MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): THE CONTROL OF FORCES IN A NAVAL LANDING OPERATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP10-00105R000100700001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 5, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 25, 1974
• Content Type: MEMO

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 2O3O!f
MEMORANDi]M FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT MILITARY THOUGHT SSR The Control of Forces in a
ava ,an ing eration
1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is part of a
series now in preparation based on the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense
publication Collection of Articles of the Journal 'T4ilita Thou ht". This
article examines the actors involve in t e success 1 contro 0 orces
in an amphibious landing operation conducted by the navies of allied
socialist countries. It is concluded that the conduct of such landings is
best accomplished by combining the forces and means of the allied navies,
rather than keeping them separate in their original organizational
structures. Since the length of the landing front is an important variable
in resolving problems of control, sketches show the organizational
structure of forces when landing on both broad and narrow fronts. This
article appeared in Issue No. 3 (88) for 1969.
2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive, this
docwnent should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within recipient
agencies. For ease of reference r o from this publication have been
assigned th
William E. Ne son
Deputy Director for erations
TS #205511
Copy #1,,~
Page 1 of 19 Pages
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Distribution:
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Assistant to the Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Department of the Army
The Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Intelligence)
Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
U. S. Air Force
Director, National Security Agency
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Deputy Director for Science and Technology
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
for National Intelligence Officers
Director of Strategic Research
Director of Weapons Intelligence
Page 2 of 19 Pages
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,n ce~seT
Intelligence Information Special Report
COUNTRY USSR
DATE OF
INFO. Late 1969
SUBJECT
MILITARY THOU(~iT (USSR) : The Control of Forces in a Naval Landing
eration
SOURCE Documentary
S z?
The following report is a translation from Russian of an article which
appeared in Issue No. 3 (88) for 1969 of the SECRET USSR Ministry of
Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal 'Zvlilita
Thou ht" The authors o t is artic a are aptain first ulman
Main First Rank N. Shmarov. This article examines the factors
involved in the successful control of forces in an amphibious landing
operation conducted by the navies of allied socialist countries. It is
concluded that the conduct of such landings is best accomplished by
combining the forces and means of the allied navies, rather than keeping
them separate in their original organizational structures. Since the
length of the landing front is an important variable in resolving problems
of control, sketches show the organizational structure of forces when
,landing on both broad and narrow fronts.
End of Summary
Page 3 of 19 Pages
DATE 25 June 1974
Captain First Rank 0. V. Shu].rnan wrote an article entitled "The Mine
as a Weapon Under Contemporary Conditions", Morskoy Sbornik, No. 12, 1967.
Captain First Rank N. Shmarov wrote two articles, one regarding submarine
training and the other about technical knowhow.of submarine commanders,
Red Star, 30 November 1966 and 17 July 1965 respectively. The SECRET
ver on of Milita Thou t was published three times annually and was
distributed own tote evel of division commander. It reportedly ceased
b
pu
lication at the end of 1970.
T~1s ~r~+ww'
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Control of Forces in an Amphibious Landing Operation
Y
Captain First Rank 0. Shulman and
Captain First Rank N. Shmarov
The geographic locations of the socialist commornaealth countries and
of the probable enemy allow us to consider that, of the many tasks that may
have to be accomplished in an amphibious landing operation, one of the most
,important, especially at the beginning of the war, is the capture of
!islands of a straits zone. This is the reason why for the past several
years, the navies and the ground forces of the Warsaw Pact countries have
been working out all the details of conducting such operations jointly.
Theoretical research and accumulated experience both testify con-
vincingly to the fact that the main condition for the effective use of
allied forces in such an operation lies, first of a11,-in precise, scienti-
fically founded organization of their control with due consideration to the
special features of the national organization of the ground-farrces--aad
navies of each country, the operational-tactical views that have been
developed in them, the language differences, the degree of sophistication
of the available communications means, etc.
It is generally assumed that the conduct of an amphibious landing
operation for the capture of straits zone islands (as is the case in
carrying out a number of other operations) is possible by employing one of
the following two organizational forms of using forces, in the framework of
which effective control can be attained.
First--by combining the forces and means of the allied navies into one
o navy; in this case, the control functions will belong to one of
t e allie naval commanders and his staff.
