MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): ORGANIZATION OF A LANDING OF AMPHIBIOUS FORCES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP10-00105R000100610001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 27, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 4, 1974
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/27: CIA-RDP10-00105R000100610001-8
50X1-HUM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/27: CIA-RDP10-00105R000100610001-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/27: CIA-RDP10-00105R000100610001-8 OX1-HUM
I/1
ia
MEMORANDUM FOR:
SUBJECT
ToC2 SEET
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
50X1 -HUM
4 June 1974
The Director of Central Intelligence
MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): Organization of a Landing of
Amphibious Forces
1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is part of a
series now in preparation based on the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense
publication Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought". This
article discusses the factors involved in the preparation for the landing
of an amphibious force. The length of time needed to prepare for such
landings is analyzed, as is the determination of a definite time for the
start of debarkation of forces. Past experience is drawn upon, particu-
larly that of World War II, and charts and formulas are presented to
illustrate the article's main conclusions. This article appeared in Issue
No. 3 (91) for 1970.
2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive, this
document should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within recipient
agencies. For ease of reference renorts from this publication have been
assigned
50X1-HUM
50X1 -HUM
William E. Nelsdn
Deputy Director for Operations
Page 1 of 12 Pages
TOP RET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/27: CIA-RDP10-00105R000100610001-8
1_
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/27: CIA-RDP10-00105R000100610001-8
0-SECRET
Distribution:
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Assistant to the Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Department of the Army
The Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Intelligence)
Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
U. S. Air Force
Director, National Security Agency
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Deputy Director for Science and Technology
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
for National Intelligence Officers
Director of Strategic Research
Page 2 of 12 Pages
TOP RET
50X1 -HUM
50X1 -HUM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/27: CIA-RDP10-00105R000100610001-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/27: CIA-RDP10-00105R000100610001-8
50X1 -HUM
Intelligence Information Special Report
Page 3 of 12 Pages
50X1-HUM
COUNTRY USSR
DATE OF
INFO. Late 1970
SUBJECT
DATE
4 June 1974
MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): Organization of a Landing of Amphibious Forces
SOURCE Documentary
Summary:
The following report is a translation from Russian of an article which
appeared in Issue No. 3 (91) for 1970 of the SECRET USSR Ministry of
Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military
Thought ". The authors of this article are Vice-Admiral F. Savelyev and
Captain 0. Shulman. This article discusses the factors involved in the
preparation for the landing of an amphibious force. The length of time
needed to prepare for such landings is analyzed, as is the determination of
a definite time for the start of debarkation of forces. Past experience is
drawn upon, particularly that of World War II, and charts and formula5oxl-Hum
presented to illustrate the article's main conclusions.
Comment:
There is no information in available reference materials which can be
firmly associated with the authors. The SECRET version of Military Thought
was published three times annually and was distributed down to the level of
division commander. It reportedly ceased publication at the end of 1970.
End of Summary
50X1-HUM
I Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/27: CIA-RDP10-00105R000100610001-8
50X1-HUM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/27: CIA-RDP10-00105R000100610001-8
TCIEICRET
Page 4 of 12 Pages
Organization of a Landing of Amphibious Forces
by
Vice-Admiral F. Savelyev and Captain 0. Shulman
The successful solution of tasks by amphibious landings depends
largely on the extent to which the complex of measures for preparing the
command, staffs, and troops for the forthcoming combat actions has been
accomplished. In turn, the possibility for the timely implementation of
measures to prepare the landing force for combat actions will be determined
by the ability to calculate the time required for their fulfilment. In the
postwar period, especially in the past five to seven years, this problem
has been given considerable attention by the staffs of the maritime
military districts, and particularly by the staffs of the formations, large
units, and units of the Leningrad and the Baltic Military Districts.
However, working out problems of coordination in a training situation
according to a previously prepared plan in which frequently a large number
of measures have been worked out before the beginning of training, often
gives an erroneous impression concerning the amount of time needed for the
comprehensive and thorough preparation of an amphibious landing. In our
opinion, this impression is further promoted by the lack of norms in the
army and navy guidance documents which should be adhered to at least to
some extent in preparing an amphibious landing of any composition.
As is known, the preparation for the landing of an amphibious force is
made up of the following basic measures: planning of the landing by the
appropriate levels; working out coordination among the diverse forces
participating in the landing or its support; organizing all types of
support; conducting reconnaissance in support of the landing; preparing the
landing troops and moving them out to the waiting areas; concentrating the
transportation and landing means; organizing the joint combat preparation
of the landing forces; preparing materiel; loading equipment and amphibious
forces onto the transport-landing facilities.
