MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): RECONNAISSANCE COMBAT FUNCTIONS FOR RECONNAISSANCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP10-00105R000100440001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 13, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 18, 1975
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/13 :CIA-RDP10-001058000100440001-7
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/13 :CIA-RDP10-001058000100440001-7
 I
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/13: CIA-RDP10-001058000100440001-7 ox1-HUM
TOP ET
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20305
Mfl~IORANDimi FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
S[JBJECT MILITARY THOU(~~T (USSR) : Reconnaissance -
om at unctions or econnaissance
18 April 1975
1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is part of a
series now in preparation based on the SECRET i1SSR T4inistry of Defense
publication Collection of Articles of the Journal 'T4ilita Thou ht". This
article examines a pro em o increasing t e re is i ity o estruction
of enemy nuclear means in terms of preemption probability. The author
explores the possibility of creating reconnaissance-combat organs capable
of delivering preemptive strikes and neutralizing enemy radio
communications. This should be done by providing improved technical
equipment and weapons rather than by adapting available means. This article
appeared in Issue No. 2 (~7) for 1969.
2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive, this
document should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within recipient
agencies. For ease of reference, reP9rts from this publication have been
assigned the Codeword
Director for er
Deputy ations
FIRDB-312/00928-75
i e s
Page 1 of 13 Pages
TS #206967
Copy #~~
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/13: CIA-RDP10-001058000100440001-7
 i
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/13: CIA-RDP10-001058000100440001-7
rIRDB-312/00928-75
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, Defense Intelligence agency
The Assistant to the Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Department of the Army
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
U. S. Air Force
Director, National Security Agency
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Deputy Director for Science and Technology
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
for National Intelligence Officers
Director of Strategic itesearch
Director of Scientific Intelligence
Director of tiVeapons Intelligence
Pa e 2 of 13 Pages
TOP TS X206 67
T copy #
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/13: CIA-RDP10-001058000100440001-7
 I
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/13 :CIA-RDP10-001058000100440001-7
Intelligence Information Special Report
Page 3 of 13 Pages
COUNTRY USSR
FIRDB-
312/U0928-75
DATE OF
INFO. Mid-1969
DATE
lg April 1975
MILITARY THOU(-1T (USSR) : Reconnaissance -Combat Functions for
Reconnaissance
SOURCE Documentary
Ste:
The following report is a translation from Russian of an article which
appeared in Issue No. 2 (87) for 1969 of the SECRET USSR T~.inistry of
Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal 'Tiilita
Thought". The author o t is ar ice o one o o uyev. is article
examines the problem of increasing the reliability of destruction of enemy
nuclear means in terms of preemption probability. The author explores the
possibility of creating reconnaissance-combat organs capable of delivering
preemptive strikes and neutralizing enemy radio comrnmications. This
should be done by providing improved technical equipment and weapons rather
than by adapting available means.
End of Summary
V. Volobuyev has made two other contributions to this publication.
His article entitled '"I'he Problem of Restoring Army Combat Effectiveness in
an Offensive Operation" appeared in Issue No. 3 (79) for 1966; the other
"The Reconnaissance Independence of a Tank Army", was in Issue No. 2 (81j
/for 1967. The SECRET version of Milita Thou ht was published three times
annually and was distributed down to t e leve of division commander. It
reportedly ceased publication at the end of 1970.
Copy ~
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/13 :CIA-RDP10-001058000100440001-7
 I
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/13: CIA-RDP10-001058000100440001-7
FIRDB-312/00928-75
Page 4 of 13 Pages
Reconnaissance - Combat Functions for Reconnaissance
Y
Colonel V. Volobuyev
Candidate of Military Sciences,
Assistant Professor
Under the conditions of modern combat operations, success in combat
with enemy means of nuclear attack rests fundamentally on preempting him in
the delivery of strikes. The preemptive destruction of these important
targets is achieved by timely reconnaissance and a high degree of readiness
of our means .
Examining the presently accepted methods of combat with operational-
tactical nuclear means, we arrive at the conclusion that these methods do-~
not always ensure the preemptive destruction of small, highly mobile, and
carefully camouflaged nuclear strike means which can be readied. for strikes
within a short time.
One of the reasons for this is the unacceptably large amounts of time
it takes reconnaissance data to get from the reconnaissance organs to the
means of destruction. Let us look into this situation in greater detail.
