MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): ENGINEER SUPPORT IN NEGOTIATING A NUCLEAR MINE BELT

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• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 27, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 24, 1974
• Content Type: MEMO

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
24 June 1974
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): Engineer Support in Negotia-
ting a Nuclear Mine Belt
1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is part of a
series now in preparation based on the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense
publication Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought". This
article dwells on engineer measures, including reconnaissance, demolition
of mines and road construction, in support of ground forces negotiating a
nuclear mine belt. The author stresses the importance of timing and the
problem of radiation among factors affecting eugineer operations. This
article appeared in Issue No. 1 (86) for 1969.
2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive, this
document should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within recipient
agencies. For_ease_of_re_.7erence, resorts from this publication have been
assigned the Codeword
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FIRDB-312/02281-74
William E. Nels n
Deputy Director for Op rations
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Distribution:
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Assistant to the Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Department of the Army
The Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Intelligence)
Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
U. S. Air Force
Director, National Security Agency
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Deputy Director for Science and Technology
Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence
for National Intelligence Officers
Director of Strategic Research
Director of Scientific Intelligence
Director of Weapons Intelligence
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Intelligence Information Special Report
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COUNTRY USSR
HRDB-
312/02281-74
DATE OF
DATE
24 June 1974
INFO. Early 1969
SUBJECT
MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR):
Engineer Support in Negotiating a Nuclear Mine
Belt
SOURCE
Documentary
Summary:
The following report is a translation from Russian of an article which
appeared in Issue No. 1 (86) for 1969 of the SECRET USSR Ministry of
Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal 'Military
Thow,ht". The author of this article, Colonel M. Tolchinskiy, discusses
engineer measures to support ground forces negotiating a nuclear mine belt.
The article dwells on reconnaissance and demolition procedures, and the
personnel and equipment required for road construction in detonated areas.
The importance of timing to coordinate engineer support with troop moves is
stressed, as is the problem of radiation levels.
Comment:
End of Summary
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There is no information in available reference materials which can be
firmly associated with the author. The SECRET version of Military Thought
was published three times annually and was distributed down to the level of
division commander. It reportedly ceased publication at the end of 1970.
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Engineer Support in Negotiating a Nuclear Mine Belt
by
Colonel NL Tolchinskiy
The requirement to negotiate nuclear mine obstacles, especially an
enemy nuclear mine belt, is 9pe, of the probable features of both a
combined-arms and a tank army offensive operation involving the use of
nuclear weapons.. As experience in military exercises and theoretical
research have shown, engineer support measures play an essential role in
the successful negotiation of this new type of obstacle.
In this article we shall examine questions concerning the effective-
ness of nuclear mine obstacles, reconnaissance support, the seizure,
deactivation, and destruction of nuclear land mines and control posts by
explosion, and also the organization of the preparation of routes through a
detonated nuclear mine belt.
The effectiveness of nuclear mine obstacles, from the enemy point of
view, should be judged mainly by the amount of time needed by attacking
troops to negotiate them. Of course, it can be gauged also by losses
inflicted on troops by the casualty-producing factors of nuclear land mine
bursts. But this, in our view, is not decisive to the enemy. His basic
goal is, with the aid of such obstacles, to delay large forces of attacking
troops for an extended time period, to create the conditions for destroying
them with all kinds of weapons, and also to gain time to regroup and build
up his own forces.
The total amount of time expended by troops in negotiating a detonated
nuclear mine belt is the sum of the time spent waiting for high radiation
levels to drop to the limit at which the subunits assigned to clear and
prepare the routes will not receive doses of radiation above the level
tolerable (or established) for one-time radiation, the time spent on
reconnaissance and preparation of routes, and the time taken to move across
the belt and the contamination zone that has formed.
These elements of time in turn depend on the density of nuclear land
mines in the belt, their yield, the nature of the terrain, wind direction
and speed, capabilities for clearing and preparing routes, the degree to
which the troops are protected against radiation, and other factors.
