INDIA IN THE MID-1980S: GOALS AND CHALLENGES

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• Publication Date: January 14, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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India in the Mid-1980s:
Goals and Challenges
C
S ' - -
R.sTURN THIS MATERIAL TO
k :I: rG:LD r7^,TC S DIVISION
TO IIGIT .AT, t DATE
C/T
Secret
NIE 31-83
14 Janua~ ~ 3
Copy 4
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Warning Notice
Sensitive Intelligence Sources-'and Methods 'Involved
(WNINTEL)
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
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NOFORN 25X1
NIE 31-83
INDIA IN THE MID-1980S:
GOALS AND CHALLENGES
Information available as of 5 January 1983 was
used in the preparation of this Estimate.
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THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE.
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS,
EXCEPT AS NOTED IN THE TEXT.
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the
Estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security
Agency, and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and
the Treasury.
Also Participating:
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps
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CONTENTS
Page
SCOPE NOTE .................... ........................ ............ ......................................................
1
KEY JUDGMENTS ...............................................................................:.................... 1
DISCUSSION ......................................................:....................................................... 3
Domestic Politics ........................................................................................... 3
Gandhi's Present Political Position ........................................................... 3
Gandhi's Political Problems ..................................................................... 5
Political Prospects ........................:............................................................ 6
Succession Possibilities .............................................................................. 6
The Economy: Clouded Prospects Despite Liberalized Policies ............... 7
Economic Policies-New and Old Cures ............................................... 8
Constraints on Economic Growth ............................................................ 9
International Payments-A Key Problem for the Mid-1980s ............... 10
Foreign Policy ......................:................................... ............................... 11
Search for Greater Foreign Policy Flexibility ....................................... 11
Relations With the Great Powers ............................................................ 11
Regional Concerns .................................................................................... 14
Nonalignment and Third World Issues ................................................... 15
The Military .................................................................................................: 15
Force Objectives ....................................................................................... 15
Paramilitary .............................................................................................. 21
Sources of. Military Imports..: ...................... : ........................................... 21
Cost of Military Program .....................................................:.................... 21
Perceived Military Threats ....................................................................... -21
Nuclear Program .......................................................................................... 23
Present Capabilities .................................................................................. 23
Indian Views on Testing ..................:.......................................................: 23
Prospects of Military Program .................................................................. 25
Implications for the United States ............................................................... 25
Annex D: Party Positions in, Lok Sabha .................................................................... D-1
iii
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SCOPE NOTE
This National Intelligence. Estimate addresses Indian efforts to
speedup economic growth and to enhance its regional and international
status, and investigates challenges that New Delhi might encounter in
achieving these goals over the next three to five years. It also focuses on
how trends in Indian policy might impact on US interests.
KEY JUDGMENTS
Prime Minister Indira Gandhi is cautiously reassessing longstanding
Indian policies in an effort to promote faster economic growth and to
enhance India's regional and international status. She has marginally
reduced the bureaucratic stranglehold over business and now selectively
welcomes sophisticated Western technology. She has also moved to
expand India's ties with the West and to reduce somewhat the
imbalance in India's relations with the superpowers. These initiatives do
not presage a fundamental alteration in New Delhi's nonaligned foreign
policy.
Over the next three to five years, Gandhi may encounter a number
of external and.internal factors which could slow or even reverse the di-
rection of some policies.
- Military confrontation with Pakistan is unlikely over the next
year but cannot be entirely ruled out within-the time frame of
this Estimate. As Pakistan's nuclear weapons program develops,
India will become increasingly concerned and its response'
could include initiation of a nuclear weapons program (to
include testing)
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- India has only an even chance of avoiding a shortage of foreign
exchange in the mid-1980s that is severe enough to force
Gandhi to curb her economic liberalization and development
efforts. Successful oil exploration efforts or sustained good
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weather and improved world markets, however, would ease
international payment problems and provide India with another
chance to exploit its potential for faster growth.
- Domestic tensions arising from competing demands for govern-
ment action are certain to continue and could even grow more
severe. This instability will not threaten the political system
itself, but a major escalation in civil disorder could make
Gandhi more cautious in taking policy risks.
Gandhi's distrust of the United States will diminish if India can
avoid a confrontation with Pakistan and a severe economic downturn.
She would then have less need for the support of the USSR and could
continue her cautious efforts to expand commercial, technological, and
military supply links with the West. An improvement in India's
relations with Pakistan and China would give a major boost to US
interests in the region. It would lessen India's felt need for a Soviet
counterbalance to the threats it presently perceives from Pakistan and
China.
Moscow will, however, retain a key role in Indian foreign policy
and Gandhi will avoid taking any action that will cause an open breach
in Indo-Soviet relations. As insurance against the possibility of external
threats and to retain India's dominant position in South Asia, Gandhi
will continue to emphasize the modernization of the Indian Armed
Forces and to preserve the option of developing nuclear weapons.
Gandhi's hold on power remains relatively firm now, but she faces
growing political problems arising from factionalism within state units
of her Congress (I) Party and from the spread of civil disorder.
Nonetheless, she should retain sufficient support to form the govern-
ment after the general elections scheduled in 1985, though the Congress
(I) is not likely to match the two-thirds parliamentary domination it now
has. A slim majority or a coalition government would make Gandhi
hesitant about pursuing policies that would arouse severe -criticism
among large segments of the population--a major expansion of her
liberalization program, border agreements with China and Pakistan. In
the event of her death, a weakened central government is likely to
emerge and it would face similar policy constraints. In neither case,
however, would there be a fundamental reorientation of Indian domes-
tic or international policy.
.2
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DISCUSSION
1. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's grip on the levers
of power is now relatively secure. Her Congress (I)-(I)
for Indira-Party has a solid parliamentary majority; no
one within the ruling party is willing to challenge her
leadership; and the national election is two years away.
2. The opposition parties, who together won more
votes than the Congress (I) in the 1980 elections, have
not succeeded in mounting a united challenge at the
national level to the Congress (I) during the past three
years. The successor parties of the unwieldy Janata
coalition which held power in 1977-79 are still divided
by the leadership conflicts that split the party in 1979
and drove it from power. They have also failed to
make a significant electoral impact outside their limit-
ed regional power bases. The two Communist parties,
while cooperating on a selective basis, are still far from
reunion and have also failed to expand beyond region-
al pockets of strength. Broader opposition cooperation
is limited by the deep ideological divisions that sepa-
rate the Communists from most other parties.