The total time (TE) expended in the preparation of a strike against
enemy nuclear means is the sum of the time (tri) needed for the
reconnaissance of the target and the transmission of the reconnaissance
information (including getting the reconnaissance data to the fire means)
and the time needed to prepare our fire means for a strike (top) against
the target
TE = tri + top (1)
The results of special troop exercises and of research games conducted
at the rilitary Academy of Armored Troops indicate that th_._greatest _a_mount
of time is spent in transmitting reconnaissance information through a
multistage system of communications and processing. These expenditures of
time often exceed, several times over, the time spent by the reconnaissance
organ directly in detecting the enemy target and determining its
Copy ~
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/13: CIA-RDP10-001058000100440001-7
 I
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/13: CIA-RDP10-001058000100440001-7
TOP`SECRET
FIRDB-312/00928-75
Page 5 of 13 Pages
coordinates (tr).
It is obvious that the time available to preempt the opening of fire
by enemy nuclear means (Y) is equal to the difference
Y = tpr (tri + top) ~ (2)
where tpr is the time remaining at the disposal of the enemy for preparing
this means to open fire or to deliver a strike, from the moment the means
is detected by our reconnaissance.
A similar relationship can be expressed in a nomogram of preemption
time (sketch 1).
To determine preemption time from the nomogram, it is necessary to
find, on scale tQp, the number designating the time to be spent in
organizing the fire strike, connect it with the number on scale tri.
designating the time needed for reconnaissance and information, and extend
this line until it intersects with the scale of total time triop? The ,
point thus obtained is connected on scale tpr with the number
characterizing the degree of readiness of the enemy nuclear means to
deliver a strike, and the preemption time is read off in minutes on scale
Y. In the first two examples shown on the nomogram, our means preempt the
enemy by 10 and 20 minutes respectively; in the third example, the enemy
preempts us by 30 minutes.
In actual practice it is also necessary to solve such problems in
reverse, for example, to determine the time which can be allotted to
reconnaissance in relation to the degree of readiness of enemy nuclear
means and of our fire means to mount a strike when there is a set (in
connection with operational-tactical considerations) preemption time (the
fourth line on the nomogram). In this case, we connect the point
designating the time for the preparation of enemy means (in our example, 25
minutes) on scale tpr with the point designating the set preemption (5
minutes) on scale Y, and we extend a straight line to the intersection with
scale triop? From the point obtained (20 minutes), we draw a straight line
to the point designating the readiness of our means of destruction on scale
top (40 minutes). The intersection of this line with scale tri will show
the time for reconnaissance and information, minus 20 minutes in this
example, i.e., the conduct of reconnaissance is already useless.
A comparative analysis of the characteristics of the time of readiness
of our own and enemy nuclear means and of the time needed by reconnaissance
TS ~ 2 06~~
Copy ~
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/13: CIA-RDP10-001058000100440001-7
 i
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/13: CIA-RDP10-001058000100440001-7
FIRDB-312/00928-75
Page 6 of 13 Pages
organs shows that the probability of preemption is extremely slight in SO
percent of the cases. b'breover, if the degree of readiness of the enemy
nuclear means is equal to or greater than our own, then in. order to preempt'
the enemy our reconnaissance data must be obtained before the enemy starts
to prepare this means for a strike (fourth example in the nomogram).
An objective evaluation of the situations set forth above urgently
demands an improvement in the methods and in the search for new ways to
increase the reliability of destruction of enemy nuclear means. Let us
examine to what degree and in what way reliability can be increased in
relation to the probability of preemption and the timeliness in the
delivery of our strike.
The preemption probability (Vy) is expressed by the following
mathematical equation:
Vu = 1 - tri+ toP (3)
tpr
An analysis of this formula shows that the probability of preempting
the enemy is in linear relation to the time expended by our means on
reconnaissance ancT~information (tri), and on the organization of the strike
(top). The probability changes, however, according to the h erbolic law,
in connection with the change in the enemy time of preparation or a stri e
(t r), which can be clearly seen on the graph of preemption probability
(sketch 2).
It follows from the graph that in order to increase the probability of
preemption it is necessary to sharply reduce the time spent by our means on
reconnaissance and information (tri) and on the organization of our strike
(top). At the same time, we cannot assume that the process of improvement
in enemy nuclear means (in the sense of reducing t r) will cease. As the
value of the quantity tTP ,which characterizes tie relative achievements
of the two sides in re ding the time for organizing a strike, tends to
approach unity, the preemption probability will drop sharply and,
consequently, the reliability of destruction will be lowered.
