MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): REVIEW OF THE RESULTS OF POLITICAL TRAINING IN THE GROUND FORCES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP10-00105R000100590001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 27, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 28, 1974
• Content Type: MEMO

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Combat Readiness--The Main Thing in Party-Political Work
On the basis of the work of the political organs in the
Ground Forces)
by
Colonel P. Chegodar and Colonel F. Yakovlev
Inspectors of the Political Directorate of the Ground Forces
Thanks to the care of the Communist Party, the Soviet Government and
our entire people, the armed forces of the USSR are equipped with
everything necessary for the conduct of modern warfare. For example, the
combat capabilities of the Ground Forces have increased greatly.
Operational-tactical rocket large units and units have become their main
force. The general types of weapons of the Ground Forces have been
improved also; they now possess the best tanks in the world, new automatic
infantry weapons, powerful artillery, completely modern motor vehicles and
armored personnel carriers, highly efficient engineer vehicles, and other
equipment. Considerable changes have taken place in the organizational
structure. The Ground Forces are now capable of conducting aggressive,
highly mobile combat actions at high rates of speed to a great operational
depth.
However, the strength of the army and navy does not consist of combat
equipment alone. The main foundation of combat might consists of men
educated and hardened by the Party, utterly devoted to the motherland and
the Communist cause, ideologically steadfast, and thoroughly trained
militarily. Working with the men is made the responsibility of commanders,
political organs and Party organizations of the army.
The very existence of the armed forces is unthinkable without active,
vigorous Party-political work; this fact has been repeatedly taken notice
of by the Party and by its organizer and leader, V. I. Lenin. Way back in
1919, in the letter "Party Work in the Red Army", the Central Committee of
the Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik) explained "...in order that the Red
Army be truly socialistic it is necessary that it should be not only of
class composition, but also that its personnel should clearly and correctly
realize their class interests. And for this, Party work is needed in its
midst".* During the period of the Civil War, Lenin had been emphasizing
the fact that "where political work is conducted among the troops with the
most care.. .there there is no slackness in the army, there its order and
its spirit are better, there there are more victories" (The Complete
Collection of Works, Volume 39, page 56).
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* The CPSU and the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union, the State Publishing
House, 196, page 106.
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The importance of Party-political work is increasing especially now,
in connection with the aggravation of the international situation, the
complexity of the struggle on the ideological front, the development of
military affairs, and the growth of the general educational, technical, and
cultural level of the soldiers. The Central Committee of the CPSU in its
decree of 21 January 1967 indicated that its overall improvement represents
the most important condition for the accomplishment of the problems that
are faced by the Soviet Armed Forces.
All this increases the role and the responsibility of political
directorates and departments as the leadership organs of the CPSU in the
army and navy in the field of Party-political work, which always were and
remain the true champions of Party policy. V. I. Lenin believed that the
political organs have the mission of increasing the combat effectiveness of
the troops, and firmly and steadfastly carrying out the directives and the
policy of the Party among the masses, through their organizational work.
Now, as never before, they must be influential, must work in close unity
with commanders and chiefs of all grades. Their duty is to increase in any
conceivable way the ideological steadfastness of the personnel, and to
strengthen discipline, one-man command, and the combat readiness of the
troops.
The political organs are constantly concerning themselves with the
problems of vigilance and combat readiness. It is here where mindfulness
of Party principles, implacability toward shortcomings and derelictions,
and a feeling of responsibility towards the State, have the most
importance. This is understandable because combat readiness means the
capability of troops to immediately start decisive actions for the purpose
of destroying the enemy in any situation, regardless of how complex and
dangerous it may be. Combat readiness means the training of men, trouble-
free combat equipment, firm discipline, precise organization of service, an
excellent ability to fully mobilize units, the skill of command personnel
in troop control, etc. The degree of combat readiness is now measured not
by the number of days, and in a number of cases not even by hours, but by
numbered minutes.