Table 1
Results of India's 1980 Parliamentary Election a
Candidates
Elected
Percentage of Seats
in Parliament
Percentage of
Popular Vote
Congress (I)
491
352
66.79
42.68
Congress (U)
212
12
2.47
5.29
Janata Party
431
31
5.88
18.93
Janata Party (S)
293
41
7.78
9.42
Communist Party of India
48
11
2.09
2.59
Communist Party of India (Marxist)
63
36
6.83
6.16
Others
3,082
43
8.16
14.93
Totals
4,620
527
100
100
a See annex D for present parliamentary status.
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Figure 1
India and Its Subcontinent Neighbors
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4
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Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
Port Blom
Nicobar
FS-- NICOBAR
? ISLANDS
(India)
0
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3. Factionalism. The major political challenges
confronting Gandhi arise from her own moves to
achieve strong centralized control over the Congress (I)
Party. To eliminate the chances of an internal party
attack on her position, she has moved systematically to
undermine party institutions. As a result, she now lacks
an organization that can effectively transmit informa-
tion about local problems to the central leadership,
enforce discipline, and mobilize support during elec-
toral campaigns.
4. Continued popular support for Gandhi's leader-
ship, at least at the level achieved in the 1980
elections, will depend on her ability to convey an
impression of competent administration. Rampant fac-
tional infighting and corruption within state units of
her party, however, are undermining public confi-
dence in her ability to administer the government.
There is a growing popular impression that Congress
(I) politicians are venal figures more concerned with
f office and maintaining power at any
governing.
5. Factionalism has already cost Gandhi politically.
Factionalism was a major cause for the Congress (I)
Party's lackluster performance in four states (Haryana,
Himachal Pradesh, West Bengal, and Kerala) that
elected legislative assemblies in mid-1982. Many offi-
cial candidates, particularly in Haryana and Himachal
Pradesh, were successfully sabotaged by rival factions.
The Congress (I) could form governments in Haryana
and Himachal Pradesh only by luring back party
rebels with promises of ministerial posts and patron-
age. The precedent dealt a further blow to party
discipline since factional leaders perceived that they
could bargain with state and central leaders from a
position of strength by hinting at leaving the party or
even by leaving it. Factional infighting was also a
contributing factor to the defeat of the Congress (I) in
the 5 January 1983 state assembly elections in the two
large southern states of Andhra Pradesh and Karnata-
ka. The loss of these two traditional Congress bastions
has further weakened Gandhi's power to manipulate
party factions.
6. Civil Disorders and Government Response.
Over the next three to five years, the growing inci-
dence of civil disorder is likely to place greater strains
on the administration in New Delhi. The government
is increasingly hard pressed to come up with accept-
able trade-offs among competitive groups seeking
government action. The failure to manage such trade-
offs often results in violence and a loss of political
support to the party in power at the center. In rural
India, traditional social linkages are breaking down
under the impact of new wage labor relationships
between the owners of land and those whom they hire.
As a result, untouchables and other groups at the lower
end of the Hindu social hierarchy are demanding the
legal enforcement of minimum wages and tenancy
rights, and respect. In urban areas, an emerging
Muslim middle class seeking access to political power
has heightened longstanding Hindu-Muslim commu-
nal tensions. Nativist "sons of the soil" movements
want to reduce the competition for jobs, for access to
educational institutions, and for political power by
limiting the opportunities of "outsiders."
7. The performance and public image of state and
local police have gradually eroded over. the past
several years, and responsibility for internal security
has increasingly shifted to centrally controlled para-
military forces. The army has occasionally had to
intervene as a last resort to restore order. The use of
centrally directed security units rather than state
police reinforces the growing trend in India toward
crisis resolution at the national rather than the state
level. The visible role of Gandhi's government and its
security forces in resolving civil conflicts has tended to
focus criticism on her, at some political cost.
8. On balance, we do not believe that the rising
incidence of civil disorder will lead to a level of
instability that would threaten the political system
itself over the period of this Estimate. New Delhi's
direct involvement in quelling violence has proved
effective despite the acknowledged political costs.
Moreover, the stability of the Indian political system is
reinforced by the complexity of Indian society. The
wide variations among the different regions tend to
compartmentalize a crisis. Seldom has an agitation in
one region generated backing in another. The autono-
my demand by the Sikh religious community in
Punjab, for example, is virtually without support
elsewhere in the country. In addition, dissatisfied
groups in the different areas seldom coordinate their
activities. The government usually has the resources to
manage the individual crises as they present them-
selves.
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9. Gandhi is not likely in our view to impose a
national emergency as she did in 1975 when she
believed that civil disorder was threatening the politi-
cal system. Her use of it then resulted in a political
.disaster. The opposition coalesced and overwhelmed
her in the 1977 elections. Since returning to power,
Gandhi has put together a legal package that gives the
government the tools to handle widespread disorder
without resorting to a measure as drastic as a national
emergency.
Political Prospects.
10. Gandhi will probably form the government
after the national election scheduled in 1985. She is
the only leader of a political party able to mobilize
substantial support in all parts of the country. She is
also a master at using the powers of office to keep the
opposition off balance. . The Congress (I), however,
will probably not match its present two-thirds parlia-
mentary majority. Indians tend to vote against bad
government, and many will hold Gandhi responsible
for the poor government, or at least the impression of
incompetent leadership, in the states. Muslims and
Hindu untouchables, two disadvantaged groups that
have traditionally formed the core of Gandhi's support
in northern India, may provide somewhat fewer votes
for the Congress (I) as a result of dissatisfaction with
government efforts to protect them from violence.
11. Several other factors would substantially reduce
the margin of Gandhi's parliamentary victory. The
poor showing in the January 1983 state elections. in
Andhra Pradesh. and Karnataka, two traditional Con-
gress bastions, have undermined her credibility as a
votegetter. She will be perceived as more vulnerable to
pressure tactics by Congress (I) factional leaders seek-
ing to force her hand in local disputes. Miscalculations
on the part of either Gandhi or the factional leaders
could lead to a disintegration of the Congress (I) in
some states. The opposition parties, more confident of
making gains in the, 1985 national election, have a
greater incentive to cooperate against Gandhi. Severe
economic problems and increasing civil disorder in the
interim after the 1983 state elections might even
reduce the Congress (I) to a plurality. In that event, we
believe that Gandhi. would be able to establish a
coalition government by luring over to her side a
number of independents and regional parties through
promises of patronage and concessions to the states: A
slim Congress (I) parliamentary majority or a coalition
government would make Gandhi reluctant to act on
issues which arouse severe criticism among large seg-
ments of the population-a major expansion of her
present efforts to loosen bureaucratic controls over the
economy, or border agreements with Pakistan and
China.
