USSR: WITHDRAWAL FROM AFGHANISTAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP09T00367R000200120001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 21, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 1, 1988
• Content Type: SNIE

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Central
Intelligence
USSR: Withdrawal
From Afghanistan (u)
Special National Intelligence Estimate
0(1.45617
SIVIE*11/37*88
:U*00104'88
IC/AESA
EDI RECIST PY
ROON 7E47
0404-0404
Sccrct
SNIE 11137-88
March 1988
Copy 404
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THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE.
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS.
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the
Estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security
Agency, and the intelligence organization of the Department of State.
Also Participating:
?The Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
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SNIE 11/37-88
USSR: WITHDRAWAL
FROM AFGHANISTAN
Information available as of 24 March 1988 was
used in the preparation of this Estimate, which was
approved by the National Foreign Intelligence
Board on that date.
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CONTENTS
Page
KEY JUDGMENTS
1
DISCUSSION
3
The Soviet Withdrawal Calculus and Conditions
3
Aftermath of Withdrawal Inside Afghanistan
5
The Impact of Withdrawal Inside the USSR
8
Impact on Soviet Allies and Clients
9
Impact on Moscow's Global Position
10
Implications for the United States
11
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KEY JUDGMENTS
We believe Moscow has made a firm decision to withdraw from
Afghanistan. The decision stems from the war's effect on the Soviet
regime's ability to carry out its agenda at home and abroad and its pessi-
mism about the military and political prospects for creating a viable
client regime:
? Although Afghanistan has been a controversial issue, we believe
General Secretary Gorbachev has built a leadership consensus
for withdrawal. The regime is aware that its client's chances of
surviving without Soviet troops are poor. We do not believe that
Moscow will attempt a partition of Afghanistan or start with-
drawal and then renege.
? The Soviets want to withdraw under the cover of the Geneva
accords. We believe they would prefer to withdraw without an
agreement, however, rather than sign one that formally restricts
their right to provide aid and further undermines the legitimacy
of the Kabul regime.
? In our view, the Soviets will begin withdrawal this year even if
the Geneva talks are deadlocked. Under such conditions, how-
ever, the Soviet leadership would not feel constrained by the
provisions of the draft accords, and withdrawal would more
likely be accompanied by heavy fighting. Although the Soviets
in this case would have the option of delaying or prolonging the
withdrawal process, we believe that?once begun in earnest?
geographic, political, and military factors would lead them to
opt for a relatively rapid exit.
? There is an alternative scenario. A more chaotic situation
accompanying withdrawal than the Soviets expect or a political
crisis in Moscow could fracture the Politburo consensus for
withdrawal and lead them to delay or even reverse course. We
believe the odds of this scenario are small?perhaps less than
one in five.
We judge that the Najibullah regime will not long survive the
completion of Soviet withdrawal even with continued Soviet assistance.
The regime may fall before withdrawal is complete.
Despite infighting, we believe the resistance will retain sufficient
supplies and military strength to ensure the demise of the Communist
government. We cannot confidently predict the composition of the new
regime, but we believe it initially will be an unstable coalition of
traditionalist and fundamentalist groups whose writ will not extend far
beyond Kabul and the leaders' home areas. It will be Islamic?possibly
strongly fundamentalist, but not as extreme as Iran. While anti-Soviet, it
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will eventually establish "correct--not friendly?ties to the USSR. We
cannot be confident of the new government's orientation toward the
West; at best it will be ambivalent and at worst it may be actively hos-
tile, especially toward the United States.
There are two alternative scenarios. There is some chance?less
than 1 in 3 in our view?that fighting among resistance groups will
produce so much chaos that no stable government will take hold for an
extended period after the Afghan Communist regime collapses. We also
cannot rule out a scenario in which the Kabul regime manages to
survive for a protracted period after withdrawal, due to an increasingly
divided resistance. The odds of this outcome, in our view, are very
small. Both scenarios would complicate relief efforts, reduce the
prospects that refugees would return, and increase opportunities for
Soviet maneuvering.
The impact of the Soviet withdrawal will depend on how it
proceeds and what kind of situation the Soviets leave behind. At home,
we believe that ending the war will be a net plus for Gorbachev,
boosting his popularity and his reform agenda. Nonetheless, withdrawal
will not be universally popular and is sure to cause recriminations.
There is some chance?if it proves to have a more damaging impact on
Soviet interests over the long term than either we or Gorbachev
anticipate?that the decision could eventually form part of a "bill of
attainder- used by his opponents in an effort to oust him.
Moscow's defeat in Afghanistan will have significant international
costs. It is an implicit admission that Soviet-supported revolutions can
be reversed. It will demonstrate that there are limits on Moscow's
willingness and ability to use its power abroad, tarnish its prestige
among some elements of the Communist movement, and lead other
beleaguered Soviet clients to question Soviet resolve.