Second--the allied navies are not united into one combined navy,
retaining their original organizational structure, but the control
functions over the allied navies will be placed under the unified command
of the Warsaw Pact countries. --~._
From the standpoint of control of the forces in an amphibious land' g
operation, both these organizational forms have their positive and neQa~ve
features. 50X1-HUM
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A positive feature of combining the navies is, first of all, the fact
that there is no need for a special coordinating organ to direct the
actions of each allied navy separately and to organize their coordination.
Also, the organization of the landing force is simplified, and planning of
its use is made easier. The coordination of the appropriate control organs
of the combined navy with the front headquarters (or the control organ. of
the front carrying out the overa direction of the landing operation is
consi ered to be less complicated.
On the negative side is the fact that combining the forces and means
of the allied navies leads to dual subordination. At the same time, this
presents difficulties for the commander of the combined navy and his
control organs in coordinating various measures with the plans and
intentions of the commanders and staffs of the national navies. And all
this increases the amount of work for the command and the organs planning
the operation. Furthermore, if one takes into consideration that the
problems of coordinating forces participating in the operation might not be
worked out adequately.in peacetime, then the whole complexity of organizing
the control of the forces in the course of military operations becomes even
more obvious.
If the allied navies are not brought together into a combined navy, a
positive factor is that, first of all, each national navy possesses an
organization and system of control developed in peacetime. Naturally, this
makes it easier to conduct an operation.
In a number of cases it is possible to carry out an amphibious landing
(albeit, as a rule, on a tactical scale) witfi the forces of only_one of the
navies (the other navies can be carrying out other tasks or operating on
secondary axes). At the same time, it provides for better operational
security and more stable control.
The main negative feature is the fact that a coordinating organ must
be created every time to organize the coordination of several navies.
Additional difficulties also arise in connection with the fact that
some of the allied navies do not have aircraft or submarines, which do
happen to be especially needed to support a landing. This makes it
necessary to allocate such forces from the navy that possesses them and,
besides, to organize their operations in the zones of responsibility of the
allied navies or in the theater of naval operations as a whole.
Finally, the organization of coordination with the front is also
complicated, since it has to be carried out by the contro~gans of each
allied navy.
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Of course, each of the abovementioned organizational forms for the use
of naval forces also has other positive as well as negative features,
depending on the specific conditions concerning their bases, the
geographical features of the seas and, most important, of the straits
zones, as well as by other factors. It simply would not be possible to
examine them in this article, but they certainly must be considered when
one has to decide which of the organizational forms for the use of forces
is most suitable for carrying out an amphibious landing operation to
capture straits zones.
Considering all the abovementioned circwnstances, and .bearing in min
the experience accwttulated by the navies and the ground forces of the
Warsaw Pact countries while conducting amphibious landing operations during
maneuvers and exercises, we feel that it is to the overall advantage of all
the countries of the socialist commonwealth that the navies of the allied /
countries be used on the basis of the principle of a combined navy.
Organizationally, it is necessary for the staff of the combined navy
to have departments or permanent operations groups (it does not matter what
they are called) representing the appropriate navies. These departments or
permanent operations groups should be capable of providing the necessary
operational-tactical information that may become necessary during the
preparation of the amphibious landing, and of helping to process the
incoming information from their own navies; in this way they will actively.
participate in the process of control. This must be reinforced by a
reliably operating,,auto ted, secure communications system at all levels
of control, and not just betty en the headquarters of the coordinating
allied navies.
An analysis of previous experience, as well as theoretical research
conducted under conditions similar to the actual ones which will prevail
when the islands of a straits zone are captured, show that it is most
advisable to include the allied navies in the composition of the combined
navy as independent operational formations consisting of permanent or
temporary components of subunits, units and large units of ships of vario~
classes, aviation, and naval infantry, without resubordinating them to the
corresponding arms of forces of the combined navy. This approach will
permit the preservation, without any changes, of the organizational
structure by which the daily control of forces was previously carried out;
and it will permit linking the top level of the allied navy control system
with the overall control system of the combined navy. In this way it will
., be possible to achieve the necessary centralization of control of the
forces participating in the landing of the amphibious assault force or in
its support, while the intermediate control levels of the landin5oxi=xuM
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will be able to carry out their own functions more effectively (the
appropriate intermediate levels are depicted horizontally in Sketch 1).
Of considerable importance in resolving the problems of control of the
forces in a landing operation are the length of the landing front and the
number of axes along which the landing is to be carried out.
A very long landing front makes it necessary to have several com-
manders of the landing force on each axis.