12. Gandhi's death would precipitate a crisis in the
Congress (I) Party, particularly if it occurred before
the national election. No other party figure possesses
either her national stature or her ability to manipulate
the party factions. Gandhi has not permitted any such
figure to emerge. Even her son Rajiv Gandhi, whom
she is grooming to succeed her, has failed to excite
either the party or the public. But the party legislators
will nonetheless rally around an interim successor to
Gandhi while the various party factions work out a
balance of power among themselves. The bargaining
will probably include politicians who once belonged to
the Congress Party.
13. There is little likelihood that anemone old
emerge from the bargaining process with the power
Gandhi now possesses. If the politicians can work out
an acceptable balance of power among themselves, the
trend would be toward a stronger party structure in
which state units are more coherent and assertive. If
they cannot, a prolonged period of political uncertain-
ty at the center would force the politicians to rely
increasingly on the advice of the civil service and the
military to maintain order. A military, seizure of power
is highly unlikely. The officer corps, reflecting the
same complexity as the larger Indian society and
divided into jealous services, would find it extremely
difficult to agree among themselves on an act as
momentous as the seizure of political power. A funda-
mental alteration of the country's political institutions
is also unlikely. Important elite groups, including the
military, are committed to the democratic system
which has protected their interests since India's inde-
pendence in 1947. Groups at the lower end of the
social ladder are also learning to manipulate the
political system to their advantage.
14. If Gandhi voluntarily stepped down, she would
probably turn over the prime-ministership to Rajiv.
She would wait until after the next general election
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and would retire only if the Congress (I) did well
enough in the forthcoming general election to ensure
political stability.- She might then try to secure Rajiv's
succession by assuming the presidency when the post
becomes vacant in 1987.
15. In the -event of Gandhi's sudden death, Rajiv
Gandhi, working closely with President Zail Singh,
would be one of the major figures involved in the
selection of a successor. His own chances of being
elevated to the office right now are uncertain, in part
because of his political immaturity and because of his
still junior status. Rajiv's prospects would probably
improve the longer Indira Gandhi remained in office.
However, even if he were to become prime minister,
his hold on the reins of power could be short lived
unless he unexpectedly emerges as a superb political
strategist like his mother or develops a party organiza-
tion. Other possible candidates which party factional
leaders might consider are such cabinet-level states-
men-politicians as Defense Minister R. Venkataraman,
Foreign Minister P. V. Narasimha Rao, Finance Minis=
ter Pranab Mukherjee, and Industry Minister Narain
Dutt Tiwari. '
The Economy:. Clouded Prospects
Despite Liberalized Policies
16. Indians are reexamining the government's role
in the economy. Sluggish growth and continuing pov-
erty have gradually eroded confidence in vaguely
socialist policies. Although Gandhi has no comprehen-
sive plan for reform of the Indian economy, she is
enthusiastic about Western technology and is now
willing to see what the private sector can accomplish
under relaxed controls. If the weather is satisfactory,
more petroleum is found, and supplies of electricity
and transportation improve, Gandhi would be able to
expand her liberalization program and avoid foreign
exchange shortages which now loom as a major prob-
lem for India in the mid-1980s. We estimate that the
chances are about even that. India will be lucky.
Economic Trends
India's economy has grown only 3.6 percent a year
since 1950-typical of poor countries, though slower
than China-but enough to permit visible gains in the
Figure 2
India: Per Capita State Position
Income a
Rupees
Punjab
Haryana
Maharashtra
Gujarat
Karnataka
West Bengal
Kerela
Tamil Nadu
Andhra Pradesh
Orissa
Assam
Rajasthan
Madhya Pradesh
Uttar Pradesh
Bihar
Foodgrain Production b
Kilograms 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800
Punjab
Haryana
Maharashtra
Gujarat
Karnataka
West Bengal
Kerela
Tamil Nadu
Andhra Pradesh
Orissa
Assam
Rajasthan
Madhya Pradesh
Uttar Pradesh
Bihar
7L
E
Rupees
Punjab
Haryana
Maharashtra
Gujarat
Karnataka
West Bengal
Kerela
Tamil Nadu
Andhra Pradesh
Orissa
Assam
Rajasthan'
Madhya Pradesh
Uttar Pradesh
Bihar
200
i
L
a Rupees per year. Average for 1973-74 through 1975-76
b Kilograms per year. Average for 1979-80 through 1981-82.
cValue added in 1978-79, in rupees. Includes electricity; excludes household
production.
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countryside as well as in cities. Agricultural output has
grown slightly faster than the population-a significant
achievement that has reduced the fear of national
famine and permitted New Delhi to avoid foodgrain
imports when the weather is normal or better., Indian
industry is now capable of producing all but the most
technically advanced goods and ranks among the top
25 manufacturing nations. Life expectancy and literacy
have also improved, albeit slowly.
India, nevertheless, remains one of the poorer.coun-
tries in the world, with a per capita income of about
$205 last year. A third of the growing population still
cannot afford an adequate diet. The burden of slow
growth falls on marginal farmers or landless rural
workers who are often also low caste or tribal. Regional
'disparities probably increased during the 1970s. Agri-
cultural gains stimulated the growth of industry in
already prosperous states, while poor states have been
unable to parlay sometimes massive central govern-
ment investment in resource-based industries into eco-
nomic diversification and self-sustaining expansion.
Urbanization has accelerated, especially in poor states,
but remains slower than in most developing countries,
and three out of four Indians still live in rural areas.
18. Gandhi's efforts to increase production are also
evident in more traditional policies of government
investment and import substitution. Her close interest
has spurred improved management of some public
enterprises. She has continued support for agriculture
through price-support programs and investment in
irrigation. New Delhi is proceeding with massive
expansion plans for electricity-generating capacity,
and is counting on petroleum exploration efforts to
increase India's own crude oil production and reduce
import costs.
