MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): A COMPARISON OF DRONES AND MANNED AIRCRAFT IN AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP10-00105R000100870001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 4, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 18, 1974
• Content Type: MEMO

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Manned Aircraft or Pilotless
Systems of Aerial Reconnaissance
by
General-Mayor of Aviation
V. Chetverikov
During the postwar years, much attention has been devoted to pilotless
reconnaissance aircraft. In this regard, the view is occasionally offered
contending that for the accomplishment of many reconnaissance tasks in
support of the Ground Forces and, especially, the Rocket Troops, pilotless
reconnaissance aircraft be used in place of manned aviation.
What is the actual status of pilotless reconnaissance systems and what
are the possibilities of their further development and improvement? Are
they capable now or in the near future of replacing manned reconnaissance
aviation? A study of these questions, using materials from a number of
countries, permits us to say the following.
In principle, pilotless means, in comparison with manned aircraft,
incorporate such strong points as a non-airfield basing capability, which
permits better camouflage on the ground than is possible for manned
aircraft and, consequently, a higher degree of viability against enemy
strikes. Non-airfield basing also permits the deployment of pilotless
means in areas near the users of reconnaissance information. Structurally,
pilotless means are simpler, their dimensions and weight are less, and they
are somewhat less expensive than manned aircraft. Finally, there is no
loss of personnel in case they are destroyed.
But existing pilotless systems and those envisioned for the near
future have numerous shortcomings as well. First and foremost, present-day
pilotless aircraft are in the first stages of development and, in the main,
represent modifications of existin: tar et drones with the installation of
current stan..r. reconnaissance equipment wi out any radical changes in
design plans, materials, etc., which are essential for such special
aircraft. They are less mobile than conventional aircraft, and their
movement is effected mainly by land-ErIsIvite slow. Ground-gamort for
LiLot.l.eiLgIFcFaTi7s-cumbergafe:'.In pfeparing them TEi-fila-"
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comparatively lgn,g_RrZMime._is_expraded. The large_AMOUnt of
automatic control equipment does not provide for a high degree of technical
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T_cgjAid..1314% Because no OrSon is on board they have no capabilities for
taking stock o17actual1light_conAliions. The cost of pilotless means IsStill-Mill:. Large dimensions and great weight, rectilinear flight,
unfavorable altitudes for combat use, and considerable radar contrast, make
them highly vulnerable to surface air defense means and fighters.
Calculations show that there is a law probabilitVf5FTWerrat1an of up
to 70 kilometers to the targets to be reconnoitered by a single pilotless
reconnaissance aircraft flying through air defense forces and means that
have not been neutralized.
The reconnaissance equipment on such an aircraft consists of only a
camera with small area - .fi - ? . Moreover,
/reconnaissance data from the interpretation of wet negatives may be
obtained only after three or four hours of flight. The possibility of a
great deviation from the assigned course diminishes the probability of
reaching the assigned target.
The need to await the return of the aircraft and the long period of
time required for processing the materials gathered, render such
information of little worth for use in the most critical periods of combat
actions, that is, during the period when the requirement is most acute.
Furthermore, the ma of the ground equipment making up the reconnaissance
system is quite high.
It is true that in the modified systems many shortcomings are being
eliminated, but the time when requirements placed upon such aircraft are
fully carried out is still very far off. These shortcomings to a greater
or lesser degree are inherent in any such pilotless systems whether
constructed at home or abroad.
In speaking of the strong and weak points of pilotless means, it
should also be kept in mind that one of the main advantages which pilotless
aircraft have over manned, i.e. non-airfield basing, is gradually
/decreasing because manned aviation is making less use of vulnerable,
artificial runways and is now making wide use of temporary airfields. It is
also shortening the distances for takeoff and landing runs and is preparing
to use vertical take-off and landing aircraft.
When the capabilities of non-airfield basing of manned aircraft are
fully realized, it will significantly increase their maneuverability, which
is closely tied to the tactical mobility of aviation large units and units.
The rapid maneuvering of non-airfield aviation sharply increases the
viability of front aviation and ensures a more secure concentration of its
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forces and the element of surprise in their application. This means that
the most mobile combat forces, under other indices, will be the most
effective.
At the same time, the absence of improved all-weather and all-
altitude reconnaissance equipment with high resolving power leads to an
increase in the required number of reconnaissance systems and variations in
their equipment, and, consequently, to an increase in the overall cost of
the entire system of aerial reconnaissance. And although there is every
reason to think that the reconnaissance equipment will, in the near future,
increase the effectiveness of aerial reconnaissance, it will likely be
quite a long time before the system is free of limitations and
shortcomings. Not one of the means of the system provides for the conduct
of round-the-clock, all-weather reconnaissance (with the exception of the
radiotechnical reconnaissance equipment), their weight and dimensions are
still very great, and the photographic coverage and resolving power of the
equipment will be insufficient, especially for reconnaissance under adverse
meteorological conditions.
