SOVIET CAPABILITIES FOR STRATEGIC NUCLEAR CONFLICT, 1981-91

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP09T00367R000400260001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 28
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 17, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 25, 1982
• Content Type: NIE

r
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000400260001-6
tvekt, Director of i 1 Tel
Central 25X1
,m Intelligence
Soviet Capabilities
for Strategic Nuclear
Conflict, 1981-91
National Intelligence Estimate
Volume I?Key Judgments
To, .-cret
NIP 11-3/8-81
23 March 1982
07 3 0 9
25X1
_Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000400260001-6
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000400260001-6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000400260001-6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000400260001-6
Top Secret 25X1
25X1
NIE 11-3/8-81
SOVIET CAPABILITIES
FOR STRATEGIC NUCLEAR
CONFLICT, 1981-91
Volume I?KEY JUDGMENTS
Information available as of 31 December 1981 was
used in the preparation of this Estimate.
Top Secret
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000400260001-6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000400260001-6
25X1
Top Secret
25X1
THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE.
? THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS,
EXCEPT AS NOTED IN THE TEXT.
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the
Estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency; the National Security
Agency, and the intelligence organization of the Department of State.
Also Participating:
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps
Top Secret
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000400260001-6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000400260001-6
25X1
25X1
Too Secret
SCOPE NOTE
Like previous issuances in this series, this NIE 11-3/8 summarizes
the latest developments and projects future trends in Soviet weapons
and supporting systems for strategic nuclear conflict. Intercontinental
attack force levels are projected with the assumption of an absence of
arms control constraints. Unlike recent NIEs, it does not contain
comparisons of present and future Soviet and US forces or measures of
the destructive potential of the forces remaining to the two sides after a
first strike. The war-fighting capabilities of Soviet strategic forces
cannot be conveyed by simplified static and dynamic comparisons of
Soviet and US intercontinental offensive forces. A joint assessment of
Soviet and US capabilities for nuclear conflict is being prepared under
the direction of the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central
Intelligence.
In this NIE we are focusing on the USSR's strategy, plans,
operations, and capabilities for global nuclear conflict as probably
perceived by Soviet leaders. We have emphasized Soviet views on the
origin and nature of a US-Soviet nuclear conflict and how the Soviets
would plan to operate and employ their forces during the various phases
of such a war. There are, of course, major uncertainties about how well
the USSR's present or future forces would be able to conduct a nuclear
conflict according to Soviet strategy.
In evaluating their capabilities to accomplish strategic missions, the
Soviets differ from us in terms of the operational factors they consider,
the analytic techniques they use, and their criteria for success. They
work toward achieving high probabilities of successfully accomplishing
missions within specified periods of time, and thus on dominating
events so as to control the course of conflict. In this Estimate we have as-
sessed trends in Soviet capabilities in terms familiar to US policymakers
and analysts, although these assessments do not necessarily correspond
to those the Soviets would make. We do not know how the Soviets
specifically would evaluate their capabilities, and have not determined
how they measure their ability to accomplish strategic missions.
This Estimate is in three volumes:
? Volume I contains key judgments about Soviet programs and
capabilities believed to be of greatest interest to policymakers and
defense planners.
III
Top Secret
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000400260001-6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000400260001-6
Top Secret 25X1
25X1
? Volume II contains:
? Descriptions of Soviet programs for the development and
deployment of strategic offensive and defensive forces and
supporting systems.
? Discussion of Soviet concepts and plans for the operations of
strategic forces during the several phases of a global conflict.
-- Projections of future Soviet strategic forces.
? Trends in the USSR's capabilities to carry out some missions
of strategic forces envisioned by Soviet concepts and plans for
nuclear conflict.
? Volume III contains annexes with detailed force projections and
weapon characteristics.
iv
Top Secret
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000400260001-6 ,
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000400260001-6
Top Secre
CONTENTS
25X1
25X1
SCOPE NOTE
Page
iii
KEY JUDGMENTS
1
A. Recent Developments
1
B. Soviet Strategic Policies and Strategy
1
C. Future Strategic Forces and Programs
2
Strategic Offensive Forces
2
Strategic Defensive Forces
5
Potential Technology Breakthroughs
7
D. Operations of Soviet Strategic Forces in a Conflict
8
Crisis Period
9
Conventional Phase
10
Theater Nuclear Phase
10
Intercontinental Nuclear Phase
10
Later Phases of a Nuclear Conflict
12
E. Trends in Soviet Capabilities To Perform Strategic Missions
13
Destroying Enemy Nuclear Delivery Means
13
Neutralizing Enemy Command, Control, and Communications and
Warning Capabilities and Other Support Systems
14
Destroying Other Military and Nonmilitary Targets
15
Assuring the Survivability of Soviet Strategic Offensive Forces
15
Protecting the USSR With Strategic Defenses
16
Survivability of Soviet Command and Control
18
F. Concluding Observations
18
Top Secret
25X11
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000400260001-6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000400260001-6
TOD Secre 25X1
25X1
KEY JUDGMENTS
A. Recent Developments
1. The Soviets have achieved capabilities for inter-
continental nuclear conflict that are widely recognized
as at least equal to those of the United States. In 1981
the USSR further improved the striking power and
survivability of its strategic intercontinental and inter-
mediate-range nuclear offensive forces, made progress
in overcoming some of the weaknesses of its strategic
defenses, and improved its supporting command, con-
trol, and communications systems.
2. During the past year the most significant offen-
sive force developments were:
? Continued deployment of accurate MIRVed
ICBMs, MIRVed SLBMs,. the mobile MIRVed
SS-20 IRBM, and Backfire bombers.
? Preparations for flight-testing of small and medi-
(
, um-size solid-propellant ICBMs, and improved
long-range liquid-propellant SLBMs.
?The beginning of sea trials for the first Typhoon
SSBN.
the flight test program of
the MIRVed SS-NX-20 SLBM, including the first
launch from the Typhoon submarine.
? Initial testing of a new long-range strategic
bomber, similar in appearance to the US B-1.
? Tests of new small, long-range land-attack cruise
missiles for sea and ground launch, with a range
of at least 1,400 kilometers. The Soviets are also
developing an air-launched long-range cruise
missile.
3. In strategic defenses the most important develop-
ments were:
? Initial deployment of Modified Foxbat intercep-
tors and continued deployment of SA-10 surface-
to-air missiles, with much better capabilities than
older systems against low-altitude targets.
? Continued development of the IL-76 AWACS
aircraft.
? Continued construction of silo launchers as part
of a modernization program for Moscow's ballis-
tic missile defenses.
4. Important developments in Soviet command,
control, and communications included:
? Achievement of an operational launch detection
satellite system providing nearly, continuous cov-
erage of US ICBM sites.
? Reorganization of the strategic bomber force,
and of tactical and strategic air defense forces,
facilitating their their employment in theater oper25X1
tions.
25X1
B. Soviet Strategic Policies and Strategy
5. Soviet leaders view strategic arms policy in the
context of a persistent, long-term struggle for expan-
sion of Soviet influence and the Communist syster25X1
They recognize that military power is necessary to
sustain the Communist regime and expand its influ-
ence in the world. It is the USSR's principal asset for
competition in the global arena. The Soviets' ultimate
objective is global political and military domination.
They view the United States as the principal strategic
threat, the greatest obstacle to their political-military
activities and the achievement of their goals. US
military power will continue to be the major external
influence on Soviet weapons development and acquisi-
tion and on Soviet planning for strategic nuclear
operations.
