MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): NUCLEAR SUPPORT OF AIRBORNE OPERATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP10-00105R000100430001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 13, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 17, 1974
• Content Type: MEMO

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THIS TJMEN-.Lw ?MY NOT BE IMPRODUCM
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
17 April 1974
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): Nuclear Support
of Airborne Operations
to-know basis within recipient encies.
1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special
Report is part of a series now in preparation based on the
SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of
Articles of the Journal "Military Thought". This article
points out complexities and unresolved aspects of nuclear
support of airborne operations. The author finds that
answers are needed to important questions of target
selection, identification of and coordination among the
combat elements involved, reconnaissance post-strike and
during the operation, and suppression of enemy air defense
positions along the routes to the drop zones. While the
Soviet airborne division is said to have practically no
technical reconnaissance equipment, there is a suggestion
that it was to receive a tactical nuclear capability. This
article appeared in Issue No. 3 (82) for 1967.
2. Because the source of this report is extremely
sensitive, this document should e- handled on a strict need-
FIRDB-312/01532-74
Deputy Director for Operations
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The Director of Central Intelligence
The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Assistant to the Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Department of the Army
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
U. S. Air Force
Director, National Security Agency
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Deputy Director for Science and Technology
Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence
for National Intelligence Officers
Director of Strategic Research
Director of Weapons Intelligence
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Intelligence Information Special Report
DATE OF
INFO. Mid-1967
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DATE17 A p r i l 1974
MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): The Delivery of Nuclear
Strikes in Support of a Large Airborne Landing in
a Front Offensive
SOURCE Documentary
Summary:
Tie following report is a translation from Russian of an
article which appeared in Issue No. 3 (82) for 1967 of the SECRET
USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of the
Journal "Military Thought". The author of this article is Co lonel
I. Andrush7 vicT This article points out complexities and
unresolved aspects of nuclear support of airborne operations. The
author finds that answers are needed to important questions of
target selection, identification of and coordination among the
combat elements involved, reconnaissance post-strike and during the
operation, and suppression of enemy air defense positions along the
routes to the drop zones. Wb le the Soviet airborne division is
said- to,_have _practically__no__technica1-_recQnnaissance equipment,
there__is._a___s,uggest-ion_that - _was__ t?. receive a tactical nuclear
capabi1ity. End of Summa
r
Comment:
Col. Andrushkevich has written three articles for the
RESTRICTED version of Military Thought: a critique and bibliography
entitled "The Soviet Army and Navy--Beloved Creation of the People",
Issue No. 2, 1973; "Psychological Aspects of Surprise" (a transla-
tion of an article from the periodicals of Fraternal Armies), Issue
No. 7, 1971; and "Combat with Tanks in Modern Operations, Issue No.
4, 1969. Military Thought has been published by the USSR Ministry
of Defense in three versions in the past -- TOP SECRET, SECRET, and
RESTRICTED. There is no information as to whether or not the TOP
SECRET version continues to be published. The SECRET version is
published three times annually and is distributed down to the level
of division commander. TS #205357
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The Delivery of Nuclear Strikes in Su ort of a Large
Airborne Landing in a Front O ensive Operation
by
Colonel I. Andrushkevich
During operational exercises and war games a situation
is occasionally encountered in which several generals and
officers of the staffs of fronts (including staffs of rocket
troops and artillery as well) view the delivery against the
enemy of missil/nuclear strikes in supciof alarge
airornF-landing in a front offensive operation as merely an
inc dent preceding the airborne landi _,In our opinion,
this is a -"definite underestimation, on the one hand,.of.the
role of a large airborne landing and, on the other hand, of
thecapabilities of front missile/nuclear weapons to ac-'
complish missions which support this type of operation.
Strikes against enemy objectives for the purpose of
creating favorable conditions for aggressive combat actions
to complete their destruction must be considered as the
basis for the employment of nuclear weapons in the conduct
of troop landing operations. These strikes are delivered
from the moment the landing is made until the tasks of the
landing are completed (joining up with the troops attacking
from the front line).