In our opinion, the most serious difficulties in the realization of
tactical-technical requirements of reconnaissance systems are encountered
in the field of flight control system design, particularly in the design of
equipment for the onboard processing and immediate transmission of data by
radio to ground information collection posts. And this is the case at the
same time that jamming-resistant transmission _channels for the entire
distance of reconnaissance flights by?pilotless systems is the first and
most important condition of their combat effectiveness.
Therefore, pilotless reconnaissance systems which are intended to
carry out even a limited range of tasks under conditions of intense enemy
air defense and radiation contamination of the air and terrain, and which
do not have equipment capable of automatically transmitting reconnaissance
linformation to ground collection posts within a realistic length of time,
could hardly ever have an advantage over manned systems.
Thus, at the present stage of aviation technology development, the
effectiveness of pilotless means of aerial reconnaissance does not justify
placing them on the same level with manned means. At the present time,
only a few tasks of aerial reconnaissance may be carried out by pilotless
aircraft. The fundamental error committed in the use of pilotless means is
that they are given the very same tasks and the same number ot tasks as are
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levied against manned reconnaissance aviation. 50X1-1UM
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The desire to replace, rather than to supplement, manned aviation
results in overburdening pilotless aircraft with heavy, cumbersome, and
very expensive reconnaissance equipment. Though they are copies of manned
aircraft, they do not possess their most ortant advantages (the
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CaPabi1itY?t0 -YinSUallY-- -9 7: iglL..,t'kePl?-e-1VA5 4AgLCODAUCtJgarinaLtiMSLthe
and_retain_theipost_m5igilifigings.-ChighlenlY
air defetisel.
To replace manned reconnaissance systems with pilotless ones (even for
the accomplishment of a limited number of tasks), it is essential, first of
all, that the latter possess a high capability for overcoming enemy air
defenses. In addition they must be capable of_r " 11-size
targets under all weather condiTsro selec
immediateI r e collected reconn4mace_infammation_ or, at
first;" 'a:del:ay-of-not-mere than tWO-Minutes from the moment the target
is fixed by reconnaissance equipment). It is also important that their
cost be several times less than that of similar manned aircraft while
having the same degree of technical reliability in the accomplishment of
tasks. In addition, the launch preparation time must not exceed 20
m
minutes.
Only when such requirements are satisfied will it be advantageous to
use pilotless systems to accomplish, roughly, the following tutu.
reconnaissance of small targets before a missile nuclear strike or the
flirar-teaffia?M-SO-nce of the situation in a specified mute area; -
MoTiitoriiirtre?ieidti-of a' missile/nuclear strike?agP41071-gret; and
precisely eteiinThthe'level,af ridiation contamination' e
atMosphere and terrain in enemy territory The accaaigNMEfft-Of-even
these limited taiks is pOssibie ofarthibugh a carefully organized defense
of the systems against enemy surface-to-air missiles and fighter aviation
by flying at the most advantageous altitudes and speeds, thus ensuring
radar "transparency" of the aircraft; by jamming enemy radar and other
means of detection and guidance, etc.
In examining the requirements for pilotless reconnaissance systems,
the fact cannot be ignored that the nature and functioning of military
targets in the theater of war have changed significantly. 50X1-HUM
In the armed forces of many countries, the relative proportion of the
means of missile/nuclear attack has sharply risen, thus increasing their
importance in combat operations. As a rule, these means are small in size
and highly mobile. In view of the danger of a retaliatory strike, the
disposition in depth (regardless of the distance from the front line),
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dispersion, shelter, and camouflage of installations are increased.
Depending on the situation, approximately 40 percent of the military
targets may be located in the depth of tactical aerial reconnaissance (at a
distance of up to 400 kilometers). Of these targets, up to 70 percent may
be mobile and approximately 15 percent may have limited mobility or none at
all; thus, a significant portion of all objectives (30 to 35 percent) will
be located at a depth of up to 100 kilometers from the front line.
( To ensure mobile combat actions of large units of the Ground Forces,
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an acute need has arisen for additional reconnaissance means for
short-range reconnaissance at a depth of 50 to 70 kilometers, which would
permit the command of large units to carry out reconnaissance tasks more
efficiently.
Since aerial reconnaissance information_is_necded by aUiont
first.-cheluraiiiislans, aerial reconnaissance must be conducted alonga
wIde- front often without the reliable neutralization of the nUmerous d
varied enemy air defense neaps. As a result, reconnaissance aviation of
the front air army may suffer great losses.
