SOVIET POLICY TOWARD THE UNITED STATES IN 1984

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP09T00367R000300290001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 22, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 14, 1984
• Content Type: SNIE

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Director of Central Intelligence , IIC.. I ' I SeC
Special National Intelligence Estimate
Soviet Policy Toward
the United Sues in 1984
Key Judgments
SNIE 11-9-84
14 August 1984
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SNIE 11-9-84
SOVIET POLICY TOWARD
THE UNITED STATES IN 1984
KEY JUDGMENTS
The full text of this Estimate
is being published separately
with regular distribution.
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THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE.
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS,
EXCEPT AS NOTED IN THE TEXT.
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the
Estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security
Agency, and the intelligence organization of the Department of State.
Also Participating:
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps
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SCOPE NOTE
This SNIE's focus, however, is broader than that issue alone. It
attempts a comprehensive assessment of current Soviet policy toward
the United States and possibilities for sharp changes of course. Such
possibilities include Soviet moves which instigate or exploit local crisis
situations and also initiatives relating to arms control negotiations. Soviet
views about the current US administration make the possibility of major
Soviet initiatives to influence the November election, or to exploit the
political environment of the campaign period, a central concern of this
Estimate.)
in the near term
This Special National Intelligence Estimate examines current
Soviet policy toward the United States and prospects for major changes
during the remainder of 1984. In part, it is a contribution to the ongoing
effort by the Intelligence Community to monitor the possibility that the
Soviets may be preparing for some form of confrontation with the
United States in the near term. This effort has assessed recent Soviet
military activities as largely the product of longstanding or evolving
plans, intended to increase Soviet strength for an intensified power
struggle over the long term, rather than preparations for confrontation
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KEY JUDGMENTS
The Soviets perceive that US policies directed against their objec-
tives enjoy a considerable base of political support within the United
States and in NATO. At the same time, they see weaknesses in that po-
litical base which can be exploited to alter or discredit US policies,
making it possible to blunt the challenge posed by the United States and
perhaps to return to a condition of detente on terms consistent with So-
viet international ambitions.
The policy implications of these perceptions for Moscow are fairly
straightforward, up to a point:
- First, Soviet leaders seem at present to believe that the likeli-
hood that the United States will continue the policies of the past
several years into the rest of the decade is high enough to
require some political and military gearing up for a period of
lasting and more intense struggle. How vigorous an effort this
will require in the future is uncertain to them, and possibly in
some dispute.-
major confrontation with the United States in the near future.
Current Soviet policy toward the United States makes hostile
initiatives in crisis areas, such as Central America and Pakistan, a
distinct near-term possibility. However, we do not see in current
Soviet political and military behavior preparation for a deliberate
and world influence can continue to grow.
Current Soviet policy toward the United States expresses deep
hostility to US aims and interests. It is shaped primarily by the Soviet
perception that the United States is acting to alter the overall military
power relationship, seeking to strengthen US alliances, and conducting
regional security policies-all for the purpose of containing and reduc-
ing Soviet influence in world affairs. US policies threaten to undercut
earlier Soviet expectations that the 1980s would be a period in which
the USSR could, against the backdrop of its military power, expand its
international influence at low risk, and enjoy the economic and
diplomatic benefits of Western acceptance of its superpower status. US
policies and pronouncements also contain a degree of challenge to the
moral and political legitimacy claims of the Soviet regime which its
leaders find unusually disturbing. Soviet policy is motivated by the
desire to combat and, if possible, deflect US policies, and to create a
more permissive environment in which Soviet relative military power
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- Second, the Soviets believe they can influence the content,
effectiveness, and durability of US policies they see directed
against them. The rigidity and hostility of Soviet policy toward
the United States, on one hand, and attempts to take initiative
and show flexibility, on the other, are aimed at negating those
policies. Up to now, they have evidently calculated that rigidity
and hostility are the most promising posture. But their recent
performance and the outlook for the future plausibly call this
into question.F_~
Moscow's policies toward the United States are focused on under-
cutting the domestic and alliance bases of public support for US policies
and programs. Hostile propaganda, which blames the United States for
an increased danger of war and for diplomatic rigidity with regard to
regional security and the major arms control issues, is used to put the US
administration on the defensive where possible and to excite opposition
to Washington's policies.
