THE NORTHWEST INDIAN OCEAN: REGIONAL IMPACT OF US-SOVIET COMPETITION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
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• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 30
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 10, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 4, 1980
• Content Type: NIE

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Central 25X1
Intelligence
The Northwest Indian
Ocean: Regional Impact of
US-Soviet Competition
NJE 30/60-80
4 November 1980
Copy 3 2 4
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 25X1
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N I E 30/60-80
THE NORTHWEST INDIAN
OCEAN: REGIONAL IMPACT OF
US-SOVIET COMPETITION
Information available as of 4 November 1980 was
used in the preparation of this Estimate.
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THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE.
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS.
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the
Estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency, the intelligence organizations of the Departments of
State and Energy, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Agency.
Also Participating:
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps
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This Estimate assesses the likely effects the US-Soviet strategic ri-
valry in the northwest Indian Ocean will have on states in that region,
and the responses of those states, over the next three to five years. In this
Estimate, "regional states" include countries of the Horn of Africa (Dji-
bouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Somalia), the Arabian Peninsula (Bahrain,
Kuwait, North Yemen, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, South Yemen, and
the United Arab Emirates), and the Indian Ocean islands (Comoros,
Madagascar, Maldives, Mauritius, and Seychelles). The "northwest In-
dian Ocean" comprises these states as well as the waters and airspace of
the Persian Gulf and the northwestern portion of the ocean itself. "Pro-
Western" or "moderate" states-although these are imprecise terms-
generally refer to all regional states except Ethiopia, North Yemen,
South Yemen, Madagascar, and Seychelles. (A map of the region ap-
pears on the second page of the Discussion section.) The interests and
activities of some nearby countries, such as Iraq and Iran, are discussed
insofar as they affect the security problems and decisions of regional
states.
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CONTENTS
Page
PREFACE ..................................................................................................................
OVERVIEW ............................................................................................................... 1
DISCUSSION .............................................................................................................. 5
US and Soviet Interests and Activity in the Region ............................................. 5
Local Rivalries and Instabilities ............................................................................. 7
Perceptions of the Superpower Competition ........................................................ 8
Challenges to Regional States ................................................................................. 9
Pressures Toward Alignment ............................................................................. 9
Exacerbation of Local Conflicts ........................................................................ 11
Internal Strains .................................................................................................... 12
Factors Shaping Relations With the Superpowers ............................................... 14
Military and Economic Support ........................................................................ 14
The Palestinian Issue .......................................................................................... 15
Alternative Sources of Support ............................................................................. 15
Other Western Powers ........................................................................................ 15
Arab States ........................................................................................................... 17
Regional Cooperation ......................................................................................... 17
Future Response to the Competition .................................................................... 18
Security Cooperation With the Superpowers ................................................... 18
Multilateral Diplomacy ...................................................................................... 21
Other Foreign Policy Implications .................................................................... 21
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OVERVIEW
The superpower competition in the northwest - Indian Ocean
overlies numerous local rivalries and instabilities that have historically
subjected regional states to wars or domestic upheaval. The regional
states thus assess the sharpened US-Soviet contest largely in terms of the
opportunities and dangers it presents for their individual interests. The
opportunities of alignment with a superpower are compelling:
- It provides protection and military assistance.
- It offers economic aid.
These, however, must be weighed against the dangers of such
alignment:
- It aggravates internal tensions.
- It intensifies regional disputes.
- It invites countermeasures by the other superpower.
The US-Soviet rivalry has intensified a dilemma for the regional
states. They feel greater need for protection because they have become
more attractive targets for influence, penetration, or conquest, but most
resist closer alignment with a major power for fear this would create
more dangers, either foreign or domestic, than it would remove.
Some regional states nevertheless are aligning more closely with
one superpower or the other. This is apt to exacerbate local conflicts.
The US military buildup in Oman will provide added justification for
South Yemeni subversion of the Omani Government, perhaps with
Soviet encouragement. Ethiopia may respond militarily-with or with-
out Soviet encouragement-to the establishment of a US-Somali se-
curity relationship. Somali President Siad, although he did withdraw
most of his regular troops from the Ogaden, could later increase his
military presence or his assistance to insurgents there. Despite the new
security relationship with Somalia, the United States probably cannot
persuade Siad to abandon completely his pursuit of irredentist goals.
Closer security ties with major powers could aggravate internal
tensions. In some regional states, suspicions and arguments concerning
the distribution and use of military and economic assistance could
worsen relations between ethnic groups or between civilian and military
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leaders. In others, however, increased aid would strengthen the govern-
ment. Close links with a major power would likely weaken governments
in countries where resentment of foreign influence is easily aroused,
particularly the island states. On balance, we believe that an augmented
US and Soviet presence will not subject states in the area to internal
strains great enough to topple existing regimes, although 'military
cooperation may exacerbate existing instability.
How closely any state will cooperate with an outside power de-
pends on how much it needs that power's economic or military support
and how it gauges the repercussions of such cooperation. Oman, North
and South Yemen, and the countries of the Horn of Africa probably will
feel heavily dependent on foreign assistance for the foreseeable future.
Even these governments will bargain hard over the concessions they
grant, however, because the superpowers appear more eager than pre-
viously to obtain logistic support for their activities in the region. For
the oil-producing states other than Oman, external threats or financial
difficulties do not appear pressing enough to outweigh the potential
internal problems of a large superpower military presence. For the time
being this is also true of the island states, but with the intensified com-
petition and increased Soviet blandishments, some of these states may
later grant concessions.
US relations with Arab governments will be hindered further if the
key question of a Palestinian homeland remains unresolved. The
willingness of the pro-Western states of the Arabian Peninsula to coop-
erate militarily with the United States also is tempered by their lpersist-
ent doubts about Washington's determination to respond to the Soviet
challenge and by their perception of US foreign policy as inconsistent
and incoherent. These states welcome the United States' recent efforts
to reassert its influence in the area but view these as only first steps
toward meeting Moscow's global challenge.
Alignment with a superpower appears less necessary to the regional
states because of the availability of alternative sources of support. Many
pro-Western states in the region would turn more closely to Western
Europe for arms or economic support if new developments should cause
their confidence in the United States to erode further or their relations
with Washington to turn sour. Because of their concern over oil supplies
as well as other commercial and strategic interests, the West Europeans
will remain at least as active in the northwest Indian Ocean as they are
now. They will emphasize closer diplomatic and economic relations
with regional states rather than military escalation, however, because
such a response is both more in line with their capabilities and, iin their
view, a more effective response to the Soviet challenge in the region.
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Another alternative for the poorer regional states is financial assist-
ance from Arab oil exporters, although moderate and radical Arabs
often work at cross-purposes. Saudi Arabia, the principal traditional
donor, is now rivaled by Libya and Iraq. For a country chiefly worried
about its physical security, moreover, financial aid cannot substitute for
the military support of a major power.
The future willingness of states in the region to assist the United
States or the USSR will depend in large measure on factors partly or
wholly outside the superpowers' control:
- Internal political changes.
- Settlement or escalation of regional conflicts.
- Further developments in the Iranian revolution or the Iraqi-
Iranian war that alter the security climate in the region.
The willingness of regional states to cooperate with a superpower will
also depend on their perceptions of the overall US-Soviet balance of
strength and the coherence, durability, and sensitivity of each power's
foreign policy.
Moscow is likely to continue a high level of air and naval deploy-
ments in the region and will seek to use the US presence as a rationale to
maintain and, if possible, increase its influence and military access in
Ethiopia and South Yemen. The Soviets will also seek to fan opposition
to US activity to obtain closer political relations with other regional
states as well as to gain access to their naval and air facilities.
A perception that the USSR was winning the strategic competition
could jeopardize the Western political and economic position in the
Persian Gulf. Increased Soviet influence in Iran or sharp setbacks to
Western interests in North Yemen or Oman, for example, could incline
the Persian Gulf states to seek to buy protection by accommodating
Soviet interests, particularly on oil policy. While the outcome of the
insurgency in Afghanistan could change the regional states' perceptions
of Soviet capabilities, it probably would have little effect on their judg-
ment of Moscow's intentions. Even a Soviet withdrawal from Afghani-
stan would be unlikely to shake the moderates' belief that Moscow in-
tends eventually to extend its control to the Persian Gulf.
Unless US credibility and capability decline a great deal further in
their eyes, the pro-Western states of the northwest Indian Ocean will
continue to accept a US military presence in the area as a counterweight
to Soviet assets. Host states will seek to impose clear limits, however, on
the size, character, location, and use of US military forces. Except for
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Somalia, these states will want to minimize the visibility of any US
military presence. Saudi Arabia and other countries not permitting US
combat forces on their territories will want such forces to stay over the
horizon and may withhold public endorsement from military activity
that they welcome in private. All pro-Western governments will be very
sensitive regarding the use of US armed forces in the region for any
purpose other than defense against overt aggression.