If, for example, the landing front is 120 to 150 kilometers wide and
if, because of geographical features, the landing forces operating on
different axes are separated from each other (landing on the islands of the,
straits zone), one landing force commander will not be able to exercise
effective combat control on each of the axes. A vivid example of this is
the_ Kerch - Feodosiya landing operation carried out from 26 to 31 December
r1941a One of the reasons why the ultimate goal of the landing was not
achiwed was the absence of a single commander and an insufficiently
precise delineation of the functions of control of forces along each of the
landing axes of the amphibious landing force. The operation was commanded
by four... d~fferent__commanders No__comna~'~.ders had been appointed __f_or _ the
landing forces for the Sea. of Azo_v,_the Kerch Straits, and the Black Sea
(the southern coast of the Crimea).
It must be noted that even in the exercises he1r~ _~ rn~~__y~rs,, not
enough attention has been given to the necessity of appointing landing
_-_ __
force COmmanciQrc fnr Pa h mnhibio ~c 1 nrlin~a,r;g, $OmetlmeS during
exercises or war games, w_h_e~n__pl~annin an amphibious landing on_indyidual
islands often separated xf _om each__other y of--miles, only one
commander for the landing forces was appointed on the assumption that he
would be able to control the battle for the landing on all axes.
One of the possible versions of the organizational structure of forces
in a landing along a broad front is shown in Sketch 1.
This version provides for the presence at the intermediate level of
the control organs of a landing force commander for the operation. He is
charged with coordinating the activities of the landing force commanders of
each of the axes (for example, in a simultaneous landing of forces on
several islands of a straits zone).
In addition, this version of the organizational structure takes into
account the complexity of maneuvering forces (in a number of cases, over
considerable distances between sectors of the landing) , for why ~~? ~??-ose
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each landing force on each of the axes has appropriate forces and means
included. 50X1-HUM
In the battle for the landing, control over strike aviation and the
rocket/artillery grouping is not stipulated to be carried out by each
landing force commander along his axis, but through the commander of the
landing force for the operation.
The proposed organizational structure of the landing forces and their
control makes it possible to increase the responsibility of each of the
allied navies for the preparation of its forces on a designated axis of the
landing. At the same time it simplifies the control at the tactical level
(from the landing force commander of each of the axes and lower), as well
as the organization of coordination with the cover force detailed from the
same navy.
An alternate version of an organizational structure of forces when
landing on a narrow front is shown in Sketch 2. It takes into account the
possibility and the necessity of control of the battle for the landing by
one landing force commander and allows him to control the aviation and
rocket/artillery groupings allotted from the front to support the actions
of the landing from the moment the battle for tie anding begins.
In this type of a structure, the commander of the landing force is
able to use the forces and means of each of the allied countries in
whichever sector of the landing they are needed. In addition, the landing
force commander is relieved of the control of the landing air defense
grouping (with the exception of t"re air defense forces and means directly
included in the composition of the landing detachments and their security).
In the final analysis, this proposed organization of forces makes it
possible for the commander of the combined navy to devote more of his
attention.to the control of the coalition forces engaged in carrying out
other tasks.
The abovementioned versions of the organizational structures of
landing forces anticipate that an amphibious landing operation conducted
for operational or operational-tactical goals is carried out by the front,
with the navy providing support for the landing. The advisability o su
a distribution of efforts is supportQd by the following considesoxi-HUM
At the beginning of the war, the navy will be engaged in carrying out
several tasks simultaneously on the maritime axis, concentrating the main
efforts of its forces and means on these tasks~and exercising control over
these forces and means. Having at its disposal various forces and means
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each landing force on each of the axes has appropriate forces any mpg
;,,,-i ?~a,~ M~
In the battle for the landing, control over strike aviation and the E
rocket/artillery grouping is not stipulated to be carried out by each
landing force commander along his axis, but through the commander of the j
landing force for the operation. 1
The proposed organizational structure of the landing forces and their
control makes it possible to increase the responsibility of each of the
allied navies for the preparation of its forces on a designated axis of the
landing. At the same time it simplifies the control at the tactical level
(from the landing force commander of each of the axes and lower), as well
as the organization of coordination with the cover force detailed from the
same navy.