6. The Soviets believe that in the present US-Soviet
strategic relationship each side possesses strategic flu-
lop Secret
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000400260001-6
1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000400260001-6
Top Secret 25X1
25X1
clear capabilities that could devastate the other after
absorbing an attack. Soviet leaders state that nuclear
war with the United States would be a catastrophe that
must be avoided if possible and that they do not
regard such a conflict as inevitable. Nevertheless, they
regard nuclear war as a continuing possibility and
have not accepted mutual vulnerability as a desirable
or permanent basis for the US-Soviet strategic relation-
ship. They have been willing to negotiate restraints on
force improvements and deployments, when it serves
their interests. They prefer possession of superior
capabilities to fight and win a nuclear war with the
United States, and have been working to improve their
chances of prevailing in such a conflict. A tenet in
their strategic thinking appears to be that the better
prepared the USSR is to fight in various contingencies,
the more likely it is that potential enemies will be
deterred from initiating attacks on the Soviet Union
and its allies and will be hesitant to counter Soviet
political and military actions.
7. Strategic nuclear forces support Soviet foreign
policy aims by projecting an image of military
strength sufficient to offset the strategic forces of
potential opponents. Soviet leaders appreciate the
political importance of world perceptions of military
power and have long acknowledged the contribution
of strategic forces to the USSR's superpower status.
They view their current strategic position as support-
ing the conduct of an assertive foreign policy and the
expansion of Soviet power and influence abroad.
C. Future Strategic Forces and Programs
8. Our projections of the Soviets' strategic offensive
and defensive forces represent our estimates of the
direction, scope, and pace of their development and
deployment programs in the absence of arms control
constraints. We have considered evidence on the
Soviets' weapon system development process, R&D
programs, and production capabilities. We have also
considered various factors that influence the Soviets'
future policies and force developments:
? Determination to improve all aspects of their
strategic forces and supporting elements.
? Determination to prevent any erosion of the
military gains they have made over the past
decade.
Efforts in any future arms control negotiations to
protect the USSR's present and planned pro-
grams, probably along with concessions intended
to circumscribe US and NATO force moderniza-
tion options.
? Perceptions of the capabilities of other countries'
nuclear forces and key weapon system programs.
9. So far the Soviets have continued to constrain
their strategic force programs in accordance with the
Al3M Treaty, the SALT I Interim Agreement, and key
provisions of the unratified SALT II Treaty, as they
assess US intentions with regard to these agreements
and the resumption of negotiations on limiting inter-
continental-range systems. They maintain a vigorous
military R&D and production base and continue to
develop weapon systems of virtually every type, giving
them an expanded number of options for deploying
new and modified strategic offensive and defensive
systems later in the 1980s. We currently are aware o
some 30 new strategic systems?summarized in figur
1?that are in various stages of development.
25X1
Strategic Offensive Forces
10. Figure 2 illustrates the trends in Soviet intercon-
tinental offensive nuclear forces that we project for
the next 10 years in the absence of any arms limitation
agreement. For the purpose of our force projections,
we assume that the Soviets would begin to deviate
from the SALT I Interim Agreement and key provi-
sions of the unratified SALT II Treaty after mid-1982,
first by retiring fewer older systems and later by
increasing deployments of, and the number of reentry
vehicles on, MIRVed ICBMs. The deviations would be
relatively small until the mid-1980s. These assump-
tions are for the purpose of force projections only.
Both the United States and the USSR have indicated a
continuing commitment to the arms control process.
The actual Soviet deployments could vary as a result
of adherence to SALT limits beyond 1982, or to future
arms control agreements.' Force 1 is consistent with
the Soviets' ongoing efforts to modernize and augment
their strategic forces; Force 2 is based on somewhat
higher production and deployment levels, and a some-
For a description of likely Soviet actions if the deployments stay
within SALT limits, see volume II, chapter JIl, paragraph 36.
2
Top Secret
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000400260001-6
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000400260001-6
25X1
25X1
L OA I
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
2bAl
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000400260001-6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000400260001-6
Top Secret
Figure 2
Projected Soviet Forces for Intercontinental Attack
Number of Delivery Vehicles
3,000
Missile RVs and Bomber Weapons
Force 1 15,000
2,000
1,000
1
5,000
1981 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 1981 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91
Equivalent Megatons
Force 2
RVs on SLBMs and Mobile ICBM Launchers
5,000
1981 82 ?83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 1981 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91
Hard-Target Missile RVsa
10,000
5,000
Force 2
Force I
1981 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91
a For the purpose of this Estimate, hard-target missile RVs are defined as
those that have a 50-percent or greater probability of destroying a target
hardened to 14 megapascals (2,000 pounds per square inch).
586292 3-82
4
Top Secret
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000400260001-6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000400260001-6
25X1
25X1
Too Secre?
what greater technological effort. The difference re-
flects our uncertainties about technological choices
and deployment levels for some new systems, and our
uncertainties about the Soviets' evaluations of their
potential offensive force requirements. Force 2 is not a
maximum effort, and is not the upper bound for either
technological or production potential. Both projections
should be regarded as plausible and achievable repre-
sentations of future Soviet force postures. Under these
projections for the 10-year period, as shown in figure
2:
Strategic nuclear delivery vehicles increase by 20
percent under Force 1, and by 30 percent under -
Force 2.
Missile RVs and bomber weapons increase by a
factor of two to three.
? Equivalent megatons increase somewhat.
? Hard-target missile RVs, with a potentially high
probability of destroying ICBM silos, increase
substantially.
? Warheads on survivable SLBMs and mobile
ICBMs increase by a factor of about three to five.
The USSR maintains additional ICBMs that could be
Figure 3
Projected Soviet Peripheral Attack Forces'
6,000
Total Weapons With Refire Missiles
5,000
4,000
3,000
Total Weapons
2,000
1,000
Delivery Vehicles
1
1
1
1
1
1_
1
1
1
1
1
1981
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
aDoes not include Fencer aircraft recently resubordinated to
strategic aviation or aircraft in Soviet Naval Aviation.
25X1
used for refire operations in time of war, but WE
do not include them in our intercontinental
attack projections.'
11. Figure 3 illustrates the projected trends in
Soviet peripheral attack forces?primarily SS-20s,
bombers, and cruise missiles. The number of warheads
increases significantly because of refire missiles for the
SS-20.
12. The most significant projected deployments in
Intercontinental and peripheral offensive forces, with
their dates of initial operational capability shown in
parentheses, include:
? A small mobile ICBM (1985).-
? ICBMs with better accuracy and improved reli
ability (in both 1985 and 1989).
? A medium-size solid-propellant ICBM, for si
basing (1984) and perhaps for rail-mobile basin
(1989).
586293 3-82
? Improved SLBMs for deployment on D-class and 25x1
Typhoon submarines (in both 1984 and 1988). 25X1
See paragraph 41 for an alternative view held by the Director,
Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, on
whether the Soviets maintain reserve ICBMs.
? A new long-range bomber (1986).
? New long-range cruise missiles for deployment
on submarines, aircraft, and ground-based
launchers (1984-85).
Strategic Defensive Forces
13. Projected defensive developments include:
? Extensive deployments of new low-altitude-capa-
ble fighters and SA-10 SAMs.
? Deployment of AWACS aircraft beginning in
1983. 25X1
-- Upgrading and expansion of the ballistic missile 25x1
defenses at Moscow, with potential for subse-
quent widespread, nationwide deployment. 25X1
? Advances in antisubmarine warfare technology.
? Continued progress in civil defense programs.
? Improved antisatellite capabilities.
25X1
25X1
5
Top Secret
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000400260001-6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000400260001-6
Top Secrei 25X1
25X1
? Advances in technologies applicable to ground,
air, and space-based directed-energy weapons.