Nevertheless, we?as well as the Soviets?believe the withdrawal
will yield important benefits for Moscow. The move will be popular
even among some Soviet allies. Moscow will net substantial public
relations gains in the rest of the world?particularly in Western
Europe?that could ultimately translate into more concrete diplomatic
benefits. Gorbachev expects the withdrawal to have a positive impact
on US-Soviet relations.
By enhancing the Soviet Union's image as a responsible super-
power, withdrawal will present new challenges to Western diplomacy.
In South Asia, US relations with Pakistan will be complicated. But
Soviet withdrawal under the conditions we anticipate will also produce
substantial benefits for the West:
? It will be seen as a triumph for Western policy.
? If it produces the benefits that Gorbachev expects, withdrawal
will probably add impetus to the ongoing rethinking in Moscow
about the utility of military power in Third World conflicts and
accelerate efforts to reach negotiated solutions on other issues.
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NOFORN/NOCONTRACT
DISCUSSION
The Soviet Withdrawal Calculus and Conditions
1. Moscow's decision to withdraw its troops from
Afghanistan stems from the war's effect on the Soviet
regime's agenda at home and abroad and its growing
pessimism about the military and political prospects
for creating a viable client regime. General Secretary
Gorbachev and reform elements in the leadership
hope the decision will dramatize their repudiation of
Brezhnev's legacy and their determination to chart a
new course for the country. Gorbachev undoubtedly
calculates that bringing Soviet troops home will be
greeted with relief among those elements of the
population and the elite whose support is most impor-
tant to the success of his domestic program:
? The war has fed ethnic tensions and aggravated
an array of problems in Soviet society.
? While casualties and material costs have not been
high?about 12,000 dead and approximately 3
percent of the annual military budget?growing
concern about the human toll has contributed to
a disillusionment with the war among the Soviet
populace.
2. The Soviets anticipate international dividends.
They expect withdrawal to reduce global perceptions
of the Soviet threat, improve relations with the West?
giving impetus to arms control and regional negotia-
tions?and help create an international environment
enabling , them to concentrate resources on domestic
revitalization.
3. Soviet leaders undoubtedly anticipate that with-
drawal will be controversial in some circles at home
and with some allies abroad?who will see it as a
retreat in the face of Western pressure and a blow to
Soviet prestige?but they probably expect the fallout
to be manageable.
4. We believe or ac ev has been pushing the
leadership in the direction of withdrawal for some
time. Although he almost certainly had to expend
political capital to obtain support from more reluctant
colleagues for the position set forth in his 8 February
statement, he probably has forged a consensus by
forcing them to confront the issue and the potential
costs of other options. We believe the improvement in
US-Soviet relations since 1985 and the considerable
Main Points of Gorbachev's 8 February Statement
on Afghanistan
? Withdrawal of Soviet troops could begin on 15
May provided that Geneva accords were signed no
later than 15 March.
? All that remained to conclude the accords was
agreement on a withdrawal timetable.
? Withdrawal timetable could be 10 months or
less?down from 12.
? "Frontloading"?withdrawing the bulk of the
troops in the first few months?could be worked
out.
? Withdrawal is not contingent on the formation of
a coalition government. The USSR would not take
part in talks to establish a coalition and neither
should anyone else other than the Afghans
themselves.
? Afghan President Najibullah's "national recon-
ciliation" program provides a political platform
for those who want peace in Afghanistan.
? Adherence to obligations on ending outside aid
should preclude a renewal of major fighting after
Soviet troops leave. If such fighting erupts, the UN
Security Council might then play a role.
turnover in the Politburo and Defense Council mem-
bership during the same time frame facilitated the
decision.
5. The Soviets want to withdraw under the cover of
the Geneva accords. They believe its provisions would
make withdrawal easier and give the appearance of
fulfilling the original mission?stopping outside assis-
tance to the insurgents. We believe they would prefer
to withdraw without an agreement rather than sign
one that formally restricts their right to provide aid
and further undermines the legitimacy of the Kabul
regime
6. In the event that Pakistan signs a Geneva agree-
ment without US guarantees, we believe the Soviets
would observe it. In our view, Pakistan is unlikely to
sign an agreement under these conditions
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Figure 1
Afghanistan: Estimated Soviet Casualties,
1980-87
Thousand persons
7
6
5
4
3
2
1980 81 82 83 84 85 86 87
Note: Total estimated casualties: 36,000
(12,000 killed, 24,000 wounded)
Figure 2
Estimated Dollar Cost of Soviet
Involvement, 1980-87
Billion 1986 US $
10
8
6
4
2
Hr
1980 81 82 83 84 85 86 87
Note: Total estimated cost, in 1986 dollars: $58 billion.
7. We believe the Soviets see the benefits of with-
drawal as outweighing the risks and will find a way to
follow through whether or not an agreement is signed
in Geneva. Soviet leaders have so raised expectations
at home and abroad as to impede their ability to
continue the war without serious damage to the
regime's credibility. The Soviets will probably have
even less desire to mount large-scale offensive opera-
tions now that an end to the war appears to be in sight.