In our opinion, the sequence for the delivery of
nuclear strikes in support of a large airborne landing might
be as follows: the destruction and neutralization of the
enemy air defense missile means along the flight routes of
the Military-Transport Aviation aircraft carrying the
airborne troops, and of fighter aircraft on their airfields
along the entire zone of the front offensive (strikes are
delivered at the beginning of the operation and are con-
cluded on the eve of the airborne landing); the delivery of
nuclear strikes against enemy troop groupings and air
defense means detected in the airborne landing zone and
adjacent areas (strikes are delivered before the landing but
no later than 30 to 40 minutes before the drop begins); and
the destruction of nuclear attack means and troop groupings,
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particularly tanks, during the combat actions of the
airborne landing forces.
The means for delivering nuclear munitions against
targets located in the airborne landing area, depending on
how deep the area is (its distance from friendly forward
troops) can be medium-range strategic missiles, delivery
aircraft of long-range and front bomber aviation, and front
missile/nuclear means. As the offense develops (shortening
the distance between the airborne landing and the troops
operating from the front line), they are joined by fighter-
bombers and army (operational-tactical) and tactical
rockets. This variety of forces and means involved in the
delivery.-,of nuclear strikes for the purpose of neutralizing
and destroying the enemy in the airborne landing area and
its vicinity, reqIjir-es_.,__in its turn, the planned allocation
of tanks_ and precisecoordnation. The basic content of
this planning-is: 'the synchronization of the targets-and
the time factors for the delivery of nuclear strikes prior
to the airborne landing drop; the detailed elaboration of
measures to hit the air defense means and to support the
airborne landing; the establishment of the sequence for
delivering the nuclear strikes after the landing; and a
determination of the type of airborne troop actions which
will best exploit the results of nuclear strikes.
The difficulties which arise in connection with the
complexity of control can be overcome to a certa-in.--extent by
establishi-ng.-w.-thin the front headquarters an operations
group to direct the airborne landing. We shall discuss
below the composition and functions of this group.
Reconnaissance and final reconnaissance of the ob-
jectives (targets) is of great importance in the delivery of
nuclear strikes on enemy objectives in the drop and combat
operations area of the airborne landing forces. Since, as
a rule, most of the objectives (launching sites for
surface-to-air and ballistic missiles, firing positions of
artillery capable of employing nuclear munitions, and
others) will be mobile and small in size, most accurate
determination of their ground zero coordinates will be
required to destroy them. Data from the airborne__.landing
forces (from their own reconnaissance organs) on the
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hocation___of--objectives-is_-also. requireci_bec-ause-of_ the low
accuracy in determining,-coordinates.. Aviation including
pilotless reconnaissance aircraft, will he the basic means
of reconnaissance (final reconnaissance) of objectives to be
hit because of the distance separating these objectives from
our troops.
Unit and subunit commanders of the._.a_i.rborne__1an.d.ng
forces must have t i melvriformat-ion_concerning the results
of-.nuclear strikes delivered on enemy targets in the
airborne landing combat zone if they are to make correct
decisions and most effectively exploit the results obtained
by the use of nuclear weapons. It is particularly-important
for the airborne landing forces to_knaw the_results of the
nuclear strikes carried out prior to the landing, because at
the momenit-hasp am hA,n c-TeliverecI_~ th airborne_landing
force may _alr eadz._ Le en_route-to__+hP the air.
Therefore,----information-(about the yield and ground zero
coordinaesjmay be transmitted to the commander of the
airborne --landing- f.orces-only._on the -Military-Transport
Aviation_.communications--net; and he, in turn, must get this
information to landing force unit and subunit commanders
(concerning those strikes which directly concern a given
unit or subunit) over the same net. Unfortunately, on the
basis of information received, the results of this or that
strike (the degree of destruction of the target, the nature
of the destruction and changes in the terrain, etc.), can hp
determined.onl y_-b -means of an initial estimate with 5OX1-HUM
subsequent -refinements made after the -landing.
