GORBACHEV'S POLICY TOWARD THE UNITED STATES, 1986-88

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP09T00367R000200350001-8
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• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 30
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 30, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 1, 1986
• Content Type: SNIE

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Intelligence
Gorbachev's Policy Toward
the United States, 1986-88
Special National Intelligence Estimate
Seerci-
SNIE 11-9-86
September 1986
Copy 489
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THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE.
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS,
EXCEPT AS NOTED IN THE TEXT.
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the
Estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency,, the National Security
Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the intelligence organizations of the
Departments of State, the Treasury, and Energy.
Also Participating:
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps
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Jt(-Kt I
S N I E 11-9-86
GORBACHEV'S POLICY TOWARD
THE UNITED STATES, 1986-88
Information available as of 12 September 1986 was
used in the preparation of this Estimate, which was
approved by the National Foreign Intelligence Board
on that date.
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CONTENTS
Page
SCOPE NOTE ...................................................................................... 1
KEY JUDGMENTS .............................................................................. 3
DISCUSSION ........................................................................................ 7
1. The US Factor in Gorbachev's Policy Agenda ........................... 7
II. Gorbachev's Agenda: Policies and Prospects ............................. 8
Economic Policy ........................................................................... 8
Military Policy .............................................................................. 9
A More Activist Foreign Policy ................................................... 9
The Domestic Political Setting for Foreign Policy ..................... 10
III. Current Soviet Strategy and Tactics Toward the United
States .......................................................................................... 10
Assessment of the West ................................................................ 10
Tactical Calculations .................................................................... 12
Summitry ....................................................................................... 13
Arms Control ................................................................................. 13
Regional and Other Issues ............................................................ 17
IV. The Outlook for Soviet Policy Toward the United States:
1986-88 ...................................................................................... 18
Domestic Variables ....................................................................... 18
Variables in Foreign Affairs ......................................................... 19
Conclusions: Arms Control, Summitry, and 1988 ...................... 19
ANNEX A: A Regional Profile of Soviet Foreign Policy ................... 23
ANNEX B: Exaggeration or Duplicity in Soviet Tactics? ................. 25
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SCOPE NOTE
This Special National Intelligence Estimate assesses the policies of
the Gorbachev regime toward the United States during the period 1986
through 1988, the remaining term of the current US administration.
This Estimate was stimulated in part by interest in the degree to which
Soviet domestic economic conditions encourage accommodation with
the United States on key security issues. The Estimate discusses
Gorbachev's broader foreign policy aims primarily as they affect US-
Soviet relations and does not attempt an exhaustive analysis of Soviet
foreign policy in all areas.
Section II summarizes our assessment of current Soviet economic,
military, and overall foreign policies and their prospects, Gorbachev's
internal political position, and the bearing of these factors on Soviet
policy toward the United States in the next two years. Section III gives
our assessment of current Soviet policy toward the United States and the
calculations shaping it. Section IV presents conclusions and the outlook
for the next two years.
The discussion in Section IV rests largely on the assumption that US
policies and positions with respect to arms control and regional security
issues remain substantially constant. We have not attempted compre-
hensively to hypothesize the impact of alternative US policies.
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KEY JUDGMENTS
The Gorbachev regime aims to re-create some sort of detente
relationship with the United States to ease the burden of arms
competition and, accordingly, the task of domestic economic revival.
Because the detente they seek reduces US challenges to Soviet interests,
Soviet leaders believe such a relationship can help preserve and advance
the USSR's international influence and its relative military power.
Gorbachev seeks to relax East-West hostility for a protracted period-
he is looking ahead through the 1990s-not to suspend the competition
but to put the USSR in an improved long-term position as a globally in-
fluential superpower.
These aims have persuaded the Soviets to pursue an active,
engaged policy toward the United States. It is focused on arms control
(supported by a vigorous worldwide propaganda offensive) and on the
prospect of US-Soviet summits (exploited for leverage to moderate US
policies and encourage concessions on arms control). The Soviets strive
to deflect the Reagan administration away from security policies that,
despite some moderation in the last two years, the Soviets see as severely
challenging to them and to discourage such hostile US policies from
being carried forward into the next US administration.
The Soviets realize, however, that their engaged policy toward the
United States risks legitimizing hostile policies of the current adminis-
tration by muting Western anxieties about them and seeming to show
that they are a sound basis for dealing with Moscow. Managing this risk
is a delicate problem for the new Soviet leadership. There are differing
points of view in Moscow about how to craft a diplomacy sufficiently
forthcoming to encourage US concessions while minimizing this risk.
Despite such controversies, we believe Gorbachev has the political
strength to forge Politburo consensus behind the initiatives and decisions
he favors in dealing with the United States.
The central Soviet objective in bilateral dealings with the United
States and in the surrounding Soviet diplomacy and propaganda toward
US Allies and Western publics is revival of the arms control framework
of the- 1970s or creation of a similar successor system. The Soviets see
such a framework as serving their political, military, and economic
interests. It would provide an important element of predictability that
would ease the balancing of military requirements and economic
revitalization in the 1990s. And, should its political side effects include a
flagging of overall US defense efforts such as occurred in the mid-1970s,
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so much the better. Gorbachev is more prepared than his predecessors
to consider substantial reductions of offensive nuclear forces in such a
framework for reasons that include cost avoidance, increasing interest in
enhancing the quality of Soviet' nonnuclear forces, and a desire to
undermine the credibility of US nuclear strategies. The main Soviet
motive for considering and negotiating about large nuclear force
reductions at present is to undermine the US strategic defense initiative
(SDI).
To be acceptable to the Soviets, a comprehensive strategic arms
control framework that includes substantial reductions of offensive
nuclear forces must provide effective constraints on the US SDI,
through formal agreement that limits the program and political effects
that they calculate would kill it eventually. Despite its uncertain future,
the Soviets are deeply concerned about SDI because it might produce a
military and technological revolution and could undermine the war-
fighting strategies of Soviet nuclear forces. In the extreme, the Soviets
genuinely fear that SDI could give the US confidence it had a damage-
limiting first-strike capability. To be in a position to counter SDI, the
Soviets believe they must preserve large ballistic missile forces and the
option to expand them. For both economic and military reasons, they
wish to avoid the costs of a competition to develop and counter
advanced ballistic missile defenses in which the United States has the
technological initiative. Their campaign against SDI aims to deny the
United States that initiative; but they will proceed to develop advanced
defense technologies in any event, as they did following the ABM
Treaty of 1972.
Despite the seriousness of Soviet economic difficulties and the
longer term importance to Moscow of easing East-West tensions to help
address them, we believe that these difficulties do not place Gorbachev
under so much pressure that he must make fundamental concessions to
the United States on major security issues during the next two years.
Gorbachev believes he can hold out for an arms control framework and
a larger US-Soviet security relationship generally on his terms, while
putting political pressures on Washington to make key concessions,
particularly on SDI.'
Gorbachev believes that only a diplomacy appearing flexible to
American and European audiences, especially on arms control, can put
pressure on Washington and test the possibilities that may exist for real
US concessions. More innovations in Soviet arms control positions of the
sort Gorbachev has already introduced are likely if he believes they can
' The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, holds that the opening clause of this paragraph
overstates the role of Soviet economic conditions in causing the Soviets to pursue detente in any time
frame, and that strategic and political considerations are overriding. See paragraph 4 of "Discussion" for
a fuller statement of this view.
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help him achieve constraints on SDI and other US defense programs.
New unilateral gestures, such as modest cuts in military manpower or in
the officially stated defense budget, are possible.
At the same time, Gorbachev sees himself able to defend Soviet
interests in the Third World, particularly with regard to embattled
Marxist-Leninist client states. He expects a more active Soviet foreign
policy overall to open up new opportunities in the Third World and
among US Allies.
Soviet policy toward the United States involves two principal tactics:
first, holding open the promise of nuclear force reductions if the United
States accommodates on SDI; second, holding open the prospect of a
series of additional summits if the United States gives ground on arms
control. If the United States makes the concessions necessary for this
process to proceed, Gorbachev believes that it will serve the political
goals of weakening anti-Soviet policies in Washington or encouraging
more congenial behavior from the next US administration. Gorbachev
sees the popularity of arms control in the United States and Europe and
domestic disquiet over the administration's foreign and defense policies
as his main source of influence over Washington and Washington's
eagerness for summits as his principal point of tactical leverage.
To maximize his leverage, Gorbachev will delay -his decision on
scheduling another summit as long as possible. All things being equal,
Gorbachev would profit politically from additional summits. But we
believe he will hold out for terms that advance Soviet political and
strategic interests; he does not need a summit for its own sake. Some US
movement on SDI, particularly acceptance of the principle that control
of space-based strategic defenses should be dealt with by reaffirming
the ABM Treaty and modifying its withdrawal clause, plus US delay in
actually breaching the SALT limits and convergence on another arms
control issue, such as nuclear testing or INF, would be enough to bring
Gorbachev to another summit. We are simply uncertain whether
Gorbachev will come short of these conditions.
Meeting these conditions and holding another US-Soviet summit
would not, however, produce Soviet agreement to a comprehensive
arms control package on nuclear force reductions. For such an agree-
ment, we believe the Soviets will demand codification in some form of
the principle that offensive strategic force reductions must go hand in
hand with tight constraints on SDI. By the same token, we believe the
Soviets will strongly resist principles and agreement terms that seem to
license SDI by reconciling its development and deployment with
nuclear force reductions.
Failing agreement along Soviet-preferred lines or publicly visible
progress toward it, we believe that Gorbachev is likely at some point to
shift his priorities and tactics toward a more concerted effort to
discredit the policies of the current US administration, to inject East-
West issues into the 1988 Presidential election, and to encourage more
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flexibility from the next US administration. Such a shift would involve
harsher propaganda attacks on the administration and the President and
stand-pat negotiating tactics, although not a Soviet withdrawal from
arms control negotiations or other fundamental changes of behavior.