14. We expect the Soviets to improve the Moscow
ABM system within the limits of the ABM Treaty by
the mid-1980s by deploying a two-layer defense using
silo-based long-range and short-range interceptors that
have been undergoing testing. The Soviets apparently
value the ABM Treaty for both political and military
reasons; they are probably concerned about a major
US commitment to ballistic missile defense. We do not
foresee the Soviets' initiating the revision or abrogation
of the ABM Treaty within at least the next several
years. There are considerable uncertainties about what
situation will prevail beyond the mid-1980s.
15. The Soviets for the past 10 years have been
developing systems?target tracking and missile guid-
ance radars, aboveground ABM launchers, and missiles
suitable for intercepts within and outside the atmo-
sphere?that would provide them the option for po-
tentially rapid and widespread ABM deployment be-
yond the limits of the ABM Treaty. When fully
developed, a system composed of these elements, using
data provided by large battle management radars,
would have the potential for one-on-one intercepts
within the atmosphere of essentially all current types
of US ICBM and SLBM reentry vehicles.
16. The available evidence does not indicate that
the Soviets have already made the decision to deploy a
nationwide ABM system. It does indicate that through
their development and deployment efforts the Soviets
are steadily improving their position to exercise op-
tions for potentially effective widespread ballistic mis-
sile defenses. Now, unlike 10 years ago when the ABM
Treaty was signed, the Soviets have a much better
capability for ABM deployments beyond the limits of
the ABM Treaty. There is an alternative view that the
Soviets always have had the motivation and now,
because of developments during the past 10 years,
have the technology to support deployment of more
sophisticated ballistic missile defenses, both at Moscow
and nationwide. The Soviet ABM activities seen to
date could represent the first steps in such a nation-
wide deployment option.'
The holders of this view are the Director, Defense Intelligence
Agency, and the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Depart-
ment of the Army.
17. We have considered three representative op-
tions for expanding ballistic missile defenses beyond
the limits of the ABM Treaty:
? Option 1: An improved Moscow defense with
some 500 launchers at 25 to 30 sites by the late
1980s or early 1990s.
? Option 2: A nationwide defense system of some
2,000 launchers at about 275 sites by the early-to-
middle 1990s to protect key military (including
some ICBM silos), command and control, govern-
ment, and industrial targets.
? Option 3: A more dense defense of some 3,500
launchers at more than 500 sites by the mid-
1990s.
18. There are different assessments of the Soviets'
capability to deploy a nationwide ballistic missile
defense. One major issue underlying the differences
concerns whether they would deploy a widespread
defense that would rely for battle management on the
five large peripheral phased-array radars (one prob-
ably operational and four in various stages of construc-
tion), as the holders of one view believe or instead
would require more suitable radars,
as the holders ot another
view believe.' The second major issue concerns Soviet
manufacturing capabilities to produce ABM compo-
nents for a nationwide deployment. One view holds
that the Soviets could produce sufficient ABM compo-
nents to build a maximum of about 50 ABM firing
sites per year beginning in the mid-1980s. The holder
of this view notes, however, that such a deployment
program would require the construction of additional
suitable radars, which would require about 12 years to
complete and would be likely to interfere with other
Soviet military programs that depend on advanced
electronics components.' Another view holds that de-
ployment of 50 to 65 sites per year is feasible. A third
The holders of this view are the Director, Defense Intelligence
Agency, and the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Depart-
ment of the Army.
5 The holders of this view are the Deputy Director for Intelli-
gence, Central Intelligence Agency, and the Director, Bureau of
Intelligence and Research, Department of State.
6 The holder of this view is the Deputy Director for Intelligence,
Central Intelligence Agency.
The holder of this view is the Director, Defense Intelligence
Agency.
6
Top Secret
2 cY1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000400260001-6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000400260001-6
25X1
25X1
Top Secret
view holds that the Soviets can manufacture enough
ABM components to support deployment of 100 sites
per year.'
19. Should the Soviets decide to abrogate the ABM
Treaty any time in the next 10 years, we believe that
their decision would be based on the intention to
initiate deployment of a nationwide system on the
scale of Option 2. We do not foresee their doing so
within at least the next several years. We are unable to
judge the likelihood that the Soviets will choose to
abrogate the ABM Treaty during the remainder of the
period of this Estimate, in part because of differences
in agency assessments of the capabilities of the ABM
system the Soviets could deploy:
? One assessment is that the large peripheral
phased-array radars being constructed and ABM
components under development would be suit-
able for deployment of a nationwide ballistic
missile defense system initiated during the
1980s.?
Another assessment is that there are few incen-
tives for the Soviets to abrogate the ABM Treaty.
The holder of this view believes, however, that if
the Treaty were abrogated by either side the
Soviets' expansion of their ABM network would
initially concentrate on improving the ballistic
missile defenses around Moscow, where a large
radar infrastructure exists. They might also de-
ploy ABMs at selected ICBM fields and hardened
command and control centers outside Moscow.
The holder of this view believes that the Soviets
would not deploy at great expense a nationwide
ballistic missile defense along the lines of Options
2 or 3, which depends upon indefensible, periph-
eral radars and weapons design technology from
the 1960s. Rather, the holder of this view be-
lieves that the deployment of an effective nation-
wide defense would require the construction in
many areas of large new radars similar to the one
under construction at Pushkino as well as a
8 The holder of this view is the Assistant Chief of Staff for
Intelligence, Department of the Army.
9 The holders of this view are the Director, Defense Intelligence
Agency, and the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Depart-
ment of the Army.
vigorous ABM development and production pro-
gram, little of which is likely to be completed
during the period of this Estimate.'?
A third assessment concludes that it is unlikely
during the period of this Estimate that conditions
will arise that would provide sufficient motiva-
tion for Soviet abrogation of the ABM Treaty.
The holder of this view believes that the condi-
tions that led to Soviet acceptance of the Treaty
still pertain, including the perception of the
potential for US technological and manufactur-
ing capabilities to outstrip those of the USSR, and
would be a restraining influence. The holder of
this view believes, moreover, that for the reasons
cited in the preceding assessment the Soviets
would not be expected to initiate deployment of
a widespread ABM system during this period."
20. We are uncertain about ballistic missile defense
deployments the Soviets would undertake if the United
States were to abrogate the ABM Treaty. We believe
that initially, in addition to increases in offensive force
deployments, the Soviets would pursue expanded de-
fenses of Moscow, but that their damage-limiting
objectives would inevitably lead them to deploy a
nationwide ABM system on the scale of Option 2,
based initially on the large peripheral phased-array
radars being constructed and ABM. components under
development. They might not immediately begin such
a nationwide deployment after abrogation, but rather
would expand the Moscow defenses while assessing US
intentions and their own options.'2
Potential Technology Breakthroughs
21. Soviet efforts in two technology areas?non-
acoustic sensors for ASW, and directed-energy weap-
ons?could, if the Soviets succeed in a major break-
The holder of this view is the Deputy Director for Intelligence,
Central Intelligence Agency.
" The holder of this view is the Director, Bureau of Intelligence
and Research, Department of State.
'2 For alternative views held by the Deputy Director for Intelli-
gence, Central Intelligence Agency, and the Director, Bureau of
Intelligence and Research, Department of State, on the ballistic
missile defense deployments the Soviets would undertake if the
ABM Treaty were abrogated, see paragraph 19.
