MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): INCREASING THE AIR MOBILITY OF THE GROUND FORCES
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Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP10-00105R000100230001-0
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RIPPUB
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
12
Document Creation Date:
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date:
October 16, 2012
Sequence Number:
1
Case Number:
Publication Date:
July 27, 1973
Content Type:
MEMO
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The Development of Airborne Landing Large Units and
the Creation of Airborne Shock Large Units
by
Colonel M. Belov, Doctor of Military Sciences
Historical experience shows that the most important conditions
for victory in operations and in combat are a harmonious combina-
tion of troop mobility with the capabilities of the main types of
armament, and the conformity of their organizational forms and
methods with the technical means of combat. The greater the
increase in the destructive power and range of the main types of-
armament, the greater the degree of troop mobility required in order
to have timely exploitation of the results of using a given type of
weapon. The main thing here is that the equipping, organization,
and methods of action of combined-arms large units and units make it
possible to forestall enemy maneuvering and to rout his troops
before their combat effectiveness can be restored or fresh forces
can be committed to battle.
In recent years, considerable attention has been devoted in
the leading countries of the world to the development of the
decisive means of armed combat--the nuclear/missile weapon. Troop
mobility has been raised mainly by perfecting the existing means
of moving troops and conducting combat and by completing full
mechanization, mainly through mass use of wheeled and tracked
vehicles. It is thus apparent that the mobility and maneuverability
of formations and large units still do not satisfy the requirements
for timely exploitation of the results of nuclear strikes or for
conducting front and army offensive operations in which mass use is
made of nuclear weapons.
An urgent problem has arisen for military theory and practice--
to determine effective ways of sharply iacreasinq he mobs rty_nf
t_ground forces and to discover the new means, organizational
forms, and operating methods necessary to accomplish this. Troops
must have an adequate number of forces whose mobility is independen
of terrain conditions. In our view, this capability is assured by
taking to the air, based on the mass and comprehensive use of
aircraft.*
50X1-HUM
*Here and below, this term refers to transport and combat
aircraft of military designation.
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Aircraft have great speed. using them, troops acquire a
higher degree-of-mobility era i i y-. They can cover
large distances rapidly, deliver surprise s rakes, and advance
swiftly into areas of destruction, obstructions, fire, flood, and
radioactive contamination. However, air mobility, or aeromobility
as it is called abroad, is not the only positive qua i y, oug a
very important one, acquired by ground forces as a result of taking
to the air. Important also are the increase in capabilities for
combat and materiel-technical support and more effective resolution
of the problems of command and communications. The firepower and
strike power of troops also rise significantly.
Actual practice shows that rot -w_ na aircraft equipped with
various onboard armament systems are becoming essential to ground
forces for fulfilling fire tasks. In complicated ground situations
and fast-moving combat actions, they are capable of changing
location along with the troops and of mounting strikes at the
initial request of the combined-arms commander. Furthermore, these
strikes may be mounted in the immediate vicinity of our troops.
Using light rotary-wing aircraft as a base, we can create a new,
mobile means for troops to conduct combat, a means possessing great
advantages over ground vehicles in supporting the strike capabilities
of combined-arms large units under conditions of nuclear warfare.
Much has already been done in our army in the realm of taking
to the air, particularly in the last two to three years. The
materiel base is being widened by increasing the production of
aircraft, as well as by creating new types required for future war-
fare. A beginning has been made toward fundamental organizational
changes projected for the future. Experiments are being conducted
for introducing new forms of troop organization and methods of
combat actions, with mass use of aircraft for fulfilling various
tasks in operations and in combined-arms combat.
At the same time, however, we still cannot say that favorable
solutions have been found for all problems. It is necessary first
of all to make a theoretical plan showing all the expedient ways
of taking to the air and to balance this against the needs of the
group forces and possible future aircraft development. Actual
practice provides adequate material from which to proceed 4-
solving solving this scientific-technical problem. -
Our industry can produce various types of aircraft with a
cargo capacity of four dozens of kilograms up to fifty to eighty
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tons and more. In accord with troop needs, some of the aircraft
are used as transport and auxiliary means, and the rest as mobile
troop means for conducting combat. Similar use of aircraft is
becoming a common occurrence at troop training exercises and
maneuvers, as well as in the actual combat practice of several
armies.