At the same time, a sh tie tance toward the West is seen by Soviet
leaders as convenient for exhorting greater discipline, sacrifice, and
vigilance on the Soviet home front, where the Politburo is preoccupied
with a range of complex problems. These problems include stagnating
economic performance and the resistance of the system to reform,
flagging social morale and the dwindling effectiveness of exhortation
and disciplinary measures to boost worker performance, continuing
isolated dissent, ethnic nationalism, "antisocial" attitudes among youth,
and some doubts among the elite as to top-leadership effectiveness.
Commanding a great deal of their attention, these problems create a set-
ting in which a deliberately stimulated image of the USSR's being
embattled abroad is used by the Politburo to reinforce its political and
ideological control at home.
An alternative view is that, while the Soviet leaders recognize the
existence of a number of longstanding domestic problems, they are not
so preoccupied with addressing these issues that it prevents them from
acting decisively and resolutely on foreign policies. Moreover, the
holder of this view also believes that, while there may be some
criticisms among party functionaries, there is no evidence that these
criticisms affect Soviet policies.'
Although there may be debates among Soviet leaders about tactics
toward the United States, we believe that current Soviet policy,
combining a dominant hard line with steps and hints of progress, is
' The holder of this view is the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency.
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based on consensus in the Politburo. The uncertain political power of
General Secretary Chernenko, his and other Politburo members' limited
foreign affairs expertise, and Gromyko's long experience as Foreign
Minister have probably given the latter influence over Soviet foreign
policy tactics he has not enjoyed under any previous General Secretary.
We doubt, however, that he is unilaterally able to enforce his prefer-
ences over the objections of the rest of the Politburo, or that explicit
contention on foreign policy-as recently rumored with respect to the
USSR's space arms control initiative-led to his being temporarily
overruled. The consensus-maintaining mores of the Politburo and the
skills of its members in avoiding isolation make such showdown
situations unlikely. Rumors of foreign policy conflict in the Politburo
are probably exaggerations of more routine debate over tactics, and
may be deliberately spread to influence Western perceptions
In the last few months, the Soviets have been amenable to progress
on several US-Soviet bilateral issues and have made a prominent
initiative on antisatellite systems/space weapons negotiations. On bilat-
eral issues, such as the hotline upgrade and the renewal of the technical
and economic cooperation accord, the Soviets appear motivated by a
desire to preserve the basis for substantive dialogue on issues of direct
benefit to them, despite their underlying hostility toward the present US
administration. The space weapons initiative, on the other hand, was
intended primarily to stimulate concessions from the United States, or
political controversy about them, in an election period when the Soviets
judge that the administration wants to display progress in US-Soviet
relations. Failing US concessions, the Soviets want, at a minimum, to
deny the US administration any basis for claiming-that it can manage
constructive US-Soviet relations while pursuing anti-Soviet military and
foreign policy goals.
The USSR's as-yet inconclusive initiative on space weapons is an
example of the policy mix being pursued. Soviet behavior on this subject
is motivated by a profound concern that the United States will develop
strategic defense capabilities-whether space-based or an ABM ver-
sion-that would seriously undercut the credibility of Soviet strategy
and by a strong desire to achieve real constraints, by agreement or
political influence, on what the Soviets regard as threatening long-term
technology challenges by the United States in space weapons. This
desire will persist and shape future Soviet actions whether there are
space weapons talks in the near future or not. But short-term political
considerations have clearly influenced the Soviets' tactics so far. They
proposed specific talks in Vienna in September for a combination of
reasons: to put Washington on the defensive if it refused, to coax it into
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major concessions if it chose not to refuse, and to stimulate political in-
terference from Congress and elsewhere with US ASAT and space
weapons programs. The Soviets have expected all of these possibilities to
be greater in an election season, and have evidently been willing, for a
time, to risk the US administration's claiming progress on arms control
for its own political advantage. Throughout the diplomatic exchanges
that followed their proposal of 29 June, the Soviets combined a
dominant line of hostility and accusation that the United States blocks
the talks with repeated hints that compromise leading to Vienna is
possible.