19. India has sought increased support from inter-
national financial institutions. Despite initial US reser-
vations, New Delhi obtained a $5.7 billion Extended
Fund Facility loan from the International Monetary
Fund in November 1981. Indian officials solicit Euro-
pean support for Indian borrowing from the World
Bank; they resent reduced US contributions to the
International Development Association, efforts to re-
duce India's share of concessional loans, and opposi-
tion to loans for some energy projects. India has not
previously borrowed from the Asian Development
Bank. It hopes to obtain $2 billion in project loans over
a five-year period beginning in 1983, but may not be
able to do so.
Economic Policies-New and Old Cures
17. A multitude of minor policy changes since
Gandhi returned to office in 1980 have eased the
stranglehold of bureaucratic controls and provided a
more favorable climate for private investment. She
has:
- Reduced legal impediments to the growth of
production and investment, especially for export
industries.
- Simplified import licensing procedures, especial-
ly those that impede exports, and recently has
begun to tolerate very limited import competi-
tion for_ domestic manufacturers.
- Encouraged technical cooperation with Western
business and offered a slightly greater welcome
to equity investment.
- Increased.use of foreign commercial loans.
Changes so far have been very cautious and the
basic regulatory structure remains in place. Gandhi
regards much of her liberalization program as an
experiment-worth an extended trial but to be aba
doned if output and exports fail to increase.
Figure 3
India: Selected Capital Receipts'
a Excludes short-term capital, suppliers credits, USSR military aid, and
foreign investment. IMF receipts include SDR allocations and Trust
Fund loans.
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Constraints on Economic Growth
20. India remains highly vulnerable to adverse de-
velopments beyond the control of economic policy.
Despite increased irrigation, agricultural production
still depends heavily on summer monsoon rains. India
has not yet adjusted to the burden of higher import
costs following the 1979/80 increases in international
petroleum prices, and recession in developed countries
now restricts Indian exports. Indian officials fear that a
reduction in foreign aid commitments-large in abso-
lute terms, but low per capita-will force New Delhi
to change its economic policies. Disbursements from
existing aid commitments will remain high for several
years.
21. Economic progress is accompanied by increas-
ing interdependence among regions and sectors, which
creates new vulnerabilities. Political agitation in the
northeastern state of Assam, for example, disrupted
national supplies of petroleum and fertilizer in 1980,
and a 12=month-old strike in Bombay textile mills is
contributing to a recession in industries in other states.
Interrelated shortages of electricity, 'coal, and rail
services crippled industrial production and exports in
1980 and remain serious problems. Agricultural gains
are increasingly vulnerable to shortages of energy,
transportation, and fertilizer, while industries suffer
when farmers receive priority allocation of electricity.
22. Industrial output has not responded in propor-
tion to the increase in investment. Developed behind a
wall of protection and impeded by bureaucratic con-
trols, many businesses are inefficient. Many public-
sector industries are plagued by overstaffing and
management reluctance to make decisions. The lead-
ership of India's large family-dominated industrial
conglomerates is becoming increasingly professional,
but a third of - all manufacturing is still' produced
outside of factories.
23. These continuing problems limit the potential
benefits from Gandhi's policy changes. India will
continue to make plodding progress over the long
term, but is still unable to achieve a vigorous economic
growth and will continue to experience periodic set-
backs. Overall output will probably stagnate this year
as a result of drought and labor disputes.' International
financial reserves are decreasing.
? Some Indian officials estimate overall growth this year at 3
percent, based on zero growth in agriculture.
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Figure 4
India: Annual Growth Rates
-15 1973-74 75-76 77-78 79-80 81-82
-5
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International Payments-A Key Problem for the Figure 5
Mid-1980s India
24. India has only a barely even chance of avoiding
a shortage of foreign exchange after late 1985 or early
1986 that is severe enough to force Gandhi to modify
economic policies:
Disbursement of the Extended Fund Facility
from the International Monetary Fund, which
provides more than $2 billion this year, will have
been completed by then. Instead, India is obligat-
ed to repay the IMF more than '$750 million in
1985/86 and almost $1 billion in 1986/87. Debt
service payments on concessional aid, World
Bank loans, and commercial borrowing are also
mounting.
- Prospects for the mid-1980s are now less promis-
ing than they seemed only a year ago. New Delhi
has not yet been able to confirm the commercial
viability of preliminary discoveries of new crude
oil deposits. India is drawing down its foreign
exchange reserves to pay for grain imports fol-
lowing poor weather this summer, while export
growth has been slower than anticipated. Some
commercial bankers are increasingly reluctant to
lend to India unless they can also profit from
credit programs subsidized by European govern-
ments.
- Major uncertainties include future crop pros-
pects, the stability of remittances from Indian
workers in the Middle East, demand in devel-
oped countries, and India's own ability to mini-
mize power and transport shortages or domestic
agitations that constrain production of export
goods.
25. Gandhi cannot be confident of receiving more
Western aid-with the possible exception of food
aid-to help alleviate foreign exchange shortages. She
may feel forced to slow the pace of her liberalization
program and delay expensive petroleum development
projects. The United States could easily be the scape-
goat for the resulting economic downturn-some Indi-
an officials would blame the troubles on lack of US
support for Indian borrowing from multilateral lend-
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Total
Imports'
I
1973-74 75-76 77-78 79-80 81-82c b
Total
Reserves(
IM F
Credit
1973-74 75-76 77-78 79-80 81-82
a Domestic crude production and imports of crude and products.
b Projected.
cC.i.f., excluding military imports and merchant ships.
d Including imports by private charities that are not available for
government distributors.
e Estimated.
(End of quarter, excluding gold.
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ing institutions, and left and right opposition parties
would blame Gandhi (inaccurately) for abandoning
self-reliance at the behest of the United States.
26. Payment for military imports will increase In-
dia's financial burden in the mid-1980s despite gener-
ous credit terms offered by the Soviet Union and
concessions wrung from Western suppliers. Payments
and debt service to Moscow could become especially
onerous; Indian officials are already considering plans
to cope by purchasing hard currency goods for deliv-
ery to the USSR or by developing aircraft industries to
cater to the Soviets or their clients. Military authorities
are apparently confident of receiving adequate funds
for modernization programs, but we believe there is a
moderate chance that the economic policy adjust-
ments Gandhi is willing to make would be unable to
cope with the dual burden of commercial and military
imports. New Delhi may have to approach the USSR
for additional aid or, appeal to Western donors for debt
relief.