However, the effectiveness of aircraft depends not only on
cargo capacity and adaptability for fulfilling various missions.
It is very important that the organizational forms correspond to
the specific conditions of their use. Current experie
results of theoretical research provide as.is car statink _thatt
twfiods of taking to tie a exist at the present time.
The first is characterized by an increase in the air transpor-
tability o5T ground, i.e. motorized rifle and tank, large units
urrirtr,--arid-- subunits in order to adapt them to airlifting. This
method anticipates that part of the aircraft will also be used
directly in combined-arms combat for fulfilling fire and other
auxiliary tasks. The increase in troop air transportability is
achieved by adapting equipment and armament to airlifting on
existing aircraft and by creating new types which will provide
for the transport of existing and projected heavy equipment and
armament. At this point we encounter certain difficulties caused
by the specific nature of the allocating and equipping of ground
large units. Since it is planned that they will for the most part
deliver powerful strikes while moving on the ground, they possess
a great quantity of heavy equipment requiring a large grouping of
aircraft with large cargo capacities to airlift them. For example,
a motorized rifle division as presently organized requires on the
average about 260 heavy and 860 medium aircraft or helicopters.
At the present time, consequently, it can only be.A__que.t.i4=_of
airlifting i ighten$d_.units and.._larq_e....unita and... then,.requi.pn~ nQ }mom
with..h.eav _ QUljt_.,equipmnent, if pos sib .g., .. om...stores.,._at. th r
point- ..2f Great attention has been given abroad to such
airlifts in recent years. And this is not accidental. Airlifts
in the "Big Lift" operation, as well as the specially created NATO
"mobile forces," showed definite effectiveness. At the present
time, with the tendency toward gradual displacement of United
States ground forces from Europe, the Americans attach great impor-
tance to this method of building up forces. 50X1-HUM
The second method of takin to the air is characterized by
the development of airborne landing an airborne shock large units
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which have already taken to the air, i.e., bgen_s_gecial.l,y__ Apted
f?=.. tra.&fer-..by.. girl tT._ They are equipped and organized in such
a way that they can be moved as rapidly as possible aboard aircraft
and can make swift attacks from the air and on the ground. With a
comparatively small number of maneuverable aircraft, they can be
committed to an engagement from distant areas more rapidly than
can ground large units, and they can swiftly penetrate deep into
the enemy disposition even if the intervening terrain is inacces-
sible to ground advance.
In accordance with the demands stemming from the nature and
conditions in the conduct of future operations, irborne landing
large units are developing above all as a strategic means an
airborne shock large uni s a means of the opera long command.
. Airborne landing large units earmarked for conducting combat
operations deep in the enemy rear are airliftedin organizationally
detached aircraft, AN-12 military transport aircraft. t is these
aircraft which to a -considerable extent determine our presen views
organization of these large units.
In the immediate future the fleet of military-transport
aircraft will consist
predominantly of medium a~rcra roviding
kilo eters an more. It is important for these aircra to be able
to transport--t itFe new forms of combat--equipment being added to the
arm ment of airborne troops, including nuclear weapons, antiaircraft
missiles, and combat vehicles
The capabilities of airborne landing large units will rise
even more with the appearance of AN-22 heavy aircraft.* These
aircraft will enable them, as forces of the first strategic
echelon, to reach a designated area on any continent rapidly, dom_
ex 1 the --results- lear strikes b strategic means, to
rout the enemy or keep him from restoring his military potential.-
*The range of the AN-22 aircraft with an airborne cargo load
of ten tons is up to 9600 kilometers, and with a fifty ton load
it is 4350 kilometers. 50X1-HUM
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Airborne shock large units are a fundamentally new means for
carrying out tasks in front and army operations. Their prototype
was an experienced helicopter brigade used in the "Dnepr' maneuvers.