Moscow would continue to position itself to appear the party eager for
improved US-Soviet relations, while trying even harder to portray the
administration as the recalcitrant side. There is some basis for arguing
that this shift has already taken place, but we think this is unlikely and
would look for it sometime in late 1987 or early 1988.
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DISCUSSION
1. The US Factor in Gorbachev's Policy Agenda
1. The Gorbachev regime is committed to reviving
both the domestic economic performance of the Soviet
system and the international effectiveness of the USSR
as a superpower with expanding military power and
global influence. It perceives a mutually reinforcing
relationship between these two goals. Revived eco-
nomic performance is seen as vital to the USSR's
future status as a superpower. Soviet foreign policy
pursues international conditions conducive to Soviet
economic revival, while it also safeguards existing
Soviet interests and capitalizes on opportunities to
expand Soviet influence.
2. This interrelationship has led the Gorbachev
regime to seek some form of detente with the United
States to avoid dangerous confrontation and to limit
the burdens of arms competition on the Soviet econo-
my. As in the past, the Soviets pursue a detente
relationship and arms control arrangements with the
United States because they see them as serving Soviet
superpower interests, restraining the challenge of US
defense and other policies, and giving the USSR
increased freedom of action.
3. While attempting to rebuild their economy, Sovi-
et leaders want to contain demands for greater nation-
al security expenditures. They want to plan and
pursue their domestic objectives in an environment of
predictable and, if possible, diminished external
threat. Without having to give way significantly to US
demands, Soviet leaders want especially to reduce the
challenge of US defense and foreign policies seen
during the current administration.
4. There is an alternative view, held by the Direc-
tor, Defense Intelligence Agency, that long-standing
strategic objectives, such as splitting the Western
alliance, isolating the United States from its Allies, and
constraining US defense efforts are the primary deter-
minants of Soviet foreign policy toward the United
States. The holder of this view believes that economic
considerations play a secondary role in the USSR's
foreign policy in general, and in the Soviet calculus
that has led the Gorbachev regime to seek some form
of detente with the United States. Moreover, the
holder of this view believes the importance of the
economic revitalization, as it relates to the USSR's
overall status as a superpower, is overstated. This view
holds that Soviet leaders see a number of clear advan-
tages to their economic revitalization program, but
they do not view it as vital to their future as a
superpower. They consider it an instrument to further
strengthen the USSR's global position. Even if the
revitalization is relatively unsuccessful, the Soviets will
strive to preserve and expand the military capabilities
and posture attributed to a superpower.
5. More specifically the USSR seeks:
-To. revive an arms control framework, based
either on the agreements of the 1970s or new
ones, that makes the strategic planning environ-
ment relatively predictable, reduces US commit-
ment to strategic modernization, and thereby
helps the USSR preserve and enhance its strategic
position. This framework requires some effective
and lasting constraint on SDI, which the Soviets
see as the most dangerous and uncertain variable
in their strategic planning outlook.
- To undermine the policies of the Reagan admin-
istration that the Soviets see aimed against them
or, failing this, to inhibit their being perpetuated
in a successor administration.
- To gain greater respect for Soviet superpower
status from the United States and its allies
through lessening of US hostility to the Soviet
system and its hegemony in Eastern Europe, a
reduction of US challenges to Soviet positions in
the Third World, and generally a willingness to
regard the USSR's interests and policies as
legitimate.
- To gain liberalized access to Western technology
and credits, which are a necessary part of Gorba-
chev's economic strategy for modernizing indus-
try and sustaining consumption levels. The inhi-
bitions of hard currency shortfalls and concern
about excessive reliance on the West will limit
Moscow's commitment to this goal for now.
Soviet interest could rise sharply, however, if
economic performance proves disappointing. C
6. Although the USSR faces more challenging for-
eign and defense policies from the United States today
than it did in the 1970s, until now Gorbachev has
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shown no willingness to pursue these goals by means of
a fundamental retrenchment of Soviet superpower
interests. But his aims require energetic and persistent
engagement with the United States, the appearance of
new flexibility on many issues in US-Soviet relations,
and some degree of real flexibility for diplomatic
credibility and to encourage US movement. The risk
for Moscow is that, contrary to its aims, active engage-
ment on arms control and summitry could end up
confirming for the current and future US administra-
tions the efficacy of hardline policies as the best way
for the United States to manage its relations with the
Soviet Union. The delicacy of this calculation is
perceived by Soviet leaders and is the subject of
debate in Moscow.
II. Gorbachev's Agenda: Policies and Prospects
7. During the past year, the Gorbachev regime
outlined its overall domestic and foreign policy agen-
da. It will continue to evolve, but the main directions
of policy for the next few years have probably been
set.
Economic Policy
8. The Gorbachev regime has decided on the out-
lines of a long-term strategy for economic revival and
has taken initial steps toward its implementation. The
key elements of this strategy are (1) placement of
better managers and enforcement of greater work
discipline at all levels (the "human factors" campaign),
(2) change in economic organization to reconcile more
efficient central planning with more autonomy for
technological innovation and greater efficiency at the
enterprise level, and (3) substantial new investments in
the civilian machine-building sector to accelerate
modernization of the USSR's production base.
9. Gorbachev and his colleagues believe they are on
the correct economic course, and their 1986 economic
performance has been encouraging to them so far. But
they know their economic problems are very serious
and that they have difficult decisions and a long
struggle before them to see lasting results.
10. While Gorbachev's strategy addresses some of
the key problems facing the Soviet economy, the
success of his program will be limited by a number of
interrelated obstacles. He seeks to overcome these
obstacles through exhortation and additional reform
measures that refine his strategy. But we doubt these
measures will be adequate to meet his goals in the long
run. Slowing growth of the labor force, increasing costs
of. extracting raw materials, and depressed world oil
prices will continue to be important constraints. More-
over, although Gorbachev has encouraged wider de-
bate on economic reforms, for now his strategy leaves
largely intact the centrally planned economy and
bureaucratic 'establishment that have inhibited eco-
nomic efficiency and technological innovation. Final-
ly, certain elements of the new strategy itself are likely
to limit its success, particularly in the short run. The
shift of investment resources to the machinery sector,
for instance, will almost certainly create disruptions as
enterprises strive to rapidly assimilate large amounts of
new plant and equipment. Similarly, some organiza-
tional changes will cause short-term disruptions
11. For all these reasons, we believe that Gorbachev
will fall well short of the main goals of the 1986-90
Five-Year Plan. The plan implies an average annual
rate of growth for GNP of 4 percent. We believe some
improvement over the 2.2-percent growth achieved in
1981-85 is likely but do not expect growth rates to
reach planned figures. To sustain the "human factors"
campaign implies real or expected improvement in
consumption levels. In our view, the upsurge in invest-
ment planned for 1986-90 and the continuing needs of
defense mean overall per capita consumption growth
probably will average between zero and 1 percent for
the five-year period.
12. Success for Gorbachev's strategy in the short
term, however, will not necessarily be reflected in the
growth of GNP. Some promising improvements in key
measures will probably be registered, even though
they are short of announced or implied goals. Total
labor productivity is planned to grow at 4 percent per
year; we would expect something more like 2 percent,
a shortfall, but still substantially better than the 1976-
85 period. We expect the negative trend in total factor
productivity growth to be substantially slowed, al-
though not reversed as the plan stipulates. Selective
improvements in consumption, such as housing, avail-
ability of meat, clothing quality, and services, are
feasible and would brighten a picture that is dismal on
the average.
13. The key for Gorbachev is to fortify confidence
that he is basically on the right track, that his strategy
can work, and, where it is falling short, affords options
and next steps. We believe the chances for this kind of
success are reasonably good in the near term. Exoge-
nous factors, such as weather and oil prices, can hurt
overall performance; accidents such as Chernobyl' can
affect the national mood; but they will not deflect
Gorbachev's economic strategy until it is given a
thorough test. We and some Soviet economists believe
the current Gorbachev program will eventually bog
down because of the system's deeply rooted obstacles
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to innovation, that his strategy will lose promise, and
that decisions about truly radical reforms will have to
be faced within five to 10 years. But both economic
and political considerations make this more likely
beyond 1988 than during the next two years. F__1
Military Policy
14. Although subject to adjustment, the basic con-
tours of Soviet military policy through the end of this
decade have been set by the five-year plan and long-
term Soviet weapons programs. Soviet defense outlays
will probably continue the slow growth seen since
1976, with defense procurement growing somewhat
certain of being met.
likely to grow toward the end of this decade and into
the early 1990s, however. Soviet military planners
expect an increasingly severe technological challenge.
Weapon systems of the mid-to-late 1990s will require
difficult technological advances in design and produc- 25X1
tion. New resource commitments to accomplish such
advances will soon have to be made. The writings of
Marshal Ogarkov and others suggest that Soviet mili-
tary strategy is evolving in a direction that calls for
more aggressive modernization of general purposes
forces on the basis of advanced nonnuclear technology.
Whatever the direction and outcome of this evolution,
future military requirements will place heavy new
demands on the Soviet technology base that are not
more slowly.
15. We have not yet observed Gorbachev's personal
stamp on Soviet military policy to the same extent as
on other, issues. He certainly sees enhanced military
power as one of the goals of economic revival. While
warning the West not to believe that arms competition
will break the Soviet economy, Gorbachev clearly
wants to limit the economic burden of defense and
possibly reduce it as the economy grows. As have
previous Soviet leaders, he has turned to the defense
sector for talent and facilities to help civilian industry.
