SOVIET POLICY AND AFRICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP09T00367R000400330001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 47
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 16, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 1, 1981
• Content Type: MISC

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National To cret
Intelligence 25X1
Council
Soviet Policy and Africa
National Intelligence Council
Memorandum
W\)
To cret
NIC M 81-10003
March 1981
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National Top Secret
Intelligence 25X1
Council
Soviet Policy and Africa
National Intelligence Council
Memorandum
Information available as of 23 February 1981
was used in the preparation of this Memorandum.
This memorandum is based on substantial con-
tributions by the Offices of Political Analysis,
Economic Research, and Strategic Research in the
National Foreign Assessment Center and by the
Directorate of Operations, and has been co-
ordinated with these components. It was prepared
by he Analytic Group of the
National Intelligence Council under the supervision of
the National Intelligence Officer for the USSR
and Eastern Europe, with the cooperation of the
National Intelligence Officer for Africa.
Top Secret
NIC M 81-10013.1
March 1981
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10 ecret
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Overview
Soviet Policy
and Africa
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Soviet policy toward Africa represents more than the mere exploitation of
opportunities. It is driven by objectives that have remained reasonably stable
over the years:
? To offset and undermine Western political, economic, and military
influence.
? To expand the Soviet presence on the continent.
? To facilitate the expansion of Soviet influence in North Africa, the
Arabian Peninsula, and the Indian Ocean littoral.
? To promote specific Soviet military interests.
? To enhance Soviet claims to a global superpower role.
? To gain political support from African countries for Soviet undertakings in
international forums.
? To stimulate changes advantageous to the USSR in African regimes
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Soviet success in achieving these aims has been mixed. For a variety of
reasons, the Soviets suffered a number of setbacks before 1974: the over-
throw of Nkrumah in Ghana (1966); the coup against a pro-Soviet regime in
Mali (1968); a decline in Soviet influence in Guinea; the failure of a
Communist coup in Sudan (1971); and the expulsion of the USSR from
Egypt (1972). More recently, the Soviets have been confronted by:
? The loss of use of the naval and air facilities at Berbera, resulting from the
Soviets' decision to pursue what they viewed as greater opportunities and
stakes in Ethiopia, although they knew this would put their gains in
Somalia at serious risk.
? The transfer of power in Zimbabwe in 1980 to a black majority govern-
ment controlled by Robert Mugabe's ZANU rather than the Soviet-
backed Joshua Nkomo's ZAPU.
? Termination by Guinea in 1977 of the right to stage TU-95 maritime
reconnaissance flights from Conakry.
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? The refusal by Cape Verde in 1980 to grant the USSR naval access rights.
Since 1974, Moscow has been able to take advantage of a confluence of
circumstances that offered new opportunities and tools with which to pursue
its aims, particularly in countries experiencing new nationhood?the type of
African country in which the Soviets scored gains in the 1960s. Soviet
activity from 1974 to date has marked a new phase in Soviet relations with
Sub-Saharan Africa, reflecting:
? Major openings presented by the collapse of the Portuguese empire,
conflict between Somalia and Ethiopia, the fall of the Haile Selassie
regime, and growing black opposition to white rule in southern Africa.
? A Soviet perception that the United States has, until recently, been
unwilling or unable effectively to contest the spread of Soviet influence in
Africa, and that such expansion would accordingly entail little military
risk.
? A Soviet assessment of the enhanced strategic significance of the Horn of
Africa?with respect to the promotion of Soviet interests on the Arabian
Peninsula and in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean regions generally.
? The need to compensate for the reduction of Soviet influence in the Middle
East occasioned by the deterioration of relations with Egypt beginning in
1972 and by the Camp David accords of 1978.
? A greater willingness on the part of some African states as well as
insurgent groups to accept Communist military assistance and support,
and of Africans to tolerate large-scale and overt combat involvement by
Communist states in African affairs.
? The availability of a proxy?Cuba?especially well suited to the military
and political requirements of the situations at hand.
? Possible heightened Soviet concerns about future deployment to the
Indian Ocean of US strate ic systems?both ballistic missile submarines
and carrier-based aircraft
Under these changed circumstances the Soviets managed to achieve major
gains and significantly strengthened their position in Africa, although they
were not immune to reverses. Since 1974 the Soviets have:
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? Used their airlift and sealift capabilities to provide large-scale military
assistance, military advisers, and technicians to clients at great distances
from the USSR.
? Helped keep in power pro-Soviet regimes in Angola and Ethiopia.
? Signed a treaty of friendship and cooperation with Mozambique, although
so far they have neither gained access to military facilities nor entrenched
themselves in the government structure.
? Exercised command and control functions for Ethiopia in its war with
Somalia.
? Gained the use of an austere naval facility on Ethiopia's Dahlak Island in
the Red Sea as a support facility for the USSR's Indian Ocean naval
contingent, partly compensating for the loss of better facilities at Berbera
in Somalia.
? Used their presence in Ethiopia to conduct reconnaissance flights over the
Red Sea, Arabian Sea, and Indian Ocean from Asmara, continuing
activities they formerly staged from Berbera.
? Used Luanda in Angola as a naval facility and staging point for recon-
naissance flights over the South Atlantic, compensating for the loss of
Conakry.
? Greatly increased military assistance and arms sales to Sub-Saharan
Africa: from $715 million in the period 1959-74 to $4.74 billion in 1975-80
(half of which went to Ethiopia).
? Profited from the employment in combat operations of large numbers of
Cuban proxy military personnel in Angola and Ethiopia. (In 1980 there
were 15,000 to 19,000 Cuban soldiers in Angola and 11,000 to 13,000 in
Ethiopia.)
? Encouraged and coordinated the placement of hundreds of East Germans
in security, organizational, and propaganda training jobs in Angola,
Ethiopia, Mozambique, and other countries.
? Channeled arms to insurgents operating in Namibia, Rhodesia (Zim-
babwe), and South Africa.
? Quietly begun to provide technical military assistance and even military
advisers to the Libyan forces now in Chad 25X1
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lop 3eCI-CL
The new Soviet activeness in Africa does not signify that the region as a
whole has any higher priority in Soviet eyes relative to other regions than it
had previously. Sub-Saharan Africa still ranks lower than the United States,
Eastern Europe, Western Europe, China, Southwest Asia, Southeast Asia,
and the Middle East as an area of Soviet foreign policy concern. The USSR
has no truly vital security interests at stake in the region that it must defend.
Soviet military objectives in the area are?aside from Indian Ocean and
Persian Gulf concerns?of a regional rather than global strategic character;
peacetime designs are probably more important than those keyed to a
general East-West war; and desired political gains are just as salient as
purely military ones
Whether the circumstances that permitted Soviet gains since 1974 will
persist in the years ahead is uncertain. There will clearly be continuing
opportunities for the USSR and its proxies to fish in troubled waters. The
potential openings are many:
? The political, economic, and social weaknesses that will continue to afflict
Africa.
? The tendency of African military organizations to acquire as much
weaponry as possible regardless of the real level of threat.
? Abiding African suspicions of Europe and the United States.
? The presence of apartheid in South Africa and its impact on the domestic
and foreign policies of other countries in Africa. Clearly, the Soviets view
support for the African struggle for majority rule in Namibia and South
Africa?in all of its political, economic, military, and diplomatic
dimensions?as a key element in their approach to Sub-Saharan Africa
over the next decade
Of the many problems Soviet and Soviet proxy actions in Africa may create
for the United States in the next several years, the most acute could be:
? Extension of the USSR's influence in Sub-Saharan Africa by providing
military assistance?either directly or through the Cubans?to Soviet
clients in the event of internal instability in Zaire, Zambia, or Zimbabwe,
or by collaborating with the Libyans to exploit instability in Chad or
Sudan.
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? Soviet provision of significantly larger numbers of advisers and equipment,
or more support for the Cubans, in order to prop up Moscow's "own"
regimes in Angola, Mozambique, and Ethiopia if they were threatened
with internal collapse, whether provoked or not by US assistance to
dissident elements.
? Military conflict between a Soviet client regime and a third country?with
or without Soviet encouragement. For example, Ethiopian encroachment
on Somalia, or?less likely?fighting between Angola and South Africa
linked with Namibia.
? Soviet acquisition of a new foothold in West Africa.
? An increased Soviet naval and air presence in the region, if the Soviets
were successful in obtaining access to port facilities and airfields in various
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We do not believe, however, that Soviet behavior in Sub-Saharan Africa is
likely to present a frontal challenge to the West in the areas of access to
strategic metals or oil. Even under circumstances favorable to the Soviets
they would not be able either to seize Sub-Saharan strategic metals for
themselves, or?barring a collapse of political order in South Africa?to
impose a prolonged denial of them to the West; nor does Soviet behavior to
date suggest that the Soviets themselves are currently pursuing either a
seizure or a denial strategy in the near or middle term. Likewise, Soviet
naval activities around the Horn and off the coast of East Africa do not
signal an active intention of interfering with the flow of oil supplies for the
West, given the supremely high risk this would entail and Soviet naval
inferiority in the region. Rather, these activities are intended to promote
essentially political objectives?as well as enhance the USSR's future
strategic capabilities in the area
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Increased Soviet activity in Sub-Saharan Africa will not necessarily assure
greatly heightened future Soviet influence. Indeed, during the past year
Soviet comment has betrayed a sense of frustration over Moscow's loss of
initiative in the region. The Soviets are probably worried by the possibility of
a peaceful Western-sponsored Namibian settlement, by their own failure to
back the right horse in Zimbabwe, by US success in winning a grant of
military facilities from Kenya, by the pro-Western stance of Nigeria, and by
the tendency even for clients like Angola and Mozambique to seek greater
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Top Secret
In the future, as the Soviets encounter new opportunities, they will also face
old constraints:
? Foremost among these is the preference of virtually all African regimes,
including recipients of Soviet and proxy assistance, to manage their own
affairs.
? Virtually all African regimes are suspicious of Soviet motives.
? The Soviets and their proxies are not alone in Africa. Most African
countries operate within a Western-oriented international economic order,
and receive sizable assistance from the major Western powers and interna-
tional organizations, which the Soviets cannot match.
? The difficulty of translating military or economic assistance into lasting
political influence, a problem the Soviets have always faced in Africa
But, in addition, there are new factors that could seriously impair the ability
of the USSR in the 1980s to extend its gains:
? South African intervention against the MPLA forces in Angola and
Somalia violation of the territorial integrity of Ethiopia made it possible
for the USSR and Cuba to introduce their military contingents in those
countries while remaining on the "right" side of the Africans. Such
fortuitous circumstances might not be repeated in the future.
? Africans may be more chary now of superpower involvement than they
were in the 1970s.
? The Soviets are encountering difficulties in consolidating their influence in
Angola, Mozambique, and Ethiopia. Existing frictions may well multiply
as Moscow attempts to impose a pattern of institutionalization of power
favorable to its own interests, while failing to respond adequately to the
economic needs of its clients.
? The Cubans are more than Soviet agents; they have their own policy aims,
which have conflicted with Soviet aims in the past and could do so in the
future
Despite the opportunities already mentioned for maneuver in Sub-Saharan
Africa which the Soviets may be able to create or exploit, and despite the ex-
panded means at their disposal to do so, the Soviets in the 1980s will
nevertheless be vulnerable to Western counteraction, particularly with
respect to:
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? The Soviet inability to compete with the West in trade and economic
development assistance.
? The dissatisfaction of African military forces with the quality of Soviet
arms, availability of spare parts, level of maintenance provided, and
training.
? The dependence of the Soviets on Cuban proxy military forces. It could
force difficult and potentially embarrassing choices on the Soviets if, for
whatever reason, the Cubans decided to remove or substantially reduce
their troops in Angola or Ethiopia when this was not desired by the host
regime.
? The incompleteness so far with which Soviet-style political controls have
been institutionalized in Angola, Mozambique, and Ethiopia, and the
consequent potential for leadership defection from Soviet tutelage and for
divergence of the system from the Soviet-preferred model.
? Suspicion among Africans of Soviet intentions, which has been reinforced
by Moscow's arm-twisting attempts to exploit dependency relations for
short-term tactical gains, and by African awareness of attempted Soviet
subversion.
? The perception widely held by Africans that "Russians" harbor racist
attitudes.
? Soviet lack of leverage to encourage the sort of negotiated resolutions of
the Namibian and?perhaps eventually?South African problems that
many leaders of black African countries would probably prefer to see.
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Contents
Page
Overview
iii
Soviet Objectives
1
General Considerations
1
Some Specific Aims
2
Military Interests
2
Africa and the Persian Gulf
4
Stimulating Change in African Regimes
4
Access To and Control Over Strategic Metals
4
Exploitable Vulnerabilities in Africa
5
Soviet Capabilities
6
The Role of Proxies
7
Proxies and the Reasons for Them
7
The Cubans
7
The East Europeans
8
Implications for the United States
9
Soviet Perceptions of the Future
9
Key Areas of Current and Potential East-West Competition
9
The Horn of Africa
9
Namibia, Zimbabwe, and South Africa
10
Other Countries
11
Threatening Collapse of Client Regimes
12
Soviet Risk-Taking
12
Soviet Vulnerabilities
12
Annex A: Current Soviet Involvement in Sub-Saharan Africa
15
Annex B: The Soviets and Sub-Saharan Strategic Metals
23
Annex C: Soviet Capabilities in Africa
31
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Soviet Policy
and Africa
Soviet Objectives
General Considerations
Soviet policy toward Africa is best understood as the
outcome of a set of fairly specific objectives which
complement and promote the USSR's broad global
purposes. These objectives have remained quite con-
stant; they are rooted in Communist doctrine and the
entrenched interests of key segments of the Soviet
political elite, and they are carried forward with
tremendous bureaucratic momentum
While the Soviets probably think that unsettled con-
ditions in Africa are likely to be especially conducive to
achieving their objectives, they also clearly assign the
region a lower priority in their scheme of things than
the United States, Eastern Europe, Western Europe,
China, Southwest Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Mid-
dle East. Apart from the incremental improvement in
its capacity to counter US strategic naval forces pro-
vided by access to ports and airfields (especially in
Ethiopia), the Soviet Union has no truly vital security
interests at stake in Sub-Saharan Africa that it must
defend. Moscow is, moreover, subject to certain con-
straints concerning Africa. The USSR has an interest
in avoiding:
? Direct military confrontation in the region with the
United States or West European powers.
