SOVIET TACTICS ON A POLITICAL SOLUTION IN AFGHANISTAN

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• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 27, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 1, 1986
• Content Type: SNIE

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Director of Tod-Secret
Central
Intelligence
LOGGED
Soviet Tactics on a
"Political Solution" in
Afghanistan
Special National Intelligence Estimate
Top met
SNIE 11 37-86
January
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THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE.
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS,
EXCEPT AS NOTED IN THE TEXT.
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the
Estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security
Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the intelligence organizations of the
Departments of State, the Treasury, and Energy.
Also Participating:
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps
Warning Notice
Intelligence Sources or Methods Involved
(WNINTEL)
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
DISSEMINATION CONTROL ABBREVIATIONS
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Contractor/ Consultants
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Controlled by Originator
REL ...- This Information Has Been Authorized for
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S N I E 11/37-86
SOVIET TACTICS ON A
"POLITICAL SOLUTION" IN
AFGHANISTAN
Information available as of 16 January 1986 was
used in the preparation of this Estimate, which was
approved by the National Foreign Intelligence
Board on that date.
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SCOPE NOTE
In Special National Intelligence Estimate 11/37-2-85/L, Afghanistan:
Soviet Problems, Prospects, and Options in the Next Year (March
1985), we concluded that, despite mounting costs and no near-term
prospects of victory, Moscow would hold to its primary objective of a
Communist regime in Afghanistan. We judged that Moscow was not
interested in a political solution that required abandoning this objective
and withdrawing its military forces from Afghanistan. Since that
Estimate, some Soviet statements and Afghan Government actions have
raised questions about these judgments. This Special National Intelli-
gence Estimate examines whether there is now indeed more Soviet
interest political resolution of the conflict short of complete victory.
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KEY JUDGMENTS
In recent months, particularly surrounding the Geneva summit, the
Soviets have issued vague hints about their increased interest in a
compromise political solution in Afghanistan.
We believe that these probes are part of a political effort to divide
the coalition of countries and forces opposing them-particularly the
United States, Pakistan, and the Afghan resistance groups. They are not,
we believe, authentic indications of increased Soviet interest in a
political solution short of the established Soviet aim of securing a
Communist-controlled regime and suppressing the resistance with
outside acquiescence. Supporting this judgment are:
- Explicit reporting on Soviet intentions to confuse their
adversaries.
- The lack of change in Soviet conditions for a political settle-
ment, which continue essentially to oblige acceptance of a
Soviet victory.
- Intensified Soviet military action in Afghanistan indicating
continued commitment to suppression of the Mujahedin.
- The character of regime-building actions in Afghanistan, which
have feigned but not accomplished a broadening of its political
base.
- Soviet domestic propaganda legitimizing a long-term commit-
ment to the war.
- Indications that the Gorbachev regime intends to sustain,
reinforcing where necessary, its commitment to Marxist-Leninist
clients in the Third World.
Soviet hints have excited speculation and rumors that various
"deals" have been or might be struck between the superpowers. This
campaign has confused Soviet adversaries to some extent, but also
undercut the confidence of the Kabul regime.
The Soviets are likely to continue to play intermittently on
international hopes for a political settlement, particularly in the period
leading to the next US-Soviet summit, and are likely to achieve some di-
visive effect. US actions supportive of the Mujahedin and Pakistan, as
well as care in making our positions clear, will be needed to assure them
that no compromise short of Soviet withdrawal is in sight.
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Should the current Soviet strategy in Afghanistan shift in a major
way toward significant escalation of the conflict or toward withdrawal
short of securing a Communist regime, we continue to believe we would
receive convincing and timely indications.
For the near term, we expect the Soviets to continue their current
strategy, which aims at eventual victory through incremental increases
in military effort, more effective regime building in Afghanistan, and
more efforts to split opposing ranks. We do not believe that their
strategy is any more promising than heretofore, but see some signs of in-
creased Soviet optimism.