To gain some idea as to how long troops could be delayed by a
detonated nuclear mine belt, the Engineering Department of the Military
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Order of Lenin Red Banner Academy of Tank Troops i/n Marshal of the Soviet
Union R. Ya. Mhlinovskiy, conducted the following research.
Three typical terrain segments were chosen on maps of the eastern part
of the Federal Republic of Germany, where the enemy plans to create a
nuclear mine belt: one with unbroken terrain, one of average ruggedness,
and one mountainous and wooded, each 20 kilometers wide, which approxi-
mately corresponds to the offensive zone of a tank division. In each of
them nuclear land mines supposedly were laid at densities of 0.35, 0.5 and
0.75, and one land mine per kilometer of the belt. In order for the
results to be comparable, the relative yields of the nuclear land mines
were assumed to be identical: in all variants one-third of the land mines
were equal to 47 kilotons of TNT, one-third to 28 to 30 kilotons, and
one-third up to 11 kilotons. Average wind direction was assumed to be
toward the attacking troops at an angle of 45 degrees to their axis of
movement. The locations for emplacing the land mines were determined by
calculating where a given number of them could produce the greatest amount
of destruction.
This format for a nuclear mine belt differs from those cited in the
periodical military press. Engineer Colonel Yu. Dorofeyev, in particular,
points out in his article* that in terrain of average ruggedness the
density of nuclear land mines will be not more than 0.5 per kilometer of
the belt. And 80 to 90 percent of the total number will have a yield of up
to 10 kilotons.
We believe that when creating powerful nuclear mine obstacles, the
enemy will not be limited to a density of 0.5 land mines per kilometer of
the belt, since he possesses great capabilities in this area. Thus, in a
defensive zone of an army corps of the USA, if the pits are prepared in
advance, a nuclear mine belt with a density of 0.8 to I land mine or more
per kilometer can be created in 10 to 12 hours.
Nor, in our view, should we believe that the yield of most land mines
will not exceed 10 kilotons. The use of these land mines at a density of
0.3 to 0.5 will not make it possible to create wide interconnecting
barriers and a solid zone of radioactive contamination of the terrain with
high levels of radiation, and the attacking forces will be able to bypass
individual centers of destruction. Therefore we should expect a large
number of land mines with yields of 30 and 47 kilotons to be present in an
enemy nuclear mine belt.
* Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought", No. 3 (85) for
1968.
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The research revealed that when the nuclear land mines exploded, the
destruction in unbroken terrain could have covered an area of 18 to 54
square kilometers, constituting 17 to 58 percent of the area of the belt
(within which the land mines were emplaced), in average terrain, 19 to 57
square kilometers (15 to 37 percent of the area of the belt), and in
mountainous wooded terrain, 20 to 70 square kilometers (17 to 39 percent of
the area of the belt). Radioactive Contamination Zone B extended to a
depth of 12 to 35 kilometers, and Zone A to a depth of 30 to70 kilometers.
The average extent of destruction on each of the previously designated
5 or 6 routes in unbroken terrain with a density of 0.5 land mines per
kilometer of the belt, was 1.9 kilometers, and with a density of one land
mine was 3.9 kilometers. .1n average terrain it came to 2.6 and 5.4
kilometers respectively, and in mountainous wooded terrain, 3.6 and 6.1
kilometers.
Thus, with an increase in the density of land mines in a nuclear mine
belt, and in the degree to which the terrain is rugged, wooded, and built
up, the amount of destruction on routes of troop movement also increases.
The nature of obstacle clearing and road or bridge building operations
varies according to the contour of the land. Thus, it developed that in
unbroken terrain, what was needed mainly was to lay cross-country bypass
routes and a few bridges.. The need to make passages through the barriers
arose only when the density was 0.75 to 1 land mine per kilometer of the
belt on three routes out of six. In average terrain there was more work to
be done to make passages through the barriers and build bridges. As for
mountainous wooded terrain, the extreme ruggedness of the terrain contour
and the impossibility of laying bypass routes made it necessary to prepare
routes directly through the centers of destruction.