Withdrawal planning is already under way. Moreover,
the appearance of imminent withdrawal may in itself
weaken the Kabul regime, pushing the Soviets to get
out before its collapse.
8. The Soviets, in our view, will begin withdrawal
this year even if the Geneva talks remain deadlocked.
Soviet officials from Foreign Minister Shevardnadze
on down have sent ambiguous signals regarding how
and when they would proceed if there is no signature
in Geneva. Some have said that withdrawal would still
begin on 15 May (before the President arrives in
Moscow), while others say it would be delayed. This
ambiguity may reflect indecision in the leadership
about next steps, uncertainty about the US position,
and efforts to pressure Pakistan to soften its stance.
The withdrawal of all Soviet troops outside a Geneva
316530 3-88
framework would leave Moscow without US and
Pakistani agreement to end aid to the Afghan
resistance:
? Without a Geneva agreement, the Soviet leader-
ship would not feel constrained by its provisions
and the withdrawal would more likely be accom-
panied by heavy fighting. Terrorist bombings
and Soviet airstrikes on resistance supply bases in
Pakistan might increase.
? Although in this situation the Soviets would have
the option of delaying or prolonging the process,
we believe that?once withdrawal begins in ear-
nest?they would, for geographical, political, and
military reasons, opt for a relatively rapid exit.
9. We believe that withdrawal does not depend on
the survival of the Kabul regime:
? The Soviets probably hope that the resistance
will become less effective and less unified once
the foreign enemy has withdrawn. Some Soviets
have expressed the conviction that geographical
proximity, natural economic ties, the availability
of Soviet assistance, Western loss of interest, and
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Afghanistan's probable decentralization and fac-
tional infighting would eventually enable Mos-
cow to regain influence.
? Nonetheless, in our view Moscow is fully aware
that the demise of the Kabul regime is likely.
Even though referring to the possibility of con-
tinued fighting after withdrawal, Gorbachev's
statement seemed to preclude the reintroduction
of Soviet troops to save the government in Kabul.
Recent Soviet media coverage has conveyed a
bleak picture of the situation in Afghanistan,
evidently to prepare the Soviet public for the
uncertain outcome. Soviet officials generally
have indicated a pessimistic view of the regime's
staying power.
10. We believe it is highly unlikely that the Soviets
will have their client partition Afghanistan, creating
an autonomous zone in the north to which the regime
could retreat if it is driven out of Kabul. Such a plan
might provide a postwithdrawal buffer for Soviet
Central Asia and a means by which to continue
exploiting the region's mineral wealth:
? Given that the strongest insurgent forces are
concentrated in the north, the survival of such a
regime would remain uncertain. It probably
could not be accomplished without a continued
substantial Soviet military presence.
? A partition or annexation of northern Afghani-
stan would be a public relations disaster for
Moscow, eliminating whatever public relations
and diplomatic benefits the Soviets hope to gain
from withdrawal.
Similar considerations would militate against a Soviet
decision to start withdrawal and then renege
settlement once aid to the resistance was cut off.
11. There is an alternative scenario. A more chaotic
situation accompanying withdrawal than the Soviets
expect or a political crisis in Moscow could fracture
the Politburo consensus for withdrawal and lead them
to delay withdrawal or even to reverse course. Moscow
could also decide to renege if it perceived that the
United States planned to establish a significant postwar
presence or if violence directed against members of
the Kabul regime were far more severe than the
Soviets had anticipated. We believe the odds of this
scenario are small?perhaps less than 1 in 5
Aftermath of Withdrawal Inside Afghanistan
12. We judge that the Kabul regime will not long
survive the completion of Soviet withdrawal. It may
even collapse before withdrawal is complete. The
People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) will
respond to a withdrawal by concentrating its forces
around Kabul and several other key cities and on the
road north to the Soviet Union
13. The regime's regular armed forces and mili-
tia?even if augmented by returning trainees from the
USSR?will remain ill-trained and undermanned. The
army, border guards, and tribal militias?approxi-
mately 110,000 men?almost certainly will suffer
massive desertions and mutinies shortly after a Soviet
departure begins. Kabul's security services and police
(35,000 to 50,000 men) will show more staying power
and discipline, simply because they can expect no
quarter from the insurgents. The PDPA's military?
deprived of the Soviet Air Forces' ground support and
aerial mobility?will have to assume responsibility for
the vital supply route between the capital and the
USSR and other critical points now secured by over
115,000 Soviet forces. We believe there are at least
175,000 resistance fighters, most of whom will contin-
ue to fight until the regime falls. Although the absence
of a unified command will probably prevent the
resistance from launching a direct assault on Kabul, it
will eventually be able to strangle the regime by
severing supply routes.
