SOVIET PROBLEMS, PROSPECTS, AND OPTIONS IN AFGHANISTAN IN THE NEXT YEAR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP09T00367R000300200001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 37
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 21, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 1, 1985
• Content Type: MEMO

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Director of TO t'CI'et
'
entral
(
Intelligence
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NI IIM 85-10003/L
SOVIET PROBLEMS, PROSPECTS,
AND OPTIONS IN AFGHANISTAN
IN THE NEXT YEAR
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CONTENTS
Page
SCOPE NOTE ...................................................................................... 1
KEY JUDGMENTS .............................................................................. 3
DISCUSSION ........................................................................................ 11
The Current Soviet Approach .......................................................... 11
Soviet Goals and Strategy ............................................................. 11
What Moscow Did in 1984 .......................................................... 12
Impact of Soviet Measures ............................................................... 13
Degree of Success for Soviets ....................................................... 13
Afghan Military Performance ...................................................... 16
Impact on the Insurgents ............................................................. 17
Impact on Noncombatants ........................................................... 17
Moscow's Perception of the Situation ............................................. 18
The Current Mood in Moscow ..................................................... 18
The Soviet Cost/Benefit Calculus ................................................ 19
Moscow's Views on Outside Support ........................................... 19
The Outlook for the Next Year ....................................................... 21
Soviet Military Operations in Afghanistan ................................. 23
Undermining the Insurgents' Civilian Base ................................ 24
Increased Military Pressures Against Pakistan and Iran............ 25
Diplomatic Options ...................................................................... 25
Prospects for Soviet Success ......................................................... 26
The Longer Term Outlook .......................................................... 27
Alternative Scenarios ........................................................................
Communist Rule Is Threatened ...................................................
The Soviets Get "Onto the Path to Victory" ..............................
27
27
27
ANNEX: Expanding Soviet Forces in Afghanistan: Capabilities and
Constraints ....................................................................... 31
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SCOPE NOTE
Increased insurgent effectiveness and the continuing ineffective-
ness of the Afghan Army forced the USSR into adopting a more
aggressive approach to combat in Afghanistan in 1984. Greater outside
support for the resistance this year and last means that Soviet problems
probably will again increase in 1985. This Interagency Intelligence
Memorandum assesses the effectiveness of the measures the Soviets have
taken thus far to deal with a more potent resistance and projects their
options over the next year or so.
This Memorandum was prepared under the auspices of the
National Intelligence Officer for the USSR in the Directorate of
Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, and coordinated at the
working level among CIA, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the
National Security Agency, and the intelligence organizations of the
Department of State and of the military services.
t
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KEY JUDGMENTS '
The Soviet military situation in Afghanistan has continued to
deteriorate as a result of the increased insurgent capabilities and the
continuing ineffectiveness of the Afghan Army, and despite intensified
Soviet military efforts. The Soviets expect that their problems will
increase as the resistance receives more and better materiel this year.
We believe that the Soviets will respond in the near term by
attempting to apply more widely and skillfully the measures they have
sought to apply in the past year. In support.of this effort, additional tac-
tical adjustments to the current economy-of-force strategy are likely
and some force increases-probably not more than 5,000 to 10,000
men-are possible
Moscow will continue to hold to its main objective of assuring a
Communist regime in Afghanistan because:
- The Soviet invasion itself has made it likely that any successor
regime in Afghanistan not supported by Soviet military occupa-
tion would be deeply hostile to Moscow.
- The fall of its Afghan regime would be seen as a serious blow to
Moscow's reputation as a resolute power.
- Control of Afghanistan is seen by the Soviets to be important to
the security of Soviet Central Asian border regions.
- The Soviets also see controlling Afghanistan as helping fulfill
long-range aspirations to expand their influence in the region.
We believe that the Soviet military are examining how their
military presence in Afghanistan could be utilized for various military
contingencies against Pakistan and Iran. Maior improvements in lines of
communications and air and logistic facilities, and the deployment of
significant additional forces, would be essential for the Soviets to
undertake and sustain large-scale operations from Afghanistan. The
Soviets almost certainly would not undertake such major improvements
until they had consolidated control in Afghanistan.
The Soviets have a combined political-military strategy for consoli-
dating Communist rule in Afghanistan, but appear to have consistently
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underestimated the difficulties they face. Initially, they reportedly
thought the mere presence of Soviet forces would be sufficient to
intimidate any resistance. Then they thought Soviet involvement in
combat would militarily destroy most armed resistance within a couple
of years. By 1983, they seem to have reconciled themselves to a longer
term military strategy aimed at destroying enough of the resistance to
compel the remainder to see the futility of continuing to fight. This
strategy was coupled with a political strategy of trying to build up a
cadre of reliable Afghan Communists to govern the country eventually.
Nevertheless, the Soviet Union has made no significant progress in its at-
tempts to obtain political backing from the Afghan people.
In 1984, the Soviets augmented their f orces by a few thousand men
and made other tactical and force adjustments designed to regain the
military initiative. But the resistance, increasingly armed and trained
from the outside, also continued to improve. The net result by the end
of the year was that Soviet losses had increased and there had been no
measurable improvement in the Afghan Government's position. The
territory under government control may actually have declined slightly
in 1984.
Moscow's lack of progress in Afghanistan has generated argument
and pessimism among Soviet middle-level military and intelligence
officials familiar with the situation. Many in the Soviet elite harbor
doubts about the prospect of ultimate victory and the wisdom of the ini-
tial Soviet commitment. Soviet officials privately admit that Afghani-
stan has entailed significant costs, but they also assert that the costs of al-
ternative policies would be even higher and that they must stay the
course. The costs of Afghanistan have not been so high as to force
Moscow to shrink from its objective of ultimately controlling the
country. Soviet military capabilities elsewhere have not been substan-
tially diminished, the economic costs are bearable, and dissatisfaction
within the elite and populace, while noticeable, has remained within
tolerable levels. The leadership's recent decision to promote three of the
key military figures who are most responsible for the USSR's operations
suggests no disposition to reexamine its commitment or its strategy in
Afghanistan now.
The new party General Secretary, M. S. Gorbachev, like all other
top leaders, has avoided significant direct comment on Afghanistan in
public. As a key figure in the leadership during the last year, Gorbachev
has presumably developed a degree of commitment to current Soviet
goals and strategy in Afghanistan. He used his meeting with Pakistan's
President Zia at Chernenko's funeral to chastise Islamabad over its
policy toward Afghanistan. Gorbachev would naturally wish to solve the
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Afghanistan problem in some way, but, while he is consolidating his
power in the Soviet leadership over the next year or so, he has a strong
political interest in avoiding positions that might make him look weak
or open him to charges of adventurism. He the'ref ore does not seem to
have an immediate interest in seeking to revise Soviet goals and
strategy.
A major escalation or expansion of the war would certainly raise
the costs to the Soviet system while not necessarily leading to a quick
victory. Intensification of the conflict at roughly present levels of Soviet
commitment-which is what we expect-will raise the costs somewhat.
The Soviet Union has the economic and military resources to continue
this war indefinitely at present or escalated levels. It is the prospect of a
very protracted war with potentially large domestic and international
costs that is politically and psychologically troubling to many in the
Soviet population and elite, and presumably of concern to the Soviet
leadership. The Soviet Union is more capable than other countries
might be of bearing the political costs of direct involvement in an open-
ended war. Its tolerance for a protracted war in Afghanistan may not be
limitless. We cannot say at this point, however, what the limits might be
and whether or when they might eventually be reached.
On the basis of an improving military supply situation, we project
that the performance of the resistance in Afghanistan will improve
steadily during 1985 as it did in 1984:
- The greater availability of ammunition and other materiel will
increase the operational effectiveness and persistence of those
already under arms.
- The number of near-full-time fighters, now estimated at about
150,000,2 will increase substantially.
- Resistance effectiveness against aircraft is likely to increase
substantially, against both airborne targets and airbases.
- The number of resistance fighters with rudimentary military
training will continue to rise, and all are learning from combat
experience.
At the same time, the inevitable sluggishness and unevenness of the
resistance logistic network, shortages in many needed items, food
problems, and the fragmented nature of the war will probably cause
these factors to increase resistance effectiveness only gradually. They
? This is the estimated number of resistance fighters for whom the war is a full-time or primary
activity; some 30 percent of them are in daily action against the Soviets. The number of occasional fighters is
probably several times as large.
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will not confront the Soviets with a dramatic crisis or sharp deteriora-
tion of their military situation, or prevent the Soviets from making
selected improvements to it.
Even so, the Soviets know that in 1985-86 they will be facing a
more militarily capable resistance. They have already signaled that
more outside support will not dissuade them from pursuing their
objective of full control over the country. They are already planning
military measures aimed at negating the improvement in insurgent
capabilities. These measures, we believe, are most likely to be extensions
of what the Soviets did in the recent past:
- More operations by Soviet forces without the Afghan Army.
- More agile and aggressive ground force tactics, particularly with
special and air assault forces.
- Better use of tactical air and ground-based firepower.
- Temporary augmentations of Soviet forces for high-priority
operations.
- Further efforts to improve tactical intelligence and command
and control.
- More efforts to interdict resistance supplies near Afghanistan's
borders.
- Continued improvement of the logistic infrastructure.
- Continued efforts to build a Communist cadre to control the
country in the long term.
We expect the Soviets to continue making a concerted effort to
destroy Pan~sheri resistance leader Masood and his men in 1985. We
also anticipate more Soviet effort to improve security in Afghanistan's
mayor cities. Interdicting infiltration across the borders with Pakistan
and Iran will mean more Soviet/Afghan air and artillery strikes and
perhaps a f ew ground incursions-both deliberate and accidental-
against insurgent targets in both these countries. Despite the Soviet
desire to keep them down, Soviet casualties and equipment losses will
probably continue to rise.