Political measures, such as limiting the political status
of top military officers, indicate Gorbachev's determi-
nation to stress the party's control of the military.
However, the prominence of military values in the
Soviet system assures that military considerations are
calculated in making top policy decisions.
16. While there may be friction, we believe most
Soviet military leaders recognize that the future mili-
tary power of the USSR demands major improvements
in overall economic performance, which may require
restraints on some categories of current military pro-
curement to facilitate long-term improvements in the
defense industrial base. At the high levels Soviet
defense spending has attained, even very slow growth
during the next five years can be expected to yield an
impressive flow of additional modern weapons to the
Soviet arsenal. For example, within spending levels
projected above and a familiar overall procurement
profile, the Soviets could produce the following illus-
trative force mix during 1986-90: some 500 ICBMs, 50
submarines, 200 strategic bombers, 18,000 tanks, 2,000
fighter aircraft, and 2,000 helicopters. There may be
some competition at the margin for scarce talent and
quality inputs between planned military production
and civilian goals. But the production lines for the
expected output of Soviet defense industry over the
next five years are already in place.
17. The difficulty in reconciling the demands of the
Soviet military and economic modernization seems
18. We believe Soviet military and political leaders
alike see the arms control process, whether it produces
agreements or desired political side effects, as helping
to manage such uncertainty. The Soviet leadership at
present sees a special utility in arms control arrange-
ments that impede the US SDI program, reduce the
size of nuclear forces, and avoid the costs of a strategic
missile offense-defense competition led by the United
States. Agreements along these lines would by no
means rescue the Soviet economy or even reduce its
current defense burden. But such arrangements would
ease the task of moving toward the high-technology,
conventional forces being discussed by Soviet marshals
and avoid undesired additional costs in the strategic
area.
A More Activist Foreign Policy
19. In addition to pursuing a policy of active en-
gagement with the United States, the Gorbachev
regime has sought to revitalize Soviet foreign policy
across the board with new faces in the foreign affairs
establishment, organizational changes, new activism,
and some seemingly new rhetoric. These innovations
have enabled Moscow to reach out more credibly to
foreign audiences it wishes to influence, especially in
Europe, and now-with the multiple initiatives an-
nounced by Gorbachev in Vladivostok-in East Asia.
Moscow also wants a more active and more widely
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20. The basic direction of his policies toward specif-
ic countries and regions does not appear altered so far.
Gorbachev apparently intends to continue efforts to
consolidate Marxist-Leninist regimes in the Third 25X1
World, most important in Afghanistan. Moscow's new-
ly activist style may increase its ability to respond to
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Gorbachev's "New Thinking" on International Relations
Gorbachev and some of his foreign affairs minions
are giving more emphasis to language that suggests that
international affairs should not be dominated by the
East-West struggle. Calling for "new thinking" on
foreign policy, this language stresses "common securi-
ty," "interdependence," and "global problems shared
by humanity" (such as ecology, nuclear power, health,
economic development, and even the issue of peace). It
shows a tendency to depolarize the Soviet picture of the
world and to dilute the traditional element of "class
struggle" in the Moscow's expressed world outlook.
Ideological references in foreign policy pronounce-
ments-for example, to the International Communist
Movement-have become less frequent
The nature of the Soviet political system precludes
dismissal of these rhetorical shifts as unimportant; but
their meaning is far from clear at present. To some
extent this verbiage is intended to enhance the image of
the USSR in the eyes of foreign audiences. And Gorba-
chev makes it clear that most of the "new thinking" he
calls for obliges the West, rather than the USSR, to
change its policies, for example, with respect to arms
competition, regional security affairs, and hostility to
Soviet client governments and movements. But this
language is also directed at internal audiences. Its
purpose may be to ready Soviet elites for future policy
moves of an accommodating nature. Over time, this
language may have the effect of encouraging some
Soviet elites to expect such moves, whether this is the
leadership's intent or not. For now, we believe that the
internal purpose of Gorbachev's call for "new thinking"
is to license more pragmatic foreign policy tactics and
restaffing of Soviet national security organizations. One
consequence we fully expect to see is the complaint that
he is neglecting ideology from quarters whose positions
are jeopardized by "new thinking."
new regional opportunities not of its own making.
Marginal shifts, if rewarded by the countries at which
they are aimed, could lead to more significant Soviet
policy shifts in the future. (See annex A, "A Regional
Profile of Soviet Foreign Policy.")
21. Gorbachev's Soviet Union still conducts foreign
policy in a way that makes most of the world a
battleground in the continuing rivalry between the
superpowers. Recent shifts in Soviet foreign policy
rhetoric toward more emphasis on mutual security and
interdependence-and deemphasis of ideological
themes in foreign policy-might represent harbingers
of future change in the way the Soviets view the larger
superpower competition, although this is as yet very
unclear. For now, however, we believe they are
intended to enhance the regime's external appeal, to
justify tactical flexibility to internal elites, and to
license shakeups of the Soviet foreign affairs bureau-
cracy
22. The Gorbachev regime is strengthening its for-
eign affairs staffing, bringing more able people into
key positions, and reorganizing to put the focus of
policymaking in the Central Committee apparatus and
conduct of diplomacy in the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs. The regime clearly seeks more tactical skill,
better harmony between diplomacy and propaganda,
and more sophistication in its foreign policy. These
measures have helped to project an image of foreign
policy activism under Gorbachev, along with some
false starts in propaganda and raggedness in diplomat-
ic execution. After some shakedown period, however,
we expect the overall skill of Gorbachev's foreign
affairs apparatus to increase noticeably.
become more rather than less difficult.
The Domestic Political Setting for Foreign Policy
23. Gorbachev's main problems are internal, cen-
tering on the economy. Political opposition or resis-
tance to his leadership, whether from entrenched
groups or individual competitors, will be inspired
mainly by the impact of Gorbachev's domestic policies
on the elite's power and privileges. Gorbachev is not a
one-man dictator. His power is still that of a leader
forging consensus within the Politburo required for
policy decisions. Other Politburo figures have power
positions and policy views of their own. Moreover, to
build his personal strength, Gorbachev must now
extend his patronage beyond the central party appara-
tus into the regional power structure, which his eco-
nomic strategy requires him to criticize and to threat-
en. The odds favor Gorbachev's winning his political
struggles over the years ahead, although they could
24. Our insight into Kremlin politics is limited, but
we believe Gorbachev now has adequate power to take
Soviet foreign policy in the directions he judges neces-
sary. Although there may be serious argument over
specific moves and audible skepticism about his gener-
al approach, Gorbachev does not, in our view, face a
concerted opposition on foreign policy.
Ill. Current Soviet Strategy and Tactics Toward
the United States
Assessment of the West
25. After some initial hopes that the Reagan admin-
istration would follow policies like those of President
Nixon's first term, the Soviets concluded early that
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Gorbachev's Political Position and
Foreign Policy Leadership
The following assessment underlies our judgment on
Gorbachev's power to control Soviet foreign policy.
Gorbachev has established himself as the authorita-
tive leader in foreign affairs in that he has the requisite
image in the country at large and is clearly dominant in
the small group of leaders and bureaucrats influential
on foreign policy issues. Although he must seek Politbu-
ro consensus on major policy moves, we believe he has
the power to forge consensus on matters where he has
developed a clear preference
We regularly receive reports about contention within
the Soviet leadership over foreign policy issues. They
frequently concern and often explicitly relate friction
over the central challenge of current Soviet tactics
toward the United States: how to use an engaged
diplomacy to extract concessions without letting Wash-
ington claim it is handling US-Soviet relations satisfacto-
rily without concessions. Gorbachev is probably less a
partisan in these controversies than their most impor-
tant audience and judge; he must himself weigh serious
tactical uncertainties. The ensuing arguments produce
audible grumbling, however, and there probably has
been opposition within the Soviet leadership to specific
foreign policy moves proposed or taken by Gorbachev.
But we do not believe Gorbachev faces a concerted
opposition on his overall policy toward the United
States
We have a number of indicators that the advisability
of summit meetings has been and continues to be a
contentious issue in the Kremlin. Gromyko reportedly
has doubts about them and is frequently a skeptical
voice on the promise of US-Soviet dialogue. His doubts
about summitry may stem from the lasting prejudices of
a longtime foreign minister. And he may be skeptical
about Gorbachev's tactics. But he also appears to be a
they faced a US Government determined to challenge
their interests more seriously than any in several
decades. They judged that the new US administration
enjoyed an unwelcome degree of domestic and Allied
support. Their failure to block INF deployments
showed further that Moscow could not effectively
respond to US challenges by simply trying to shout
them down from a distance.
26. By the mid-1980s, the Soviets claimed to see the
growth of forces within the United States and among
its allies that could help to contain or deflect Washing-
ton's anti-Soviet policies. They are newly attentive to
the importance of policy differences within the Amer-
ican body politic and to the role that the Congress can
play in constraining the administration's options. They
political supporter and may have played a key role in
swinging the Politburo for his election. Gromyko's role
in foreign policy is clearly on the wane, and we see no
other Politburo figure positioned or inclined to chal-
lenge Gorbachev on foreign policy moves for now. If
Gorbachev believes the substantive and atmospheric
conditions make a summit desirable, he can, we believe,
gain the necessary Politburo concensus.
Both because he has continuing struggles before him
on the domestic scene and because he sees reviving the
USSR's international effectiveness as a prime task,
Gorbachev sees great personal political benefits in
projecting the statesman's image. It is important to him
politically how he looks in the conduct of foreign policy,
be it in terms of publicity or diplomatic results. He also
knows that the USSR's leverage depends in some part
on his reputation as a man to be reckoned with, a
reputation he wants but has only begun to build.