14. A likely upsurge in PDPA factionalism once the
withdrawal commences will further reduce the regime's
chances of surviving. The majority of members of the
party's Khalq and Parcham factions have opposed
Parchami President Najibullah's national reconcilia-
tion policy from the beginning, believing that it is a
sign of weakness and that the regime's record of abuses
and association with Moscow rule out resistance coop-
eration in any event:
? We believe the Khalqis, who dominate the offi-
cer corps and much of the security services, may
try to oust Najibullah as the Soviets leave and
inaugurate a regime committed to fight to the
finish.
? There is also a strong possibility that elements of
the Afghan military sympathetic to the insur-
gents will stage a coup following the withdrawal
to oust Najibullah and negotiate with resistance
leaders.
? There is also a chance that urban violence in
Kabul?perpetrated either by insurgents or civil-
ians seeking revenge against regime officials?
will add to the disorder spawned by PDPA
factionalism.
15. Continuing Soviet military supplies probably
would have little impact on the regime's ability to
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survive. Kabul's forces have shown themselves unable
to use effectively the weaponry they now possess. We
believe that any Soviet advisers left behind would be
inviting targets for the resistance and disgruntled
regime elements. And they would have minimal im-
pact on the performance of the regime's troops, unless
they are able to call on Soviet artillery and air assets.
16. Despite infighting, we believe the resistance
forces will have sufficient supplies and military
strength to ensure the demise of the Communist
government. The regime could survive only if the
insurgency self-destructs from factional infighting
once the unifying influence of the Soviet presence is
removed. Kabul almost certainly will try to spur
disintegration by offering local autonomy to some
commanders and attempting to bribe others into leav-
ing the war. We believe the Afghan Communists
might meet some limited success in these efforts?
among the insurgents' political leaders in Peshawar,
factionalism is already more evident. Given the post-
war political ambitions of such major regional com-
manders as Masood and Ismail Khan, however, they
almost certainly will not risk their credibility by
entering agreements that could give the PDPA?or
any significant element within it?a new lease on life.
17. In an alternative scenario, the PDPA regime
could hang on for longer than we anticipate. In this
scenario, insurgent infighting could increase to a debil-
itating level. A demonstration by the regime of a
consistent ability to prevent infiltration into Kabul and
to keep open the road north to the Soviet Union would
be especially disheartening to the insurgents. A pro-
longed siege of Kabul could prompt a gradual melting
away of insurgent forces as the fighters return to
protect their possessions and political standing in their
own communities. The insurgency could be under-
mined by internecine arguments about how best to
capture Kabul and some commanders could attempt
to cut a deal with elements of PDPA regi
believe the odds of this scenario are very small.
18. We cannot confidently predict the composition
of the new regime, but we believe it initially will be an
unstable coalition of traditionalist and fundamentalist
groups whose writ will not extend far beyond Kabul
and the leaders' home areas. It will be Islamic?
possibly strongly fundamentalist, but not as extreme as
Iran. Afghanistan's Shias constitute less than 15 per-
cent of the population, and the country has no tradi-
tion of strong central government or direct clerical
rule. No matter who "wins" Kabul, they will be under
enormous pressure to proceed quickly to the formation
of a more permanent government; this process could
also be bloody as competing groups try to influence
the outcome. In this sorting out, the military com-
manders will almost greater role than
the Peshawar Seven.
Afghan Resistance Alliance
Group
Leader
Primary
Ethnic
Composition
Political/Religious
Composition
Area of Strength
Islamic Union for the Liberation of Abdul Rasul Sayyaf
Afghanistan
Pushtun Islamic fundamentalist
Eastern Afghanistan
(mainly Kabul)
Hizbi Islami (Islamic Party) Gulbuddin Hikmatyar
(Gulbuddin)
Pushtun Islamic fundamentalist
Eastern Afghanistan
Jamiat-i-Islami (Islamic Society) Burhanuddin Rabbani Tajik
Islamic fundamentalist Northern and western
Afghanistan
Hizbi Islami (Islamic Party) Muhammad Yunus
(Yunus Khalis) Khalis
Pushtun
Islamic fundamentalist Nangarhar and Paktia
Provinces
Jabha-i-Najat-i-Milli Afghanistan
(Afghanistan National Liberation
Front)
Sibghatullah Mojadedi
Pushtun
Moderate Islamic Eastern Afghanistan
Harakat-i-Inqilab-i-Islami (Islamic
Revolutionary Movement)
Muhammad Nabi
Muhammadi
Pushtun Traditionalist
Eastern Afghanistan
Mahaz-i-Milli-Islami (National
Islamic Front)
Sayyid Ahmad Gailani
Pushtun Moderate Islamic
Eastern Afghanistan
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Figure 3
Major Insurgent Groups in Afghanistan
Alliance Members and Leaders
Harakat-i-Ingilab-i-Islami
(Mohammad Nabi)
Hizbi Islami (Gulbuddin)
Hizbi Islami (Yunis Khalis)
Islamic Union (Sayyaf)
Jabha-i-Najat-i-Milli Afghanistan
(Mojadedi)
Jamiat-i-Islami (Rabbani)
Mahaz-i-Milli-Islami (Gailani)
Non-Alliance Groups
Harakat-i-Islami (Iranian based)
Hizballah
Sazman-i-Nasr and Sepah-e Pasdaran
(Radical Iranian backed)
Shura-Ingilab-i-Itifag-i-Islami
(Traditionalist Hazara)
Independent fronts
Soviet thision
150 Kilometers
1150 Miles
.Persian
Gulf
e rain
Oster
U.A.E.