As an adjunct to their military efforts, the Soviets will attempt to
do more politically and diplomatically to reduce support for the
resistance. However, we see no signs that Moscow is now prepared to
seek a genuine political solution that requires abandoning Soviet
objectives and withdrawing from Afghanistan:
- In addition to continuing cross-border incidents, the Soviets will
apply strong diplomatic and propaganda pressures on Pakistan.
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They may increase efforts to destabilize the Zia regime. They
have had strong incentives to do so in the past, but apparently
lack adequate means.
- In recent months the Soviets have toughened their stance
toward Iran, and we expect this trend to continue. However, the
Soviets might try a more flexible approach to Iran in which they
seek to exploit Iran's interest in an improved relationship to get
Iran to cut back its support of the Afghan resistance.
- The USSR and China have moved to improve relations with
each other despite the "three obstacles" raised by China-Soviet
troops on China's borders; Soviet support of the Vietnamese
occupation of Cambodia; and Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.
Even if the Afghan issue has become more significant because
of the growing Chinese role in aiding the Mujahedin, we fudge
that neither side is likely to make the continuing improvement
of relations contingent on its resolution.
- Toward the United States, the Soviets could attempt to make US
support for the resistance more of a factor in bilateral relations
than they have in the past. But there are inhibiting risks in
either of the two approaches they might take. Should they
suggest that other improvements in the relationship, such as
arms control progress, are jeopardized by US policy toward
Afghanistan, they risk sacrificing other important political goals,
such as encouraging restraint in US military programs. Should
they, on the other hand, hint at the possibility of a Soviet
withdrawal from Afghanistan without prior guarantees for the
Kabul regime in order to encourage reductions in US support
for the resistance, they would risk signaling their own vulnera-
bility in Afghanistan and emboldening their major adversary.
For these reasons we do not believe that the Soviets will wish to
make Afghanistan stand in the way of changes in US-Soviet
bilateral relations in the near future.
We doubt that any of these military or political measures will be
sufficient to put the war convincingly on the path toward a Soviet
victory. To the contrary, if our appreciation of the situation is correct,
the Soviets are likely to find themselves no better off after another year
or so of tactical adjustments and small troop increases. At some point, a
continued military stalemate might no longer be tolerable to the Soviets
and they might consider radical alternatives to their present strategy.
These could include a large Soviet military buildup in Afghanistan and
more forceful attempts to diminish Pakistan's support to the resistance
or-less likely-serious efforts to get a political solution involving Soviet
military withdrawal.
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For the time being, however, we believe that Moscow prefers to
avoid the military costs and risks of a major troop increase. Logistic
preparations for an increase of 50,000 troops, for example, would
require several months and would probably not decisively affect the
course of the war. A much larger expansion-to a level of 400,000 to
500,000 troops-designed to assure Soviet control would take a year or
more to accomplish and still might not lead to quick suppression of the
insurgency.
We also believe that Moscow is not yet ready to face the military
risks and political consequences of a significant expansion of hostilities
into Pakistan or Iran. Major action against either country from Afghan
territory would require extensive logistic preparations, including secur-
ing of supply lines.
We believe, therefore, that the Soviets will continue for at least the
next year or so to try to make progress against the insurgents without a
major expansion of their forces or of the geographic scope of the war.
But we believe that such progress will continue to elude them.
There are a number of developments, which do not now seem
likely, that could upset our calculations. Although we see no evidence
that Gorbachev is ready to depart far from current Soviet strategy,
Soviet leadership politics could produce debate that leads to more
radical changes in Soviet policy than we currently foresee. A Pakistani
government without President Zia might be less committed to current
Afghan policy, despite the consensus that supports this policy now. Iran
might reduce its support for the Afghan resistance to improve its
relations with Moscow; but an increase of Iranian support is as likely in
the near term. Regional political development adverse to the Afghan
resistance might curtail but probably would not altogether cut off
Muiahedin resupply. If there were a cutoff of outside support for the re-
sistance in Afghanistan, the Soviets would start making progress toward
gaining control of Afghanistan. This would reduce pressure on them to
escalate their commitment to the war or to seek a political accommoda-
tion
If present trends continue, the Soviets may well face 10 years or
more of fighting in Afghanistan. We cannot fudge with any certainty
how this will impact on Soviet society and the Soviet political system.
The case can be made that the USSR would find the prospect of
indefinite and costly conflict preferable to the alternatives of significant
reinforcement or abandonment of Soviet objectives, and will continue
the present course indefinitely in the belief that eventually the resist-
ance and its outside supporters will give up. The contrary case can be
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made that the prospects of indefinite and protracted conflict in
Afghanistan would be unacceptable to Moscow; that sooner or later the
domestic and international costs of a continuing war in Afghanistan will
force the leadership to either radically increase the Soviet military
commitment to the war, accepting the costs and risks of its expansion
beyond Afghanistan's borders, or to seek a political path for withdrawal,
even at the cost of the Kabul regime's collapse. If the Afghan resistance
continues to grow in scale and effectiveness in the years ahead, the odds
increase that the Soviets will eventually confront such choices.
We think our view of the war and how the Soviet leadership sees it
is a reasonably accurate one. Changes in insurgent effectiveness, morale,
and the size of forces actually fighting might take some time to detect.
We probably would not be able to forecast with long leadtimes a
Soviet decision to undertake radical policy changes. However, because
the logistic preparations for a substantial escalation in the Soviet
military effort either within Afghanistan or against Pakistan and Iran
would take many months, we should still be able to provide early
warning. Moscow might attempt initially to obfuscate a decision to cut
Soviet losses and get out of Afghanistan, but eventually we should be
able to detect such a decision from Soviet diplomatic and propaganda
shifts in time for assessment and policy response.
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DISCUSSION
The Current Soviet Approach
Soviet Goals and Strategy
1. Moscow's basic goal in Afghanistan has changed
little since the invasion. The Soviets are seeking to
create a situation whereby apro-Soviet Communist
regime can rule the country on its own without a large
Soviet military presence engaged in occupation and
pacification-and to do so at the lowest possible cost in
terms of Soviet lives and resources. The Soviets now
realize that accomplishing this goal requires a political
and military campaign, extending over years, that
suppresses the resistance and develops a large, effec-
tive, and loyal cadre of Afghan Communist leaders. As
of now, the Soviets do not know how long this strategy
will take to succeed. But this uncertainty, while a
concern to them, is not a deterrent to their continued
quest for control of Afghanistan.
2. Moscow will continue to hold to its main obiec-
tive of assuring a Communist regime in Afghanistan
because:
-The Soviet invasion itself has made it likely that
any successor regime in Afghanistan not support-
ed by Soviet military occupation would be deep-
ly hostile to Moscow.
-The fall of its Afghan regime would be seen as a
serious blow to Moscow's reputation as a resolute
power.
-Control of Afghanistan is seen by the Soviets to
be important to the security of Soviet Central
Asian border regions.
-The Soviets also see controlling Afghanistan as
helping fulfill long-range aspirations to expand
their influence in the region.
3. We believe that the Soviet military are examin-
ing how their military presence in Afghanistan could
be utilized for various military contingencies against
Pakistan and Iran. Major improvements in lines of
communications and air and logistic facilities, and the
deployment of significant additional forces, would be
essential for the Soviets to undertake and sustain large-
scale operations from Afghanistan. The Soviets almost
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certainly would not undertake such major improve-
ments at least until they consolidate control in Afghan-
istan.
4. Moscow has consistently underestimated the dif-
ficulty of quelling the Afghan insurgency. When the
Soviets first intervened, numerous sources report they
thought that the accession of a more moderate and
controllable regime (Babrak Karmal following Amin)
and the mere presence of Soviet forces would enable
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5. By t e time Genera Secretary An ropov re-
placed Brezhnev in late 1982; the Soviets were begin-
ning to realize that their forces in place might not be
sufficient to quell all armed resistance. Rather than
iricrease Moscow's military commitment, the Soviets
appear to have opted for a longer term attrition
strategy aimed at destroying enough of the resistance
to compel others to see the futility of continuing to
fight. How long the leadership expected this to take is
not clear. Officials responsible for implementing Sovi-
et policy often talk in terms of a few more years.
Soviets who know Afghanistan talk of decades. To
relieve insurgent pressures, the Politburo also appar-
ently ordered the Soviet military to engage in a more
intensive effort to negotiate some insurgent leaders out
of the war and used the UN-sponsored talks on
Afghanistan to probe more energetically for signs of
give in Pakistan's position.
6. By mid-1983, however, the Soviets apparently
reached the conclusion that the increased attention
given to the political side of the struggle had not
significantly eased Soviet security problems in Afghan-
istan. They sent Defense Minister Sokolov-then a
first deputy defense minister charged with overseeing
the war-back to Kabul for an assessment of the
situation. found the 25X1
resistance sti strong an oviet counterinsurgency
operations ineffective because of chronic deficiencies
in tactical intelligence, inadequate logistics, and dete-
riorating Soviet morale, discipline, and leadership. In
early 1984, Sokolov went back to Afghanistan to
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oversee a new military campaign against the resistance
and to pressure Soviet commanders to remedy prob-
lems still hampering operations.
7. The centerpiece of the 1984 campaign was the
offensive in the Panisher Valley, the largest single
operation of the war, involving 20,000 Soviet and
Afghan troops. By early 1984 it had apparently be-
come clear to the Soviets that the cease-fire they had
concluded with Panisheri resistance leader Masood in
early 1983 was working more to insurgent than Soviet
advantage. Freed of the necessity of protecting their
home base, the Panisheri insurgents were taking a
heavy toll of Soviet supply convoys en route to Kabul;
the capital was experiencing unprecedented shortages
of fuel and electricity; and Masood was working on
expanding his local political base of support.