When_p1_anning a large airborne landing, the front
staff, jointly with the staffs of the air army and of the
rocket troops and artillery, designates the enemy objectives
to be hit by nuclear weapons in the airborne landing area,
in adjacent areas, and in the Military-Transport Aviation
flight zone; determines the delivery times for the nuclear
strikes, their yields, types of bursts, and the means to be
used; and the nuclear strike sequence and means to be
employed (in specific terms for front and army rocket units
and large units) while the airborne landing force is ac-
complishing its combat task. All of these matters are set
forth in the plan for the employment of front rocket troops
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in the operation and in the plan for the combat employment
of the air army.
Asa-rule, the nuclear strikes planned for the landing
are-a_-ar~_air--bursts . In a case of extreme necessity (when
an air burst has little effect in the destruction of an
objective) ground bursts may be employed, but it is
mandatory to take into account the direction of the average
wind and the yield of the nuclear munitions in order to
assure the security of the landing and the subsequent
actions of the airborne landing units and subunits.
Lately it has become widespread practice to have
airborne landing commanders and staffs participate in the
determination of the objectives to fie flit "in the landing.
zone. It must be admitted that this approach is correct,
because nobody has greater primary interest than the air
landing personnel in the destruction of the enemy in the
landing zone. However, this will not always be possible
because of the conditions of the situation. Therefore, it
is necessary to organize in advance an operations group of
the-landing staff which would participate-in the front
planning for nuclear strikes against-objectives in the
landing and combat- actions zone--_
To assure the flight of the Military-Transport Aviation
column (to the landing and return) re- pjres--tha ir
defense means in the zone _be neutralized strongly__enough to
preclude the destruction of transport _aircraft _- the_f ght
route-s-.------The-
outes. The width of the flight zone will vary in every
specific case. The effective ranges
air defense means on e light altitudes chosen by Military-
Transport Aviation will serve_y,,.~te ci+~
determining_t_e-wi t. of the flight zone, For example,
taking into account the capabilities of theJke-Hercules
and Hawk surface-to-air missiles, it js.,.assumed.that
f light "altitude of 9QQ meters, '-the. --wi . .-Q. -t. . f light zone
may a rom 6 0 to 150 kilometers.
The following must be destroyed along with surface-
to-air missile launching sites: airfields with enemy
fighter aviation; control and guidance posts and radar
stations of the detection system; and also the firing
1vP-1WeK-T-
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positions of tube antiaircraft artillery. As indicated by
research, such objectives in the front offensive zone will
be numerous (more than 100), and, therefore, to destroy them
will obviously involve a considerable portion of the means
of destruction (medium range strategic missiles, long-range
aviation, front aviation and rocket units, and units of tube
and rocket artillery) on a given operational-strategic axis.
It seems to us that these measures, carried out actually to
gin air supremacy will be lanned and executed within the
framework of the__entirestrate is operation. Accordingly,
the--,
he front may be assigned specific objectives to destroy or
a zone of defined depth within which front means must
destroy enemy air defense installations. Ik_must be stated
frankly that the problem of destroying enemy air defense
means with the aim of assuring the flight of Military-
Transport Aviation carrying_the airborne landing force still
awaits comprehensive analysis and practical solution.
The front plan for the employment of nuclear weapons
must include a definite number of nuclear munitions and the
means of delivering them to targets to enable the airborne
landing force to combat the enemy nuclear attack means and
his operational reserves, particularly his tanks, and to
destroy other important objectives. Accordingly, the plan
will indicate the types of munitions, their yields, and the
degree of readiness of the allocated delivery means for each
day of the operation.