An alternate version of an organizational structure of forces when
landing on a narrow front is shown in Sketch 2. It takes into account the
possibility and the necessity of control of the battle for the landing by
one landing force commander and allows him to control the aviation and
rocket/artillery groupings allotted from the front to support the actions
of the landing from the moment the battle forTlanding begins.
In this type of a structure, the commander of the landing force is
able to use the forces and means of each of the allied countries in
whichever sector of the landing they are needed. In addition, the landing
force commander is relieved of the control of the landing air defense
grouping (with the exception of tree air defense forces and means directly
included in the composition of the landing detachments and their security).
In the final analysis, this proposed organization of forces makes it
possible for the commander of the combined navy to devote more of his
attention.to the control of the coalition forces engaged in carrying out
other tasks.
The abovementioned versions of the organizational structures of
landing forces anticipate that an amphibious landing operation conducted
for operational or operational-tactical goals is carried out by the front,
with the navy providing support for the landing. The advisability o
a distribution of efforts is supported by the following conside~soxi-HUM
At the beginning of the war, the navy will be engaged in carrying out
several tasks simultaneously on the maritime axis, concentrating the main
efforts of its forces and means on these tasks~and exercising control over
these forces and means. Having at its disposal various forces and means
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~ for the successful conduct of combat operations at sea, the navy is not
capable of simultaneously carrying out a large number of tasks on shore.
To assign the navy the task during this period of carrying out an
amphibious landing with an operational or operational-tactical goal would
inevitably affect the fulfilment of other tasks, and it would lead to the
dispersal of its efforts and create additional difficulties in the control
of forces. An amphibious landing operation for the capture of straits
zones generally is part of a front offensive operation on a maritime axis,
which predicates unified contro3-'in the preparation. conduct, and support
of these operations. -
The conduct of an amphibious landing oueration, especially during the
battle for the landing, will require calling upon the forces and means of
the front and to carry out tasks on the shore; to deliver missile/nuclear
stri ec~s; to carry out aviation preparation and support; to organize air
defense and radio countermeasures; and to seize landing points by a
helicopter landing force. In other words, the value of the contribution of
'the front to an amphibious landing operation, especially in its final
stage; s more significant than that of the navy.
Naturally, the achievement of the goals assigned to the landing will
in many ways depend on the extent to which the actions of the maritime
front troops and the amphibious landing force are coordinated in regard to
t nunst nuns g. Only the favorable development of combat actions by troops of the
maritime front in the initial period of the offensive operation, and the
certainty~~eir successful fulfilment, will allow the correct determina-
tion of the time to begin the debarkation of the amphibious landing force.
It should be assumed that only the front commander can make the most
accurate and timely evaluation of tfie situation that has developed at the
front and make the decision on when to begin the debarkation of the
amphibious landing force.
The argtunents presented give grounds for assuming that it is advisable
to have the control of all the forces of the landing operation assigned to
the front commander, or to his first deputy with a staff or operations
group specially created for this purpose.
The landing of amphibious forces for tactical purposes, especially
j outside the zone of actions of front troops, should, in our opinion, be
1 assigned to the navy. In this case, control of all the forces allotted for
the landing and for support of the landing will obviously be the responsi-
bility of the commander of the combined navy or of the commander of one of
the allied navies through their respective staffs. 50X1-HUM
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As is known, the direct control of the forces of an amphibious landing
during the preparation, embarkation, sea crossing, and in the battle for
the landing is carried out by the landing force commander with the help of
his staff. Success in the control of forces in many ways depends on the
teamwork of the staff at all stages of the landing operation. Yet, in
peacetime there are no permanently functioning control organs of landing ~!
operations.. They have to be formed each time landing operations are being
planned as part of maneuvers or exercises. The experience of training in
the navies and ground forces of the Warsaw Pact countries has shown during
recent years that there are several ways of organizing the staff of a
landing force: from the control organs of the fleet, formations: or~large
units -(combined staff of t _e~-fan ud`~ig ~orce~ ; on -tie basis of the staff of
one of the naval bases; or on the basis of the staff of one of -the allied
navies .
In landing a coalition amphibious force, it is advisable to form the
staff of the landing force for that navy which has allocated the largest
amount of forces and means for the landing and whose commander is the
deputy to the front commander for the naval element (or commands all the
amphibious lan ic'['~ng forces during the conduct of the operation by the navy).