While there will be a tendency for states that establish closer se-
curity ties with Washington to support US policy across the board,
stepped-up involvement in the region may adversely affect US effec-
tiveness in the future, both in the region and elsewhere. Closer security
ties with a regional state like Somalia risk identifying the United States
with its client's unpopular policies. Moreover, US support for a regime
that is overthrown increases the chance that the new rulers will be anti-
American, as occurred in Iran. Finally, US initiatives outside the region
might meet stronger opposition as an indirect result of sharper competi-
tion in the northwest Indian Ocean. In particular, the US Middle East
peace policy might encounter greater resistance as Arab oil producers
like Iraq and Libya, attempting to limit great-power influence in the
area, increase their leverage among poorer regional states. Support for
US Middle East policy could also erode among the West Europeans,
who have become increasingly anxious about the security of their oil
supplies and hence more inclined to back Arab positions in the Arab-
Israeli dispute.
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DISCUSSION
US and Soviet Interests and Activity
in the Region
1. The USSR's interest in the northwest Indian
Ocean reflects its longstanding desire to expand its
presence and influence in this strategically important
region (see accompanying map) as well as its more
general aim of supplanting Western influence in the
Third World. Moscow wants not only to impede any
military use of the area that threatens Soviet interests
but also to exert leverage over Western access to the
region's energy resources and to gain access to air and
naval facilities for its own use. Furthermore, the In-
dian Ocean offers the only year-round sea route be-
tween the eastern and western USSR-a particular
concern to Moscow because of its conflict with China.
In addition, access to Middle East oil-the primary
Western interest in the region-seems likely to be-
come important to Moscow if Soviet petroleum
production begins to drop as sharply as some projec-
tions indicate.'
2. The Soviets established a continuous naval pres-
ence in the Indian Ocean in 1968 that in recent years
has included about 21 units. (See figure 1.) Since late
1979, in response to the Iranian and Afghan crises and
the deployment of US Navy carrier battle groups to
the area, the Soviet Indian Ocean Squadron has in-
creased to about 16 auxiliaries and 16 combat ships,
including as many as four ships equipped with sur-
face-to-surface missiles. (See figure 2.) Although the
Soviets have previously augmented their naval force in
the Indian Ocean during local wars-such as those be-
tween India and Pakistan in 1971, the Arab states and
Israel in 1973, and Ethiopia and Somalia in 1977-78-
their current sustained force level is the highest they
have ever maintained in the Indian Ocean. In addi-
I There is agreement within the Intelligence Community that
Soviet energy developments will have serious implications for
international relations in the 1980s. There is disagreement, how-
ever, over the Soviet energy future. The Central Intelligence
Agency believes that Soviet oil production will drop to 8-10 million
barrels per day by 1985 and decline further by 1990. The Defense
Intelligence Agency believes that the Soviet Union will not experi-
ence an energy shortage during the 1980s.
Figure 1
US and Soviet Naval Ship-Days in the
Indian Ocean, 1968-Present
I I I I I I I I I I I 1 1
1968 70 72 74 76 78 80*
`Projections for 1980 are twice the actual figures
for January-June 1980.
25X1
582880 9-80 CIA
tion, the Soviet naval air presence has increased from
periodic deployments to the continuous deployment of
up to six naval maritime reconnaissance aircraft.
3. The United States maintained a smaller continu-
ous presence than the USSR through most of the 1970s,
although a larger proportion of the US presence was
combat vessels. This presence was supplemented by
periodic visits of naval task forces. The US task force
presence became continuous in November 1978.
4. Although the Soviet Navy uses anchorages exten-
sively in servicing its Indian Ocean fleet, both sides
have developed installations on shore to stage air mis-
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Gr ce p
V Turkey
' V w, 6
Mediterranean
Sea
South
Africa
ANTARANARIYB*
Mozambique
Madagascar,
Pakistan
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Kenya
*NAIROBI
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Figure 2
US, Soviet, and French Naval Presence in the
Indian Ocean, 1 August 1980
Squadron Command Ships 0 1 ^
Submarines
Aircraft Carriers
Cruisers
Destroyers
Frigates
Patrol Craft
L
U
Amphibious Units 5
Minesweepers 0
Auxiliaries
sions and to provide limited repair, communications,
and logistic support to their ships. The USSR lost its
investment in military installations in Somalia when it
supported Ethiopia in the 1977-78 Ogaden war, it now
uses facilities in Ethiopia and South Yemen. The
United States is developing the naval support base on
Diego Garcia, uses air and naval facilities in Bahrain,
Djibouti, Kenya, and Oman, and has negotiated a
similar arrangement with Somalia. Warships of both
navies have also made port calls in other Indian Ocean
states, such as Mauritius and Seychelles, for replenish-
ment and crew rest and to show the flag.
5. This Estimate assumes that the US military pres-
ence in the Indian Ocean will include, at a minimum,
permanent deployment of the five-ship MIDEAST-
FOR and a Marine amphibious capability, frequent
visits by tactical air units, and frequent B-52 flights. It
also assumes that the United States will expand and
improve further the base at Diego Garcia, will seek
^
^
continued use of facilities in Bahrain and Djibouti, and
will endeavor to implement the new access arrange-
ments with Kenya, Oman, and Somalia.
6. The USSR will respond to increased US military
activity to maintain its credibility as a regional power
and to forestall US efforts to convert a military pres-
ence into political advantage. Moscow is likely to con-
tinue a high level of air and naval deployments in the
region and will seek to use the US presence as a ration-
ale to maintain and, if possible, increase its influence
in Ethiopia and South Yemen. The Soviets will also
seek to fan opposition to US activity to obtain closer
political relations with regional states as well as access
to their naval and air facilities.
Local Rivalries and Instabilities
7. The superpower competition overlies an assort-
ment of sociopolitical problems in the northwest In-
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than Ocean that have subjected most regional states to
wars, insurgencies, or the threat of domestic upheaval.
These local conflicts have a variety of specific causes.
Some, including ethnic tensions and boundary dis-
putes, would exist even in the absence of East-West
rivalry. Others, such as ideological antipathy between
neighboring states, are related to the East-West politi-
cal competition but predate the current US-Soviet
strategic rivalry in the Indian Ocean.
8. Conflict in the Horn of Africa is the continuation
of a centuries-old struggle between Christian high-
landers and Muslim lowlanders as well as a legacy of
colonial boundaries that cut across the Somali home-
land. The late 19th century expansion of Ethiopia into
the Somali-inhabited Ogaden, together with the rec-
ognition of this expansion by the European powers
that were then colonizing East Africa, produced an
Ethiopian-Somali boundary that Somalia has never
recognized. Mogadishu's irredentism and the Oga-
denis' discontent with Ethiopian rule led to an insur-
gency in the Ogaden in 1963-64, Somalia's invasion of
the region in 1977, and a new upsurge in fighting
there beginning in 1979. The Ethiopian-Somali con-
flict makes it difficult for Djibouti to manage its rela-
tions with its two neighbors and to contain tension
between its own Ethiopian-oriented Afars and Somali-
oriented Issas. Kenya's relations with its northern
neighbors are uneasy both because of the Somali habi-
tation of northeastern Kenya (where an insurgency
was waged in the mid-1960s) and the contrast between
the capitalist and democratic ways of Kenya and
the socialism and authoritarianism of Ethiopia and
Somalia.
9. Tensions between states of the Arabian Peninsula
stem largely from their different patterns of political
development. South Yemen is ruled by a radical group
whose Marxism-Leninism was annealed in its bloody
struggle for independence against the British. Most of
the other, peninsular states are conservative monar-
chies, and deep distrust between them and Aden is
virtually inevitable. South Yemen's involvement in
armed conflict with its neighbors has included its, sup-
port for the rebellion in the Dhofar Province of Oman
in the 1960s and early 1970s and a border war with
North Yemen in 1979. The peninsular states also have
varying degrees of antipathy toward, and concern
over, the states farther north that present either a mili-
tary threat or a revolutionary example-Israel, Iraq,
and Iran.
10. Challenges to the traditional social and political
order make the internal politics of several states of the
Arabian Peninsula volatile or at best uncertain. A civil
war between royalists and republicans was fought
from 1962 to 1970 in North Yemen, where factions
associated with Saudi Arabia and South Yemen now
vie for influence. The surviving monarchies on the
peninsula face the problem of maintaining their legiti-
macy despite a lack of institutions permitting wide-
spread political participation. These governments have
used their wealth to satisfy many of their citizens' ma-
terial demands, but the modernization that the oil bo-
nanza has permitted also endangers established
authority by rapidly changing social patterns and
producing new classes that are educated and economi-
cally mobile but politically frustrated. Religious de-
mands for reform and sectarian differences also
contribute to the potential for internal instability,
particularly among the Shia populations of Bahrain,
Kuwait, and eastern Saudi Arabia.
11. Although the physical isolation of the island
republics insulates them from armed conflict with
neighbors, their political diversity encourages rivalry
and distrust among them. Aside from Mauritius, the
island states have little or no tradition of democracy,
and their sharp internal divisions make their political
stability questionable. The toppling of the Comoran
government in 1978 by a small band of European
mercenaries demonstrated both the fragile basis on
which these regimes rest and the possibility of foreign
involvement in extralegal transfers. of power.