In our opinion, the development of short-range aerial reconnaissance
means must proceed along the lines of using light, small-size, pilotless
aircraft (helicopters) with law flight speeds, equipped with inexpensive,
light, and small-size reconnaissance gear which ensures the immediate
transmission from onboard the aircraft of collected data.
The low cost of pilotless reconnaissance aircraft must also determine
the mass nature of the use of this means of aerial reconnaissance. The aim
of this approach must not be to dupliate the front air army but to
uplement it; and not to briag_alIout the autonomy of the Ground Forces in
questidffg-of aerial reconnaissance, but to reinforce and strengthen
CO-Ordination with the Aii-ForwA,An-the basis of a egr-cu a ocition of
Its weakest short -range tactical aerial
reconnaissance.
While acknowledging the necessity for the Ground Forces to have their
own means of tactical aerial reconnaissance, we feel, nevertheless, that
given the present stage of development of pilotless systems, to include in
them long-range reconnaissance means and reconnaissance equipment equal to
that of manned aircraft is economically unjustified. In addition, the
development of pilotless means of reconnaissance which have specifications
similar to those of manned aircraft leads to a degree of parallelism in the
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work of the Ground Forces and the Air Forces, as well as to an increase in
the number of special units and specific types of armament in the Armed
Forces. Furthermore, in the process there is only an insignificant
increase in the probability and reliability of information gathered on the
enemy, while the cost of such information is significantly higher.
Reconnaissance aviation of the front air army conducts reconnaissance
in support of the commands of the front and armies, i.e., in support of the
principal command levels whichmalg7g decision on the use of nuclear
weapons. Only front and air army headquarters can most effectively plan,
support, and carry out flights of aircraft to reconnaissance and strike
targets located at a great depth, with the neutralization and destruction
of enemy air defense means. In particular, calculations show that the
effectiveness of radar jamming produced by aviation is directly
proportionate to the number of aircraft creating it.
Consequently, the effectiveness in the fulfilment of combat tasks and
the magnitude of losses depend to a significant degree, on the quantity of
forces participating in the flight and on their combat support. Therefore,
whenever possible, reconnaissance flights must be combined with massive
bomber and fighter-bomber flights.
We think that, since pilotless systems are still short of being
perfected technically, they should be turned out in small quantities and
thoroughly checked, and the tactical and technical aspects of their
application worked out. For this, it is advisable to form one or two
special experimental or combat-training units according to wartime T/O and
E, manning them completely with well-trained specialists for whom
conditions and incentives for scientific research work must be created.
Officer cadres of these units must be able to collate the experience
of work with the new equipment and work out recommendations for its
technical improvement and instructions for its tactical use. It is
inadvisable, costly, and not particularly effective to accept into the
armament intermediate types of pilotless reconnaissance systems, and even
less so to create numerous units and subunits armed with such systems.
In our opinion, this, or a similar, method of selecting armament will
lessen the likelihood of falling behind the pace of development of modern
science and technology. 50X1-HUM
We do not want to contrast manned systems with pilotless ones but only
want to make an attempt to select the best combination for effectively
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executing the tasks of aerial reconnaissance at an acceptable cost.
At the present time, i.e., during the first stage of the development
of pilotless means of reconnaissance, great advantages (along with
substantial shortcomings) are found on the side of manned means. It may be
anticipated that, with the_developpent of eqpipmant for-autamatic_flistt
control systems and?s79it-ens for the onboard processing of rPc9npais5ance
drUG-the role and significance of manned means in the system of aerial
reconnaissance Means will increase significantly. -However, in the caadett
otorec6hnaissance, niamdirairraiiiin is, aeltrpresent time, significantly
more effective than pilotless systems; and, in spite of the very high cost
in its use for carrying out combat tasks, it is more advantageous and
economical than pilotless means. Thus, for the time being, under equal
conditions, developmental priorities must be given to manned reconnaissance
aircraft.
In conclusion, it should be noted that in the leading capitalist
countries during recent years, more than 25 types of pilotless tactical
reconnaissance aircraft were being developed. The greatest development of
pilotless reconnaissance aircraft took place in the United States.
However, during the last five or six years, a sharp cutback has been noted
there in the means allocated to the development and production of pilotless
reconnaissance aircraft.
Calculations made in the US (which, incidentally, are confirmed by our
computations) indicate that with the expected density, under modern
conditions, of air defense means in a theater of military operations, the
probability of American pilotless aircraft accomplishing reconnaissance
tasks is near zero. Undoubtedly, this factor plus the high cost of medium
and long-range pilotless reconnaissance aircraft were the bEV,F1!;7mthe
curtailment of further work in the US.
The accomplishment of tactical aerial reconnaissance tasks (other than
short-range) has been totally levied on the tactical air armies,
coordination with which the US ground forces devote much attention.
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