The basis for determining the required amount of
nuclear munitions will be the data available in the front
headquarters concerning enemy groupings in the landing zone
and in adjacent areas, taking into account their possible
move and regrouping and, also, the duration of the in-
dependent combat actions of the landing forces.
The means for delivering nuclear strikes are selected
by taking into account the depth at which the landing forces
will be dropped and, also, the reduction of the depth as the
situation changes (as front troops advance). Thus, ini-
tially these means might be bomber aviation and front
operational-tactical rockets, then army operational-tactical
rockets and fighter-bombers, and, in the concluding phase
TO
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(as front troops enter the airborne landing force zone of
action), tactical rockets and tank and artillery fire.
The experience of exercises and war games indicates
that, if a front executes an airborne landing with a force
up to an airborne division in strength, then to destroy the
enemy in the airborne landing drop and combat action zone
would require the expenditure of up to 6 to 8 medium-yield
nuclear munitions in 3 to 4 days. This calculation is based
primarily on the assumed repulse by the landing force of the
enemy reserves consisting of up to one tank or mechanized
division (at full strength). Of course, these calculations
are purely approximations, since they were arrived at, not
on the basis of actual targets but only on assumed ones and
taking into account the organization and action tactics of
the probable enemy.
How will the planning be conducted for the delivery of
nuclear stri es in support of a large airborne landing- Our
lima experience allows_ recommensiing_.-the_ _f.ollowing_work
procedure. The commander of the airborne landin_g_Jas__a
rule, the commander of an airborne division with his
operations group), located at_the_frontheadquarters,
clarifies the assigned task and makes his proposals for the
destruction of the enemy in the landing zone and adjacent
areas, taking into consideration the planned (or already
delivered) nuclear strikes. He presents these proposals to
the __f-r n troop .conmander together with his plan for the
landing and combat actions. Then, under the direction of
one o the frcnt_-dDputy -commanders or of the chief of the
fxQnAt._ope-rati-ions directorate, problems concerning the
coordination of the airborne landing troops with rocket
troops and aviation are worked out. The amount of detail in
this coordination depends on the specific conditions of the
situation and the nature of the means to be employed. Thus,
for the front means (rocket units and bomber aviation) it is
necessary to indicate the exact level of readiness to de-
liver nuclear strikes of specific yields for every day of
the operation; but for army means and fighter-bomber
aviation, obviously it will suffice to orient them on the
level of readiness required to strike the enemy (from a new
airfield area for fighter-bomber aircraft) in the combat
operations zone of the airborne landing as the army troops
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reach a specified line. Obviously this will be a line
within reach of the indicated means.
The-most-complex-4).rablerns, in our opinion, are those of
control while-nuclear strikes are being_ aeIivered on_
objectives in the airborne landing zone and combat
operations area of the airborne landing. Right up to the
present riot ye t_--clear -who- wi-ll--marce--the decision to
deliver nuclear strikes and how this task will be conveyed
to the executors. No one doubts that the decision to employ
nuclear weapons must be made by the commander who possesses
them. At the same time, also, the commander of the airborne
landing cannot remain indifferent to this matter, because he
is the person who has the most detailed knowledge of the
situation in the combat actions area and who is most
concerned with the employment of this weapon. Depending on
the situation which has developed, he may specify the
objectives (targets) which must be destroyed by nuclear
weapons and report them to front (army) headquarters,
indicating the nature and dimensions of the objectives and
their location on the ground (coordinates). The decision to
deliver a nuclear strike on these objectives will be taken,
of course, by the front or army troop commander.
Such a procedure for delivering nuclear strikes
combines centralized control over rocket troops and aviation
by the front (army) troop commander with the designation of
the ob ect ves to be destroyedFby tie airborne Ianaing-
commander. In this way, the most rationa-L-expendi?ure of
nuclear munitions is obtained because strike yields will
correspond strictly to the required destruction levels,
while the use of duty batteries (squadrons at readiness No.
1) will allow the task to be accomplished in the shortest
time possible.