Gorbachev is likely over the next few years to face
serious opposition on foreign policy or arms control
issues only if he proposes actions that are either very
concessionary or dangerously "adventurist." The very
need to operate within a Politburo consensus is a guard
against this, as it was for Brezhnev. Significant opposi-
tion to Gorbachev could arise over such domestic issues
as economic reform, party privileges, and lack of
control on the cultural front. In such a case, it is likely
that an opposition faction would add foreign policy
mistakes to their indictment. Khrushchev was taxed
with the mistake of adventurism over the Cuban Missile
Crisis when he was removed, for largely domestic
causes, two years later. More recently, political rivals
tried to charge Brezhnev with laxity on defense (1967)
and excessive eagerness for detente (1972); in both cases
the rivals were ousted from the leadership and Brezh-
nev grew stronger.
are also counting on what they see as the growing
ability of American and European political forces to
challenge US foreign and defense policies by hoisting
the banner of "peace" and opposition to
nuclear weapons, attacking defense budgets and pro-
grams, and obstructing intervention against Soviet
interests overseas. The Soviets see tendencies that may
reverse the conservative political wave that hit their
interests in the early 1980s.
27. The Soviets are also newly attentive to the
vagaries of capitalist economics because of their im-
pact on the politics and defense programs of the
United States and its allies. They greatly respect the
West's economic and technological vitality. Yet they
see, particularly in the US deficit, economic cycles,
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and trade disputes among the allies, economic forces
that can blunt Washington's policies or prevent them
from enduring
28. The Soviets see growing pressure on this admin-
istration to deal positively with the USSR on arms
control. In Soviet eyes, the administration has so far
successfully managed'these pressures by feigning sin-
cerity on arms control, while making no real conces-
sions. Conveying an element of authentic frustration,
Soviet propaganda roundly attacks Washington for
using arms negotiations and summitry as a "smoke
screen" behind which it acts to pursue its defense
goals. But the Soviets believe they can make this more
32. A variety of reporting indicates that there are
differing views as to
whether prospects for
an arms agreement with this
administration are zero or merely poor but not zero,
with Gorbachev currently leaning toward the latter
view. Those of the former persuasion are more dubi-
ous about the political value of summitry, and more
inclined toward policies that simply wait out the
present US administration. The latter viewpoint holds
that the best tactics for waiting out the current
administration require active engagement, because
they might produce results and, at a minimum, will
favorably shape the political environment for 1988
difficult for Washington.
29. Public Soviet commentaries have claimed that,
as 1988 approaches, political pressures for positive
developments in US-Soviet relations will mount and
the ability of the administration to pursue uniformly
anti-Soviet lines will erode. The Soviets perceive that
arms control and related defense policy issues have
caused serious fissures within the administration. In
both public and private communications, the Soviets
have judged that the President would sincerely like to
move forward on arms control, were it not for his
political dependence on the US "military industrial
complex" and certain deep but mistaken convictions,
such as his belief in SDI and desire to challenge Soviet
aims in the Third World.
30. References to these crosscurrents in the United
States and among its allies are widely used by Soviet
authorities to help justify Gorbachev's policy of diplo-
matic engagement and activism on arms control. At
the same time, our evident
ma es c ear t at
exploiting the political forces in Washington is central
to current Soviet policy toward the United States.
Gorbachev's placement of experienced Americanists in
his foreign policy apparatus-foremost among them
Dobrynin-is intended to increase Moscow's skills in
this respect
. 31. Nonetheless, the current Soviet leadership is
deeply skeptical about its ability to reach an arms
control agreement with the Reagan administration
that meets its chief security concerns, such as braking
SDI and other US military programs in the 1990s, and
the general political objective of blunting US hostility
to Soviet interests. There is a general sense among
Soviet leaders that almost any US administration after
1988 will be less challenging to Soviet interests and in
some ways easier to deal with, although they also
appreciate that the President's politics and popularity
give him unusual power to gain support for any arms
control compromise he might make.
Tactical Calculations
33. Gorbachev and his advisers believe that, what-
ever the actual prospects, Moscow must act as though a
breakthrough with the current US administration is
possible. Only a diplomacy that is active and appears
forthcoming to many American and European audi-
ences, especially on arms control, can put pressure on
Washington, keep it on the defensive, and test the
possibilities that may exist for real concessions. This
conviction has guided Soviet policy throughout the
period since the 1985 Geneva Summit, despite disap-
pointments during the ensuing six months, when the
US engaged in a series of actions the Soviets saw as
directed against them, and Soviet arms control initia-
tives found less resonance in the West than expected.
34. Disappointments in early 1986 and the advice
of newly influential. Americanists around Gorbachev
probably persuaded Moscow that it had to add some
concreteness to its grandiose arms control proposals.
The result was new Soviet proposals on the ABM
Treaty and START made on 29 May and 11 June
1986. These initiatives probably had been in planning
for some months; and some elements, such as suspend-
ing the withdrawal clause of the ABM Treaty, had
been talked about by US Soviet experts for several
years. Although they were not deliberately timed to
coincide with the President's 27 May decision on
SALT, the fact that they were advanced at this time
indicates Soviet determination to keep up the pressure
of positive arms control moves. This coincidence also
heightened the receptivity of audiences in the United
States and Western Europe to Soviet proposals. While
not muffling their unhappiness at the President's
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SALT decision, they took his Glassboro speech as
evidence that they had made an initiative with which
he would have to deal.
35. Through the pressure of arms control diploma-
cy, Moscow seeks to elicit new US arms control
concessions, to broaden opposition to the administra-
tion in the absence of such moves, and to complicate
the funding of defense programs in Washington. F
(See
annex B, "Exaggeration or Duplicity in Soviet Foreign
Policy Tactics").
Summitry
36. Gorbachev sees political value in summits. Sum-
mits provide a stage for asserting his role as a states-
man and the USSR's role as a coequal superpower.
They dramatize the new activism of Soviet foreign
policy and the competence of its leadership to foreign
and domestic audiences. They afford a valuable means
of reading Washington. The Soviets believe political
pressures on the United States generated by summits
can increase the probability of arms control and other
agreements that serve Soviet interests. At the same
time, Gorbachev is genuinely concerned that Wash-
ington uses summitry as a means to mute domestic and
allied anxiety about East-West relations without mak-
ing substantive concessions.
37. Moreover, judging that the US side puts a high
political value on summitry, Gorbachev sees leverage
in bargaining over whether and when summits occur.
Soviet behavior and indicate that
Moscow plans to hold out as long as possible for
favorable US movement on arms control before decid-
ing on the next summit. At the same time, Gorbachev
and his key advisers appear aware that they could
overplay their hand. Hence, they have not been too
explicit, constant, or precise in stating their conditions
for another summit beyond some "concrete results" on
38.
the Soviets were pleased with the results of the Geneva
1985 summit, despite its lack of concrete results,
because it accelerated political processes the Soviets
expected to exploit. Other reporting,
legitimize hardline US policies.
contended that the failure to achieve more in 1985
was politically costly for Gorbachev and cannot be
repeated. We believe that Gorbachev was satisfied
with the 1985 summit but also wants more tangible
products from future summits, less for internal politi-
cal reasons than because the USSR cannot afford to
routinize summits that yield no concessions but rather
39. The Soviet Union continues to use arms control
diplomacy to pursue a range of objectives from the
broadly political to the more specifically military and
technical. Arms control is the key link in the logic
chain of the USSR's whole foreign policy line toward
the West. The Soviets want the nexus of "preventing
nuclear war-arms control-detente" to dominate the
East-West agenda, with or without agreements, be-
cause this tends to undermine the legitimacy of West-
ern military programs and to reduce the salience of
other issues where hostility to Soviet interests can be
mobilized, such as their Third World actions, hegemo-
ny in Eastern Europe, and human rights behavior.
40. The Soviets seek through the arms control pro-
cess and agreements to make their threat environment
more predictable and thereby to facilitate orderly,
incremental force modernization in harmony with
their economic objectives. The Soviets believe that the
political environment created by arms control can
favor them in the strategic competition because they
are able to insulate their programs from political
pressures that may depress US military programs, to
exploit ambiguities in agreements without domestic
criticism, and occasionally to engage in deliberate
noncompliance, which the United States could not get
away with. They also, however, see a risk, especially in
the 1980s, that the United States can exploit its
involvement in arms control to gain political support
for military programs
41. Soviet arms control policy, especially its public
diplomacy, has a number of other aims. The Soviets
seek to undermine political support for US nuclear
weapons, programs, and strategies, knowing that they
will remain vital to US security and alliance leadership
for years to come. At the same time, the Soviets seek to
discredit prospective alternatives to nuclear weapons
in US strategy, most important SDI but also more
proficient nonnuclear forces and weapons, such as
those in NATO's "emerging technology" effort.
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42. Gorbachev has made a number of important
innovations in Soviet arms control policy in his effort
to give credibility to Moscow's diplomacy in the West
and to elicit changes in US .policy. He has:
- Expressed greater readiness than his predecessors
to consider substantial reductions in nuclear
forces.
- Expressed more willingness to consider onsite
inspection to aid verification.
- Announced an extended nuclear testing mora-
torium.
- Made more artful appeals to US and European
publics.
- Made more effort to be "comprehensive," to
have Soviet proposals on as many conceivable
arms control topics as possible.
43. Combating the US SDI is central to the USSR's
arms control policy and, therefore, bears heavily on its
entire policy toward the United States. The Soviets are
conscious of the great political, budgetary, and techni-
cal hurdles that stand in the way of the . program.
