MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): THE USE OF FORWARD SECURITY ZONES IN DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP10-00105R000100840001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 16, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 20, 1974
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/16: CIA-RDP10-00105R000100840001-3
Next 3 Page(s) In Document Denied
Iq
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/16: CIA-RDP10-00105R000100840001-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/16: CIA-RDP10-00105R000100840001-3
Page 4 of 12 Pages
The Use of a Forward Security Zone in Defense
General-Leytenant V. Petrenko
The nature of modern operations, the availability to enemy ground
forces large units of a large number of tactical nuclear means, and their
high mobility, necessitate establishing a deep forward security zone of
operational significance in a defense. In our opinion we should have such
zones not only when organizing the defense in advance, but also when going
over to the defense during an offensive operation, when in direct contact
with the enemy, and under conditions of extremely limited time in which to
prepare a defensive operation.
Through skilful selection of lines and conduct of combat operations, a
forward security zone can, for a certain length of time, deprive the enemy
of the advantages stemming from his possible superiority in tactical
nuclear weapons, hamper the massive use of the latter, and create the
conditions necessary for destroying the bulk of his tactical nuclear means
even prior to his approach to the main defensive zone. In addition, the
successful actions of the troops assigned to defend in the forward security
zone can contain the enemy offensive, draw his main forces into the battle
for this zone, and force him to attack on axes which are disadvantageous to
him. It is not out of the question that the defending troops will in that
case deliver fire strikes against the attacking enemy on the approaches to
the defenses for a longer time and, having worn him out, will weaken the
force of the initial strike. The possibility and desirability of
establishing a deep forward security zone n1so is accounted for by the
growing mobility of the troops, their capacity r rapidly going over to
the_ defense =off advantageous Ines and_ a long range o the means of
destructions _as well-as the reliability of the means of control.
Thus, under modern conditions the forward security zone must be
established with the aim of preventing the attacker from advancing the bulk
of his tactical nuclear means all at once at a range allowing him to
deliver massive strikes against the main forces of the defending troops, as
well as for purposes of creating favorable conditions for destroying the
50X1-HUM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/16 _ CIA=RDP10-00105R000100840001-3
 I 50X1-HUM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/16: CIA-RDP10-00105R000100840001-3
Page 5 of 12 Pages
enemy tactical nuclear means of attack, deceiving him regarding the
disposition of our main forces in the defense and causing him to deploy his
main forces prematurely, containing their offensive and gaining time to
prepare a defense, and discovering his groupings and intentions in a timely
manner.
It goes without saying that a forward security zone need not be
established in all instances and under all conditions of the transition to
the defense. The decision to establish it on an operational scale must be
made by the front troop commander. If the front is going over to the
defense with the forces of one army on an isolated axis, a forward security
zone may be established by the decision of the army commander, but in
accordance with the concept of the front operation to defeat the enemy on
that axis.
This is accounted for by the fact that the front troop commander has
at his disposal the bulk of the nuclear means and aviation, with which he
can influence the defeat of the advancing deep operational reserves of the
enemy, disrupt their regrouping, and, an the basis of the results of the
strikes delivered against them, determine which method to employ in
conducting the defense, including establishing a forward security zone. In
addition, the front troop commander, in establishing a forward security
zone, can apprai es and estimate the conditions of the situation more fully,
specifically: the operational status and combat tasks of the defending
army and its adjacent forces; the configuration of the front line; the
military-economic significance of the area in which all or part of the
front forces go over to the defense; the dispositions of the major targets
so that they do not fall in the forward security zone; the nature of the
terrain and the availability of favorable lines on which to organize the
defense of the main forces, and also the special features of the terrain on
which the establishment of the forward security zone is proposed. As to
direct organization of the defense of the forward security zone, obviously
it will be carried out by the army co,naander within the limits of the
boundaries of his army.