7
Top Secret
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000400260001-6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000400260001-6
Top Secret
25X1
25X1
through, have profound consequences. We have no
basis for believing the Soviets will achieve major
breakthroughs during the next 10 years, but they are
intensively investigating these technologies and would
place high priority on deploying any capabilities that
might result from their research efforts.
22. The Soviets' R&D effort in the field of remote
nonacoustic submarine detection is apparently aimed
at developing airborne and eventually spaceborne
systems that could have high search rates. This effort
has been in the experimental stage since the late 1960s.
We do not believe that they have made much progress
or are close to a technical breakthrough. Our limited
knowledge of the program's precise nature
impossible to
predict with confidence what success the Soviets might
have in the coming decade. Even if a breakthrough
occurred in the next several years, we do not believe
the Soviets could deploy an operational spaceborne or
airborne system during the next 10 years.
23. Directed-energy weapons potentially could be
developed for antisatellite .applications, air defense,
battlefield use, and, in the longer term, ballistic missile
defense. Of the three types of directed-energy technol-
ogies with potential weapon applications?high-ener-
gy laser, particle beam, and radiofrequency?evi-
dence is strongest that the Soviets are pursuing
development of high-energy lasers. We do not under-
stand the full scope, concepts of operation, and status
of these efforts:
? The Soviets now have a ground-based laser that
may be capable of an antisatellite (ASAT) role.
? We believe that a future ground-based laser
ABM weapon, if feasible, is probably more than
10 years away.
? There has been evidence that the Soviets are
working on a space-based laser weapon. They
could launch a high-power prototype for ASAT
applications by the late 1980s. A future space-
based laser ABM weapon could conceivably be
developed, but a prototype probably could not be
tested during the period of this Estimate. Testing
of technology and components of laser systems
could take place on manned space stations and
these could conceivably become operational ele-
ments of future space stations.
? Soviet particle beam weapon research might
eventually have some antisatellite and ballistic
missile defense applications, but the achievement
of a prototype system for such uses would be at
least 10 to 15 years in the future.
We believe the Soviets have investigated the
feasibility of radiofrequency weapons. There is
some evidence of interest in ASAT applications,
but only a moderate likelihood of any capability
through the mid-1980s.
D. Operations of Soviet Strategic Forces in a
Conflict 25X1
24. In this year's Estimate we have emphasized 25X1
Soviet views on the probable nature and origins of a
US-Soviet nuclear conflict
operate and employ their
phases of a global war
and how the Soviets plan to
forces during the various
25X1
25X1
25. We believe that a fundamental Soviet objective
in acquiring and operating strategic forces is to assure
a high probability of prevailing in a nuclear conflict,
even if many important aspects of the conflict turn out
worse than expected. To this end, training of Soviet
forces for a global nuclear conflict is increasingly
broad in scope and complex in the operational factors
taken into account. In their military writings, the
Soviets note that wars usually do not proceed accord-
ing to prior expectations and planning. They almost
8
Top Secret
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000400260001-6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000400260001-6
25X1
25X1
Top Secret
certainly anticipate wide variations in circumstances
and events. They recognize that numerous complica-
tions and degradations would affect planned oper-
ations, particularly in the unprecedentedly difficult
nuclear environment,
The inherent uncertainties of warfare cannot be elimi-
nated through such practice, but the Soviets believe
that their ability to continue to operate effectively in
adverse conflict situations would be enhanced as a
result of the experience gained
26. With respect to the first sentence of paragraph
25, there is an alternative view that the concept of
prevailing in nuclear war is recognized by the Soviets
as so ridden with uncertainties and so general as to
render it unrealistic as a driving principle behind
specific force acquisitions and operations. Rather, as
suggested elsewhere in the text, the Soviets apparently
are working incrementally within budgetary, bureau-
cratic, and technological constraints to do the best they
can at any particular time. They would, of course,
hope to prevail should their forces be put to the test,
but they are fully aware of the great uncertainties and
catastrophic losses that would be incurred by all
parties in a nuclear war."
27. The Soviets' perceptions of the growing com-
plexity of warfare have led them to plan for more
varied contingencies and greater realism in combat
training. Their military planners have developed a
launch-on-tactical-warning option for land-based mis-
siles. They have developed and are refining plans for
conducting theater and intercontinental nuclear oper-
ations over an extended period, and for reconstituting
a portion of their forces after nuclear strikes, to
prepare for the eventuality of a conflict becoming
protracted.
28. The Soviets operate the majority of their newer
SSBNs, with long-range SLBMs, in waters contiguous
to the USSR, where they can be more effectively
controlled and can be protected by ASW forces. The
Soviets have demonstrated the capability to operate
D-class SSBNs for prolonged periods in the Arctic near
or under the Polar icecap. An SSBN could patrol in
"The holder of this view is the Director, Bureau of Intelligence
and Research, Department of State.
deep polar regions where it could surface through the
ice to launch missiles or, more likely (at least in the
near term), patrol along the edge of the icecap so that
it could use the ice as protective cover from ASW
detection and emerge into open water to launch 25X1
missiles. 25X1
29. In recent years, the Soviets have made a great
effort to increase the probability of maintaining con-
tinuity of control in a nuclear conflict, by providing
for the survivability of their command, control, and 25x1
communications system. In addition to hardening and ,,x1
redundancy measures, they have emphasized mobile L?
command posts and supporting communications units
deployed on aircraft, trains, vans, ships, and subma-
rines 25X1
25X1
30. We have structured a composite scenario in the
Estimate, summarized briefly below
25X1
25X1
we believe this composite picture
captures essential Soviet military views on the oper-
ation of Soviet strategic forces and on the nature of a
major US-Soviet confrontation that proceeds through
intercontinental warfare.
31. The flow of events in an actual conflict would
be likely to vary considerably from that presented
here. Our presentation, therefore, should not be re-
garded as a Soviet prescription for nuclear conflict.
The presentation does not preclude efforts by the
Soviets to achieve political solutions at any stage, or to
vary their military actions in response to circum-
stances. On the contrary, the Soviets evidently intend
to prepare the military establishment to meet the
contingencies of a long global conflict, to increase the
options available to the political leadership at any
point in such a conflict, and thus to increase their
chances of controlling events and securing favorable
conflict outcomes.
Crisis Period
32. The Soviets see little likelihood that the United
States would initiate a surprise attack from a normal
peacetime posture. We believe it is unlikely that the
9
Top Secret
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000400260001-6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000400260001-6
Top Secre 25X1
25X1
Soviets would mount such an attack themselves. Rath-
er, they evidently believe that, if a general nuclear
war occurred, it would most likely result from the
expansion of a major theater conflict, preceded by a
political crisis period that could last several weeks or
longer. During this crisis period the Soviets would
heighten their surveillance of enemy activity, shift
from a peacetime to a wartime posture, and employ
concealment, deception, and disinformation to at-
tempt to mask their preparations.
Conventional Phase
33. The Soviets perceive the conventional phase of
a NATO?Warsaw Pact conflict as lasting from a few
days to as long as several weeks, during which the
Warsaw Pact would contain a NATO attack and then
launch a counteroffensive deep into Western Europe.
A key objective would be to weaken the enemy's
theater-based nuclear capability.
Theater Nuclear Phase
34. The Soviets would prefer to achieve their the-
ater objectives without using nuclear weapons. They
apparently believe that a theater nuclear war would
arise either when NATO used, or was preempted from
using, nuclear weapons to avoid losing the conven-
tional war, or, less likely, when the Warsaw Pact had
to use nuclear weapons to halt a NATO breakthrough.
In this phase the Soviets would use, in addition to
tactical nuclear weapons, hundreds of peripheral and
some intercontinental-range missiles and aircraft
against NATO's forward-based nuclear forces and, if
the conflict had spread to the Far East, against China.