12. Because of the diversity of conflicts, both
domestic and external, -in the northwest Indian Ocean,
few generalizations about local security problems ap-
ply throughout the region. The effects of the sharp-
ened superpower competition on local rivalries and in-
ternal instability will inevitably: be variable and
complex. In some cases these effects are major, but the
course of many other conflicts in the region will be
determined less by US and Soviet actions than by the
policies of regional states and by the longstanding
political, economic, and religious 'divisions that gen-
erated these disputes in the first Place.
Perceptions of the Superpower Competition
13. Given the many local security concerns in the
northwest Indian Ocean, regional states assess the
sharpened US-Soviet competition largely in terms of
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the opportunities and dangers it presents for their in-
dividual interests. North Yemen is exploiting the US-
Soviet rivalry, trying to wheedle more arms and eco-
nomic aid from both powers in an effort to increase its
independence from Saudi Arabia. At the moment,
other governments are not working both sides of the
street but nevertheless exaggerate their alarm over the
activities of one superpower, even in distant areas, to
stay in favor with the other. Kenyan leaders, for exam-
ple, have little interest in events outside East Africa
but express concern over Soviet inroads in Southwest
Asia partly as a way of soliciting US aid. Most regional
states, however, worry that their interests will receive
short shrift as each superpower becomes preoccupied
with parrying the other's moves. In particular, the
Saudis and other Arab states fear that US efforts to
counter the Soviet threat will delay progress on the
Palestinian issue and lead to increased US military aid
to Israel.
14. Most states in the region expect the US-Soviet
strategic competition in the northwest Indian Ocean to
continue unabated for the foreseeable future. Most
conservative states on the Arabian Peninsula interpret
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the earlier So-
viet inroads in South Yemen and the Horn of Africa as
confirming their view that Moscow intends eventually
to control the Peninsula and the Persian Gulf. For-
merly believing that the Soviets would use clandestine
means to accomplish this objective, many conserv-
atives in the area now are convinced that Moscow is
prepared to move overtly as well. Even the pro-Soviet
regimes in Ethiopia and South Yemen, although they
naturally feel less threatened by the Soviet activity,
share the concerns of others that the US-Soviet mili-
tary buildup in the region will upset local balances of
power.
15. The pro-Western states of the Arabian Penin-
sula, however, have persistent doubts about Wash-
ington's determination to meet the Soviet challenge
and to protect its own interests and those of its friends.
Many rulers believe that the United States was tardy
in perceiving and countering the Soviet threat to their
region. The confidence of these states was further
eroded by the fall of the Shah of Iran, which seemed
to indicate that American ability or willingness to aid a
beleaguered ally, even one as important to US strategic
interests as the Shah, is seriously limited. These gov-
ernments also believe that US foreign policy has been
incoherent and inconsistent, a belief rooted in what
they see as a US failure to formulate effective policy
on economic problems like energy and inflation and
other global issues.
16. Most pro-Western states welcome Washington's
recent efforts to reassert its influence in the area as
signs that it finally is shaking off the effects of the
Vietnam trauma and henceforth will be less reluctant
to assume overseas commitments. Nevertheless, they
view such evidence of US concern as only a step in the
right direction. Military arrangements alone will not
restore US credibility. Many leaders still wonder
whether renewed American interest in the region is
attributable more to the presidential election cam-
paign than to a determination to protect what they
perceive to be US interests there. Rescue of the Tehran
hostages might have enhanced further the moderates'
confidence in US will, but the failure of the rescue
mission instead raised doubts about US military
capability.
Challenges to Regional States
Pressures Toward Alignment
17. The northwest Indian Ocean states believe that
the strategic competition in their region has made
them even more attractive targets for influence, pene-
tration, or conquest. Although most of these states pre-
fer that neither the United States nor the USSR main-
tain military forces in the area, the support of a
friendly power to deter or defeat threats to their se-
curity seems more important than before. The strate-
gic competition thus has made the region more polar-
ized as Kenya, Oman, and Somalia negotiate new
security ties with the United States while Ethiopia and
South Yemen maintain or strengthen their ties with
the USSR.
18. A close security relationship with a superpower
appears to raise a variety of foreign and internal dan-
gers, however. This is why the island republics and the
Persian Gulf states other than Oman have eschewed
such links so far. (See accompanying table.) Pro-West-
ern Arab states are concerned that an overt security
relationship with the United States would lead to
subversion of their governments by expatriate Pal-
estinians. They also have a nagging suspicion that the
United States might use military facilities such as those
in Oman as staging bases to seize the oilfields. Another
serious problem in the eyes of many governments is
that aiding the military activity of one superpower
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Current Use of Facilities in the Northwest Indian Ocean by Foreign Military Forces
Includes both continuous and intermittent deployments of warships, military aircraft, and ground combat troops.
US Forces
Limited use of port; re-
supply flights
Other Foreign Forces Remarks
None
Kenya
Madagascar
Maldives
Mauritius
Saudi Arabia
Seychelles
South Yemen
Regular port calls and
naval reconnaissance
flights
Port calls at Mombasa;
use of Mombasa and
Nairobi airfields; agree-
ment for expanded use
Occasional port calls and
refueling stops
None
Port calls at Male
Port calls at Port Louis
Port calls at Matrah;
periodic use of Jazirat
Masirah airfield and As
Sib (Seeb) airport; agree-
ment for expanded use
Occasional port calls
Rare port calls
Limited use of Victoria
port
Periodic naval visits;
agreement for expanded
use
United Arab Emirates Occasional port calls
Recently made first
combat ship visit
Regular ship use of
Dahlak; occasional ship
visits to Massawa; recon-
naissance flights from
Asmara; development of
Assab airfield
None
Port calls at Male
Port calls at Port Louis
Squadron flagship re-
cently made port call
None
Limited use of Victoria
port
Regular naval use of
Aden port, Socotra and
Perim; regular air use of
Aden airport
10
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No known restrictions
but facilities not in de-
mand
France stations 4,000
troops and air units and
uses as home port for its
Indian Ocean fleet
10,000 to 13,000 Cuban
troops
United Kingdom makes
port calls and holds joint
land exercises
West Europeans make
occasional port calls
Declared policy of
excluding all foreign
military forces
West Europeans make Miltary facility at Gan
occasional port calls at remains closed
Male
West European port calls
at Port Louis
United Kingdom makes
port calls and uses as
training area
West Europeans make
occasional port calls
None
Limited French use of New restrictions limit
Victoria port number of ship and air-
craft calls and prohibit
nuclear-powered or nu-
clear-armed ships.
Occasional French naval
visits
Occasional West Eu-
ropean port calls
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makes it more difficult to accommodate the other and
may stimulate a hostile response. In sum, alignment
and accommodation both have become more impor-
tant, but pursuit of one undermines the other.
19. Military cooperation with an outside power also
contradicts the Indian Ocean states' often-stated objec-
tives of nonalignment and the exclusion of major
power influence and rivalry from the region. Most of
these states wish to do nothing to increase the chance
of a superpower conflict in their backyard, in which
their own interests would suffer at least as much as
those of Moscow or Washington. The new tide of
Islamic sentiment has further strengthened prejudice
against reliance on outside powers. Arab governments
in particular envision the Islamic world-and more
narrowly, the Arab world-as an independent power
center speaking with one voice. East-West polarization
in the region makes realization of this dream less
probable.
20. Overt alignment with a major power exposes a
regime to criticism in wider Third World forums like
the nonaligned movement, the Organization of Af-
rican Unity (OAU), the Islamic Conference, and the
Arab League. This can cause embarrassment, although
two of the regimes seeking closer ties with the United
States have little influence to lose. Sultan Qaboos of
Oman already has isolated himself from the Arab
consensus through his support of Egyptian President
Sadat's peace diplomacy. Somali President Siad Barre's
stock in OAU circles never has been high, because he
has irredentist ambitions and offers only tepid support
for popular African causes like majority rule in south-
ern Africa. Kenya, however, is concerned about avoid-
ing isolation from the mainstream of African and non-
aligned opinion. Third World sentiments are unlikely
to deflect Nairobi from its present course, but they
have made Kenyan leaders more sensitive to the pub-
licity given to, and the character of, any US military
presence on their territory.
Exacerbation of Local Conflicts 2
21. Intensified US-Soviet competition is pushing
some northwest Indian Ocean states into closer rela-
2 it falls outside the scope of this Estimate, the Arab-
Israeli dispute also may be affected by the US-Soviet competition in
nearby regions, including the northwest Indian Ocean
tions with a superpower, raising fears among their
neighbors and revising local military balances. This is
apt to aggravate some local tensions and to increase the
chances of border clashes and externally sponsored
subversion.
