MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): THE RESTORATION OF TROOP COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS IN A WAR GAME

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP10-00105R000100020001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 13, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 30, 1973
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/13: CIA-RDP10-00105R000100020001-3
Next 2 Page(s) In Document Denied
Iq
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/13: CIA-RDP10-00105R000100020001-3
 50X1-HUM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/13: CIA-RDP10-00105R000100020001-3
Intelligence Information Special Report
COUNTRY USSR
30 March 1973 50X1-HUM
N
MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): The Reduction of Possible Losses
and the Restoration of the Combat
Effectiveness of Troops 50X1-HUM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/13: CIA-RDP10-00105R000100020001-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/13: CIA-RDP10-00105R000100020001-3
The Reduction of Possible Losses and the
Restoration of the Combat Effectiveness of Troops
by General-Leytenant N. Stashek
In a scientific-research game conducted at the Academy
i/n M. V.. Frunze, one of the problems investigated was to find
ways of reducing possible losses and restoring the combat
effectiveness of troops in a front offensive operation under
conditions of massive use of weapons of mass destruction.
The following situation was created in line with this
theme. On the decision of the formation commander, the main
forces of the front were moved out of their permanent loca-
tions (areas of concentration) toward the border in order
to go on the offensive. At this time the "enemy" delivered
a massive nuclear strike, of which more than half consisted
of nuclear surface bursts. Additionally, many centers of
chemical and bacteriological contamination were also created.
The possible troop losses under these conditions were
reckoned according to three variants: among troops which
were moving out to the lines of deployment in order to go on
the offer:.sive; among troops which were still at their per-
manent locations; and among troops which were located in areas
of concentration fortified with rudimentary engineer prepara-
tions.
Calculations showed that, even though they were in columns,
the troops and installations in the rear area sustained heavy
losses while moving out to the lines of deployment in order
to go on the offensive. More than half of the large units of
the front, including rocket troops and aviation, lost 30 to
50 percent of their personnel, equipment, and weapons to
nuclear weapons alone.
The nuclear surface bursts resulted in a severe radiation
situation. Up to 90 percent of the area occupied by front
troops was contaminated. Also, zones of strong and dangerous
radioactive contamination constituted 25 to 60 percent of 50x1-HUM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/13: CIA-RDP10-00105R000100020001-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/13: CIA-RDP10-00105R000100020001-3
the territory. In addition, the troops sustained up to 20
percent losses from chemical weapons. It was calculated that
all units and large units subjected to attack by toxic agents
of the "V" type required immediate special treatment.
Analysis of the results of a massive "enemy" strike
once again reaffirms the conclusion that, if troops begin
to move out to go on the offensive before enemy means of
mass destruction are destroyed or neutralized, they will
sustain massive losses and their capability to fulfil their
assigned tasks will be sharply reduced. Consequently, be-
fore the troops move out to go on the offensive, it is
necessary to take measures to sharply weaken the combat
effectiveness of enemy means of mass destruction. This
can be done only by delivering decisive strikes against
him with nuclear weapons, as a result of which his nuclear
power will be decreased, major troop groupings destroyed,
antiaircraft defense means neutralized and destroyed, and
the control and work of the rear area disorganized.
If, during the first enemy strike, troops are deployed in
permanent locations without being dispersed and protected by
engineer preparations, research has shown that they will sus-
tain even greater losses. In this case the enemy will require
significantly fewer nuclear munitions in order to completely
decimate our troops. The explanation for this is, first,
he may know the location of our units and large units and,
second, it is not uncommon for our divisions to be deployed
in their entirety in one military cantonment no larger than
one to two square kilometers. Needless to say, under such
conditions a large unit may completely lose its combat effec-
tiveness if hit by a single nuclear weapon, even one with low
yield.