Their naval and air forces, using both nuclear and
conventional weapons, would continue strikes against
enemy naval strike forces.
35. We believe that, overall, the Soviets' losses in a
large-scale theater conflict would not significantly
degrade their intercontinental attack or strategic de-
fensive capabilities. They could, however, lose some
SSBNs to Western ASW forces, and some bombers in
peripheral and naval strikes, and suffer degradation of
capabilities for command, control, and communica-
tions and for tactical warning.
Intercontinental Nuclear Phase
36. From the Soviets' perspective, escalation to
intercontinental nuclear war would not be necessary if
they could achieve their theater objectives without it.
However, they view theater nuclear war as only an
uncertain step away from intercontinental nuclear
war. During a theater conflict the Soviets would try to
acquire strategic warning of a US intercontinental
strike by such means as intercepting communications
to and from US nuclear commands and NATO forces.
As the likelihood of an intercontinental nuclear con-
flict increased, Soviet leaders would face the difficult
decision of whether to seize the initiative, as would be
consistent with their general military doctrine, or to
wait in the hope of averting massive nuclear strikes:
They would be more likely to seize the initiative
by launching intercontinental nuclear strikes if
the war had already reached the level of theater
nuclear conflict, than if it were still at the
conventional level. The Soviets probably would
not expect to be able to prevent a US nuclear
retaliatory strike, however, and would consider
the possibility that the United States would
launch its forces on warning.
? The Soviets' recognition of the consequences of
intercontinental nuclear conflict could give them
incentives to await strategic warning. If they
acquired convincing evidence that a US intercon-
tinental strike was imminent, they would try to
preempt. We are unable to judge what informa-
tion would be sufficiently convincing to cause
Soviet leaders to order a preemptive attack. They
would be more likely to act on the basis of
ambiguous evidence if a theater nuclear conflict
were under way than during a crisis or a conven-
tional conflict.
? For reasons such as the lack of convincing evi-
dence from their strategic warning systems or
fear of unnecessarily or mistakenly initiating
intercontinental nuclear war, the Soviets might
not mount a preemptive strike. Their launch-on-
tactical-warning option would permit a larger
and more coordinated counterattack than retali-
ation, while reducing the risk of unwarranted
escalation.
? We believe the Soviets recognize the possibility
that they might fail to get reliable tactical warn-
ing of an enemy intercontinental nuclear strike.
They prepare for the possibility that they would
be unable to act quickly enough to successfully
launch a large number of missiles before an
10
Top Secret
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000400260001-6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000400260001-6
Top Secret
enemy strike occurred, and could retaliate only
after absorbing an attack. Although retaliation
would not support Soviet counterforce damage-
limiting aims nearly so well as other attack
options, it would give them time to assess the
nature of the US attack and to decide upon an
appropriate response.
? We have no indication that the Soviets would
respond to a limited US nuclear attack on their
homeland with anything other than a massive
nuclear attack, but under actual combat condi-
tions they conceivably could respond differently.
37. The objectives of a Soviet intercontinental nu-
clear attack would be to neutralize and offset US
military operations and warmaking capabilities by:
? Destroying US-based nuclear forces and disrupt-
ing and destroying the supporting infrastructure
and control systems for these forces.
? Isolating the United States from the theater
campaign by attacking its power projection
capabilities.
Depending on the circumstances, they might also
attempt to reduce US industrial capacity to support
military operations. Limiting the initial strikes to
command, control, and communications targets, or to
a portion of US strategic forces such as ICBM silos, is
not consistent with the evidence
38. Soviet large-scale intercontinental nuclear at-
tacks would involve primarily ICBMs and SLBMs.
Massive strikes probably would be delivered against
worldwide US and allied military targets, as well as
perhaps a more comprehensive set of political and
industrial-economic facilities. Peripheral attack forces
could launch coordinated strikes against remaining
theater targets. We believe that the Soviets would
conduct repeated attacks in an attempt to destroy,
degrade, and disrupt the US capability to employ
nuclear forces, and the reconstitution capabilities of
US nuclear forces and their command and control.
? The Soviets have considerable flexibility in their
employment of ICBMs for intercontinental at-
tack. We believe they would not launch their
ICBMs in a single massive strike.
25X1
25X1
25X1
It is less clear how the Soviets intend to use their
SSBNs during intercontinental nuclear conflict.
Some forward-deployed Y-class SSBNs would
probably be used in an initial strike against time-
urgent US command, control, and communica-
tions targets and bomber bases. Other submarines
also might be employed in an initial attack,
against targets in the United States and Eurasia.
Some SSBNs in protected areas near the Soviet
homeland probably would be withheld for poten-
tially protracted nuclear operations.
Some strategic bombers may have a role in initial
intercontinental nuclear strike operations, within
hours after the initial missile strike. We believe it
is likely that bombers would be used later, for
postattack reconnaissance and strikes against sur-
viving targets in the continental United States.
There is an alternative view that Soviet long-
range strategic bombers would have a role in
initial intercontinental nuclear strike operations,
within hours after the initial missile strike."
39. Soviet strategic defensive operations in the i55xXil
tercontinental nuclear phase of a conflict wou_
include:
? Ballistic missile defense operations to protect key
targets in the Moscow area, by engaging enemy
missiles until essential elements in the ABM
system were destroyed or all available intercep-
tors had been expended.
? Air defense in depth, to impose successive bar-
riers to enemy penetration. The Soviets probably
would have relocated some surface-to-air missiles
to thwart defense suppression and avoidance
tactics. They evidently plan to use nuclear-armed
SAMs against penetrators 25X1
25X1
They plan for the rapid restora-
tion ot damaged SAM sites, airfields, and cor-25xi
mand, control, and communications facilities.
25X1
1? The holder of this view is the Assistant Chief of Staff,
Intelligence, Department of the Air Force.
11
Top Secret
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000400260001-6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000400260001-6
Top Secret 25X1
25X1
? ASW operations to attempt to destroy enemy
SSBNs.
? Attempts to interfere with and destroy US satel-
lites, at the latest just prior to this phase of
conflict.
? Full implementation of civil defense plans, initi-
ated earlier. Most of the Soviet leaders would be
in protective facilities from which they would
direct emergency rescue and recovery operations
by civilian units and civil defense military troop
units. With a few days for preparations, the
essential workers either would be in shelters at
their place of work or, if off duty, would be
dispersed to zones outside the cities. We believe
the Soviets would attempt to evacuate most of
the urban population.
Later Phases of a Nuclear Conflict
40. We have only limited insights into the Soviets'
views of the nature and duration of the later phases of
a nuclear conflict. They seem to expect that intercon-
tinental nuclear forces would play a much-diminished
role. Soviet operations in the Eurasian theaters would
be conducted primarily by remaining general purpose
forces supported by small Soviet strategic nuclear
strikes. The Soviets plan to reconstitute some surviving
general purpose and strategic forces and to secure
their theater objectives- the occu-
pation of substantial areas of Western Europe.
41. The Soviets prepare for combat operations that
could extend weeks beyond the intercontinental nucle-
ar phase. They would clearly prefer to accomplish
their objectives quickly, but recognize that the later
phases could be protracted, given the difficulty and
complexity of conducting operations following massive
nuclear strikes. The duration would depend on such
factors as the capabilities of remaining theater forces,
the status of surviving political leaders, the viability of
command and control, and the conditions in the US
and Soviet homelands.
withhold
We believe the Soviets would
of their initial ICBM
force, and a small portion of the peripheral
attack forces, for protracted operations, and
would reconstitute additional missile forces using
reserves. We believe these forces would be used
against residual enemy conventional and nuclear
forces and command and control, and perhaps
key surviving elements of the economy support-
ing military operations. An alternative view holds
that the evidence available is insufficient to
support the judgment that the USSR maintains
reserve missiles for its ICBM force beyond the
numbers required for maintenance and training.