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
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19. Kabul's new foreign policy would be officially
nonaligned and would probably feature building
strong ties to the Organization of the Islamic Confer-
ence and other Islamic organizations. Its stance toward
the West would depend on the balance of traditional-
ists and fundamentalists in the government; at best it
will be ambivalent, and at worst it may be actively
hostile, especially toward the United State
20. The new regime will need to maintain cor-
rect?not friendly?ties to Moscow in order to protect
transshipment rights in the USSR for Afghan exports
and to ensure its Soviet market for natural gas and
minerals. It might also accept reconstruction aid from
Moscow (but not Soviet civilian advisers and techni-
cians), particularly if aid from the West and Islamic
countries were to prove less than the regime expected.
Kabul will not seek an open rapprochement with
Moscow because of the populace's residual hatred for
the Soviets and the near certainty that such an effort
would prompt a fundamentalist challenge to the gov-
ernment. The new regime will also be unable?and
perhaps unwilling?to prevent Islamic groups in the
country's northern provinces from attempting to pros-
elytize among Muslims in Soviet Central Asia.
21. The postwar Kabul regime is likely to try?
probably with Pakistani and Iranian encouragement?
to reduce the trade and economic dependence on the
USSR that Afghanistan developed during the Soviet
occupation. The new government will seek expanded
Western economic ties, especially with such traditional
trading partners as Japan, the United Kingdom, and
West Germany. It probably will show a strong interest
in acquiring reconstruction aid through multilateral
organizations such as the United Nations and the
World Bank. Kabul will also try to exploit its Islamic
credentials for aid from wealthy Arab states.
22. We are not sure how quickly the refugees will
return. Their return will depend on a number of
variables, including the timing of Soviet withdrawal in
relation to the growing season, stability in their home
areas, and the availability of aid
23. In an alternative scena some
chance?perhaps one in three?that no stable central
government will develop in Kabul after the defeat of
the PDPA regime. Although Afghans have historically
proven themselves able to arrive at modus vivendis
among competing ethnic groups, the postwar environ-
ment will find these groups better armed than ever
before and unwilling to tolerate a return to the
political status QUO ante. Given this instability?and
the near certainty of Soviet, Iranian, and Pakistani
efforts to influence Afghan affairs?Afghanistan could
evolve into a Lebanon-like polity in which there is no
effective central government and regional warlords
battle each other and compete for hegemony in the
capital. In this scenario relief efforts would be compli-
cated, the return of refugees delayed, and opportuni-
ties for Soviet meddling increased
The Impact of Withdrawal Inside the USSR
24. Our evidence about attitudes toward the war
inside the Soviet Union is largely impressionistic.
Termination of the war probably will enhance Gorba-
chev's personal popularity and the legitimacy of his
reform agenda in the short run, if Soviet withdrawal is
relatively peaceful and smooth. If it is not, or if
Afghanistan degenerates into chaos or radicalism, his
immediate gains might prove transitory. Among the
urban, educated segments of Soviet society, the end of
the war will be seen as evidence of the new leader-
ship's ability to overcome the stagnation and decay of
the late Brezhnev era. Informal public opinion polls
suggest growing disapproval of the Afghan war among
the intelligentsia and managerial elite
25. Withdrawal will remove a factor contributing
to anti-Russian nationalism in the Baltic republics, the
western Ukraine, and the Caucasus. In Soviet Central
Asia, the end of the war may reduce tension between
Russians and Central Asians. Most Muslims in Soviet
Central Asia are not attracted to Iranian-style theocracy,
but would prefer a more substantial role in the Soviet
system. Along the Afghan border, however, where
religious fundamentalism has roots, the establishment
of an Islamic regime in Kabul might embolden some
dissident Muslims.
26. Unless it is violence or appears
to be a retreat under pressure, we believe withdrawal
is likely?at least in the short run?to be supported by
the broad mass of Russians as well. Even Russian
nationalist organizations have recently condemned the
war and called for the trial of those who involved the
USSR in it.
27. We drawal will also find support
among the military and security forces, although their
opinions will be more mixed:
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most KGB officials
support withdrawal under the conditions laid
down by the General Secretary. Nonetheless, his
public remarks suggests that KGB chief Chebri-
kov may share the concern of those KGB direc-
torates responsible for internal security that mili-
tant Islam from Afghanistan could infect Soviet
Central Asia.