Commanders, political organs and the Party organizations of the Ground
Forces, using various forms and methods of Party-political work, are, by
their joint harmonious efforts persistently solving the problems of further
raising the vigilance and combat and mobilizational readiness of large
units and units. At present, this diversified work is being conducted
within the framework of the appropriate celebration of the 100th
anniversary of V. I. Lenin's birthday. The Communists and Komsomol members
are influencing their colleagues mainly by personal example. In many units
and large units, the majority of members and candidate-members of the
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Party, who are serving directly in subunits, have been given excellent or
good ratings.
In a recent inspection, the Communists of a large unit commanded by
General-Mayor A. Kunilov and in which Lieutenant Colonel I. Vasilyev is
Chief of the Political Department, demonstrated high achievements in weapon
firing training. The large unit completed the past training year with high
marks and is one of the best.
Men of many large units have achieved good marks in training, in
mastering equipment and weapons. The field training of the troops and
their teamwork in all types of combat activities have improved. The number
of outstanding units and subunits has increased and so has the number of
outstanding soldiers and rated specialists. Fruitful work is being carried
out in training second driver-mechanics for tanks, armored personnel
carriers, and motor vehicles.
Improved training has been displayed by many ground forces large units
in the operational-strategic exercises VESENNIY GROM, SHUMAVA, NEMAN,
VOSTOK, ZAPAD, and others. Together with the units of the fraternal
armies, by their decisive actions they thwarted the insidious plans of the
enemies in Czechoslovakia and demonstrated high morale-political qualities,
ideological conviction, and adherence to the principles of international-
ism. Infinite devotion to the Party and motherland, heroism and bravery
have been displayed by soldiers in combat operations while repulsing the
armed raids of the Chinese invaders on the Soviet-Chinese border.
In 1969 alone, about 5,000 soldiers, non-commissioned officers and
officers of the Ground Forces were awarded orders and medals of the Soviet
Union for excellent fulfilment of assignments issued by the command, for
high marks in combat and political training, and for mastering new weapons
and equipment.
In all this, the services of the political organs, the commanders, and
the Party and Komsomol organizations were considerable. They are persist-
ently striving, with harmonious efforts, to fulfil the requirements of the
XXIIIrd Party Congress, the decree of the Central Committee of the CPSU of
21 January 1967, the directive of the Minister of Defense and the Chief of
the Chief Political Directorate, No. D-058, and orders for increasing the
vigilance, and combat and mobilizational readiness of the troops, and for
improvement of the field training of personnel. 50X1-HUM
Much can be learned from the activity of the Political Directorate and
the political organs of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany. Here it has
become the practice to conduct exercises each month on working out
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functional duties in bringing the troops to various degrees of combat
readiness. Military-scientific conferences are held periodically. For
example, interesting conferences were conducted with the theme: "Ways and
methods of reducing the time periods for bringing units and subunits to
combat readiness". At these conferences, officers share their experience
in striving to reduce the time needed for the transition of troops to
increased and full readiness and in searching for new possibilities to
accomplish this, make critical comments, and submit proposals for making
improvements. This contributes to raising the combat readiness of the
troops.
For example, in order to reduce the time for bringing to full combat
readiness a rocket brigade which is commanded by Colonel L. Razryvin and
whose Chief of the Political Department is Lieutenant Colonel A. Strukov,
non-organic crews from the ranks of servicemen having related specialties
were trained in the erection and fueling of the missiles. This made it
possible to prepare the initial nuclear strike within a reduced period of
time in carrying out exercises with an antiaircraft missile battalion.
Great initiative in reducing the time periods for achieving combat
readiness has been shown by the Political Department of the antiaircraft
missile brigade in which the chief of the department is Lieutenant Colonel
G. Zayka. He and the commander of the brigade have supported and intro-
duced the method of assembling missiles in the technical battery right on
the 9T25 transport vehicles, which was developed by Communists V. Popov. N.
ArtamonoV, V. Khromov and V. Pisarev. In this manner, the combat work was
reduced by 40 to 50 percent. On the initiative of the Communists, the
method of cross-connecting the cable harness of the automatic fire control
system was used, which made it possible to reduce the time for setting up
the system by 7 minutes, and the time for tearing it down, by 17 minutes.