22. The establishment of a US-Somali military rela-
tionship, which Ethiopia probably expects to em-
bolden Siad to push Somali claims in the Ogaden,
could result in escalation of hostilities between Ethi-
opia and Somalia. Ethiopia has hinted it may respond
to US military aid for Somalia by striking against So-
mali facilities at Berbera or elsewhere, and its air at-
tacks on Somali military facilities during recent
months have served to make this threat more credible.
The USSR, concerned over international criticism and
possible US counteractions, has threatened to with-
draw its aid if Ethiopia invades Somalia at this time.
Nevertheless, Ethiopia will likely use a combination of
further air attacks, small-scale cross-border ground op-
erations, and increased activity by Somali Salvation
Front guerrillas to pressure Somalia and the United
States. Over the longer term, a major Ethiopian inva-
sion of northern Somalia, to include the occupation of
Hargeisa and possibly Berbera, is a distinct possibility.
Addis Ababa would see such an action as a means to
unseat Siad and permanently solve the Ogaden
problem.
23. In approving a military access agreement with
the United States, Siad promised withdrawal of regular
Somali forces from the Ogaden. This does not, how-
ever, preclude a future increase in the Somali military
presence there. Neither does it rule out continued or
even increased support by Mogadishu to the Western
Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) and possibly to Eri-
trean and other non-Somali separatists in Ethiopia. In
the past, Somalia has reduced its involvement in the
Ogaden for political reasons or when its military forces
were weak, only to revise this policy at an opportune
time.
24. In response to Washington's efforts over the past
three years to condition US military aid on a reduction
of his support to the WSLF, Siad made it clear he
would continue to back the guerrillas. Even with a
close security relationship, the United States probably
cannot persuade Siad to abandon pursuit of his
irredentist goals, any more than the USSR could keep
him from invading Ethiopia in 1977. Siad can be ex-
pected to test the limits of US tolerance of further
Somali involvement in the Ogaden.
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25. Intensification of the Ethiopian-Somali conflict
probably would affect Djibouti as well, both by
disturbing its economy and by stirring up the internal
conflict between Afars and Issas. The balance Djibouti
has sought to maintain in its relations with its two
larger neighbors could easily be upset, particularly if
French forces were withdrawn. Djibouti recently im-
proved its relations with Ethiopia, while Somalia has
begun limited support to Issa dissidents-a reversal
from previous months, when Djibouti tilted toward So-
malia and Ethiopia provided substantial aid to Afar
dissidents. Ethiopia apparently concluded that the re-
cent extensive US use of Djibouti facilities was not di-
rected against itself and was preferable to a US mili-
tary relationship with Somalia. Formalization of
Washington's military ties with Djibouti could cause
Addis Ababa to revise its assessment and to resume
support to the Afars.
26. Although Somalia also has designs on Somali-
inhabited portions of Kenya, US military aid to Siad
would not ignite open conflict between the two coun-
tries. In fact, Kenya hopes that a US presence will
moderate Siad's behavior, which is why Kenyan lead-
ers privately accept a US-Somali relationship despite
their deep fear of Somali irredentism. Siad may be-
come more flexible toward Kenya in order to please
the United States and other potential Western bene-
factors, but his refusal to renounce claims to Kenyan
territory will mean continued distrust between his gov-
ernment and Nairobi.
27. The formalization of Kenya's ties with the
United States will not lead to hostilities between Kenya
and its neighbors. Even with increased shipments of
US arms, Kenya will be too militarily weak to pose a
significant threat to other East African countries. De-
spite Ethiopia's suspicions of US intentions in the re-
gion, Kenyan-Ethiopian military cooperation does not
appear to have suffered. Addis Ababa probably inter-
prets Kenya's ties with the United States as a continu-
ation of its traditional pro-Western orientation and not
as directed against itself. Over the long term, however,
ideological differences and Ethiopia's clear military
superiority will work to cool bilateral relations.
28. Greater superpower activity in and around the
Arabian Peninsula may aggravate the already strained
relations between South Yemen and Oman. Oman has
long feared Aden's attachment to the USSR, while
South Yemen wishes ultimately to topple Sultan
Qaboos. South Yemen has recently indicated, both
publicly and privately, its growing concern over the
US military buildup in Oman. A continuing American
military presence provides a convenient justification
for Aden-alone or in addition to other radical Arab
states and perhaps the USSR-to increase subversion
of Oman.
29. Leaders of the island states fear that the
sharpened competition in the Indian Ocean will make
them targets of foreign-sponsored subversion as each
side tries to install governments more willing to sup-
port its activity in the region. The pro-Western island
regimes are concerned about Soviet interference in
their internal politics. Mauritian leaders are correct in
their belief that the Soviets have long provided guid-
ance and financial support to the main opposition
party, the Mauritian Militant Movement. The left-
leaning island presidents-Ratsiraka of Madagascar
and, even more so, Rene of Seychelles-fear that
France, South Africa, or the United States will support
attempts by mercenaries or underground opposition
groups to topple their governments, similar to the 1978
coup in Comoros. Regardless of whether such fears are
well founded, the island governments may respond to
them in ways more likely to escalate the strategic com-
petition than to dampen it. Rene, for example, re-
quested additional port calls by Soviet warships last
year as a show of support from Moscow when he be-
lieved an externally mounted coup was imminent.
30. Even without foreign meddling, the heightened
strategic rivalry will stretch the political and social
fabric of several northwest Indian Ocean states,
particularly those entertaining a new or enlarged for-
eign military presence.
31. Increased military and economic assistance, al-
though it augments the resources available for satisfy-
ing internal demands, may in some countries ag-
gravate tensions between ethnic groups or between
civilian leaders and military officers. The Afars of Dji-
bouti believe that the Issa-dominated government in-
tends to use foreign-made arms to suppress their agita-
tion for social and economic equality. Further military
aid from any source to the Gouled regime thus may
stimulate additional Afar unrest with or without
encouragement from Ethiopia. In Somalia, animosity
between Siad's fellow Marehans and other tribes
would increase if the benefits of a US aid relationship
seemed to flow disproportionately to the Marehans.
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Disaffected non-Marehans would tend to believe this
whether it were true or not. Substantial US military
aid to Somalia probably would placate restive Somali
military officers. Elsewhere, however, a large infusion
of weapons and supplies might strengthen and em-
bolden the military and eventually encourage it to
take power. This is a long-term risk of major military
aid to Kenya, where ethnic tension and grumbling
about the Moi regime recently have increased within
the usually apolitical military, but it is a risk the civil-
ian leaders probably will be able to contain.
32. Superpower activity in the region will alter, in a
similarly complex manner, the political influence of
pro-Western or pro-Soviet factions in several countries.
On one hand, military aid to a rival state can reduce
the influence of political figures associated with the
aid giver. In particular, establishment of a US-Somali
military relationship could undercut residual pro-
Western elements within the Ethiopian Government.
They would have difficulty rationalizing Washington's
provision of arms to Somalia while the latter continues
its support to the Ogaden insurgency. On the other
hand, military aid often will strengthen the aid giver's
friends in the recipient state. Libya's gifts of military
equipment to Djibouti, for example, persuaded some
Djiboutians that they need not restrict their friendship
to France, the United States, and the moderate Arabs.
In a state that traditionally has been less dependent on
foreign security ties, however, military cooperation
with an outside power would more likely add to the
government's political burdens by stimulating na-
tionalist sentiment. This is particularly true in Mada-
gascar, Mauritius, and Seychelles, where important
domestic political lines pit a generally pro-Western
group against one favoring the East. As the leaders of
these states undoubtedly realize, closer ties with a
superpower would furnish a convenient issue to the
opposition, which could call for the ouster of an appar-
ently foreign-dominated government.
33. Domestic politics in the three states where the
United States has negotiated access arrangements do
not divide in the same way, but opposition leaders in
those countries could exploit military cooperation with
the United States by appealing to popular resentment
of foreign influence, although this is doubtful in
Kenya. Sultan Qaboos of Oman is especially vulner-
able because of discontent over his reliance on British
advisers to run the armed forces and some government
departments. Younger Omani officials feel their own
advancement has been blocked, and they believe the
foreigners are lining their pockets and promoting the
interests of their home government rather than those
of Oman. Military assistance from Washington would
heighten resentment if it appeared to increase corrup-
tion or if absorption of new materiel became a pretext
to delay further the Omanization of the armed forces.
34. An augmented US military presence at the lev-
els currently projected should not, by itself, subject
pro-Western states in the northwest Indian Ocean re-
gion to internal strains great enough to topple current
regimes. Military cooperation may exacerbate existing
instability, however, and in most cases the size, char-
acter, and associated benefits of a US military pres-
ence will be important in determining its effect on
internal politics. US-Somali ties probably will
strengthen Siad Barre's internal position, mainly by
enhancing his support within the predominantly anti-
Soviet military establishment. Siad could encounter
new opposition from military officers if the United
States failed to fulfill their expectations of assistance.