? Actions that would have a high probability of
worsening Soviet relations with Western Europe or
with valued Third World countries.
? Burdensome economic commitments to the region,
which have not paid off in the past and for which
resources are unavailable
Soviet objectives in Sub-Saharan Africa are to:
? Offset and undermine Western political, economic,
and military influence.
? Facilitate the expansion of Soviet influence in North
Africa, the Arabian Peninsula, and the Indian Ocean
littoral.
1
Top Secret
? Expand the Soviet presence on the continent.
? Promote various Soviet military interests.
? Enhance Soviet claims to a global superpower role.
? Gain political support from African countries for
Soviet undertakings in international forums.
? Stimulate changes advanta eous to the USSR in
African regimes.
The Soviets do not believe that these objectives can be
quickly realized; and they are well aware of reverses
they have suffered in the past: the overthrow of Nkru-
mah in Ghana (1966); the coup against Keita in Mali
(1968); the failure of a Communist coup in Sudan
(1971), which was blamed on the Soviets (although
they in fact did not instigate it); the expulsion of the
USSR from Egypt (1972); termination by Guinea in
1977 of permission to stage TU-95 maritime recon-
naissance flights from Conakry; the forced choice be-
tween Ethiopia and Somalia, leading to the loss of
Berbera (1977); and the victory of Robert Mugabe's
ZANU over the Soviet-backed Joshua Nkomo's
ZAPU in Zimbabwe (1980). Nevertheless, the Soviets
pursued most of these objectives vigorously in the
1970s; overall, the effort expended represented a
quickened impulse in Soviet policy toward Africa.'
Why did the Soviets seek to realize their aims more
aggressively at this juncture?
First, local opportunities beckoned:
? Somali irredentist ambitions.
? The collapse of Portuguese power in Mozambique
and Angola.
' Current Soviet involvement in Africa is summarized by country in
annex A.
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? The overthrow of Haile Selassie and radical turn in
Ethiopian politics.
? The black insurgency in Rhodesia.
Second, there were new strategic considerations:
? The need to compensate for the reduction in Soviet
influence in the Middle East occasioned by the
deterioration of relations with Egypt beginning in
1972, and the USSR's later exclusion from participa-
tion in the process of settlement of the Israeli-Arab
dispute with the Camp David accords of 1978.
? US development in the mid-1970s of new naval and
air facilities at Diego Garcia, which may have
heightened Soviet concerns about future deployment
to the Indian Ocean of US strategic systems?both
ballistic missile submarines and carrier-based
aircraft.
? The radical shift of world economic power to the
Middle Eastern oil-producing states and the
vulnerability of the West displayed in the 1973
OPEC oil embargo, which made the Persian Gulf
region an even greater object of Soviet interest than
it had been previously
Finally, the possibilities of bringing Soviet military
power to bear in Africa were improved:
? The Soviets perceived prospects for diminished com-
petition in Africa from the United States in the wake
of Vietnam and Watergate, and reduced resolve to
counter Soviet military initiatives.
? Acquisition by the USSR in the late 1960s of access
to Aden as a naval and air staging point increased the
capacity of the Soviets to deliver military assistance
into the Horn of Africa.
? A proxy?Cuba?was available through which
Soviet interests could be pursued.
rclear_clit.1
Most of the Soviet objectives noted above are
but several points require further discussion.
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Some Specific Aims
Military Interests. Soviet military objectives in Sub-
Saharan Africa serve both defensive and offensive
aims. These include:
? Gaining access to facilities in Africa (see accompany-
ing map) from which the USSR can conduct recon-
naissance and targeting missions?in particular the
monitoring of US and Western naval activities in the
Atlantic and Indian Oceans, especially US sub-
marines and aircraft carriers.
? Securing Soviet sea lines of communication between
the European USSR and the Soviet Far East.
? Denying Western access to military bases or
facilities.
? Protecting Soviet fishing and merchant marine fleets
on both sides of Africa.
? Securing access or transit for Soviet military forces
being deployed to various locations worldwide.
? Gaining permission to stockpile limited amounts of
materiel and fuel in Africa mainly for Soviet use.
? Providing military assistance?particularly arms
and advisers?to protect revolutionary changes and
favored insurgents or client regimes against Western
counteractions.
? Establishing bases from which subversion or insur-
gency potentially could be supported either in the
Arabian Peninsula (for example, North Yemen) or in
adjoining African states (such as Zaire)
These Soviet military objectives in Sub-Saharan Af-
rica are oriented less toward global than toward re-
gional strategic concerns?including those in the Mid-
dle East and Persian Gulf. "Peacetime" designs are
probably more important than those keyed to a general
East-West war, and political ains are just as salient as
purely military ones
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Africa and Persian Gulf Oil. Soviet military moves in
the Horn and along the east coast of Africa are partly
related to Moscow's interest in expanding its influence
with respect to Persian Gulf oil, but the connection at
present is almost certainly more political than military.
The Soviets' attempts to establish a presence along the
east coast of Africa are not in doubt; but this does not
signal an intention to interfere with the flow of oil
supplies to the West. They lack the forces to do so, and
are aware that to employ even inadequate forces for
this purpose could lead to the most serious possible
confrontation with the West. More importantly, how-
ever, it is unclear why the Soviets would opt for this
uncertain means if they wanted to cut off oil to the
West (with all that entailed as to the danger of major
conflict with the United States and Western Europe)
when it would be much easier for them either to close
down Persian Gulf oil facilities or to interdict passage
through the Strait of Hormuz. To the extent that these
moves to establish a military presence in the region are
related to oil, the aim is probably to parlay their
psychological impact into increasing acceptance of the
Soviet Union's claim to recognition as a "security
guarantor" of Persian Gulf oil, and into greater Soviet
influence in the Persian Gulf region and along the
northern littoral of the Indian Ocean
Stimulating Change in African Regimes. In reaching
decisions related to political action, Moscow divides
African regimes into two categories: "capitalist" re-
gimes, and regimes of a "socialist orientation." The
Soviets are uncertain how rapidly the former can be
altered in a "progressive" direction, but their strategy
for fostering this objective is straightforward: encour-
agement of structural changes in the economy, society,
and foreign relations of a country that are compatible
with "national capitalism" but which undercut the
influence of pro-Western and moderate elements in the
population, thus laying the groundwork?the Soviets
hope?for more "progressive" changes later on
The Soviet attitude toward the leftist, self-designated
"socialist" or even "Marxist-Leninist" regimes
(including Angola, Mozambique, and Ethiopia) is ex-
tremely cautious. The Soviets look at these regimes in
Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, Benin, Cape Verde, Congo,
Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Madagascar, Tanzania, and Sao Tome and
Principe.
Ton Secret
the light of what they have learned through bitter
experience in Egypt and Somalia, and judge them still
highly vulnerable to defection from a solidly pro-Mos-
cow orientation. They see the possibility either of
creeping capitalism or the "treason" of new Sadats
Moscow's aim, which Soviet commentators make no
bones about, is to prod and assist the leaders in these
countries to institutionalize the revolution: to build
disciplined parties, organize reliable internal security
systems, purge the armies of politically unreliable ele-
ments, and form mass organizations to circumscribe
and channel the activity of key social groups in the
population at large. In the economic sphere, Soviet
strategy is to encourage a gradual elimination of pri-
vate enterprise and an even more gradual shift of trade
toward the Soviet bloc, avoiding radical measures that
could totally isolate a regime from its own population
or confront the USSR with undeflectable demands for
massive continuing Soviet economic support. Pro ress
in achieving these aims has been very slow.
Access To and Control Over Strategic Metals. The
three countries besides South Africa that produce
substantial quantities of any of the four strategic met-
als found in Africa (cobalt, chrome, platinum-group
metals, and manganese) are Zaire (cobalt), Zambia
(cobalt), and Zimbabwe (chrome). Of these metals, the
Soviets are self-sufficient in all but cobalt. We believe
that, barring radical changes in South Africa, the
Soviets under the most favorable conditions (including
revolutions of the Angolan type) would be unable to
achieve more than a moderate degree of concessionary
access themselves to strategic African metals (some
cobalt from Zaire or Zambia is all that they need for
their own purposes, and only until the mid-1980s), and
a limited measure of influence over sales of cobalt to
the West by these two countries or of chrome by
Zimbabwe. The Soviets would not be able to corner the
international market in these metals, although they
might attempt to engage in collusive price setting with
African producers. They could, however, work to pro-
mote disorder in these three countries that might?at
least for a while?shut down production and prevent
exports. Such a turn of events would have painful but
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not disastrous consequences for the West. If Zaire or
Zambia were the targets, collapse of exports would
also damage Soviet economic interests: until the sec-
ond half of the 1980s, when it will become an exporter
of cobalt, the USSR will probably depend on imports
from these two countries to meet a significant share of
its own cobalt requirements.
Direct evidence of how the Soviets themselves size up
the strategic metals problem is very thin, precluding a
confident judgment that their assessment is the same
as ours. Soviet behavior to date that is immediately
related to African strategic metals does not display a
very active intention to exploit Western vulnerability,
although Soviet spokesmen frequently call attention to
this vulnerability. Our best judgment is that the metals
consideration is a longer term, background element
that combines with other, more immediate aims shap-
ing Soviet behavior toward Sub-Saharan Africa.'
Exploitable Vulnerabilities in Africa
The capacity of the USSR to realize its objectives in
Sub-Saharan Africa depends in the first place on the
opportunities that are available. The extent and limits
of current Soviet involvement in Sub-Saharan Africa,
and prospects for future Soviet gains, are significantly
conditioned in the first lace by African perceptions of
the Soviet Union.
Most Africans are wary about Moscow. They are
sensitive to the international competition between the
Soviet Union and the United States, and regard that
competition as providing opportunities to further their
own interests?but also risks of entanglement. Even
those governments that rely on assistance from Mos-
cow to prop them up exhibit a large degree of
independence, and many of those that are strongly
anti-Soviet applaud Moscow's support on African
problems
Most Africans welcome the support Moscow has given
to national liberation groups in Zimbabwe, Namibia,
and South Africa. When possible, they prefer to have
military assistance to those groups funneled through
the Organization of African Unity (OAU)?which
Moscow, however, is generally unwilling to do. They
' The reasoning behind our position is presented in annex B.
5
regard such assistance as crucial in allowing liberation
groups to exert the pressure necessary to force their
adversaries to accept a settlement. They draw back,
however, from purely military solutions?largely be-
cause of the Angola experience and a realistic appre-
ciation of African military inadequacies?and prefer
to work for Zimbabwe-type negotiated settlements. 25X1
Many African states look to the Soviet Union for arms
that they cannot obtain from the West, although they
do so with mixed feelings. Although the USSR pro-
vides virtually no arms on a grant basis (even Ethiopia
is required to repay, primarily in hard currency), Mos-
cow still pressures clients to adopt pro-Soviet positions.
Some countries, such as Nigeria and Zambia, pay for
their arms with hard currency or minerals in an at-
tempt to avoid any question of political indebtedness to
Moscow. Even those countries that do not pay in cash, 25)(1
such as Tanzania, Uganda, Congo, and Guinea, do not
slavishly adopt pro-Soviet positions. 25X1
Moderate states, such as Zambia, fear that Soviet
involvement in domestic politics would accompany any
large Soviet military presence associated with arms
agreements, and have tried to limit the number of
Soviet technicians and advisers in country or arrange
for training to be carried out in the Soviet Union.
Other states, fearing an external threat from Western
powers or exile opposition elements, are happy to have 25X1
a Soviet presence. Such was the case with Guinea in
1970 when President Sekou Toure, facing Portuguese
retaliation for his support of the insurgents in Por-
tuguese Guinea, gave the Soviets access to air and
naval facilities in exchange for arms and a Soviet naval
presence in the area. Although Guinea now is putting
distance between itself and Moscow by curtailing
Soviet access and by accepting Western aid, it still
regards Moscow as its key arms supplier 25X1
African political systems are built on single parties and25X1
often these parties are poorly organized, are ill dis-
ciplined, and lack a broad popular base. Weak orga-
nization and discipline are also often characteristic of
African intelligence and security services. Generally,
African leaders admire the effectiveness and discipline
of Soviet and East European Communist parties and
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security organizations even while deploring the Soviet
political system. Because of a basic fear of Soviet
involvement or penetration, or a desire not to show
themselves as tools of Moscow, they are inclined to
turn to the East Germans or the Cubans for training in
the fields of political organizing and security
Most African states are willing to establish trade and
aid relations with Moscow. Such agreements seldom
work to the advantage of the Africans, however, and
often lead to protracted and acrimonious disputes over
terms. Such has been the case with Moscow's develop-
ment of a bauxite mining project in Guinea. Africans
have found Soviet conduct in other development
projects (for example, the projected large Nigerian
steel mill) to be inept as well as heavyhanded. Even
countries which tilt toward Moscow have resented
Soviet exploitation of so-called joint ventures, in such
areas as fishing. Guinea-Bissau has forced Moscow to
accept various revisions in the original fishing agree-
ment, and Angola recently concluded a joint agree-
ment with Spain following a longstanding dispute with
the Soviets over the division of the catch and Moscow's
refusal to improve Angola's own fishing fleet
Soviet Capabilities ?