8. The campaign itself was the most innovative of
the seven maior offensives the Soviets have conducted
there. First, they deployed an additional 5,000 men to
Afghanistan-1,000 returned to the USSR after the
campaign. Then, they temporarily deployed over 100
bombers to bases north of Afghanistan for a brief high-
altitude bombing campaign in support of ground
forces-the first such use of strategic aviation assets
since World War II.
9. The Soviets made widespread use of small heli-
borne assault units to seize the area's high points and
establish fire support bases to protect advancing Soviet
units and block insurgent escape routes. They tried
harder to secure more accurate intelligence and to use
it more effectively in support of their military opera-
tions. When the offensive ended in May, the Soviets
had succeeded in reestablishing a military presence
halfway up the valley and disrupted Masood's opera-
tions. The campaign may have also contributed to the
subsequent easing of the supply situation in Kabul.
11. The Soviet leadership also appears to have
reached a consensus early last year that more had to be
done to reduce outside support to the Afghan resis-
tance. Beginning in February 1984, there was a steady
hardening in Moscow's posture toward both Pakistan
and Iran:
In July the Soviets delivered a warning to Paki-
stan threatening serious consequences if Pakistan
did not cease supporting the resistance.
Beginning in August, Soviet forces moved into
eastern Afghanistan to try to block insurgent
infiltration routes and relieve insurgent pressures
on a number of besieged government outposts,
and there was a sharp increase in the number of
Soviet or Afghan violations of Pakistani airspace.
We have had no reports of Soviet or Afghan
ground force incursions into Pakistan since 1980.
- In March 1985, Pravda issued ahard-hitting
warning to Iran that Moscow would not remain
indifferent to its support for the resistance.
mce une
about two a month.
1984, confirmed cross-border bombing incidents
against Pakistan have averaged more than six a month,
while cross-border attacks against Iran have averaged
13. It is worth noting that during 1984 and to date
in 1985, while increasing political and limited military
pressure on Iran and Pakistan, the Soviets did not-
save for intermittent propaganda attacks-make a
maior political effort to alter the Afghanistan policies
of those extraregional countries they accuse of provid-
ing support to the Muiahedin-the United States,
China, Saudi Arabia, and others. Moscow probably
believed it had little chance of any success in this
arena. Moreover, the Soviets may have feared that, at
this stage, such an effort involving explicit threats to
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Soviet Military Improvements in Afghanistan in
? During 1984, Soviet special-purpose forces (Spets-
naz and security units) were augmented by two
battalions, bringing the total of those forces in
Afghanistan to about 3,000.
? Another 2,500-man motorized rifle regiment has
recently been deployed to Herat in western Af-
ghanistan
? The Soviets deployed to Afghanistan longer range
field guns (152 mm), more effective mortars (the
82-mm automatic mortar Vasilek), a new more
capable command vehicle, and improved conven-
tional munitions. (See figure 1 on page 14.)
Of equal importance, older model aircraft were
replaced with more modern MIG-239, SU-179, and
SU-259 (see figure 1). (The SU-25 is similar to the
US A-10 and especially suited for operations in
Afghanistan's mountainous terrain.)
? The Soviets upgraded their helicopter force and
replaced losses, keeping the total number in Af-
ghanistan at nearly 300-of which 200 are attack
helicopters (MI-249, MI-8s) (figure 1) and 100 are
transport helicopters (MI-8s, MI-6s)
? Maior expansion of an airbase is under way at
Termez, and the Soviets are in the process of
upgrading airfields elsewhere in the Turkestan Mili-
tary District iust north of Afghanistan. When these
are completed in 1987, we estimate the Soviets will
be able to deploy twice as many aircraft as they now
have for operations in northern Afghanistan
escalate and expand the war or more conciliatory
proposals about a political settlement, might convey
lack of confidence in their strategy, impart too much
leverage to their adversaries, or make Afghanistan
more central to Soviet relations with these countries.
Impact of Soviet Measures
Degree of Success for Soviets
14. Although the number of Soviet troops in Af-
ghanistan has increased some 35 percent since 1980 to
116,000, and the Afghan armed forces now number
? The Soviets developed more effective air tactics-
approaching the target from several directions,
using massed airstrikes (12 to 15 aircraft as opposed
to two to four), and increasingly employing flares
? In 1984 the Soviets conducted many more heli-
borne assaults of insurgent positions using elite
troops from airborne and ground forces units and
special-purpose troops (such as Spetsnaz)
? Because of the poor performance of the Afghan
Army, the Soviets took over a larger share of
combat and undertook more operations without
Afghan Army participation
? In late 1984 and early 1985 the Soviets were also
more active during the winter than ever before,
especially along the border with Pakistan. They also
established Afghan-manned outposts in positions to
interdict insurgent supply lines.
? The Soviets deployed additional photoreconnais-
sance and SIGINT assets to Afghanistan and at-
tempted to improve their human intelligence col-
lection and analytical efforts.
after the Panisher campaign, the Soviet mili-
tary intelligence organization (the GRU) sent some
officers to do a better iob
roughly 50,000, these forces are far too few to defeat
entirely an unconventional resistance force that is
estimated at 150,000.9 Moscow turned in a somewhat
better counterinsurgency effort in 1984, but the insur-
gents were also more effective. The overall result,
therefore, was some deterioration in the Soviet/
Afghan position.
a This is the estimated number of resistance fighters for whom the
war is a full-time or primary activity; some 30 percent of them are
in daily action against the Soviets. The number of occasional fighters
is probably several times as largq'
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Figure 1
Selected Soviet Equipment in Afghanistan
SU-17
Fitter (various models)
Max speed:
2,250 km/hr (at 12,000 meters)
Combat radius:
450 km with eight 250-kg bombs
SU-25
Frogfoot
Max speed:
900 km/hr (a[ 12,000 meters)
Combat radius:
500 km with six 250-kg bombs
MI-24
Hind
Designed for close air support and assault
Maximum combat radius:
220 km with 1,150-kg weapon load
Cruise speed:
260 km/hr
MI-8
Hip
Designed for close air support and
troop transport
Combat radius:
200 km with 2,000-kg payload
Cruise speed:
210 km/hr
82-mm automatic mortar
Vasilek
Maximum range:
4,000 to 6,000 meters
Fires 80 to 100 rounds per minute
Air transportable
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15. The increased use of airpower was not as
effective as the Soviets probably hoped. In particular,
the brief high-altitude bombing that preceded the
Panjsher VII campaign was inaccurate and ineffective,
Moreover, the
onger t e war as ragge on t e more adept the
insurgents have become at protecting themselves from
Soviet airstrikes and at shooting down aircraft
16. Soviet special forces-the Spetsnaz troops and
the airborne and ground forces reconnaissance units-
tinue supporting the resistance. President Zia has used
them to justify closer military cooperation with the
United States and firmly believes that Soviet pressures
along the border occasioned by the war are more
tolerable than an ultimate Soviet victory would be.C
20. The more aggressive Soviet approach last year
have been used more often during the past year and
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have been more effective in combat than regular
Soviet combat troops. Insurgents, who generally regard
regular Soviet soldiers with contempt, respect the
fighting abilities of Soviet special forces.
mando assault on a major insurgent base at Tora Bora
last October by Soviet troops disguised as insurgents.
In any event, Moscow cannot win the war with Soviet
special-purpose forces alone. Soviet special-purpose
troops in Afghanistan number about 3,000, and the
airborne and ground reconnaissance units that are also
used for commando-type operations number about
21. We estimate that total Soviet casualties since the
invasion now amount to about 25,000,' one-third of
whom were killed in action. Preventable infectious
diseases still appear to be taking a much higher toll-
perhaps two to three times as high-of Soviet forces
than combat. Afghan Army
and paramilitary forces, in our judgment, have suf-
fered some 67,000 casualties. (See figure 3 on page 16.)
The Soviets and their Afghan allies have also lost
several thousand combat vehicles and trucks since
1979 and more than 600 helicopters and fixed-wing
aircraft in combat, at an equipment cost of more than
$2 billions (See figure 4 on page 17.) We have no
reliable data on Afghan resistance or civilian casualties
and offer no estimates.
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19. Cross-border attacks against Pakistan and Iran
have not reduced either country's willingness to con-
22. Moreover, government control over Afghan ter-
ritory has diminished in the five years since the
invasion. By late 1983, Afghan Government statistics
indicated that the insurgents controlled twice as many
local districts in Afghanistan as the government. (See
figure 5 on page 17.) We believe the regime lost
further ground in 1984 because of increased insurgent
activity in the cities and the decline in security in
some areas of the countryside. No Afghan town, not
even the capital, was completely free of insurgent
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23. The Soviet program to transform Afghanistan
socially and politically into a reliable Communist
client state continued to have little impact. Lack of
security prevented Communist civilians from trying to
implement regime social and economic reforms in
more than two-thirds of the country. The Afghan
education system, which before the 1979 invasion
reached no more than 20 percent of the school-age
population, now reaches an even smaller proportion of
the population and is widely distrusted. Even those
Afghans sent to the USSR for all types of training-
they reportedly number about 7,500 annually-often
return antagonized rather than indoctrinated. Some
returnees cannot find appropriate or attractive lobs
from which to spread regime influence. The evidence
suggests that efforts to buy loyalty for the regime with
economic inducements or truces continue to work only
temporarily
Afghan Military Performance
24. Despite Soviet efforts to build reliable forces for
the Babrak regime, Afghan military and paramilitary
Figure 3
Afghanistan: Estimated Soviet and Afghan
Government Losses, 1980-84
Casualties Aircraft
Thousands Hundreds
Soviet Afghan ~ Soviets Afghanb
a Helicopters and fixed-wing-400 helicopters, 45 fixed-wing; ]0 transports.
bHelicopters and fixed-wing.