This view further holds that, while the Soviets
may be working toward a capability to reconsti-
tute some silo-based ICBMs, the evidence is
insufficient to support the view that the Soviets
have contingency plans for using such weapons."
? We have few details of Soviet planning for SSBN
operations in a protracted conflict. We believe
some submarines would be withheld, under naval
force protection, for a reserve force role.
? We have little recent evidence on how the
Soviets would employ their strategic bomber
force. We believe bombers would conduct recon-
naissance and strike operations against key sur-
viving targets.
? Soviet air defense units plan to restore airfields
for defensive operations. Fighters and SAM units
would operate from alternate sites if necessary.
Civil defense units would continue rescue and
recovery operations and aid with the distribution
of reserve supplies to the civilian population. The
Soviets evidently expect that some economic
restoration would be possible?even after absorb-
ing multiple nuclear strikes.
42. The Soviets have plans to reconstitute strategic
forces, but we are highly uncertain about their actual
capabilities. Overall, we believe the Soviets could
maintain the combat effectiveness of many of the
surviving withheld weapons and would be able to
reconstitute strategic forces to at least some extent
with surviving reserve weapons and materiel, although
damage to the logistic system and requirements for
decontamination would stretch out the time required
for reconstitution.
'5 The holder of this view is the Director, Bureau of Intelligence
and Research, Department of State.
12
Top Secret
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000400260001-6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000400260001-6
Top Secret
E. Trends in Soviet Capabilities To Perform
Strategic Missions
43. During the next 10 years the primary wartime
missions of Soviet strategic offensive and defensive
forces will continue to be to:
? Destroy enemy nuclear delivery means.
? Neutralize enemy command, control, communi-
cations, warning, and other support systems.
? Destroy other military and nonmilitary targets.
? Assure the survivability of sufficient offensive
forces and command and control capabilities to
perform the missions envisioned by Soviet
strategy.
? Defend the Soviet homeland against attacks by
ballistic missiles, bombers, and cruise missiles.
? Protect the Soviet population and economy
through civil defense.
Destroying Enemy Nuclear Delivery Means
44. ICBMs. The latest types of Soviet ICBMs have
the potential to achieve a high probability of destroy-
ing a US ICBM silo. The Soviets have enough hard-
target-capable ICBM RVs today to attack all US
missile silos and launch control centers in a well-
executed first strike. We project that, over the next 10
years, the USSR will have substantially larger numbers
of hard-target-capable RVs and that the effectiveness
of individual Soviet ICBMs against hardened targets
will increase substantially. As shown in figure 4, in a
well-executed strike Soviet ICBMs would have the
potential?using two RVs against a Minuteman silo?
to achieve a damage expectancy of about 75 to 80
percent today, and about 90 percent by the mid-1980s,
although these percentages could vary substantially, as
shown, because of our uncertainties about Soviet
ICBM characteristics. (With one RV, the damage
expectancy would be 50 to 60 percent today, and
about 75 percent by the mid-1980s.) Improvements in
the accuracy of Soviet ICBMs projected for the mid-
to-late 1980s will give them a high probability of
damaging silos hardened
25X1
25X1
25X1
Although the Soviets
hard-target capabilities will increase substantially, we
believe that they will still be concerned that at least a
portion of the US ICBM force could be launched while
under attack. Also, the Soviets could not optimize the
timing of a coordinated attack by ICBMs against US
missile silos and by forward-deployed SLBMs against
US bomber bases and other time-urgent targets be-
cause of the difference in flight times of these Soviet
weapons.
45. By the late 1980s the Soviets could develop the
capability to use saturation tactics, penetration aids, or
maneuvering reentry vehicles in an attempt to over-
come a ballistic missile defense of US silos. The
specific measures the Soviets would select, and their
effectiveness, would depend on the type and charac-
teristics of the US ABM system. Regardless of which
Soviet measures were pursued, such a defense would
compound the Soviets' difficulties in planning 25X1
counterforce attack and would increase their unceiz DA I
tainty about its success.
46. Strategic .Aircraft. The Soviets would almost
certainly try to attack US strategic aircraft on the
13
Top Secret
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000400260001-6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000400260001-6 ?
Top secret 25X1
25X1
ground, but it is unlikely that they would be able to
destroy most of the alert aircraft. We do not believe
the Soviets will be able to develop the capability
during the next 10 years to target and destroy, with
strategic offensive weapons, US aircraft in flight.
47. SSBNs. The Soviets do not now have the capa-
bility to detect US SSBNs operating in open ocean
areas except by chance, or to maintain contact with or
trail them if a chance detection occurs. Overt trail by
modern Soviet nuclear-powered attack submarines
(SSNs) using active sonar is technically feasible if they
establish contact, but would require greater numbers
of modern SSNs than the Soviets have, and could be
overcome by US countermeasures. Projected improve-
ments in Soviet passive acoustic sensors, plus deploy-
ment of more ASW platforms, probably will enhance
the Soviets' capabilities to detect and destroy US
submarines operating in confined areas or close to the
USSR but will not give them an effective broad-ocean
detection capability or improve significantly their
capability to trail US SSBNs. We do not believe the
Soviets have made much progress or are close to a
technological breakthrough in nonacoustic detection.
The increased patrol areas of SSBNs carrying Trident
SLBMs will more than offset Soviet ASW improve-
ments. Thus, over the next decade the overall effec-
tiveness of Soviet ASW against the US SSBN force
probably will decline.
48. Nuclear Forces in Eurasia. We believe cur-
rent and projected Soviet strategic forces for peripher-
al and intercontinental attack would be more than
adequate in numbers and capabilities to attack nuclear
forces in Europe and Asia in hardened and soft fixed
facilities. We are not able to assess the Soviets' capabil-
ity to locate and strike mobile missiles that have
departed their fixed bases. Their targeting problems
would be compounded severely by planned Western
deployments of additional mobile systems?GLCM,
Pershing II, and SLCM on SSNs?particularly those
deployed beyond the range of Soviet tactical recon-
naissance systems.
Neutralizing Enemy Command, Control, and Com-
munications and Warning Capabilities and Other
Support Systems
49. Throughout the next 10 years, the Soviets will
have weapons of sufficient numbers and capabilities to
give them high confidence, under any circumstances,
in their ability to destroy most fixed, land-based US
nuclear support facilities, such as depots, nuclear
storage sites, maintenance bases, airfields, and ports.
They have the capability to destroy or interfere with
most major elements of the US tactical warning and
attack assessment system, shortly before or during a
large-scale nuclear strike. Although the Soviets prob-
ably could substantially degrade US tactical warning
systems, we do not believe they would be confident
that such interference alone would prevent the launch
of substantial numbers of US weapons.
50. We cannot assess the likely effects of a Soviet
attack on the US command, control, and communica-
tions system. However, the Soviets' doctrine 25X1
and targeting strategy, an 25X1
preoccupation with the survivability of their own
command, control, and communications systems lead
us to believe that they would devote substantial efforts
to:
? Disconnecting and destroying the US National
Command Authority, some operating alternates,
and critical intermediate military control points.
? Delaying or preventing transmission of launch
orders by disrupting the various communications
paths with direct attacks, jamming, and electro-
magnetic interference, and by a well-coordinat-
ed, minimum warning attack on many control
points and communications facilities.