Kenya is one of the few stable countries in Africa, and
the projected small US military presence is unlikely to
alter this. Neither should limited and discreet use of
Omani facilities seriously endanger the tenure of
Qaboos, who is popular for having ended his father's
oppressive rule and instituting social and economic re-
forms. If alienation among key elements of the Omani
military increases, however, the issue of dependence
on foreign powers would become an increasingly
troublesome one for him. The other moderate Persian
Gulf states, by avoiding a foreign military presence on
their territories, are relatively less affected by the US-
Soviet strategic competition. Their future stability is
uncertain, but this is chiefly a question not of ties with
outside powers but of their ability to manage the social
and political changes caused by the influx of oil
wealth.
35. Although the Soviets are targets of some popular
resentment in Ethiopia and South Yemen, their pres-
ence is unlikely to weaken the internal position of
either country's current regime as long as tensions with
neighboring states persist. Potential opposition ele-
ments recognize a military need for that presence de-
spite any dislike they may have for Soviets on their
soil. Particularly for Ethiopia, no alternative source of
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support-even one that a more moderate successor to
the Mengistu regime might tap-appears able and
willing to provide military help comparable to that
given by the USSR and Cuba. Furthermore, Soviet
penetration of both countries already is so deep that
would-be coup plotters probably are discouraged by
the prospect that Moscow would attempt to prevent,
forcibly if necessary, any change of regime not to its
liking.
36. Of the other countries in the region, the strate-
gic competition has indirectly exacerbated the inher-
ent internal instability in Djibouti and North Yemen,
each of which attempts to walk a tightrope between
antagonistic neighbors, competing domestic groups,
and sometimes East and West. President Gouled
should be able to contain unrest in Djibouti for the
time being with the assistance of French security
forces, but the competition in military aid begun by
Libya has enlarged both the suspicions of the Afars
and the ambitions of radical elements in the govern-
ment and army. In North Yemen, President Salih's
dangerous game of playing his suitors off against each
other could contribute to his eventual overthrow by
elements associated with either Saudi Arabia or South
Yemen.
Factors Shaping Relations With the Superpowers
37. Alignments of regional states with outside pow-
ers generally reflect long-established cultural and eco-
nomic relationships, ideological preferences, or searing
historical experience. Oman and the other conserv-
ative Arab countries are economically wedded to the
West and see Communism as implacably hostile to
their social order and way of life. Kenya considers its
pro-Western orientation to be consistent with its free-
enterprise economy and relatively open political sys-
tem. Somalia does not share these values but is anti-
Soviet by virtue of its earlier unhappy relationship
with the USSR. The Soviets' heavyhandedness and rac-
ism, and later their support to Ethiopia and refusal to
back the 1977 invasion of the Ogaden, left a legacy of
ill will in Somalia that would limit severely how far
any Somali leader could go in improving relations with
Moscow. The Soviet clients, Ethiopia and South
Yemen, both feel far more ideologically compatible
with the USSR than with the West. They have de-
clared themselves to be Marxist-Leninist and generally
are following Communist models in both their internal
and external policies.
Military and Economic Support
38. While the direction of a state's alignment usu-
ally reflects historical or cultural ties, the degree to
which it cooperates with a superpower is largely a
question of how dependent it is on that power's eco-
nomic aid, arms, or promise of military protection.
This dependence in turn is a function of perceived
threats and an inability to pay for economic or mili-
tary development.
39. The deep security concerns and poverty in the
Horn of Africa make all states of the Horn willing to
permit US or Soviet use of their military facilities.
Equipment needed to wage war in the Ogaden (and
for Ethiopia, on other fronts as well) is the most impor-
tant benefit Mogadishu and Addis Ababa hope to gain
from security ties with a superpower. As long as the
Ogaden conflict is unresolved, arms will continue to be
the primary concern of each. Djibouti is almost totally
dependent on foreign support for its security. Kenya
sees security problems along most of its borders, and it
relies on ties with friendly Western powers to obtain
not only arms and training for its armed forces but also
the implicit promise of military intervention should
these forces prove to be inadequate. Nairobi also hopes
to profit economically from its expanding relationship
with the United States.
40. South Yemen's cooperation with the Soviets re-
flects its heavy military dependence on Moscow. It
needs a foreign underwriter for almost all of its efforts
to maintain its defenses against the nearby conserv-
ative states, especially Saudi Arabia, that it distrusts so
deeply. Aden's relationship with Moscow in turn
makes Oman's Qaboos feel even more dependent on
Western support for his security and thus has height-
ened his interest in expanded military and economic
ties with Washington.
41. Although most other states in the region are eco-
nomically or militarily dependent on the United States
or the USSR to some degree, they will be unwilling to
entertain foreign armed forces on their territories as
long as external threats do not appear immediate
enough to outweigh the potential internal problems of
a foreign military presence. Other Persian Gulf states,
for example, are less exposed than Oman to attack
from a hostile neighbor but more vulnerable to unrest
by Shia militants or Palestinian radicals within their
own borders. US military forces on their soil thus
would aggravate-not alleviate-their most pressing
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security concerns, while their oil wealth makes foreign
financial subsidies unnecessary.
42. Even heavy dependence on a major power's
support will not by itself impel a government to grant
concessions it does not consider in its own interest, for
it will try to exploit whatever counterleverage it en-
joys. The strategic competition has increased the bar-
gaining power of almost all regional states by making
the superpowers appear more eager than ever for dip-
lomatic as well as logistic support for their activities in
the area.
43. The present US position on the Palestinian ques-
tion significantly limits the willingness of even the
most pro-Western Arab governments to cooperate
militarily with the United States. For the Saudis and
other Arab conservatives, Washington's handling of
this issue has become a litmus test of US fairness and
sensitivity to their own problems and interests.
44. These governments believe that US Middle East
peace policy has failed to address the Palestinian prob-
lem adequately, thereby perpetuating the greatest
threat to regional stability. They believe the Camp
David accords have dangerously polarized Arab poli-
tics, neutralized Egypt as a moderating force, stimu-
lated terrorism, and given the Soviets an opportunity
to recoup lost influence. Furthermore, it has placed
Arab moderates on the defensive and made it more
difficult and politically hazardous for them to coop-
erate with the United States.
45. Failure to achieve a breakthrough on the Pal-
estinian issue in the near future could lead to serious
new strains in relations with the Arab moderates and
to abandonment of Saudi Arabia's efforts to keep the
Palestinian question separate from US-Saudi bilateral
affairs. Besides making military cooperation with
Washington even more politically dangerous for the
moderates, the belief that the United States had failed
to exert adequate pressure on Israel would intensify
the already widespread impression of a US inability to
act wisely and resolutely in the region.
Alternative Sources of Support
Other Western Powers
46. Western Europe is, after the United States and
the USSR, the most promising source of external sup-
port for most northwest Indian Ocean states. West
European governments consider this area, which has
historically been a European sphere of influence,
strategically important enough to justify substantial ef-
forts to promote stability there and to nurture closer
relations with key regional states. European interest in
the region recently has been rising, largely because of
worries sparked by the Iranian revolution and Mos-
cow's invasion of Afghanistan. The primary concern is
the security of oil supplies, including both the produc-
ing areas of the Persian Gulf and the tanker routes
linking the gulf to Europe. The northwest Indian
Ocean also provides access to the Suez Canal, which is
reassuming much of its traditional importance as a
passage for dry cargo between Europe and the Far
East and, with the Canal's recent expansion, for oil as
well. In addition, European interest in the area is
linked to a concern over Soviet influence in Africa.
47. France maintains a continuous Indian Ocean
naval force of about 14 ships, which for years was the
largest such force from a Western country. (See figure
2.) The fleet is supported from bases in Djibouti-
and 25X11
on Reunion and Mayotte. France is able and probably
willing to increase this force temporarily, as it did fol-
lowing the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. It will con-
tinue to use its Indian Ocean squadron flexibly, but it
could not expand its naval presence in the region
permanently and significantly unless it curtailed its
activity in the Mediterranean and the central Atlantic.
48. The United Kingdom retains a military rela-
tionship with Kenya, where joint exercises are held,
and provides leadership and technical assistance to
Oman's armed forces. It maintains a small naval sup-
port element at Diego Garcia and periodically deploys
naval task forces to the Indian Ocean. The British are
laying plans for a limited intervention force but prob-
ably. will not be able to increase their presence
substantially until at least the mid-1980s-and even
then a significantly expanded British role in the area is
doubtful. Their commitment to critical NATO roles
and to security in Northern Ireland will make it dif-
ficult to augment their military activity in the Indian
Ocean beyond modest increases in advisers, exercises,
and port calls.
49. The Dutch have dispatched token naval contin-
gents to the Indian Ocean every two or three years but
are unlikely to do more. West Germany recently sent
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its first combat vessels there on a training cruise. Bonn
will be very cautious about projecting armed forces
outside Europe, however, lest it trigger alarm over a
resurgent German military. The proposal by the
conservative West German opposition to extend
NATO's purview to the Persian Gulf was rejected by
the government, and the idea is now moribund.