India's Annual Payments for Military Imports
(By Supplier, Million US Dollars)
USSR a
Other
Total
1970s
Less than 250
20-95
270-345
Current
200-420
200
400-620
Mid-1980s
500-1,100
400-500
900-1,600
a Accounts with the Soviet Union are maintained in rupees and
both countries have agreed to balance bilateral payments. India pays
for military. and commercial imports from the Soviet Union by
exporting goods, some of which have few alternative markets. The
Soviet Union is probably willing to import more Indian products.
But in the future, India increasingly will have to offer goods that
otherwise could have been sold in hard currency markets.
27. A more optimistic scenario is possible. A series
of good monsoons would improve India's agricultural
position substantially and give a strong stimulus to the
domestic economy. Additionally, major oil discoveries
and improved world markets would relieve pressure
on India's balance of payments and permit Gandhi to
continue her domestic liberalization efforts. The cur-
rent IMF-supported program could then, as intended,
produce substantially improved'
competitiveness of
Indian products on the world market. The economy
would have another chance to exploit its potential for
much faster growth. Internal political strains from
competition for government-allocated resources could
be managed more easily. Gandhi would continue to
view the United States as an unreliable economic
partner, but resentment of US policies toward multi-
lateral lending institutions would have a diminished
impact on bilateral political relations.
Foreign Policy
Search for Greater Foreign Policy Flexibility
28. Gandhi bristles at charges that India is, pro-
Soviet. In response to international criticism and in an
effort to improve Indian security, she has attempted to
expand India's ties with the West and to reduce
somewhat the imbalance in New Delhi's relations with
the superpowers. The pace of change, however, will be
guided by India's desire to avoid an open breach in
Indo-Soviet relations and by New Delhi's concerns
about the threat posed by US military assistance to
Pakistan. .
29. Barring a renewed conflict between India and
Pakistan, we expect the trend toward greater foreign
policy flexibility to continue. A more balanced foreign
policy is widely supported in India. . Even Indian
leftists value Western technology, and the rightists
recognize the value of good Indo-Soviet relations.
Economic stringencies, however, would limit India's
ability to finance increased imports from the West,
and political instability might also make a government
more cautious in risking policy changes.
Relations With the Great Powers
30. The USSR. We believe Moscow will retain a
central place in New Delhi's foreign policy strategy
for the foreseeable future. The value to India of many
of the benefits gained through friendship with the
Soviet Union is not likely to diminish. India's preoccu-
pation with the potential security threat from Paki-
stan, New Delhi's perception of the Soviets as reliable
arms suppliers, and the uncertainty about alternative
trade opportunities provide strong incentives to con-
tinued close ties. A core of shared interests is likely to
endure as the continuing basis of the relationship
regardless of the changing atmospherics of the
relations.
31. Gandhi's efforts to acquire greater foreign poli-
cy flexibility nevertheless have contributed to strains
in Indo-Soviet relations. We believe Moscow is appre-
hensive about the thaw in Indo-US relations, the
modest diversification in India's arms acquisitions
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policy, New Delhi's increasing ties with Western
Europe, and Gandhi's moves to normalize relations
with Islamabad and Beijing. The Soviets have become
increasingly critical of New Delhi's failure to be more
supportive of Moscow's positions in international fo-
rums. For her part, Gandhi is dissatisfied with Mos-
cow's refusal to consider Indian views on Afghanistan,
and she has become increasingly irritated with Mos-
cow's covert support of the Indian Communist parties,
and with its failure to muzzle the Indian Communists'
criticism of her. The present critical stance of the pro-
Soviet Communist Party of India toward Gandhi is in
marked contrast to its support of her during her first
term in office (1966-77).
32. Despite the strains in Indo-Soviet relations, Mos-
cow continues to commit substantial resources in order
to advance. its interests in the region. New Delhi and
Moscow share interests in minimizing Chinese influ-
ence in South Asia, and in opposing cooperation
among China, Pakistan, and the United States. Friend-
ship with India provides the Soviets with entree and
legitimacy in the Third World, especially important
now that Gandhi is about to assume the presidency of
the Nonaligned Movement (NAM), and a platform
from which to voice Soviet criticism of US policies,
particularly on the Indian Ocean. The USSR sends
numerous high-level delegations to India, is increasing
military support, and conducts an extensive propagan-
da campaign designed to strengthen public support in
India for Indo-Soviet friendship.
33. The large Soviet investment in active measures
designed to influence Indian society and politics has
paid relatively meager dividends. Indian. social and
cultural institutions and Hindu religious traditions
have proved a barrier to the spread of both Commu-
nist influence and other left-of-center ideologies. The
relatively high rating the USSR receives in public
opinion polls is due to the popular perception of the
Soviet Union as a reliable friend and not support for
Communism as such. Indian Communists have limited
national influence and the strongest Indian Commu-
nist party is independent of Moscow. The Commu-
nists, divided into a number of competing parties,
have not been able to expand beyond regional pockets.
Gandhi and most other national leaders consider Com-
munism an alien philosophy. At the moment, there are
no known Communist sympathizers in the policymak-
ing level of her government, her circle of personal
advisers, or in the top echelons of the military. We do
not anticipate any significant change in this situation
within the time frame of this Estimate.
34. The United States. Gandhi will try to keep
relations with the United States from deteriorating,
and would like Indo-US relations to improve some-
what. She values trade, aid, and technology links with
the United States. Indian policymakers resent US
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opportunity for reestablishing Indo-US military ties
has improved, we believe Gandhi is likely to proceed
slowly in concluding new arms contracts with the
United States. In discussions on weapons contracts,
Indian officers have shown their dislike for Foreign
Military Sales (FMS) restrictions. In addition, India
generally requires that contracts for the purchase of
new weapons contain a provision to produce them
under license, an option more easily obtained from
West European producers than from the United
States.
37. Gandhi's long memory of frictions in trade and
aid relations with the United States reinforces her view
of Washington as unreliable. New disputes will
strengthen that suspicion. Indian efforts to import
computer technology, for example, are increasingly
running up against US export control restrictions that
are intended to prevent diversions to the Soviet Union.