? Preventing reconstitution of residual command,
control, and communications capabilities through
repeated attacks.
51. There are a number of factors that could reduce
the Soviets' chances of severely degrading critical US
command and control of nuclear forces:
? The Soviets' inability to use ballistic missiles to
destroy US airborne command posts and other
supporting aircraft in flight.
? The reduced vulnerability of US strategic com-
mand and control in a period of crisis or theater
conflict, as a result of increased readiness and
dispersal.
? Improvements to US command, control, and
communications systems programed for this
decade.
? Major uncertainties about the effects of electro-
magnetic pulse on electronic equipment.
14
Top Secret
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000400260001-6
25X
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000400260001-6
4
Top Secre1 25X1
25X1
? Uncertainties about whether they have identified
all the important fixed or mobile command,
control, and communications facilities.
Destroying Other Military and Nonmilitary
Targets
52. Today, following a Soviet attack on US-based
strategic nuclear forces and supporting facilities, about
4,000 Soviet strategic intercontinental weapons would
still be available for attacking other targets worldwide,
if Soviet forces were fully generated and not degraded
by enemy strikes. We believe that, with the force
improvement programs under way, Soviet planners
probably expect that the USSR will be able to main-
tain the capability to neutralize worldwide targets not
associated with strategic nuclear forces, if the USSR
were to initiate intercontinental strikes or launch on
tactical warning. The increasing vulnerability of Soviet
ICBM silos during the period of this Estimate, as the
accuracy of US weapons improves, will present the
Soviets with concerns for the adequacy of their capa-
bilities in the event that they absorb a large-scale US
strike. We believe the Soviets' efforts to expand the
capabilities of their SLBM force and develop mobile
ICBMs reflect their concerns.
Assuring the Survivability of Soviet Strategic
Offensive Forces
53. ICBMs. We expect that silo-based ICBMs will
continue to be the largest and most capable element of
Soviet strategic offensive forces through the decade. As
illustrated in figure 5, silos for the latest Soviet ICBMs,
and their associated launch control facilities, would
have a high probability of surviving an attack by
current US offensive weapons, but US weapon systems
in development would pose a considerably greater
Figure 5
Trends in Vulnerability of an SS-18 Silo to an Attack by US Missiles'
15
Top Secret
1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000400260001-6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000400260001-6
25X1
25X1
Top Secre
threat. Further silo hardening would result in only
modest improvements to Soviet ICBM survivability.
We expect the Soviets to:
? Continue to improve their capabilities to launch
ICBMs on tactical warning.
? Deploy a mobile MIR Ved ICBM by the mid-
1980s in a mode similar to that used with the
SS-20 mobile IRBM, and perhaps a larger, more
capable MIRVed ICBM in a rail-mobile mode by
the late 1980s.
? Be capable of deploying a ballistic missile de-
fense for selected ICBM complexes in the late
1980s.
54. Bombers. We cannot evaluate the survivability
and operability of the USSR's strategic bomber force
during the nuclear phases of a conflict. Important
factors include the extent of bomber losses during the
preceding phases of conflict, capabilities to disperse
and maintain aircraft at untargeted locations, and
capabilities for bomber force reconstitution.
55. SSBNs.
Soviet SSBNs at sea would be
potentially vulnerable to ASW forces, primarily be-
cause of their relatively high noise levels. Typhoon-
class submarines are expected to be quieter than the
currently deployed SSBN classes, thereby increasing
their ability to avoid detection by acoustic means.
SSBNs with long-range SLBMs can remain in range of
targets in the United States while operating in waters
close to the USSR, exploiting ice cover and shallow
ocean depths, and avoiding Western SOSUS arrays.
The Soviets have committed a significant portion of
their general purpose naval forces to protect their
SSBNs in waters contiguous to the USSR. These prac-
tices increase the chances that Soviet SSBNs would
survive a period of conventional conflict, be able to
participate in an initial Soviet nuclear strike, and be
available for use in protracted nuclear war.
Protecting the USSR With Strategic Defenses
56. The USSR deploys massive air defense forces, is
improving its ballistic missile defenses at Moscow, and
has an extensive civil defense program. Although we
provide an assessment of the capabilities of these
elements individually, we have not assessed the degree
of overall protection, now or in the future, that would
be afforded the USSR by the combination of its active
and passive defenses.
57. Ballistic Missile Defense. The Moscow ABM
system currently could effectively counter only an
attack by a small number of RVs not accompanied by
penetration aids. The projected upgrade of the Mos-
cow defense system will improve the Soviets' ability to
defend Moscow against a retaliatory attack by small
numbers of current types of US RVs and against
increasingly sophisticated third-country missile sys-
tems. In a large-scale attack, the projected 100 inter-
ceptors would quickly be exhausted, but they might be
effective in preferentially defending selected targets in
the Moscow area, such as national command and
control facilities. The upgrade to the Moscow defenses
is expected to provide the Soviets with a foundation
for a more dense defense at Moscow beyond the limits
of the ABM Treaty. With an expanded defense the
Soviets could make targets around Moscow, especially
command bunkers, less vulnerable to a substantial
force of attacking RVs, with or without many types of
penetration aids. The leakage likely in such an attack
would cause severe damage to most of the above-
ground, unhardened facilities in large areas around
some of the targets, and some of the hardened target
facilities as well.
58. If the Soviets were to deploy a nationwide ABM
network, involving as many as 2,000 to 3,500 launchers
as noted earlier (see paragraph 17), the potential
impact on the US strategic missile force could be
substantial. Even a US first strike could be degraded,
perhaps to a significant degree. A US retaliatory strike
in the face of such a defense could be degraded even
more. Its effectiveness would depend on the vulnera-
bilities of key elements of the network and the
potential of an attacking force to exploit them. We are
highly uncertain about the overall potential effective-
ness of a nationwide ABM system?its ability to limit
overall damage and to protect key military functions.
It would be more effective against SLBMs than against
ICBMs, but less effective if US countermeasures, such
16
Top Secret
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000400260001-6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000400260001-6
Top Secret RUFF 25X1
25X1
as decoys or maneuvering RVs, were successful. In any
case, widespread Soviet deployment of an ABM sys-
tem, even if it technically could be overcome by an
attacking force, could greatly complicate US attack
planning and create major uncertainties about the
potential effectiveness of a US strike.
59. Air Defense. The present Soviet air defense
system, undegraded by a large-scale ballistic missile
attack or highly effective ECM, probably would per-
form well against aircraft at altitudes above about 500
meters, although it does not have the capability to
conduct intercepts much beyond the Soviet borders.
We are uncertain of the extent to which its perform-
ance would be degraded by defense suppression. The
current Soviet air defense system would be relatively
ineffective against a low-altitude attack. It could,
however, have a higher probability of intercepting
low-altitude aircraft in areas where radar coverage is
dense and there is a high concentration of ground-
based terminal defenses, unless the attacker used
standoff missiles or effective countermeasures and
tactics.
25X1
61. Any judgment about the overall effectiveness of
the future Soviet air defense system against an attack
by bombers and cruise missiles is thus subject to
considerable uncertainty. Penetration of improved So-
viet air defenses by currently deployed bombers will
be more difficult. These defenses, however, would be
considerably less effective against US cruise missiles.