The political organs of the Ground Forces, together with the
commanders, are persistently searching for possibilities for reducing the
time for bringing large units and units to combat readiness. The problems
of this matter are thoroughly examined and decided upon at the assemblies
and seminars of commanders and political personnel, and are discussed at
military-scientific conferences. 50X1-HUM
The experiment of the Political Department headed by Colonel A.
Chvarkov (Carpathian Military District) deserves approval. Here the
Communists acted as initiators of the improvement of the warning system
during an alert, which was not effective enough: three men had to spend a
minimum of 5 to 7 minutes in transmitting the signal. A meeting of the
Party militants was held in the division. The comrades made constructive
proposals which were then consolidated and put into practice. After this,
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a methodological conference was held for commanders, their deputies, chiefs
of staffs, secretaries of Party committee and members of Party bureaus, at
which an automated system was demonstrated. The new warning procedure
provides a more effective control of units during alert and assembly in an
alert, during departure from points of permanent deployment, and during
movement into concentration areas. As a result, on the division-regiment
level the warning takes up to one to two minutes, and in garrisons this
time is reduced by 12 to 20 percent. Similar work has also been carried
out in other large units of this district.
Of decisive significance in reducing the time for bringing large units
and units to full combat readiness is a precise procedure for storing
material means in depots and for their loading and removal during an alert.
In a large unit where Colonel I. Bogatskiy is the Chief of the Political
Department, useful experience is available. Much has been done in
accumulating this experience by rationalizers and inventors whose
undertakings were supported in every way by the staff and the Political
Department. One day the officers of the Political Department familiarized
themselves in the artillery unit with the rationalizers' proposals for
improving the storage procedure and the mechanization of loading of
clothing and equipment, and they talked about this at a meeting of the
Party militants of the large unit. Later, the information was presented at
a conference of unit commanders and secretaries of Party organizations by
the deputy commander for rear services of the artillery regiment. The
large unit commander ordered that the proposals of the artillerymen be
introduced into all units. 50X1-HUM
The experience of the artillerymen was improved upon, container
devices and racks for loading and reloading ammunition, clothing and
equipment, and rations were developed. The command of the Carpathian
Military District supported this innovation, and now it has been widely
introduced in the troops. The results may be judged by the following
indicators: the saving in motor transport has increased 1.5 to 2.5 times,
the standard load capacity of the GAZ-51 vehicle has increased by 50 to 70
percent, and the loading time for one vehicle has been reduced sixfold.
Now all the supplies are loaded within one hour, and the numerical strength
of the loading crews has been sharply reduced; basically, the work is
fulfilled by the non-commissioned officers in charge of the depot and the
transport vehicle drivers. 50X1-HUM
For reduced-strength units, the task of removing equipment from the
park in an alert is very complicated. By agreement with the command of the
abovementioned large unit, the Political Department brought this problem up\
for discussion by the Party organizations. The Communists worked out a
special technological network chart for the removal of two tanks from
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storage by a single mechanic-driver. The time for bringing two combat
vehicles to full combat readiness was reduced by20 to 25 minutes. Other
proposals of the rationalizers have also been introduced: the cooling
liquid is now stored in special containers in the tanks; an attachment for
filling the oil tanks of a tank and a device for charging batteries with
low current right inside the vehicles have been developed; a system of
diverting exhaust gases from parks has been prepared for use, etc. The
rationalizers have developed improved methods of preserving different types
of arms and combat equipment by using inhibiting paper and wax paper,
silica gel, various fabric solvents, and special films.
Unfortunately, in a number of other large units and units finding
themselves in similar conditions and having the same or often even better
capabilities, work on reduction of the combat readiness time is carried out
without the needed intensity. Some political departments and Party
organizations do not get deeply enough into the substance of the matter and
are poorly utilizing the creative initiative of Communist and non-Party
soldiers. Often the problems of combat readiness are still considered on
"an overall level"; little attention is given to the mechanization of
loading and unloading of equipment, ammunition, military stores, fuel and
lubricants, etc., which has a negative effect on the state of combat
readiness of large units.