The USSR is currently following a deliberate dual-track policy
toward the United States. It involves, on one hand, hostile propaganda
on all subjects, hostile acts such as harassment of US diplomats and
tampering with access to Berlin, stubborn resistance to compromise on
central arms control issues, and incremental increases in military
capability dramatized by exercises and INF-related deployments. It has
also allowed, on the other hand, forward movement on selected bilateral
issues and contained hints of progress on arms control and wider US-So-
viet issues if the United States makes concessions. Sustained Soviet
efforts to undermine US interests and policies, from Central America, to
Europe, to the Middle East, are an integral part of this policy course.LI
We expect this mixed Soviet policy to continue in the near future.
It provides a basis for denying political benefits to the US administra-
tion-which the Soviets expect, but are not sure, will be reelected-
while exploring for concessions and a new tactical base for dealing with
the administration in a following term. This tactical posture leaves open
the possibility of joining ASAT/space weapons talks in September if the
United States appears ready to make inviting proposals, and also the
possibility of refusing such talks, or walking out on them, if the
administration looks politically vulnerable to such moves
As of now, we believe the chances are well less than even that the
Soviets will see it in their interest to start some form of ASAT/space
weapons talks in September. They have probably not yet conclusively
decided this, notwithstanding high-level assertions that talks are not
expected. In any case, they will handle the matter for the short-term
purpose of stimulating pressures for a US ASAT test moratorium and to
coax concessions on the agenda and substantive issues. Should such talks
begin, it is highly likely that the Soviets will hold over them the constant
threat of a walkout or suspension to keep up this pressure. If they see
the US administration as unbending on Soviet demands, divided within,
and politically vulnerable as the election approaches, there is a signifi-
cant chance they would stage some sort of walkout for political effect. It
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is somewhat more likely, however, that they would remain at the talks,
press for a scheduled adjournment or suspension before the elections,
and maintain a drumfire of public and private accusations that the
administration is blocking progress on a vital arms issue that could open
the way to progress on the rest of the strategic arms control agenda. This
tactic would maintain pressure on Washington for concessions, keep the
issue alive during the campaign, but not damage irretrievably the
prospects for resuming the game should the administration be reelected.
Soviet desires to exacerbate the political vulnerabilities of the
administration or to exploit inhibitions on its behavior in the preelection
period could play a role in Soviet behavior toward potentially confron-
tational situations that may arise in regions of tension, or could be
instigated by Soviet action. On the whole, Soviet behavior toward
regional crisis contingencies will be governed more by local opportur.i-
ties and risks than by the Soviet reading of the US political environ-
ment. As regards the latter, while the Soviets may see opportunities to
hurt the US administration politically or to exploit election-year
inhibitions, they will also reflect on a spotty record of assessing these ef-
fects, realizing that a Soviet challenge might strengthen the administra-
tion's standing and generate support for a forceful response unwelcome
to Moscow. The following examines possible contingencies we believe
most worthy of attention, and we have reached judgments as to their
probability
- In Central America, an insurgent offensive of limited scope and
moderate effectiveness is likely to occur in El Salvador in late
summer or the fall, and the Soviets expect it to undermine
Washington's claim that its policies there are working. There is
evidence that the Soviets are arranging the shipment of L-39
trainer/combat aircraft to Nicaragua, possibly before Novem-
ber. Although the United States has made clear that it will not
accept MIGs or other combat jets in Nicaragua, the Soviets
would count on the less capable L-39 to introduce ambiguities
into the situation and to complicate a US response. The Soviets
would be betting that the United States is unwilling militarily to
challenge the L-39 deployment before the election, and con-
strained by its prior acceptance to tolerate the planes thereafter.
The Soviets may intend to introduce more advanced fighter
aircraft (such as MIG-21s) into Nicaragua at some point in the
future. Their decision on MIGs or other advanced aircraft
would depend principally on US reaction to deployment of the
L-39s. The Soviets could also exploit the availability of Nicara-
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qua's large new military airbase for visits by Bear reconnais-
sance and ASW aircraft, to shape the political environment for
other deployment actions, and for military activity, such as
maritime monitoring at the approaches of the Panama Canal.