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DISCUSSION
Background (1980-85)
1. Soviet conditions for a political settlement of the
Afghan conflict were first set forth in a statement by
Brezhnev in February 1980; they have not changed
appreciably since then. Brezhnev blamed all internal
Afghan opposition to the Communist takeover on
foreign interference in Afghan affairs. He said that
Soviet troops would be withdrawn only after all such
interference, and therefore resistance, had ceased and
the USSR had guarantees that it would not be re-
sumed. The Soviets have consistently characterized
their aim as an "independent and nonaligned"
Afghanistan, a characterization they also apply to
Cuba and Vietnam. They have left little doubt that
their aim is an Afghanistan protected by Soviet power
and governed by a Leninist regime. The Soviet formula
for a "political solution" merely requires the acquies-
cence in this outcome of other interested parties.
Soviet forces would stay or depart at Moscow's discre-
tion.
2. The Soviets seriously underestimated the interna-
tional consequences of their intervention in Afghani-
stan and, for most of the first two years they were
there, were on the defensive diplomatically. Pressed
by various international players to negotiate, they
would agree in principle and then reject the specific
proposal at issue. Only after they failed to stave off
UN, Islamic, and Nonaligned condemnations of their
actions in late 1980 and early 1981 and the UN
Secretary General appointed a special mediator on
Afghanistan did the Soviets conclude that they needed
a better approach. In August 1981, they let their
Afghan allies make the tactical concessions necessary
to begin the UN-sponsored Proximity Talks. Previous-
ly, the Afghans had insisted on direct talks with
Islamabad and Tehran.
3. Since that time, the Soviets have sought in the
UN talks to test Pakistani resolve, to rebut charges the
USSR is not serious about a political resolution of the
Afghan conflict, to split the broad coalition that
supports the Afghan resistance and Pakistan, and to
obtain international legitimacy for their client regime.
But the effort has been intermittent, generally timed
to influence the annual UN debate about Afghanistan
or upcoming Proximity Talks.
4. During the first few months of Andropov's term
as General Secretary, there was a concerted Soviet
effort to display the USSR as more seriously interested
in a political solution to the conflict. The Soviets also
stepped up attempts to negotiate cease-fires with
resistance groups, which have gone on intermittently
since then. After two rounds of UN talks, however, it
was clear that the Andropov regime had not changed
the Soviet position
5. Gorbachev came to power cultivating an aura of
broad policy change and was the first of Brezhnev's
successors not a full member of the Politburo at the
time the decision to invade Afghanistan was made.
Speculating that he may not have the same personal
responsibility for Soviet policy toward Afghanistan as
his predecessors, many observers-including Soviets-
felt he might be more eager to find a way out of the
conflict. His first moves, however, sh
in the jet position. Gorbachev told
at former General Secretary Chernenko's
funeral in March 1985 it was inconceivable that the
USSR would abandon its ally or accept an unfriendly
government in Kabul. The Soviets reportedly also said
that they would defeat the Afghan opposition sooner
or later, just as they had the Basmachi guerrillas in
Soviet Central Asia.
7. Mindful of the continuing international costs of
Afghanistan and ready to discuss other regional prob-
lems in the context of a more activist diplomacy
toward the United States, Gorbachev approved the
June bilateral meeting with the United States on
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Afghanistan and the reconvening of the UN-sponsored
Proximity Talks. These meetings, however, provided
no signs of a changed Soviet position.
8. In the meantime, as General Secretary, Gorba-
chev presided over intensification of the Soviet cam-
paign in Afghanistan, including a modest increase in
troop levels, the appointment of a more activist new
commander, more aggressive and costly operations,
and additional pressures on the Pakistani border.
Additionally, during Gorbachev's rise and tenure so
far, Soviet domestic propaganda supportive of the war
effort has increased. Although it bespeaks more leader-
ship concern about domestic attitudes, it also signals
resolve to stay the course.