Calculations have shown that the work of clearing away obstacles and
building and repairing roads and bridges on each route takes, depending on
the density of the land mines in the belt, an average of 1.3 to 6 hours in
unbroken terrain, 2 to 11 hours in average terrain, and 9 to 24 hours in
mountainous wooded terrain.
Since the centers of destruction and the bypass routes will be located
mainly in the zone of dangerous radioactive contamination, subunits
assigned to prepare the routes, and also the main forces of first-echelon
divisions, will be forced to wait for the high radiation levels to drop to
the point at which personnel will not receive more than 50 roentgens, or
another predetermined dose, during the work.
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To determine the time needed by the troops to negotiate a detonated
nuclear mine belt, a special algorithm and program were developed which
were used in making calcuUtions on a Mins1=2_electronic computec. Initial
data fed in dealt with the place, yield, and depth of the burst of nuclear
land mines, the direction and speed of the wind, and the amount and
location of engineer works to be done on each route. The computer then
produced data on the time to start work on each route, taking into account
the time spent waiting for a drop in radiation, and the time when subunits
engaged in clearing obstacles would arrive at the terminal point of the
route, including the amount of time it would take to cross the belt.
Knowing the moment when these subunits will reach the rear boundary of the
nuclear mine belt, it is possible also to compute the time it will take the
troops to negotiate it, since the main forces of first-echelon divisions
must overtake these subunits when the latter are completing obstacle-
clearing operations on the route.
The calculations produced an interesting fact. It developed that the
time spent waiting for a drop in high radiation levels, and the total time
needed to negotiate a nuclear mine belt along various routes within the
offensive zone of a division, differ substantially from each other. Thus,
in the area of average terrain with a density of 0.5 land mines per
kilometer, the time needed to negotiate the belt along Route No. 1 was about 6
hours, Routes 3 and 4--9 to 10 hours, and Routes 2 and 5--over 18 hours.
Consequently, in a number of cases it is possible to decide against
preparing all previously designated routes, and prepare only those
requiring a lesser expenditure of time.
The average overall time troops require to negotiate a detonated
nuclear mine belt is shown in the table. It is based on the assumption
that the personnel of subunits engaged in preparing routes are in vehicles
with a radiation attenuation factor equal. to 10. When working in vehicles
with less protection, the time required to negotiate the belt will
increase. The data cited in the table pertain to terrain segments with
large wooded areas, that are heavily built up, and have an extensive
network of roads. Under other conditions they could change in one
direction or another. However, on the whole these data make it possible,
in our view, to judge the approximate time the troops require to negotiate
a detonated nuclear mine belt.
(See Table on following page)
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Average Time Troops Require to Negotiate a Detonated
Nuclear Mine Belt
tensity of Average time Time needed
land mines to prepare to move
in the belt routes across the
per 1 km, through the belt
nuclear mine
belt
Average time
spent waiting
for a drop in
high levels
of radiation
Total average
time needed for
troops to
negotiate a
detonated
nuclear mine
belt
On Unbroken Terrain
0.35
1 hour 15 m.
2 hr. 8 m.
2 hr. 19 m.
5 hours 42 m.
0.5
1 hour 15 m.
2 hr. 33 m.
5 hr. 12 m.
9 hours 00 m.
0.75
4 hours 30 m.
2 hr. 40 m.
11 hr. 39 m.
18 hours 49 m.
1.0
5 hours 40 m.
2 hr. 50 m.
17 hr. 20 m.
25 hours 50 m.
On Terrain of Average Ruggedness
0.35
1 hour 40 m.
2 hr. 08 m.
2 hr. 06 m.
5 hours 54 m.
0.5
3 hours 24 m.
2 hr. 10 m.
7 hr. 02 m.
12 hours 36 m.
0.75
6 hours 36 m.
2 hr. 53 m.