An alternative view is that the estimate places too much
emphasis on the L-39 issue. If these aircraft are shipped to
Nicaragua, Moscow would perceive their introduction as only
one of a number of increments in the Sandinista regime's
military capability-others would include the construction of a
large military airfield at Punta Huete and three Soviet-
equipped communications intercept facilities. In evaluating the
probable US response to the MIGs, Moscow would consider US
reaction to all of such increments, not to the L-39s alone. The
Soviet concern not to provoke the United States into military
action that has kept Moscow from delivering MIGs to Nicaragua
for over two years would continue in play. 2
- The Soviets may take hostile action against Pakistan to end its
support of the Afghan resistance, the tenacity of which appears
to have increased the Soviets' frustration and perhaps led to
doubts as to whether they ought to be satisfied with their
protracted strategy for imposing control on Afghanistan. They
are likely to support, and may take some measures to stimulate,
an Indian military initiative against Pakistan, such as an attack
on Pakistan's nuclear facilities, to pressure President Zia into
more congenial policies while leaving the United States in a
position where it is politically difficult to support him. The
Soviets cannot direct Indian actions against Pakistan. But we
believe that the likelihood of India's taking action over the next
12 months for its own reasons has risen distinctly, and we
believe that the Soviets are in consultation with New Delhi
about the situation and strongly motivated to exploit it.' It is
somewhat less likely that the Soviets will make direct but
limited attacks on Pakistan's border because this would present
the best political circumstances for increased US support while
not altering Zia's policies. Nevertheless, given Moscow's strong
incentives to try to change Pakistan's policies toward the Afghan
war, recent signs of increased Soviet pressure on Islamabad, and
Moscow's inability to command Indian action against Pakistan,
the prospect of unilateral Soviet political and military pressures
on Pakistan, such as limited air attacks and hot-pursuit raids on
border sites, cannot be ruled out. The Soviets may decide to
increase the frequency and scale of limited cross-border raids in
' The holder of this view is the Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State.
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an attempt to force President.Zia to rein in the insurgents, but
we believe large-scale Soviet military actions against Pakistan
remain unlikely.
- In the Persian Gulf region, escalation of the Iran-Iraq war and
the prospect of US intervention might induce the USSR pre-
emptively to apply military pressure on Iran to end the conflict
and to assert a Soviet role as a superpower in the Gulf region.
Various developments in the Gulf are possible, but in the short
term the most likely Soviet responses will be efforts to gain
increased political influence in Iran and other regional states,
rather than confrontational military actions. An Iranian victory
over Iraq and Soviet reaction to it could lead to a Soviet invasion
of Iran, and thereby to a direct military confrontation with the
United States. But we believe this course of events is highly
unlikely in the time frame of this Estimate. There is no
evidence to suggest that the Soviets are readying their military
forces in the region to exert visible pressure or to take local
action, but they could be brought within weeks to sufficient
readiness to attack Iran or play a part in a Soviet pressure
campaign against Iran
- In Berlin, where the Soviets have been acting to remind the
West of its vulnerable access, the Soviets could escalate pressures
to stimulate fear and tension among the United States and its al-
lies. Some increase in Soviet actions to test US and allied
reactions cannot be ruled out in the short term. We believe any
major escalation of pressure is very unlikely because the risk of
counterproductive political effects in the West or a genuine
confrontation is higher than the Soviets wish to run now
Taken together, these regional conflict situations, in which US and
Soviet interests are opposed and the potential for local conflict escala-
tion is significant, generate possibilities for limited US-Soviet confronta-
tion over coming months which we cannot rule out, although we judge
them unlikely. Circumstances could arise in which local events combine
with Soviet desire to gain local objectives and, secondarily, to embarrass
the United States, resulting in a degree of confrontation the USSR did
not originally seek. Domestic political conditions in the United States
will play some role in Soviet calculations. The Soviets would expect the
election period to impose inhibitions on US responses to their initiatives
or other developments which would enhance their prospects of local
success. To a lesser extent, they may expect regional crises to put the US
administration on the defensive regarding its overall foreign policy. At
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the same time, uncertainties about US reactions to challenge and about
the political effects of Soviet challenges on US politics will continue to
be a restraining influence on Moscow's actions.