In theoretical research studies, in military literature, and in
lectures at military-scientific conferences it is frequently reported tha
we must increase our reconnaissance forces and means considerably in orde
to obtain reconnaissance data on a timely basis. We can agree with the
authors of such statements if we are discussing the least necessa
rational increase enabling units, large units, an ormations to dle
t eir reconnaissance independently. In addition, no amount of increase
TS ~ 20~~7
Copy N J~
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/13: CIA-RDP10-001058000100440001-7
 I
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/13: CIA-RDP10-001058000100440001-7 ~
FIRDB-312/00928-75
reconnaissance forces and means, no matter how great, can solve the problem
of reconnaissance timeliness it combat with nuclear weapons is conducted
using old methods.
Furthermore, an excessive increase in the number of reconnaissance
organs can lead to an overburdening of the troops and to complications in
servicing, supporting, and supplying them. But above all -- it will be
impossible to avoid even greater expenditures of time in obtaining and
processing the increased flow of information. The information will lose
its reconnaissance value because of the delay in processing, and this will
have an adverse effect on the reliability of our destruction of enemy
nuclear targets.
From the foregoing it is evident that the traditionally developed
method of combat with conventional enemy targets according to the pattern
-- reconnaissance, transmittal of information to the commander, evaluation
of the reconnaissance data by the commander, transmittal of commands to the
means of destruction, and the destruction of the target -- does not always
ensure the delivery of strikes against the small, carefully camouflaged,
and highly mobile enemy means of nuclear attack. Therefore, in seeking new
methods of destroying these means, it is obvious that we must, if
necessary, abandon the established pattern of organizing combat. It
appears to us that we should also not confine ourselves to the ingrained
view regarding the functions of reconnaissance, which have supposedly
always comprised only the detection of the enemy and the transmittal of
data on the enemy to the commander.
The patterns in the development of reconnaissance, confirmed by the
experience of World War II, by postwar training exercises, and by
theoretical research studies, permit the observation that for objective
reasons reconnaissance is chan in more and more from a form of combat
s ort to an ante a art of t e co at activit o troo s; t s is
urt ere y e to ical an ire ec{uipping o iel reconnaissance
organs . _ -_
This leads us to the idea of the possibility and expediency of using a
onsiderable portion of our o erational-tactical reconnaissance or ans for
ombat with enemy nuclear means. erating, as a rule, in c ose contact
ith the enemy and inside his positions, these organs can often deliver
reemptive strikes and put out of action important targets which they have
etected. Under such conditions it is advisable and even necessary for
hese reconnaissance organs themselves to conduct combat against enemy
uclear means according to the following pattern: the detection of the
TS #206967
Copy #~~
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/13: CIA-RDP10-001058000100440001-7
 i
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/13: CIA-RDP10-001058000100440001-7
FIRDB-312/00928-75
Page 7 of 13 Pages
~-----
reconnaissance forces and means, no matter how great, can solve the problem
of reconnaissance timeliness it combat with nuclear weapons is conducted
using old methods.
Furthermore, an excessive increase in the number of reconnaissance
---- - -
o~ans can lead to an overburdenuig o~the troops and to complications in
servicing, supporting, and supplying them. But above all -- it will be
impossible to avoid even greater expenditures of time in obtaining and
processing the increased flow of information. The information will lose
its reconnaissance value because of the delay in processing, and this will
have an adverse effect on the reliability of our destruction of enemy
nuclear targets.
From the foregoing it is evident that the traditionally developed
method of combat with conventional enemy targets according to the pattern
-- reconnaissance, transmittal of information to the commander, evaluation
of the reconnaissance data by the commander, transmittal of commands to the
means of destruction, and the destruction of the target -- does not always
ensure the delivery of strikes against the small, carefully camouflaged,
and highly mobile enemy means of nuclear attack. Therefore, in seeking new
methods of destroying these means, it is obvious that we must, if
necessary, abandon the established pattern of organizing comfit. It
appears to us that we should also not confine ourselves to the ingrained
view regarding the functions of reconnaissance, which have supposedly
always comprised only the detection of the enemy and the transmittal of
data on the enemy to the commander.
The patterns in the development of reconnaissance, confirmed by the
experience of World War II, by postwar training exercises, and by
theoretical research studies, permit the observation that for objective
reasons reconnaissance is than in more and more from a form of combat
s ort to an ante a art of t e co at activit o troo s; t s is
urt ere y e to ical an ire equipping o iel reconnaissance
organs .
