat against tactical
nuclear weapons in an operation stipulates that they be reconnoitered and
destroyed not only when we are attacking an enemy who is on the defensive
but also when the forces of the two sides are approaching each other and
when the enemy is advancing to attack or to deliver a counterstrike. The
main point is the necessity to reconnoiter (make a final reconnaissance of)
the target nuclear weapon and to organize its destruction before our forces
come within its range.
In support of combat against enemy tactical nuclear means, we should
tentatively designate two zones, as the opposing sides approach each other,
directly in front of the main forces of the first echelon of combined-arms
large units: a zone of deep reconnaissance, in which nuclear weapons must
be discovered; and a zoneotina1 reconnaissance and destruction for
refining our information and straying these weapons before our forces
come within their range.
The zone of deep reconnaissance must be large enough to provide for
discovering tactical nuclear means before they reach the zone of final
reconnaissance and destruction. The minimum distance of its outer limit
(Grazv) from our troops can be expressed by the equation
Graze DP + (Vp + Vn)(trazv + tinf + tresh + tgot - tpr),
where DP
V
Vp
trazv
tinf
tresh
tfot
pr
range of enemy tactical nuclear means;
speed of advance of enemy tactical nuclear means;
rate of advance of our forces;
time necessary to reconnoiter a given type of enemy
tactical nuclear means;
time needed to receive and process reconnaissance data
and report to the formation commander;
time required for formulating a plan, making preparations, and
transmitting orders for destruction;
time needed for our means to prepare and deliver a strike;
time needed for a given enemy means to prepare for a strike.
The outer limit of the zone of final reconnaissance and destruction
(Gdp) will be separated from our forces by a distance equal to the range of
the enemy tactical nuclear means plus the distance which our forces (or the
enemy means of nuclear attack, or the two together) will cover in the time
spent on final reconnaissance, the transmittal of reconnaissance
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information, the formulation of a plan, and the destruction of the nuclear
means. The equation has the following form:
dp DP + CV P + n)(tinf + tresh + tgot tpr).
The specific figure for the depth of the reconnaissance zone or the
zone of final reconnaissance and destruction under different conditions can
be determined using the nomogram (sketch 2).
One of the ways enabling us to reveal the enemy in time to deliver a
preemptive strike with tactical nuclear weapons is the purposeful
organization of reconnaissance with a periodicity which has been calculated
in advance.
Considering the short fire (launch) preparation time of this type of
weapon and the limited range, the periodicity of reconnaissance must be
such as to assure the capability of discovering tactical nuclear weapons
while they are still in transit, before they enter the zone of final
reconnaissance and destruction. This can be achieved if the repeated
observations of the routes of advance of enemy forces take place within the
time interval P, which must be less than the time necessary for the enemy
to negotiate the zone of deep reconnaissance. The time P is determined as
the quotient of dividing the depth of the reconnaissance zone by the speed
with which the enemy nuclear weapon is approaching our forces. For
example, if the concentration area of the enemy army reserve is located 100
kilometers from our forces, if the reserve is advancing at 20 kilometers
per hour, and if the depth of the zone of final reconnaissance and
destruction is 20 kilometers, then reconnaissance of the tactical nuclear
means in the reserve must be conducted to a depth of 100 - 20 = 80
kilometers, with a periodicity
Ij /
Davy/
Crockett
w
"u-c- I ear
/ artillery
.,,-Lance
tpr (T-tpr)
In determining the minimum
allowable distance of the line
Gdpl up to which a given enemy
weapon must be reconnoitered,
Tinf+ Tresh must be laid off on
scale tupr
In determining the distance
of'the line Grazv' trazv must be
included in tupr?
Z03.2mm
nce __ Honest John ho tzers 155mm Davy Crockett
Page 11 of 12 Pages
Minimum allowable distance from our forces
destruction of enemy nuclear means
Graze reconnaissance line I , ,,,I I I I
Gdp = limit of zone of final reconnaissance 95 90 85
and destruction
1 I I I I I I I
80 75
Dp
to the lines of beginning and completing\ of the reconnaissance and
Graz
70 65 60 55 50 45 40 35 30
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nuclear means during period our forces are advancing to attack
-`/IIeCOMdiaeanc! and final reconnaissance
VVV of enemy objectives during
advance of our forces:
Aviation
Pilotless means
r // r
Minimum distance of first echelon of divisions from positions of tactical missiles
Deep reconnaissance groups
Radio and radio-technical
Observation from helicopters
/ ! ---- --_.. moment of -receiving reconnaiaaance.dataon-. emvarg_-- __. ___.-------v
/ /I ! I Distance covered by forces durb
u 8-10 ka
I I 1 1 / 1 11 30 "i-3 gym'
/ I Depl nt Range of enemy tactical missiles ing period or organization of
TiFirna_IIee -- -- sf_ea,tactical?
ff ME
~aiesance ofiedvaa I \ Minimum distances of first-echelon of divisions from
positions of nuclear artiliarr 3t moment of
receivi
- I /
ng tactical nuclear) _ reconnaiaeanca da
means \~ Die ante covered by force.
I V i dur -ig period of organi- .
N~ Range of nuclear artillery sarrpn or ass ctlon of
Zoogof fus eance - 1~ --
aed dletcuct n ing --1~ -
tactic nuclear ma meal tte
0
Reconnaissance and final
reconnaissance of object-
ives during period of
approach
Reconnaissance groups of
of divisions and regiments
Radio and radio-technical
reconnaissance of divisions
Observation from helicopters
Aviation reconnaissance
Pilotlesn means
Combat reconnaissance patrols
of forward detachments and
--- advance guards
Memo of artillery reconnais-
.ance
Reconnaissance and destruction of tactical nuclear means when the opposing sides are
Zone within range of
enemy tactical
missiles
Zone within range of
enemy nuclear
artillery
RGSN (Army) - Special reconnaissance group
GGR - In-depth reconnaissance group
RG - Reconnaissance group
Mad = Motorized rifle division
Map = Motorized rifle regiment
S - Sergeant
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