However, they remain deeply apprehensive about SDI
and want to kill it through the arms control process,
using some combination of formally agreed constraints
and political effects that undermine its public and
Congressional support. At present, they are not sure
whether any combination will work. Personal ex-
changes at the Geneva 1985 summit and since have
convinced Gorbachev of the President's deep commit-
ment to SDI. The Soviets perceive the President as
determined to shield SDI from crippling arms control
constraints and, if possible, to use the arms control
process to enhance its support. Therefore they have
adopted a more nuanced approach to attacking SDI
than they followed in 1984 and 1985, acceding to the
principle that SDI research in the laboratory can be
allowed.
44. In addition to their general campaign to depict
SDI as offensive, dangerously destabilizing, and con-
ducive to an escalating arms race, the Soviets have
developed two lines of attack:
First, they seek to persuade all audiences that
SDI is directly inimical to prospects for nuclear
force reductions. This is politically useful because
both sides have established deep reductions as the
hallmark of real arms control. But it is more than
a political contrivance for the Soviets. We believe
the Soviets regard expansion of their ballistic
missile forces as a valuable option, among sever-
al, for countering SDI and see deep reductions as
risky so long as SDI proceeds.
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SDI poses great technical and political uncertainties
for the Soviets. They see it as the most volatile and
dangerous uncertainty confronting them in the overall
military competition with the United States. It could
conceivably produce a highly effective ballistic missile
defense, revolutionizing the strategic environment to
Soviet disadvantage. Even moderately effective de-
fenses would degrade the calculability of missile strike
plans, except for the most massive and indiscriminate
attacks, undermining Soviet strategy and doctrine. The
Soviets worry that technological spinoffs from the pro-
gram could give the West new advantages in military
competition. Despite US protests to the contrary, the
Soviets see SDI as part of a broad effort by the United
States to regain strategic superiority and to pressure the
Soviet economic and technology base. While they do
not know what shape SDI will ultimately take, to
compete with and to counter SDI would involve bur-
dens they wish to avoid and undesirable distractions
from preferred lines of military modernization. Soviet
military plans give heavy attention to future strategic
defenses. But the Soviets would much prefer a setting in
which they could pursue near and long-term technology
options at their own pace while the United States
neglected strategic defense, as was largely the case from
1972 until 1983.
- Second, the Soviets see the ABM Treaty as the
best instrument for blocking the program. They
calculate that reaffirmation of the ABM Treaty
in some manner by the current President would
create a political obstacle to SDI deployment,
which future US leaders would find impossible to
surmount, especially if nuclear force reductions
were taking place. In a period of tight US
defense budgets, they could expect political sup-
port for the program in the United States would
decline.
45. In their campaign against SDI, the Soviets face
their larger dilemma in dealing with the United States.
If they are too uncompromising, the arms control
process may bog down and leave the United States
relatively free to proceed with its plans. But compro-
mises that keep the process going, without an explicit
retreat by the administration on SDI, run the risk of
legitimizing SDI as reconcilable with arms control and
"enforcer" of flexibility on the Soviet side.
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explicit constraints on SDI in the form of a lengthy
suspension of the right to withdraw from the ABM
Treaty, definitions that restrict SDI-type research, and
a ban on "space strike weapons" clearly intended to
prohibit any form of space-based intercept. They are
virtually certain the current US administration will not
agree to all of this outright.
Gorbachev currently leans toward-the view
that an arms agreement-by implication on offensive
nuclear force reductions-would serve to "slow" the
SDI program, presumably by indirect political effect
rather than explicit constraint. This suggests that Gor-
bachev sees some room to depart from his current
position and still strike an effective blow at SDI in the
longer run.
47. Moscow has approached arms control compli-
ance in pragmatic terms, interpreting its treaty obliga-
tions narrowly and stretching treaty ambiguities. Our
evidence on Soviet attitudes about compliance is al-
most entirely derived from Soviet actions and self-
serving statements to external audiences. (See inset and
for alternative view, see paragraph 50.)
Moscow's attitudes toward arms control compliance
contributed to the accumulation of a record of Soviet
noncompliance over the past two decades. In our view,
prior to the President's May 1986 decision on interim
restraint, the Soviets regarded expressed US concern
about their noncompliance as a nuisance to them, to be
dealt with by whatever means best permitted them to
deny US charges and by countercharges. They charge,
and also largely believe, that US accusations of Soviet
noncompliance are politically motivated devices for
undermining arms control and progress in US-Soviet
relations. The Soviets have seen the compliance issues
as marginal to US-Soviet political and arms control
dealings.
48. The President's decision in principle to depart
from adherence to the SALT I and SALT II accords
because of Soviet noncompliance has changed the
situation significantly for Moscow. We do not believe
it has changed basic Soviet attitudes. But it has made
Soviet noncompliance a more central political issue
because it has jeopardized a major Soviet objective, the
preservation of the arms control framework of the
1970s-both the ABM Treaty and SALT-or the
creation of a congenial successor system. The Soviet
reaction, so far, has been to charge that the President's
decision is part of a larger strategy for scuttling arms
control and to mount political pressures to encourage
his retreat. At the same time, positive hints about
Soviet openness to new forms of verification are
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The Soviet View of Arms Control Compliance
as a Political Issue
We are generally obliged to infer Soviet thinking and
motives from Soviet behavior and our broad assessment
of the Kremlin outlook on international politics. In our
view, Soviet leaders operate on the following pro-
positions:
- Power politics involves cheating on the margins of
international undertakings by all nations. The
ability of a closed society to get away with it better
than an open one is an objective reality to be
exploited.
- All things being equal, cheating is not intrinsically
desirable, and a record of cheating can be harm-
ful. But where important interests are at issue, it is
justifiable. The key determinant is the interest that
requires cheating versus the USSR's ability to
conceal it or manage the consequences of its
revelation.
- Charges of cheating and noncompliance must
never be admitted, whether they relate to pur-
poseful or inadvertant behavior. Such admissions,
whatever their nature, would undermine the in-
ternational and domestic authority of the Soviet
system itself. Moreover, the outside world must be
conditioned, so far as possible, to accept that
intolerance of Soviet cheating behavior, real or
perceived, is a threat to peace more serious than
the Soviet behavior in question.
According to an alternative view held by the Direc-
tor, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, for the De-
partment of State, this inset ignores the detailed and
internally consistent views the Soviets have presented
on many compliance issues-such as the SS-25 and
encryption. The holder of this view believes the evi-
dence does not support the inference that the Soviets
"actually" know themselves to be in violation of arms
control agreements, but rather that-by their own
interpretation-they believe they are in compliance.F
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designed to raise hopes that the future could be better
so long as the arms control process progresses.
49. We cannot judge whether and, if so, to what
degree Gorbachev and his colleagues are prepared to
admit to themselves that the erosion of the arms
control framework is in large part a political conse-
quence of Soviet behavior. Erosion of the existing arms
control framework concerns the Soviets because they
fear what the United States could do if US military
planning is freed from the formal and indirect con-
straints of arms limits. Moreover, their whole foreign
policy line toward the West would be undermined if
arms control came to seem less central to international
security. Despite these concerns, we believe Soviet
attitudes and positions on compliance will not change
significantly in the future.
50. The Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Re-
search, for the Department of State agrees that the
Soviets interpret arms control obligations narrowly and
frequently exploit their ambiguities, but holds that
analysis of their activities indicates that the Soviets
consider their action to be consistent with the letter of
the SALT accords as they interpret them. The Soviets
do not appreciate the nature and depth of US compli-
ance concerns and continue to view compliance as a
marginal issue in relations with the United States.
Because the Soviets do not perceive their actions to be
the actual rationale for the US 27 May interim
restraint decision, this decision has not changed Soviet
attitudes toward compliance.
51. Soviet policy on offensive strategic nuclear
force reductions has both political and military aims.
In our view, the present Soviet leadership does not
believe that all nuclear weapons can be eliminated.
Gorbachev made his 15 January proposal to get politi-
cal high ground. But we believe the Soviets are more
serious generally about nuclear force reductions than
they have been in the past:
- Modernized but reduced Soviet forces, along
with major constraints on US force moderniza-
tion programs could preserve their current nucle-
ar force capabilities and perhaps improve their
relative capabilities, compared to a situation in
which both sides carry out their strategic mod-
ernizations programs as planned.
- The Soviets expect that the more controversial
US strategic force modernization programs might
be unilaterally constrained by political and bud-
get pressures in an environment in which nuclear
force levels were being reduced.
- The Soviets would see strategic nuclear force
reductions generally as helping to erode the
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alliance commitments and leadership role.
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52. For these reasons, the Soviets want to keep the
prospect of large nuclear force reductions on the East-
West arms control agenda. More immediately impor-
tant, this prospect is their best weapon against SDI. E
53. Additionally, in one view,' it is possible that the
evolution of Soviet doctrine on the nature of a future
general war-which sees greater likelihood that it
could remain conventional for an extended period or
terminate without nuclear escalation-has increased
Soviet willingness to consider reduced nuclear arsenals
on both sides as militarily tolerable and perhaps even
attractive for Soviet military strategy. Several NFIB
agencies are skeptical about the impact of evolving
Soviet military doctrine upon attitudes toward nuclear
force reductions. They note that Soviet military litera-
ture-including writings on the possibility of protracted
conventional war-continues to underscore the impor-
tance of robust nuclear forces for deterrence and
warfighting; they observe that the modernization of
Soviet nuclear forces continues apace; and they doubt
that possible shifts in Soviet military doctrine would
greatly influence Soviet willingness to reduce nuclear
forces in the next two years.
54. There is a specific alternative view 8 that be-
lieves the possible linkage between Soviet military
doctrine and expressed willingness to consider nuclear
force reductions is too broadly stated. This view
recognizes that the Soviet military is examining the
future threats and opportunities posed by technically
advanced conventional weapons, which have the po-
tential for high lethality and great precision over
distances. Exactly how these emerging nonnuclear
technologies will shape Soviet perceptions of military
doctrine, force requirements, and dependence on the
various categories of weapons (tactical, theater, and
strategic) is yet evolving.