Usually, some of the measures (mainly those connected with planning)
are accomplished in advance, in peacetime; and others, in the course of (or
on the eve of) military operations at the same time or in strict sequence.
In the final analysis, the length of time to carry out these measures
determines how far in advance the tasks are assigned. And this duration of
time depends mainly on two factors: 50X1-HUM
-- the numerical strength of the amphibious force and the conditions
under which the preparation for the landing is being carried out;
TOP SECRET
I Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/27: CIA-RDP10-00105R000100610001-8
50X1-HUM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/27: CIA-RDP10-00105R000100610001-8
TOP ECRET
Page 5 of 12 Pages
-- the possibilities that nuclear weapons will be used, or only
conventional weapons, during a front offensive or defensive operation.
The influence of the first factor may be judged to a certain extent by
the experience of World War II. It took eight months to prepare for the
Sicilian operation, one and one-half years for the Normandy operation, one
year for the landing in southern France, and almost six months for the
landings on the islands of Okinawa and Iwo Jima.
A favorable situation--the lack of any kind of interference and
countermeasures by the enemy, as well as a considerable amount of
time--allowed the US and England to carry out thorough planning of the
operation, concentrate large human and material resources, and have them
well-trained and supported. Of course, much of this was due to the
policies of the US and England, who deliberately delayed the opening of the
second front.
The amphibious landings carried out by the Soviet Navy were often
prepared under very difficult conditions, especially during the initial
stages of the Great Patriotic War, while conducting defensive operations,
and during offensive operations of fronts, when the situation was changing
sharply and rapidly and there were not enoughtrained forces available.
And, in most cases, no specially built transport-landing means were
available.
Chart 1 gives a graphic presentation of the conditions under which the
Soviet Navy had to carry out amphibious landings during the war. It also
shows that the attainment of goals was assured not only by the duration of
training of the landing forces but also by a favorable combination of a
number of factors.
(See Chart 1 on following page.)
TOP S
50X1 -HUM
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/27 : CIA-RDP10-00105R000100610001-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/27: CIA-RDP10-00105R000100610001-8
Ti",$ECRET
Page 6 of 12 Pages
50X1-HUM
Chart 1
Controlling fleet Duration of Strength of landing force,
and date operation landing area
Baltic 3-10-41 24 hours Reinforced company of naval
infantry brigade, Strelna
Baltic 4-10-41 Several hours Company of rifle division
Baltic 15-3-42 4 days 320 men, Ust-Tosno
Baltic 14-7-44 13 days 567 men
Baltic 25-9-44 7 days 3,061 men
Black 26-12-41 22 days 22,754 men,Kerch-Feodosiya
Black 4-2-43 47 days 3 brigades, 2 regiments,
1 battalion, Stanichka-
Yuzhnaya Ozereyka
Black 4-2-43 10 days Novorossiysk
Black 26-12-41 21 days 40,519 men, Kerch Peninsula
Northern 9-10-44 days 2,800 men
)`
(Translator's note:
Results of
achieving
the goal
Not achieved
Not achieved
Achieved
Not achieved
Achieved
Not achieved
Not achieved
Achieved
Not Achieved
Achieved
Numbers in the above chart are not clearly legible.)
Taking into consideration the experience of the war and the results of
the exercises of the past years, as well as calculations made for possible
extreme conditions in which amphibious landings may be made in a future
war, it may be assumed that the time needed to prepare for amphibious
landings must be within the time limits shown in Chart 2. In those cases
where the vessels of the Ministry of the Maritime Fleet had not been
enlisted into service beforehand, for some reason or other, as landing-
transport means, it is necessary to take into consideration the time needed
to complete equipping them and to concentrate them in the embarkation 50X1-HUM
areas.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/27: CIA=RDP10-00105R000100610001-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/27: CIA-RDP10-00105R006100610001-8
TOP'SECRET
Composition of Landing Force
Chart 2
Naval infantry battalion with reinforcements
Basic subunits of a naval infantry regiment
Naval infantry regiment at full strength
Naval infantry regiment, motorized
rifle regiment, reinforcement units
Motorized rifle division
Motorized rifle division, amphibious
landing division, naval infantry
regiment, reinforcement units
Minimum training time
(days)
1 - 3
2 - 3
3 - 4
8- 10
12- 14
25- 30
As the preparation nears the end, the command which is organizing the
landing operation must set a definite date and time the debarkation of
forces is to begin; and it must take into account the time needed for the
embarkation of troops, the loading of equipment, and the transporting of
the landing detachments from the embarkation areas to the debarkation
areas.