African states are dissatisfied with the meager eco-
nomic aid Moscow provides. This dissatisfaction is
particularly strong on the part of countries that claim
to be "scientifically socialist" or "Marxist-Leninist,"
such as Congo, Benin, and even Angola, Mozambique,
and Ethiopia. Such countries will remain dependent on
the Soviet Union for military assistance but are seek-
in economic assistance in the West and from China.
The Soviets themselves, while unhappy over certain
political developments of the past year or so (such as
the defeat of Joshua Nkomo, whom they supported, by
Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe), nevertheless foresee an
intensification of longer term processes of social
change in Africa that will provide good opportunities
to enhance the influence of the USSR. And in this
assumption they are probably correct. Africa is going
through what is likely to be a protracted period of
instability, and we expect the 1980s to be a decade of
intensified economic difficulty, social dislocation, and
civil disorder in this part of the globe.
Top Secret
In the sphere of economic relations, the Soviets discov-
ered between 1959 and 1969 how difficult it would be
for them to compete with the West for influence in
Sub-Saharan Africa through economic aid. Between
1970 and 1974, new Soviet aid overtures ground to a
virtual halt. Between 1975 and 1980, Soviet economic
aid commitments to the region were about $500 mil-
lion (when credits for a large steel mill project in
Nigeria are excluded). During the same period, mili-
tary sales escalated steeply to $4.4 billion. Clearly,
arms supply and military assistance have become the
primary vehicle by means of which the Soviets have
attempted to establish their influence in the region.
While their successes in so doing have been substan-
tial, their dependence on this single instrumentality
leaves Soviet relationships with client countries poten-
tially vulnerable to erosion.
Moscow has a significant military power projection
capability, which it has twice already brought to bear
on Sub-Saharan Africa. The USSR's Military Trans-
port Aviation (VTA) can mount a major, unopposed
airlift in a short time and sustain it. And the Soviets
have developed airborne and amphibious units
which?in addition to their conventional forces?can
be used for intervention in distant areas. Nevertheless,
the Soviets would encounter serious difficulties in
? For a more detailed discussion of Soviet capabilities, see annex C.
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delivering substantial numbers of airborne troops or
amphibious forces to many African locations, particu-
larly if such movements were opposed
The Role of Proxies
Proxies and the Reasons for Them
In assessing the Soviet use of proxies in Africa, it is
important for us to emphasize that "proxies" are not
synonymous with "puppets." The large-scale Cuban
military forces and substantial East German political-
security training presence in Sub-Saharan Africa serve
Soviet objectives. But the Cubans and East Germans
are there because the Cuban and East German leaders
decided that this would serve the interests of their own
regimes. In short, the proxy relationship is based on
mutual interests.
The relationship is fairly described by the term
"proxy," however, because the Cubans and East Ger-
mans are performing tasks which the Soviets
would?in some cases?have been unwilling to per-
form for themselves because of their high political
7
costs. From the Soviet standpoint, proxy activity
makes a great deal of sense; it has permitted
effective?and perhaps critical?military support of
Soviet clients when the only alternative to their col-
lapse or severe setback might have been the unprece-
dented direct involvement of Soviet ground forces; it
has reduced the chances of US political and military
counteraction; it has permitted military actions on the
ground in Africa to be presented in a Third World/
"national liberation" context rather than as a mani-
festation of superpower conflict; and it has effectively
exploited the African belief that other Communist
regimes are less threatening than the USSR 25X1
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The Cubans
Cuban military activity in Sub-Saharan Africa did not
begin with the massive troop buildup in Angola in
1975; Cuban military instructors and technicians had
already been dispatched previously to a number of
African countries as one manifestation of Cuban in-
terest in the region?an interest that preceded the
1969 reconciliation between Castro and the Kremlin.
And it is clear, that Cuba was pursuing its own objec-
tives in intervening in Angola, rather than responding
reluctantly to Soviet commands. Whether or not there
were initial Soviet reservations about putting the Cu-
bans in Angola (analysts differ on this issue), the 25X1
Soviets obviously firmly decided at some point that
Cuban troops were desirable, and the operation ro-
ceeded with close Cuban-Soviet cooperation 25X1
In the case of Ethiopia, Cuban interest was less pro-
nounced than it was toward Angola. Here there may
have been a much more clear-cut display of willingness
on the Cubans' part to serve as Soviet Gurkhas. Cuban
combat forces were introduced by the Cubans primar-
ily to serve Soviet rather than Cuban objectives. 25X1
Large numbers of Cuban troops remain in both Ethi-
opia and Angola, and there is little chance that many
of them will be brought home in the next year or two 25X1
unless external reasons are compelling. The Castro
regime maintains that a sizable Cuban military pres-
ence is required in both countries so long as a signifi-
cant external threat exists. This is virtually an admis-
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sion that Cuban leaders see no likelihood in the near
term that the Ethiopian or Angolan armed forces will
be able to assume full responsibility for national
defense?although Cuban ground forces are doing lit-
tle fighting today in either country; apart from train-
ing, their presence serves basically deterrent and politi-
cal psychological functions. Small Cuban military
detachments of advisers and technicians are in a num-
ber of other African countries, and Havana shows no
signs of reversing its policy on this type of support
activity so long as political benefits can be gained from
it
Also significant is the Cuban civilian presence in
Africa, particularly in the fields of public health,
construction, education, and agriculture. In some
cases, Cuban personnel are supplied because of the
political benefit that accrues to Havana in bilateral
relations and in multilateral forums. In many cases,
however, the Castro regime is simply exporting surplus
labor in exchange for desperately needed hard cur-
rency. Cuban leaders openly acknowledge the rising
trend in their exportation of labor and claim that by
1985, in the construction field alone, Cuba will have
more than 25,000 le working abroad, many of
them in Africa.
It is clear that the Cuban leadership sees its foreign
assistance programs as effective means of achieving
foreign policy goals. By aiding actual and prospective
allies in a tangible way, Cuba satisfies its ideological
need to promote internationalism, gains prestige as a
benefactor ostensibly driven by altruistic ideals, and
provides sustenance to Fidel Castro's ego by creating
the im ression that Cuba is a major actor on the world
stage
Of key importance, of course, is Havana's relationship
with Moscow and Cuba's need to guarantee continued
massive Soviet support. The Cubans may fear that
Moscow will be willing to underwrite the Castro re-
gime only as long as Cuba can provide vital services in
return. Castro will temper neither his basic antipathy
toward the United States nor his determination to
become a pivotal figure in world politics and he is thus
compelled to ally himself with the only superpower
that can give him what he needs to maneuver success-
fully within these self-imposed confines. There are
circumstances in which he can act relatively independ-
ently or can fend off Soviet pressure to act in a certain
fashion; but in the final analysis his policy decisions are
conceived with the realization that they must be sal-
able in Moscow if the flow of Soviet aid (including
virtually all of Cuba's oil) so vital to his continuation in
power is to be maintained
The possibility of Cuba's becoming involved in yet
another major military undertaking in Africa, there-
fore, is very real. If, for example, Mozambique were to
require an infusion of Cuban combat units to prevent
the overthrow of the Machel government by South
African?supported rebels, Havana almost certainly
would respond favorably if it were convinced that the
United States would not intervene militarily, that
Moscow would approve and provide the necessary ma-
terial support, and that the Cuban forces could
successfully turn the tide. But it is also possible that
concern over US intentions toward Cuba mi ht induce
Havana to return some of its forces to Cuba
The East Europeans
The East European states?some in close cooperation
with the Soviets?are seeking to increase their influ-
ence in Africa. The East Europeans see a great advan-
tage in selling arms for cash and developing potential
sources of key raw materials and, over the past several
years, have become increasin ly involved in providing
technical assistance
Among the Communist states, East Germany has
specialized in assisting newly established regimes in
Africa?especially Angola, Mozambique, and
Ethiopia?to reinforce their political control by devel-
oping security and intelligence organizations. This
assistance?most likely coordinated with the Soviets
and on occasion directly urged by them?extends to
establishing an orthodox party organization, training a
political cadre, and organizing mass media. The East
Germans have long sought to establish a "presence" in
African?and other Third World?countries and have
offered such assistance as a means to gain entry into
those states. They have achieved success only in the
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past several years
East German activity will probably continue to
increase as new opportunities develop. From the Soviet
standpoint, East Germany is useful because of its lower
profile, loyalty, and technical proficiency. For the East
Germans, a motivation as strong as pleasing Moscow is
to bolster the insecure East German state's drive for
international prestige and political influence in order
to compete with West Germany
Implications for the United States
Soviet Perceptions of the Future
Whether the circumstances that permitted Soviet
gains since 1975 will persist in the years ahead is
uncertain; existing constraints on Soviet progress?the
preference of virtually all African regimes to manage
their own affairs, the general suspicion of Soviet mo-
tives, and the involvement of African countries in the
Western international economic s stem?may be re-
inforced by new obstacles.
The Soviets themselves are prepared for the long haul
in Africa. While they are constantly attempting to
position themselves to exploit opportunities that may
arise, they basically do not anticipate any quick break-
throughs and are conscious that setbacks will probably
occur. Indeed, over the past year Soviet comment has
revealed a sense of frustration over Moscow's loss of
initiative in Africa. The Soviets are probably worried
by the possibility of a peaceful Western-sponsored
Namibian settlement, their own failure to back the
right horse in Zimbabwe, US success in winning a
grant of military facilities from Kenya, the pro-West-
ern stance of Nigeria, and the tendency even for clients
like Angola and Mozambique to pull in the direction of
economic ties with the West. The Soviets are also
confronted with a delicate situation in their relations
with France: while France plays a key role in Soviet
attempts to maintain detente with Western Europe and
split Europe from the United States, France itself has
been on the cutting edge of opposition to developments
in Sub-Saharan Africa that would advance Soviet
interests?in West Africa, Shaba Province of Zaire,
Cape Verde, and now Chad.
9
Nevertheless, the Soviets are optimistic now that over 25X1
the long term the tide in Africa is in their favor: from 25X1
their standpoint the establishment of pro-Soviet leftist
regimes in Mozambique, Angola, and Ethiopia rep-
resents a big step forward; internal conditions for
revolutionary changes in "capitalist" African countries
are maturing; and in their view the eventual collapse of
white power and radicalization of politics in South
Africa are not in doubt 25X1
2bAl
The precise strategy that the Soviets will adopt in the
1980s to promote their objectives through political
action will, of course, be heavily influenced by the
opportunities that arise. Clearly, the Soviets view sup-
port for the African struggle for majority rule in Na-
mibia and South Africa?in all of its political,
economic, military, and diplomatic dimensions?as a
central element in their approach to Sub-Saharan
Africa over the next decade. Beyond this point, how-
ever, there are probably differences of opinion in Soviet
policymaking circles over where the key opportunities
are likely to arise and how they can best be exploited.
Key Areas of Current and Potential East-West
Competition
The Horn of Africa. So far, the fighting between
Ethiopia and Somalia has been contained to the Oga-
den, although occasional Ethiopian forays into So-
malia have taken place. Diplomatically, the Soviets
have benefited from being on the side of the Ethiopi-
ans, whose argument that they are fighting to maintain
Ethiopia's territorial integrity commands great sup-
port in Africa. The situation would change, however, if
Ethiopia staged a major invasion of Somalia, as some
Ethiopian military leaders would like. Logistic weak-
nesses, however, probably preclude any such large-
scale military operations. Moreover, the Soviets prob-
ably fear that any such military action could lead the
USSR into a confrontation with the United States,
particularly if it occurs after the US-Somali access
agreement has taken hold, and reportedly have sought
to discourage it. Moscow probably is not adverse,
however, to limited Ethiopian-Somali conflict and ten-
sions. It may reason that such actions promote Ethi-
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opian dependence and create uncertainties in the
United States about the desirability of a close link with
Mogadish
The potential for East-West competition in the Horn is
further complicated by the fact that Moscow has only
limited leverage with Addis Ababa:
? Ethiopian leader Mengistu has procrastinated in
establishing a Marxist vanguard party, despite con-
stant Soviet prodding.
? He has refused to entertain the notion of a political
settlement with Somalia or Soviet suggestions that
he seek a solution to the Eritrean conflict through
negotiation.
? He has resisted Soviet pressures for a naval base at a
major port like Massawa.
? But he could change that position if he sees no hope
of driving a wedge between the United States and
Somalia.
President Siad will not give up Somalia's claim to the
Ogaden despite the political costs this policy has in-
curred in Africa. Moreover, he may try to use weapons
from the United States in future attempts to take the
Ogaden; and any future moves of his into the Ogaden
could well be viewed by Africans as having at least
tacit US support
It is not inconceivable that strains which have emerged
between Addis Ababa and Moscow will worsen during
the coming year. Ethiopia has accumulated a debt of
well over $1 billion, some of which already has been
rescheduled. Addis Ababa also probably signed a large
new arms agreement in early 1981, substantially add-
ing to its debt. Moreover, Soviet guarantees to meet
Ethiopia's oil needs run only through this year, in
contrast to Ethiopia's desire for a five-year guarantee
period. A failure on Moscow's part to grant further
financial concessions or to extend oil guarantees will
perhaps accelerate Mengistu's ongoing campaign to
find economic support elsewhere.