55. The Soviets regard INF as a possible area for
interim steps that may keep up the momentum of the
arms control process where other issues prove unyield-
ing. Initally they hoped to stop NATO's deployments
both to block a new and worrisome military threat and
to disrupt the whole political process of managing
Central Intelligence Agency.
9 The holders of this view are the Director, Defense Intelligence
Agency; the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department
of the Army; the Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the
Navy; and the Director of Intelligence, Headquarers, Marine
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nuclear strategy within the Alliance. When they failed
to do so, their calculus became more political, mainly
to use the INF issue as a means to generate prospects
for the whole arms control process and allied pressures
on Washington. Over the past year, the Soviets discov-
ered that the West Europeans became reluctant to
negotiate the complete reversal of INF deployments.
This has obliged the Soviets to consider interim steps,
which allow some US INF deployments
56. Eventually the Soviet leadership wants to use
INF negotiations as a means to limit the size and
modernization of French and British nuclear forces.
For now, however, it plays down this objective in
order to avoid antagonizing Paris and London. Mean-
while, programs for the modernization of Soviet inter-
mediate and theater nuclear systems suggest that
Soviet planners continue to see a role for nuclear strike
systems of varying ranges in the future.
57. The immediate purpose of the Soviet campaign
for a comprehensive nuclear test ban (CTB) is to put
political pressure on the United States across the entire
spectrum of arms control issues. The Soviets probably
regard the likelihood of achieving a CTB as low.
However, they do see practical benefits to be derived
from such a ban. It would block nuclear tests they
believe important for SDI and US strategic force
modernization. Soviet nuclear weapons designs are
conservative, stable, and in continuing production,
permitting them to engage in testing moratoria and to
consider an extended CTB, which would halt US
testing at a time when they probably perceive US
nuclear weapons technology as newly dynamic. Be-
cause the Soviets see nuclear weapons as an enduring
reality, requiring them to make nuclear weapons
technology advances of their own, we suspect that the
Soviets would enter a CTB openminded about its
permanence, believing that they could renegotiate or
abrogate if future circumstances gave them a strong
need to test.
58. Moscow's initiatives on limiting conventional
arms in Europe are primarily intended to add credi-
bility to its overall political stance and arms control
posture. By proposing large-scale reductions of wide
geographic scope, including the possibility of asym-
metric weapon reductions and discussion of surprise
attack and doctrine, the Soviets want to persuade
NATO audiences that arms control can redress any
imbalances that may exist, that conventional force
improvements are not necessary, and that large nucle-
ar reductions are reasonable. The Soviets hope through
this to help revive the antinuclear movement in
Europe. Gorbachev has called for a ban on new
conventional weapons whose overall effectiveness "ap-
proaches that of nuclear weapons," a clear allusion to
advanced precision and area weapons. Because high
Soviet military figures believe these weapons will be
vital to Soviet military posture in the future, this ploy
may be intended to delay such programs in the West
while Eastern technology advances. Lately, the Soviets
have indicated their belief that MBFR is virtually
moribund and that something like a second-phase
CDE should provide the setting for comprehensive
negotiations on conventional arms. The size and diver-
sity of the resulting forum shows that the Soviets are,
for the moment, more interested in political theater
than in real agreements on this front. In multiple
bilateral dealings with NATO governments, however,
the Soviets may express more serious interest in sub-
stantial force reductions, aiming at such traditional
Soviet goals as limitations on the Bundeswehr. The
Soviets might be prepared to give impetus to their
initiatives by announcing a modest unilateral cut in
standing military manpower.
Regional and Other Issues
59. The Soviets see regional security issues-the
Middle East, the Persian Gulf, Indochina, and the
conflicts surrounding Soviet efforts to consolidate
Marxist-Leninist regimes in Afghanistan, South Ye-
men, Ethiopia, Angola, and Nicaragua-as integral
aspects of the larger US-Soviet competition. They see
the administration as bent on denying them advances,
supporting their opponents, and undermining their
positions throughout the Third World. But for the
present, the Soviets see these issues as peripheral to
managing the US-Soviet relationship through dialogue,
allied and public pressures, and arms control negotia-
tions.
60. While confronting problems in all areas of
Third World commitment, the Gorbachev regime does
not feel under pressure to make real concessions in any
of them and would find it politically costly for Soviet
regional interests to do so. The USSR is willing to
discuss the regional issues with the United States
largely because Washington is concerned to keep these
issues part of the broader US-Soviet dialogue, and the
USSR can accede to this desire without jeopardizing
the overwhelming centrality of arms control. Mean-
while, the USSR has its own interests to press in such
dialogue without expecting real concessions to be
made by either side:
- Superpower dialogue and the language of diplo-
macy tend to legitimize Soviet interests in region-
al conflict situations, despite US hostility to them.
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- Such appearances could undermine public sup-
port in the United States for policies that chal-
lenge Soviet interests or aid Soviet adversaries in
the Third World, for example, on the Contras.
- The appearance of US-Soviet cooperation on
regional issues makes US allies and clients anx-
ious. Making Pakistan and the Afghan resistance
nervous is of special interest to Moscow at pre-
sent even though Kabul is also made nervous.
- Such exchanges provide a forum for airing to US
counterparts the Soviet view of Third World
conflicts, that they arise from local factors or US
interference, not the hand of Moscow; but must
be dealt with "realistically," that is, with respect
remain in place for the next several years. The Soviets
will continue to strive for their main objective, an
arms control framework that constrains or kills SDI,
makes the strategic environment of the 1990s more
predictable, and inhibits US policies hostile to the
USSR.
64. Although they probably believe agreements on
principles or of limited scope remain possible, they
probably doubt a comprehensive agreement with re-
spect to space and strategic arms as likely during the
next two and a half years. In addition to agreement on
complex and controversial offensive arms issues, this
would require a prompt US retreat from SDI, which
the Soviets seek but cannot be confident of getting, or
Soviet sanction of SDI, which they are most unlikely to
for Moscow's interests.
61. The Soviets would like to encourage the view
that active US hostility to Soviet interests and clients in
the Third World could jeopardize the bilateral dia-
logue. But they believe there are too many in Wash-
ington who would applaud this effect, making it a
risky ploy to use forcefully. The furthest that Moscow
has gone in trying to exploit such linkage was to cancel
the meeting of foreign ministers over the US strikes on
62. Although human rights, various kinds of ex-
changes, and trade issues are on the US-Soviet political
agenda, these too are seen as largely peripheral issues
to the current relationship. In the case of human
rights, the Soviets want, on one hand, to use isolated
gestures to encourage Western optimism about their
policies while, on the other, making sure that domestic
impacts are limited. The Soviets manage the dialogue
on exchanges not only with an eye to the informational
and propaganda opportunities they contain, but also to
minimize the intrusiveness of Western presence in the
USSR. In the area of trade, the current Soviet strategy
is to use the political atmosphere created by the
prospect of movement in US-Soviet relations to en-
hance their dealings with West European and Japa-
nese partners, while maintaining pressures for change
in US policies on technology transfer and other trade
issues that may yield benefits in the longer term.F_
IV. The Outlook for Soviet Policy Toward the
United States, 1986-88
63. Although specific Soviet moves cannot be pre-
dicted in detail-and Gorbachev has demonstrated a
knack for diplomatic surprises-the main contours of
Soviet policy toward the United States are likely to
grant.
65. Whether they agree to schedule summits in
1986 and 1987 or not, they will try to use the politics
of summits for leverage on Washington. And the
approaching 1988 US Presidential election will loom
ever larger in Soviet calculations.
Domestic Variables
66. Forseeable trends in Soviet internal affairs are
unlikely to alter the main directions of Soviet policy
toward the United States during the next two years:
- We anticipate that Gorbachev's political power
base will slowly but steadily be strengthened.
- The economy will show enough progress to keep
his political position and his economic revival
strategy intact.
- Further changes in the Soviet military leadership
will probably assure that serious policy chal-
lenges do not come from that quarter for the rest
of the decade.
The 70th anniversary of the October Revolution in
1987 will provide an occasion, akin to the 27th Party
Congress, for Gorbachev to celebrate his progress and
to elaborate his domestic, foreign policy, and ideologi-
cal lines.
67. Less likely but possible alternative prognoses on
the Soviet internal front involve worse than expected
economic news, trouble within the party or with the
military over Gorbachev's policies, or perhaps contro-
versy on the cultural front. A Politburo showdown
such as Khrushchev faced in 1957 is conceivable but
unlikely; Gorbachev's victory would not necessarily be
guaranteed. Developments such as these would result
in temporizing in policy toward the United States
rather than major departures in any direction. F_~
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Variables in Foreign Affairs
68. Gorbachev's new activism and the consolidation
of his Moscow foreign policy team are likely to
produce important Soviet initiatives during the next
few years in several regions, for example, toward
Japan, China, and West Germany, possibly also to-
ward Iran and Israel and in Latin America. He can be
expected to make numerous foreign trips. He will pay
special attention to Europe, the more so if socialist
governments come to power in London or Bonn, to set
a trend of West European detente that Washington
must try to catch. Gorbachev has powerful incentives
to show foreign policy movement that influences US
interests but takes place outside the US-Soviet bilateral
context. Overall; we expect Gorbachev to be successful
in projecting an image of foreign policy dynamism
and challenge toward the West during the next two
years, although he may not achieve irreversible gains.