Recent Developments (Since Summer 1985)
9. As the November US-Soviet summit approached,
the Soviets began a new effort to create an impression
of flexibility toward a political settlement./
stick by its friends, denouncing what he said was
a mistaken and dangerous proclivity by the
United States to see Third World conflicts in
East-West terms, and citing local socioeconomic
conditions as their cause rather than the "hand of
Moscow."
- He charged that the United States wants to keep
the Soviet Union engaged in Afghanistan, there-
by implying that Moscow regards the Afghan
war as politically costly. Although he generally
attacked US support for anti-Communist resist-
ance movements, which he termed "anti-popular
forces," he did not specifically attack US support
for the Mujahedin. He denied that the USSR had
strategic interests in Afghanistan relating to
warm-water ports, bases, or oil.
- While not specifically mentioning Soviet troop
withdrawal, he altered the usual order of Soviet
conditions for a settlement, placing an end to the
fighting before guarantees of nonintervention,
along with the return of the refugees and recon-
ciliation "around" Afghanistan. The latter for-
mulation conveys Moscow's insistence that what
happens inside Afghanistan is no one else's busi-
ness and suggests that the changed order of
political conditions for a settlement was not
deliberate, but resulted from Gorbachev's prac-
tice of speaking without notes.
- Finally, he repeated Soviet willingness to discuss
Afghanistan and other regional conflicts with the
United States, suggesting there is room for signifi-
cant US-Soviet cooperation in a political settle-
ment.
These nuances, when noted publicly by US officials
and possibly amplified by Soviet press backgrounders,
excited media speculation about new Soviet flexibility.
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11. The same month, the US Embassy in Moscow
noted that the Soviets were sending mixed signals on
Afghanistan. Some Soviet spokesmen were stressing
that Gorbachev really wants out of Afghanistan and
was prepared to cut a deal-contents unspecified-
while others were saying the current policy was
working, and there was no need for change.
12. At the November summit with President Rea-
gan, Gorbachev spoke at some length about Afghani-
stan and related Third World themes:
- He energetically defended Soviet views regard-
ing the Third World, saying the USSR would
13. Gorbachev's Geneva press conference and sub-
sequent Supreme Soviet speech, however, offered no
clues of a policy change. He reaffirmed Moscow's
longstanding line on the need for a political settlement
of the situation "around" Afghanistan. And he reiter-
ated the standing position that only when the USSR
has guarantees of noninterference in Afghan internal
affairs will the question of Soviet troop withdrawals be
resolved.
14. During November and December the Afghan
regime made internal moves that were billed by a
leading Soviet academic expert on Afghanistan as a
new effort at reconciliation with its opponents. In fact,
they were aimed only at those not actively opposing
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the regime or at those willing to lay down their arms
and support the government. Not surprisingly, they
attracted few takers. The new government, presented
at the end of the year as containing many nonparty
figures, was a reshuffled version of the old govern-
ment. F__~
this central question (see inset).
15. Round VI of the Geneva talks held in late
December witnessed a new fillip on Soviet troop
withdrawals but indicated that the USSR's Afghan
allies were continuing diversions to avoid confronting
16. Western press stories speculating in mid-
December that Gorbachev invited French mediation
toward a political solution during French National
Assembly President Mermaz's visit to the USSR appear
unfounded. In any event, when Gorbachev addressed
the Moscow diplomatic corps at the end of the year, he
reiterated a call for settlement of numerous regional
conflicts, including the situation "around" Afghani-
stan. This excited fresh press speculation by Western
reporters who were either encouraged by Soviet back-
grounders to indulge in it, or had not read Gorbachev's
wording carefully.