Not all commanders, political organs and Party organizations draw the
correct conclusions from the stepped-up requirements of the Central
Committee of the CPSU and the Minister of Defense concerning combat
readiness. Some of them have not deeply studied the processes taking place
in the life and activity of the units and subunits, and have not noticed
the serious shortcomings in matters of combat readiness and training of
personnel. Often Party-political work is organized without considering the
applicable orders of the Minister of Defense, the directive of the
Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces, and the instructions of the
Political Directorate of the Ground Forces stemming from combat operations
on Damanskiy Island.
Clearly, such things cannot be tolerated in the future. Political
organs and Party organizations, together with the commanders, are called
upon to be concerned constantly with problems of reducing the time of
bringing large units and units to combat status, and to search for rational
ways and methods to achieve this. Work with inventors and rationalizers
should be improved; their creative thought should be directed toward
increasing the combat readiness of the troops. 50X1-HUM
Political work during the period of the alert and the carrying out of
the march to the concentration areas should be organized more purposefully
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and substantively. Experience shows that subunits often act in an
unorganized way, without the necessary support measures. It is very
important to establish the place and the tasks of political workers, and
the role of Party and Komsomol militants, in organizing individual work
with servicemen, especially with young soldiers, drivers, and soldiers with
other specialties, during the taking of arms out of reserve storage and
putting them in combat condition, and during the carrying out of the march.
Of great importance in ensuring the security of the country is combat
tour of duty--an effective method of maintaining the combat readiness of
the army and navy. Duty units and subunits are those troops which must at
any minute repulse an aggressor's attack and bring down on him the entire
might of their strike. This is precisely the reason why the problems of
the combat tour of duty occupy a special place in the Party-political work
both in the Ground Forces and in other branches of the armed forces.
Vigilant performance of the tour of duty depends to a great extent on
the level of training of the officers of directorates and staffs at all
levels, and of departments and services. Let me tell you about one of the
antiaircraft missile units (Commander Yu. Seleznev, Chief of the Political
Department I. Petushkov). On the initiative of the Political Department,
there are periodically organized here seminars, at which the experience of
combat work is discussed, its positive aspects, shortcomings and derelic-
tions are analyzed, and ways of eliminating them are pointed out. Also
used are theoretical conferences on the problems of the actions of the
troops. Discussed regularly at Party meetings and at the seminars of
political workers and secretaries of Party organizations, are the tasks of
Communists while performing combat service, and their work in educating
personnel of the duty subunits.
Officers of the political department participate in assigning
Communists and Komsomol members to duty shifts, make recommendations to
Party bureaus, to the secretaries of them, and to Party and Komsomol
organizers of the duty shifts, talk to the men about the military-political
situation and about the shortcomings that occurred during the preceding
tours of duty. This kind of concrete work helps to increase vigilance and
strengthen responsibility.
Combat service in many units and subunits of the Ground Forces is
organized in conformance with the requirements of the regulations and
instructions. 50X1-HUM
However, unfortunately, Party-political work in duty units also has
some substantial shortcomings. In organizing it, the specific features
stemming from the deployment of the troops and the possible theaters of
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military operations, etc., are not always taken into consideration. There
are also some units where the procedure laid down by regulations is not
adhered to and political-educational work has been weakened, as a result of
which incidents and gross violations of discipline and the rules for
carrying out a tour of duty are frequent; instances occur of unauthorized
abandonment of a post, drunkenness, and coloring the true state of affairs.
Political organs tolerate flagrant outrages in order "not to wash dirty
linen in public", are not fighting against indulgences, and tolerate
unscrupulousness in evaluating incidents and liberalism toward those who
commit misdemeanors and even crimes.
The task of the political organs is to categorically improve Party-
political work during the period of performance of combat service, to
mobilize the personnel for irreproachable performance of their functional
duties during combat work, to search for possibilities of more effective
use of arms, to improve control, to assure the vanguard role of Communists
and Komsomol members in a combat tour of duty.
Nowadays the problems of military-technical training are approached in
a different way, on a scientific basis, for without a firm knowledge of
equipment, without practical skills in its use, there can be no thought of
a high level of combat readiness. Success depends to a considerable degree
on the level of operational-tactical and military-technical training of
officers and generals, and on the improvement of the military knowledge of
personnel. In one of the training large units (Commander General-Mayor G.