24 hr. 31 m.
34 hours 00 m.
11 hours 20 m.
2 hr. 57 m.
33 hr. 32 m.
47 hours 49 m.
In Mountainous Wooded Terrain
0.35
8 hours 35 m.
2 hr. 25 m.
167 hours
178 hours
0.5
12 hours 30 m.
2 hr. 40 m.
314 hours
329 hours
0.75
16 hours 20 m.
3 hr. 35 m.
374 hours
394 hours
1.0
23 hours 35 m.
4 hr. 30 m.
543 hours
571 hours-21,W
Thus, from data obtained on the combat effectiveness of a nuclear mine
belt, we may conclude that this type of obstacle is capable of substan-
tially delaying an advance of attacking troops. Thus, a major problem here
is to find methods of reconnoitering, seizin, deactivating, and destroying
nuclear land mines and detonation control points.
Support of these operations while troops are negotiating a nuclear
mine belt will constitute the first stage of engineer measures. In the
second stage, in the event of complete or partial enemy detonation of a
Eraiii mine belt, reconnaissance, and the clearing and preparation of
routes for moving the main forces are organized. In this connection,
engineer units and subunits in an army and in divisions must be allocated
in such a way that some of them support reconnaissance, seizure, and
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deactivation of nuclear land mines, while others are in readiness for
reconnaissance and preparation of routes for the movement of the main
forces.
We know that all forms of reconnaissance, including engineer
reconnaissance, are assigned to obtain data on a nuclear mine belt.
However, because the enemy carefully protects the main elements in this
belt, independent operations by engineer reconnaissance subunits will be
made extremely difficult. It therefore is advisable to include recon-
naissance sappers in deep reconnaissance groups and in reconnaissance
groups and patrols. From their various revealing features, reconnaissance
sappers have to determine the places where nuclear land mines have been
emplaced and the location of detonation control points, and ascertain the
nature of barriers and obstacles protecting them, possible routes for
bypassing them, and the nature of the engineer preparation of security
positions and detonation control points. In those cases in which
reconnaissance groups are able to seize the site of an emplaced nuclear
land mine, reconnaissance sappers pinpoint the location of the land mine
itself, and take part in deactivating and destroying it. In addition, they
assist reconnaissance subunits in negotiating obstacles.
In order to fulfil these tasks, each reconnaissance group or patrol
must include 2 or 3 reconnaissance sappers with the necessary means (mine
detector, land mine detector, explosive charges and tool set). The
overall requirement in engineer subunits for reconnoitering a nuclear mine
belt is 2 to 3 platoons for a first-echelon division, and 2 to 3
reconnaissance sapper companies for an army as a whole (with three
divisions in the first echelon). This calculation is based on a density of
up to one land mine per kilometer of the belt and does not include the
reconnaissance sappers allocated for reconnaissance of the routes of troop
movement after the blowing up of these obstacles.
The task of capturing and destroying nuclear land mines and detonation
control points is given to forward detachments, from which seizure and
destruction groups are allocated.
In most of the military exercises, in order to achieve more efficient
distribution of tasks and more convenient control, the group for the
seizure and destruction of nuclear land mines was divided into a seizure
and support subgroup and a destruction subgroup. The first of these
usually was the stronger, destroyed the immediate protection, seized the
land mine site, and supported the operations of the destruction subgroup.
The latter consisted of specialized sappers and dosimeter monitors, and
conducted final reconnaissance of a nuclear land mine site, which it then
deactivated or destroyed.
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In order for the seizure subgroup to be able to negotiate the barriers
and obstacles protecting the site of an emplaced nuclear land mine, it is
advisable to allocate to it 1 or 2 mine-clearing attachments and 1 or 2
tank bulldozers on tanks. The destruction subgroup, in order to be able to
determine, with sufficient certainty, in a short time, the exact
emplacement of a land mine and prevent its detonation, will require a
sapper section equipped with mine detectors, land mine detectors, mine
probes, ladders, explosive charges and a tool set.