69. We do not expect deliberate Soviet retreat from
the Third World's Marxist-Leninist regimes. The Sovi-
ets will probably supply sufficient military and other
support to protect their stakes against predictable
levels of challenge. We expect them to hold to course
in Afghanistan while intensifying their military, politi-
cal, and diplomatic operations aimed at improving
prospects for eventual victory.. They probably will not
go looking for trouble with the United States in new
areas or undertake commitments involving large eco-
nomic outlays, but they will not foreswear opportuni-
ties either, for example, in the Philippines.
70. There are numerous regional trouble spots
where crises and some degree of US-Soviet confronta-
tion could upset these predictions. An example involv-
ing deliberate Soviet initiative is Afghanistan-Pakistan.
Although averse to any direct confrontation over the
Afghan war, Gorbachev could find that his progress
toward winning it is too slow or elusive to satisfy his
political needs. He could, therefore, take additional
measures against Pakistan that could risk such con-
frontation with the United States. A degree of confron-
tation could arise at the initiative of others, including
the United States, over Israel-Syria, Libya, or Nicara-
gua. Trouble in Eastern Europe has a high potential
for producing the kind of Soviet behavior that inter-
rupts US-Soviet dialogue.
Conclusions: Arms Control, Summitry, and 1988
71. Although a long shot, Gorbachev wants an arms
control agreement on space and strategic weapons
with this administration if he can get one that sharply
constrains SDI, leaves Soviet modernization options
relatively open, curtails the most threatening US stra-
tegic modernization programs, and generally helps
depress US defense efforts in the years ahead.
72. The troubled outlook for the Soviet economy
contributes to Soviet interest in such an agreement and
in its expected political effects. That interest may
grow in the years ahead as Gorbachev's economic
strategy confronts systemic obstacles and, with it,
Soviet flexibility on the terms may increase. But in the
next two years or so, neither the domestic situation nor
the foreign policy outlook of the regime obliges Gorba-
chev to compromise substantially on central arms
control or security issues in dispute with the United
States.
73. Gorbachev will try during the next year to
create political pressures that encourage compromises
from the US side. His tactics will be to hold out the
promise of summits while bargaining hard about
timing and content, to suggest the possibility of com-
promise on arms issues, and to conduct a broad
diplomatic and propaganda effort, including new arms
proposals, to depict the USSR as the reasonable party.
We believe Gorbachev will stand subtantially by his
present objectives. But we do not rule out further shifts
in Soviet negotiating positions to encourage US conces-
sions. More unilateral gestures are also possible, for
instance a modest reduction of Warsaw Pact military
74. If this effort fails, as time passes Gorbachev is
likely to shift his priorities toward a more concerted
effort to demonstrate that US policies for dealing with
the USSR during the 1980s have been a failure, to
inject East-West issues into the US Presidential elec-
tions of 1988, and to cultivate an environment that
encourages more accommodating behavior from the
next US administration. Such a shift of priorities would
involve subtle but important tactical shifts: continued
participation in NST in Geneva, but. little give on
substance; expressions of interest in summitry without
agreement to hold summits; a propaganda line giving
much more stress to the negative than to the promise
of dealings with this administration; and possibly but
less likely a revival of the Soviet "danger of war"
propaganda of the early 1980s aimed at heightening
popular anxieties in the West.
75. Although demanding and fairly rigid at its core,
the stance described above would still give Gorbachev
room for maneuver on numerous secondary issues
where convergence between US and Soviet positions
might occur-such as an interim INF agreement or an
accord limiting nuclear tests-and a sense of momen-
tum toward further accommodation might be generat-
ed, with its attendant political pressures on Washing-
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ton. Moreover, despite its central importance to them,
the Soviets have some flexibility on SDI with respect to
the duration of a ban on deployment (a minimum of
nine to 10 years has been mentioned by Soviet offi-
cials, vice the 15 to 20 years officially proposed), the
definition of permitted research, and the manner in
which the ABM Treaty is employed to define con-
straints. This flexibility on SDI issues derives from the
expectation, or at least hope, that acceptance of some
formal constraint by the current US administration
will eventually leach away SDI.'s political support. We
believe the minimum they will insist on is some
codification of the principle that SDI must be con-
strained for large offensive reductions to be seriously
considered. They will reject any approach that ap-
pears to license SDI by accepting that full-scale devel-
opment and deployment of SDI-type strategic de-
fenses can be reconciled with deep offensive force
reductions
76. Two alternative outlooks are possible, but, we
believe, a good deal less likely:
- While prepared to bargain hard over arms con-
trol substance and summitry for what he can get,
Gorbachev may be ready now for two more
summits and a strategic offensive arms reduction
agreement, without explicit satisfaction on SDI.
In this case, his motive would not be that a
desperate economic plight obliges prompt pro-
gress toward US-Soviet amity, but rather that the
political effects of progress on offensive force
reductions would eventually kill SDI, deflect the
anti-Soviet directions of the current administra-
tion before it left office, and create a climate for
further accommodation after 1988. We believe
this outlook is unlikely because it would be too
great a gamble for Gorbachev and his regime,
running too high a risk of seeming to reward US
policies the Soviets aim to undermine.
- Alternatively, Gorbachev may already have giv-
en up on changing the policies of the current
administration sufficiently to allow accommoda-
tion with it. In this case, he would already be
pursuing tactics that look beyond 1988, plan no
future summits while not publicly foreclosing
their possibility, and be unwilling to explore
serious compromise on arms and security issues.
We believe this alternative overstates the rigidity
of the Soviet side. Fear of rewarding a hostile
administration remains a factor in Gorbachev's
calculations, but it is unlikely, in our view, to
preclude accommodation on something like his
terms
77. We believe the Soviets are still open to the
prospect of a summit in the winter of 1986-87 and
desire to have one if the United States makes conces-
sions that somehow meet their stated. conditions of
"concrete achievements on arms control" and "an
improved atmosphere." We also believe that the Sovi-
ets have not yet decided specifically what US conces-
sions they will deem satisfactory to meet these vaguely
stated conditions. They will delay a final decision as
long as possible to see what they can get, making their
decision on the basis of substantive US positions and
their assessment of where political pressures will take
the United States following another summit.
78. NFIB agencies are uncertain as to where exactly
the Soviets will come down with respect to their
minimum conditions for the next summit:
- We believe they are nearly certain to come if the
United States agrees in principle to reaffirm the
ABM Treaty as a means of dealing with ad-
vanced space-based strategic defenses or agrees
to pursue a CTB in the immediate future.
- We believe the odds that they will come are
better than even should agreement be achieved
on one or more significant arms control issues
other than Space-START, such as INF, CBW,
and TTB.
- There is a small chance that the Soviets will not
insist on any specific agreements, but will be
satisfied with a communique that conveys the
impression of progress on a range of arms control
issues.
We believe that Gorbachev will not agree to a summit
in the face of US actions that cause him embarrass-
ment, such as a US strike on Libya.
79. The Soviets will want the United States to
believe that continued adherance to the SALT accords
is a condition for another summit but will probably be
satisfied if the United States merely refrains from
breaching their limits for a decent interval or makes
an attractive offer on mutual restraint largely consis-
tent with SALT accords. We believe it very unlikely
that the Soviets will deliver any significant improve-
ment in their own compliance behavior. Should the
United States actually exceed the SALT limits before
another summit, the likelihood of Soviet agreement to
have one decreases, but does not, in our view, disap-
pear. If the United States does exceed the limits, the
USSR will view this in conjunction with other trends in
US security policy in determining its own actions. It
will feel the need to take some programmatic action to
show that the US move is not without consequences
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and to excite public concern. Soviet political and
military responses will seek to exploit opportunities
and hedge against threats posed by the absence of
arms control constraints, and also to maximize pres-
sures for the restoration of a congenial successor
framework under a new US administration.
80. Gorbachev will feel some pressure to accept
another summit in order to give the impression he is
subjecting the US President's proposals to a fair hear-
ing and, more generally, to keep up an image of
foreign policy momentum. But he will fear coming
away from a second summit with the President having
won political credibility on arms control while protect-
ing SDI.
81. Gorbachev will seek to prevent this from con-
tinuing indefinitely. Unless the United States makes
what the Soviets regard as significant concessions on
SDI or some other combination of issues, we believe
that sometime during the next 30 months he will shift
his tactics toward a more uncompromising line while
still engaged in active diplomacy with the United
States, aiming primarily to influence 1988 and be-
yond. In deciding on such a shift, the Soviets would be
influenced by the content of US-Soviet dealings, their
reading of US politics, and developments in NATO
governments. On balance, we believe the more the
Soviets see what they regard as "healthy forces"
working in these various arenas against unchanged US
policies, the more likely they will try to encourage
those forces while looking beyond the current US
administration.
82. It is very important for the Gorbachev regime
to prevent, if at all possible, the current US adminis-
tration from perpetuating a legacy of anti-Soviet
policies into another Presidency. This goal is as impor-
tant as stopping SDI and reviving the 1970s arms
control framework, even more so if the latter objec-
tives are unattainable by 1988. Even if his economic
strategy is relatively successful, Gorbachev wants pro-
tracted relief from the kinds of military and political
challenges shown the USSR by the United States in the
1980s. Although optimistic about his economic strate-
gy, Gorbachev knows its success is far from assured. If
his economic policies are relatively unsuccessful, he
will be bargaining from a weaker position with the
United States and its Allies in the 1990s, on arms,
trade, credits, and technology. He does not want to do
that bargaining with a US Government carrying on the
policies of the Reagan administration.
83. The USSR's domestic problems and internation-
al interests augur now for Soviet policies designed to
induce change in long-term US behavior, not accom-
modation to it in the near term. Gorbachev wants such
change to help sustain-and in the case of the econo-
my, revive-Soviet capabilities as a superpower. Ac-
commodating to the United States 'now on major
security issues without substantially compensating re-
wards would make the USSR a less imposing super-
power in the future. His problems at home and abroad
are not at present so severe, nor the immediate
strengths and staying power of hostile US policies so
convincing, that he must move toward real accommo-
dation now.