Proposing to name the new large units airborne shock large
units, we are proceeding from the fact that this term reflects the
essence of such formations: their capability to carry out shock
attacks from the air with their own organic weapons during the
entire period of fulfilling tasks. The term "helicopter large
units," characterizing the new large units from the aspect of how
they are equipped, is a less desirable designation. And this is
why. First, in all obability, t -larog-unita w
gqui e _w.L o aircra we Second, this term is already
firmly in as a es i or for air transport units equipped
with helicopters.
In our view it is a great mistake to try to view the new large
units as one of the variants of landing force formations, i.e., to
reduce their activity to the same old plan: the landing force
lands and conducts combat while the aircraft return across the
front line as fast as possible. IMpot q trams
of airborne shock large units also include organic adaptability
to airlifting and the possibility of using organic aircraft for
carrying out combined-arms tasks at all stages of combat use,
including directly on the battlefield.
Airborne shock large units must have numerous special qualities
conducive to the use of completely new methods of operating.
Principal among these qualities are exceptionally high mobility,
independence from terrain conditions, and the capability to alter-
nate between swift air advances and ground actions, to make shock
attacks from the air with organic means during the entire period
of carrying out tasks, to disperse rapidly in order to reduce losses
from enemy strikes, and to concentrate quickly in order to create a
needed advantage.
What is the essence of the new qualities of these large units
and units? 50X1-HUM
First of all, thanks to their high mobility and independence
from terrain conditions, airborne shock large units and units can
be committed to combat as the situation demands. It is they who
are above all capable of assuring the development of rapid advances
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in front and army operations under conditions of great destruction,
fire, barriers, floods, and zones of radioactive contamination.
Such large units have exceptional capabilities for overcoming water
barriers and other natural obstacles of operational importance and
for conducting combat actions in almost inaccessible terrain.
Of particular significance is the capability of troops to
alternate between swift air advances and ground actions and to make
shock attacks from the air with their own organic means during the
entire period of carrying out tasks. This is something totally
new in the realm of tactics and the art of operations. It is like
a response to the development of nuclear weapons and is based on the
actual capabilities of the military aircraft which have been
created. It appears that this is precisely what determines the
prerequisites for bringing the methods of combat actions into con-
formity with the newest weapons of armed combat.
Organic aircraft with powerful onboard weapons of all types
assure the capability for massing fire in a short period of time,
mounting a series of rapid fire strikes from the air against
various targets at considerable distances from one another, and
maintaining uninterrupted fire support for troops regardless of
the terrain conditions and the rapidity with which the situation
may change.
The capability of troops to disperse rapidly and to concentrate
swiftly in conformity with the conditions of nuclear warfare is also
difficult to overestimate. Possessing these qualities, airborne
shock large units and their units can operate effectively on a
broad front and can quickly create superiority where needed.
Even a brief analysis allows us to state most definitely that
the creation of airborne shock large units is the most important
result of taking to the air, conducive not only to a sharp rise in
the mobility of ground forces under the conditions of a future war
but also to an appreciable increase in their fire and strike power.
Fronts and armies will have the means to exploit the results of
nuclear strikes on a timely basis in complicated ground situations,
to achieve high rates of advance, to rapidly overcome enemy defenses,
including nuclear obstacles, and to conduct successful combat actions
in areas with almost inaccessible terrain. 50X1-HUM
We are, of course, far from believing that no complicated
problems will arise in the course of using these large units. On
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the contrary, we must assume that problems will be numerous, for
example, in overcoming enemy antiaircraft counteractions and in
implementing materiel-technical, engineer-aviation, and other types
of support. It appears that many problems will have to be solved
differently than in other combined-arms large units. Even the
position of the new large units within the ground forces may be
somewhat isolated.
The first results of theoretical research and the experience
of the "Dnepr" maneuvers show that airborne shock large units differ
appreciably from all other combined-arms components in such vital
aspects as equipment, organization, and the tactics of operations.
This shows that a completely new type of troops is appearing, with
its own distinctive operational-tactical features and capabilities.
It is capable of carrying out missions which are suited only to
these components and may also be used for fulfilling traditional
tasks under various types of combat actions.