Tan Sperpt
Namibia, Zimbabwe, and South Africa. The area of
greatest potential for increased East-West competition
in southern Africa is Namibia. At present, the Af-
ricans, particularly the Frontline States,' are encour-
aged by the success of the settlement effort that led to
Zimbabwe's independence and are willing to work for
a similar settlement in Namibia. They realize, of
course, that South Africa is far less vulnerable to the
international diplomatic, economic, and military pres-
sures that were brought to bear against the white
minority regime in Rhodesia, and they see a conflict of
interest between the West's support for black majority
rule in Namibia (and, by extension, ultimately in South
Africa itself) and the West's economic interests in
South Africa.
Over the short term, the leaders of the South-West
Africa People's Organization (SWAPO)?the prin-
cipal Namibian insurgent group?and their African
and foreign supporters (non-Communist as well as
Communist) face a dilemma:
? The failure of the Geneva Conference on Namibia in
early January has prompted the Frontline States and
the Soviets to indicate their support for an escalation
of guerrilla operations in Namibia.
? That would lead to stepped-up South African retali-
ation against SWAPO bases in Angola and Zambia
and perhaps against host-country targets as well.
? It would also encourage Pretoria unilaterally to grant
Namibia independence under a government domi-
nated by pro?South African political parties inside
Namibia.
Thus, the Africans will attempt to keep their political
options alive through Western-backed diplomacy and
international pressures while supporting a "credible"
military effort on the part of SWAPO. They may also
The Frontline States are Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tan-
zania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
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seek UN sanctions against South Africa, but more as a
means of saving face than in the belief of the efficacy
of sanctions
The potential for civil unrest is still high in Zimbabwe.
Frictions between the rival former guerrilla or-
ganizations there have already led to several bloody
clashes, either of which could have sparked
countrywide fighting except for Prime Minister
Mugabe's adroit handling of the crises. Moscow has
cut formal ties with Mugabe's primary opponent,
Joshua Nkomo, as the price for Salisbury's agreement
to establish diplomatic relations, but is undoubtedly
maintaining clandestine contacts and might be able to
capitalize on any breakdown in internal stability.
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come, could produce a political situation that Moscow
would be able to exploit. Moscow is providing arms and
equipment to Zambia under 1979-80 agreements val- 25X1
ued at more than $200 million. Although Zambia
earlier turned down a Soviet offer to fully reequip and
reorganize the Zambian military, Moscow now has 50
to 100 military advisers and technicians in that country
and thus has a good base on which to build in the
future.
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With respect to South Africa itself, East-West com-
petition will be directed toward the Frontline States.
Those states will continue to support black majority
rule in South Africa. Frontline leaders realize, how-
ever, that they are vulnerable to military and economic
retaliation from Pretoria and that South African liber-
ation movements are a long way from being strong
enough to apply sufficient pressure on Pretoria to force
it to yield to black majority rule. Thus, they will not act
rashly. The Soviets will continue to support the Af-
rican National Congress and to train and equip South
African guerrillas; but in self-interest the Frontline
States will seek to limit the extent of Soviet involve-
ment. Pretoria will attempt to keep its black neighbors
off balance through a combination of economic meas-
ures and preemptive military strikes against guerrilla
facilities, particularly in Mozambique. South African
military actions could, of course, compel Frontline
States to seek Soviet assistance and a greater Soviet
presence
Other Countries. A number of countries in central and
southern Africa are experiencing domestic political
and economic strains that raise the potential for serious
instability in the future. Steadily deteriorating eco-
nomic situations in Zambia and Tanzania have led to
sporadic popular unrest and unprecedented criticism of
Presidents Kaunda and Nyerere, both of whom may be
serving their final terms as leaders of their countries.
Neither leader has adequately prepared for a change-
over in leadership. The changeover periods, when they
11
The Soviets hope to be able to work closely with the
new government of Uganda; they had good relations
with President Obote during his pre-Amin rule. Obote
has not consolidated his authority and may request
Soviet military assistance to suppress antigovernment
insur ents if more aid from Tanzania is not forthcom-
ing
In Zaire, economic pressures are building, although
President Mobutu so far has escaped the organized
criticism leveled at Kaunda and Nyerere. Labor unrest
and popular resentment against the central govern-
ment and the Zairian military could spark another
wave of violence in the Shaba region either
precipitated or exploited by dissidents of the National
Front for the Liberation of the Congo, which is based
in Angola and Zambia and has received Soviet-manu-
factured arms and some Cuban training. The National
Front appears determined to launch a third incursion
into Shaba hat
would attempt to capitalize on disillusionment in the
region.
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giving some technical assistance to Libyan forces in
Chad. Whatever the degree of Soviet involvement and
despite Moscow's misgivings about some of Qadhafi's
actions (such as his proclamation of unity with Chad),
Moscow has been pleased by the loss of French influ-
ence and establishment of a potentially pro-Soviet
regime in Chad. In contrast to Soviet support for
legitimate regimes in Angola and Ethiopia, however,
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the Soviet military presence in Chad along with Lib-
yan forces will be critical by the OAU and presumably
by a majority of OAU member states. Even if there is
no collaboration between Moscow and Tripoli in west-
ern and central Africa, there are important factors that
could be working to Moscow's benefit in the region:
Libya's military strength; the anti-Western and
Islamic zeal of its unpredictable leader; and, perhaps
most important, Libya's wealth. If Moscow were able
to establish a foothold in Chad, it might consider more
actively supporting subversion against President
Nimeiri in Sudan?probably collaborating to some
extent with Libya
In the Indian Ocean island states of Madagascar and
Seychelles mutual suspicions and fears of coups by
Western mercenaries have led to increased Soviet at-
tempts to exert influence. The conservative govern-
ment of Mauritius remains staunchly pro-Western,
however, becaus rt for its principal
opposition group
Threatening Col apse o lent egimes. Another
type of situation that could lead to US-Soviet con-
frontation would be a threat of collapse of one of
Moscow's "own" regimes in the region, with US in-
volvement taking the form either of assistance to in-
ternal enemies of the Soviet clients, or of participation
in the external playing out of the crisis. The scenarios
here might include an increasingly successful chal-
lenge by UNITA forces to MPLA power in Angola;
serious pressure by the NRM guerrillas against the
current regime in Mozambique; continuing separatist
activities in Ethiopia; or growing dissidence among the
military or internal schisms within the political elite of
a regime leading to a major opening toward the West.
The context in which US-Soviet conflict might occur
would be Soviet supply of larger numbers of advisers
and equipment, support?perhaps?for proxy military
involvement, but probably not dispatch of Soviet com-
bat forces
Soviet Risk-Taking
In the past, the Soviets have tended to move cautiously
in settings that could lead to military confrontation
with the United States. This pattern of behavior was
confirmed by Soviet actions in Angola and Ethiopia.
Before they made their final decisions to intervene in
Top Secret
force, Soviet policymakers first convinced themselves
that the risk of US military counteraction was negli-
gible. Probably the Soviets would, by their own lights,
be equally cautious in seizing future opportunities in
the areas of potential confrontation with the West
noted above. The point at issue, however, is whether
they would correctly assess the risks. Three factors
might lead them to miscalculate such risks: a convic-
tion that the world "correlation of forces" was moving
sufficiently in the USSR's favor to discourage US
counteraction; a judgment that domestic political fac-
tors in the United States once again would minimize
the likelihood of an American military reaction; or an
assessment that Soviet actions would have sufficient
African support as to preclude US counteraction
Soviet Vulnerabilities
Moscow has suffered major setbacks in the past in
Africa, and this could happen again; there is nothing
inexorable about its future prospects in the region.
Indeed, the Soviets suffer from a number of important
vulnerabilities.
The overwhelming reliance by the Soviets on military
might?whether arms transfers or direct military
assistance?to extend their influence in the region
reflects their weakness in other dimensions of power.
In particular, the Soviets are unable to compete with
the West in trade and economic development assist-
ance. The Soviets have not met the economic needs
even of preferred client regimes such as those in An-
gola, Mozambique, and Ethiopia, and these regimes
increasingly see the necessity of closer ties with the
West in order to survive economically.
Even Soviet military assistance to African countries is
not without its difficulties. African military forces are
often dissatisfied with the attitudes and behavior of
Soviet advisers, the quality of arms, the av liability of
spare parts, and the level of maintenance
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these countries for leadership defection from the Soviet
line and for divergence of the entire social-economic-
political system from the Soviet-preferred model.
Africans distrust Soviet political intentions. They have
experienced Moscow's arm-twisting attempts to ex-
ploit dependency relations (usually in the military
field) for short-term tactical gains. And they have also
witnessed Soviet subversion. Some African leaders
now suspect that Moscow may be encouragingLibya's
Qadhafi to destabilize their governments
The Soviets lack leverage to encourage the sort of
negotiated resolutions of the Namibian and?perhaps
eventually?South African problems that many lead-
ers of black African countries would probably prefer to
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institutionalized in Angola, Mozambique, and Ethi-
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Annex A
Current Soviet Involvement
in Sub-Saharan Africa
The USSR's major current African involvements are
with those countries with which it has concluded Trea-
ties of Friendship and Cooperation: Angola (1976),
Mozambique (1977), and Ethiopia (1978). These trea-
ties serve to delineate the economic-political-military
parameters of the bilateral relationship, and to sym-
bolize the concrete nature of that relationship. But
they do not serve as mutual defense pacts, although
they commit the concerned parties to abstain from
alliances directed at one another?and call for mutual
consultation in the event of a dangerous situation.
Major Relationships
Angola
Soviet, Cuban, and East European support has been
essential to the Popular Movement for the Liberation
of Angola (MPLA): to ensure its grip on political power
and to support its battle with insurgents of the Na-
tional Union for the Total Liberation of Angola
(UNITA) and its defense against potential South Af-
rican incursions. Soviet advisers are present in several
important civilian government ministries, including
mining; but the Angolans have kept the Soviets out of
Angolan oil production and sales. Angolan civilian as
well as military officials are being trained in the
USSR, East European countries, and Cuba in a broad
range of subjects, both professional and ideological.
The Soviets have also continued to foster relations
between the MPLA in Luanda and the Portuguese
Communist Party.
Moscow's economic assistance to Angola is negligible,
and Angola has made overtures to the West for eco-
nomic aid and investment. The Angolan economy is
moribund, largely because of the lack of technical
expertise, the cost of maintaining the Cubans (who are
paid in hard currency), and the continued fighting with
UNITA
Pervasive weaknesses hindering the development of the
Angolan armed forces will prolong heavy Angolan
15
dependence on Cuban and Soviet military assistance
for the foreseeable future. The inability of government
forces to subdue insurgents of UNITA and adequately
counter South African military incursions into south-
ern Angola continues to generate insecurity in Luanda
and promises to ensure important military roles in
Angola for the Cubans and Soviets despite Angolan
dissatisfaction with the level of their assistance
Although the presence of Cuban troops in Angola and
their involvement in combat operations have both de-
clined, Cuban military personnel continue to provide
extensive support to the Angolan armed forces. Since
1978, Cuban troops have rarely participated in
counterinsurgency warfare?the predominant mission
of government forces?while Angolan responsibility
for antiguerrilla operations has increased substan-
tially. A moderate withdrawal from Angola of Cuban
combat troops in 1979 and 1980 underscored the
reduction in combat assistance and lowered the total
number of Cuban military personnel in Angola to
between 15,000 and 19,000. These personnel, consist-
ing of a large complement of military technicians and
advisers in addition to combat troops, are heavily in-
volved in the support and operations of Angolan Air
and Air Defense Forces, play key roles in the command
of ground forces, plan and execute logistic operations
for all branches of service, and provide th 1
military training for government forces.
The Soviet military misson to Angola, numbering an
estimated 1,000 personnel, maintains a lower profile
than its Cuban counterpart but provides essential
direction and operational support to Angolan military
forces. Soviet personnel assist in the high-level plan-
ning of counterinsurgency strategy and operations and
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probably are involved in the regional command of
Angolan ground forces. The Soviets furnish important
technical assistance to the Air and Air Defense Forces
and also advise, train, and coordinate logistic support
for ground forces. Angolan-Soviet relations, like those
between the Cubans and Angolans, are often strained.
The Angolans consider the Soviets to be penurious in
their supply of spare parts and technical training to
Angolan military forces. The Angolan Government's
discontent with Soviet military assistance, however,
probably will not impede the Soviets' access to naval
facilities in Luanda or their privilege to base Ion
range naval reconnaissance aircraft there
Mozambique
Mozambique has a growing number of Cubans-
365 military personnel in 1981 and 800 civilians?
although it is somewhat less dependent on Moscow
than Ethiopia or Angola for its political viability.
Nonetheless, increased guerrilla activity by the South
African?backed National Resistance Movement
(NRM) has led to a growing reliance on the Soviets,
who not only provide arms, training, and pilots but also
play a key role in planning counterinsurgency oper-
ations. (A group of 150 Cuban counterinsurgency
specialists also reportedly arrived in early 1981.) Mos-
cow has not made military use of Mozambican facili-
ties;
The issue of economic assistance has complicated
Soviet-Mozambican relations. Moscow is apparently
uneasy over Maputo's efforts to attract Western aid
and investment for revitalizing the stagnant economy.
Nevertheless, Mozambique has been unable to win
Soviet bloc backing for membership in the Council for
Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA), and Moscow
thus far has not given Ma uto the degree of economic
support it is seeking
The Machel regime is almost totally dependent on the
Soviets for military assistance. Thus far, Mozambique
has signed agreements for some $410 million worth of
military equipment from the USSR and other Warsaw
Pact states. Nevertheless the conversion of the Mo-
zambican military from an insurgent to a conventional
force is proceeding slowly. Mozambique's faltering
economy and nearly universal illiteracy have ham-
pered the process. Five years after independence the
combat effectiveness of most units, particularly Air
Force fighter squadrons, is marginal at best.