305311 0-85
forces remain ineffectual. The government's inability
to retain personnel is a principal cause. Desertions
average about 30,000 a year in an army of about
50,000, not counting paramilitary forces. Factionalism
in the Afghan People's Democratic Party is another
factor contributing to the Afghan military's ineffec-
tiveness, particularly in the officer corps. Infighting
between the Parcham and Khalgi factions of the
Communist Party has hindered the development of
military cohesion and the emergence of competent,
dependable commanders. Shortages of equipment, low
equipment readiness rates, and the technical inability
of many soldiers to use what equipment they do have
also diminish Afghan military effectiveness.
25. In combat, the Afghans need strong Soviet
support to ensure even small gains against the resis-
tance. The Soviets are increasingly conducting opera-
tions on their own, although most of their operations
are still carried out iointly with the Afghans. Afghan
troops frequently leak word of pending operations to
the resistance and desert under fire. Last year, part of
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Figure 4
Afghanistan: Estimated Soviet Helicopter
Losses, 1980-84
Figure 5
Afghanistan: Insurgent Versus Government
Control of Local Districts, 1980-84
Insurgent
controlled
Disputed
0 1980 81 82 83 84
ooaaas ~-es
an elite Afghan brigade that reportedly had been
trained in the USSR deserted when faced with the
prospect of fighting in the Pan~sher Valley; the fight-
ing in the valley itself decimated the remainder.
Impact on the Insurgents
26. Although Soviet and regime forces have been
unable to maintain continuous security in the cities
and in rural areas following sweep operations, their
forces have prevented the insurgents from maintaining
large permanent strongholds. The threat of air and
artillery retaliation on civilians has deterred the resis-
tance from firing persistently from a single area, and
Soviet and regime surveillance networks and infor-
mants-weak as they are-hamper the insurgents,
causing delays and complications in infiltration and
logistics, and occasionally provoking internecine fight-
ing among insurgent groups.
27. Nevertheless, in 1983 and 1984 the insurgents
increased attacks on airfields, garrisons, and other
military targets. Increased patrolling and periodic
Soviet and Afghan sweep operations and retaliatory
bombing strikes did not substantially ease the pressure
by resistance forces on Soviet supply lines. Although
Kabul's supply situation eased after the Panisher VII
campaign, rocket and mortar attacks on Soviet installa-
tions in Kabul increased and there was a dramatic
bombing at the Kabul International Airport in 1984.
Resistance forces operate freely in both Herat and
Qandahar-Afghanistan's second- and third-largest
cities-keeping both in a state of constant turmoil.
Impact on Noncombatants
28. Soviet and Afghan military pressure has forced
the emigration or dislocation of about one-third of the
population and disrupted the traditional agricultural
transportation and marketing networks. There are now
an estimated 2.8 million Afghan refugees residing in
Pakistan and 1.2 million in Iran, and Kabul reportedly
has swollen to roughly twice its prewar population of
about 900,000.
29. The impact of the population dislocation and
exodus-both of which have declined in recent
years-has been mixed. Some areas of the countryside
that have been largely depopulated by repeated Soviet
military operations-the Panisher, the Konar Valley-
no longer grow enough food to feed the insurgents,
and the resistance cannot rely on the population for
intelligence or blend in for security. In depopulated
areas, freed of the necessity of providing local govern-
ment services to the civilians, the resistance now has
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more time to devote to its military effort against the
Soviets. The refugee influx into Kabul has brought
more people under Soviet control, but it is probably
also one of the factors that has made Kabul increasing-
ly insecure for the Soviets. The refugee influx into
Pakistan may vet prove to be a serious internal
security problem for the Zia government, though it is
now largely an economic problem, and relations be-
tween the predominantly Pushtun refugees and Paki-
stani Pushtuns are surprisingly good.
30. Only repeated military operations, serious food
shortages, and high casualties appear to erode civilian
willingness to support the resistance, and the impact of
these measures has usually been only temporary. The
Soviets have not applied systematic scorched-earth
policies throughout most of the country. The result is
that, despite occasional signs of war weariness, overall
support for the resistance after five years of fighting
appears strong.
Moscow's Perception of the Situation
The Current Mood in Moscow
31. The Soviet party's new General Secretary, M. S.
Gorbachev, was not on the Defense Council at the
time the decision to invade Afghanistan was made and
presumably had little voice in that decision. As a key
figure in the leadership during the last year, Gorba-
chev has presumably developed a degree of commit-
ment to current Soviet goals and strategy in Afghani-
stan. He used his meeting with Pakistan's President Zia
at Chernenko's funeral to chastise Islamabad over its
policy toward Afghanistan. Although he would natu-
rally wish to solve the Afghanistan problem in some
way, while he is consolidating his power in the Soviet
leadership over the next year or so, he has a strong
political interest in avoiding positions that might make
him look weak or open him to charges of adventurism.
He therefore does not seem to have an immediate
interest in seeking to revise Soviet goals and strategy.
32. A major escalation or expansion of the war
would certainly raise the costs to the Soviet system
substantially while not necessarily leading to a quick
victory. Intensification of the conflict at roughly pres-
ent levels of Soviet commitment will raise the costs
somewhat. The Soviet Union has the economic and
military resources to continue this war indefinitely at
present or modestly escalated levels. It is the prospect
of a very protracted war with potentially large domes-
tic and international costs that is politically and psy-
chologically troubling to many in the Soviet popula-
tion and elite, and presumably of concern to the Soviet
leadership. The Soviet Union is more capable than
other countries might be of bearing the political costs
of direct involvement in an open-ended war. Its
tolerance for a protracted war in Afghanistan may not
be limitless. We cannot say at this point, however,
what the limits might be and whether or when they
might eventually be reached.
33. There is no hard intelligence on the current
views regarding Afghanistan of other members of the
Politburo. The situation in Afghanistan does not figure
prominently in their public remarks or their private
ones that are known to us. Moreover, they, along with
Gorbachev, have lust promoted some key military
figures who have been most directly responsible for
the military strategy underlying the Soviet campaign.
Newly appointed Defense Minister Sokolov, Chief of
the General Staff Akhromeyev, and Commander in
Chief of the Southern Theater of Military Operations
Maksimov all come to their jobs having spent the
better part of the past five years grappling with the
war in Afghanistan. It seems unlikely they would have
been promoted had there been any fundamental
leadership dissatisfaction over their performance or
the strategies they have followed
34. The removal of Marshal Ogarkov as Chief of
the General Staff could have involved Afghanistan to
some extent, although we have very little hard knowl-
edge on why he was removed and believe the main
cause was his suspected lack of subservience to the
political leadership on a whole range of issues. One
recurrent but undocumented rumor contends he com-
plained about the inconclusiveness of the war and
pressed for escalation or withdrawal. If this was the
case, then it is significant that he was demoted while
officers more directly responsible for the strategy were
t e ai ure o
the Panjsher VII campaign last spring to locate and
destroy the Panisheri resistance-the kev objective of
the campaign-heightened frustration in Moscow and
led to recriminations within the military over the
cause of the poor Soviet performance.
many middle-level mili-
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tars intelligence officials familiar with the situation
now think the war is unwinnable. In support of this
judgment, they reportedly cited the fact that less than
30 percent of the country is in government hands, the
insurgents are becoming more numerous and more
capable, and Soviet losses are increasing.
36. It is possible that top Soviet leaders have a less-
than-accurate appreciation of the Soviet position in
tant to admit it made a mistake and face the domestic
and international consequences that might result.
Third, Soviet ideology dictates that the maiority of the
Afghan people want the kind of revolution the Com-
munists are attempting to impose, and the Soviet
ship surely finds it difficult to admit that this is
Finally, the condition of the men at the top
during the past five years and their need to address
more pressing problems at home and abroad probably
has limited the time they devote to their Afghan
problem, at least to its fundamental assessment.
The Soviet Cost/Benefit Calculus
37. The Soviets privately admit that Afghanistan
has entailed significant political, economic, and mili-
tary costs. They also assert, however, that the costs of
alternative policies would be even higher and that
they have no alternative but to stay the course. We
believe the costs have not yet reached a point where
they are likely to force the Soviets to scale back their
objectives.
- Afghanistan has been nowhere near as disruptive
an experience for the Soviet Union as was Viet-
nam for the United States after five years. It has
not upset Soviet military priorities elsewhere or
significantly diminished the overall readiness of
the Soviet military. The problems the Soviet
army has experienced with morale, discipline,
and leadership, while not insignificant, are mag-
nified versions of problems throughout the Soviet
forces in peacetime. (See inset on "Effects of the
War on the Military, page 20.")
-The economic costs are bearable. Direct military
costs are estimated to amount to about 1 percent
of the Soviet defense budget, and aid for Afghan-
istan is substantially less than the costs of aiding
either Vietnam or Cuba. (See inset on "The
Economic Impact, page 21.")~~
the Soviet Involvement, page 23. ")
Afghanistan has exacerbated a number of domes-
tic and societal problems, but we believe the
population's normal passivity, the regime's coer-
cive and palliative measures, and the popula-
tion's acceptance of some costs for the fulfillment
of the USSR's global role have all combined to
keep the political and social consequences of the
war under control. The absence of a free press
allows the government to keep the war out of the
public eye; to some degree, however, the lack of
information about the war undermines the credi-
bility of official Soviet pronouncements on the
war to the population. (See inset on "The Domes-
tic Social and Political Impact, page 22. ")
The Soviets have said, and almost certainly be-
lieve, that failure to preserve the Communist
regime in Kabul would have a more damaging
international impact than continued occupation
and war; a Soviet defeat would weaken the
USSR's international posture, damage its credi-
bility as an ally, and encourage the West to
increase the pressure on Soviet interests around
the globe. (See inset on "International Impact of
Moscow's Views on Outside Support
38. The Soviets know outside support for the resis-
tance has steadily become a more important factor
accounting for the increased military effectiveness of
the resistance. Nonetheless, they have not chosen to
make Afghanistan a major roadblock in their bilateral
dealings with any of the aid donors, except Pakistan
and Iran-whom they regard as the potential weak
links in the chain of support and the most vulnerable
to Soviet pressures.