Troop losses decrease significantly if units and subunits
are dispersed in areas of concentration fortified with rudimen-
tary engineer preparations- Calculations show that in this case
troop losses are about 20 to 30 percent less than among troops
which are in the process of moving out. If the concentration
area of a division is increased to 900 (sic) square kilometers,
losses will be reduced by a factor of 1.5 to 2. In order
5O+--X1-HUM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/13: CIA-RDP10-00105R000100020001-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/13: CIA-RDP10-00105R000100020001-3
preserve the combat effectiveness of our troops it is there-
fore advisable to deploy them in areas of concentration forti-
fied with rudimentary engineer preparations before the start
of a massive enemy strike. However, it is not always possible
to do this. In the first place, the outbreak of war will not
necessarily be preceded by a threatening period, which means
that the troops will have less than 1.5 to 2 hours in which
to leave, the military cantonments. Second, it is not always
possible to prepare fortified areas of concentration in ad-
vance, i.e., in peacetime. Taking all this into account, in
order to preserve the combat effectiveness of our troops we
must set up, while still in peacetime, engineer preparations
in the maximum number of areas of permanent troop locations.
This would permit rapid occupation of the engineer preparations
should time not permit the movement of troops to an area of
concentration.
If the situation allows, it is advisable to move the
troops to areas of concentration where they must immediately
set to work digging trenches and setting up other rudimentary
engineer preparations. Regarding materiel, particularly
rockets and fuel, they must be dispersed and stored, while
still in peacetime, in reliable reinforced-concrete struc-
tures.
Troops may sustain large losses from radiation, especially
from surface bursts. Figures show that these losses may be
two to fifteen percent during the first two hours. Particu-
larly heavy losses may be sustained by units and subunits being
transported in motor vehicles and open armored personnel
carriers--rocket troops (front mobile rocket-technical base,
front alternate rocket-technical base), troops of command posts
(forward command post of the front, rear area command post of
the front), and troops of special units. Tank large units
and units are not as vulnerable to the effects of radiation.
Analysis of the effects of the first nuclear strike by the
enemy against the troops and installations of the rear area
of the front shows that, on the whole, tank regiments in tank
divisions retain their combat effectiveness even under the
most severe conditions. However, on the whole, the combat
effectiveness of divisions is very dependent on the statu5oxl-HUM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/13: CIA-RDP10-00105R000100020001-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/13: CIA-RDP10-00105R000100020001-3
the special units and of the rear area, which may sustain
significant losses and, in effect, become incapable of ful-
filling their tasks.
A few words now about the methodology used in assessing
the combat effectiveness of troops. The combat effectiveness
of a large unit often depends directly on the percentage of
its losses: if they are under 40 to 50 percent, the large
unit is considered combat effective; if they are greater, it
is not considered combat effective. Research shows, however,
that the percentage of losses is not always the determining
factor in resolving this problem. Thus, for example, in this
game two divisions lost, respectively, 24 and 25 percent of
their personnel from nuclear strikes. It would seem that with
such small losses both of these large units would retain their
combat effectiveness, but a qualitative analysis of the losses
showed that this was not quite so. The command of the divisions
was put out of action, as well as separate rocket battalions
and artillery and tank regiments, after which it was impossible
to claim that the large units retained their combat effective-
ness. From this it is perfectly clear that our methodology
in assessing troop combat effectiveness must be based on a
qualitative analysis of losses and then later expressed in
terms of percentages.
Recently, considerable attention has been devoted in
the press to problems of restoring the combat effectiveness
of troops during an offensive operation involving massive use
of nuclear and chemical weapons.* This is quite unclerstand-
able, since these problems will always occupy the center of
our attention.
It is well known that, whatever the situation of the
troops and installations of the rear area of a front at the
start of a massive enemy nuclear strike, they may sustain
losses. Consequently, the main task of the command of a
front, of armies, and of large units will be to restore
troop combat effectiveness within a short period of time
*Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought,"
No. 1 (77) 1966, No. 3 (82) 1967. 50x1-HUM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/13: CIA-RDP10-00105R000100020001-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/13: CIA-RDP10-00105R000100020001-3 .
and to create conditions for going over to an all-out offen-
sive. However, there may be very many facilities requiring
the restoration of their combat effectiveness.