With these requirements taken into account, the length of time from
the moment the preparation of the landing force is completed until the
moment its debarkation begins is equal to
(1)
Tpr =T so +T t +T pogr+ Tform + per
where:where: T - time it takes to notify the forces of the exact time of the
binning of the debarkation of the landing force (communication
time);
- maximum time it takes any transport-landing means to reach
loading and embarkation points from the initial (dispersal)
basing area.
TC141S14ET
50X1 -HUM
I Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/27: CIA-RDP10-00105R000100610001-8
50X1-HUM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/27: CIA-RDP10-00105R000100610001-8
TOSECR ET
Page 8 of 12 Pages
Tpogr- the longest duration of time for loading troops and equipment on
to any of the landing ships or vessels of the first and second
echelon detachments.
T - time it takes to form amphibious detachments after the completion
form of loading and the departure from ports and harbors.
Tper time it takes for the landing detachments of the first and secm,1
echelons to reach the debarkation area. 50X1-HUM
Taking into consideration the experience gained from the exercises of
the past several years, there is reason to assume that the above formulas
are approximately equal to the following values: 'k = 30 minutes; Tt = 2
hours; Tnovr= 2 or 10 hours (2 hours for Project 1171 amphibious ships, 10
hours fof transport ships of 10,000 tons displacement). I = 1 or 2 hours;
T,, = depending on the distance between the embarkation rdebarkation
pts and on the rate of speed (rper for land-locked seas does not exceed
30 hours).
An analysis of formula (1) and the values included in it shows that
the time for beginning the debarkation of the amphibious force must be
announced not less than one and one-half days prior to the beginning of the
landing. A postponement of the time to begin the debarkation of the
amphibious force to a later date often does not substantially affect the
fulfilment of the task. A premature landing, on the other hand, may entail
serious consequences.
Experience shows that during the operational preparation conducted by
the navy jointly with the troops of military districts, when allocating
tasks to the landing force and when drawing up the plan for the battle on
shore, not enough attention was paid to the pace of the debarkation or to
the speed of the buildup of troops and equipment on the shore.
If we turn to the experience of World War II we can see that the pace
of debarkation of the amphibious landing carried out by the Black Sea Fleet
in 1941 in the area of Feodosiya was 2 divisions in 7 hours on the first
day and one division in 12 hours on the second day. In the landing at
Novorossiysk, the pace of debarkation reached that of one battalion in 20
minutes. These are examples in which the pace of the landing under
conditions that existed then must be considered quite high. However, there
are others. 50X1-HUM
In the area of Grigoryevka in 1941 a regiment of 1900 men was landed
in 5 hours and 50 minutes. Such a long period of time could have been
TOP SECRET
I Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/27: CIA-RDP10-00105R000100610001-8
50X1-HUM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/27: CIA-RDP10-00105R000100610001-8
TOSECRET
Page 9 of 12 Pages
fatal. And the only reason it was not was the fact that the landing force
managed to achieve the element of surprise which assured its success.
On the whole, even for the conditions of World War II the pace of
landings was often relatively slow, thus allowing the enemy to concentrate
the necessary forces for a strike against the landing force.
The time it takes for the debarkation of an entire amphibious landing
force, or its units and subunits, depends on many factors. However, the
main ones are: the nature of the anti-landing defense, the availability of
forces capable of neutralizing it, and the capabilities of the landing-
debarkation means and amphibious equipment.
Generally speaking, this time can always be determined fairly
accurately and, consequently, permits well-founded allocations of tasks to
be made to the units and subunits of the amphibious landing force.
In our opinion, in allocating tasks to the landing force, as well as
in drawing up the plan for their fulfilment by the landing force as a
whole, the large units, units and subunits of the landing force must be
guided by the planned pace of the landing. Only when each commander knows
how soon after the beginning of the debarkation his subunit, unit, or large
unit, either as a whole or the main part of it, will be on the shore, will
it be possible to use and control them properly and purposefully.
The determinations of this time are achieved by preparing schedules
for the debarkation or the buildup of forces and means on shore, these
schedules are worked out by the staff of the debarkation force on the basis
of the plan adopted by the commander of the landing force for conducting
combat on shore (and, accordingly, the composition of the debarking troops
and materiel).
These schedules provide a visual presentation not only of the
contemplated momentum of buildup of the basic types of combat equipment at
one or another point of the debarkation, but they also reflect the sequence
of arrival of the forces and means on shore.