T 11q technical aspects of this matter, in our opinion,
should be decided by an operations group, at ron
headquarters, charmed ith tie employment_fdontrolI__of__the
airb ro ne landing. Besides officers and generals of the
airborne landing troops, this group should consist of
officers from the operations directorate, officers from the
front rocket troop and artillery staff, and representatives
of the air army. This group may be located in the front
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troop commander command post, from whgre_i is conwenient to
maintain--uninterrupted communications with the-.-airborne
landing and with the appropriate directorates and
departments of the front headquarters and of the arms of
troops.
The basic tasks of this group may be: the collection
of data concerning the situation in the combat operations
area of the airborne landing and in adjacent areas
(collected from the landing commander, reconnaissance
aircraft, and other sources of information); the preparation
of proposals for the employment of missile/nuclear weapons
and bomber (fighter-bomber) aviation to destroy objectives
in the landing and combat actions area of the airborne
landing; and the approval of requests by the front troop
commander and the transmittal of appropriate instructions to
executors.
The last condition mentioned above requires some
clarification. In our view, if a nuclear strike is to be
delivered in accordance to plan (within the limits of the
restrictions issued), then, with the approval of the front
troop commander, the decision to deliver it may be made
independently by the operations group. In those cases when
added restrictions are required for nuclear means, or when
their employment will also permit the accomplishment of
other operational tasks (the destruction of nuclear attack
means, enemy operational reserves, etc.), the decision to
destroy these objectives should be made by the front troop
commander.
Conveying to the executors the task of delivering a
nuclear strike should be accomplished, as a rule, through
the corresponding staffs (of rocket troops and artillery, of
the air army). After sendinq the order, the operations
group informs the airborne landing commander of the
situation (coordinates of the points of aim), the type and
yield of burst, and the time of delivery; and it also takes
steps to-determine the results of the burst.
$egrettably, in many exercises and war games the
problem of employing nuclear weapons against the enemy in
the combat operations area of the airborne landing is
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resolved by setting up and detailing to the airborne landing
commander a group of representatives from the front (army)
rocket troops staff and from aviation, who have to make the
landing with the airborne force. The advisability of this
approach raises serious doubts, because staff officers
(except for pilots) are not trained to make parachute jumps
In addition there aroma great difficulties in organizing
communications for this group_with__the__senior commander,
because the dimensions of the R-102 and R-118 shortwave
radio sets make it difficult _ to _drop them. There are even
doubts about the competence of this group to resolve
independently the question of the emoymn t offmissile/
nuclear weapons.
The subject is much simpler concerning the organization
of coordination when nuclear strikes are delivered by the
means of the troops approaching the combat actions area of
the airborne landing. The front plan will provide for the
allocation of means from those of the combined-arms or tank
army and of the motorized rifle and tank divisions
approaching to join the airborne landing force; and the
amount of nuclear munitions allocated will he enough to
accomplish tasks jointly with the airborne landing force.
In contrast with the procedure we suggested for delivering
nuclear strikes by front means (through the operations group
at front headquarters), the employment of army and division
nuclear means has to be carried out at the decision of the
army (division) commander, upon request from the airborne
landing commander, within the limits of the nuclear
munitions allocation. Communications must be direct in this
case-,. from the airborne landing command post to the army
(division) command post.
The chief of artillery of the airborne landing and his
staff are at present sufficiently trained to resolve ef-
ficiently problems pertaining to the employment of nuclear
weapons and to provide the airborne landing commander with
appropriate assistance in selecting objectives to he struck
and in preparing the necessary data to deliver nuclear
strikes on them. But even to this day the problem remains
the,final reconnaissance of the objectives to be struck,
because airborne troop large units do not yet have technical
reconnaissance means (except visual) which will provide
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accurate coordinates for the objectives to be struck.