Our judgment is that against a combined attack of
penetrating bombers, SRAMs, and cruise missiles, So-
viet air defenses during the next 10 years probably will
not be capable of inflicting sufficient losses to prevent
large-scale damage to the USSR. We believe, however,
that the Soviets will be able to provide an increasingly
effective air defense for many key leadership, control,
and military and industrial installations essential to
wartime operations. There is an additional view that
the relative improvements in effectiveness can be
estimated only against currently deoloved aerodynam-')cYi
ic systems 25X1
60. The Soviet air defense system from the mid-
1980s on will be qualitatively different from the
current system. The Soviets will have deployed a
variety of new systems in large numbers that possess
the technical capabilities to defend against at least
some types of low-altitude targets. We cannot assess
with confidence the overall capabilities of these de-
fense
25X1
the relative effectiveness
of future Soviet defenses against these systems is likely
to be diminished by US improvements."
62. There is an alternative view that this Estimate
substantially understates the capability of the Soviet
air defense system to defend key target areas against
low-altitude penetrators. According to this view, de-
fense effectiveness in these areas could be high today
against bombers. The holder of this view believes that
,,,i
by 1985 the effectiveness in such areas would beL?A
significantly higher against a combined attack 0f25X1
penetrating bombers, SRAMs, and cruise missiles than
the Estimate suggests."
63. Civil Defense. We believe that, with as little as
a few hours' warning, a large percentage of Soviet
civilian leaders?party, government, and economic?
would probably survive a large-scale US nuclear strike.
A large-scale retaliatory nuclear attack directed
against Soviet economic installations would cause se-
"The holder of this view is the Assistant Chief of Staff,
Intelligence, Department of the Air Force.
"The holder of this view is the Assistant Chief of Staff for
Intelligence, Department of the Army.
17
Top Secret
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000400260001-6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000400260001-6
25X1
25X1
Top Secre
vere damage to the plant and equipment at the vast
majority of these facilities. Timely implementation of
sheltering and dispersal plans would provide effective
protection for a large percentage of the essential work
force at key facilities. Soviet population casualties
would vary greatly, depending on the extent to which
civil defense measures had been implemented. Im-
provements in Soviet civil defense preparations during
the next 10 years would increase the likelihood that a
large percentage of the leadership and essential work
force would be able to survive a large-scale attack, but
casualties among the general population would be at
least comparable to those we would expect at present.
Survivability of Soviet Command and Control
64. We believe the Soviet command and control
system for nuclear forces, even if directly attacked,
can ensure transmission of launch instructions; howev-
er, retaliatory strikes could be delayed and not fully
coordinated. Although US attacks could destroy many
known fixed command, control, and communications
facilities, elements of the political leadership and
military commands probably would survive, and re-
dundancy in Soviet strategic communications would
prevent loss of any one channel from disabling the
overall system.
65. The Soviets could experience difficulty, how-
ever, in maintaining the endurance and effectiveness
of strategic command, control, and communications
for weeks of continuing operations, particularly if
subjected to US strikes. They would be relying on
fewer?primarily mobile?command posts. The cu-
mulative impact of residual nuclear effects could
endanger command personnel and degrade communi-
cations systems. It is also unclear how effectively the
Soviets could retarget and employ surviving or recon-
stituted weapons. We believe the Soviets might expect
to lose most satellite reconnaissance and would thus
rely primarily on long-range reconnaissance aircraft
and signal intercept capabilities.
F. Concluding Observations
66. We do not know how the Soviets would assess
their prospects for prevailing in a global nuclear
conflict. Sizable forces on both sides would survive
massive theater or intercontinental strikes:
? Soviet offensive forces will not be able to reliably
target and destroy patrolling US SSBNs, alert
aircraft, aircraft in flight, or land-mobile missiles,
particularly those beyond the range of tactical
reconnaissance systems. We believe that, in a
crisis or conflict, the Soviets would credit wide-
graded US warning and control systems with the
ability to launch ICBMs on tactical warning.
? Soviet mobile missiles, perhaps dispersed aircraft,
SSI3Ns patrolling in waters near the USSR, and,
currently, most silo-based ICBMs are highly sur-
vivable. We believe the Soviets can launch
ICBMs on tactical warning, assuming their warn-
ing and control systems are undegraded.
Moreover, the Soviets are well aware of their inability
to prevent massive damage to the USSR with their
strategic defenses even with the improvements taking
place in these forces. They also recognize that US
strategic defenses, other than ASW, have very limited
capabilities to prevent massive damage.
67. We believe that the Soviets' confidence in their
capabilities for global conflict probably will be criti-
cally dependent on command and control consider-
ations?the need for continuity in their own command
and control capabilities, and their prospects for dis-
rupting and destroying the ability of the United States
and its allies to command and to operate their forces.
The Soviets continue to make extensive efforts to
improve all aspects of their command, control, and
communications capabilities. We believe the Soviets
would launch continuing attacks on US and allied
strategic command, control, and communications to
prevent or impair the coordination of retaliatory
strikes, thereby easing the burden on Soviet strategic
defenses, and impairing US and allied abilities to
marshal military and civilian resources to reconstitute
forces. We believe that planned US and NATO im-
provements in command, control, and communica-
tions will increase the Soviets' uncertainties about their
capability to disrupt enemy force operations.
68. The Soviets are attempting to prepare their
leaders and military forces for the possibility of having
to fight a nuclear war, and are training to be able to
maintain control over increasingly complex conflict
situations. They are well aware that the course of a
nuclear conflict will probably not go according to
plans. But Soviet leaders have seriously addressed
many of the problems of conducting military oper-
ations in nuclear war, improving their ability to deal
with the many contingencies of such a conflict and
18
Top Secret
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000400260001-6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000400260001-6
25X1
25X1
Top Secret
raising the probability of outcomes favorable to the
USSR.
69. There is an alternative view that the final
sentence of the concluding observations conflicts with
the thrust of the other observations pertaining to Soviet
increased uncertainties and vulnerabilities. However
much the Soviets' serious addressing of operational
problems may improve their military capabilities, the
uncertainties about the course of a conflict would
preclude Soviet confidence as to its outcome. Accord-
ing to this view, it is apparent, moreover, that their
recognition of the destructiveness of general nuclear
war would lead Soviet leaders to conclude that there is
no outcome that would be advantageous."
'9 The holder of this view is the Director, Bureau of Intelligence
and Research, Department of State.
19
Top Secret
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000400260001-6
rDeclassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000400260001-6
DISSEMINATION NOTICE
1. This document was disseminated by the Directorate of Intelligence. This copy is for the
information and use of the recipient and of persons under his or her jurisdiction on a need-to-
know basis. Additional essential dissemination may be authorized by the following officials
within their respective departments:
a. Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, for the Department of State
b. Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, for the Office of the Secretary of Defense
and the organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
c. Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, for the Department of the Army
d. Director of Naval Intelligence, for the Department of the Navy
e. Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, for the Department of the Air Force
f. Director of Intelligence, for Headquarters, Marine Corps
g. Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Intelligence Analysis, for the Depart-
ment of Energy
h. Assistant Director, FBI, for the Federal Bureau of Investigation
i. Director of NSA, for the National Security Agency
j. Special Assistant to the Secretary for National Security, for the Department of the
Treasury
k. The Deputy Director for Intelligence, for any other Department or Agency
2. This document may be retained, or destroyed by burning in accordance with applicable
security regulations, or returned to the Directorate of Intelligence.
3. When this document is disseminated overseas, the overseas recipients may retain it for a
period not in excess of one year. At the end of this period, the document should be destroyed
or returned to the-forwarding agency, or permission should be requested of the forwarding
agency to retain it in accordance with IAC-D-69/2, 22 June 1953.
4. The title of this document when used separately from the text is unclassified.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000400260001-6
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000400260001-6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/01/17: CIA-RDP09T00367R000400260001-6