In our opinion, the efforts of the front command must
be directed first to the restoration of the control organs
of rocket troops and aviation, primarily to the restoration
of communications systems and the operating efficiency of
officers and generals at command posts. The troops them-
selves must participate in the first stage of restoring the
combat effectiveness of combined-arms large units. The elimi-
nation of the aftereffects of enemy nuclear strikes can con-
tinue even after the top priority tasks have been accomplished.
Research shows that if the greater portion of the command
posts and the communications system are put out of action, it
will be a long time (from several hours to several days) before
the command and staff of a front will be able not only to take
measures to carry out assigned tasks, but also to determine the
status of their troops. It is precisely for this reason that
the task of restoring control is of paramount importance.
In the above-mentioned war game the average loss for each
communications center was up to 70 percent of the means of
communication and up to 65 percent of personnel. Losses among
officers and generals at command posts were from 20 to 90
percent.
All possible methods have been investigated for restoring
the control system of a front which has been disrupted in this
manner: the transfer of control to an intact army (division)
command post; the transfer of division control to a front
command post; the designation of a new army field command at
reduced strength, drawing on the forces and means of the front;
the designation of an operations group with means of communi-
cation, drawing from the front field command; the transfer of
troop control of an army to the commander and staff of one of
the divisions; and the transfer of subordination of 'divisions
to adjacent armies.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/13: CIA-RDP10-00105R000100020001-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/13: CIA-RDP10-00105R000100020001-3
Research results revealed that each of these methods
can be applied, depending on the specific conditions of
the command of an army (front).
For example, the transfer of control to an intact com-
mand post will not take much time. All it requires is to
clarify the status of the command posts and to determine
whether they should be restored or whether it is necessary
to transfer control to an intact post. In the latter case
the post will take over troop control, after which it will
be reinforced with means of communications and with officers
(generals); and its functional duties will be clarified. Ex-
cept for just one army, in almost all large units and formations
in which both the command post and the forward command post
were out of action, troop control from the forward command
post of these formations (large units) became possible in
about an hour. At the same time, in order to have stable and
reliable troop control, we consider it necessary to restore
the command post at the same time that control is transferred
to the forward command post. To accomplish this it will be
necessary to reinforce the command post with means of communi-
cation drawn from the second line of communications centers
or from the reserves, and to build up its personnel with
officers from command posts which have been.put out of action.
These measures will require from two to three hours up to a few
days.
More difficult conditions for the restoration of control
may develop if all command posts are put out of action, as
happened during the game to the troops of one army when both
the command post and the forward command post were hit by
nuclear strikes and the rear area command post was subjected
to contamination by bacteriological weapons.
As the situation developed, restoration of control took
place by designating an operations group from the front field
command while the communications center was restored by draw-
ing from a surviving second line center and reserves of the
army means of communication. Calculations showed that this
task can be accomplished in four to six hours if the opera-
tions group is transported by helicopter to the area whex5oxl-HUM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/13: CIA-RDP10-00105R000100020001-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/13: CIA-RDP10-00105R000100020001-3
the army command post is being restored. If the operations
group is transported by vehicles, however, at least ten to
twelve hours will be required.
Troop control of an army may be given to the commander
and staff of one of the divisions. However, research shows
that a division commander's means of communication are not
adequate to guarantee firm and stable control of army troops
operating over a broad area. In this case it is necessary
to strengthen the division command post with appropriate means
of communication and with officers, while also taking measures
for the final restoration of fully functioning command posts
and communications systems in the division and army. At best,
these measures will require seven to nine hours for implementa-
tion.
