COVERT ABUSES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP09T00207R001000020044-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 9, 2011
• Sequence Number: 44
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Approved For Release 2011/08/09: CIA-RDP09TOO207RO01000020044-5
NEW YORK TLMES
Covert Abuses
President Ford's defense of "covert action" by intelli-
gcnce organizations against. foreign governments is faulty
both in its particular application to Chile and as a general
tenet on foreign policy. The belatedly-revealed campaign
against the government of the late President Salvador
.Allende adds just one more example of how executive
powers can be abused when the element. of effective
accountability is absent.
Mr. Ford tried to put the most benign face upon the
dubious Chilean exploits of his predecessor's Administra-
tion at his Monday news. conference, and again yesterday
in meeting Congressional leaders. Money was indeed spent
to influence Chile's political process, he conceded, despite'
all the prcvions- denials by senior government officials
who k'.rew better. But the President explained that this
was clone only. "to help and assist the preservation of
opposition newspapers and electronic media and to pre-
serve opposition political parties." This explanation might
be more convincing if there were any record of ehailar
concern for democratic opposition voices in Greece under
the military. junta, for example, or in totalitarian South
Vietnam or South Korea today-or for that matter in
post-Allende Chile.
The broader question is whether such covert activities
were properly conceived and policed inside the govern-
;nent, the legislative as well as executive branc!,. XXey
Congressional leaders who are supposed to be intorrned
of such operations claim they were kept in the dark.
Responsible committees of Congress were misled in
sworn testimony by Administration officials. inside
the Executive branch the so-called 40 Committee for
intelligence oversight, chaired by 1-lemy A. Kissinger as
President Nixon's national security adviser, reportedly
orchestrated the anti-Allende campaign, even as govern-
ment spokesmen at all levels were insistently denying
any intervention in Chilean affairs.
It is not enough for the President and Secretary of State
?r,;mply to brief invited Congressmen on controversial ac-
tions once they become known, as happened yesterday.
As we have long advocated, the Congress should insist
on rnire effective oversight procedures than have been
exercised so far; one aim should be to break up the con-
centration of decision-making power in the hands of one
man or a small group of anonymous officials under the
limited accountability that, more than anything else, in-
vites free-wh oeling abuse of power.
It would r lash statement to say that there is never
a need boa t ov;r1 intelligence operations in the modern
world, but stringent criteria must be established and
enforced before resorting to such dan erou Icchr.iques.
Lyman B. Kirkpatrick Jr., one of the nation's most
experienced intelligence executives, observrJ several
',ears ago: "The Luse of 'covert action' fo, the imple-
mentation of foreign policy mx,,v be even counrerpro-
dactive when successful: w hen u.I:succcssful it can be
catas'trophic."
"z CEP r-
00693
Approved For Release 2011/08/09: CIA-RDP09TOO207RO01000020044-5