17. In the US Embassy's first exchange of 1986 with
the Foreign Ministry on Afghanistan, the responsible
Soviet department chief claimed the Afghan regime
enjoyed ever-increasing popular support, character-
ized Pakistan's recent stance during the UN talks as
unconstructive, and reiterated the Soviet position that
there could be no troop withdrawals until after all
interference (read resistance) ceased
What Are the Soviets Up To?
authoritative Soviet officials have described
con using the enemy as the name of this signaling
game. One top-level adviser to the regime was de-
scribed as positively gloating over the confusion caused
in the United States by Soviet tactics in the pre-
summit period, noting how they issued deliberately
contradictory statements on human rights, arms con-
trol, and Afghanistan. The Soviet said the USSR would
continue pursuing this approach up to the 1986 sum-
mit. Another Soviet official said the Soviets had adopt-
ed the tactic of giving public hints that they are more
willing than previously to talk about various issues,
including Afghanistan, the aim being to support their
claim in the UN Proximity Talks that the inflexibility
of others is keeping their troops in Afghanistan and to
buy time for Soviet decisionmaking.
19. The intent of the "confusion" the Soviets seek to
sow is to weaken the relative unity, mutual trust,
resolve, and effectiveness of the coalition combating
them in Afghanistan. They aim, we believe, to achieve
all or some of the following effects:
- To persuade elements in the United States and
Pakistan that continued or increased support for
the Mujahedin will thwart a political solution
that may lie just around the corner.
- To entice compromise suggestions about a solu-
tion from their adversaries, from which the
Soviets can select new tactical ploys.
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- To excite disruptive suspicions among their
several adversaries that a "deal" may be struck
by some at the expense of others, which the latter
should preempt by making deals of their ownC
20. A case can be made that the Gorbachev regime
should be interested in a real political solution that
ends the Afghan war. Although the political, econom-
ic, and military costs of the war do not oblige Moscow
to change course, some of these costs are rising,
specifically the military and attendant economic costs
of more vigorous operations. The burden of the war
for Soviet foreign policy has in fact lightened over the
years as sanctions have eroded and the international
community has adjusted to the reality of the war.
Nevertheless, it is still an inhibiting factor in Soviet
efforts to encourage a shift toward detente in US-
Soviet relations that would reduce the US challenge to
Soviet interests and increase Soviet influence with US
allies. It is still an inhibitor in Sino-Soviet rapproche-
ment. It inspires mistrust of the USSR among Arab
States but did not prevent Soviet diplomatic advances
in the Persian Gulf in 1985. Moscow might expect
these foreign policy burdens to increase in the future if
the war continues to intensify. The Gorbachev regime
may worry that such intensification could heighten the
pressure on it to expand or escalate the war, with the
risk of a larger East-West confrontation. Increased
Soviet internal propaganda indicates that domestic
unhappiness about the conflict may have deepened
and has certainly become more worrisome to the new
Kremlin leadership.
21. We believe these considerations at present play
a role in stimulating the Gorbachev regime to try
harder in pursuit of a "political settlement" in Afghan-
istan on Soviet terms-namely, outside acceptance of a
Soviet victory. We do not believe they have inspired
current Soviet ment on any other
terms. Beyond Soviet motives cited
above, we rest-this assessment on the following evi-
dence and reasoning
22. None of the reported hints about Soviet flexibil-
ity contains any substantive suggestion as to how the
Soviet position might have changed or may change in
the future. Were the Soviets truly interested in a
settlement on terms other than a victory, we believe
they would make more inviting proposals. Their fail-
ure to do so conveys a lack of seriousness as well as fear
that more forthcoming proposals would undermine
their image of resolve and the stability, such as it is, of
the Kabul regime.
23. The Soviets probably appreciate better than
much of the outside world that their invasion, military
and security operations, and political tactics inside
Afghanistan have essentially destroyed for years to
come any political basis for a compromise settlement
somewhere between their victory or defeat-most
important, a Kabul government that could survive on
its own and also be acceptable to the USSR. A Soviet
pullout any time soon would lead to the destruction of
the Kabul regime and to a defeat for Soviet power that
would resound throughout the Soviet Bloc and the
outside world. On no policy front has Gorbachev
shown any willingness to reappraise Soviet interests so
sweepingly or to accept such a grievous blow to Soviet
superpower status. On the contrary, he has built his
political platform on the premise that established
Soviet internal and external aims can be achieved by
more effective leadership. He has indicated that he
intends to sustain, reinforcing where necessary, Soviet
efforts to support Marxist-Leninist clients in the Third
World.