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? Withdrawal could feed evident concerns among
some in the military that Gorbachev is not
sufficiently vigilant in protecting Soviet national
security. Some officers will almost certainly be
concerned that the pullout will damage the
morale and prestige of the armed forces. On the
other hand, there is evidence of increasing am-
bivalence among military professionals about the
benefits of the war. Many officers reportedly
believe Soviet losses are unjustifiably large and
are worried about health and morale problems in
the army. Senior officers apparently resent the
costs of supporting an unreliable ally in a period
of budgetary stringency
28. The termination of the Afghan war will not in
itself have a significant impact on the military budget.
It may permit Moscow marginally to reallocate re-
sources to modernize the armed forces
29. We do not believe that withdrawal will present
a serious short-term risk to Gorbachev's power. Even
more conservative figures such as "Second Secretary-
Ligachev have forcefully supported Gorbachev's 8
February announcement
30. Gorbachev's decision could, however, entail
greater mid- and long-term risks. Although popular on
the whole, withdrawal will be seen by some conserva-
tive elements of the elite as further evidence of
Gorbachev's misguided leadership. Their views could
gain greater credence if withdrawal produces more
negative results (such as turmoil in Central Asia) than
he has led his colleagues to expect. His 8 February
statement, which included a powerful tribute to the
veterans of the war, suggests that Gorbachev is aware
of and wants to defuse the potential for negative
fallout within the society
31. Afghanistan alone is unlikely to endanger Gor-
bachev. In a crisis arising over his reform agenda,
however, Gorbachev's critics would probably use the
withdrawal as part of a "bill of attainder- to oust
him?just as the Cuban missile crisis figured in
Khrushchev's demise
Impact on Soviet Allies and Clients
32. We believe withdrawal?however much the
Soviets claim that the PDPA was not actually social-
ist?will tarnish Moscow's prestige among some ele-
ments of the Communist movement and lead Third
World clients to question Soviet resolve. Moscow
probably would incur similar costs, though to a lesser
extent, even if the Afghan Communists survived as
one of many competing factions in a situation of
chronic disorder. Nonetheless, withdrawal will be op-
ular among some of Moscow's allies
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33. Withdrawal is unlikely to cause significant
damage to the Soviet position in Eastern Europe. East
European leaders have shown scant interest in the
Afghan question, and we have seen no evidence that
they are seriously concerned about the implications of
a Soviet withdrawal. The East Europeans, moreover,
generally welcome anything that reduces East-West
tensions and smooths the way to the improvement of
their political and economic relations with the West.
Withdrawal will be regarded by many East Europeans
as evidence of Gorbachev's credibility and effective-
ness. A specific bone of contention would be removed
from Soviet relations with Romania and?outside the
Warsaw Pact?Yugoslavia. 25X1
34. Withdrawal may em .o en proponents of
change in Eastern Europe?particularly reform-minded
intellectuals?to test Soviet resolve more assertively.
The extent of this testing will depend on how the 25X1
withdrawal unfolds, but we believe the fallout will in
any case be modest. Some leaders will be less confident
about Kremlin actions in a future East European crisis,
although they realize that Moscow regards Eastern
Europe as far more critical to Soviet security than
Afghanistan. Those regimes that have sought to main-
tain some independence from Moscow may perceive
more room for maneuver.
35. The costs for Moscow in its relations with Third
World clients?both governments and nonruling par-
ties?will probably be more substantial, particularly
among regimes facing their own insurgencies. With-
drawal will strengthen fears that Moscow is ready to
sacrifice its friends to the imperatives of East-West
relations and eager to reduce the material burden of
its Third World commitments. Even if the Afghan
Communists were to survive as part of a coalition,
regimes such as those in Nicaragua and Angola might
conclude that Moscow will try to pressure them into
compromise with their oppositions. Vietnam and Cuba
will be concerned that Moscow may urge application
of the Afghan precedent where their interests are
affected?such as Cambodia and Angola?and that
the USSR might add teeth to that advice by withhold-
ing aid. Neither, however, is likely to see the with-
drawal as heralding a fundamental change in relations
with Moscow.
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36. Some Soviet clients may be moved by with-
drawal to compromise with their opponents while they
still have the Soviet card to play, even if Moscow does
not press them to do so. But their concerns about
Soviet staying power are unlikely in the near term to
reduce significantly Moscow's influence. Most depend
heavily on Soviet support and have no ready alterna-
tive. They will in any case avoid public criticism of 25X1
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Soviet actions, and some may welcome the withdrawal.
Cuba, for example, attaches great importance to its
prestige in Third World forums, where the Soviet
occupation of Afghanistan has been an embarrass-
ment.