However, this equipment, and especially the existing means of
detecting land mines, is not as effective as it should be. In particular,
the land mine detectors make it possible to detect land mines at a depth of
only 3 meters at the most, and a mine detector at only 30 to 40 centimeters
at the most. Because of the inadequacy of reconnaissance means in the
exercises in the Carpathian Military District in 1966, one nuclear land
mine was not detected and it took about 1.5 hours to find another. At the
exercises in the Southern Group of Forces in 1967, it took about 1 hour to
reconnoiter and destroy a land mine. This amount of time does not satisfy
modern requirements, since in the interval the enemy can detonate a nuclear
land mine that we have seized.
Final reconnaissance and deactivation of a nuclear land mine should
not take sappers longer than 20 - 25 minutes, since most land mines have a
safety fuse with a delayed-action interval of up to 30 minutes. Obviously
we must develop a land mine detector that is effective at a depth of 8 to
10 meters and a distance of several dozen meters. Using two such detectors
within the elimination zone, it is possible to detect a land mine rather
quickly by using the directional fixing method. Perhaps the land mine
detectors should be mounted on a helicopter for this purpose. To prevent
the discovered land mine from exploding, the sappers must first sever the
wire connecting it to the detonation control point, and also the antenna.
As to recommendations for destroying nuclear land mines by exploding
them, this method seems to us to be open to considerable question. Nuclear
land mines of types XM55, XM127, and XM129 can, when exploded, produce a
partial nuclear burst with a yield of 30 percent of nominal, while an M59
land mine can produce a burst equal to its rated yield. Only )(M125 and M50
land mines are safe in this respect. However, the first of these has an
explosive charge of about 200 kilograms, which will go off from the
detonation when the land mine explodes.
The radius of safe distance for personnel in armored personnel
carriers when an X4127 land mine is exploded (30 percent of rated yield)
can reach 1.5 to 2 kilometers, while for an M59 land mine it could be 2 to
5 kilometers. Consequently, when destroying these types of land mines by
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explosive means, it is essential to move personnel a considerable distance
away, which requires a great deal of time. In addition, the center of
destruction that forms as a result, and the radioactive contamination of
the terrain, will hamper the advance of the main forces. Damage to other
subunits of the forward detachment also is possible. Therefore, it is
advisable to deactivate 'the XM127 and M59 land mines by moving the
explosive device to a safe position. The fact that these land mines are
emplaced in pits that are not filled in makes this easier. After the main
forces of an army negotiate the belt, these land mines can be turned over
to engineer or other special units of the front for dismantling.
For operations when mine density is 0.75 to 1 per kilometer of the
belt, the groups for the seizure and destruction of nuclear land mines in a
division will have to consist of 2 or 3 engineer-sapper companies, while
these groups in an army will have to have 6 to 9 engineer-sapper companies,
60 to 70 mine-clearing tank attachments, 90 to 100 land mine detectors, and
other equipment.
In organizing the negotiation of a nuclear mine belt, we should always
allow for the fact that the enemy can fully or partially detonate it. In
such a situation, reconnaissance will be required, and the routes will have
to be cleared and prepaTied to support the movement of the main forces of an
army through the detonated belt. The number of routes depends on the
amount of obstacle-clearing and road and bridge-building work, the degree
of radioactive contamination of the terrain, and the structure adopted by
the troops. It is advisable to move the main forces of divisions in
battalion columns. This kind of structure will permit divisions to deploy
fairly quickly into combat array to seize the enemy forward defensive line.
This will require preparing 4 to 6 routes.
Opinions are sometimes expressed in the press that under these
conditions a division must prepare 8 to 12 routes and move along them in
company columns. Such proposals are subject to challenge with regard to
both the advisability of moving a division in company columns to a depth of
20 to 50 kilometers, and the possibility of allocating a sufficient number
of engineer forces and means. If at least one engineer road construction
and repair platoon were assigned to prepare a route, then a division would
require a total of 4 to 6 engineer road construction and repair companies.