Based on the experience of exercises, the combined staff of a landing
force, which is made up of officers of control organs of a navy, large
units, and units, must be formed not later than a month prior to_ the
landing. This period of time is needed to achieve cohesiveness of the
staff as a control organ, to permit the officers to master their functional
duties, and to study the forces designated to support and carry out the
operation. It is obvious that to count on that much time in an actual
combat situation is quite impossible. Besides, if a number of officers are'
assigned to the staff of a landing force) away from the staffs of large
units and other control organs where they serve regularly, this may have a
negative effect on the state of affairs of these large units and
formations. Therefore, the abovementioned method of organizing the staff
of the landing force is not always acceptable.
When organizing a staff of a landing force based on the staff of one
of the naval bases, it will be possible to distribute beforehand, and
organizationally formalize, the additional responsibilities of the officers
for the period that the staff of the landing force is functional. The
preparation and establishment of a staff from a control organ can be
accomplished systematically in the course of daily combat training. Such a
staff can be based on.a daily functioning and cohesive basis, does not
require specially organized, lengthy preparation should it be necessary to
carry out an operation in the shortest possible time, and makes it ^^~~~~~.e
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to quickly study and plan the combat use of the forces and means allocated
for the operation.
However, the relatively small number of personnel in the staffs of
naval bases, the irregularity of their contac w;th__xhe__headquarters of
the allied navi.S~ and of military dstric.~s in the course of daily combat
train ri ~, and the lack of a number of documents covering joint operations,
can complicate the control of the landing force in an amphibious landing
operation, especially in an operation to capture a straits zone by joint
effort of allied countries.
In this case, obviously, it will become necessary to transfer part of
the functions of the staff of the landing force, especially those dealing
with the problems of organizing coordination with the headquarters of the
front and the headquarters of the allied navies, to the navy from which the
st-~ of the landing force was formed.
Considering these conditions, and also in view of accumulated
experience, it is not difficult to conclude that the second method of
forming a staff for a landing force is most acceptable for a tactical
amphibious landing.
The third method--forming the staff of a landing force on the basis of
a staff of one of the allied navies--is most effective when conducting a
landing operation for the capture of straits zones by the forces of several
allied countries, especially when the landing is carried out on abroad
front.
The advisability of such a method of forming the staff of a landing
force is confirmed by the exercises of the allied navies, both within the
framework of a single combined navy and in the independent operations of
each one of them (with parts of the forces of the other navies allocated to
the navy responsible for the landing of the amphibious force).
Such a staff of a landing force, having had daily experience in
controlling heterogeneous large units and having had the appropriate
training, is considered the best qualified and can control the forces of
allied navies operating on independent axes of the landing (the landing
force on each axis, as shown in Sketch 1). At the same time, being in
constant contact with the military districts even in peacetime, it is in a
position to set up reliable coordination with the front carrying out the
amphibious landing operation.
To assure efficient control of the landing forces participating in the
operation, and of the allied fleets, it is advisable that the staff of the
,/
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landing force include operations groups through which, and with whose help,
the commander of the landing force would be able to control efficiently and
reliably the forces of the allied navies assigned to him, and coordinate
with all the allied navies.
Proceeding from the organizational structure, the degree of prepara-
tion, and the capability of controlling the forces, it would be more
accurate to call such a staff "the staff of the landing force commander for
the operation" or "the staff of the deputy commander of the landing
operation for the naval element".
It is also appropriate to note that by forming a staff of a landing
force to include operations groups will allow the commander of one of the
allied navies to control the naval part of the landing operation, and the
commander of the combined navy to concentrate on the control of forces
carrying out other tasks.
The solution to the problem of which allied navy should be used and as
the base for the formation of the sta f of t e ianc~ing force will depend
primarily on which troops (of which allied country) will be operating as
part of the maritime front and will constitute the main force of the
amphibious and airborne~anding. For example, if the forces concentrated
on a maritime axis are mainly those of a certain country and if they also
constitute the main part of the amphibious and airborne landing forces, it
is best to form the staff of the landing force on the basis of the staff of
the navy of that country. This will provide for better mutual understand-
ing with the staff of the maritime front, will facilitate the organization
of coordination with the forces and means allotted by the front in support
of the landing, and will simplify the control of the forces.
As may be seen from the foregoing, each of the above versions of
forming a staff for a landing force has negative features which prevent the
achievement in peacetime of a high degree of preparedness for the fulfil-
ment of the task of landing an amphibious force to capture a straits zone
at the beginning of the war.