Turshatov, Chief of the Political Department Colonel G. Komlev), wide use
has been made of technical circles for the mastery of related specialties
and for the study of physics, mathematics, and electronics. Technical
conferences and meetings of rationalizers are also conducted, exhibits of
the achievements of innovators are arranged, and technical councils are
functioning. Officers who need it in connection with their service have a
rated specialty. For the third year in a row, already the large unit has
been turning out highly qualified junior commanders. The large unit has
been awarded the Memorial Banner of the Central Committee of the CPSU, the
Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the Council of Ministers of
the USSR.
This is not the only example of its kind, but there are also many dark
aspects in this matter. As inspections and exercises show, not all
political organs manifest interest in improving the operational-tactical
knowledge of officers; some overlook the study of classified literature,
multi-theme training sessions and periodic technical servicing. This
explains the fact that militry servicemen do not possess the necessary
training and this has a negative effect on the quality of their serv4r.
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Improvement of the military-technical
of the vital tasks of Party-political work
purpose, it is important to systematically
technical conferences, question-and-answer
mastery of related specialties, and other measures.
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training of the soldiers is one
among the troops. For this
organize lectures, reports,
evenings, circles for the
The most important place in the general system of combat training
belongs to the field training of the troops and tactical exercises. In
them the commanders and staffs master advanced methods of troop control and
improve their methodological skill, while the political organs master their
forms of work under conditions close to those of combat.
This is how the Party-political work is organized in the tank large
unit where the commander is General-Mayor P. Kirpichenko and the chief of
the Political Department is Colonel A. Pustovalov. The Political
Department plans its work in accordance with the stages of a tactical
exercise, taking into account the special features and importance of the
tasks being carried out by the units, the nature of the terrain, the
climatic conditions, and the level of training of the various categories of
personnel. We will give an example.
During the preparatory period, meetings of the Party and Komsomol
militants were held in the large unit, and the same problem was discussed
in the primary Party and Komsomol organizations. Special attention was
concentrated on increasing the organizer's role, personal example, and the
responsibility of each Communist and Komsomol member, which found its
reflection in the plans of Party work. The tasks of the personnel were
discussed in general meetings and separately in the meetings of officers
and non-commissioned officers.
The Political Department conducted seminars, interviews, and
individual briefings, and assigned tasks to political personnel, with
consideration of the theme and special features of the exercises.
Materials of classified collections were studied at seminars.
Officers of the Political Department helped the commanders, political
workers, and the Party committees of the regiments in the planning work, in
placing and instructing the militants, and in carrying out substantive
measures. Meetings were held between the soldiers and veterans of the
Great Fatherland War and Heroes of the Soviet Union. A military-
theoretical conference was conducted with the commanders of the units and
the officers of the staff of the large unit on the subject: "Moving
forward a tank division over a long distance by the combined method,
organizing a march and an attack from the march, the march and the 77I41-mm
engagement; and going over to the defense". Officers familiarized
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themselves with the materials of exercise DNEPR, the subsequent large
exercises, and the experience of combat operations in Vietnam.
Differentiated work was organized with various categories of
specialists: driver-mechanics and chauffeurs. Soldiers who were to
participate in the airborne assault met with those who had carried out such
a task in the past and familiarized themselves with their experience. Not
forgotten were traffic controllers, radiomen, intelligence personnel,
chemical warfare personnel, and other specialists.
During the course of exercises the officers of the Political
Department and political workers were present in the units and subunits.
During the period of preparation and conduct of field firing by artillery
and rocket units, special attention was paid to accurate preparation of
initial data. After receiving the task to cross river lines, the political
workers, together with the commanders, explained the situation and the
duties of the crews to the tank men, and organized an inspection of the
readiness of the men and equipment. Various forms of encouragement of
those who distinguished themselves were widely used.
The carrying out of all these measures contributed to the fact that
the large unit received a good rating.