Recent Soviet military and political actions have, created concern
that the Soviets may be preparing for a major military confrontation
with the United States. During the past six months or so the Soviets have
pursued a vigorous program of large-scale military exercises, have
engaged in anomalous behavior with respect to troop rotation and
withdrawn military support for harvest activities, have demonstratively
deployed weapon systems in response to NATO's INF deployments, and
have heightened internal vigilance and security activities. Amidst
continuing propaganda and intermittent reporting
about Soviet fears of impending war, there is concern that
recent Soviet military and defense-related activities might be read as
revealing (or attempting to cloud) definite Soviet preparations for a
near-term confrontation with the United States that could sharply
heighten the risk of a general war
There is also concern about the possibility that the Soviet leader-
ship might be of a mind to attempt a "now-or-never" effort to
dramatically shift the terms of the US-Soviet power struggle through
central confrontation, fearful that future Soviet domestic problems may
make it excessively difficult for the USSR to achieve its military and in-
ternational goals in the future. It is feared that Soviet military activities
could be in preparation for such a confrontation.
We strongly believe that Soviet actions are not inspired by, and
Soviet leaders do not perceive, a genuine danger of imminent conflict or
confrontation with the United States. Also, we do not believe that Soviet
war talk and other actions "mask" Soviet preparations for an imminent
move toward confrontation on the part of the USSR.
Supporting the conclusion, the analysis underlying the present
Estimate has led us to judge, further:
- The Soviet leadership displays an expectation of intensified
power competition with the United States in the years ahead,
along with some hope that US policies can be deflected by a
combination of stubbornness and cajolery. It does not now
display a view that dangerous confrontation may be required to
defend its interests and advance its power
- While pleased with the USSR's improved military situation
achieved in the past decade, the Soviet leadership is not so
confident in it that it would deliberately seek out a central test
of US-Soviet strategic strength to "keep history on track. " 0
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- Patterns of power and decisionmaking in the Soviet Politburo at
present are very unlikely to generate initiatives that are politi-
cally dangerous for its members, which a risky confrontational
strategy would be
- Examined comprehensively, Soviet military and defense-related
activities are in line with long-evolving plans and patterns,
rather than with sharp acceleration of preparations for a major
war. Noteworthy by their absence are widespread logistics,
supply, and defense-economic preparations obligated by Soviet
war doctrines and operational requirements. We have high
confidence in our ability to detect them if they were occurring
on a wide scale.
To be sure, Soviet propaganda and other information activities
have deliberately tried to create the image of a dangerous international
environment, of Soviet fear of war, and of possible Soviet willingness to
contemplate dangerous actions. Some, although by no means all, recent
Soviet military activity appears to have been directed in part at
supporting this campaign, especially large and visible Soviet military
exercises. We believe that the apprehensive outlook the Soviets have
toward the long-term struggle with the United States has prompted
them to respond with a controlled display of military muscle.
In reaching these judgments, we must point out that the indicators
and methodologies of our strategic warning establishment are oriented
toward the provision of warning of war within a short period, at most
one to two months. Because we give less emphasis to defense-economic
and other home front measures that might provide strategic warning
beyond so short a period, and because a pattern of such activities is in-
herently difficult to detect in their early stages unless deliberatedly
signaled by the regime, we have less confidence in longer range warning
based on military and defense-related activities alone. However, in the
total context of Soviet foreign and domestic developments, we judge it
very unlikely that the Soviets are now preparing for a major war or for
confrontation that could lead to a major war in the short run.
It is possible that, following the US elections and their reading of
the overall political results, the Soviets could adjust their present foreign
policy tactics to give more emphasis to steps of limited accommodation.
Their aim would be to encourage US political trends that would deflect
or alter the defense and foreign policies of the United States which the
Soviets see directed against them. They would seek a return in some
form to the detente environment of the early 1970s in which they
enjoyed many political and economic benefits of East-West amity but
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suffered few constraints on the expansion of their military power and
international activities directed against the West, especially in the Third
World. Although political circumstances in the West, both in the United
States and in Europe, may encourage them to make more serious
attempts in this direction than in the past several years, the present
Soviet leaders appreciate that detente consistent with longstanding
Soviet aims requires fundamental changes in US policies, namely a
substantial US retreat from efforts to contain Soviet power. They also
appreciate that this is unlikely to be accomplished solely by diplomatic
maneuver on their part.