A comprehensive analysis of exercises which have been conducted leads
to the conclusion that the shortcoming indicated above could have been
eliminated, for example, by organizing the staff of the landing force on
the basis of a special operational amphibious formation consisting of
several amphibious large units in each sea and formed in peacetime by the
navies of the allied countries in accordance with national principles. The
commander and the staff of such a formation could continually study the
probable enemy, collect the necessary information about him, make a
detailed study of the areas where tasks may be carried out, and prepare
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Page 13 ofsoxi Hums
themselves purposefully to carry out within the shortest possible time
their main function--to be the control organ in an amphibious landing. In
addition, it would enable the staff of the amphibious formation to maintain
continuous coordination with other arms of troops and branches of the armed
forces which could participate in an amphibious landing operation, and
also enable it to work out the organization of control and communications
on a daily basis and continuously carry out operational planning.
While examining the control of forces in an amphibious landing
operation we would like to dwell also on the matter of the exchange .of
operations groups (representatives) of coordinating staffs. On the basis
of many years of experience of coordination with the staffs of certain
allied navies, we consider it advisable during the preparation and conduct
of an amphibious landing operation carried out by the joint efforts of a
front and a combined navy, to effect an exchange of operations groups
men the staffs of the front and the combined navy, and also between the
staffs of the national navie''s: In addition, the staff of naval aviation
should have operations groups, or representatives, from naval large units
_'and from attached.aviation;_ the air defense commander of the landing force
should have them from air defense formations of the front and of the
countries which are providing air defense for the landing supporting the
landing air force; and the landing force commander should have them from
the units and large units which are included in the composition of the
amphibious landing force.
It is possible that certain difficulties will be created by forming
operations groups from the complement of a staff and sending them to other
control organs, since it will complicate the functioning of those organs
from which the officers were detached. The problem of providing operations
.groups with communications means may prove to be just as difficult.
Therefore, in case the number of them has to be decreased, the guiding
principle should be the following: only the higher control lines will send
operations groups (representatives) to the lower ones.
This principle will provide for a proper way of conveying the task and
other instructions from the higher level to the lower ones and. will allow a
check to be made on how well they have been understood; and it will also
provide for control over the adoption of a plan, a reduction in the volume
of orders to lower control levels and, accordingly, a reduction in the
amount of inquiries from them, and, at the same time, a considerah~P
improvement in the stability of control. 50X1-HUM
Experience shows that the contemplated principle of the exchange of
operations groups makes it possible for all participating forces to receive
the information needed for control directly, without wasting time on
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 ~ 50X1-HUM
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Page 14 of 19 Pages
additional discussions with the higher echelon. Such groups also help
overcome language difficulties.
If control of the actions of the landing force at sea is carried out
by one of the commanders of the allied navies, and the other navies assign
part of their forces and means to his command, it may be recommended that
the staff of the landing force (staff of the navy) include operations
groups from the allied navies. These operations groups should be headed by
chiefs with the proper authority and capable of organizing control of their
own national forces in conformity with the plan of the commander of the
landing operation (commander of the allied navy). Such a chief will
actually be the deputy to the commander of the landing force (commander of
the navy) for his own national forces.
Which, then, is the most desirable composition for operations gro s
and what are the main requirements that should be demanded of them? Itpis
considered sufficient for them to include one or two operatives, an
intelligence officer, a political worker, a naval air defense specialist, a
naval infantry officer, a commanications man, and one or two secure
communications specialists (the number of the latter depends on the number
of channels of automatic secure communications the operations group will
have).
Senior officers of the operations groups departing to loin the front
staff or the staff of the coordinating navy, and the other officers e~ a ng
for the units of their respective responsibilities, must be well informed
about the plans of their respective commanders, especially on matters which
require mutual clarification or which may affect the fulfilment of tasks by
another navy.
A situation may often develop whereby the operations groups will have
to depart before the operations plan of their respective navies have been
formulated. In this case, the staff that has sent the operations group
must inform it in good time on all matters that may be of interest to the
coordinating formation,
An absolute requirement for the operations group is that it have
detailed knowledge concerning the status of the national forces allocated
for the landing force, their combat capabilities, the availability of
communications means, and the special aspects of control.