Despite several multibrigade government offensives
against the NRM insurgent forces, the NRM presence
and influence appear to be expanding. The NRM does
not pose an immediate threat to the regime's survival,
but countering it compels the government to divert
resources that would otherwise be used for upgrading
overall military capabilities and economic develop-
ment
Ethiopia
Moscow was invited into Ethiopia in 1977 by Pro-
visional Military Administrative Council (PMAC)
Chairman Mengistu because of his need for arms to
combat the country's numerous insurgencies. Despite
his dependence on the Soviets, Mengistu has been a
less-than-pliable client. While endorsing the Soviet
positions on international questions, he nonetheless has
resisted Soviet pressure to grant major concessions: he
has refused Moscow the major naval base on the
mainland it seeks and has moved slowly in responding
to Soviet urgings to create a civilian-based Marxist
party. In recent months, elements in the Ethiopian
military have called for the expulsion of the Soviets
and the Cubans. Another source of Soviet-Ethiopian
friction is Moscow's minimal amount of economic
assistance.
Ethiopia is Moscow's most important client in Sub-
Saharan Africa, having received about $2 billion worth
of military equipment since 1977. In addition, some
1,500 Soviet advisers and 11,000 to 13,000 Cuban
troops are present in Ethiopia. In return for this assist-
ance, the Ethiopians allow the Soviets to stage recon-
naissance flights from Asmara and have exclusive use
of Dahlak Island for a naval support facility.
The Mengistu regime's dependence on Soviet military
assistance, moreover, shows little sign of decreasing, as
the Ethiopian armed forces face serious problems.
Despite their recent successes in the Ogaden, the Ethi-
opians are far from subduing their opponents and
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consolidating government control throughout the
country. Addis Ababa's military difficulties stem from
the necessity of expanding (from 50,000 to 250,000),
reequipping, and modernizing its armed forces in the
midst of a two-front war. As a result, the Ethiopians
are afflicted with heavy casualties, low morale, poor
leadership, insufficient training, and an inadequate
logistic system. Although the regime remains in con-
trol, discontent within the military appears to be
growing?as is resentment of the Soviet and Cuban
presence. (The Cubans have been relatively inactive
militarily since mid-1978.) Meanwhile, because of
combat losses, wear and tear of near-constant field
operations, and poor equipment maintenance, Soviet
military assistance will have to increase simply to
maintain current capabilities
Other Relationships
Benin
Though most military equipment in Benin's armed
forces is of Soviet origin and Soviet naval ships make
port calls at Cotonou, Soviet influence is limited by
Benin's ties to neighboring countries, which have been
designed to curb the Soviet presence (for example,
Benin's 1979 military assistance and training agree-
ment with Nigeria). Libya is reportedly financing the
upgrading of an interior airfield to provide Benin with
a second field capable of handling jet aircraft, but the
project appears to have been delayed. Libya continues
to provide Beninese personnel with military training in
Libya and may provide some arms.
Botswana
In a breakthrough for Moscow, Botswana signed a
small military assistance agreement in December 1980
calling for Soviet provision of ground and air defense
weapons. The Soviets have argued that the Botswana
Defense Force needs to be prepared to protect the
country against possible South African incursions. Bo-
tswana, however, has few other links to the Soviets and
will probably be inhibited from extensive dealings with
Moscow by the potential for an adverse reaction by
South Africa and the West
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Cape Verde
Despite Soviet naval visits in 1979, continued use of
Sal Airport for Soviet and Cuban flights to Angola,
and offers of greater military assistance (possibly
including fighter aircraft), Cape Verde has rejected
Soviet attempts to increase access to facilities
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Chad
Libyan troops, currently estimated at 6,500, entered
Chad in the fall of 1980, supporting the factions loyal
to the Chadian President and equipped primarily with
Soviet weaponry. Libyan motives in calling for a 25X1
merger of Chad and Libya appear to be purely of
Libyan inspiration. Nevertheless, the USSR has ac-
quiesced in Tripoli's use of Soviet equipment in Chad.
In fact, evidence increasingly points to some Soviet
support of Libyan troops in Chad, perhaps in a tech-
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Moscow views the installation of an anti-Western re-
gime in Chad as a favorable development and is trying
to discourage French and Egyptian support for dis-
sident leader Habre. However, neighboring countries
have experienced fear that Libyan involvement reflects
a larger Soviet design on Africa. The condemnation of
Libya's role by the Organization of African Unity
(OAU) and French unhappiness with the Libyan power
play are important constraints on Moscow. But Mos-
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Congo
Congo has had a longstanding political and military
aid relationship with the USSR. But relations of this
self-professed "Marxist-Leninist" state on most levels
with the Soviet Union are now strained, and President
Denis Sasson-Nguesso's most recent planned visit to
Moscow (December 1980) was put off at the last mo-
ment. Tensions are due to denial of regular Soviet
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military access to the naval facilities at Pointe-Noire
and the airfield at Brazzaville (though both have been
used occasionally by the Soviets), unwillingness by the
Congolese to sign a treaty of friendship and
cooperation, and the dearth of substantial economic
aid from Moscow. The Congolese have sought eco-
nomic and military aid from the West and China
Congo continues to rely on Soviet military equipment,
though complaints have been voiced over the quantity
and quality. This reliance will prevent any severe rup-
ture in relations, but will not necessarily facilitate
Soviet efforts at gaining access to air and naval facili-
ties. Soviet military personnel in Congo number 120
(there are 850 civilian economic technicians), with over
2,000 Cuban soldiers and advisers reported in
1980?but most are on rotation to Cabinda. Cuban
personnel have been removed from the President's
personal guard
Guinea
While Moscow has been Guinea's main arms supplier
since the late 1950s and is likely to remain so in the
future, President Sekou Toure has become increas-
ingly disenchanted with the USSR. In 1977, Soviet
TU-95 maritime reconnaissance flights staging from
Conakry were banned, and AN-22 flights en route to
Ethiopia were not permitted to stop in Guinea, though
flights to Angola are still granted stopovers. Conakry
remains a port facility for the Soviet West African
naval contingent, but Guinea has refused several
Soviet efforts to construct a major naval facility on
Tamara Island. Though Guinea relies on Soviet mili-
tary equipment, greater access for Soviet aircraft and
ships will not readily be available, partly because of
frictions over the following issues:
? The expulsion of many Soviet and Cuban military
personnel in late 1978, reducing the number in coun-
try to some 35 Soviets and 10 Cubans.
? Soviet demand that payments for equipment be
made in full and in cash, as opposed to previous
methods of partial credits in exchange for bauxite
deliveries.
? Guinean complaints over the quality of Soviet equip-
ment, lack of spare parts, and Moscow's poor mainte-
nance. (Problems with Soviet naval ships delivered in
1979 led to attempts by the Guineans to purchase
French naval equipment.)
Liberia
Despite energetic courting with arms and aid offers,
Moscow has made little headway with the Doe regime
in Liberia but hopes the precarious economic situation
and unpredictable nature of the current leadershi ? will
Soviet possibilities.
Economic problems p ague t e country, an
some e ements within the ruling military council and
the civilian government are pressuring Doe for more
ties with the Soviets and Soviet allies.
Madagascar
Given the country's major economic woes, Malagasy
President Didier Ratsiraka is vulnerable to pressures
from the Soviets for use of naval facilities at Diego
Suarez and air facilities at nearby Andrakaka military
airfield as repayment for the large quantities of mili-
tary equipment delivered since 1979, including light
tanks, armored personnel carriers, antiaircraft guns,
radars, and fighter aircraft. A 1979 maritime agree-
ment with Madagascar permits Soviet merchant ships
to call at island ports, but military access apparently is
still denied. In December 1980, eight Soviets were
reported assisting in the upgrading of the Andrakaka
airfield, probably for deployment of the MIG-21s
which arrived earlier that year. There now are 300
Soviet military advisers and 70 economic technicians
in Madagascar. In the event of political instability,
Moscow will attempt to ca italize on the ties it has
with local Marxist groups
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Mali
Since 1974, large amounts of Soviet military equip-
ment have arrived in Mali, including SA-3 missiles,
though deliveries are contingent on transit permission
through Guinea (not always promptly given) and, to a
lesser degree, Senegal and Ivory Coast. Mali has
permitted overflights of Soviet aircraft and occasional
stopovers of Soviet flights to Angola, but there is no
formal access agreement. Nevertheless, Soviet person-
nel have upgraded the airfield at Bamako and ex-
tended the one at Mopti Barbe, and plans are under
way for similar improvements at other Malian air-
fields
Nigeria
Although Moscow made a major but unsuccessful bid
for influence during the civil war in the 1960s by
selling arms to the victorious federal side, Nigeria's
civilian government displays an openly pro-Western
bias. Nigerian students and labor organizations have
been priority targets of Soviet subversive activities.
The Soviets are involved in a large steel mill project
and have 1,500 economic technicians in the country
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Seychelles
After the 1977 coup which installed President Rene
the Soviets began to establish closer ties with Sey-
chelles, and there were two hasty Soviet cruiser visits
in 1979, when the Seychelles Government believed a
coup attempt was imminent. Soviet influence has ex-
panded only gradually, because some ministers in the
Seychelles Government, who are suspicious of Soviet
intentions, have limited naval visits, refused student
scholarships, and discussed the Soviet threat more
openly with the West. The Soviet presence is currently
limited to five economic technicians. Nevertheless, bi-
lateral relations may expand with the signing of mer-
chant marine and scientific/cultural accords, and
achievement on a framework accord on air rights. In
addition, Foreign Minister Hodoul retains his openly
pro-Soviet and pro-Cuban outlook and apparently
maneuvered Seychelles support of the USSR in the
most recent UN vote on Afghanistan. We suspect that
Moscow may be attempting to work through its
supporters in the Seychelles Government
Moscow maintains a small military advisory mission of
approximately 50 persons in Nigeria, although the
government's desire to protect its nonaligned status
and the general dissatisfaction of the Nigerian armed
forces with existing Soviet military assistance pro-
grams constrain the relationship between Lagos and
Moscow. Soviet instructors have provided training to
the Nigerians on several types of Soviet equipment now
part of the inventories of Nigerian air and ground
forces, including jet fighters, tanks, and antiaircraft
artillery. The Nigerians, however, are known to be
disaffected with Soviet military assistance because of
Moscow's lethargy in delivering spare parts, the poor
condition of secondhand equipment recently purchased
by Nigeria, persistent language problems that hinder
training programs, and the heavyhandedness of Soviet
advisers toward Nigerian military personnel
Sao Tome and Principe
Occasional Soviet naval visits along with 400 Angolans
and some 40 Cubans support the present government
of Sao Tome and Principe, which probably would
provide limited port and air facilities should the Soviets
require access to them
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Cuba recently
opened an embassy in Victoria, and there currentl are
small numbers of Cuban medical personnel
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Since April 1979, deliveries of equipment from the
Soviet Union have included patrol craft, armored
personnel carriers, radars, and air defense weapons,
though no Soviet military personnel are known to be on
the islands. (Training and support within Seychelles
have been provided by Tanzania and Madagascar;
eight students from the Seychelles People's Liberation
Army are currently training in the Soviet Union, and
an additional eight are in Cuba.) Moscow would like to
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Tanzania
Although the USSR is Tanzania's largest arms sup- 25X1
plier (some $340 million), Moscow has been unable to
exercise any major influence in the country's affairs.
Moscow is resentful of Nyerere's condescending man-
ner, ideological pretensions, and suspicion of Soviet
motives. The Tanzanians dislike their Soviet advisers
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(about 140 are now present) and resent the lack of
Soviet support during the invasion of Uganda in 1979.
They have continued to acquire arms from other
sources, notably China and Yugoslavia. Moreover,
Dar es Salaam's military assistance relationship with
the USSR is constrained by the deteriorating Tan-
zanian economy and the increasing likelihood that it
will be unable to pay for future arms deals or even
ossibly for arms already ordered or delivered
Uganda
Moscow was pleased with the victory in Uganda's
presidential election of Milton Obote, with whom it
enjoyed good ties in the pre-Amin era. Hopeful of a
swing to the left, the Soviets have increased their
Embassy staff and technical advisory presence. A
potential exists for renewal of the arms aid relationship
that existed under Amin. But military assistance to
Uganda from the USSR and its surrogates has thus far
been limited to training of some security personnel in
Cuba and delivery of small arms. The overriding con-
straint preventing further Soviet military assistance is
the prevailing chaos in Uganda
Zaire
Despite the rapprochement between Angola and Zaire,
the Front for the Liberation of the Congo (FLNC)?
the ex-Katangan gendarmes?still hopes to "liberate"
Shaba Province from Zaire. Both Soviets and East
Germans are reported to have visited the FLNC camps
to check on the state of the military preparedness of the
FLNC,
At the same time, the Soviets are trying to upgrade
relations with Zaire, although their openings are
limited. (They have only 10 technicians in Kinshasa.)
President Mobutu remains generally suspicious of
Soviet activities in Zaire, but for personal political
reasons swings back and forth in his public position
toward the Soviets. The Soviets are known to have
dealings with dissidents both in Zaire and abroad and
to keep in close contact with Zairian students. Mobutu
is particularly suspicious of Soviet support, direct or
indirect, for the FLNC
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Zambia
Major arms deals of 1979-80 totaling $215 million
have brought a corresponding increase in the Soviet
presence in Zambia. President Kaunda, however, re-
mains wary of Soviet intentions. The Zambian military
is not entirely happy about Soviet involvement?and
often complains about training (there are 50 to 100
Soviet military advisers in Zambia) and Soviet efforts
to ensure Zambian dependence on the USSR for the
utilization of sophisticated equipment.