50. The only other Western state militarily active in
the Indian Ocean is Australia, which responded to the
invasion of Afghanistan by offering to assist the United
States in monitoring Soviet activity in the region. This
assistance will include added surveillance flights and
naval patrols by Canberra's own forces as well as en-
hanced US access to Australian facilities. Australia's
objective is to encourage the United States to accept
most of the Western defense burden in the area. It
does not aspire to become an "Indian Ocean power"
or, even less, a protector of the states in the western
part of the region, with which it does not have close
relations.
51. The West Europeans will limit their military
response because of budgetary constraints, their desire
to maintain defenses closer to home, and the hazards
they associate with a military approach to problems in
the Indian Ocean. One of the hazards they fear is
damage to detente in Europe. They also are wary of
bolstering the Western military presence in the Indian
Ocean if this appeared to lead only to another cycle of
stepped-up deployments to the region. Furthermore,
they are skeptical that the United States, which would
have to shoulder the heaviest part of the military bur-
den in countering Soviet moves in the region, is ca-
pable of doing so. The West Europeans believe that
cultivation of good relations with the regional states-
including Ethiopia-through aid and diplomacy
would more effectively protect Western interests in
the area. This approach, they believe, avoids the dan-
gers of military confrontation and capitalizes on anti-
Soviet sentiment that the invasion of Afghanistan
aroused in many Islamic and other nonaligned
countries.
52. In sum, augmentation of military resources in
the northwest Indian Ocean will be only a small part
of a balanced West European response to sharpened
competition in the region. The Europeans might be
willing, if events warranted, to reinforce their naval
and military assets in the area somewhat and would
probably accept some coordination among themselves
and with the United States (although not within an
alliance framework) to increase their effectiveness in a
crisis. Most allies, particularly West Germany, prefer
an increased "division of labor," however, whereby
their own defense efforts would be concentrated in
Europe while the United States diverts military re-
sources to the Indian Ocean. They also will show in-
terest in schemes designed to "stabilize" foreign activ-
ity in the Indian Ocean, perhaps even listening to
Soviet proposals of this type. Meanwhile, the Europe-
ans will nurture their bilateral ties with the oil-produc-
ing states.
53. Most Europeans believe their main asset in the
Indian Ocean region is not military force but rather
influence based on economic, cultural, and political
ties. They also believe they are better able to influence
the Arab states for having increased their distance
from US policy on the Palestinian issue. France and
the United Kingdom in particular have retained links
with most of their former colonies. At times, the colo-
nial experience seems more of a liability than an asset
as many countries become more intent on avoiding
neocolonialism or the appearance of it. In the Indian
Ocean archipelagoes, this experience also left a legacy
of territorial grievances involving islands remaining
under European administration (including the claims
of Mauritius to Diego Garcia and of Comoros to
Mayotte). Furthermore, European aid programs have
their share of friction and distrust-most notably in
Djibouti, where the Gouled government is unhappy
with the pace of French military and financial aid and
Paris is displeased by Djibouti's receptivity to Libyan
overtures. Nevertheless, several regional states rely on
Western Europe enough for aid or commerce that
they would be reluctant to take steps, particularly
overt alignment with the Soviets, that would jeop-
ardize these relations. The island republics in particu-
lar depend heavily on Western Europe for develop-
ment aid, investment, purchase of agricultural
products, and foreign exchange from tourism.
54. For the time being, most pro-Western regimes
on the Arabian Peninsula will continue to look to the
United States as the power ultimately most capable of
defeating serious threats to their security. Further ero-
sion of confidence in the United States or a souring of
relations with Washington, however, would lead most
of them to turn first to other Islamic countries or
Western Europe for additional arms or other types of
security assistance. If these countries become increas-
ingly disenchanted with US Middle East policy, they
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probably would look more and more to Western
Europe not only for weapons but also for intercession
with Washington to change its stance on the Palestin-
ian issue-overtures to which the Europeans may be
increasingly responsive. Existing European security
arrangements with individual states in the region,
including those of the United Kingdom with Kenya
and Oman (despite plans for Omanization of the
armed forces) and of France with Comoros and Dji-
bouti, probably will continue as long as the present
regional regimes remain in power.
55. Most northwest Indian Ocean states would wel-
come support from other Third World countries as be-
ing more consistent with nonalignment than reliance
on a superpower or its allies would be. Although Third
World states cannot match the superpowers' ability to
manufacture arms or project military force, the Arab
oil exporters have a natural resource that is vital to
other regional states and that has made the exporting
countries wealthy enough to bestow economic aid and
finance foreign purchases of weapons. They also have
sufficient interest in the region to use their aid to com-
pete vigorously for influence there, particularly in
Arab League states.
56. Because of their ideological differences, they
often compete with each other. Djibouti and Somalia
are principal intra-Arab bones of contention. In the
former, Libya and Iraq are trying to wean the Gouled
regime from Western arms and aid while France and
Saudi Arabia use their support to try to keep it in the
moderate camp. In Somalia, Arab hardliners led by
Iraq have put heavy pressure on President Siad to ob-
serve Arab League sanctions against Egypt, which Siad
has resisted in order to preserve his military supply
relationship with Cairo. One of Siad's chief Arab
patrons-Saudi Arabia-so far has not pressured him
to follow the Arab consensus, evidently considering it
more important to keep Soviet influence out of So-
malia and to maintain Mogadishu's military position
against Marxist Ethiopia.
57. The US-Soviet competition in the area is stimu-
lating Arab donors to make new offers of aid in an
effort to keep regional states out of the embrace of a
superpower, particularly a hostile one. Iraq has been
particularly active in expanding its relations with, and
offering assistance to, numerous states in the northwest
Indian Ocean region. The prospect of US access to
Somali facilities apparently led Iraq and the United
Arab Emirates (UAE) to offer financial assistance to
Mogadishu. Kuwait and the UAE reportedly planned
to use aid to dissuade Oman from granting military
facilities to the United States, and Saudi Arabia and
other Persian Gulf states may offer assistance to South
Yemen once again as an inducement to leave the So-
viet orbit.
58. Arab resentment against the intrusion of foreign
military forces in Arab lands-expressed in Iraq's pro-
posed Pan-Arab "charter" barring foreign military
forces from Arab soil-could mean some reductions in
aid to states that expand security ties with a major
power. Most Arab donors, however, will conclude that
the sharpened strategic rivalry makes flexible and
imaginative use of their oil and money more impor-
tant than ever. They often will see continuation of
assistance in their own interest even if they dislike
many policies of both the recipient and the major
power with which it cooperates. In particular, Saudi
Arabia's distaste for the secular and socialist aspects of
Siad Barre's regime does not preclude continued Saudi
aid to Somalia, although recent relations between
Riyadh and Mogadishu have been cool.
59. For countries worried about their physical
security, oil money cannot substitute for the military
support of a major power. Governments whose most
pressing concerns are financial rather than military,
however, will be more likely to rely on Arab aid. The
island republics may seek such assistance to better re-
sist the blandishments of major powers desiring use of
their ports and airfields.
Regional Cooperation
60. Strategic competition in the northwest Indian
Ocean probably will stimulate new attempts to en-
hance cooperation among states in the region. The
objectives would be to counter pressures toward align-
ment, to facilitate mutual assistance, and to harmonize
demands for the exclusion of great-power rivalry from
the area. The very tensions and polarization that such
schemes would be designed to counteract, however,
are reducing further what already were poor prospects
for significant new intraregional arrangements.
61. The island republics constitute one obvious re-
gional group, but their disparate domestic politics, dif-
ferent interpretations of nonalignment, and some un-
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resolved interisland quarrels probably will preclude
formation of anything approaching an alliance that
embraces them all. The relatively like-minded regimes
in Seychelles and Madagascar, which have cooperated
militarily, could conclude a defense agreement.
Nevertheless, both governments realize they cannot
furnish each other much help and would still look else-
where for military and economic support.
62. Cooperation among the Arab states of the Per-
sian Gulf should be aided by their common ethnic
heritage and the potent dream of Arab unity, but this
goal has always eluded them. The gulf states have an
aspiring leader in Iraq, and Baghdad's qualifications to
fill this role have grown along with its increasing eco-
nomic and military strength, its enhanced influence in
the nonaligned movement, the ostracism of Egypt in
Arab councils, and the fall of the Shah and the result-
ing deterioration of Iran's armed forces. Iraq has
endeavored to become more acceptable to the conserv-
ative gulf states by moderating its more extreme rhet-
oric and demonstrating its independence from the
USSR. Baghdad has used the war with Iran to further
its claim to leadership of the gulf states by posing as a
defender of the "Arab nation" against the "Persians"
and demanding, as a condition for peace, return to the
UAE of gulf islands seized by the Shah.
63. The regional US-Soviet military rivalry touched
off by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan directly chal-
lenges the Iraqi ambition. In particular, Baghdad sees
a US-Omani security relationship as preempting its
own effort to succeed the Shah as protector of the
lower gulf states. Iraq's response has been vehement
denunciation of all superpower military intrusions in
the region (including the Afghan invasion as well as
the US attempt to secure access to facilities) and a
campaign to win support for its Arab charter.