38. Western Europe. Gandhi is likely to try to
broaden the ties she has developed with Western
Europe. These links provide India with an alternative
to dependence on or close identification with either
superpower. Her numerous meetings with European
leaders have both offered an opportunity to escape
from the choice between conflicting superpower posi-
tions and elicited a modest degree of support for
Indian goals. New Delhi has achieved more diversifi-
cation in its arms supplies by concluding contracts
with the West Germans for submarines and with the
French for Mirage 2000 fighters, as well as some other,
smaller contracts. Economic links with West European
countries and Japan provide the Indians with the
advanced technology they are now seeking. Although
Western Europe's share of India's foreign trade has
fallen somewhat, it still accounts for more than a
fourth of India's exports and imports. As a group, these
countries now provide over 30 percent of India's
concessional aid receipts. Because individual country
contributions are relatively low, West European do-
nors are seldom accused of using aid to influence
Indian policy. Other financial links have increased
because several major European countries are trying to
revive their own industries by offering India quasi-
commercial credits and associated Eurocurrency loans.
39. China. India's diplomatic dialogue with China
will remain an important element in Gandhi's attempt
to gain greater flexibility, but we do not expect a
major breakthrough in Sino-Indian relations over the
policies toward international financial institutions, but
a circle of Gandhi's closest advisers favor a continued
dialogue with Washington. High-level discussions with
Washington enhance India's status as a nonaligned
leader. Purchase of selected US military equipment
would contribute to Indian efforts to diversify their
sources of arms. Better relations with Washington are
also a signal to Moscow of India's independence of
action.
35. US security assistance to Pakistan will remain
the major irritant in Indo-US relations. New Delhi
fears that Islamabad ultimately will use the weapons-it
acquires against India. The Indians argue that the
number and sophistication of the weapons in the US
package far exceed Pakistan's legitimate defense re-
quirements and that US assistance will only speed up
the arms race in the region.
36. We believe Gandhi will continue to avoid con-
frontation in her approach to the United States, but
New Delhi's doubts about US intentions in the region
and about US reliability virtually exclude the possibili-
ty of significant Indian concessions to US views or
sharp increases in military ties. On issues such as
Afghanistan, Kampuchea, or Poland, we believe Gan-
dhi is unlikely to risk serious strains in Indo-Soviet ties
by moving away from at least tacit acquiescence to the
Soviet policy line, although, as president of the NAM
between 1983-85, she will face pressure to take a
position closer to the majority nonaligned view on
these issues, particularly on Afghanistan. While the
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period of this Estimate. Significant progress toward a
resolution of the longstanding border dispute might
become possible following the national election in
1985 if Gandhi is returned to office with a heavy vote
of confidence. Deep mutual suspicions are likely to
persist, however, and military, strategic, or substantive
science and technology cooperation is unlikely for the
foreseeable future. The slow normalization that has
been achieved is subject to abrupt reversal if, for
example, China enhances significantly its military
relationship with Pakistan and other South Asian
countries on India's periphery. Progress in reaching
new agreements for a modest expansion of trade and
cultural exchange is likely to be balanced by remain-
ing differences on Kampuchea, possibly on Afghani-
stan, and in international financial institutions as both
compete for loans.
Regional Concerns
40. The probability of renewed conflict between
India and Pakistan is low over the next year, but,
beyond that, several potentially destabilizing factors
pose a continuing threat of another war. The same
tensions that have ignited conflict three times in 35
years-mutual distrust, the disputed territory of Kash-
mir, and . New Delhi's perception of Pakistan as an
unstable state that threatens India's borders and vital
economic installations-still fester today. The threat of
renewed conflict is heightened by Pakistan's nuclear
program. Conflict mediation between the two states is
impeded by Gandhi's . rejection of the concept of
equality as a guide to relations between India and
Pakistan. Gandhi accepts the widely held Indian view
that Pakistan's policies should reflect acknowledgment
that in size, population, industrial base, and other
respects India is the dominant power in the
subcontinent.
41. Despite the numerous sources of tension in
Indo-Pakistani relations, Gandhi has good reasons to
pursue greater normalization of relations with Islam-
abad. Besides the heavy costs of another war, Indian
action against Pakistan could prompt the Arab states
and Iran to damage the Indian economy through such
actions as imposing of . a limitation on the flow of
remittances from Indian workers in the Middle East.
Such remittances have been an important source of
foreign exchange for New Delhi since the mid-1970s.
In addition, India's relations with China would plum-
met, which would have a major adverse impact on
India's present efforts to enhance its diplomatic
flexibility.
42. We believe Gandhi will keep India's options
open, waiting for unambiguous evidence that Pakistan
has moved into sustained production of fissile materi-
al. Confronted with such evidence, she may be faced
with a choice between launching an Indian nuclear
weapons program (to include testing) or taking mili-
tary action against key Pakistani nuclear facilities. The
likely consequences of military action would be a
wider conflict with Pakistan. In the absence of such
evidence, Gandhi will probably pursue a course of
slow rapprochement with Islamabad, although she is
unlikely to make significant concessions. She would
like to project an image of reasonableness to enhance
India's credentials as a .NAM and Third World leader.
In addition, negotiations with Islamabad signal the
Soviets that India will pursue its own interests regard-
less of Moscow's warnings that Zia's willingness to talk
is only a ploy. New Delhi also. wants to avoid the
possibility that Pakistan could exploit civil unrest in
key Indian border regions. India's cautious but favor-
able attitude toward greater normalization reflects a
continuing strong Indian belief that, if an opening of
borders and free flow of commerce and people can be
achieved, then greater Indian influence over Pakistan
can be realized.
43. The prospects for the evolution of a more stable
state system through regional cooperation in South
Asia are limited as long as Gandhi remains in power.
The South Asian states have made tentative moves
toward a regional organization similar to the Associa-
tion of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN); discomfort
with the superpower presence in the region may
convince New Delhi of the need for greater coopera-
tion among the subcontinental states. Gandhi, howev-
er, has long exhibited a lack of sensitivity to the
concerns of the other states in the region. As the area's
strongest military and economic power, India has
presumed to be the final arbiter of regional interests,
which it generally equates with its own. Disputes over
sharing of river waters with Bangladesh are of growing
economic importance to both countries and will re-
main a major source of political friction, although
there are some tentative signs that India and Bangla-
desh may- be willing to discuss seriously how to deal
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with the Ganges-Brahmaputra water issue. Serious
instability in Nepal or Bangladesh, which might invite
Soviet or Chinese intervention, would increase Gan-
dhi's concern dramatically, but the possibility of either
is remote.
44. Domestic political considerations influence
Gandhi's policies toward India's South Asian neighbors
because developments in those states sometimes touch
on the interests of important groups within India.
