MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): SOVIET ASSESSMENT OF NORTH VIETNAMESE AIR DEFENSE ACTIONS AGAINST US AIRCRAFT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP10-00105R000100260001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 5, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 18, 1973
• Content Type: MEMO

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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
18 September 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR; The Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT MII;ITARY THOUGHT (USSR): Soviet Assessment of
Nort Vietnamese Air Defense Actions Against
US Aircraft
1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report
is part of a series now in preparation based on the SECRET
USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles
of the Journal "Militar Thou ht." T is attic a escr es the
operations of Nort Vietnamese air defense and air forces
against US aircraft from 1965 to 1967. The evolution of tactics
as the result of interaction of attacking and defending forces
is the primary focus of the article. While there is some
criticism of North Vietnamese air defense doctrine and tactics,
the author expresses admiration far the performance of the de-
fenders against overwhelming odds. This article appeared in
Issue No. 2 (81) for 1967.
2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensi-
tive, this document should be handled on a strict need-to-know
basis within recipient agencies. soxi-
i iam E. e son
Deputy Director fo Operations
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The Director of Central Intelligence
The Director of Intelligence and Research
Department of State
The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Assistant to the Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Department of the Army
The Assistant Chief of Naval Operations {Intelligence)
Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
U.S. Air Force
Office of the Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Deputy Director for Science and Technology
Director of National Estimates
Director of Strategic Research
Director of Weapons Intelligence
Director of Scientific Intelligence
~~ ~~, ~Tn ~~~
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Intelligence Information Special Report
DIRlCTORAT! O~
O~lRATIOfii
COUNTRY USSR
DATE OF Dgid-19 6 7
INFO.
SU6JECT
DATE 18 S ept 19 7 3
MILITARY THOUGHT (USSRj: Combat Actions of Air Defense
Troops an t e A r Forces of the Democratic
Republic of Vietnam
Documentary
3u~unary
~t
The following report is a translation from Russian of an
article which appeared in Issue No. 2 (81} for 1967 of the
SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of
Articles of the Journal "Militar Thou ht." Tie aut~o'r of
this art cle is Colonel A..~~~~c., T e study describes the
operations of North Vietnamese air defense and air forces
against US aircraft from 19b5 to 1967. The evolution of
tactics as the result of interaction of attack~;ng and defend--
ing forces is the primary focus of the article. [dhile there
is soave criticism of North Vietnamese air defense doctrine
and tactics, the author expresses admiration for tt~e performs
mance of the defenders against overwhelming odds. The value
of the North Vietnamese experience to Soviet forces is ac-
knowledged. Tables are used to depict the relative effecti~ye--
ness of the air defenses by weapons systems, density of attack
and chronology.
End of` Swnmary
50X1-HUM
Colonel A. Gryaznov~wrote an article on vectoring fighter
aircraft in Aviation and Cosmonautics-for October 1964 and an
article on US a r aperat ons in Vietnam in Red Star on 16
August 1966. Militar Thou ht has been pubby the
USSR Ministry o Defense n t ree versions in the past--TOP SECRET,
SECRET, and RESTRICTED. There is no information as to whether or
not the TOP SECRET version continues to be published. The SECRET
version is published three times annually and is distributed down
to the level of division cammander. ~,,,,, ....,,
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COMBAT AC~i~IOiIS OF AIR DEFENSE TROOPS
AND THE AIR FORCES OF TFiE DEDIOCRATIC
REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM
by
Colonel A. Gryaznov
A short summar of combat actions for ttti~o ears . Air
defense troops an the air forces of the Democratic Republic
of Vietnam (DRV) conduct continual combat ~ti~ith American avia-
tion, which has been carrying out systematic raids, bath day
and night, against the DRV since 7 February 1965.
To achieve their aggressive goals, in 1966 the Americans
increased the intensity of their aircraft raids by a factor
of more than one and one-half. If, in 1965 more than thirty
thousand aircraft sorties were carried out over the territory
of the ~.P.V, then, from 1966 to February 1967, ttiEra were more
than fifty thousand sorties. Every twenty-four hours an average
of up to 160 aircraft sorties, and on some days up to 300, were
carried out over the DRV to deliver bombing stri]:es, to conduct
aerial reconnaissance, and to cover strike groups of attack
aviation.
The number of aircraft sorties conducted by US aviation
over the DRV, by months, is shown in the table. (See Table l.)
In all, for two years, American aviatio~z carried out over
eighty thousand aircraft sorties over the DRV. Included in tI~.at
total are approximately 9(100 bombing stri}>es against various
targets in DRV territory. As a result of these strikes more
than 800 instillations were completely or partially destroyed.