This leads us to the idea of the possibility and expediency of using a
considerable portion of our operational-tactical reconnaissance organs for
combat with enemy nuclear means. Operating, as a rule, in close contact
with the enenry and inside his positions, these organs can often deliver
preemptive strikes and put out of action important targets which they have
detected. Under such conditions it is advisable and even necessary for
these reconnaissance organs themselves to conduct combat against enemy
nuclear means according to the following pattern: the detection of the
TS #206967
copy ~ l
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/13: CIA-RDP10-001058000100440001-7
 I
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/13: CIA-RDP10-001058000100440001-7
FIRDB-312/00928-75
Page 8 of 13 Pages
nuclear means and its immediate destruction. All of this considerably
increases t e capa ilities o troops to estroy enemy nuclear weapons in a
short period of time.
In studying the problem of reconnaissance - combat activity we have
become convinced that it can be resolved successfully by further equipping
reconnaissance organs, special groups and teams, and deep reconnaissance
groups from combined-arms large units with modern reconnaissance and
communications equipment (accurate rangefinders, instruments for
identif in nuclear warheads from a distance radio sets with rapid
operation an automatic co ing an deco ing of transmissions), and with
appropriate armament and_c~mbat equipment. If this is done, we believe
that a systematic development of the newest means and their introduction
into reconnaissance twits and subunits will lead to the emergence of
different operating methods and organizational forms in reconnaissance
organs and, in the final analysis, to the creation of reconnaissance-combat
organs
The time has now arrived when we must devote attention to increasing
the reconnaissance-combat functions or the neutralization functions, which
are becoming characteristic of reconnaissance elements and of individual
types of technical reconnaissance means.
Considering the tendencies toward the increased mobility of enemy
means of nuclear attack and toward the reduction of the time needed to
prepare them for a strike, reconnaissance organs, in order to reach highly
mobile targets, in the future will have to be able to maneuver at an ever
increasing pace. One of the ways of achieving a significant gain in time
in the transfer of reconnaissance efforts along axes and in the depth is to
airlift reconnaissance organs by helicopter.
To destroy or put out of action nuclear warhead delivery means and the
means for controlling units which employ nuclear weapons, and to disrupt
the enemy delivery of nuclear warheads and to restrict his moving of them,
it is advisable to equip our special and deep reconnaissance subunits with
guided missile launchers, magnetic mines, and silent small arms.
*Here and below, the terns reconnaissance-combat organs is to be understood
as those personnel and combat means, of reconnaissance units and subunits,
capable of destroying enemy nuclear weapons imrIIndiately after they are
detected.
TS #206967
Copy # ~
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/13: CIA-RDP10-001058000100440001-7
 I
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/13: CIA-RDP10-001058000100440001-7
T[]CZM.QFT
FIRDB-312/00928-75
Page 9 of 13 Pages
It is already possible to increase the capabilities of large units and
operational formations to conduct deep and special reconnaissance with
relatively small materiel outlays by a judicious increase in the number of
organic deep and special reconnaissance groups. In our opinion, it is also
possible, without additional expenditures of materiel means, to centralize
the control of radio reconnaissance units and radio countermeasures units.
This will enable us to make more economical use of radio reconnaissance
means and, at the same time, to increase the capabilities of detecting the
enemy communications means. There will also be an improvement in the
resolution of problems of the simultaneous deployment of OSNAZ subunits and
SPETSNAZ subunits without mutual jamming, as well as an improvement in the
quality of the processing of reconnaissance data.
However, the main advantage of centralizing control is the capability
it affords to neutralize the radio communications of control osts of en
nuclear means on a more tunely an lexi le asis, depending on t e
reconnaissance value and importance of the radio means detected. In other
words, centralization of control of the means of radio reconnaissance and
radio countermeasures is the most expedient method for combat with nuclear
weapons according to the pattern: radio reconnaissance -- radio
countermeasures.
It has been noted above that the degree of probability of a timely
strike is significantly (if not decisively:) influenced by the time spent
on the transmittal of information from a reconnaissance organ to the means
of destruction. Let us assume that this time is reduced to near zero
through the use of, let us say, television, enabling the means of
destruction to receive reconnaissance data on an enemy target at the same
time that an event takes place (at the time this target comes into the
field of view of the reconnaissance organ). In this case, the preemption
time for delivering a strike will be determined by the difference in time
required by the means of destruction of the two sides for delivering their
strikes.
If the degree of readiness of the means of the two sides is equal,
and, even more so, if the degree of readiness of an enemy nuclear means is
greater, a preemptive strike against the latter is possible only if the
reconnaissance or an detectin it can deliver the strike itself. The
probability of such a strike is determined by the ollowing equation:
V - tyr tr ' (4)
ur - tpr
while the degree of probability is characterized by curve 3 (see sketch L).