39. The Soviets have sought to signal to the aid
donors that more outside support will not deter the
USSR from accomplishing its objectives in Afghani-
stan. In a major Pravda editorial article on 14
February 1985, they noted that such aid might reach
$600 million this year and includes such items as the
Swiss Oerlikon-Bourlet antiaircraft gun and more
Chinese-made weapons, including surface-to-air
missiles, mines, submachineguns, and heavy-caliber
antiaircraft guns. The Soviets probably expect that
the resistance will be more capable militarily in
1985-86, particularly against Soviet aircraft, as the
growing amount of military supplies they have
denounced in their propaganda reaches the resis-
tance forces.
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Maintaining a force of 116,000 men in Afghanistan
has not affected Soviet military priorities elsewhere or
seriously reduced the overall readiness of the Soviet
military. Soviet casualties and equipment losses are a
source of major concern to the leadership in Moscow
due to their potential impact on the population, the
prestige of the Soviet military, and morale in Afghani-
Afghanistan has highlighted serious deficiencies in
the military supply system and in Soviet military
medicine, and the measures
The Soviets have also experienced chronic morale and
discipline problems among their forces in Afghanistan.
In i Brent or incompetent
leadership at unit levels, together with frequent cases of
physical abuse and neglect of conscript personnel, have
diminished operational effectiveness.
onstrated serious deficiencies in the Soviet system and
procedures for command and control. Some measures to
streamline the process by which operations are directed
and controlled were made in 1982, and more probably
are in train as a result of the activation of the new
Southern Theater of Military Operations high com-
mand last autumn, which appears to be taking a more
direct hand in operations in Afghanistan. But Soviet
commanders in Afghanistan still must operate in a
complex and highly rigid command and control envi-
ronment that significantly inhibits more effective oper-
ations in a counterinsurgency environment. In the
tactical arena Soviet commanders can successfully carry
While the terrain and nature of the conflict in
Afghanistan limit the relevance of the Soviet military
experience in Afghanistan to a war in Europe or
China-the theaters where Soviet military planning is
overwhelmingly focused-there have been benefits. A
small but growing group of career military personnel
are gaining combat experience, and the Soviets have
learned some lessons about the performance of specific
weapons and tactics that may be useful elsewhere.
Afghanistan has been used as a testing ground for
new weapon systems. For example, the Soviets have
tested the SU-25 Frogfoot ground-support aircraft, the
rapid-fire Vasilek mortar, and new antipersonnel mines.
Moreover, usage in Afghanistan has generated modifi-
cations to existing systems, such as the incorporation of
additional armor on the MI-24 Hind helicopter.
In contrast to the rigidity seen in operational com-
mand and control, the Soviets have demonstrated con-
siderable flexibility in organizing forces for unique
combat situations. In fact, the most important opera-
tional development has been the Soviets' attempt to
adapt their combined-arms approach to the special
conditions of the war in Afghanistan. Difficulties en-
countered in coordinating the various combat units
have led Moscow to create new units in Afghanistan for
specific combat missions by combining on an ad hoc
basis motorized rifle, tank, artillery, and engineering
troops, and other special supporting elements. More-
over, the Soviets have also established several perma-
nent specially tailored combat formations for operations
in Afghanistan. These included two combined-arms
independent brigades and several independent security
battalions for pipeline protection and road security.
Such tactical experience for young commanders may
have significant relevance beyond Afghanistan.
The Soviets have learned to use helicopters effective-
ly to ferry troops and supplies and to support operations
by ground forces. They have also demonstrated a
growing appreciation for the value of heliborne assault
operations, and have gained substantial experience in
coordinating the use of fixed-wing and rotary-wing
aircraft in such operations.
Some of the lessons learned in Afghanistan are now
finding their way into the military school system. For
example, Maior General Slyusar, former commander of
the airborne division in Afghanistan and now comman-
dant of the Ryazan Airborne Forces Higher Command
School, has publicly acknowledged the necessity of
including the lessons learned from operations in Af-
ghanistan in the school's curriculum. ~~
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The Economic Impact
Direct Soviet military expenditures in Afghanistan
are estimated to account for about 1 percent of total
Soviet military spending. In the years 1980-84, we
estimate it cost Moscow, at a minimum, the equivalent
of more than $16 billion in direct support of Soviet
forces. However, about 55 percent of this total probably
would have been spent on maintaining these forces even
if there had been no intervention in Afghanistan. C
The dollar estimate for the direct military costs of the
war takes account of operations and maintenance,
personnel, medical care, transportation, construction,
ammunition and POL used, and equipment repair and
replacement. The $16 billion figure does not include-
for lack of data-the costs of repairing roads, facilities,
or pipelines in Afghanistan, which are damaged daily
by insurgent actions; the loss of Soviet food, POL, and
ammunition to theft or ambush; the additional man-
power cost of the combat benefits Soviet soldiers receive
while serving there; pay for civilian employees of the
Soviet military in Afghanistan; or the cost of replacing
wornout equipment. In ruble terms, what we can
estimate amounts to about 1 percent of estimated Soviet
defense spending each year between 1980 and 1984.
Because of the limitations on our data and methodolo-
gy, what we can cost must be regarded as a very
conservative estimate.
Manpower and construction costs rose sharply in
1981 and 1982 but then declined and leveled off. The
cost of replacing equipment lost in combat or destroyed
in accidents has been rising steadily. About 90 percent
of these replacement costs, which account for about 15
percent of the direct military costs of the war, go for
aircraft, especially helicopters
Preparations for the invasion temporarily caused a
significant disruption of the civilian economy in the
region just north of Afghanistan, and military priorities
there continue to cause periodic disruptions. For exam-
ple, having to use scarce railroad rolling stock to
transport goods to Afghanistan causes bottlenecks in
Soviet industries in the region, which disrupt produc-
tion and limit output. Western economic sanctions
caused even more widespread economic disruptions,
but almost all economic sanctions now have been lifted
and their impact has diminished.
The growth of the insurgency and the concomitant
decline in the Afghan Government's ability to collect
revenue has meant Moscow has also had to provide
steadily increasing amounts of economic and military
support to Afghanistan. We estimate that Moscow has
provided about $1.6 billion in economic assistance and
$1.7 billion in military aid since the invasion. The
Soviets pay Afghanistan about $300 million annually for
natural gas-about 2.8 billion cubic meters in 1984-
which the Afghans then use to pay for Soviet imports
and repay Afghanistan's prerevolutionary debts to the
40. On the basis of an improving military supply
situation, we proiect that the performance of the
resistance in Afghanistan will improve steadily during
the next year or so as it appears to have in 1984:
- The number of near-full-time fighters, now esti-
mated at about 150,000, could increase
substantially.
- Increased availability of ammunition and other
material will increase the operational persistence
of those under arms.
- Resistance effectiveness against aircraft is likely
to improve substantially, against both airborne
targets and airbases.
- The number of resistance fighters with rudimen-
tary military training is likely to continue to rise.
Some 25,000 were trained in 1984; we expect at
least that number will receive training in 1985;
trainees steadily impart their knowledge to other
fighters.
41. At the same time, the inevitable sluggishness
and unevenness of the resistance logistic network,
shortages in many needed items, food problems, and
the fragmented nature of the war will probably cause
these factors only gradually to increase resistance
effectiveness. They will not confront the Soviets with a
dramatic deterioration or crisis in their military posi-
tion or prevent the Soviets from making selected
improvements to it.
42. On the basis of recent trends in Soviet opera-
tions and available resources, we can anticipate with
some confidence many of the major actions the Soviets
are likely to take and some of the options that they
might adopt to reverse a gradually deteriorating situa-
tion and to counter the increases in resistance effec-
tiveness they expect in the coming year. We believe
Soviet operations will certainly include attempts to
apply more skillfully and widely the tactics applied
with limited success in 1984:
- More operations by Soviet forces without the
Afghan Army.
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The Domestic Social and Political Impact
Stan was politically contentious and that middle-level
officals in the ruling Soviet elite questioned the necessi-
ty for intervention. Five years later, it is not clear
whether Afghanistan currentl enerates significant
tension at the top
Dissatisfaction within the elite has been accompanied
by some problems within the populace at large
casualties returning from Afghani-
stan have triggered isolated popular demonstrations
against the government. The fact that the regime has
publicly acknowledged only some dozens of the esti-
mated 25,000 casualties suffered there testifies to its
concern about possible popular reaction to the real level
Afghanistan were more frequent shortly after the inva-
sion.
spontaneous, s ort- ive popu ar emons ra-
tions against the war occurred, generally in response to
kept, Dushanbe, and other cities in Soviet Central Asia.
Subsequently, antiwar demonstrations reportedly oc-
curred in the Baltic republics, the Ukraine, Azerbaijan,
the European RSFSR, and Siberia. In the most recent
report in October 1984, ~ claims to have
learned from a senior mi itary o cer that relatives of
the killed and wounded burned the military commissar-
iat in Kazan' 450 kilometers east of Moscow. In
addition, learned from colleagues in
TASS an Novosti t at t ey have received thousands of
letters from Soviet citizens complaining about casualties
and asking for further explanations of Soviet policy.