Of great importance in the control of forces in an amphibious landing
operation is the determination of the time the forces are to begin the
battle for the landing. 50X1-HUM
The experience of World War II tells us that there are two ways of
resolving this problem; and they can be combined and can complement each
other in accordance with a previously prepared plan and according to the
actual situation in the debarkation area. For example, in the debarkation
TOIET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/27: CIA-RDP10-00105R000100610001-8
I 50X1-HUM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/27: CIA-RDP10-00105R000100610001-8
Page 10 of 12 Pages
of a landing force in the Sudak area in 1942, the artillery preparation was
carried out in accordance with a previously prepared plan, but not
according to the actual state of readiness of the landing force for
debarkation. As a result, there was a 40 minute interval between the end
of the artillery preparation and the beginning of the debarkation.
Approximately the same interval occurred in the debarkation of a landing
force in the area of Yuzhnaya Ozereyka in 1943.
In the debarkation of the landing force in the area of Sommers Island
in 1942 the interval between the completion of the bombing strike and the
beginning of the debarkation was 30 minutes.
In those cases when control of the landing was carried out in
accordance with the situation that had developed (the artillery and air
preparation were begun on a signal from the landing force commander, and
the fire was switched into the depth as the landing ships reached the
shore), there was no interval between the actions of the forces during the
debarkation, which permitted the successful achievement of the assigned
tasks. Other examples are the debarkation of a landing force at
Novorossiysk in 1943 and the one at the Kerch Peninsula in 1943.
In our opinion, the experience during the war, which confirmed the
advantage of setting the time for the forces to commence actions to conform
with the actual situation in the area of the battle for the landing, should
be combined with the actions of forces in accordance with a plan.
Thus, for example, the beginning of aviation preparation for an
airborne landing and the landing itself, the neutralization of the shore-
based observation and communications system, the beginning of mine
reconnaissance, and the neutralization of aviation on the airfields, should
be started in accordance with a plan (which conforms with detailed
reconnaissance information). The time to begin and end the aviation and
artillery preparation and support of the debarkation of an amphibious
landing force, the time for the debarkation of the second echelon and the
rear services of the landing force, and the time that ships and vessels
pass through channels and areas endangered by mines and areas subjected to
radioactive contamination, should be determined in a manner to have it
conform with the actual situation. 50X1-HUM
The experience of exercises and war games shows that the rapidly
changing situation in the area of the battle for the landing and of the
battle on the shore makes it necessary to make corrections once or twice a
day in the plan for the delivery of nuclear strikes. Moreover, if an
amphibious landing is preceded by an airborne landing, the corrections can
I Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/27: CIA-RDP10-00105R000100610001-8
50X1-HUM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/27: CIA-RDP10-00105R000100610001-8
TCA.,ECRET
Page 11 of 12 Pages
be very important in regard to the time of delivery of the nuclear strikes
against targets and the nature of the bursts.
It is important that the staff preparing the plan for the use of
nuclear weapons in support of the battle on the shore take into account how
much time must elapse before it is possible to realize the results of the
nuclear strikes. This length of time is determined by the technical
capabilities of the delivery vehicles and can be from some tens of minutes
to several hours.
The control of forces in the debarkation of an amphibious landing is
greatly influenced by haw long it takes the command to complete its
evaluation cycle of the correctness of assigning certain tasks to certain
forces (what we mean here is the time that elapses from the moment it
became necessary to carry out the task until the moment word is received
from the executors that it was completed).
Generally, this cycle includes the following:
where: T = T + T + *T (2)
of cycle an resh pz
in which T is the time it takes the higher level to make an analysis of
an
the information received from the executors.
T resh is the time it takes to make a new decision.
Tnz is the time it takes to assign the new task (getting it to
the executots).
The shorter the cycle the more stable the control of the forces is,
and the more influence the command exerts over the course of the fulfilment
of the task.
A minimum cycle duration is possible when the decisions are made
quickly, the executors are informed of their tasks in good time, and the
source of information is direct observation.
If the task assigned to the forces conforms with the objective
situation and thoroughly covers all the factors that may influence its
fulfilment, the process of control can be established very quickly.
Otherwise several cycles will be required to set up the kind of
control that will assure the fulfilment of the assigned task, and for such
a complex type of combat operation as an amphibious landing this is
extremely undesirable as it may lead to a failure.
50X1 -HUM
TC.:SEZET
I Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/27: CIA-RDP10-00105R000100610001-8
I 50X1-HUM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/27: CIA-RDP10-00105R000100610001-8
Page 12 of 12 Pages
A proper functioning of control over the forces of an amphibious
landing must provide for a differentiated approach towards the speed of the
flow of information and the making of a decision.
Without further developing this idea, it should be said that this
will, to a considerable degree, permit more effective distribution of the
means of communications, an intelligent use of signal and other charts, and
strengthening of the organs of control.
50X1 -HUM
50X1 -HUM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/27: CIA-RDP10-00105R000100610001-8