The Soviets are demanding the right to control access
to the bases where much of the new equipment?
particularly MIG-21 fighters and SA-3 surface-to-air
missiles?is to be located. The Zambians generally
have reacted negatively to these demarches, aware that
by consenting they would be granting the Soviets effec-
tive control of key weapon systems and military facili-
ties. Some Zambians have also questioned the cost of
the Soviet weaponry ordered, in view of the country's
parlous economic state and the fact that even when
fully operational the arms will not prevent South Af-
rican incursions
Zimbabwe
The Soviets have experienced major frustrations in
Zimbabwe. During the war against the white minority
Smith regime, they actively supported Joshua
Nkomo's Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU)
with arms and training. From independence last April
until February 1981, they were unable to reach an
understanding on diplomatic relations with Prime
Minister Mugabe?whose Zimbabwe African Na-
tional Union (ZANU) group received almost no Soviet
backing during the war. Moscow's suspicions of
Mugabe's pro-Chinese views and its reluctance to
break links with Nkomo's ZAPU were the main stum-
bling blocks. To open an embassy in Salisbury, the
Soviets were compelled to accept?at least
formally?Mugabe's demand that they break all rela-
tions with ZAPU
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Black Nationalist Movements
The Soviet Union and its proxies give varying degrees
of military support to major black nationalist move-
ments in Sub-Saharan Africa:
? The South-West Africa People's Organization
(SWAPO), which continues to conduct frequent
cross-border guerrilla raids into Namibia from sanc-
tuaries in southern Angola, receives almost all of its
arms from the USSR, and the Soviets provide ad-
vanced training for some SWAPO guerrillas. Some
Soviet advisers may also participate with Cuban and
East German instructors in providing basic training
for SWAPO cadres at Angolan camps. As a result of
their patron role, the Soviets have gained significant,
but not dominant political influence in SWAPO.
Moscow continues to press for implementation of the
UN resolution calling for the transfer of power to
SWAPO. Following the recent failure of the UN
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conference, the Soviets reaffirmed their commitment
to SWAPO leader Nujoma, promising "all that is
necessary" to liberate Namibia
? Mozambique-based insurgents of the African Na-
tional Congress (ANC)?the predominant black
nationalist movement in South Africa?reportedly
receive a regular flow of Soviet military equipment
from Angola, where Soviet and Cuban personnel
provide training to guerrilla forces. ANC cadres
have also been trained in the USSR, Eastern Europe,
and Cuba
? The Front for the National Liberation of the Congo
(FLNC), as noted above, has received Soviet-manu-
factured arms and has been in contact with the
Soviets, East Germans, and Cubans.
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Annex B
The Soviets and Sub-Saharan
Strategic Metals
The US dependence on-politically unstable countries in
central and southern Africa for manganese, chro-
mium, cobalt, and platinum-group metals?essential
military and industrial materials?leaves the United
States potentially vulnerable to sudden supply disrup-
tions. This vulnerability is heightened by the USSR's
role as the only other significant exporter of two of
these metals and its heavy involvement in the trade in
all four critical metals
The USSR is the world's largest producer of metals
and a leading source of the four critical metals. Near
total self-sufficiency in metals provides Moscow with a
far greater security of supply than that experienced by
developed Western countries. This self-sufficiency,
combined with its importance as an exporter of critical
materials, underlies the frequent speculation by West-
ern observers as to Soviet motives in metal market
dealings. In particular, developed-country dependence
on the USSR for over half of its platinum-group metal
supplies causes concern. The importance of the USSR
as supplier of other critical metals has generally dimin-
ished over the past decade as alternative suppliers have
emerged and as changing technologies have lessened
the metals' importance. These trends are expected to
continue during the 1980s.
Obviously, the problem of Western vulnerability to
Soviet action in the strategic metals area is one that
calls for very concrete analysis. We can assume that it
would be highly desirable from the point of view of the
Soviets to be able to control the allocation of African
strategic metals. What is in question is the price they
might be prepared to pay in attempting to gain such
control, and their possibilities of realizing such a goal
in practice.
African Strategic Metals
Of the four main producers of strategic metals in
Africa?Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe, and South
Africa?only South Africa is a source of all of the
23
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strategic metals; and South Africa is the only producer
in this group of manganese (some manganese is also
produced in Gabon). Zaire and Zambia together pro-
duce most of the continent's 60-percent share of world
cobalt output (see the accompanying chart), with Zaire
accounting for by far the largest fraction. And Zim-
babwe is the major source, following South Africa, of
Africa's 36 percent of world chromium output. Thus,
leaving South Africa aside, the geographical locus of 25X1
our analysis is highly circumscribed: Zaire and Zam-
bia for cobalt and Zimbabwe for chrome 25X1
Soviet and Central/Southern African Share
of World Production of Selected
Critical Materials, 1979
Percent
100
21
33
31
Other
75
46
Central/
25
Southern
Africa
36
?
60
?
50
USSR
51
44
25
31
19
Platinum Chromite
G oup Metals
583826 3-81 CIA
Cobalt Manganese
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At present, the strategic metals markets favor buyers.
Barring major political disruptions in southern Africa,
we believe that for the next several years there will be a
glut in the markets with downward pressure on prices.
Strategic metals such as chromium, cobalt, man-
ganese, vanadium, and platinum currently are in
oversupply with high user inventories and stable or
falling prices. Production increases in the future are
expected to add to this glut and lessen Western de-
pendence. Expansion is highlighted by these programs:
? Zimbabwe plans to expand its ferrochrome capacity
by half by 1982. It will then trail only South Africa
in output of this essential ingredient in stainless steel.
? South Africa is engaged in the greatest expansion of
mining activity in its history. Important new deposits
of vanadium, chromium, and platinum are now being
developed.
? Both Zaire and Zambia will continue to expand
cobalt production rapidly. Zaire's 1985 cobalt
production is slated to reach 20,000 metric
tons?equal to total cobalt consumption in the non-
Communist world in 1980
On the demand side, slow economic growth, less
steel?intensive development (for example, the trend
toward smaller automobiles), improved steelmaking
technology, and increased recycling will hold demand
for strategic metals far below past trends. In addition,
users are eliminating substantial amounts of strategic
metals by substitutin more abundant alloying metals
such as nickel
Soviet Motives
Logically, there could be two conceivable motives lying
behind a Soviet design on African strategic metals: (1)
to acquire these metals to meet the USSR's own needs;
or (2) to deny or control the flow of them to the West
for commercial gain or military advantage (or, of
course, both motives together). In reaching judgments
about Soviet motives we have information on Soviet
metals production; some very limited direct evidence of
Soviet perceptions; data on Soviet behavior, mainly
Top Secret
economic; and the possibility of making certain es-
timates of the likely outcomes of possible future strat-
egies
Soviet Critical Metals Situation
Platinum-Group Metals
The USSR produced about half of the world's plati-
num-group metals during the 1970s, South Africa
nearly 40 percent, and Canada most of the remainder
(see the chart). Soviet production in 1979 is estimated
at 3.6 million ounces
The USSR obtains virtually all of its platinum-group
metals as a byproduct in the exploitation of copper-
nickel ores. Soviet production consists mainly of
palladium?three times as much palladium as
platinum?whereas South African output is mainly
platinum. In the event of disruption in South African
supply, major importing countries would have no
choice but to turn to the USSR. Soviet offerings of
palladium rather than platinum could be increased
marginally but in any case at substantially higher
prices.
The USSR exports most of its output of platinum-
group metals. Total exports to non-Communist coun-
tries during 1970-79 amounted to 20.8 million ounces,
or about two-thirds of total estimated output during
that period. Some additional, although small, amounts
probably were exported to other Communist countries.
Annual exports reached peak levels during 1972-74,
averaging over 2.6 million ounces, but declined to
about 1.9 million ounces during 1975-79. During the
1970s, the USSR accounted for 50 to 60 percent of the
platinum- rou metals annually moving in world
trad
The USSR is assured of substantial increases in
production of platinum-group metals in the 1980s as
progress is made on a major project to expand produc-
tion of nickel and copper at Noril'sk in northern Si-
beria. Soviet production could easily increase to about
4.5 million ounces by the mid-1980s and possibly 5.5-
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6.0 million ounces by 1990. As a result, the role of the
USSR as a supplier of platinum-group metals to inter-
national markets will be greatly strengthened.
Chromite
The USSR is the world's second largest producer of
chromite after South Africa. Soviet output peaked at
about 3.5 million tons in 1975, declined to 3.2 million
tons in 1979, but rebounded to 3.4 million tons in 1980.
Soviet production in 1980 was about 20 percent short
of the original target in the Tenth Five-Year Plan. The
stagnation in Soviet production is the result of the
depletion of surface deposits in Kazakhstan and lags in
commissioning new underground mining capacity. We
believe that, at present, mine depletion accounts for
about one-half of gross annual commissionings. The
available information indicates that there is little
chance that the Soviets will be able to boost output
dramatically at least until 1985
The USSR has been a major exporter of chromite for
many years. Annual deliveries to non-Communist
countries averaged nearly 850,000 tons during 1970-
75 but fell to about 388,000 tons per annum during
1976-79. Deliveries to Communist countries amounted
to 397,000 tons in 1979, down slightly from the peak of
416,000 tons reached in 1977. Fragmentary informa-
tion suggests that total Soviet exports slipped to about
700,000 tons in 1980, roughly 10 percent less than the
amount posted in 1979. We believe that the fall in
Soviet exports is tied directly to declining domestic
production and increased Soviet difficulties in fully
covering domestic needs
The outlook for Soviet exports of chromite in the 1980s
is uncertain. Although the quality of the ore has de-
creased in recent years, the USSR still exports primar-
ily high-grade chrome ore. However, recent tech-
nological advances have weakened market preference
for high-grade Soviet ore. The use of the AOD process
in the manufacture of stainless steel permits greater
use of less expensive, high-carbon ferrochrome, which
can be produced with abundant low-grade chromite
rather than from expensive, low-carbon ferrochrome
utilizing scarce high-grade ores, such as Soviet ore
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Another uncertainty is whether the USSR, even with
adequate production, will continue to export chromite.
The Soviets have given strong indications that they 25X1
may shift to exports of ferrochrome as others with
chromite resources are doing. The Soviets have shown
interest in obtaining Western participation in ventures
to produce ferrochrome, but, as yet, no arrangements
have been made. 25X1
Cobalt
Soviet cobalt is obtained mainly as a byproduct in
nickel production. Soviet production of about 6,000
tons in 1980 ranks second only to Zaire. Although it
has exported some cobalt in the past, Soviet production
has not increased sufficiently to meet domestic de-
mand and it has been a net importer for the last 10
years. Soviet purchases, mainly from Zaire, were some
400 to 600 tons per annum during most of the 1970s,
increasing to about 1,000 tons per annum in 1978-80. 25X1
The increase in purchases probably is associated with
serious delays the Soviets have encountered completing
a new nickel/cobalt refinery at Noril'sk. This refinery
will account for all of the increase in Soviet production
of nickel and cobalt during the 1980s; its projected
capacity is equivalent to 40 percent of world output in
1979. But the refinery is already several years behind
schedule. According to recent sensitive sources, an
explosion of unknown intensity severely damaged part
of the refinery. Although the extent of the present
damage is unknown, an earlier accident in 1977 pushed
back the construction schedule for six months to a
year. 25X1
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Cobalt may remain in tight supply for some years to
come but will eventually improve as the Noril'sk
project is completed. We believe that, by the mid-
1980s, the USSR probably will be self-sufficient and
able to export cobalt to non-Communist as well as
Communist countrie 25X1
Manganese
The USSR is the world's largest producer of man-
ganese ore. Production amounted to about 10 million
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tons in 1979, up almost 50 percent over output in 1970,
and roughly double the output of South Africa, the
world's second largest producer
The Soviets have been major exporters of manganese
for many years. Total exports averaged about 1.3
million tons per annum during the 1970s. The bulk of
these exports go to other Communist countries. Soviet
sales to non-Communist countries fell from about
375,000 tons in 1970 to about 100,000 tons in 1979.
Japan and Sweden account for most of the Soviet
exports to non-Communist countries. Soviet sales to
the West probably fell because of increased availabil-
ity from non-Communist suppliers (most notably
South Africa) and possibly because of increased
domestic requirements
If past trends continue Soviet production could in-
crease to about 12-13 million tons by the mid-1980s.
This amount should be more than adequate to meet
domestic needs and provide for a growing exportable
surplus
To sum up, it is apparent that the only significant
Soviet strategic metals gap that must be covered by
imports is cobalt; and this gap will probably be closed
by expansion of domestic production capacity within
the 1980s
Soviet Perceptions
Direct evidence of Soviet intentions with respect to
African strategic metals is extremely sparse. The Sovi-
ets are, of course, fully aware of Western dependence
on African supply of these metals, and frequently call
attention to it in their propaganda. Nor do they ignore
the connection between these metals and Western mili-
tary production requirements. Other things being
equal, they would undoubtedly like, for military pur-
poses, to be in a position to clamp off this source of
supply to the West when and if they desired to do so.
Yet powerful commercial interests have led them so far
not to apply the clamp even where it has been in their
power to do so?namely to their own strategic metals
exports to the West. decisions were
made in June 1978 at the annual session of the Soviet
TOD Secret
bloc's Council for Mutual Economic Assistance to
develop "cooperation" with Third World metals pro-
ducers. This broad declaration of intention probably
has been translated into some project planning. Evi-
dence presented below, however, suggests that, if the
idea voiced at the CEMA meeting was to move in on
African strategic metals, it has not amounted to much
so far.