64. The turmoil in Iran has encouraged the Arab
gulf states to think again about cooperation insofar as
they all worry about a spread of the Shia revolution.
Additional concern over events in Iran and the effects
of US-Soviet competition have driven Saudi Arabia
and Iraq closer together despite their ideological
antipathy. Nevertheless, the barriers to further
cooperation in the gulf are considerable. Saudi Arabia
and Oman consider the proposed charter an infringe-
ment on sovereignty, neither wants to hinder further
the ability of the United States to aid them, and all of
the conservative gulf rulers retain much of their tra-
ditional distrust of Iraq. Furthermore, the Iranian.
revolution has been a mixed blessing for Iraq's ambi-
tions because it has forced Baghdad to devote more
attention to containing its own restive Shias and Kurds.
Other Arab states have expressed varying degrees of
support for Iraq in its war against Iran, but the gulf
states have not translated such expressions into signifi-
cant military cooperation with Baghdad. They fear
that such cooperation would make them targets of
Iranian retaliatory strikes. In any case, the gulf states
are wary of becoming ensnared in any exclusively bi-
lateral dispute concerning the Iraqi-Iranian border.
65. Expanded cooperation among states of the Horn
of Africa-a sometime Soviet goal-is unlikely.
Although limited military collaboration between
Ethiopia and Kenya probably will continue, the pros-
pects for similar arrangements are virtually nonexist-
ent between Somalia and either Kenya or Ethiopia.
66. Cooperation with neighbors will be one more
avenue some northwest Indian Ocean states explore as
they try to ensure their security while avoiding
embroilment in the US-Soviet rivalry, but it is unlikely
to become a major source of support. To hedge their
bets or to avoid heavy dependence on a superpower,
most will turn first to bilateral assistance from other
willing benefactors, including Western Europe and
wealthy Arab states.
Future Response to the Competition
Security Cooperation With the Superpowers
67. The future willingness of the northwest Indian
Ocean states to permit access to their facilities or
otherwise to assist the United States or the USSR to
compete militarily in the region will depend in large
measure on factors other than the competition itself.
Some of these factors will be partly or wholly outside
the superpowers' control.
68. One is internal political change. In particular,
further chapters in the Iranian revolution will help to
determine the extent of any Iranian subversive or mili-
tary threat to the rest of the Persian Gulf, the spread of
instability to neighboring states, Soviet influence in the
area, and perceived US interests and intentions there.
All of these will shape the security climate in the re-
gion and with it the security policies of regional states.
Political changes may be less likely outside Iran, but in
several currently pro-Western states they probably
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would bring to power rulers less inclined to rely on the
United States. Any successors to the present regimes in
Saudi Arabia and the smaller Persian Gulf states would
probably be more nationalistic and even less likely
than their predecessors to cooperate militarily with
Washington. A coup in Djibouti probably would re-
duce if not end its security ties with France. Military
cooperation with the United States would be more
likely to survive changes of power in Kenya and So-
malia-especially Kenya, where the political elite uni-
formly favors a pro-Western course.
69. Another type of change that could alter the
alignment of regional states is settlement or escalation
of local conflicts. An end to warfare in the Horn of
Africa or a significant easing of tension between South
Yemen and its neighbors-although neither seems
likely in the near future-would reduce polarization
in the area and probably loosen the ties between re-
gional states and their patrons. Without the need for
Soviet and Cuban military support to combat
insurgencies in Eritrea and the Ogaden, Ethiopia
might open itself more to non-Communist influence as
it sought economic benefits from Western powers or
moderate oil-producing states. A Somali regime that
had made peace with its neighbors also would shift its
priorities from military to economic needs, making a
security relationship with Washington appear less
important as long as the oil-rich Arab states provided
financial aid. Conversely, eruption of a new local war
involving, say, one of the Persian Gulf emirates could
dispel present reservations about establishing or
strengthening security ties with the United States or
another major power. Concern that the Iraqi-Iranian
war may spread to other Arab states could have this
effect, as suggested by Saudi Arabia's recent request
for US AWACS (airborne warning and control system)
aircraft to assist its air defense forces.
70. The willingness of regional states to cooperate
with the United States or the USSR also will depend on
their perceptions of the overall balance of strength-
not just the balance in the Indian Ocean-between the
superpowers and on the general coherence, durability,
and sensitivity of each side's foreign policy. The mod-
erate Persian Gulf states will draw further away from
the United States if they perceive that its power is
receding in the face of a stronger, more assertive
USSR. After the presidential election they will scruti-
nize US foreign policy for signs of greater firmness and
consistency than they feel Washington has exhibited.
If they see none, their reluctance to place their se-
curity in US hands will grow.
71. Barring major change for any of the preceding
reasons, drastic realignments in the region comparable
to Somalia's expulsion of the Soviets in 1977 are un-
likely. Alignment with one side in the strategic rivalry
burns some of the bridges to the other, making not
only realignment but also a strategy of accommodation
less feasible. Increased superpower activity in the re-
gion, including US access to Somali facilities, has no
doubt strengthened Soviet arguments for further ac-
cess to Ethiopian facilities, which Moscow could con-
tend was necessary to defend the Mengistu regime and
to counter US military capabilities. Addis Ababa
recently granted the USSR exclusive use of Dahlak
Island. Kenya and Oman appear committed to a pro-
Western course, and closer US-Somali ties will all but
end Mogadishu's already limited opportunities to im-
prove relations with Moscow.
72. Nonetheless, the favors any one of these states
grants to its patron will depend heavily on what it
thinks it is receiving in return. Oman's Qaboos will
expect US economic and military aid at least sufficient
to offset the negative effects of a US military presence
on his territory. Most of all, he will look for a strong
and continuing US commitment to Omani security
that is tailored to Omani sensitivities. Although Kenya
has made few demands in discussing access rights with
the United States, it has high expectations for US eco-
nomic assistance. It hopes also that the United States
can influence Somalia to give up its expansionist aims.
If either of these objectives goes unrealized-as the
latter one might, in view of Siad's refusal to renounce
publicly his claim to Kenyan territory-Nairobi may
reconsider its military relationship with Washington.
Siad Barre will likely accept substantially less military
hardware than he has requested in return for US ac-
cess to Somali facilities, but his later demands for arms
are apt to increase. He might threaten to curtail US
access rights to gain either additional aid or US ac-
quiescence in his support to the Ogaden insurgents.
73. Djibouti and Bahrain probably will continue for
the time being to permit US forces to use their air and
naval facilities, but these privileges rest on shaky
ground. President Gouled, who personally clears all
requests for US P-3 flights, feels he has not received
sufficient economic aid in return for his cooperation.
This dissatisfaction, increased radical influence on his
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government, or external pressures may spell future
difficulties in obtaining access to Djibouti facilities.
Use of the port at Bahrain could become a casualty of
Arab disgruntlement over the festering Palestinian
problem.
74. Unless US credibility and capability decline a
great deal further in their eyes, the pro-Western states
of the northwest Indian Ocean generally will continue
to accept a US military presence in the area as a coun-
terweight to radical and Soviet assets whether or not
they permit one on their own territories. Because of
the risks of US-Soviet military escalation and their
persistent doubts about Washington's resolve, how-
ever, these regimes will seek to impose clear limits on
the size, character, location, and use of US military
forces.
75. Countries other than Somalia that entertain a
US military presence will want to minimize its visibil-
ity and the publicity given to it. The semantic and
legal distinction between a foreign base and access to
an indigenously controlled facility will remain impor-
tant to them even if the practical difference is slight.
Because troops tend to receive more attention than
materiel, these regimes generally will be more sen-
sitive about foreign personnel on their soil than about
military construction or pre-positioning of equipment.
In countries where resentment of foreign influence is
most likely to become a problem, as in Oman, pref-
erence will be given to US deployments that can be
isolated from the local population.
76. Other moderates share these concerns about the
visibility of any US military presence and in addition
will want to keep US forces outside their own coun-
tries. To minimize further the political costs of becom-
ing identified with foreign military activity, many of
them will voice opposition to such a presence even if
they find it reassuring. Mauritian Prime Minister
Ramgoolam, for example, openly denounces the US
presence on Diego Garcia even though he welcomes it
in private. Similarly, the Saudis have accepted US ac-
cess rights in Oman and Somalia despite publicly dis-
sociating themselves from these arrangements.
77. If force levels in the region stabilize, the pub-
licity given to the strategic rivalry and to access
arrangements no doubt will diminish, and some of the
sensitivity of regional states regarding these arrange-
ments might lessen as well. Nevertheless, the limits to
their tolerance of nearby military activity probably
will not change appreciably. Furthermore, their
continued acceptance of forces and access privileges
already in place will depend on the purposes for which
they are used. The Persian Gulf states will continue to
be suspicious that US military operations are also in-
tended to improve the US capability to seize oilfields.
Arab countries with large Shia populations also would
be very worried by any future US military action
against Iran. None of the gulf states is likely to approve
deployment of US ground forces in the area for any
reason short of defense of one of them against overt
aggression.