The methods for establishing a forward security zone, and the grouping
of forces and means when an army goes over to the defense during a front
offensive operation, will be quite varied. In some conditions of the
situation this zone may be created from territory seized by forward
detachments and advance guards (in this case the main forces go over to the
defense on advantageous lines in the depth), and in others by consolidating
the line reached and leaving on it the minimum number of forces and means
required, at the same time as the main forces of the army first-echelon
X1-HUM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/16: CIA-RDP10-00105R000100840001-3
 I
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/16: CIA-RDP10-00105R000100840001-3
Page 6 of 12 Pages
50X1-HUM
large units move into the depth to a line which will be advantageous for
defense. The zone also may be established by moving the necessary number
of forces forward from the complement of the army first echelon as soon as
the task is received to go over to the defense on the line reached.
Depending on the situation, it is quite probable that these methods for
establishing a forward security zone may be combined.
The task to prepare a forward security zone is given by the army
commander at the same time as the tasks for defense are allocated to the
divisions. The number of forces and means assigned to the defense of the
forward security zone will depend on the composition of the army, the
combat effectiveness of the large units, the combat task, the specific
conditions of the situation, and the methods of establishing the forward
security zone.
On the main axis, a tank or motorized rifle division located ahead of
the designated forward edge of the battle area, may be assigned to conduct
combat operations in the forward security zone. Research has shown that a
division can conduct successful battles in the forward security zone on a
50 to 60-kilometer front, i.e., intercept the offensive zone of the enemy
army corps operating on the axis of the main strike of the field army.
Forward detachments sent out from the first-echelon division may operate on
other axes; these detachments may consist of a motorized rifle or tank
battalion or, in certain cases, regiments, as practiced in the DNEPR
exercise. The remainder of the forward security zone may be covered by
reconnaissance subunits and various types of obstacles.
The number and composition of the forward detachments assigned from
each division of the army first-echelon will be determined by their task,
the anticipated composition and strength of the enemy forward attacking
units, the nature of the terrain, and other conditions of the situation.
The forward detachments, consisting of a motorized rifle (tank) regiment,
can defend a 15 to 20-kilometer-wide erector in the forward security zone,
and a reinforced motorized rifle (tank) battalion can defend a six to
eight-kilometer area along the front. We know that US and West German
divisions move out toward the defensive line they are supposed to break
through by several routes, in a 20 to 30-kilometer-wide zone, having in
front of them reconnaissance and covering troops which include reinforced
motorized infantry and tank battalions. A regimental strength forward
detachment can successfully repulse the attempts of these troops to
penetrate to the forward edge of the battle area and force the main f7_77-HUM
of the enemy divisions to deploy in the forward security zone.
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/16: CIA-RDP10-00105R000100840001-3
 I
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/16: CIA-RDP10-00105R000100840001-3
Page 7 of 12 Paves
50X1-HUM
The use of forward detachments to defend a forward security zone was
widely practiced in the defensive operations of World War II. The nature
of the tasks they performed and their operating methods also are of
interest for modern conditions. We will take as an example the defensive
actions of troops of the 21st Army of the Southwest Front in November 1941
at Belgorod.* The large units of this army, having broken contact with thy;
enemy during withdrawal, on 3 November went over to the defense on the
Koroch-Novoselovka line (east and northeast of Belgorod). The army did not
have close contact with the enemy. To wear out the enemy forward units and
ensure the defense was organized and prepared by the main forces, forward
detachments composed of up to a reinforced regiment were sent out from the
first-echelon divisions to a distance of 35 to 50 kilometers from the main
forces. Operating in a 10 to 18- kilometer-wide zone along the front on
several successively occupied lines, they contained the offensive of the
superior enemy forces for four days, which permitted the army to make an
orderly transition to the defense and carry out the necessary engineer
work.
In subsequent World War II operations, forward detachments were sent
out more often for actions in the forward security zone, and their
composition, distance and the duration of combat operations conducted were
quite varied. Thus, by the time of the defensive engagements at Stalingrad
the composition of the forward detachments included tanks and artillery
(see chart).
In the examples stated, the forward detachments operated
independently, without the fire support of the main forces defending the
main defensive zone, and successfully completed their tasks. In modern
operations in which entire motorized rifle and tank regiments are assigned
to the forward security zone from first-echelon divisions, it is all the
more probable that they will be given complex tasks, as indicated earlier.