Incidentally, we shall mention that this--situation-fiends--to
favor, to a certain degree, the use of bomber aviation as
the delivery means for nuclear munitions, because bombers
are capable, under certain conditions, of accomplishing
final reconnaissance while executing a combat task and
thereby cut down on the time between receipt of the request
(report) of the airborne landing commander and the delivery
of the nuclear strike on the accurately located objective
(target).
Some work has already been done along these lines. In
one of the exercises carried out in the summer of 1966, a
separate`-heavy bomber aviation corps, operationally
subordinate to the front during an airborne landing
operation, was used to deliver nuclear strikes during the
landing and combat actions of the airborne landing force.
In all, it was planned to carry out 5 regimental-size
sorties employing 15 medium and large yield nuclear aerial
bombs. Most of these resources (3 regimental-size sorties
and 10 nuclear aerial bombs) were used to strike the enemy
in the flight zone and in the air landing zone before the
beginning of_the drop; and 2 regimental-size sorties and 5
medium-yield nuclear aerial bombs were used to accomplish
tasks rin_g-_the combat operatiQns.
The planning for the combat actions of the corps was
conducted at the headquarters ofthe air army, which was
included in the front troop complement, under the direction
of the army commander with the participation of generals and
officers of the control group of_the airborne troops
directorate, which had been given control of the airborne
landing. When determining the tasks and the procedure for
combat actions for the large units and units of the aviation
corps, the capabilities and specific characteristics of
long-range aviation were taken into account fihe objectives
chosen_t-o-Se stru- ck-tiiere--sEationary ana- 'I fmited-=nobility
targets of distinct radar reflectivity, such as airfields,
large enemy troop concentrations, amphibious landing and
combat ships, and the disembarkation areas of enemy
amphibious landings. The strikes were delivered primarily
in the hours of darkness by one or two squadrons of TU-16
aircraft. Reconnaissance and final reconnaissance of the
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objectives to be struck was conducted in advance by
specially allocated reconnaissance aircraft, or during
combat sorties by crews accomplishing combat tasks.
The
plan for the
use
of long-range bomber aviation was
developed
jointly by
the
air army staff, the separate bomber
aviation
corps staff,
and
the operations group of the
airborne
troops; and
the
allocation of available aviation
units and subunits by periods of readiness for flight (from
readiness No. 2), was effected in advance while resolving
questions of coordination. For closer coordination with the
airborne landing, an operations group, headed by a_guidance
service officer, was detached from the separate bomber
aviation corps and made the landing together with the
airborne landing force. This operations group maintained
communications with the corps headquarters and the airborne
landing force commander, assisted the latter in selecting
objectives to be struck, and provided reconnaissance data
obtained directly from on board the aircraft. _ The close
coordination main ah d tflroug lout tfie entire exercise
between the airborne landing troops operations group
directing the airborne landing and the corps headquarters,
assured the timely allocation of tasks and effective action
by long-range aviation supporting the airborne landing; and
it also assured the receipt of necessary reconnaissance
izforrmation of interest to the airborne landing troops.
Thus, one can already conclude that the most precise
coordination of forces and means is achieved to the highest
degree by the creation, under the front troop commander, of
a special group to control all troops participating in an
airborne landing operation. Wide authority must be given to
this group for the employment of forces and means (including
nuclear weapons also) within the limits established by the
front offensive operation plan.
There isnn_diuht_at ail that the incorporation _ of
tactical__ niissile/nucJear_weapons_ Into -the armament of
airhQrne QODG_._wi11_help_sesolve the problems of the
employment of nuclear weapons in an airborne landing
operation as a whole, and will raise the combat capabilities
of a large airborne landing operating in the depth of the
enemy rear areas.
TS #20537
Copy #_)
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/13: CIA-RDP10-00105R000100430001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/13: CIA-RDP10-00105R000100430001-8
50X1-HUM
FIRDB-312/01532-74
Page 15 of 15 Pages
TS #205357
Copy #
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/13: CIA-RDP10-00105R000100430001-8