In 1966, the greatest destruction was inflicted against ground
and water communications. Up to sixty percent of the tactical.
and carrier aviation participated i.n the Uombing of bridges and
water crossings, stations and railroad stations, and river and
~ ~ T
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seaports . The US command allocated up to t~~irty percent of the
total number of aircraft for strikes against industrial and
power installations, and up to ten percent for the destruction
of hydrotecIinical installations and military targets. Approxi-
mately twenty percent of the aircraft sorties were accomplished
under night conditions, bot~~ to deliver bombing strikes and also
to conduct aerial reconnaissance.
The basic strike force of tactical aviation consisted of
the F-105 (sixty percent) and the F-4C (twenty-five percent).
Reconnaissance tasks were accomplished by the R5-6C and the RF-1(31
(fifteen percent). Carrier aviation involved irr combat actions
were the A-4D and A-4E (fifty-five percent} , tPie F-4I~ and t}ie
F-4B (twenty percent), and ttie F-8, A-6, RA-5C and RF-8 (twenty-
five percent) .
There tae re systematic actions up to fifteen times against
tiie same target with from thirty to fifty aircraft participating
in each raid. As the countermeasures by the air defense and air
forces of the DRV increased, the USAF and USIv commands continuously
altered their strike tactics, endeavoring to find new methods
and ways to accomplish the basic tasks of destroying the national
economy installations of the republic with tl:e .east amount of
losses in aircraft and pilots.
Even though American aviation inflicted significant damage
on the national economy of the DRV, the aggressors still did not
achieve their goals. The Vietnamese people in the north and
south of the country continue their heroic struggle against
American imperialism. :he Vietnamese information agency reported
that, as of 15 May 1967, 1900 American combat aircraft t~~ere
destroyed over the DRV solely try the forces and means of the air
defense and air forces of the Vietnam People's Army {VPA); thus,
appreciable losses in equipment and pilots have been inflicted
on tine USAF . The number of ai rcraf t dotti7ned comprises ttao percent
of the overall total of aircraft sorties carried out by American
aviation over the DRV. It should be recalled that American
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.~vnl-n~ri
aircraft losses by the end of World War Ii comprised only one
percent of the overall total of aircraft sorties carried out by
their aviation during World War II.
The following unfavorable conditions have substantially
affected the results of the combat actions of the DRV air defense:
-- air defense is conducting an unequal struggle against a
powerful opponent who has complete air superiority. In the air
raids on the DRV, more than 1500 modern jet aircraft are par-
ticipating from air bases in Thailand and South Vietnam and from
aircraft carriers. The number of SAM systems available to the
air defense of the DRV is inadequate for the struggle against
US aviation, besides which the lower limit of tl-~eir kill zone is
500 meters;
-- the fighter aviation of the VPA has a limited number of
fighter aircraft. The lack of airfields on the coast of the Gulf
of Tonkin and on the borders of Laos and South Vietnam does not
permit interception of the air enemy on t_he distant approaches
to the principal installations in the country;
-- the mountainous-forested terrain (three-fifths of the
territory in the country) gives rise to favorable conditions for the
concealed approach of American aircraft to their strike targets
along river valleys with exits to key areas of the country and -
makes it difficult for radiotechnical troops of the VPA to effect
the timely detection of piloted and pilotless targets, particularly
those flying at low altitudes;
-- the air defense of the VPA began to be established in an
organized manner only at the initiation of air raids against the
DRV and was improved while already engaged in combat actions.
Concomitantly, there were difficulties and great deficiencies
(still not overcome at present} in the organization of the air
defense in the control of forces and means while repulsing air
raids, and in the achievement of coordination of fighter aviation
with SAM forces and antiaircraft artillery;
-- the cadres do not yet have adequate technical and combat
training, particularly for actions in complex situations, though
their morale and combat qualities are high.
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All this does not allow the full utilization of the combat
capabilities of even the available forces and means of the VPA
air defense and air forces.
However, even under these conditions American aviation is
suffering heavy losses from the air defense troops of the DRV.
The US press reports that air defense means of North Vietnam
lately have been downing more American aircraft than are presently
being produced in the US. Sr'1M troops, which at present constitute
the basis of the air defense of the DRV, have proven to be a
formidable force in the struggle against piloted targets. From
the date of their employment (24 June 1965] up to 15 May 1967
they Nave downed 396 American aircraft; on the average three
missiles were expended to destroy one target.