TS #206967
Copy # / ~
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/13: CIA-RDP10-001058000100440001-7
 I
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/13: CIA-RDP10-001058000100440001-7
FIRDB-312/00928-75
Page 10 of 13 Pages
It is important to note one further circumstance: in this case, the
degree of probability of making a timely strike will be very close to the
degree of reliabilit of destruction, since a certain amount of inaccuracy
in reconnaissance ata, unavoi le under the former method of destruction,
will not result in diminished reliability. For example, the probability of
a timely strike against an enemy nuclear means which is in a state of
60-minute readiness, by afire means of ours at the same degree of
readiness, is equal to zero (point A on sketch 2). But the probability of
a timely strike and the reliability of destruction by a reconnaissance
organ, which spent 10 minutes on the detection of this target and in the
preparation of its own weapon, will be ~5 percent (point B on sketch 2).
This is a sufficiently high reliability.
These calculations and examples once again offer convincing testimony
as to the advisability of expanding the reconnaissance-combat functions or
neutralization i~.mctions which will be Carrie out reconnaissance or ans
rig t up to t e tune t ey become reconnaissance-combat organs.
It appears to us that it is advisable to resolve the problem of
creating reconnaissance-combat organs not by adapting available means,
since it is a question here of a fundamentally new method of combat with
enemy means of nuclear attack, but by attaining a high level of technical
and fire equipping of these systems. At the same time this will lead to a
reduction in the personnel needed for a piece of reconnaissance-combat
equipment. Specific recommendations on this problem can be made only on
the basis of subsequent careful research studies, innovations, and
practical testing.
It is apparent that broad possibilities for creating silent weapons
for reconnaissance-combat organs are opened by laser equipment, small-size
guided grenades, and mortars using new types of explosives and incendiary
means. At the present time, it is possible to make only a preliminary and
purely approximate estimate of the required number of such organs, bearing
in mind that their use must not diminish the reconnaissance capabilities of
the troops. In our view, the number of reconnaissance-
combat organs must correspond to the number of batteries of nuclear means
in the opposing enemy grouping if the latter are in the field of view of
these reconnaissance-combat organs.
Let us make an estimate. In a large unit of our probable enemy, which
we can expect to be opposing a division of ours there are 12 to 16
batteries of means for delivering n r warheads to a target. These
means can maneuver within the zone of operations of their large unit to a
TS #206967
Copy #~~
TOP
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/13: CIA-RDP10-001058000100440001-7
 i
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/13: CIA-RDP10-001058000100440001-7
FIRDB-312/00928-75
Page 11 of 13 Pages
depth of 30 to 50 kilometers along 4 to 5 axial and 2 to 3 lateral roads,
forming 8 to 15 road junctions. The presence of a reconnaissance-combat
organ in the area of each such junction virtually excludes undetected
maneuvering by these enemy nuclear means. Proceeding from these
considerations, an average of 10 to 15 reconna~~ance-combat organs will be
required per division, which comprises 40 to 60 percent of the total number
of ground reconnaissance organs available at the present time.
In conclusion, let us point out that allocating tasks for
reconnaissance forces and means in regard to combat with enemy means of
nuclear destruction, particularly with those of operational-tactical
designation, and adding reconnaissance-combat functions to some of them,
may be regarded as a supplementary measure to the established system of
destroying enemy nuclear means with conventional fire means and, mainly,
nuclear means.
Along with this, the creation and effective utilization of
reconnaissance-combat organs will to a great extent further the resolution
of the problem of combat with enemy nuclear weapons, especially when the
two opposing sides are at an equal degree of readiness to deliver nuclear
strikes.
TS #206967
Copy #~
TOP S
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/13: CIA-RDP10-001058000100440001-7
 I
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/13: CIA-RDP10-001058000100440001-7
FIRDB-312/00928-75
Page 12 of 13 Pages
Sketch 1. Nomogram of preemption time
TS #206967
Copy #~-~
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/13: CIA-RDP10-001058000100440001-7
 i
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/13: CIA-RDP10-001058000100440001-7
~T P'S~-6~REL
FIRDB-312/00928-75
Page 13 of 13 Yages
Vu ~
100-
Sketch 2. Graph of preemption probability
TOP
TS #206967
Copy ~~~
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/13: CIA-RDP10-001058000100440001-7