24. Gorbachev has presided over an intensification
of the Soviet war effort. Although this may signify as
much a response to necessity as confidence in future
success, it does not indicate flagging Kremlin resolve.
During the past year, we judge that intensified fight-
ing with higher losses on both sides has yielded neither
side real net gains. Although we doubt that Moscow is
getting only good news on the war, there is fragmen-
tary evidence that the Soviet Military Advisory Group
in Kabul may think they are doing better than we
believe the are.
Gorbachev might conclude that at last
the war is going in the Soviets' direction. Moreover,
the Soviets appear to believe recent regime-building
moves have actually strengthened the Kabul govern-
ment, although we doubt this will prove out.
25. Increased Soviet domestic propaganda in sup-
port of the war-which most recently included an
hour-long TV documentary vividly depicting its
brutality-by communicating the legitimacy of the
campaign in the face of clear costs also communicates
the regime's resolve to continue with the campaign. F
The Impact of Moscow's Political Tactics
26. Soviet political gamesmanship surrounding the
Afghan war in recent months, through the diplomatic
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Afghanistan in 1985
In 1985 the Afghan resistance was better armed and
trained than ever before. During the course of the year,
it demonstrated improved capabilities to plan and
coordinate its military operations, and it scored some
notable successes. For instance, in June
Panjsheri resistance forces captured the
Afghan garrison at Peshghowr and seized enough weap-
ons to supply themselves for a year. The same month,
some 5,000 men from various insurgent groups began
an offensive against the Afghan garrison at Khowst in
Paktia Province that ended when the Soviets launched
their major operation in Paktia Province in August-
September. The resistance also demonstrated greater
proficiency in destroying aircraft in the air and on the
ground, achieving in 1985 the highest totals of any year
The Soviets deployed an additional 4,000 men-
about half Spetsnaz troops, half regular motorized rifle
troops-and launched more major campaigns than they
have in the past. The new commander of the Southern
Theater of Military Operations, General Zaytsev, be-
came much more active in directing operations. Two
major operations were along the Pakistani border and
resulted in higher numbers of cross-border artillery
strikes and air violations. The Soviets also continued
trying to negotiate cease-fires with some insurgents,
especially Panjsheri resistance leader Masood and the
tribes along the border with Pakistan. Although Masood
is still talking to them, the overall results of their tribe-
buying efforts do not appear to have been very success-
ful. Resistance supplies are still getting through, albeit
with greater difficulty.
Politically, the Soviets tried some new gambits-such
as local elections-to demonstrate that Babrak Karmal
has genuine popular support; but their efforts were
undercut by the continuing ineffectiveness of the Af-
ghan Government, party, and military. Few were won
over to the government by either the sham elections for
local government or the two tribal jirgas. The poor
performance of the Afghan Army continues to be the
major obstacle to the Soviet strategy.
A review of Babrak's speeches in 1985 suggests he
remains preoccupied with hanging on to power and
preventing any of his Communist rivals from ttracting
Soviet support. Moscow
intervened when a ra c tried to get rid o the leader of
the Khalqi faction of the party in June. It probably also
was responsible for the promotion to the ruling Politbu-
ro of the Khalqi Defense Minister in November.
and media speculation it has stimulated, has had some
detectable effect, not all of it positive from Moscow's
point of view, and as yet without a tangible influence
on the course of the war.
27. The Resistance. Some elements in the Afghan
resistance, which has long been sensitive to develop-
ments that could be interpreted as signs of slackening
US support, are concerned about an impending deal
on Afghanistan. Fundamentalist resistance leader
Gulbuddjn Hekmatyar is convinced that the United
States, Pakistan, and China have approved a deal that
keeps Babrak in power, sets up a safe area for the
refugees, and deploys a peacekeeping force made up
of Pakistani, Libyan, Syrian, and South Yemeni forces
as the Soviets gradually withdraw. And he persists in
this belief despite US Embassy efforts to disabuse him
28. Moscow will try to exploit this psychological
climate in its effort to negotiate various resistance
groups out of the conflict. As long as arms support
continues to arrive, however, we believe these efforts
will generally fail.