But the most it could have would be 2 or 3 such companies: 1 organic and 2
attached for reinforcement.
As has been shown by research and experience gained during training at
the academy, the amount of destruction on certain routes can be so
extensive that we will have to limit ourselves to preparing only 3 or 4
routes (and sometimes even fewer) per division. For example, in a war game
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held at the academy in 1967 it was planned to prepare 12 routes for a tank
army with 3 divisions in the first echelon. In the offensive zone of 2 of
the divisions about 40 percent of the land mines were seized and
deactivated, as a result of which two passages, each 10 to 12 kilometers
wide, were formed. Two routes were prepared through each of them. In the
offensive zone of the third division, as a result of the large amount of
destruction and the high levels of radiation, it became necessary to
abandon the idea of negotiating the nuclear mine belt and instead commit
the division to action in the adjacent sector.
To move an army rocket brigade, surface-to-air missile units reserves
(of the second echelon), control posts, and other army units, 2 o. 3 army
routes must be prepared. To maneuver army troops from one axis to another
it is advisable toprepare in advance 3 or 4 routes parallel to the
national border at a depth of 30 to 60 kilometers.
Engineer and radiation reconnaissance is organized to spot the most
advantageous routes for the main forces. To carry it out, army divisions
should have a reserve of forces and means, since there exists a major
threat that the reconnaissance subunits acting jointly with the forward
detachments and airborne landing forces, will suffer casualties when the
enemy detonates the nuclear land mines, and will not be able to furnish
timely information about obstacles and destruction on the roads. On each
route designated in advance, it will be necessary to send out one recon-
naissance group consisting of an officer of a combined-arms headquarters,
an officer of the engineer troops, 3 or 4 reconnaissance sappers, and 1 or
2 chemical reconnaissance men. In view of the fact that reconnaissance
will be conducted in an area with high levels of radiation and a large
amount of destruction, reconnaissance groups should be sent out in
helicopters.
On the basis of the data obtained from all types of reconnaissance,
the sites of seized, deactivated, and blown up nuclear land mines, centers
of destruction, zones of radioactive contamination of the terrain, areas of
fires, etc. are plotted on a map. Then the routes are determined, and the
time when work on them is to begin and the main forces are to move is
calculated. In order to lessen the amount of work and reduce the waiting
time of the main forces, routes are chosen which can bypass the centers of
destruction by using existing roads or which fall on axes with lower levels
of radiation.
The preparation of each route may require 1 or 2 platoons of tanks, up
to a platoon of sappers in an armored personnel carrier, 2 to 4 bulldozer
tanks, 1 or 2 KMT-5 mine-clearing tank attachments, 2 or 3 bridgelayers,
equipment for widening passages in minefields and for marking routes,
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explosive charges, etc. Units varying in size from a platoon to an
engineer road construction company may be assigned on axes with lower
radiation levels.
During operations in zones with high levels of radiation, personnel
may receive the maximum tolerable doses of one-time radiation before
completing work on the routes. In such cases they should be replaced by ?,/
personnel, brought in by helicopter from a previously prepared reserve.
For this purpose an army will require 10 to 12 M1-4 helicopters, taken from
those being used to reconnoiter routes.
Subunits assigned to prepare the routes will be able to begin work
immediately after receiving intelligence data or after the radiation drops
to the level at which the personnel would not receive more than the maximum
tolerable dose. The relevant data are given in the table cited above.
Before an offensive begins, the main forces of the first-echelon
divisions should be stationed outside the probable zone of radioactive
contamination of terrain from the detonation of a nuclear mine belt, and
not less than about 60 to 80 kilometers from the national border. These
units should begin their advance toward the detonated belt at a time that
will enable them to overtake the subunits assigned to prepare the routes,
at the moment the subunits complete obstacle-clearing and road work. The
interval of time between the beginning of movement by these subunits and by
the main forces will be approximately equal to the duration of the
obstacle-clearing and road work. In the process, the main forces may
advance toward the border and cross the detonated nuclear mine belt at a
speed close to the average rate of march. They will not stop in places
where obstacle-clearing work is going on, where personnel would receive
additional doses of radioactivity.