It is strongly recommended that the composition of an operations group
be determined beforehand by an appropriate schedule and its training
conducted during exercises in peacetime, In order to prevent difficulties
arising from language differences, it is advisable that these groups
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Page 15 of 19 Pages
include officers who have a good command of the appropriate language and
who are capable of reporting immediately any information received from the
national navies. 50X1-HUM
Thus, the successful control of forces in an amphibious landing
operation conducted .by the navies of?allied countries depends greatly on
the organizational structure within the framework of which it is being
carried out.
(See Sketches 1 and 2 together with a key to each on following pages.)
50X1-HUM
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 '~CO~mn~nder
of landing
forces
'Fleet chief of
+ :s~~ff o~ co~mnander r
~s?-naval base 1_
~eT off:
forces covering-from
'the sea ' /~
Conuaander; of~lar e'
g
unit o~ combined
flavy ''
Surface strike groups of
combined navy
%~i%~ ' ~~~~
~L.L_ ~/_r~,~.p
Deputy. commandex, of
,artillery `~
1~.a
Units of front rocket and -,..
artillery troops
'/' ~~'~me?rt ~:. 2 ~, ~'
k ._
~. ~ ~
Com~der, o~.~f~,eet
Forces of landing ~
~ ~
,.
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Forces of landing
_detachment~ No__~_-
_1Teputy for the naval element
_. .._._ _
Uor~zder-of one-af tt~ navies
amphafsious
landing
C~mmandex-~f iar~e
Ships of fire support groups
of the combined fleet
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Co~nartider of air''
defense. rou '
1 8 pig
of the landing
-- large unit `
1
?onasande~ of air defense
Airborne landing force units 1
National and front air defense
of allied armies large units an3 units ~~~
_ __
_ _ _ .. ._. __ ~- a~
~. _. _........._ _ --- ,,.o......_....~....~..__.,, ....
~,.,,,_
Forces and means of navgata'
I
and hydrographic support of ,
the combined navy
- . ',~.
r i - rescue group '
support vesse s =:_B_..
.. ~ -- _ __
_Ehief of hydro- ?hief of fleet ~
graphic service. ~- sale e and. rescue
ag f
_ __
~ enrvirc 1
Page 16 of 19 Pages
Conmlaitder of~,~~'
the seat, ~~
~~
Ccmunander of Iar e unit`'
g
of combined navy
~`~ ;
Surface strike groups of combined navy
Forces and means of salvage-
rescue support of the combined '~
navy
---~--_i~,-t,_
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Page 17 of l~ Fages
Key to Sketch 1
Diagram of the organizational structure of forces
and. their control in a landing of an amphibious force
on abroad front (hachuring shows the participation
in the landing operation of the forces and means of
allied navies).
is the line along which the control of
oi?ces is conducted in the battle for the landing.
x x x is the line along which the control
o~~rces is conducted before the battle for the
landing begins.
is the line along which the exchange
0 1P.~T7ilat10n is conducted concerning the situation
and actions.
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Key to Sketch 2
Diagram of the organizational structure of
forces and their control in a 1_anding of an
amphibious force on a narrow front (hachuring
shows the participation in the landing operation
of the forces and means of allied navies).
is the line along which the control
o~forces is conducted in the battle for
the landing.
- - - - - - - is the line along which the
exchange of information is conducted
concerning the situation and actions.
x x x is the line along which requests
are ma ecT~for forces for air support or rocket-
artillery preparation.
Abbreviations:
KI1G - - ship strike group
DESO -- landing detachment
OK~P -- detachment of ship fire support
;GIGO -- navigational and hydrological support
ass -- emergency rescue service
~7)V - - airborne forces
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Deputy for the naval element
Surface vessels of
corrba.ned navy
'Front and fleet
air ~l'arge units and
I units
Commander of one of
the allied fleets
~~ T ___ _ . ~~,
_:.... Cor~rGander~ o~~-
roGket=artillery-
__
__.., p g _
~~rnu an
?duty-~or(91sandEr of
_ front rocket- troop~-
w....~ _
+~_.~'~._~rtillery
II~puty co~manderof
,. front aar.ar?ny._.__...
_Cgmmarider of large
__ unr>; of-airborne--,.
___--_ -forces _
i Large units and units
of rocket-artillery 4
~ troops of the front
i
Car~r~~nder of fleet
largz ~.anit
_..
Commander of.~ ~:~
Go, der~~~~ ,
?~nan
air-defense4grouping
~ree~. ~ode~ikg
of-the landing_ _ _
rrlx t~t~ S~~ `,