Charges of criticizing the occupation of Afghanistan
have figured in the trials of a number of Soviet
dissidents. on-
demned the invasion in anuary a c arov was
arrested five days after his interview with Western
media and exiled to Gor'kiy. An unusual incident of
dissent within official ranks-albeit at a low level-
occurred in 1983 when a Moscow Radio broadcaster,
Vladimir Danchev, altered official news broadcasts on
Afghanistan for foreign audiences to express opposition
to Soviet involvement.
Reports from returning troops-specifically the con-
trast between what they tell and what Soviet media
report-have increased popular cynicism about regime
propaganda. Western visitors report that ordinary Rus-
sians do not relish risking the lives of their children in
Afghanistan, and the paucity of media coverage of
casualties indicates the regime is sensitive to their
concerns.~~
Afghanistan, along with events in neighboring Iran,
reportedly has increased regime concern about disaffec-
tion among Soviet Central Asians. In May 1984 a
Moscow lecturer told a public audience that Islam
represented a serious internal problem and that the
regime was worried about the impact of Afghanistan on
Soviet Taiiks. In addition, there are reports that mem-
bers of most major ethnic groups in the USSR complain
they are bearing a disproportionate share of the combat
burden. (Central Asians were prominent among the
Soviet initial invasion force, but the ethnic breakdown
of Soviet forces is now approximately representative of
the population as a whole
A Soviet emigre journal has reported that in a covert
opinion poll of 287 Muscovites, including some party
members, 62 percent expressed disapproval of Soviet
age or o er were opposed to the intervention, and
some 60 percent of midcareerists (35 to 45) were op-
posed. Diplomatic observers, journalists, and most expert
travelers report, however, that, while generally negative
feelings about the war may be widespread in the Soviet
population and elite, they are not intense, they coexist
with broad acceptance that Soviet interests require its
continuation, and they are surpassed by popular worries
about other issues, such as the economy.
Soviet media have acknowledged increased tensions
resulting from the fact that children of the elite can
avoid service in Afghanistan. The leadership has also
shown public signs of concern that the problem of youth
alienation in the USSR is growing in part because of the
Soviet involvement.
The regime has not let problems with popular opin-
ion go unattended, but has moved to minimize or
control their impact. Thus it has:
- Sought to justify its involvement by playing up US
involvement and the dangers to Soviet security of
an insurgent victory.
- Appealed to the patriotism of ordinary Soviets by
more candid media coverage of conditions Soviet
troops face there, by publicizing a few heroic
exploits, by calling attention to the problems of
wounded veterans, and by cracking down on elite
draft dodgers by tightening draft deferments.
- Launched new propaganda campaigns to improve
discipline within the military and combat the
problem of youth alienation.
- Increased antireligious propaganda in the Turk-
men SSR.
- Attempted to relieve ethnic tensions, particularly
in the military
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International Impact of the Soviet Involvement
The unprecedented economic and political sanctions
imposed on the USSR because of Afghanistan endured
much longer than any sanctions imposed after other
Soviet international misdeeds. The Soviets are con-
cerned about the coalition of outside forces continuing
to support the Afghan resistance. Soviet actions rein-
forced international perceptions of Soviet aggressive-
ness; fueled increased Western, Chinese, and Japanese
defense efforts; made Third World countries more wary
of Soviet intentions; and hampered Moscow's efforts to
exploit the Nonaligned Movement. In Southwest Asia in
particular, Afghanistan disrupted Soviet efforts to culti-
vate the post-Shah regime in Iran and turned Pakistan
into the maior supporter of the Afghan resistance and a
closer security partner of the United States. India views
the Soviet presence in Afghanistan as posing an indirect
threat to Indian interests because it has brought super-
power competition to a region where India aspires to
unchallenged political and military dominance.
Moscow probably believes, however, that it has
weathered the worst of international censure as Afghan-
istan has become an international fact of life. Last year
most of the remaining countries that had put ties to the
USSR on ice because of Afghanistan moved to resume
more normal economic and political contacts.
- More agile and aggressive ground forces tactics,
particularly with special and air assault forces.
- Better use of tactical air and ground-based
firepower.
- Temporary augmentations of Soviet forces for
high-priority operations.
- Further efforts to improve tactical intelligence
and command and control.
- More efforts to interdict resistance supplies near
Afghanistan's borders.
- Continued improvement of the logistic
infrastructure.
forces, ranging from poor health among the troops to
rigid behavior by commanders, and, of course, the
near-complete undependability of the Afghan Army.
Much of the Soviet effort during the coming year will,
hence, be devoted to simply struggling with these
problems along lines seen in the past. With respect to
the Soviets' programs for improving the basic perfor-
mance of their own forces and the viability of their
puppet regime in Kabul, we foresee neither sharp
departures of policy nor maior positive achievements
over the next year
Soviet Military Operations in Afghanistan
44. Planning probably is already under way for a
good-weather campaign against the resistance in 1985
that will include another Panisher offensive-albeit
not necessarily on the scale of 1984-to capitalize on
last year's partial success. Destroying the insurgency in
the Panisher would greatly improve security along the
Termez-Kabul highway and increase the supply of
goods to Kabul, as well as disrupt one of the most
visible and effective pockets of opposition to Soviet
forces
45. There probably will be other attempts to cap-
ture or kill key insurgent leaders, especially Ahmad
Masood, who has become a symbol of Afghan resis-
tance. Arenewed effort against Masood most likely
would involve smaller, elite forces. The timing of such
attacks could depend largely on the ability of Soviet
and Afghan intelligence to locate Masood's headquar-
r
46. There will be more efforts to interdict supplies
and personnel crossing the Pakistani and Iranian bor-
ders.
control the country in the long term.
43. In the nature of guerrilla warfare, the Afghani-
stan conflict is dominated by small, diverse actions
occurring all over the country. Operations as large as
the Panjsher VII campaign are the rarity. Moreover, a
good part of the Soviets' problem in Afghanistan
derives from a host of persistent deficiencies in their
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expense of other missions such as convoy security and
protecting the cities.
47. The Soviets are likely to increase their efforts at
suppressing insurgent activity inside and surrounding
the maior cities. The Soviets will continue conducting
regular sweeps and airstrikes against the insurgents
operating from nearby bases in the countryside. Inside
the cities, there are limits to what direct military
measures can achieve. Superior Soviet firepower is less
of an advantage, generally killing far more civilians
than resistance fighters, though Soviet troops have
used heavy weapons and airstrikes in the suburbs of
Qandahar and Herat. Reprisals for urban incidents are
likely to be increased. Since the most effective mea-
sures are manpower intensive, any large Soviet effort
in the cities would seriously affect other military
missions. A perception that security in Kabul was
deteriorating, however, would be most likely to pro-
voke an exceptionally strong Soviet reaction0
48. There is likely to be an increased amount of
Soviet activity in western Afghanistan over the next
year. The new regiment at Herat, which is subordinate
to the motorized rifle division at Shindand, presum-
ably will be tasked with reducirig the insurgent pres-
ence near that hotly contested city and protecting the
new pipeline in western Afghanistan. The Soviets are
also attempting to enhance their capabilities for con-
ducting simultaneous and independent operations in
both the east and the west. They are realigning their
forces so that those in the west are less dependent on
redeployments from the east for maior operations.
50. To increase their total effectiveness over the
next year, the Soviets are likely to introduce into
Afghanistan relatively small numbers of additional
troops perhaps totaling up to 10,000. These forces
could be added within a month or so of a decision to
do so. The Soviets will probably adopt more aggressive
tactics led by special forces and conduct more inde-
pendent operations. Greater aggressiveness could be
achieved by more use of airmobile assaults, greater
willingness by regular troops to leave armored vehicles
and close with the enemy, use of smaller tactical
formations, more initiative by lower ranking officers,
more effective use of air and fire support, and quick-
reaction forces to follow up on intelligence reports of
insurgent locations. Independent operations-without
supporting Afghan units-would be easier to conduct
and less likely to be compromised by leaks to insur-
gents. All these approaches would be more casualty
intensive, however, which would tend to inhibit their
application and at the same time reinforce Soviet
commanders' demands for more forces.
Undermining the Insurgents' Civilian Base
51. The Soviets have generally tried to undermine
civilian support for the resistance with a combination
of conciliatory and coercive measures. This combina-
tion of tactics is likely to continue in 1985 and will
probably be intensified, because undermining the
resistance's civilian base is one of the keys to a Soviet
victory. The Soviets have given Afghan government
workers and military men large salary increases, an
opportunity to benefit from the government's land
and water reform program, and educational opportu-
nities for them and their children in the USSR.
Villages and tribes willing to support the government
get economic, military, and medical aid and some
degree of local autonomy. On the other hand, some
villages, whose sympathies are with the resistance,
have been completely destroyed, and the Soviets and
their Afghan allies reportedly routinely use torture to
extract tactical military intelligence from captured
insurgents
levels cannot seal the Iranian and Pakistani borders,
interdiction measures nearby hamper insurgent resup-
ply efforts by forcing them to move only at night, split
into smaller groups, expend ammunition en route, and
take more circuitous routes to and from Afghanistan.
52. In the next year the Soviets will continue to
employ a mixture of coercive and conciliatory mea-
sures toward the population:
- They will continue trying to improve the image
of the Kabul regime and smooth over the faction-
al infighting in the ruling party but they will not
be successful, at least in the near term. We
believe the Soviets now see no better alternative
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than Babrak Karmal and that they will not move
to replace him.
The Soviets probably will make greater political
and economic concessions to win support from
individual tribal and regional leaders, but this
program is not likely to find much receptivity
among insurgents.