However, not everywhere is work organized concretely. The most
serious shortcoming in the majority of cases, in our view, is the fact that
they don't differentiate it by stages (sounding the alert for units in an
alert, on the march, in the meeting engagement, during the forced crossing
of water obstacles, etc.), are not concerned with improving old forms and
methods or seeking new forms and methods of political influence over the
men during the most difficult periods of an exercise. All these problems
undoubtedly require attention on the part of the political organs.
Indulgence, oversimplification, exhibitionism and showiness still
remain the greatest evils, which harm education and training. Sometimes
exercises are carried out in an outmoded way, without consideration of the
changes which have taken place in military affairs; they are prepared on
the basis of outdated plans, choosing the same areas over and over, are
weak in instilling standards of staff work, and weaken the exacting
attitude towards subordinates. The responsibility for these shortcomings
rests not only with the one-man command commanders but also with the
officers and generals of the political organs.
Party-political work in exercises is a special kind of activity; it
requires a thoughtful approach and creative search, must be carried5oxl -HUM
constantly, and must inspire men to aggressive and skilful actions.
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The high combat readiness of a unit, a large unit, and a formation is
made up of the skills, abilities and mastery of each soldier, sailor,
non-commissioned officer, officer, and general. In other words, it depends
on individual and collective efforts and actions. The combat qualities of
a serviceman are formed in the process of training. There are no other
ways of solving this problem. Because of this, the primary attention must
still be paid to fulfilling the combat and political training plans at all
levels among the troops and to carrying out each training period on a high
level. However, it is precisely these seemingly copybook truths which, for
some reason, are lost sight of by political organs. Checking and summary
inspections testify to this. In a number of units and large units,
political workers and Party and Komsomol organizations half-heartedly look
into such important types of combat training as tactical, firing, and
special training, close their eyes to the facts of unscrupulousness and
irresponsibility on the part of some officers in carrying out their duties,
and do not come up with a Party-minded appraisal of the fact that
competition on tasks and norms remains on paper, that to the present day
formalism and exhibitionism in place of painstaking everyday work still
persist.
?
From all that has been said, it is necessary to draw practical
conclusions: to devote great attention to the individual training of
soldiers, and to the coordination and combat teamwork of small subunits; to
cultivate in the soldiers skill in using foxholes, firing positions,
trenches, and communication trenches; to appreciate the role of
camouflaging combat dispositions, and increase its importance in artillery,
intelligence engineer-combat engineer and communications subunits; and to
scrupulously work out the task of artillery support of the operations of
infantry and tanks. All measures must be taken to improve the
operational-tactical training of command personnel, and first of all, of
the young officers, to develop in them high qualities of command,
initiative and creative thinking, resourcefulness and decisiveness, the
ability to boldly make independent decisions and carry them out, and
correctly use combat equipment and weapons, especially tanks, armored
personnel carriers and infantry combat vehicles. All these are urgent
problems requiring appropriate interpretation and concrete expression in
the activities of political organs and Party organizations.
The high combat readiness of units depends to a considerable degree on
the style of work and on the organization of staffs and command posts.
Recently, the political organs have begun to pay more attention to those
echelons, specifically, to the problems of improving the command training
of officers and raising their ideological-political level, scrupulousness
and efficiency, participation in military-technical propaganda, and
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creative attitude towards political work with the personnel. It is
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significant that where the political organs do not lose sight of the
activity of the staff and directorate Party organizations and are leading
them knowledgeably, there the combat readiness is higher.
Unfortunately, some political organs are still leading with the "by
and large" approach, relying on the substantial service, life experience
and the high position of officers and generals. However, he who gets a lot
has a lot demanded of him. The interests of the service are above every-
thing else. Educators must also be educated--this is a Party principle
which is one of the basic principles in the organizing and political
activities of political organs in their leadership of staff Party
organizations.
As is known, permanent combat readiness depends directly on the
ideological conviction of the men, and their combat and and morale-
political qualities. Of great importance is the orientation of
Party-political work, the ability to organize and carry it out. The
political organs are constantly concerning themselves with improving the
forms and methods for increasing the effectiveness of political and
military education.