*Archives of the Ministry of Defense, file 315, work 2648, Top Secret,5OX1-HUM
volume 93, pages 109-112
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/16: CIA-RDP10-00105R000100840001-3
 I
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/16: CIA-RDP10-00105R000100840001-3
Page 8 of 12 Pages
Divisions from
which forward
detachments sent
192nd Rifle
Division
Line on which forward
detachments initiated
battle, and its dis-
tance from the main
forces defenses
Composition of
forward detach-
ments
Duration of conduct
of combat operation
Pronin, 50 kms
33rd Guards Riflel Chernyshevskaya,
Division 40 Ions
147th Motorized
Rifle Division
Morozovskiy, 60 kms
Rifle regiment,
separate tank
battalion, arti-
llery batta-
lion
Rifle regiment,
separate tank
battalion, arti-
llery battalion
Rifle regiment,
tank company
18-23 July
17-23 July
19-23 July
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/16: CIA-RDP10-00105R000100840001-3
 I
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/16: CIA-RDP10-00105R000100840001-3
Page 9 of I? Pa .A.
50X1-HUM
The depth of the forward security zone on the army main axis must
allow conducting combat operations on two or three successively occupied
lines, creating the conditions for wide movement and, particularly
important, preventing the use of tactical nuclear weapons against the main
forces of the defending troops by engaging the enemy in battle for the
forward security zone. We think these requirements may be met by a depth
on the order of 30 to 50 kilometers. On those axes where battalion-size
forward detachments are operating, the depth of the zone may be less in
order to ensure their support by the fire means of the main forces of the
divisions and prevent the enemy from outflanking the lines the detachments
are occupying.
The depth of the forward security zone must allow the defending units
to conduct active combat operations which would force the enemy strike
groupings to deploy at a great distance from the army forward edge of the
battle area and expend a considerable part of their munitions, including
nuclear. In addition, troop actions in the forward security zone must
force the enemy to condense his combat dispositions, reduce the momentum of
attack and, by the same token create favorable conditions for the defending
forces to inflict losses on the attacking enemy with all means of
destruction, especially missile/nuclear weapons.
To achieve this goal the front (army) commander predesignates the
zones for destroying the enemy troops which they are moving out and in
battle in the forward security zone. Areas of destruction where the enemy
actions can be restricted or his movement slowed, such as narrows, defiles,
crossings of water obstacles, mountain gaps and passes, etc., are indicated
on the terrain. Strikes are planned against these areas, and various types
of engineer obstacles are widely used here.
In order to inflict heavy losses on the attacking enemy in the forward
security zone, sometimes it will be advantageous to move part of the
artillery from the main forces onto temporary fire positions there. In
addition, the troops operating in the forward security zone may be
reinforced by the forces and means of combat with enemy radioelectronic
means so that, as the enemy main control posts and communications system
are deployed and activated, his radioelectronic means will be neutralized
by jamming and his control disrupted.
While operating in a forward security zone a division (regiment)
concentrates its main efforts by axes, one of which is the main one. The
uniform distribution of forces and means and the tendency to create a
continuous front of defense in the forward security zone cannot be
50X1-HUM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/16: CIA-RDP10-00105R000100840001-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/16: CIA-RDP10-00105R000100840001-3
Page 10 of 12 Pages
50X1-HUM
tolerated. The main roads and other axes most favorable to enemy armored
troop actions must be firmly intercepted on the defensive lines.
It is desirable to have the combat structure of a division in one
echelon with one motorized rifle (tank) regiment allocated as reserve. Its
artillery, as a rule, should be sent to reinforce the regiments of the
first echelon. It is hardly desirable to create a divisional artillery
group. Motorized rifle regiments use the bulk of their tanks to reinforce
the antitank defense of the subunits, locating them in company and platoon
strongpoints, and also to operate from ambushes.