Impact on Moscow's Global Position
37. International reaction to the Soviet occupation
has become increasingly rhetorical over the years,
most nations not allowing their disapproval to interfere
with ties to Moscow dictated by more immediate
concerns. It is therefore unlikely that withdrawal from
Afghanistan will produce?at least in the near term?
many concrete improvements in Moscow's political
and economic relations with individual countries. The
Soviets will, however, net substantial public relations
gains. The West will be deprived of an issue it has used
to hammer at Soviet expansionism. Withdrawal will
contribute to the already growing impression that the
USSR under Gorbachev is "different," reducing elite
and popular suspicions of Soviet motives. These gains
may translate eventually into more tangible benefits
for Moscow, both in its bilateral relations and in its
ability to influence international and regional ques-
tions
38 Soviet withdrawal will probably have the great-
est impact in Western Europe. It will almost certainly
enhance Gorbachev's strong standing among West
European publics. It will be cited by some leaders as
evidence that the USSR under Gorbachev has become
a more responsible world power whose behavior might
be further modified by greater Western inducements.
Some West European leaders may use the withdrawal
to argue that the Soviets should be accorded a more
substantial role in multinational initiatives such as an
Arab-Israeli peace conference
39. In South Asia, Moscow's ability to influence
Afghanistan and threaten Pakistan will be set back by
withdrawal. But Soviet relations with the countries
around Afghanistan?China, India, Pakistan, and
Iran?will on balance be enhance
40. China has cited the Soviet presence in f ghani-
stan as one of three obstacles to improving Sino-Soviet
relations, although the Chinese have said publicly that
Soviet support for the Vietnamese occupation of Cam-
bodia is the most important of these. Soviet withdrawal
will help to improve the atmosphere of Sino-Soviet
relations and contribute to Beijing's confidence that
the Kremlin is now more willing than before to make
hard choices about fundamental issues in the relation-
ship. The impact will be greater if the Soviets use the
Afghan precedent to press the Vietnamese for conces-
sions on Cambodia
41. India will hail a Soviet withdrawal, though it
would be dismayed should an Islamic fundamentalist
regime emerge in Kabul. Withdrawal will accord with
New Delhi's interest in reducing US and Soviet in-
volvement in the region. Resolution of the conflict will
also remove an awkward element in India's claim to
leadership in the Nonaligned Movement: its refusal to
jeopardize its political and economic ties to Moscow by
publicly condemning the Soviet occupation. Moreover,
New Delhi probably views the Soviets' recent efforts
to consult on withdrawal plans as a nod to India's
status as a regional power
42. We believe Pakistan's relations with the Soviet
Union are unlikely to improve significantly. Although
a Soviet withdrawal under a signed agreement would
create the best opportunity for improved relations, the
growth of the USSR's influence will be greatly con-
strained by its close ties to India and by limits on its
ability to offer significant foreign aid. Islamabad
might, however, welcome an opportunity for more
balanced relations with the superpowers. Its historical
doubts of US reliability have been reinforced by the
persistent threat of an aid cutoff in retaliation for
Pakistan's clandestine nuclear weapons program. Any
ill feeling caused by differences with the United States
over end-game strategy in the Geneva talks might also
make Islamabad more receptive to Soviet overtures.
43. Improvement in Soviet relations with Pakistan
could be held back by the circumstances of the
withdrawal?including the absence of a Geneva ac-
cord, or Soviet airstrikes and terrorist bombings in
Pakistan. If a unilateral pullout or a Geneva settlement
without an agreed interim government were to lead to
the survival of the Kabul regime?an outcome we
believe highly unlikely?Pakistan's fears about Mos-
cow's geopolitical ambitions in the region would be
perpetuated. The inevitable charges that Islamabad
had sold out the resistance would incline the Pakistanis
to keep their distance from Moscow. Such an out-
come?or a situation of chronic disorder?would also
do less to alleviate the domestic problems associated
with the presence of the Afghan refugees, most of
whom would not return home. Whatever the outcome,
Islamabad will continue to fear Soviet subversion.
44. Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan will re-
move a stumblingblock in the way of closer ties
between Iran and the USSR. Iran wants Moscow's
support in preventing UN sanctions and a reduction in
Soviet assistance to Iraq. It is likely at least tacitly to
condone even a settlement that falls short of its
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maximum demands?such as Shia participation in any
new government?as long as the successor regime is
Islamic and approved by the resistance. Any warming
toward Moscow would be largely tactical, however,
and driven by more central Iranian concerns, particu-
larly the war with Iraq and possible US moves in the
Persian Gulf. In the long run, moreover, instability in
Afghanistan?whether or not the present regime hangs
on?could present Tehran with increased opportuni-
ties to meddle, possibly bringing Soviet and Iranian
interests into further conflict.
45. Withdrawal will bene it Moscow's relations
with Islamic countries by removing both a specific
bone of contention and a factor inhibiting cooperation
on other issues where coincidence of interests might
otherwise enhance Soviet influence. Most Islamic orga-
nizations have condemned the Soviet occupation, and
some countries?notably Saudi Arabia?have named
it as an impediment to resuming normal diplomatic
relations. Moreover, some Islamic countries, including
Iraq and Syria, that have extensive ties to the Soviets
and maintain perfunctory relations with Kabul, have
privately urged the Soviets to withdraw. Although
withdrawal will win Moscow points with most Muslim
nations, real improvements in bilateral relations will
depend on more immediate concerns of individual
states.