The Soviets may apply draconian measures
against selected civilian targets as they have in
the past, perhaps on a wider scale. But we do not
believe they will adopt large-scale scorched-
earth tactics to drive out or kill populations that
they do not control. This would inevitably raise
the economic and international political costs of
the war while not assuredly advancing the pros-
pect of a Soviet victory
Increased Military Pressures Against Pakistan and
Iran
53. Alongside efforts to improve the capabilities of
Soviet forces in Afghanistan, Moscow will probably
increase military pressure on insurgent targets inside
Pakistan and Iran, but only modestly. Options within
the capabilities of present Soviet forces are limited.
Moscow can:
- Conduct more frequent artillery attacks and
airstrikes on insurgent targets just inside Pakistan
and Iran.
- Mount up-to-regimental-size heliborne assaults or
operations by ground forces to destroy individual
insurgent bases.
54. More intensive air and artillery strikes than we
have seen thus far are Moscow's easiest option-even
though the strikes that have taken place have accom-
plished little militarily. A sustained bombing cam-
paign might prompt Tehran, Islamabad, and the
refugees themselves to relocate camps farther away
from the border but this would have little effect since
the insurgents will remain in the border area. Current-
ly, the paramilitary Pakistani Frontier Corps, which
has primary responsibility for border security, has very
limited capabilities to detect and shoot down incoming
aircraft from the west, and the most modern Pakistani
fighters are located at fields in central and eastern
Pakistan. If, however, increased airstrikes cause the
United States to accede to Islamabad's requests for
early-warning aircraft and more advanced air-to-air
and surface-to-air missiles, Pakistan's air defenses
could improve markedly and could take a large toll of
attacking aircraft. The prospect of becoming engaged
in serious air-to-air actions with Pakistan is a deterrent
to major Soviet cross-border attacks, Iran has no
fighter aircraft based in eastern Iran, and its overall
border defenses are weaker than Pakistan's.
55. There is no evidence of Soviet planning for
limited ground incursions to destroy individual insur-
gent bases outside Afghanistan-although the Soviets
long ago laid a propaganda groundwork justifying such
actions, particularly vis-a-vis Pakistan. Small-scale
heliborne assaults are most likely. Assaults of up to
regimental size are also possible, though some reposi-
tioning of units would probably be necessary. Surprise
attacks with extensive air support could destroy specif-
ic insurgent bases provided they are conducted in
remote areas away from the major infiltration routes,
which are protected by Pakistani and Iranian forces.
As with air attacks, however, defensive responses by
refugees and Pakistani or Iranian forces would quickly
increase the risks for follow-on raids, especially if the
insurgents obtain advance warning. The large numbers
of helicopters that would be required to mount opera-
tions along the mountainous parts of the northern
Afghan-Pakistani border would be vulnerable to
ground fire.
56. Because of limited forces and logistics, and the
fact that their resources are concurrently occupied
with missions inside Afghanistan, the Soviets are in a
poor position to put serious military pressure on
Pakistan and Iran through strikes at border targets.
Even increased levels and frequency of Soviet cross-
border attacks are unlikely to create serious problems
for President Zia unless such attacks are directed at
Pakistani facilities or the Soviets conduct the force and
logistics buildups needed to create a serious offensive
threat. While we believe it likely that the Soviets will
increase the severity of cross-border air attacks, and
may undertake occasional ground raids, these are
unlikely to be of sufficient nature or scale to force any
Pakistani accommodation to the Soviets.
Diplomatic Options
57. The USSR has put some diplomatic effort into
attempts to neutralize world hostility to its role in
Afghanistan, and will continue to do so. Moscow
agreed to indirect talks between Kabul and Islamabad
under UN sponsorship in an effort to appear reason-
able about wanting a political solution and thus relieve
international pressures. Its approach to the talks, how-
ever, involves trying to win in the diplomatic arena
what it has been unable to win on the battlefield in
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Afghanistan-an effective end to the resistance with-
out any commitments for a withdrawal of Soviet
forces. Thus, the Soviets demand that the Pakistanis
recognize the regime and guarantee Pakistani non-
interference in Afghan internal affairs, while main-
taining Soviet troop withdrawals are a bilateral issue
between the USSR and Afghanistan to be decided
separately as the country is brought under effective
control by a Soviet-run regime.
58. The talks are currently bogged down over Mos-
cow's attempts to have a bilateral Soviet-Afghan ac-
cord on a Soviet troop withdrawal timetable excluded
from a comprehensive UN-sponsored settlement. The
Soviets may try to regain diplomatic initiative in 1985
by suggesting that a withdrawal commitment could be
part of a comprehensive accord, thus shifting the onus
for the diplomatic stalemate back to Pakistan and
focusing discussions on how Pakistani pledges of non-
interference might be implemented
59. In addition to continuing cross-border incidents,
the Soviets will apply strong diplomatic and propagan-
da pressures on Pakistan. They may increase efforts to
destabilize the Zia regime. They have had strong
incentives to do so in the past, but apparently lack
adequate means
60. In recent months the Soviets have toughened
their stance toward Iran, and we expect this trend to
continue. However, the Soviets might try a more
flexible approach to Iran in which they seek to exploit
Iran's interest in an improved relationship to get Iran
to cut back its support of the Afghan resistance. C
61. The USSR and China have moved to improve
relations with each other despite the "three obstacles"
raised by China-Soviet troops on China's borders;
Soviet support of the Vietnamese occupation of Cam-
bodia; and Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Even if
the Afghan issue has become more significant because
of the growing Chinese role in aiding the Muiahedin,
we judge that neither side is likely to make the
continuing improvement of relations contingent on its
resolution.
tant political goals, such as encouraging restraint in US
military programs. Should they, on the other hand,
hint at the possibility of a Soviet withdrawal from
Afghanistan without prior guarantees for the Kabul
regime in order to encourage reductions in US support
for the resistance, they would risk signaling their own
vulnerability in Afghanistan and emboldening their
major adversary. For these reasons we do not believe
that the Soviets will wish to make Afghanistan stand in
the way of changes in US-Soviet bilateral relations in
the near future.
Prospects for Soviet Success
63. We doubt that any of these military or political
measures will be sufficient to put the war convincingly
on the path toward a Soviet victory. On the contrary,
if our appreciation of the situation is correct, the
Soviets are likely to find themselves no better off after
another year or so of tactical adjustments and small
troop increases. At some point a continued military
stalemate might no longer be tolerable to the Soviets
and they might consider radical alternatives to their
present strategy. These could include a large Soviet
military buildup in Afghanistan and more forceful
attempts to diminish Pakistan's support to the resis-
tance or-less likely-serious efforts to get a ,political
solution involving Soviet military withdrawal.
64. For the time being, however, we believe that
Moscow prefers to avoid the military costs and risks of
a major troop increase. Logistic preparations for an
increase of 50,000 troops, for example, would require
several months and would probably not decisively
affect the course of the war. A much larger expan-
sion-to alevel of 400,000 to 500,000 troops-de-
signed to assure Soviet control would take a year or
more to accomplish and still might not lead to quick
suppression of the insurgency.
65. We also believe that Moscow is not yet ready to
face the military risks and political consequences of a
significant expansion of hostilities into Pakistan or
Iran. Major action against either country from Afghan
territory would require extensive logistic preparations,
62. With respect to the United States, the Soviets
could attempt to make US support for the resistance
more of a factor in bilateral relations than they have in
the past. But there are inhibiting risks in either of the
two approaches they might take. Should they suggest
that other improvements in the relationship, such as
arms control progress, are jeopardized by US policy
toward Afghanistan, they risk sacrificing other impor-
including securing of supply lines
66. We believe, therefore, that the Soviets will
continue for at least the next year or so to try to make
progress against the insurgents without a major expan-
sion of .their forces or of the geographic scope of the
war. But we believe that such progress will continue to
elude them.
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The Longer Term Outlook
67. We do not attempt in this Memorandum to
project Soviet strategy toward the war beyond the
current year. From the present vantage point, how-
ever, the pattern of successive reassessments, tactical
adjustments, and ratcheting up of the Soviet commit-
ment-qualitative and quantitative-appears to us the
most likely prognosis for several years to come. This is
because it appears to offer the Soviets a reliable and, so
far, tolerable means of preserving their minimum
equity-a Communist regime, however ineffective, in
Kabul, while avoiding the unpleasant costs and risks of
substantially expanding the war or pulling out.
68. The Soviets would clearly like not merely to do
better, but to put the war on a course that points
convincingly toward ultimate victory, even though it
might take many more years to complete. To do so,
however, they must crack the morale of the resistance
through a sustained pattern of tactical victories inside
Afghanistan, and sharply constrain by military or
political means its outside support. We believe it is
highly unlikely that the Soviets can achieve these
conditions through the measures they are most likely
to apply in the near future.
Alternative Scenarios
69. There are a number of developments, which do
not now seem likely, that could upset our calculations.
Although we see no evidence that Gorbachev is ready
to depart far from current Soviet strategy, Soviet
leadership politics could produce debate that leads to
more radical changes in Soviet policy than we current-
ly foresee. A Pakistani government without President
Zia might be less committed to current Afghan policy,
despite the consensus that supports this policy now.
Iran could also change its Afghan policy, but the
change would probably lead to more rather than less
support for the resistance. These developments might
curtail but probably would not altogether cut off
Mujahedin resupply. If their were a cutoff of outside
support for the resistance in Afghanistan, the Soviets
would start making progress toward gaining control of
Afghanistan. This would reduce pressure on them to
escalate their commitment to the war or to seek a
political accommodation
70. We cannot rule out a more serious deterioration
of the Soviet position in Afghanistan than we estimate.