India's Bengali-speaking population is concerned
about the well-being of the Hindu minority in Bangla-
desh in large part because communal tensions there
could touch off a mass migration to West. Bengal as
occurred in 1971. Tamil-speakers in South India would
also be concerned if there were a major deterioration
in relations between the Tamil minority in Sri Lanka
and its Sinhalese-speaking majority. Growing domestic
demands for water resources in northern and eastern
India, which involve Nepal and Bangladesh, influence
government policies toward those two neighboring
states. New Delhi's efforts to maintain good relations
with Pakistan and with the Muslim states of West Asia
are in part influenced by the government's desire to
demonstrate to India's large Muslim minority that
India is a secular state.
Nonalignment and Third World Issues
45. We expect India, soon to assume the presidency
of the NAM, to continue to playa moderate role in
Third World forums, taking a position between the
pro-Soviet minority and the "truly nonaligned" major-
ity in the NAM and avoiding acrimony with the
industrialized countries on North-South issues. As a
founding member of the NAM, India regards the
organization as a means to act on the world stage as a
moderating influence on superpower tensions. In its
capacity as a NAM leader, India has also attempted to
assert a role as conflict mediator in disputes such as the
Iran-Iraq war. In addition, India is attempting to
expand its exports to other developing countries and its
interest in promoting cooperation among them.
46. Tensions between India and other Third World
states are likely to persist where Indian and Soviet
interests converge against the NAM consensus. Indian
policy toward Afghanistan, for example, reflects New
Delhi's dilemma of avoiding international criticism for
condoning the Soviet presence while at the same time
minimizing strains in Indo-Soviet ties and increasing
its long-run leverage with the government in Kabul.
Gandhi has adopted an ambiguous formula-calling
for an end to all forms of foreign intervention in
Afghanistan. Similarly, New Delhi is likely to continue
its diplomatic support for the Heng Samrin regime in
Kampuchea and its opposition to the rival coalition
headed by Prince Sihanouk, but may make minor
diplomatic concessions to the ASEAN and UN posi-
tions in order to minimize the damage to its creden-
tials as a Nonaligned leader.
The Military
47. Gandhi has undertaken a major commitment to
modernize the armed forces because she believes that
Pakistan-and in the long run China-poses serious
threats to national security. She hopes to assure India
of continuing regional supremacy and to extend Indi-
an influence in South Asia and the Indian Ocean. The
Indian armed forces are already the fourth largest in
the world, capable of defending against conventional
attacks by any neighbor. Modernization will increase
general force levels only slightly over the next three to
five years but will enhance India's combat capabilities.
While India is turning increasingly to the West for
high-technology arms purchases, the Soviet Union will
remain its principal foreign supplier.
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repayment periods. With Soviet sales go Soviet techni-
cians for the construction of facilities, the licensed
production program, and equipment deliveries. The
number of Soviet technical advisers in India is now in
excess of 200.
56. New Delhi is turning to Europe for selected
weapons systems in order to obtain sophisticated mili-
tary hardware and to reduce its dependence on Mos-
cow. However, the Europeans cannot match Soviet
prices or credit terms. The Indian military is interested
in US equipment, but the government is apprehensive
that Washington would be an unreliable supplier.
Indians are concerned that arrangements under For-
eign Military Sales (FMS) contracts might not be
fulfilled.
Cost of Military Program
.57. New Delhi's defense effort is expensive. The
defense budget for 1982-83 is $5.3 billion, up from
approximately $5 billion in 1982 (an increase of
roughly 6 percent). As in prior years this will comprise
approximately 3 percent of the gross national product
(GNP). India's defense expenditures rank 14th in the
world in terms of absolute spending and 16th as a
percentage of GNP.
Perceived Military Threats
58. India can defend itself against any regional
threat. The Indian military has more personnel and
more sophisticated equipment than Pakistan, and the
disparity is likely to increase over the next several
years. Nonetheless, New Delhi continues to worry
about a military threat from Pakistan. Indians believe
that US military 'assistance to Pakistan raises the
potential for a Pakistani attack. India is even more
concerned about Pakistan's nuclear weapons program.
As the Pakistani program continues, Indian apprehen-
sions about Pakistani intentions will increase, and New
Delhi's response could range from renewed nuclear
testing in support of a weapons program to direct
military action against Pakistan. We believe that
armed conflict with Pakistan is unlikely over the next
12 months, but beyond that a military conflict with
Pakistan cannot be entirely ruled out.
59. China is seen as India's major long-term threat,
though a Sino-Indian conflict is unlikely during the
Sources of Military Imports
55. The Soviet Union will remain India's principal
supplier to all three services during the time period
covered in this Estimate. It offers state-of-the-art
weapons and cheap credit-low interest rates and long
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period of this Estimate. Relations have improved over
the last few years, and the two sides are now engaged
in efforts to establish more normal relations, though
New Delhi remains deeply suspicious of China's inten-
tions. New Delhi continues to fear that Beijing may
again assert itself to challenge Indian interests in South
Asia. Fears of a future combined Sino-Pakistani attack
remain a concern of Indian defense planners.
60. India presently considers its land borders as
reasonably secure, but New Delhi is uneasy about the
naval presence of US and, to a lesser extent, Soviet
contingents in the Indian Ocean. In response to super-
power activities and with a view toward enhancing
India's recognition as a maritime power, the Indian
Navy's blue water operations will increase. On the
diplomatic front, New Delhi, will strive to reduce
foreign power naval activity in the Indian Ocean and
will support the proposal for an Indian Ocean Zone of
Peace.
Nuclear Program
Present Capabilities
61. The Indian nuclear program has two major
goals: to increase energy production by nuclear power
and to maintain an option of building nuclear weap-
ons. India resents foreign interference in its nuclear
policy and therefore avoids international. safeguards
whenever possible. India has the. means to support its
nuclear power program-trained scientific personnel,
limited uranium reserves, and mastery over the fuel
cycle technology.
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Indian Views on Testing
63. Since her return to power, Gandhi has made
general policy statements, both public and private,
affirming India's commitment to peaceful uses of
nuclear energy. She has not, however, ruled out tests of
nuclear explosives for peaceful purposes if tests are
deemed to be in India's national interest. On the other
hand, she has unequivocally stated her opposition, on
moral grounds, . to the development of nuclear
weapons.