Calculations have shown that the overall requirement of forces and
means for engineer support of the negotiation of a nuclear mine belt by an
army (with three divisions in the first echelon) is up to 6 tank companies,
16 to 20 engineer-sapper companies, 8 to 10 engineer road construction and
repair companies, 3 or 4 engineer bridge-building companies, 80 bulldozer
tanks, 80 to 110 mine-clearing tank attachments, up to 40 bridgelayers, and
12 to 15 helicopters. On the basis of the number of engineer troops in an
army, it could require an additional three engineer-sapper battalions.
In an army, considerable forces will be engaged in accomplishing the
tasks of engineer support of the negotiation of a nuclear mine belt.
However, engineer-sapper and engineer road units do not have adequate
protection from radiation. This can cause them to take more time to fulfil
their assigned tasks. Therefore, in our view, it now is especially
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important to organize special engineer units of the Reserve of the High
Command, intended for qualitative reinforcement of troops lacalilium are
negotiating nuclear mine obstacles.
In this case, it appears to be just as necessary as was organizing the
mine-clearing tank regiments and engineer assault brigades which were used
to reinforce armies and divisions when breaking through heavily fortified /
positions during World War II. A study of this question has shown that i
is advisable to have obstacle -clearing engineer regiments of the Reserve \
of the High Command consisting of 3 or 4 battalions, with a view toward \
reinforcing an army with such a regiment and a first-echelon division with
a battalion. Considering that when negotiating a nuclear mine belt, 15 to
20 groups for the seizure and destruction of nuclear land mines can be
organized in a division (with at least one sapper-specialist section in
each), and 4 routes will have to be prepared, an obstacle-clearing engineer
battalion should have 2 companies for the deactivation and destruction of
nuclear land mines (with 3 platoons in each) and an obstacle-clearing road
company of 4 platoons. A platoon of a company for the deactivation and
destruction of nuclear land mines may consist of 3 sections, each with
means of reconnoitering and deactivating land mines, and deployed in an
engineer combat vehicle. A platoon of an obstacle-clearing road company
should have 2 engineer tanks, 2 or 3 tank bridgelayers with spare trusses,
and 1 engineer combat vehicle.
To successfully fulfil the task of supporting the negotiation of a
nuclear mine belt by troops, obstacle-clearing engineer units must be given
new equipment in addition to their existing means (bridgelayers, mine-
clearing tank attachments, mine-clearing charges, etc.). The most
important new items are mine detectors, engineer tanks, and engineer combat
vehicles.
An engineer tank must be equipped with a set of equipment which
enables the crew, without getting out of the tank, to successfully perform
the work of clearing routes through a detonated nuclear mine belt under
conditions of high radioactive contamination of the terrain. This
equipment may include a bulldozer attachment for clearing away barriers and
piling up dirt, two saws for slicing up the large elements in tree
barriers, a mechanical "hand" for pulling barriers apart, and a device for
throwing explosive charges. The radiation attenuation factor for personnel
in these vehicles should equal 20 to 30.
A combat engineer vehicle is intended mainly for operating in the
nuclear land mine seizure and destruction groups. It is supposed to
accommodate a sapper section, have a bulldozer attachment for clearing the
approach to the emplacement site of a nuclear land mine, a crane for
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removing it from the pit, and a device for sucking dirt out of the pit in
those cases in which the land mines are packed in. The radiation
attenuation factor should be the same as that of tanks.
At the same time it is essential to reinforce the protective
characteristics of road clearers, base vehicles of truck-mounted treadway
bridges, and other engineer materiel, in order to raise the effectiveness
with which engineer units are used when negotiating nuclear mine obstacles.
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