As an example, let us take the guards large unit where the commander
is General-Mayor V. Korchits and the chief of the Political Department is
Colonel A. Bridnya (Kiev Military District). For an entire ten days
officers of the Political Department studied the status of Party-political
work in the 304th Guards Tank Regiment for raising vigilance and combat
readiness in light of the requirements of Directive No. D-058. It became
clear that ideological work with the men was organized inadequately here,
and that many servicemen had a poor knowledge of the requirements of the
Central Committee of the CPSU and the Minister of Defense on maintaining
constant combat readiness of the troops. Some of the men had only a
superficial conception of the successes of the USSR in building Communism
and of the activities of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in
carrying out Lenin's nationalities policy. There were serious shortcomings
in the system of Marxist-Leninist training of officers and the political
training periods with soldiers and non-commissioned officers.
Officers of the Political Department, not limiting themselves to
exposing the shortcomings, helped to eliminate them. At a meeting of the
Party committee, organized and conducted with the participation of the
inspectors, the work of the Communists of this unit in educating the
soldiers and strengthening combat readiness was reviewed. General meetings
were held in all subunits with an agenda devoted to: "Problems of
personnel in increasing vigilance and combat readiness". 50X1-HUM
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A few months later, the Political Department checked to see how its
recommendations were being implemented. In the large unit, a seminar of
the commanders of battalions, companies and batteries on the topic of forms
and methods of political-educational work was held, and a conference of
political workers and the secretaries of the Party bureaus of the units was
held. A report was heard from the Deputy Commander for Political Affairs
of the tank regiment on the work of Party and Komsomol organizations in
further increasing the combat readiness of personnel.
The preparation for Lenin's 100th anniversary celebration is having a
positive impact on the education of servicemen. The desire of personnel to
learn about Lenin's heritage has risen. The Political Department and Party
organizations are organizing theoretical conferences and interviews on
topics concerning Lenin. Conducted regularly in this unit are readings of
Lenin's works, to which are invited veterans of the revolution, old
Bolsheviks, representatives of local Party organs and scholars. The
readings are led by the most experienced propagandists. As the result of
the measures taken, many of the shortcomings have been eliminated, the
personnel are successfully fulfilling training tasks, and the regiment has
become one of the .best.
There are many such examples in this military district. The Political
Directorate organizes instructional-propagandist groups which conduct
propaganda work and instruct the Party and Komsomol militants. Enlisted in
this work are the services of instructors of higher military educational
institutions. Special lecture groups of scholars have gone out several
times among the troops of the district. Other forms of work are also used.
Jointly with civilian youth, demonstrations dedicated to historical dates
are arranged, and walking tours of sites of combat and partisan glory are
conducted. The groups of officers of the Political Directorate and staff
of the district going out among the troops are headed by the Chief of the
Political Directorate or his deputies.
Systematically conducted morale-political and psychological training
of personnel for modern warfare is one of the most important elements in
ensuring combat readiness. In the Kiev Military District this work has
been noticeably improved. Let us take, for example, the formation in which
the Member of the Military Council and Chief of the Political Department is
General-Mayor N. Barkov. Here there was conducted a theoretical conference
with the leadership personnel on the topic: "The psychological and
pedagogical basis of education and training of soldiers". In the units
there took place conferences on the significance of the revolution in
military affairs, the role of psychological training of troops, etc. In a
number of large units, methodological commissions attached to the political
departments have been established; they consolidate the experience of
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psychological training and propaganda work. At a seminar of the chiefs of
the political organs of the Political Directorate of the district, a
discussion of papers on the problems of modern combat was organized.
Information sessions on materials from classified collections are
conducted monthly for officers. In one of the large units, a special
training area has been fitted out; in it mockups of American combat
equipment have been set up, tactical-technical specifications are given,
and the methods of use are explained. The soldiers study combat methods
against tanks, missiles, antitank weapons, and other enemy means, and
methods of protection from flame-throwing and incendiary means used in
South Vietnam.
We have dwelt upon a few of what, in our opinion, are the most typical
problems successfully solved among the troops of the Kiev Military
District.