This could occur if the insurgents are able to improve
their coordination, adjust their tactics, and assimilate
increased outside assistance more rapidly than we
anticipate. Even a more rapid deterioration of the
situation than we anticipate would give the Soviets
time to assess and react.)
- The Soviets might attempt to stabilize the situa-
tion by introducing a few additional divisions-
possibly as many as 50,000 men-in order to
increase efforts to garrison and hold large areas
after sweep operations. Such an increase, howev-
er, would require the kinds of regular ground
force units that have been least effective so far.
- If the Soviet hold in Afghanistan were to be
seriously threatened, we do not rule out a much
more sizable reinforcement of 300,000 to 400,000
troops. Such a reinforcement would allow Mos-
cow to make serious inroads against the insurgen-
cy if the effort were sustained. An augmentation
of forces on this scale would require along-term
buildup involving large-scale mobilization of
forces throughout the USSROA major
reinforcement of Soviet troops would substantial-
ly raise the political and economic costs of the
war. We currently believe Moscow would bear
them rather than face the consequences of a
victory by the insurgency. But even a massive
increase in the Soviet troop commitment would
take up to a year to execute and would not
guarantee a rapid victory.
71. We believe a major Soviet expansion or escala-
tion of the war is unlikely in the near term, not only
because of the increased cost and risk to Moscow, but
because even increased Mujahedin effectiveness, while
probable, is unlikely to confront the Soviets with
distinct "crunch points" or a countrywide crisis of
control that would precipitate a major revision of
strategy. Moreover, although leadership politics in
Moscow could generate debate over Afghanistan, we
believe the Soviets will focus more heavily on other
issues, such as the domestic economy. During his
consolidation of power Gorbachev will not want to
face the implications of a major policy change if
present Soviet strategy can avoid it; and we believe it
can for now.
The Soviets Get ~~Onto the Path to Victory"
72. Some close observers of Afghanistan, among
them strong supporters of the resistance, believe that
Moscow will prevail in Afghanistan eventually and
sooner than we judge probable. Basing their judgments
on classified and unclassified reporting, observations in
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Kabul, and knowledge of Afghan society, these observ-
ers argue that Soviet efforts to build a viable regime in
Kabul are making slow but steady progress. They note,
too, that Soviet forces have a military capability that
the insurgents cannot hope to match and which is
being used with somewhat better effect each year the
Soviets have been in Afghanistan. They assert that
divisions among the resistance groups will prevent
them from providing an alternative focus of legitima-
cy to the pro-Soviet regime.0
73. Drawing on observations in Kabul and conver-
sations with regime officials, these observers point to
the thousands of Afghans-estimates range up to
375,000-who now are in some way part of the
Communist government. They are convinced that the
Afghan Army already includes a core of highly moti-
vated iunior officers and is gradually increasing its
effectiveness.
74. These observers maintain that, with the excep-
tion of a few leader's such as Masood, most insurgent
commanders are poorly organized to carry out mili-
tary operations and have few disciplined political
cadres capable of building an underground political
and administrative infrastructure. They characterize
many insurgent leaders as local warlords who would
like to get Soviet forces out of Afghanistan but who
often are opportunists seeking to deal with both sides.
These observers suggest that most Afghans are apathet-
ic and that war weariness may gradually erode the
insurgents' base of support.
75. This perspective must be taken account of, but
we believe it is unduly pessimistic about insurgent
prospects. We believe it is influenced by the com-
plaints of resistance figures pleading for more aid,
insufficient awareness of the military picture through-
out Afghanistan, and overestimation of Soviet capabili-
ties and performance.
76. The implication of this perspective for Moscow
is that the Soviets will hold to a patient continuation of
their current strategy with neither escalation of nor
retreat from the war.
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ANNEX
Expanding Soviet Forces in Afghanistan:
Capabilities and Constraints
Moderate Augmentation
Depending on the size of the augmentation, the
Soviets could introduce new forces into Afghanistan to
improve performance throughout the country, or
might focus on particular areas such as the Pakistani
and Iranian borders. Increases of from two to four
divisions-roughly 20,000 to 50,000 troops-could
probably be carried out over one to two months,
including calling up reservists, training, and transport-
ing them to Afghanistan. While we estimate such an
increase would not pose a serious long-term threat to
the insurgency, it would allow the Soviets to improve
security in several maior cities, interdict more insur-
gent convoys near the Pakistani and Iranian borders,
and perhaps establish additional garrisons in high-
,priority areas, such as the Panisher Valley and along
lines of communication
At present, Soviet forces in Afghanistan rely on a
very ,limited and vulnerable road net. Logistic and
support elements in Afghanistan would need to be
considerably expanded, especially if more troops were
committed to border areas away from current garri-
sons and airfields. Initial deployments would probably
be to large bases close to maior cities. Construction of
temporary tent camps would take several weeks or
longer, with permanent construction requiring many
months. Buildups of munitions and POL storage would
rp obably begin well before the arrival of troops.
A potential bottleneck for sizable force augmenta-
tions would be in-country air support. Soviet maneu-
ver units rely heavily on locally based helicopters and
fixed-wing aircraft for mobility and fire support. The
airfields in Afghanistan are estimated to be close to the
saturation point. Constructing additional runways and
support facilities would require at least months and
perhaps considerably longer
Either strategy would probably require troops several
times their current numbers. We estimate that main-
taining apermanent presence in large areas of the
countryside would require double or triple the present
Forces Available for Afghanistan
Theoretically, the USSR has over 200 divisions from
which to augment forces in Afghanistan; in practice,
considerations such as location, readiness, and other
priority missions would limit the choice of units
selected. To spread the military and economic impact,
any large augmentation eventually would probably
involve ground forces from many areas of the Soviet
Union.
There are 32 motorized rifle or tank divisions in the
four military districts closest to Afghanistan; most of
them, however, are designated "not ready" or cadre
units by the Soviets and would require three to five
weeks for mobilization and training before deploy-
ment. About one week would be required to prepare
the "ready" units in this area, but none of these are
located near Afghanistan and all probably have priori-
ty missions opposite China, Iran, or Turkey. Divisions
or maior units could be drawn from other areas-
particularly from the interior military districts of the
USSR-but most of these are in the "not ready"
category. We believe that there is little likelihood the
Soviets would draw down maior ground combat forces
opposite NATO in Eastern Europe or immediately
Massive Reinforcement
The Soviets could greatly expand their troop
strength to clear and hold large parts of the country-
side, or to block infiltration from Pakistan and Iran.
opposite China to reinforce Afghanistan.
The Soviets also have five operational airborne
divisions not currently committed to the war, and the
airborne forces are among the best the Soviets have in
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Afghanistan. They have been reluctant to commit
additional airborne units, although elements of the
104th Guards Airborne Division did deploy temporar-
ily last April to serve as a reserve during the spring
offensive in the Panisher Valley. Soviet Defense Minis-
ter Sokolov had previously been reported to favor the
dispatch of additional airborne forces to Afghanistan,
but we do not know the extent to which this might be
constrained by potentially competing missions for
these few units. In addition, the Soviets have a number
of units especially trained for heliborne assault opera-
tions that would be suitable for use in Afghanistan.
One such unit has been deployed there since the
invasion.
Limited numbers of additional specialized troops
could also be deployed to Afghanistan. An estimated
3,000 Spetsnaz special forces and some 3,000 KGB
Border Guard troops have already been deployed. The
KGB contingent could probably be doubled by draw-
ing from the estimated 13,000 Border Guard troops in
adjacent areas of the Soviet Union. Reinforcements for
Spetsnaz troops-which Afghan insurgents rate high-
ly-are more problematic and would probably require
a drawdown of capabilities elsewhere, as current
estimates credit the Soviets with only about 12,000
Spetsnaz troops in the order of battle (including those
already in Afghanistan).
Logistics
The Soviets, however, do not currently have in place
the logistic infrastructure necessary to support and
sustain a force significantly larger than the 116,000-
man army they have already deployed. The limited
number of airfields and all-weather roads and the
absence of railroads in Afghanistan would severely
impede movement of large forces and their support
elements into and through the country. Any large
increase would have to be preceded by a substantial
augmentation of the logistic infrastructure
The Soviets would also have to improve their distri-
bution and upgrade repair facilities. Intermittent
shortages of fuel and munitions, for example, still
occur and at times hamper operations. The Soviet
capability to repair equipment remains poor, especial-
ly for aircraft. Past Soviet experience indicates, more-
over, that the provision of water and medical support
for additional forces would also pose maior challenges
to the current infrastructure. Although the Soviets
have spent an estimated $2 billion on military con-
struction in Afghanistan during the first five years of
the war, Soviet forces for the most part remain housed
in temporary accommodations (tents), and such seem-
combat aircraft are only now under construction.
involved.
Manpower costs or adjustments required for a maior
expansion would be substantial and would involve
either the mobilization of reservists to fill out low-
strength units, the diversion of conscripts from other
units, increased conscription, or a combination of these
measures. Recent restrictions on draft deferments and
indications that defense industry workers are being
conscripted highlight the manpower pinch the Soviets
are experiencing and suggest some of the difficulties
involved in any peacetime military manpower in-
crease. Commitment of a large number of divisions
from the military districts near Afghanistan to the
counterinsurgency effort would severely restrict Soviet
capabilities to deal with contingencies elsewhere in the
southern region, and would involve a lengthy effort to
increase the overall readiness levels of the forces
The attraction of such large troop increases would
be the prospect of decisive actions to permanently
cripple the insurgency and allow Moscow to begin
reducing its military commitment within two to four
years. The Soviets cannot be sure, however, that even a
massive presence near the borders would prevent
insurgents from operating in the interior, using stock-
piled and captured weapons. Once Soviet troops left,
the insurgency would probably revive, as long as bases
in Pakistan and Iran remained intact
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