Soviet Behavior
The main case of a noneconomic sort that might
conceivably throw light on Soviet intentions is provided
by the incursions by the Katangans from Angola into
the cobalt-producing Shaba Province of Zaire in 1977
and 1978. While there is conclusive evidence of Cuban
involvement in the training of the Katangans and
planning of the operation, and allegations of an East
German training role, we have no hard evidence of
Soviet guidance. Presumably, at the very least the
Soviets knew beforehand about these operations and
did not try to stop them; it is not unlikely that they gave
them their blessing?even though one of the predict-
able effects of the operations would have been t
increase the cost to the USSR of cobalt imports
In the sphere of economic behavior, there are three
areas of possible Soviet action in strategic metals that
could affect Western interests: joint ventures, bilateral
barter agreements, and market operations. In the first
area, there has been no measurable upsurge of Soviet
or CEMA involvement with metal extraction in the
less developed countries (LDCs). Indeed, a survey of
Soviet bloc economic aid to the LDCs reveals no
projects anywhere involving such key strategic metals
as cobalt, chrome, manganese, and platinum. Within
Africa the USSR has only three confirmed compensa-
tion agreements involving metals: zinc from Algeria,
lead concentrates from the Congo, and bauxite from
Guinea in repayment for mineral development assist-
ance. (Guinea supplies about 70 percent of Soviet
bauxite imports.
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In the key countries producing strategic metals?
Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe, and South Africa?the
USSR and its East European clients have virtually no
influence or investment in the development of cobalt,
chrome, platinum, or manganese.
The possibility of a bilateral deal has so far arisen only
with respect to Zambia. It has been reported that the
Soviet-Zambian arms pact signed in 1979 calls for
Zambia to pay in cobalt for at least part of the arms.
Even
if it is true, however, the amount reportedly in-
volved-300 tons?is less than 10 percent of Zambian
output and only about 1 percent of normal non-
Communist world consumption. A transaction of this
size wo ild have a negligible effect on the world cobalt
market
In the metals markets, Soviet representatives generally
have followed the pragmatic, highly businesslike prac-
tices of their Western counterparts. They have, for
example, scrupulously adhered to commitments and
have not reneged on existing contracts to take advan-
tage of price changes or to respond to altered political
relations with the West. Following US imposition of
trade sanctions in January 1980, for example, the
Soviets continued to make deliveries of strategic met-
als under prior contracts and indeed elicited additional
transactions. Similarly, during the Vietnam conflict,
the flow of critical metals from the USSR continued
unabated and in some cases increased. Nor is there any
evidence that the Soviets have ever intervened in mar-
kets intending to deprive the United States or the West
of strategic metals. Allegations to the contrary during
the cobalt "crick" of 197R were unclinnnrtahle
The Soviets, nevertheless, have proved to be shrewd
traders, highly sensitive to market situations in which
they can press for higher prices. In the 1970s, for
example, they took advantage of the chrome shortage
brought on by UN sanctions against Rhodesia to triple
the export price of Soviet chrome ore?an action fol-
lowed by other exporters. Similarly, the Soviets have
27
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used their dominant role in platinum-group metals
trade to help maintain high prices by carefully control-
ling the volume of exports. At no time have they
attempted to form a cartel or otherwise involve them-
selves in formal collusive actions. Where they are 25X1
marginal metals suppliers, and price takers, the Soviets
quickly adjust their prices at or near the prevailing
level.
Future Soviet Options
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Soviet market practices to date cannot be taken as a
firm indication of Soviet market actions in the event of
major shortfalls in supply brought on by cessation in
exports from the principal central and southern Af-
rican producers. That situation might tempt Moscow 25X1
to try to disrupt Western industry by depriving it of
critically needed metals. Platinum provides the USSR
the most leverage among critical metals. The worst
case scenario would presuppose advance knowledge on
the part of the Soviets of an impending cutoff in supply
from South Africa. Under these conditions, the Soviets
could:
? Attempt to buy dealer inventories of platinum using
multiple brokers in European and US markets to
hide Soviet involvement.
? And, more importantly, cancel orders and stop all
exports following the cutoff in South African
supplies.
As a consequence, the Soviets could theoretically de-
prive the West of roughly 90 percent of normal supply
of platinum imports. Assuming that the West had little 25X1
advance warning of the supply cutoff, it would have no
opportunity to build inventories, invoke meaningful
substitution, or expand output in Canada and other
small producers. Nevertheless, the United States' and
most of the West's essential industries could maintain
production through a one-year "crisis," aided by a
system of allocations, recourse to available substitutes,
and drawdowns of strategic reserves. US stocks are
equivalent to one year of normal demand for platinum-
group metals. Similar strategic buildups are under way
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in France and are being considered in West Germany,
Italy, and the United Kingdom. Needless to say, this
scenario depends on taking South Africa out of the
picture, which, in the near-to-medium term, is highly
problematic
Economic strategies to cut off cobalt or chrome deliv-
eries to the West from Zaire, Zambia, or Zimbabwe
also raise serious questions. It is very unlikely that any
of these countries, under any leadership, would?out of
rational economic calculations?sign a bilateral agree-
ment to sell all or most of their output to the USSR;
and, obviously, political considerations would power-
fully reinforce resistance on the part of leaders cur-
rently in power. (However, the possibility of a collusive
price-setting agreement is not inconceivable.) The op-
portunity costs to the Soviets of a bilateral purchase
scheme?both in terms of scarce hard currency sac-
rificed and probable economic retaliation from the
West?would be high. The same costs would be asso-
ciated with attempts at preclusive buying on the West-
ern metals markets. Moreover, for a variety of reasons
it is highly improbable that an attempt to corner these
markets (which do not depend on large stockpiles, deal
mainly in future output, and involve commitments to
longstanding customers) could succeed?much less be
allowed to stand by Western governments.
The crux of noneconomic strategies (political or mili-
tary) for gaining access to African strategic metals or
denying (or controlling) their delivery to the West is
that, by definition, they entail curtailing?to a greater
or lesser extent?the opportunity of African states to
get the highest price they could on the international
market in hard currency for what is the lifeblood of
their economies. Thus any noneconomic strategy
would inevitably confront two problems:
? The natural reluctance of African leaders of almost
any ideological persuasion to sacrifice their own na-
tional wealth.
? The likely social tensions and ensuing political in-
stability that would arise from the withdrawal of
economic resources from the system
Unless compensated for in some way, both problems
would, presumably, tend to increase roughly in propor-
Top Secret
tion to the economic opportunity cost imposed by
Soviet action. The greater the sacrifices imposed by
Soviet action, the more dependent the African leader-
ship would have to be on Soviet political/military
support for it to stay in line, and the more coercion
would be required to maintain social equilibrium.
Depending on the scenario, noneconomic strategies
could also entail political costs to the USSR elsewhere
in Africa and the Third World, and possible
counterproductive consequences or confrontational
encounters with the United States and other Western
powers.
The following noneconomic options would theoreti-
cally be open to the USSR:
? To interdict the transport of strategic metals out of
African countries to Western consumers against the
will of the producing countries. It is difficult to
visualize how such a blockade could avoid rapidly
escalatin into an East-West military confrontation.
? To cause production of strategic metals to be inter-
rupted by fomenting civil strife. The model in this
instance would be a "Shaba III." If the cutoff were
indefinite, the effect would be denial of cobalt or
chromite to the West, with possible large windfall
monetary gains to the USSR from price increases for
Soviet metal exports (if we are talking about Zim-
babwe chromite), or losses (if we are taking about
Zairian or Zambian cobalt before the mid-1980s).
This approach would be less risky than the first
strategy, although still fraught with unpredictable
contingencies, and might be attractive to the Soviets.
Sooner or later, as order was restored, an attempt
would be made to restore production; and at this
juncture the Soviets would certainly attempt to sup-
plant Western technical assistance and management
with their own, parlaying this aid into concessionary
acquisition of metal by the USSR and as much
control as possible over allocation of remaining out-
put
? To exploit political influence in order to gain
concessionary acquisition of metal by the USSR
and/or control over deliveries to the West. This
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strategy could work, up to a point, but its success
would hinge on how really dependent an African
leader's personal power was on Soviet support. In
Angola, the Soviets have not found it easy?indeed
possible?to translate the large joint Cuban-Soviet
military presence into acquisition of, or control over,
Angolan oil.
? To gain and exercise outright colonial control over
Zaire (Shaba), Zambia, or Zimbabwe. If the Soviets
were prepared and able to carry out such a strategy,
it would obviously give them the greatest control over
strategic metals. But this strategy would probably
commit the Soviets to a new Afghanistan deep in
Africa. It is difficult to imagine the Soviets opting for
such a high-risk strategy, with all its obvious political
costs, in the absence of the urgent need to do so that
could be provided only?perhaps?by a Soviet
anticipation of imminent global confrontation with
the United States
Conclusions
The analysis presented above suggests that:
? The key to a truly decisive economic warfare break-
through by the Soviets on the strategic metals front
lies in South Africa, with all the problems attendant
thereto from the Soviet standpoint. Obtaining con-
trol over South African supplies can be viewed only
as a long-range Soviet objective. Other opportunities
are limited to cobalt in Zaire and Zambia, and
chromite in Zimbabwe
? The Soviets themselves have a partial and temporary
need for only one African metal?cobalt, for which
there are no acceptable substitutes
? Any Soviet African metals strategy would therefore
be propelled far less by insistent internal military-
production security needs, than by the prospects of
achieving desirable but not immediately compelling
foreign policy objective
? Soviet noneconomic behavior in Africa to date has
shown, by even the most generous interpretation,
only a slight interest in the immediate and direct
attainment of ulterior metals goals
29
? In the economic sphere, the Soviets so far have not
shown the sort of interest in joint ventures that would
be dictated by a concern to gain a foothold in strate-
gic metals production 25X1
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Soviet behavior in the international metals 25X1
market to date has capitalized on opportunities cre-
ated by African supply interruptions, but has not
revealed an intention to corner the market.
? In the future, Soviet attempts at direct market inter-
vention through preclusive buying would probably
not succeed and, if interpreted as a form of economic
warfare (as they probably would be), would invite a
series of broader, more sustained and much costlier
counteractions by the West.
? Noneconomic future strategies, political and mili-
tary, to a greater or lesser degree would give rise to
the twin problems of African leadership resistance to
loss of hard currency earnings, and enhanced pros-
pects of depressed standards of living for the popula-
tion and heightened political instability
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? Probably the strategy that would best balance risks
and gains for the Soviets would be neither interdic-
tion of deliveries to the West nor outright seizure of
power in metal-producing countries. Rather, it might
involve an exchange of military support for a politi-
cally dependent African leadership group in return
for some concessionary metals deliveries to the
USSR and a measure of influence over the alloce25X1
of the remaining output to Western countries. One
way this situation could be brought into being would
be through Soviet involvement in local wars or civil
disturbances that could temporarily interrupt th25X1
production and export of strategic metals to the
world market 25X1
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Annex C
Soviet Capabilities in Africa
Clandestine Action
The USSR has a formal diplomatic presence in almost
all the African states; the exceptions are the Central
African Republic, Chad, Ivory Coast, Malawi, and
South Africa. Once having gained diplomatic entree,
the Soviets as a general rule have attempted to expand
the size of their representation as much as the traffic
will bear?and sometimes beyond this limit. Soviet
officials in African countries perform all the normal
diplomatic, consular, cultural, and intelligence-gather-
ing activities; but they are also engaged in the active
promotion of propaganda themes. Playing on residual
resentment of colonialism, they seek to influence local
governments toward Moscow, or at a minimum, away
from a Western orientation. They pursue these ends
both directly, through diplomacy and open propa-
ganda, and indirectly, through covert contacts who are
influential in the host government and society.
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Table 1
Sub-Saharan Africa:
Soviet Economic Aid Commitments a
(Million US $)
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Total
1959-69
1970-74
1975-80
Total
2,580
755
111
1,714
Angola
17
?
?
17
Chad
5
2
2
1
Congo
28
14
4
10
Ethiopia
401
102
1
298
Guinea
216
200
8
8
Madagascar
20
13
7
Mozambique
62
?
62
Nigeria
1,207
b
7
1,200c
Somalia
164
63
35
66
Sudan
65
65
Uganda
24
16
8
Zambia
15
12
3
Other
356
281
38
37
a The term commitments (extensions, agreements) refers to a pledge
to provide goods or services, either on deferred payment terms or as
grants.
b Negligible amount.
c Four-percent, 10-year credits.
Economic Aid, Training and Services, and Arms Supply
Economic Aid
After a decade (1959-69) and $755 million in commit-
ments to 17 countries, the early Soviet economic aid
program could claim few successes and failed to win
the sympathies of the new nations on the continent.
The West continued to provide more than 90 percent of
total aid committed to Sub-Saharan Africa?on some-
what softer repayment terms than given by the
Soviets?and accounted for an even greater share of
the aid actually delivered
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In the next five years (1970-74) new Soviet aid over-
tures ground to a virtual halt, with extensions hovering
around $20 million a year. Assistance increased to
$100 million in 1975, and was marked by Moscow's
largest and final commitment of credits and food
grants to Somalia. Since then, the Soviets have ex-
panded their economic aid program only minimally (to
about $40 million a year), apart from a large trade
credit on near-commercial terms to Nigeria for build-
ing a steel mill and $300 million committed to Ethiopia
for agricultural development, oil and as exploration,
and oil import subsidies. (See table 1.)