Considering economic and combat factors, it is advisable at
first-to-have airborne shock troops as large units subordinate to
fronts. As the materiel-technical base broadens and is perfected,
rise. It will a units in
armies. The time v-an c m ut Qn yqi 1 hP a te; h1 a rn ve
alrborne shock subunits or units
--included in ground combined-arms
large units as we
However, at the present time, when aircraft in large concen-
trations are the means of the air forces, it is more difficult to
resolve this problem successfully. There must be an organizational
restructuring which takes into account the established methods of
taking to the air, and there must also be further development of
aircraft in accord with specific equipment and with the conditions
under which they are to be used. This is one of the most urgent
scientific-technical problems. At the same time it is extremely
complicated, since the interests of all branches of the armed
forces are affected, above all those of the ground forces and air
forces.
We believe it advisable to resolve this problem with consid-
eration for the interests of these two branches above alsoxl-xuM
It dvantageous, as formerly, that hea
aircraft be inc u
ransport aviation as means of
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t Command. They may be used in support of the
various branches of t e rmed forces to fulfil transport tasks of
various types in line with their importance.
It is desirable even now to introduce helicopters and rotary-
wing aircraft, existing models and those which are being added to
our armaments, and also light aircraft, into all branches of the
armed forces, each in an established proportion. Ground forces
should have the largest supply of such aircraft, which may be
divided organizationally into two groups.
The first group comprises aircraft as an auxiliary means of
assuring troop mobility and raising the firepower of combined-arms
large units and formations, and also as a means of carrying out
tasks in support of combat actions. It is advisable to have
aircraft of this group at organizational levels from districts
(fronts) to combined-arms large units. The main bulk of heavy and
medium helicopters and rotary-wing aircraft should be in front
formations. This assures their massive use and mobility on the
most important axis. Part of the heavy and medium helicopters
(rotary-wing aircraft) must be included in-the air forces for use
as reserves by the Supreme High Command and for the needs of the
air?Lorces themselves. There must also be a few organic aircraft
in combined-arms (tank) armies, mainly to support combat actions
and to perform other auxiliary tasks. They can receive heavy and
medium rotary-wing aircraft from the front. It is advisable to
include units of the same type in combz end-arms large units (corps
and divisions), equipped with light, small military aircraft,
mostly combat helicopters and rotary-wing aircraft.
The second group of aircraft for ground forces is, by its
function, the rinci al means of assuring troop mobility and
carrying out fire and other tasks as part of combined-arms airborne
shock large units which are capable of being airlif15oxl-HUM
For e uigpirborne shock large units, combat rotary-wing
aircraft of at Nast letwo types afecessary in addition to
transport and support aircraft. ove a ffiere must be a combat
helico ter or rotary-wing aircraft serving as an air corm at~ veHiicle
(BVM or as an infantry airlift combat vehicle. As already noted
in the pages of this journal, air combat vehicles are earmarked for
use in subunits as a mobile means of conducting combat, similar to
armored transport or combat infantry vehicles in ground units. A
combat helicopter must be specially designated to serve as a
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military air fire system, or "fire support helicopter" as it is
called abroad. It goes without saying that this must not be a
vehicle of yesterday or copied from an enemy equivalent, but some-
thing more advanced and forward-looking.
Great importance is attached to the creation of a troop air
combat vehicle which will be capable of transporting a combat
detachment and will have reliable defense means and powerful on-
board armament. Such a vehicle is necessitated by the trend in
the development and use of mechanical means of transport and of
conducting combat. As is known, troop organization and combat
methods corresponding to the capabilities of the new types of
armament can only come into being at such time as mechanical means
provide for the transport of troops not only up to the area of
combat action but directly onto the field of battle, i.e., when
they become combat means with a troop function.