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ANNEX A
A Regional Profile of Soviet
Foreign Policy
1. In Eastern Europe, Gorbachev's basic aim is that
of previous regimes, to keep complex economic and
political problems from either jeopardizing Soviet
hegemony or impelling the nasty interventions that
hurt other foreign policy interests. His techniques are
familiar: Bloc integration and jawboning, combined
with a bit more willingness to listen to his allies than
previous Soviet leaders. He is not interested in any
basic liberalization of the Soviet-East European rela-
tionship, and has restated the essentials of the Brezh-
nev Doctrine: Eastern Europe is in the Soviet camp to
stay and any moves to change this are a threat to
peace. Heightened Soviet economic demands, leader-
ship changes and other domestic stresses in Eastern
Europe, and uncertainty about the exact limits of
Soviet tolerance, however, are likely to cause trouble
for Moscow in this region
pressure on the United States, on such issues as arms
control and trade, and making them more flexible
toward Soviet concerns. Moscow also strives, through
its diplomacy and new flexibility toward the West
European Left, to influence the domestic politics of
US Allies, as a means to further foreign policy goals.
Moscow has lately begun to take relations with Bonn
off the back burner and is clearly attempting to woo
Tokyo. However, the Soviets have shown only limited
willingness so far to compromise on the more impor-
tant security and national issues that encumber these
relationships, such as the Northern Territories with
Japan and inner-German relations with West Germa-
ny. They are seeing what political benefits can be
gotten at low cost and perhaps positioning for more
substantial moves in the future. In all cases, Soviet
influence with US Allies is somewhat enhanced by the
sense of promise produced by more active policies
2. Toward China, Gorbachev has hopes of gradual-
ly expanding on the minidetente that became possible
because Beijing became willing to take a more equidis-
tant stance between the superpowers. At Vladivostok
he showed willingness to consider movement on one of
China's "three obstacles," the Sino-Soviet military
relationship near the border, an issue on which he has
great room for maneuver without hurting Soviet secu-
rity interests. On a second, Afghanistan, he expresses
flexibility, which we and the Chinese so far regard as
feigned, not real. On the third obstacle, Indochina, his
flexibility is limited by Vietnam's commitments in
Cambodia and fears of China and the importance to
Moscow of the Soviet-Vietnamese relationship. Gorba-
chev clearly wishes, among other objectives, to con-
front the United States with a progressing Sino-Soviet
rapprochement in the context of an active Asian
diplomacy. How far he can carry this now depends
greatly on China. We believe China will react posi-
tively, but cautiously and skeptically, and soon will
find limits to Soviet flexibility. Hence, China will
remain in the camp of challengers to Soviet interests
for the foreseeable future
3. Soviet policy toward US Allies, Western Europe
and Japan, has been both active and more stylistically
appealing under Gorbachev. He clearly aims to derive
the twin benefits of increasing their ability to put
toward the United States.
4. The. Gorbachev regime has expressed under-
standable displeasure with the USSR's lack of influ-
ence in the Middle East and the immobility of its
policies in this vital region, reportedly under basic
review at present. Actual policy lines being followed
under Gorbachev have been in place for some years,
however: preservation of the key client relationships
with Syria and Iraq; pressing for unity within the
PLO, among radical Arabs, and all Arab states, if
possible; testing for openings with moderate Arab
governments; holding up an international conference
as the main instrument for addressing the Arab-Israeli
conflict; watching for useful openings with Iran
against the day of a more promising post-Khomeini
environment and, possibly, to contain the damage of
an Iranian victory over Iraq. Moscow is experimenting
with moves toward relations with Israel, recognizing
that influence with both Arabs and Israel are'crucial to
a serious political role in the region. But the risks are
considerable and the gains uncertain.
5. In Afghanistan Gorbachev clearly wishes to in-
crease the prospects for eventual Soviet success in
pacifying and controlling the country through a more
effective Kabul regime, better military performance
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against the Mujahedin, and, especially, a combination
of pressures and inducements that could change Pakis-
tan's policies. The costs and risks of alternatives-
either withdrawal without regard for the survival of a
Communist regime or substantial escalation of military
action in the country and against Pakistan-have
persuaded him to hold to course. His announcement of
a token withdrawal of Soviet troops, new emphasis on
Afghanistan as a US-Soviet issue, and protests about
Pakistan's nuclear program are, in our view, political
gambits pursuant to a constant policy, with Pakistan's
resolve the key target.
6. Elsewhere in the Third World the accession of a
new Soviet leadership does not appear to have had
practical impact on the main lines of Soviet policy.
Gorbachev knows, as did his two predecessors, that the
USSR cannot underwrite the economic and social
development of any but a very few Third World
countries. But it remains as willing as previously to
underwrite the military strength of chosen clients,
especially those developing along Marxist-Leninist
lines; to provide economic support where vital to their
survival; and generally to use arms transfers as the
mainstay of diplomacy throughout the Third World.
Rhetorically, the Soviet leadership has somewhat
downgraded the prominence it accords to Third
World "revolutions" in its depiction of the internation-
al scene and placed new emphasis on nonaligned
capitalist oriented Third World states. In practice,
however, it proceeds largely as it has in the past for, in
practice, providing arms and political support to Third
World clients, particularly those pressing revolution-
ary causes with which Moscow identifies, is vital to
Soviet superpower status. A retrenchment from such
policies might remove irritants in East-West relations
and economize on resources; but it would remove a
major element of Soviet foreign policy, which the
USSR lacks the economic, technological, or cultural
appeal to replace)
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ANNEX B
Exaggeration or Duplicity
Soviet Tactics?
1. This annex assess the evidence that Soviet foreign
policy tactics involve more than an exaggeration of
Soviet flexibility but involve a signficant degree of
duplicity
2. Afghanistan provides a test case. Numerous Sovi-
et actions-from Gorbachev's public statements to
private remarks at many levels-have been designed
to convey Soviet interest in a "political solution" that
facilitates the withdrawal of Soviet troops.
Gorbachev's
Vladivostok announcement of a token troop withdraw-
al was accompanied by pledges that Moscow will stand
by its Afghan friends so long as they are under attack.
Moscow's effective condition for withdrawal remains
outside acquiescence in its victory, namely total cessa-
tion of support to the Mujahedin. Soviet diplomacy
clouds, but does not refute this judgment.
3. On human rights, similarly, Gorbachev's willing-
ness to concede it as a valid issue and make such
gestures as the release of Shcharanskiy have clearly
been aimed at creating a picture of Soviet flexibility.
But other visible actions, such as Sakharov's treatment,
have belied any fundamental change of Soviet policy,
and no authoritative Soviet has claimed such change to
be possible.
4. On arms control, Soviet tactics may or may not
be intended to confuse the United States and its Allies.
They are certainly intended to convey a more activist
and forthcoming Soviet image than the West is used
to. Moreover, we do not believe that Gorbachev or any
Soviet authority genuinely regards the elimination of
nuclear weapons as an operational objective or a real
possibility within any foreseeable time frame, the 15
January proposal to the contrary notwithstanding. But
we cannot cite explicit reporting for this judgment.
5. We believe the Soviets have deliberately and
misleadingly inflated their flexibility on major issues,
more often by insinuation than by outright lies, but
have generally avoided explicit indications of interest
in policies they are not prepared to consider or
readiness for commitments they are not intending to
keep. Whether there is a further order of duplicity in
the policies and tactics of the Gorbachev leadership is
not clear. Three interpretations, not altogether mutu-
ally exclusive, are possible.
the Gorbachev leadership, aided by efforts to
present a more appealing image generally, is genuine-
ly willing to show flexibility at the margin of issues
and to follow through on its more substantial proposals
if their essential elements are agreed to, but not to
sacrifice those essential elements in bargaining. Thus,
were the United States to make agreements that, in the
Kremlin's view, assured the end of the SDI program,
the USSR would seriously pursue deep cuts in offen-
sive strategic arms consistent with its national security
requirements. If support to the Mujahedin were ended
and the resistance could be expected to dry up over a
year or so, the USSR would be willing to implement a
troop withdrawal timetable commensurate with the
survival of the communist regime in Kabul.
7. We believe the foregoing is the most likely
interpretation because it accounts best for the total
body of our evidence, including our best interpretion
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JCLKt I
of official Soviet positions, and with the logic of the
-Soviet external and internal situation. We cannot
entirely rule out the following alternative explana-
tions, however, although we believe they are much less
probable.
8. In part because he does not expect the United
States to satisfy him on essential elements of his
current positions and proposals, Gorbachev does not
expect or intend to follow through materially on any
of them and has communicated this into the Soviet
bureaucracy. Further, if by chance the United States
were to accede to a major demand, such as taking
positions that promised termination of SDI or an end
to support of the Afghan resistance, the Soviets would
pocket the political benefits of such concessions to the
extent they could and retreat from their seemingly
flexible positions, or, delay at least, further movement
on their part until the next US administration. The
underlying motive for this kind of Soviet calculus
would be that the Kremlin does not really want, much
less expect, any real breakthrough with the Reagan
administration because of its anti-Soviet legacy. C
9. Alternatively, intimations within the Soviet for-
eign affairs bureaucracy of duplicity in Soviet foreign
policy might be reflections of Gorbachev's efforts to
persuade other leaders and functionaries that his
initiatives will not cost the Soviet Union anything and
are therefore tolerable, while unsavory to some ele-
ments. He himself, however, could be willing to be
more flexible on fundamental security issues if the
United States and other partners create the right
atmosphere through marginal concessions that help
him sell further Soviet movement to his reluctant
colleagues.
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