Instructive experience in morale-psychological training has also been
gained in other military districts, particularly the Moscow Military
District, where, in the process of training and education of personnel,
consideration is given to the specifics of training soldiers of various
specialties. In motorized rifle units special attention is paid to the
conduct of offensive operations following a nuclear strike and rapid
crossing of contaminated areas; they teach hitting targets under complica-
ted conditions and carrying heavy physical loads. In the 2nd Taman Guards
Division, well-equipped training fields have been set up; the personnel
undergo "being rolled over by tanks", learn how to combat napalm and
conduct fire against low-flying aircraft, train in negotiating minefields,
etc. "The conditions created in the classrooms and in training simulators
are such," the soldiers say, "that one forgets that he is in a peacetime
situation."
In the tank units of the district, there is being developed and put
into practice a specific educational system directed towards assuring the
necessary qualities among soldiers for overcoming fear during the period of
driving combat vehicles underwater and when firing with a standard
artillery round. In the rocket units, great attention is being given to
reducing the time for preparation of rockets for launching and surpassing
the norms. In multi-theme training sessions and during the period of
preparation and launching of live rockets, beneficial work is carried out
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in the psychological hardening of men and in developing automatic action in
crews carrying out operations on a control panel.
However, as inspections show, not all the political organs and Party
organizations have drawn the necessary conclusions from the requirements of
the XXIIIrd Party Congress, the plenums of the Central Committee of the
CPSU, and the instructions of the Central Committee of 21 January 1967 on
the need for increasing vigilance and combat readiness and for improving
all ideological work. In a number of large units, ideological work still
does not respond to the increased problems; elements of formalism have not
been eliminated from political and military training, and numerous measures
are being carried out on a low ideological level and do not exert the
necessary influence on the personnel.
Some political organs have been weak in explaining the decisions of
the April and July plenums of the Central Committee of the CPSU. In a
number of units, the work on exposing bourgeois ideology is carried out
without thorough argumentation. In political instruction periods and in
propaganda lectures, the matter of educating men in the spirit of
proletarian internationalism is omitted. The specific characteristics of
troops deployed under varying conditions of a theater of military
operations, the intensification of bourgeois propaganda against the USSR
and the permeation of all sorts of enemy fabrications are not always being
taken into consideration. Instances of complacency, carelessness, and
violation of the regulations for handling classified documents are not
always eliminated in time by the political organs, and the measures taken
by them to close channels through which classified information may be
leaking out are not always effective. In some large units of districts
adjacent to the border, a number of soldiers and non-commissioned officers
poorly understand their specific tasks in increasing vigilance and combat
readiness under the conditions of direct contact with imperialist states.
There have been cases of individual servicemen listening to anti-Soviet
propaganda by using their service radio sets. Some of the soldiers,
influenced by such broadcasts, praise the bourgeois way of life and run
down Soviet reality. 50X1-HUM
Work in many large units on educating personnel in the spirit of
Soviet patriotism, friendship among the peoples of the USSR, and
proletarian internationalism still have not been brought up to the level of
the requirements of the Central Committee of the CPSU. Individual
propagandists unskilfully explain the successes of the Soviet people in the
building of Communism, use the easiest method of a simple comparison of
statistics on the development of the economies of the USSR and the United
States, without offering any deep political explanation or class analysis
and without pointing out the basic differences of the social-economic
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systems historically. As a result, men who are poorly trained politically
swallow the bait of enemy propaganda and display pacifist attitudes5oxl-Hum
The interests of combat readiness require that the political organs
and Party organizations improve in every possible way ideological training
among the troops, explain to the personnel the internal and external
policies of the Party and the Government, the complexity of the
international situation, and the tasks of the armed forces, and more fully
use all the available opportunities for instilling in the soldiers high
ideological-mindedness and implacability towards any manifestation of a
hostile ideology.
The interests of the defense of the motherland and the countries of
the socialist commonwealth call for exemplary fulfilment of the require-
ments of the Party and Government, and the orders and directives of the
Minister of Defense and the Chief of the Political Directorate, to increase
vigilance and combat readiness of troops, in order to exclude any
possibility for the enemy to catch us off guard. These tasks must be at
the center of attention of the political organs and be the main tasks in
Party-political work.
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