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Implications for the United States
70. India's size, large industrial base, military capa-
bilities, and relative stability make it an important
regional power and give India importance in any
consideration of US security, interests in the South
Asian region. India is capable of taking action that
could adversely affect those interests, particularly in
Pakistan and Afghanistan. Changing circumstances
within India and the region, however, are resulting in
a reevaluation of some longstanding tenets of Indian
foreign and economic policy which provides a basis for
furthering a number of US interests.
71. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the
continued presence of Soviet troops on India's side of
the Hindu Kush mountains in'Afghanistan arouse fears
in India of superpower confrontation on its own
doorsteps. To reduce the chances of such confronta-
tion, New Delhi has stepped up its efforts to improve
relations with the United States, Pakistan, and China
in the expectation that outside powers will be more
mindful of Indian interests.
72. An improvement in India's relations with Paki-
stan and China would give a major boost to US
interests in the region. It would lessen India's felt need
for a Soviet counterbalance to the threats it presently
perceives from Pakistan and China, and thus would
probably reduce Indian sympathy to Soviet interests
which such threats encourage. Better Indo-US rela-
tions would enhance this trend. New Delhi would be
less apprehensive that Washington is teaming up with
Islamabad. and Beijing against it. This in turn would
improve the atmosphere in which India pursues rap-
prochement with Pakistan and China.
73. The present Indian reevaluation of its economic
policies has resulted in some modest initiatives that
could further US objectives. The Indian Government,
recognizing that India must export to.pay its oil bill
(currently 65 percent of India's annual foreign ex-
change earnings), is actively courting foreign compa-
nies to enter into "collaborations" with Indian firms.
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In doing so, ' it hopes for an influx of technology that
will make Indian industry more competitive on world
markets and efficient at home. New, Delhi believes
that it will continue to require assistance on conces-
sional and partly subsidized terms over some indeter-
minate'period. Gandhi's comments during her visit to
Washington made clear that she closely associates
improved relations with the United States with greater
sympathy for India's economic needs as New Delhi
perceives them. Both. the will and the ability of the
Indian Government to take US interests into greater
consideration in its policies will be significantly influ-.
enced by Washington's policies toward international
financial institutions. A strengthened Indian economy
would in itself advance US interests because India
could sustain its present effort to expand commercial
and military supply links with the West. Indians
recognize that the USSR is increasingly less capable of
meeting their growing need for sophisticated; technol-
ogy and probably cannot increase the quantity of
petroleum it now supplies. Over time, these trends
may result in greater Indian moderation in multilater-
al political and economic forums on subjects of interest
to the United States.
74. We do not anticipate domestic political changes
that will in themselves cause the Indian Government
to alter its present nonaligned posture over the time
frame of this Estimate. There are no leftist ideologues
close, to Gandhi. Indeed, Indian leftists tend to be in
the opposition. Her most likely successors, including
Rajiv Gandhi, are less distrustful of the West than
Gandhi. Should Gandhi's Congress (I) Party lose sub-
stantial support in the next general election, the parties
most likely to make significant electoral advances are
middle-of-the-road regional parties and not the Com-
munists. The emergence of a new generation of
politicians, entrepreneurs, and professionals is laying
the foundation for a more pragmatic approach to
India's domestic and international problems.
75. Even if there'were a period of sustained politi-
cal instability at the center, we do not expect a
fundamental alteration in the country's political insti-
tutions. India has had almost 80 years' experience with
representative institutions and an even longer experi-
ence with a national bureaucracy. Important elite
groups are committed to the democratic system which
has protected their interests since India's independ-
ence in 1947. Groups at the lower end of the social
ladder are also learning to manipulate the political
system to their advantage. In short, we expect India to
remain a democratic and united country. A weakened
central government, however, might be reluctant to
make policy decisions that arouse severe criticism
among important parts of the population.
76. -Nonetheless, there are limitations on how far
India and the United States will go in accommodating
the interests of the other. New Delhi's desire to
maintain good Indo-Soviet relations is one important
constraint. The USSR will remain India's major arms
supplier and will support New Delhi in possible future
disputes with Pakistan and China inside multilateral
forums. Consequently, Gandhi (or any successor) will
try to avoid taking any action that will cause an open
breach in Indo-Soviet relations. Neither for the sake of
the United States nor anyone else will India abandon -
what it regards as its right and destiny to be the
preeminent power in South Asia and the Indian Ocean
basin and to be recognized as such. India will continue
to opposethe military presence of both superpowers in
the Indian Ocean. New Delhi will also avoid nuclear
safeguards whenever possible and will preserve its
option of developing, nuclear weapons. As a major
nonaligned nation and an outspoken representative of
the so-called South, India is likely to continue to be on
the opposite side of the United States on many multi-
lateral issues.. Finally, Indian suspicions of the United
States will be kept alive by US international policies
that India will not accept. Most significant will be the
supply of US weapons to Pakistan and US policies
toward international financial institutions.
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Annex D
Party Positions in Lok Sabha (Lower House of India's Parliament)
Name of State
or Union Territory
Congress
(I)
Communists a
0
Lok Dal
DMK
Other
Parties In
depe
T
ndents Ele
otal
cted
Vacancies
State
Total
States
Andhra Pradesh
41
1
42
42
Assam
2
2
12
14
Bihar
_
31
5
5
7
5
53
1
54
Gujarat
24
1
25
1
26
Haryana
5
3
2
10
10
Himachal Pradesh
4
4
4
Jammu and Kashmir
2
2
1
5
1
6
Karnataka
27
1
28
28
Kerala
4
8
4
4
20
20
Madhya Pradesh
33
5
1
39
1
40
Maharashtra
40
1
6
47
1
48
Manipur
1
1
2
2
Meghalaya
1
1
1
2
Nagaland
1
1
1
Orissa
20
1
21
21
Punjab
11
1
12
13
Rajasthan
'16
2
5
23
2
25
Sikkim
1
1
1
Tamil Nadu
20
16
3
39
39
Tripura
2
2
2
Uttar Pradesh
47
1
22
13
1
84
1
85
West Bengal
4
30
7
41
1
42
Union Territories
Andaman and Nicobar
1
1
1
Arunachal Pradesh
2
2,
2
Chandigarh
1
1
1
Dadra and Nagar Haveli
1
1
1
Delhi
6
7
7
Goa, Daman, and Diu
2
2
2
Lakshadweep
1
1
1
Mizoram
1
1
1
Pondicherry
1
1
1
Nominated (Anglo-Indian)
2
2
2
D-1
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