It likewise is desirable to have the combat structure of the forward
detachments composed of a motorized rifle (tank) regiment (battalion) into
one echelon by company and separate platoon strongpoints, with allocation
of a reserve in the strength of up to a motorized rifle (tank) company
(platoons) reinforced by antitank means. Artillery attached to a forward
detachment is used in a centralized manner. The bulk of it is deployed
behind the company positions on the tank-threatened axis, and the rest in
the depth behind the position to which the detachment will withdraw during
battle, but set up so it can support the battle of the forward detachment
on the first position.
The basic operating method of the units and subunits in the forward
security zone is the surprise artillery strike to inflict the maximum
losses on the enemy, and then hold the most important areas intercepting
the main axes of possible enemy breakout toward the forward edge of the
battle area. The distance between the successively occupied positions is
determined on the basis of existing favorable natural lines, and for the
purpose of ensuring that the subunits (units) disengage, withdraw and
occupy positions on a new line. Intervals of 3 to 5 kilometers are allowed
for a battalion-strength forward detachment, and S to 8 kilometers for a
regiment.
The units and subunits in the forward security zone must stubbornly
defend the occupied lines, in order to contain the attacking enemy for a
longer time and to be able to rapidly disengage, break contact with the
enemy, and occupy the next line, as well as operate from an ambush.
In the course of the battle the officer commanding the first
detachment, skilfully moving fire, using obstacles and coordinating with
adjacent units, must prevent the enemy from penetrating the gaps between
the strongpoints and, especially, from seizing the occupied position from
the march. The division units fall back to the subsequent lines and
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/16: CIA-RDP10-00105R000100840001-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/16: CIA-RDP10-00105R000100840001-3
Page 11 of 12 Pages
50X1-HUM
positions of the forward security zone after the subunits disengage in
company and platoon columns. This withdrawal must be covered by artillery
fire, obstacles, and tanks firing from ambush. In night conditions most of
the regiment (division) forces can make a simultaneous disengagement from
the enemy under cover of tank fire.
At the last position of the forward security zone, the withdrawing
units, with the air and artillery support from the main forces, must
steadfastly repulse the attack from the march of the first echelon of enemy
divisions, force them to stop, and prepare a repeat attack. Only in this
case will troops operating in the forward security zone completely fulfil
their task and be able to fall back to the depth of defense on command.
When planning the troop withdrawal from the forward security zone to
the depth of defense of the main forces, the army and division commanders
must determine in advance the axes of movement of units and subunits, using
favorable terrain conditions, and organize the cover of the withdrawal by
the fire means deployed in the main zone of defense. In this period it is
highly important not to permit the enemy to break through right after the
withdrawing troops toward the forward edge of the defending troops. This
requires specially assigning engineer subunits to construct obstacles on
the approaches immediately after completing the troop withdrawal.
Defensive artillery fire is prepared on the axes of withdrawal, as are the
flank and crossfire of tanks and antitank means.
It is most desirable that the units of the division and the forward
detachments pull back behind the forward edge of the battle area from the
last position of the forward security zone after the enemy has conducted
preparatory fire at this position, since an earlier withdrawal might be
noticed and the advantage of having a security zone would be lost.
A complex situation in which to conduct combat operations in the
forward security zone can arise as a result of enemy airborne forces
landing and capturing a line to which the pullback was previously
contemplated. If the line occupied by the enemy is important to the
defending forces from a tactical or operational standpoint it is necessary
to organize the destruction of this landing force by the forces of troops
operating in the forward security zone, and in a number of cases by
subunits from the main zone.
Direct control of the forward detachments during a battle in the
forward security zone is effected by the commanders of the divisions from
which they have been sent. When a motorized rifle or tank division is sent
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/16_ CIA-RDP10-00105R000100840001-3
 I 50X1-HUM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/16: CIA-RDP10-00105R000100840001-3
Page 12 of 12 Pages
out to an army forward security zone, its activities are controlled by the
army commander. In all cases the army commander, through the division
commanders, coordinates and directs the efforts of the forward detachments
in accordance with the overall concept of the defensive operation.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/16: CIA-RDP10-00105R000100840001-3