Experience shows that the rapid restoration of command
posts under the exceptionally complex conditions of modern
nuclear warfare requires that each operational formation
(front, army) and large unit must have, besides a command post
and a rear area command post, an alternate command post fully
equipped with means of communications and at least a limited
number of personnel. In addition, all command posts must have
the necessary transport facilities at their disposal, particu-
larly helicopters, which will allow both personnel and means of
communications to be flown to areas where they are needed.
The data we have obtained and the subsequent conclusions
derived from them are, of course, tentative. They require fur-
ther research and verification in troop exercises and war games.
We will now touch upon an equally important task--that of
the restoration of combat effectiveness of rocket troops. In
order to give a more graphic idea of the status of rocket
troops after the first mass strike by the enemy, we shall use
as an example the war game referred to above.
About thirty-five percent of all batteries were put out.
of action by the first "enemy" nuclear strike. Because of
large personnel losses, over thirty percent of the R-300
missile battalions were on the verge of complete loss of
combat effectiveness. An even worse situation developed5oxl-HUM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/13: CIA-RDP10-00105R000100020001-3
 - ... r..
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/13: CIA-RDP10-00105R000100020001-3
the rocket-technical units: two bases were put completely
out of action, and the effectiveness of the remaining bases
dropped by fifty percent. With the destruction of the rocket
fuel depot, the large units of operational-tactical rockets
were in fact without fuel.
Research has shown that in such situations the first
steps in restoring combat effectiveness of rocket troops
must be: their withdrawal from areas with high radiation
levels to other siting areas; the conduct of rescue work in
areas subjected to enemy nuclear attacks; the reforming of
rocket units; and the restoration of combat effectiveness
of rocket bases and the system for supplying rockets. The
first necessary step is to withdraw rocket units from siting
areas located in zones B and C. It is extremely dangerous
to leave the units in these areas for an extended period of
time since personnel may receive a radiation dosage equal to
fifty roentgens in the course of only one hour.
We calculate that the transfer of battalions to new areas
will require an average of 3.5 to 5 hours; the completion of
reconnaissance, one hour; the movement into new siting areas,
1 to 2 hours; and the deployment and completion of engineer
construction work and the preparation of strikes, 1.5 to 2
hours. As a result of these measures, the combat capabilities
of organic rocket troops increased at about the following rate:
in 2.5 hours the front troops were ready to mount strikes with
10 nuclear and 3 chemical rockets; in 3.5 hours, 17 nuclear
and 7 chemical rockets; and in 5 hours, 20 nuclear and 22
chemical rockets.
For the timely restoration of the combat effectiveness
of rocket troops, they must be assigned subunits of engineer
and chemical troops; and points for special treatment must
be deployed near siting areas of brigades. Such measures
must be provided for in advance. Since-rocket units must
be capable of remaining in contaminated zones for an extended
period of time, their equipment (especially launchers and
special vehicles) must be supplemented with means for reduc-
ing the dosage of radioactive contamination to which personnel
will be exposed. In addition, the rocket large units will
need some kind of organic subunits to perform quard duty, to
construct engineer shelters, and to eliminate aftereffe'5ox1-HUM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/13: CIA-RDP10-00105R000100020001-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/13: CIA-RDP10-00105R000100020001-3
Rockets and rocket fuel must be dispersed, part of it
at depots and part with rocket large units. Rocket fuel de-
pots must be dispersed among sections in various areas.
It is very important to clarify the tasks of rocket
units which were not hit by enemy nuclear weapons, since an
abrupt change in the situation will require the reassignment
of combat tasks among rocket units. It may develop that some
tasks previously assigned to army brigades will have to be
reassigned to the rocket troops or front aviation.
Front aviation may sustain significant losses from enemy
nuclear strikes. In the above-mentioned war game, the air army
had lost up to twenty percent of its total forces after the
first strike. In addition, only about fifteen percent of the
surviving aircraft were able to carry on combat action imme-
diately after the strike. The combat effectiveness of the air
army was restored at approximately the same rate as that of
the front rocket troops.
