THE CIA'S NEW BAY OF BUCKS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP09T00207R001000020043-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 9, 2011
• Sequence Number: 43
• Publication Date: September 23, 1974
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Approved For Release 2011/08/09: CIA-RDP09TOO207RO01000020043-6
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23 SEP 1474
Thuo% ' _..._-_ e Bay of
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The * United States Government ad- ! this failed, the 40 Committee deci
tiered to a policy of nonintervention in to try' to induce the Chilean Congress-
Chile's internal affairs during the Allen- sitting as an electoral college-to pass
de period. over Allende. After this scheme crum-
-Deputy Assistant Secretary of State bled, the CIA was given $5 million to
Harry Schlaudeman spend over the next three years to "de-
stabilize" the Allende government. In
August 1973, with the Marxist regime al-
We
, n cotes, we funded no read in deep trouble, the 40 Committee
, ice promoted no coups.
candidates
-Former Assistant Secretary of State li decided to throw in $1 million more.
Charles Mever
"Technically, Kissinger was accurate
'
The CIA had nothing to do with the
-COUP ...
-Secretary of State Henry Kissinger
oath after month, Nixon Administra-
tion officials had come before Con-
gress and testified that the United States
was free of any involvement in the
events leading up to last September's
Chilean coup. Then last week those same
lawmakers learned that the White House
had, in fact, authorized CIA expendi-
tures of $8 million in Chile from 1970 to
1973 in a clandestine effort to undermine
the Marxist government of Salvador
Allende. "I couldn't believe my eyes,"
said Massachusetts Congressman Mi-
chael Harrington after reading a top-
secret briefing to a House subcommittee
by CIA director William Colby. "Here
everyone from top to bottom in the Ad-
ministration had been insisting we had
nothing to do with it-and there it was,
40 pages in black and white ... telling in
clinical detail how we were engaged up
to our eyebrows."
The revelations about the CIA's activi-
ties in Chile broke in the press just as the
fire storm over the Nixon pardon put an
abrupt end to Congress's honeymoon
with Gerald Ford. And in the revived
mood of anguish and acrimony, Washing-
ton reacted to the CIA story with deep
dismay. Although there was no proof
that the CIA had any direct role in the
actual coup that toppled Allende, it was
clear that Congress was deliberately mis-
led about the scope and degree of U.S.
meddling in internal Chilean affairs. Sev-
eral lawmakers started an investigation to
determine whether. State Department
officials who testified before them on
Chile could be prosecuted for perjury.
And the controversy loomed as a serious
political challenge to-Henry Kissinger,
who apparently was the motive force be-
hind the anti-Allende campaign in his
role as head of the supersecret CIA
board of overseers known as the "40
Committee" (page 52).
Bribe: At the very least, last week's
revelations embarrassed the CIA more
than anything since details of the Bay
of Pigs fiasco became public. As the lat-
est story was pieced together, the CIA
first distributed Si million among Allen-
de's opponents in hope of defeating him
in the 19; 0 Presidential election. When
t pull
when he said that the CIA didn
the coup," remarked one expert. "But
how can you work for three years to up-
set Allende and then claim you didn't
have anything to do with the coup?"
The fact that the Nixon Administra-
tion managed to keep its war against
-Allende secret indicated anew how lit-
t1d leverage Congress has over the CIA.
The agency, an arm of the executive
branch, reports in theory to four Con
gressional subcommittees. But there is
a reluctance among veteran members of
these panels to ask too many questions.
"The clandestine services give them a
peek under the rug and their eyes pop,"
one CIA source said. "It doesn't take
long before the Congressional overseers
acquire that old-school feeling."
While there seemed little inclination
to go after the CIA, which was only
carrying out White House orders, feel-
ings were running stronger about the
testimony of Administration officials. And
a number of lawmakers felt any effort to
get to the bottom of the Chilean story
should start with the testimony of Henry
Kissinger. NEwswEEK's Bruce van Voorst
reported that it appeared that Kissinger
pushed the covert operations against Al-
lende even though the State Depart-
ment and the CIA were not too enthusi-
astic about the idea. "Henry had a tick
about Chile," one 40 Committee staffer,
told van Voorst. At a meeting of the
panel that took place in June 1970, an-
other source said, Kissinger declared:
"`I don't see why we need to stand by
and watch a country go Communist due
f to the irresponsibility of its own people."
Disclosure of the U.S. campaign against
1 Allende caused scarcely a ripple last
week in Santiago, where most politicians
have correctly believed for years that
the CIA was deeply involved in Chilean
politics. But the news created a sensa-
tion in many foreign capitals, and revived
all the old doubts and suspicions about
CIA activities in far corners of the world.