It is highly unlikely that the Soviets will fundamentally moderate
their military and international aims and shift to a policy of genuine
and far-reaching accommodation toward the United States in the period
of this Estimate. This could occur in the years ahead as a result of the
USSR's facing greater internal problems and external obstacles. For the
present and the foreseeable future, Soviet leaders are likely to remain
attached to expanding their military and international power. They will
try to manage the Soviet internal system to sustain these objectives.
They would like to achieve a form of East-West detente that facilitates
these objectives while limiting the costs and risks of pursuing them.
They are not yet ready for a form of detente that forswears the
expansion of their power
In brief summary, the near-term projections we have made are as
follows (percentages are merely for display of qualitative judgment;
note that judgments of probable Soviet behavior in some cases are
contingent on prior developments having a lower probability):
- The USSR is likely to continue through the remainder of 1984
the mixed policy toward the United States observed during the
summer months so far, with heavy emphasis on hostility and
rigidity, but with an undercurrent of hints about progress in
bilateral relations and arms control (70 percent)
- It is now unlikely, but not ruled out, that the USSR will agree at
the last minute to commence space weapons talks in September
(20 percent). The odds rise sharply if the United States agrees to
an ASAT test moratorium (70 percent).
- Should space weapons talks begin in September, there is a
chance that the Soviets will contrive some sort of breakoff to
damage the US administration politically (30 percent), but more
likely that they will simply accuse the United States of blocking
substantive progress (70 percent)
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-A moderately effective insurgent offensive is very likely to
occur in El Salvador in late summer or the fall, and the Soviets
will welcome it for putting significant although not decisive
political pressure on Washington (90 percent)
- It is likely that the Soviets will introduce L-39 jet aircraft into
Nicaragua (70 percent). It is unlikely that more advanced
fighters (such as MIG-21s) will be introduced before November
(10 percent). Should they successfully introduce L-39s, then the
probability of their sending more advanced fighters rises. See
the alternative view, held by the Director, Bureau of Intelli-
gence and Research, Department of State, as referenced in
footnote 2. The Soviets could also use the new large airfield soon
to be completed for visits by Bear reconnaissance and ASW
aircraft.
- Should India evince interest in attacking Pakistan
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the Soviets probably would
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be privately supportive, and probably would agree to provide
intelligence and some logistic support (70 percent). The Soviets'
main aim would be an end to Pakistan's support of the Afghan
resistance.
- There is also a serious possibility that the Soviets will take
escalated unilateral military steps such as airstrikes and hot-
pursuit actions to pressure Islamabad toward this end in the
months ahead (40 percent). A major Soviet attack on Pakistan,
requiring new deployments and some weeks of preparation, is
very unlikely during the period of this Estimate (5 percent).[
- Near-term Soviet behavior toward the more probable develop-
ments in the Iran-Iraq war is likely to be continued efforts
toward political openings in Tehran and among the Persian Gulf
states (80 percent). Only in the event of dramatic military
success by Iran against Iraq (10 percent) or major US interven-
tion on Iranian soil are the Soviets likely to take direct military
measures toward intervention (70 percent).
- The Soviets are unlikely to escalate substantially their present
very low-key pressures on Berlin access (10 percent). They may,
however, test Western reactions by small increases in the degree
and visibility of pressures they are now applying (30 percent).[
- There is some likelihood that the Soviets will try, following the
US elections, a mix of tactics toward the United States that give
greater emphasis to flexibility on arms control and movement
on bilateral issues, without giving up fundamental positions (30
percent). Continuation of present policy mix well into 1985 is
more likely (70 percent)
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- It is highly improbable that the Soviets will shift to more far-
reaching accommodations toward the United States during the
period of this Estimate (5 percent). =
- It is highly unlikely that the USSR is now preparing for and will
move deliberately into a visible posture of direct, high-level
military confrontation with the United States during the next six
months (5 percent). It cannot be ruled out, however, that the
USSR could move Quickly into such a posture as a result of a lo-
cal crisis escalation not now planned or sought by Moscow (10
percent)
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 l I I l I l l 1 I I I I I I I I
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/22 : CIA-RDP09T00367R000300290001-4
Secret
Secret
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/22 : CIA-RDP09T00367R000300290001-4