29. The Afghan Regime. There has been some
negative effect in Kabul from Moscow's political
rumormongering. As happened in 1982-83 when the
Soviets were putting it about that Andropov wanted a
political settlement, the Afghan Government and
party became concerned.
members of the Khalgi faction are trying to contact
the resistance to save themselves from the effects of a
deal they would not otherwise survive. As in the past,
the Soviets may have to issue public and other reassur-
ances that undercut the credibility of their "peacefeel-
ers." They can probably never maintain a reputation
for complete reliability. Although the Afghan Com-
munists have no place to go, their nervousness is a
continuing burden to the Soviets.
30. Pakistan. Some Pakistani officials appear to
have been genuinely encouraged by their session with
Korniyenko in August. Afghan stonewalling in the UN
talks and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze's standard
defense of the Soviet position in his September meet-
ing with Yaqub should have lowered
tations.
S statements about what happened
at the summit, the Afghans' behavior at the last round
of the UN talks, and their beliefs about the rising costs
of the USSR's Afghan venture are still encouraging
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them to believe that there will be real movement in
the Soviet position once Gorbachev gets the Party
Congress behind him.
31. Thus far, Pakistani President Zia has taken
Soviet hints of flexibility as evidence that his Afghan
policy is correct. In the future, he may have to expend
effort reassuring his supporters, particularly those sus-
picious about US steadfastness. He may face increased
demands from his political opposition to take Soviet
"peacefeelers" seriously and not increase support to
the resistance. Opposition criticism, however is not
likely to force Zia to change his Afghan policy.
32. China. There is some indication the Soviets
have been sending deliberately misleading private
33. We believe the Chinese will not take Sovie
"peacefeelers" very seriously unless the rhetoric
acquires considerably more substance or is seen to be
influencing Washington or Islamabad
34. Saudi Arabia. We believe Riyadh is also con-
cerned that Washington will reduce its support for the
resistance in the interest of better Soviet-US relations.
The issue remains crucial for them because they
support to the resistance so as to
discourage ovie meddling closer to home and bur-
nish their Islamic credentials. In the Arab world,
rumors about an Afghan deal orbit about in the
company of even more excited tales of US-Soviet
condominium in a Middle East peace pact. As the
Soviets increase their ties in the Gulf region, the Saudis
may see more reason to waffle on their support to the
Afghan resistance. This would be particularly true if
they felt in danger of being left isolated by a US-Soviet
"deal."
35. Iran. Tehran has tailored its support for the
resistance to serve its parochial interest in Afghan-
istan's Shias. But Iran does not want to see the Soviets
win in Afghanistan, and, in the past, has been con-
cerned about rumors of "deals" that might promote a
Soviet victory. We see no current evidence of Iranian
concern on this score and suspect Iran would respond
to such concern by trying to stiffen Pakistan's resolve.
36. India. The Indians have not responded positive-
ly to the latest round of Soviet "peacefeelers," proba-
bly because of their experience in the summer of 1985.
We believe Prime Minister Gandhi, fearing manipula-
tion, will not want to get out front in any peacemaking
diplomacy unless he gains confidence that real conces-
sions by the Soviets or the other parties are in the
offing. If he acquires that confidence, he may try to
play a role to bolster Indian pretensions to be a
regional superpower.
Conclusions, Outlook, and Implications
for the United States
37. We believe, as we did last March, that the
Soviets remain fixed on their objective of creating a
viable Communist-controlled regime in Afghanistan
and are determined to pursue their political and
military campaign toward that end. We remain skepti-
cal, however, that their current strategy will be suffi-
cient to put them on a convincing path toward victory.