The U.S. ambassador to India, Daniel
Patrick Moynihan, cabled Kissinger that
the reports had confirmed Prime Min-
ister Indira Gandhi's "worst suspicions
and genuine fears" about American pal-
ucks
icy. "She is not sure," . loynihan told
Kissinger, "but that we would be content
to see others-like her-overthrown."
Political considerations aside, there
was also the question of morality. Kissin-
ger himself is known to believe that
there is a valid philosophical question
whether democracies such as the U.S.
should engage in such clandestine activi-
ties-and if so, how Congress should be
kept informed. Many congressmen-even
some of those who were most critical of
the Chilean revelations-would probably
agree with CIA director Colby that in
the harsh world of big-power politics
the U.S. is left with little choice but to
engage in sane covert activities. As
Colby said last week during a two-day
Washington conference on the CIA's ac-
tivities: 'I think it would be mistaken to
deprive our nation of the possibility of
some moderate covert-action response to
a foreign problem and leave us with
nothing between a diplomatic protest and
sending in the marines." At the same time,
however, the Administration officials who
send secret agents into action cannot ex-
pect much public support in a demo-
cracy if they lie to the people's repre-
sentatives in Congress.
Despite official denials, Washing-
ton learned last week that the CIA had
secretly campaigned to undermine,
Chile's Marxist government. With files
from Bruce van Voorst, 'Milton Ben-
jamin assesses the controversy.
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OQ691
itinued
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O
SUPERVISING THE SPOOKS.
t 's one of Washington's most exclu-
sive clubs and its name might lead
some outsiders to think that it organ-
izes snooty charity balls. But when
the members of the 40 Committee
gather once or twice a month behind
the thick wooden door of the Situa-
tion Room in the White House base-
ment, they come prepared to endorse
? sub rosa action against real and im-
agined enemies of the United States.
The 40 Committee is the board of di-.
rectors for America's master spies.
Over the years, the projects it has ap-
proved have included the 1953 coup
against Mohammed Mossadegh of
Iran, the spy flights of the U-2, the
Bay of Pigs invasion and the secret
war in Laos. Last week, it was identi-
fied as the sponsor of the U.S. effort
to sabotage the Marxist regime in
Chile of the late Salvador Allende.
Only the scantiest details about the
fense department officials and its mis-
sion was to make sure. the year-old
CIA's projects were worth the political
risk. Though it has been renamed from
time to time-"the 54/ 12 group," "the
303 Committee" and now "the 40
Committee" after the title of its latest
reorganizing memorandum-its mem-
bership is still restricted to five key
men. Currently they are Secretary of
State Henry Kissinger, CIA chief Wil-
liam E. Colby, Deputy Defense Sec-
retary William Clements, Under Sec-
retary of State Joseph Sisco and Air
Force Gen. George Brown, chairman
of the joint Chiefs of Staff. Most of its
work focuses on capsule summaries. of.
CIA proposals, which-spell out objec-
tives, list available agents, give costs,
assess prospects and-most important
-present a plausible way the Admin-
istration can deny U.S. involvement
if something- goes wrong.
Old hands in the intelligence trade
say that for many years the committee
held a fairly tight rein on the "roman-
. and 40 Committee boss Kissinger
tics" the CIA inherited from the
World War II OSS. Meeting' weekly.
in the 1950s and 1960s, it thumbed
down many operations-such as covert
support for rightist politicians in Rome
and Saigon-on the ground that they
were. too risky or wouldn't work.
The rise of Henry Kissinger, 'how-
ever, has sharply reduced the com-
mittee's impact. It meets less often
now, and when it does Kissinger's
unchallenged right. to say flatly, "The
President told me .. has made him
dominant. Some of the Secretary of
State's critics feel that Henry Kis-
singer is overly fascinated by the
spy game at a time when. technology
has become far more important to
intelligence collection than espionage.
He was recently dubbed "Henry Su-
perspy" by one sarcastic 'critic. And
when Kissinger takes a personal. in-
terest in a project-in Chile, for ex-
ample-it is almost certain to win ap-
proval despite others' doubts. As with
so many other aspects of U.S. policy
abroad, says one former member, "the
40 Committee has come in practice to
mean Henry Kissinger."
40 Committee are known. It was
formed in 1948 as a "special group" of
senior White House and State and De-
Approved For Release 2011/08/09: CIA-RDP09TOO207RO01000020043-6