Abroad, there are still no military air combat vehicles
capable of providing subunits on the battlefield with the capability
to alternate between rapid movement by air and action on the
ground. In the United States the air-equipped large unit called
an air mobile division still lacks the qualities. necessary for
e e five ci~h n~tclar warfare. Howevew._X judge from
the- lates t. data that in _the West, too, they-are.-approaching the
idea g creating__a _ pop air combat vehicle. Thus, one of the
articles published in the West German magazine Wehrkunde (1967)
states that "ground vehicles cannot provide the necessary increase
in the speed with which troops are moved on the battlefield; the
vehicle capable of doing this is one that can leave the ground."
Troop air combat vehicles can be produced by Soviet industry
in the very near future. As initial models for such vehicles it
is advisable to use light armored helicopters equipped with
powerful onboard armament systems. The combat features of these
helicopters will be perfected, taking into account the conditions
of combined-arms combat.
Troop air fire systems, as indicated above, are earmarked
for supporting airborne shock subunits and carrying out independent
fire tasks. Their entire cargo capacity should be used for the
installation of powerful armament and radioelectronic equipment
and also for increasing the radius of action and overall armor
protection. We note that troop air fire systems are necessary
not only for airborne shock large units. They are more and more
50X1-HUM
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5(1X1 -HT TM
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necessary in ground large units as well, as a means of fire support
for tactical airlifts and as a means of carrying out independent
fire tasks. The point is that the combat helicopter or rotary-
wing aircraft used as an air fire system has greater mobility
than ground systems, greater independence of terrain conditions
in moving about, and greater capability to mount surprise powerful
fire (nuclear) strikes and to move rapidly to a new axis (new
area). This is the basis for considering air fire systems the
most mobile fire means, making possible the rapid creation of high
densities of fire in all combined-arms large units.
Of the various ground forms of armament, airborne shock
large units can use the fire means of airborne landing troops.
They can be transported successfully by medium and even light
helicopters, loaded and unloaded without difficulty, and quickly
brought to combat readiness. /
Of essential importance in raising the effectiveness of the
organization of airborne shock large units are high mobility at
all levels and accuracy in control based on a unity of ~i8~'f-'
standing as to tasks and the responsibility for carrying them out.
To accomplish this, the air combat vehicle must obviously be
incorporated down to the lowest organizational levels, i.e., used
as an organic means of airborne shock detachments. These detach-
ments may include a rifle group and an air combat vehicle crew.
Finally, we would like to remark that it is still too soon to
make definitive conclusions on the equipping and organizational
structure of airborne shock large units. Fundamental innovations
in military affairs are involved, touching objectively on many
aspects of military art, the structuring of the armed forces, and
the national economy. Therefore, the problem must be solved with
careful consideration and without undue haste, combining theoretical
research with experimental exercises. As correctly pointed out by
Minister of Defense of the USSR Marshal A. A. Grechko, a changeover
to a new organizational structure must always be made with great
circumspection and only after careful testing in many exercises in
various situations.
This indicates that to assure timeliness in the solution of
the basic problems, with due consideration for the interests of
the armed forces as a whole, we must create in the large staffs
(directorates) a specialized organ (directorate, department, or
section of aerizatsiya) which will be knowledgeable in this matter
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and will provide continuous leadership in working out and imple-
menting this problem on the basis of well-thought-out plans. This
organ must be guided in its work by a detailed program covering a
minimum of ten to fifteen years. In this way there will be a clear
perspective, and the progression and reliability of the solution
will be assured.
We must emphasize that this does not mean an organ which
would, as in the United States Army, handle only questions of the
use and development of army aviation. The problems of taking to
the air affect the armed forces as a whole and must be solved,
as shown above, on a two-sided basis: by the all-around use of
aircraft and by the reorganization and technical adaptation of
the various branches of the armed forces as needed. Therefore
these air support organs should be staffed with specialists of
various types headed by a representative from the appropriate
branch of the armed forces.
It appears to us that the practical solution of the most
important problems of taking to the air will provide a basis for
completing the current restructuring of the armed forces. There
will be a qualitative change in the materiel basis of war.
On the strength of the pattern stipulated by the dialectics
of the development of means and methods of armed combat, the new
theory of conducting operations must be in conformity wit the
qualitatively new materiel basis of war. The working out of this
theory is yet another major new problem.
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