After the initial foray into black Africa, Moscow be-
gan to draw on its experience elsewhere in the Third
World, using training and arms supply as more effec-
tive instruments of access. Thereafter, the Soviets be-
came very unwilling to extend new economic aid; arms
and military assistance became the primary vehicle
with which they attempted to establish their influence
in the region
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Table 2
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(Number of Persons) Table 3
Sub-Saharan Africa: Academic Students in the USSR Sub-Saharan Africa:
and the United States, December 1980 a Soviet Economic Technicians, 1980 a
USSR
US
Total
14,370
22,105
Angola
625
15
Benin
255
10
Cape Verde
350
15
Central African Republic
230
5
Chad
305
10
Congo
800
5
Ethiopia
2,700
1,570
Ghana
500
1,650
Guinea
605
10
Kenya
575
1,430
Liberia -
65
750
Madagascar
1,000
25
Mali
400
15
Mozambique
275
5
Nigeria
1,180
13,510
Sierra Leone
415
790
Sudan
410
Tanzania
600
360
Togo
360
15
Uganda
250
360
Upper Volta
330
15
Zambia
255
150
Zimbabwe
180
580
Other
1,705
810
a Estimates are preliminary
Training and Services
By the mid-1960s, the USSR was already providing
extensive training programs in the Soviet Union for
black African nationals. At the end of 1980, Moscow
had trained almost 32,000 of these students (some
20,000 additional in Eastern Europe) in professions
such as medicine, engineering, science, and social sci-
ence. An additional 4,500 were trained in the USSR
(and 3,500 in Eastern Europe) in technical skills. Al-
though far larger numbers have been schooled in the
West?there were 22,000 studying in the United
States alone in 1980, as compared with 14,000 in the
USSR (see table 2)?the 2,000 to 3,000 graduates
33
(Number of Persons)
Total 5,965
Angola 500
Chad
Congo 850
Ethiopia 1,000
Guinea
Madagascar
Mozambique
Nigeria
300
70
350
1,500
Somalia
Sudan
Tanzania 100
Uganda
Zambia
270
Other
1,025
a Data are preliminary. Minimum estimates of number present for
one month or more. Numbers are rounded to nearest five. In
addition, there were 5,560 East Europeans and 10,650 Cubans in
Sub-Saharan Africa concentrated in the same countries.
coming home each year have returned with Russian
language capabilities and acquaintance with Soviet
institutions and people in their fields of expertise,
whether or not their political persuasions have been
altered
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From the beginning, the Soviets have provided exten- 9X1
sive administrative, health, and teaching services to the 25X1
black African States. More than 5,000 Soviets were
working in these capacities in 1980 (supplemented by
more than 16,000 East Europeans and Cubans). (See
table 3.) Their numbers have grown especially rapidly
in the last few years because of the USSR's new
interests in Angola, Ethiopia, and Mozambique and its
growing commercial relations with Nigeria
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Table 4
Sub-Saharan Africa:
Value of Military Purchases
(Million US $)
Total
1959-74
1975-80
From
USSR
From Non-
Communist
Countries
From
USSR
From Non-
Communist
Countries
From
USSR
From Non-
Communist
Countries
Total
5,135
6,278
715
1,378
4,420
4,900
Angola
434
70
434
70
Chad
7
15
7
7
8
Congo
101
9
14
7
87
2
Ethiopia
2,232
542
6
249
2,226
293
Guinea
170
10
56
4
114
6
Liberia
16
10
6
Madagascar
97
68
40
97
28
Mozambique
311
14
a
311
14
Nigeria
208
831
101
158
107
673
Seychelles
6
2
a
6
2
Somalia
402
639
206
16
196
623
Sudan
100
1,003
93
61
7
942
Tanzania
340
77
84
21
256
56
Uganda
144
38
77
21
67
17
Zambia
264
172
11
87
253
85
Other
319
2,772
67
697
252
2,075
a Negligible amount.
Arms Supply
Reduced Soviet interest in black Africa after the initial
spurt in the early 1960s meant that the Soviets put
relatively little into military assistance before the mid-
1970s. For the most part, Moscow provided outmoded,
reconditioned equipment and basic military instruc-
tion. Somalia and Sudan were treated as special cases,
each receiving substantial quantities of arms (Somalia
$200 million worth and Sudan $100 million) before
1975 largely because of their strategic locations on the
Indian Ocean and the Red Sea. (See table 4.)
The rapid deterioration of the Portuguese position in
the early 1970s invited intensified Soviet efforts. The
Soviet decision in 1974 not to let the MPLA faction in
Angola collapse for lack of military support apparently
was only part of a larger decision to step up military
assistance to the region as a whole. Mali, Nigeria,
Somalia, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia all signed
Ton Seer et
record arms contracts with Moscow in 1974, which
added together totaled some $335 million, a commit-
ment fi ure three times as great as that of any previous
year
The success of Soviet/Cuban-backed guerrilla forces '
in Angola triggered an even sharper escalation in
Soviet military assistance to the region between 1975
and 1980. (See table 4.) Moscow campaigned hard
throughout the region, signing record arms deals with
old and new clients alike that culminated in $2 billion
worth of military aid to Ethiopia (more than five times
the value furnished to Ethiopia over the previous 20
years by the United States).
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Table 5
Sub-Saharan Africa:
Military Advisers From Selected Communist Countries
(Number of Persons) a
1974
1978
1980
USSR
Eastern
Europe
Cuba USSR
Eastern
Europe
Cuba
USSR
Eastern
Europe
Cuba
Sub-Saharan
Africa
1,320
30
3,300
515
37,275
4,095-
4,145
930
26,825-
32,825
Of which:
Angola
1,000
300
19,000b
1,000
550
15,000-
19,000 c
Chad
20
Congo
25
5
50
10
300
120
10
400
Ethiopia
1,300
100
16,500b
1,500
200
11,000-
13,000
Guinea
100
10
100
200
35
10
Madagascar
10
300
200
Mozambique
230
800
500
50
215
Nigeria
55
5
10
50
Somalia
1,000
Sudan
80
10
Tanzania
5
120
5
10
140
Uganda
30
50
5
Zambia
10
80
100
50-
100
80
Minimum number present for one month or more.
b Includes troops, who account for most of the Cuban presence in Angola and Ethiopia.
c Includes troops in Cabinda.
d Not available.
The turnaround in the Soviet arms assistance program
and the opportunities provided in Angola, Ethiopia,
and the Frontline States allowed Moscow to dem-
onstrate its ability to move large quantities of military
hardware quickly over long distances. In the process,
the USSR became the largest supplier of arms to the
subcontinent, even thou h its list of major recipients
has remained small
Moscow's post-Angolan arms aid also has earned it
sizable amounts of cash, especally since the increase in
arms prices after 1974. Prices for some big-ticket items
(fighters, air defense, and helicopters) have increased
as much as 100 percent, and terms have been hardened
for quicker paybacks. When it has perceived political
or strategic advantage, however, Moscow still accords
35
preferential treatment that is generally not obtainable
from Western sources
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The influx of more Soviet weapons, often of higher
technology than available Western models, also
brought large increases in the number of Soviet and
Cuban military personnel. The Soviet military pres-
ence is estimated to have quadrupled since 1974, with 25X1
more than 4,000 technicians and advisers assigned to
African clients in 1980. The number of Cuban troops
and advisers in Sub-Saharan Africa in 1980 has dipped
only slightly from the 1978 high of 37,275 (35,500 in
Angola and Ethiopia alone) to about 30,000. (See
table 5.) 25X1
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Once they have gained a foothold, Soviet personnel
have attempted to:
? Extend their activities and influence as widely as
possible wthin the host country's military
organization.
? Use their clients' indebtedness as a lever for attempt-
ing to extract concessions such as access to air and
naval facilities, or support for Soviet diplomatic
initiatives.
? Employ the threat of delays or cutoffs of arms and
spare parts shipments, as well as the withdrawal of
advisory and maintenance su ort, as a means of
exerting political influence
Moscow's ability to use military assistance as a means
to gain influence in Sub-Saharan Africa, however, has
its limits. Having observed the Soviets in action, many
African military and political leaders are wary of
Soviet military aid offers and the strings that are
invariably attached to them. When the Soviet presence
becomes onerous and particularly when Moscow has
imposed or threatened a cutoff of arms or spare parts, a
number of African states have moved to acquire arms
from other sources. Ultimately, if Moscow's demands
become too objectionable, the client may decide to
terminate the military assistance relationship al-
together. This drastic course of action becomes more
traumatic as the size of a Soviet mission grows. How-
ever, the Soviet ouster from Egypt in 1972 and from
Somalia in 1977 demonstrates that, even where Mos-
cow has established a redoubtable presence with exten-
sive access to client facilities and made the client
almost totally dependent on Soviet assistance, the rela-
tionship remains vulnerable to a directive from the host
government ordering Soviet personnel to leave.
Whether host countries as dependent on Soviet and
Cuban propping up as Angola or Ethiopia would ask
that their forces be removed, however, is uncertain.
Military Power Projection
The USSR's Military Transport Aviation (VTA) has
undertaken eight major airlifts to Third World coun-
Top Secret
tries, including two to Africa.6 These operations have
demonstrated that VTA can mount a major, un-
opposed airlift in a short time and sustain it. But they
have revealed limitations as well. The proficiency dis-
played has been uneven, and in some cases even rel-
atively low levels of effort have taxed VTA's capabili-
ties. Obtaining clearance for overflight, landing, and
refueling from various countries en route will continue
to be crucial to the success of VTA airlifts to the Third
World, including Africa
The USSR has developed forces that could be used for
intervention in distant areas and has introduced small
elements of them into distant-area combat situations
as early as 1971 in Egypt. We believe that Soviet
leaders in the future would be more willing to use force
for this purpose. Elements of all Soviet conventional
forces?ground, air, and naval?are potential re-
sources for use in situations that call for intervention.
Although Soviet airborne and amphibious forces have
generally been touted by Western observers as the
most likely components of any Soviet intervention in
the Third World, in practice these forces have not
played a role, though Soviet airborne divisions have
been placed on alert during several periods of interna-
tional tension
The Soviets, nevertheless, would encounter serious dif-
ficulties in delivering substantial numbers of airborne
troops or amphibious forces to African locations,
particularly if such movements were opposed. Air
transport to the region would require acquiescence for
overflight and permission for refueling stops from a
number of countries that might oppose the Soviet
effort. Limitations on the numbers of transport aircraft
available and inadequate facilities at Third World
airfields would make the delivery of an airborne di-
vision a lengthy and vulnerable process. Similarly, the
sea lanes to the Soviet naval bases from which an
amphibious operation would have to be mounted are
'These include six military airlifts?to the Middle East (June 1967),
North Yemen (November 1967), the Middle East (October 1973),
Angola (October 1975), Ethiopia (November 1977), and Vietnam
(February 1979)?and two airlifts for disaster relief?to Peru (July
1970, earthquake) and Pakistan (December 1970, flood).
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Table 6
Access Privileges for Soviet Military Forces
in Sub-Saharan Africa
Maintenance
of Naval
Presence
Naval Port
Calls
Naval Air
Deployments
Stopover
Privileges
for Transport
Aircraft
Overflight
Privileges
Ethiopia
?
Angola
Guinea ?
Mozambique
Congo
?
Cape Verde
Benin
Seychelles
Mauritius
?
Sao Tome and Principe
Mali
TU-95 reconnaissance flights to Guinea were prohibited beginning in 1977, but naval transport flights continue to land there.
b Two show-the-flag visits by Soviet ships to Cape Verde occurred in 1979.
c Stopovers were permitted in Mali during the Angolan airlift in 1975-76.
long and pass through narrow straits controlled by
states that might be unfriendly. Only one Soviet
amphibious ship is capable of carrying more than 200
troops to distant areas, and the Soviets lack the carrier-
based aircraft required to provide air cover for an
opposed amphibious landing far from the USSR
Naval and Air Activities
In our view, the Soviet Navy has access to port and air
facilities in a number of Third World countries, and
may actually enjoy de facto control over some limited
facilities such as the Dahlak Island complex in Ethi-
opia and a small communications station in South
Yemen. It does not currently control major military
support facilities which we would describe as overseas
"bases" in Africa. (See table 6.)
The Horn and East Africa
The Soviets have kept a continuous naval presence in
the Indian Ocean since 1968. Initially, this presence
consisted of a few ships that were reinforced for special
37
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activities such as the 1974 harbor and mine clearing
operations in the Suez Canal. By the latter half of the
1970s the number had grown to 18-20 ships. In 1980
the Soviet force expanded to as many as 38 ships at a
time in reaction to the rapid increase in US naval
forces in the Indian Ocean. Ships of the Indian Ocean 25X1
Squadron call at a number of littoral states and main-
tain regular patrols of the Bab el Mandeb and the
Strait of Hormuz
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In peacetime, the primary mission of the Indian Ocean
Squadron is to exert Soviet influence in the region.
Also, the Soviets have defensive concerns connected
with protecting their own sea lines of communication
through the Red Sea and Indian Ocean. Soviet naval
operations in East African waters focus on show-the-
flag missions and monitoring Western naval move-
ments. The ships have also been used in direct support
of client states?an example being the sealift to sup-
port Ethiopia during its war with Somalia. In wartime,
Soviet naval forces, as currently constituted, would be
significantly at risk because of limited firepower and
air defense, inadequate shore facilities, and lengthy
supply lines
The mission of the West African patrol is to support
Soviet diplomatic initiatives, to influence regional
developments, and to inhibit Western involvement. In
January 1981 the Soviets sent a naval task force to the
waters off Morocco to protest the seizure of Soviet
fishing boats, in a more direct use of the USSR's naval
presence to exert regional influence. Although this
small show of force was not a decisive factor in the
settlement reached in February, it did serve as a visible
sign of Moscow's displeasure. Beyond these peacetime
uses, the West African patrol is of marginal military
utility. It is too small to disrupt traffic in the Atlantic
Sea lanes and suffers from lengthy supply lines and
lack of firepower
West Africa
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