If the resistance continues to get the required arms
support, the record of the past five years and current
evidence suggest they will be able to keep pace with
any improvements in the Soviet combat performance.
This judgment does not rule out the possibility that at
some future point Moscow could substantially escalate
its campaign or move toward withdrawal.
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38. We expect Gorbachev periodically to play on
international hopes for a settlement, particularly in the
period leading up to the next summit. He evidently
believes he can reduce Soviet difficulties in Afghani-
stan by feigning a more flexible diplomatic position 25X1
internationally. The objective of this effort will be to
get the USSR off the defensive diplomatically and
break up the coalition that supports Pakistan and the
Afghan resistance. But he must be wary of the coun-
terproductive effects of undermining the Kabul re-
gime and encouraging his adversaries by his "peace-
feelers."
39. The Soviets will attempt particularly to buoy
Pakistani hopes for a political settlement. At the same
time, to heighten Pakistan's need for a political settle-
ment even on Soviet terms, we expect them to con-
tinue their efforts aimed at intimidating and desta-
bilizing Pakistan, particularly through overt pressures
on the border, subversive operations among the border
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mands.
tribes, and political actions within Pakistan. The Sovi-
ets will continue to use the Proximity Talks to provide
a political fig leaf for their strategy of victory, and as a
venue for atmospherics. But the irreconcilable posi-
tions of each side in these talks currently precludes any
outcome unless one side gives in to the other's de-
41. US partners in the campaign to resist the Soviets
will be most reassured by tangible US actions to sustain
support for the Mujahedin and for Pakistan's security.
Official US statements about continued opposition to
Soviet aims will have some reassuring value; but this
could be outweighed by the suspicions created if there
are official or credible indications of US interest in a
compromise short of early Soviet troop withdrawals.
42. We expect to be able to track the political
action campaign around Afghanistan that the Soviets
are very likely to conduct, at least as to its real intent
and broad outlines. But the Soviets' capacity for
more vulnerable in this period.
40. Soviet political tactics are likely to achieve
effects worrisome to the United States and its partners
in opposing the Soviets in Afghanistan. During a
period of more active US-Soviet dialogue on strategic
and regional matters, accompanied by conflicting
atmospheric trends in the superpower relationship and
a great deal of confusion as to what is really happen-
ing, Soviet-inspired and purely spontaneous rumors
about a "deal" over Afghanistan and other issues will
inevitably gain credence. All parties to the opposing
coalition will wonder what the others, especially the
United States, are doing. We believe Pakistan's politi-
cal resolve, which has been very solid, could become
outright duplicity and their access to a multitude of
communication channels plus
the likelihood of spontaneous rumors, make it likely
that the United States will be obliged to run a steady
fire-brigade to keep suspicions and false hopes under
43. We continue to believe that we would receive
convincing and timely indications of a major shift in
the USSR's Afghan military strategy. Although we
would not immediately detect a Soviet decision to
escalate or expand the conflict, we could be alerted by
developments in Afghanistan to anticipate such a
decision, and we are very likely to see the military and
logistic moves to implement such a decision well
before they effectively changed the scope of the war
or seriously increased the threat to Pakistan.
44. In the less probable event the Soviets made a
decision to withdraw from Afghanistan or to move
toward a settlement that would oblige withdrawal, the
initial indicators might be ambiguous or contradictory.
However, we believe that we would quickly begin to
see more convincing evidence on the scene-such as
retrenchment of offensive military operations, conces-
sionary bargains with resistance groups, and extraction
of valued Communist cadies for a future campaign in
the country. We believe a Soviet diplomatic effort to
assist an authentic move to withdraw from Afghani-
stan would have much more convincing content than
we have seen so far. The Soviets will not, however,
decide their Afghan strategy on the basis of diplomatic
bargains. Rather, they will decide their strategy-
whether or not to continue the present course, escalate,
or withdraw-on the basis of a broad assessment of
political and military costs, risks, and prospects for
success. They will tailor their diplomacy to support
their chosen strategy.
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