46. Although most nonaligned Third World nations
have backed international resolutions calling for an
end to the Soviet occupation, they do not generally
regard the issue as one in which they have an impor-
tant stake, nor have they allowed it to interfere
significantly with the normal course of their relations
with Moscow. Withdrawal would help to reduce sus-
picion of Soviet motives in seeking to expand ties in
such areas as Latin America and Southeast Asia and
would probably enhance?particularly in internation-
al forums?Moscow's claim to be the natural ally of
the Third World. How much this translated into
tangible economic and political gains, however, would
probably depend on Moscow's willingness to provide
substantial amounts of aid?unlikely at best?and
whether Gorbachev's reforms enable the Soviet Union
to become an attractive trading partner for the indus-
trializing countries
Implications for the United States
47. Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan?after fail-
ing to achieve the objectives of the 1979 invasion?will
produce some significant benefits for the West:
? It will be seen as a triumph for Western policy.
? It will demonstrate that there are limits on
Moscow's willingness and ability to use its power
abroad.
? The decision to withdraw is an implicit admis-
sion that Soviet-supported revolutions can be
reversed.
? If it produces the benefits that Moscow expects,
withdrawal will probably add impetus to the
ongoing rethinking about the utility of military
power in Third World conflicts and accelerate
efforts to reach negotiated solutions on other
issues. Gorbachev and the reformers already
appear to be deemphasizing military approaches,
placing more stress on diplomatic solutions, and
attempting to redirect Soviet resources to build-
ing the USSR's place in the international eco-
nomic order.
? Uncertainty provoked by the Soviet withdrawal
may induce some Third World regimes to reduce
their reliance on Moscow, seek better relations
with the United States, and mend fences with
opposition parties and neighboring countries.
48. The withdrawal, however, will also have some
drawbacks for the United States:
? It will remove an issue that has served to keep
many nations wary of Soviet intentions and on
which the United States has been able to act in
concert with a wide variety of countries and
international organizations.
? By enhancing Gorbachev's credentials as a leader
and the USSR's image as a responsible super-
power, withdrawal will present new challenges to
American diplomacy. Washington could be
faced with international expectations of greater
responsiveness to Soviet initiatives on arms con-
trol and regional issues, which might leave the
United States vulnerable to Soviet charges that it
is not interested in reducing global tensions.
49. In South Asia, the implications for the United
States are mixed. The Soviets' loss of position is
unlikely to translate into an equivalent US gain:
The withdrawal will probably leave US and
Pakistani interests less closely tied. Pakistan will
continue to seek US assistance in securing hu-
manitarian aid for remaining refugees and to
deal with the Indian threat. Islamabad probably
fears, however, that, without the common cause
provided by the Soviet presence in Afghanistan,
US incentives to provide aid will diminish and
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traditional irritants in the relationship?Pakis-
tan's nuclear weapons program and posture on
narcotics issues?will assume more salience.
? US interests in the region would suffer if a
radical fundamentalist regime replaces the cur-
rent regime in Afghanistan, particularly if ties
with Iran were closer than we expect. We believe
that the symbolism of a victory by a Muslim
resistance over a superpower will give a shot in
the arm to international Islamic extremists. We
also see a risk that some factions within Afghani-
stan will work with radical Islamic groups else-
where.
50. The Soviets certainly expect withdrawal to have
a positive impact on US-Soviet relations, particularly
at the forthcoming Moscow summit. They expect
near-term benefits on arms control and regional nego-
tiations. Gorbachev will cite withdrawal as an example
of -new thinking- in Soviet policy and will use it to
seek US concessions on other issues. Over the longer
term, the impact of the withdrawal on US-Soviet
relations will depend on the degree to which the
United States is perceived by Moscow to have facilitat-
ed the process, US and Soviet behavior in the Third
World during the period immediately after it, and the
extent to which the domestic and international costs
and benefits correspond to Moscow's present estimate:
? There is a chance that withdrawal will yield
more negative consequences than Gorbachev has
led the leadership to expect?contributing to
nationality unrest in the USSR, destabilization in
Eastern Europe, or what Moscow would see as
more assertive US efforts to challenge Soviet
global interests. In that event, a foreign policy
backlash that produces a more conservative, de-
fense-minded leadership in Moscow?and a
tougher policy toward Washington?cannot be
ruled out.
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We believe it is more likely, however, that the
benefits of withdrawal for Moscow will on bal-
ance outweigh the costs, giving impetus to the
rethinking of traditional policies already under
way and improving the prospects for more inno-
vative Soviet approaches toward issues of con-
cern to the United States and the Western alli-
ance.
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