Fighter aviation of the VPA air forces, which has modern
fighter aircraft in its arsenal, is also conducting a successful
struggle against enemy aircraft; in air battles it has destroyed
116 American aircraft while losing 49 fighters.
Antiaircraft artillery and antiaircraft machine guns are
the most numerous air defense means that the VPA has. They are
credited with seventy-six percent of the American aircraft
destroyed. The explanation for this is, first, since the second
half of 1965 American aviation has been forced to fly at low
altitudes because of the actions of the SAM troops; second, anti-
aircraft artillery and antiaircraft machine guns operate through-
out DRV territory where there are no SAM troops or fighter
aviation; and, third, there are incomparably more tube artillery
means in the VPA air defense than there are SAtR battalions and
fighter aircraft.
The results of two years of combat actions by the DRV air
defense are shown in the table (SAM troop and fighter aviation data
from Soviet military specialists, antiaircraft artillery data from
the VPA command). (See Table 2.)
From the table it can be seen that the average number of
missiles expended to destroy one target began to rise considerably
in 1966. The lowered effectiveness of fire and increased average
expenditure of missiles, especially since the second half of 19fifi,
are primarily due to the fact that attacking aviation improved the
- r - m
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 Snug -uTTTVr
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methods of overcoming SAM defenses. The US command, on the basis
of a detailed analysis of reconnaissance data and the study and
exposure of the weak aspects of the SAM systems employed in the
DRV, developed for its aviation new tactical approaches to over-
come SAM defenses. Tlie basic one was the following evasive action:
after detecting a missile launch from an altitude of 1.5 to 2
kilometers, the aircraft dives sharply to an altitude of 400 to
300 meters, changes its flight bearing 90 to 180 degrees, and
leaves the kill zone of the missile system. In addition to this,
there is widespread use of very intensive combined jamming
(active and passive simultaneously), which, as a rule, prevents
accurate missile launches. There was also an increase in the
number of air strikes with Shrike type guided missiles against
SAM battalion launching sites.
A reduction in firing results was also caused by deficiencies
in the combat use of SAM troops. Since 1966 Vietnamese crews have
been conducting combat firings independently, not Having had enough
practice with and knowledge of the equipment from the very beginning.
There were even cases when missiles were launched v~?ithout preparing
initial data and without checking the technical equipment. Such
missile launches were called the accomplishment of a tactical
task to scare off America-~ aircraft. The requirements of Firin
Regulations were often not fulfilled: in firing against a maneu-
vering target, instead of a salvo of three missiles, a single
missile was launched, when tracking a target manually, laying
operators made errors in angle of sight, as a result of which the
missiles went far off the target. Operator lack of skill was
particularly noticeable when firing under mode N~1 and MV, which
led to ground contact by the missile and its detonation. Here
is an example. The battalion prepared for fire on a group target
descended to an altitude of 600 meters. Firing was conducted
under mode N~Tn r~r1- i i
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an altitude of 1500 meters. Immediately before the strike target
the aircraft broke up into smaller groups (of two aircraft each)
and delivered theft strike from various directions and from
chandelles with successive dives from an altitude of 1200 to 1000
meters. Upon approaching the SAM troop zone, the follower and
leader in each pair successively switched on the afterburners and
kept overtaking each other, thereby creating "scissors," as it
were, on the radar display screens and hampering target tracking.
The aircraft penetrated the SAM troop zone from three or four
directions simultaneously with two or three groups from each
direction and echeloned by altitude.
~In general, each raid lasted fatty to sixty minutes. Up to
thirty percent of the aircraft delivered strikes against installa-
tions with aerial bombs and guided missiles. The remaining
aircraft were used to make up diversionary groups (aircraft of
various types), cover groups (F-4 and F-8), damming groups
(RB-66 and F-105), groups to neutralize air defense means, and
reconnaissance groups, Those which did the damming operated
80 to 120 kilometers from the strike targets outside the SAM
troop zone. RF-101 reconnaissance aircraft conducted recon-
naissance before and during the strike and after the raid. Pilot-
less PQM-34A reconnaissance aircraft conducted reconnaissance
after the end of the raid from an altitude of seventeen to
eighteen kilometers and the 147j aircraft from an altitude of
400 to 800 meters .
During two years of struggle by the forces and means of the
VPA air defense and air forces with American aviation, a large
and varied experience has been accumulated, which also has great
importance for our own air defense troops. The necessity for
studying and for the practical application of this experience in
the daily training of our air defense troops is dictated by the
fact that considerable areas of our country, with high population
density and developed industry, may be within range of the tactical
and carrier aviation of the probable enemy; and the enemy measures
and tactical approaches to the use of his means for air attacks
may be analogous to those used in the DR~7.
Of course, the adoption and dissemination of the combat
experience presented above must be amended to take into account
the specific conditions under which the air defense and a~:r forces
of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam have to operate.
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