Research on the questions of restoring the combat effec-
tiveness of combined-arms large units after a massive enemy
strike was conducted, as we have mentioned, primarily for that
period when the units were enroute to the lines of deployment
for transition to the offensive. In this research we proceeded
from the assumption that enemy nuclear forces and his group-
ings of ground troops were also subjected to a massive nuclear
strike, as a result of which they sustained about the same
losses as the troops of the front. This is a crucial movement,
and the question of victory is directly dependent on which of
,the opponents is the first to deliver a decisive strike with
jhis surviving forces. We have calculated that if timely measures
are taken, about thirty percent of the units and large units
of all divisions located in the first echelon of armies will
be able to begin combat action in only three to four hours.
In one instance the offensive may be opened by separate regi-
ments, and in another, by a few divisions. we consider that
under similar conditions the first variant will be feasible
most often. It goes without saying that from the start of
the offensive it will be necessary to mount repeated nuclear
strikes against enemy rocket troops, aviation, and combined-
arms large units. This will allow us to achieve the regt'5ox1-HUM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/13: CIA-RDP10-00105R000100020001-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/13: CIA-RDP10-00105R000100020001-3 ,
superiority of forces and weapons to defeat the enemy with
decisive offensive actions.
Various points of view are presently being expressed on
questions concerning the elimination of the aftereffects of
an enemy nuclear attack. Some consider that this task must
be accomplished by creating organic defense subunits for each
division; others think it must be done by non-organic detach-
ments; and a third group maintains that the job must be done
by those subunits and units which have been subjected to the
attack.
Research findings have shown that organic defense bat-
talions created in divisions are capable of working in two
contamination centers. at the same time, while organic defense
companies in regiments can work in one. Thus, in each divi-
sion organized in this manner, this work can be carried out
simultaneously in six contamination centers.
Non-organic detachments have somewhat lesser capabilities.
They do not have enough medical and engineer subunits to carry
out special work, nor do they have reconnaissance means. In a
division, one non-organic detachment for eliminating after-
effects can most often work in only one center, and that where
the nuclear burst is of low yield.
It is possible to assign motorized rifle subunits to
the detachments which eliminate aftereffects. If five or
six contamination centers develop in the zone of a division,
it can allot part of its subunits for the elimination of
aftereffects of nuclear strikes and still continue to fulfil
its assigned task. However, to create non-organic detachments
in a division it is necessary to call in at least five sec-
tions each of engineer, chemical, and radiation reconnaissance,
ten armored recovery vehicles, five bulldozers, five sections
for tracked vehicle repair, and seven medical groups. As a
result, the division may lack the necessary forces and means
to build roads for the advancing units and to give them medi-
cal assistance. From this one can conclude that it is diffi-
cult to rely to any great extent on eliminating aftereffects
with one's own forces unless the organic structure is altered
to allow an increase in special subunits. 5OX1-HUM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/13: CIA-RDP10-00105R000100020001-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/13: CIA-RDP10-00105R000100020001-3
The volume and nature of work in centers of contamination
require still more research on the subject. It seems to us
that in units and large units of the first echelon the volume
of work in evacuating inoperative and damaged equipment should
be sharply reduced. The reason for this is that the radius of
destruction for tank crews and gun teams will exceed the radius
of destruction for combat equipment. Therefore, much service-
able equipment may remain in the centers of attack, while the
crews may have been put out of action. Quite frequently it may
not be possible to use even the serviceable equipment. The
question of evacuation and repair of damaged equipment must
obviously be solved at the level of the army and front by
specialized evacuation and repair subunits. In units and large
units of the first echelon, however, we must consider the basic
task of eliminating aftereffects of a nuclear attack to consist
of aid for casualties and special treatment for personnel.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/13: CIA-RDP10-00105R000100020001-3