78. The most attractive support facilities that cur-
rently are closed to foreign powers but to which the
Soviets may try to gain access are in the island states-
specifically, the port and airfield at Diego Suarez in
Madagascar and the anchorage and abandoned British
airbase on Gan in the Maldives. The Soviets will at-
tempt to parlay Madagascar's growing indebtedness
into access to its installations. Rumors have circulated
that President Ratsiraka will end his policy of barring
foreign warships from his harbors and open Diego
Suarez to Moscow. Such a move seems unlikely for
now, chiefly because Ratsiraka could face hostile re-
actions from conservative internal elements, from Iraq
(his primary source of oil), and most of all from
France, which has increased its financial aid to
Madagascar dramatically during the past two years. If
Ratsiraka senses increased domestic or external dan-
ger, however, his resistance to Moscow's blandishments
will diminish and the chances for Soviet access will
increase. Gan likely will remain closed as a base to
foreign forces. Maldivian President Gayoom follows
the lead of moderate Arabs and nearby nonaligned
states like Sri Lanka, and he probably will continue to
resist the repeated Soviet attempts to lease Can.
79. Island ports that are relatively open to both
superpowers, including Male in the Maldives and Port
Louis in Mauritius, likely will remain open, partly be-
cause of the economic benefits of foreign ship visits.
The Mauritian and Maldivian governments both wel-
come a moderate number of port. calls by US warships,
enough to balance Soviet visits. The welcome in
Mauritius, however, might end: if the leftist MMM
(Mauritian Militant Movement) came to power or
even entered a governing coalition.
80. Seychelles has imposed restrictions on port calls
and aircraft landings that sharply curtail US activity
there while having little effect on the limited Soviet
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use of Seychelles facilities. The next US casualty in
Seychelles could be the satellite-tracking station on
Mahe Island, whose benefits to the local economy,
once deemed important, now seem expendable. Re-
negotiation of the lease (now under way) will be dif-
ficult in view of Seychelles' demand for a major in-
crease in the rental fee. Even if agreement is reached,
the tracking station's long-term future is precarious
given President Rene's opposition to US activity in the
region.
Multilateral Diplomacy
81. The US-Soviet military competition has height-
ened interest in an Indian Ocean "zone of peace" as a
device for excluding, or at least condemning, great-
power rivalry in the area. Diplomatic machinery for
discussion and negotiation of such a zone has existed
since the UN Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean
was established eight years ago. Preparations have
begun in the committee for a possible UN conference
on the Indian Ocean to be held in Sri Lanka in 1981.
There will thus be ample occasion for the Indian
Ocean states collectively to denounce the superpower
rivalry in their backyard. Few, if any, of the partici-
pants in this exercise expect it to produce effective
arms control (partly because disagreement over the In-
dian Ocean states' own military activities impedes
agreement on the terms of a zone of peace). Nonethe-
less, it is a convenient and low-cost opportunity to re-
cite the shibboleths of nonalignment and to resist, at
least rhetorically, the pressures toward alignment.
82. Most nonaligned members of the Ad Hoc
Committee will continue to press for an Indian Ocean
conference, although divisions among the nonaligned
and opposition from Western powers make the timing
and format of such a gathering uncertain. Malagasy
President Ratsiraka recently confused the issue further
by calling for a summit conference on a zone of peace
to be held in his capital, Antananarivo, in late 1981 or
early 1982. Disagreement over the appropriateness of
either a ministerial or a summit conference could
mean that discussion of the zone will merely continue
in the Ad Hoc Committee.
83. The USSR has attempted to exploit the height-
ened interest in northwest Indian Ocean security by
floating a proposal for an international conference to
guarantee the security of Persian Gulf oil. The Soviets
also almost certainly framed the Afghan Government's
recent peace plans, which linked a settlement in
Afghanistan to the creation of an Indian Ocean and
Persian Gulf zone of peace. The purpose of these So-
viet initiatives is to develop a dialogue with the West
Europeans and Indian Ocean states, to focus attention
on US military activity in the region, and to attenuate
the Afghanistan issue by placing it in a larger context.
84. Such Soviet efforts are apt to be only partially
successful. Denunciation of foreign military bases will
be a major theme in future diplomacy on a zone of
peace, with Diego Garcia serving as the principal
lightning rod for criticism. Recent discussions of a
zone, however, have paid increased attention to the
threat posed by land forces to littoral and hinterland
states, and a continued Soviet occupation of Afghani-
stan would also be the target of sharp diplomatic at-
tacks. Any document emerging from a future Indian
Ocean conference probably would be only a hortatory
declaration that implicitly criticized both super-
powers.
Other Foreign Policy Implications
85. The sharpened competition will affect the de-
gree of support and opposition to other US foreign
policy efforts, not just military activity in the Indian
Ocean. One reason for this is that most regional states,
once they establish close security ties with a super-
power, become more disposed to support that power's
overall foreign policy line. With greater polarization in
the Horn of Africa, Ethiopia can be expected to be-
come more stridently pro-Soviet and anti-American,
although it probably will not break diplomatic rela-
tions with Washington. Somalia already has adopted a
more moderate approach to international issues as
relations with the United States have improved over
the past year. The prospect of closer ties with the
United States also seems to have increased Kenya's in-
clination to support US foreign policy efforts, particu-
larly those, like the Olympic boycott, that are re-
sponses to a Soviet threat.
86. Governments that do not throw in their entire
lot with one camp or the other will prefer to temporize
on issues that do not concern them directly-as .Dji-
bouti, despite its pro-Western orientation, has done
since independence. With a sharper US-Soviet rivalry
in their region, equivocation between East and West
on such issues may appear even more desirable than
before in order to stay out of trouble with both sides.
Moderate regimes unwilling to cooperate openly with
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Washington on security matters, however, may sup-
port US and Western interests in less direct and hence
less hazardous ways. For example, the moderate Arabs
might help deflect Iraqi or other radical efforts to
punish Oman and Somalia for maintaining ties with
the United States.
87. Closer security ties with a regional state risk
identifying the United States with its client's unpopu-
lar policies. Ill will arising for this reason probably
would be most widespread if, despite the US-Somali
military agreement, Somalia's support for the Ogaden
guerrillas continued unabated or escalated. Resent-
ment against the United States could increase not only
in Ethiopia but among other members of the OAU,
which opposes the revision by force of colonial bound-
aries in Africa. Elsewhere, the risk is that US support
for a regime that is overthrown in a coup or revolution
increases the chance that the new rulers will be anti-
American, and perhaps that the populace will become
so as well. Public unhappiness with a discarded gov-
ernment usually is transferred to its patron, as hap-
pened to the United States in Iran. If the United States
has furnished arms, it becomes vulnerable to the more
specific charge that it has abetted oppression.
88. Perhaps the US foreign policy effort most in
danger of meeting stronger opposition as an indirect
result of the sharper competition is the negotiation of
peace in the Middle East. Increased concern over the
security of oil supplies has made the West Europeans
more anxious than ever to cement relations with the
oil producers and in general to emphasize closer ties
with regional states rather than military escalation as a
way of handling the crisis in the area. This likely will
mean greater European backing for Arab positions in
the Arab-Israeli dispute. In addition, the leverage the
oil-rich- Arab states have gained by becoming an in-
creasingly attractive alternative source of support may
lead many regional states to endorse the dominant
Arab view more strongly. The dependence of Kenya
and the island states on Arab oil already makes them
careful not to offend the producing states. Kenya re-
cently extended diplomatic recognition to the Pal-
estine Liberation Organization, apparently in ex-
change for promises of aid from Iraq and other Arab
countries. Further dependence on the oil exporters for
financial assistance could lead to more far-reaching
and more explicit promises of mutual support.
89. Over the longer term, the strategic competition
with the USSR-or more precisely, a perception that
the USSR was winning that competition-could jeop-
ardize the Western political and economic position in
the Persian Gulf. The Soviets, if they should increase
their influence in Iran or deal US interests a sharp
setback in North Yemen or Oman, would be even bet-
ter able than they are now to play on the insecurities
of Saudi Arabia and the smaller gulf states. The gulf
states might then try to buy protection by accom-
modating Soviet interests, particularly on oil policy.
90. The outcome of the insurgency in Afghanistan
could change the regional states' perceptions of Soviet
capabilities but probably would have little effect on
their judgment of Moscow's intentions. If Soviet forces
succeed in quashing the Afghan resistance, some mod-
erate governments in the area may become more in-
clined to accommodate the USSR. The Afghanistan
issue would remain as an irritant in Moscow's relations
with Islamic countries, however. If a military stale-
mate in Afghanistan continues indefinitely or Soviet
forces there suffer more dramatic setbacks, regional
state perceptions of Soviet strength, and with them any
inclinations to accommodate Moscow, probably would
decline. Nevertheless, even a Soviet withdrawal from
Afghanistan would be unlikely to shake the moderates'
belief that Moscow intends eventually to extend its
control to the Persian Gulf.
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