WHERE PRESIDENT FORD IS WRONG

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP09T00207R001000020002-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 9, 2011
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: September 28, 1974
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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distance by Hunt and asked to meet him at six am at technician who had developed the pictures for Hunt
Dulles Airport to receive the camera and film and de- was told Gen. Cushman was lunching with Hunt the
veiop them. The film was taken for development but next day and wanted a complete briefing on what
the technicians began to question the use to which assistance Hunt had been given. The technician in-
Hunt was putting the equipment. The camera had cluded in the briefing material xerox copies of the
been used by Hunt and Liddy to clandestinely photo- Hunt photographs. What happened at that meeting
graph Dr. Fielding's office, ' side and outside, in (if it took place) between Hunt and Cushman, and
order to prepare for the burgla The photographs why did the CIA deputy director at that time want to
were reviewed by CIA techhical sup isory person- be brought up to die on Hunt's requests? Did the
nel before they were delivered to Hunt. T revealed agency figure o that there was a relationship between
a shot of a parking space with the name "Dr. ding" the Ellsber rofile and the Hunt casing job of Field-
clearly visible. They also disclosed shots of the o ice ing's o ce? Was any additional material supplied
and one CIA official speculated at the time they wer by A on Ellsberg after the Fielding break-in? I've
"casing" photographs. Deputy Director Cushman 's ed that question several places and have no answer.
office was informed. A decision was made to tell Hunt t ' known that the final CIA profile went to the White
that no more requests for assistance would be honored:' Hous on November 9, 1971 and carried with it a note
According to Gen. -ushman's aide, the CIA techpi'cal from He s stating: "I do wish to underline the point
people thought the-assistance given Hunt "a eared that our in lvement in this matter should not be
to involve the agency in_4Qniestic clandesti a opera- revealed in an context, formal or informal." Though
tions," a finding confirmed_,by,the CIA g eral coun- Helms was later testify he meant the work might
sel's office. That same day, August 27, C shmancalled reflect adversely on capabilities of the agency, the
Ehrlichman at, the White House and 6Id him aid to men who put the study together have said that their
Hunt was being halted because of those concerns. concern was that the "agency's involvement become
On September 3, 1971 the break-in at Dr. Fielding's known and particularly that it might come to light
"
office took. place. On October 14 or 15, 1971. the CIA during any proceeding.
_a<
Candid but Mistaken about Chile
Walter Pincus
VVhere President Ford Is Wrong
by Tad- Szulc
Gerald Ford's first public pronouncement on a contro-
versial foreign policy question-secret intervention
in Chilean politics prior to last year's bloody coup
d'etat-was as startling in its sweep as it was errone-
ous on virtually every point of fact. Probably the first
American President to do so publicly, Mr. Ford last
week delivered an extraordinary defense of covert
intelligence operations abroad, claiming that in this
particular case it was "in the best interest of the people
of Chile, and certainly in our best interest," and that
"our government, like other governments, does take
certain actions in the intelligence field to help imple-
ment foreign policy and protect national security."
TAD SZULC is a Washington-based writer on foreign
policy.
By thus advertising the subversion engineered on a
continuing basis;by the super-secret "40 Committee"
of the National Security Council, the President handed
the worldwide Communist propaganda mill some of
the best grist it has had in years.
Now for the facts.
Mr. Ford stated that the US government "had no
involvement in any way whatsoever in the coup it-
self." In the strictest sense, this is probably true: the
Chilean army needed no further physical help from
us to launch the September 11, 1973 revolution and the
subsequent terror. Chile's armed forces are equipped
mainly with US materiel, and our military advisers
worked with the Chileans throughout the Allende
period. Likewise between 1970 and 1974, when the US
deprived Chile of commercial. credit, including credit
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for vitally needed food imports, it supplied the Chilean
armed forces with at least $30 million worth of arms,
primarily aircraft, on credit. A squadron of S-5 jet
fighters was delivered a few weeks before the coup
and more planes were in the pipeline. The regime fell
after jet fighters bombed the presidential palace. For
what it was worth psychologically, a US naval task
force was off the shores of Chile the week of the coup
in preparation for joint exercises with Chilean war-
ships. Most loans to Allende's Chile were refused by
the. US on the grounds that Chile lacked credit worthi-
ness, although this was no bar to military credit sales.
What of US assistance to anti-Allende forces before
the coup and before Allende took office? Here is where
the President was misinformed, perhaps by Secretary
of State Kissinger who himself is caught in a credibility
squeeze on Chile.
Until the surfacing of secret congressional testimony
last April by CIA Director William E. Colby, the ad-
ministration had insisted, as did Kissinger a month
after the coup, that the US did virtually nothing to
damage Allende. Colby testified, however, that the
1
Ford and Frankfurter
Q. Mr. President, under what international law do we
have a right to attempt to destabilize the constitu-
tionally elected government of another country? And
does the Soviet Union have a similar right'to try to
destabilize the government of Canada, for example, or
the United States?
A. I'm not going to pass judgment on whether it's
permitted or authorized under international law. It's
a recognized fact that historically as well as presently
such actions are taken in the best interests of the
countries involved.
Presidential press conference, Sept. 16, 1974
I remember shocking him [the judge Advocate General]
... when he came into my room and said, "Frank-
furter, I want you to help me. I've just been over to the
White House" -this was just after we had seized the
customs house at Vera Cruz [April 19141 "and I'm
asked to write a memorandum whether that seizure
should be treated as an act of war and what its status
is in international law. Will you work with me on that?"
I said, "General, I'm going to ask to be excused. I
don't have to work on that. I know the answer to that."
"You do?"
"Yes, I do."
"What is the answer?"
"It would be an act of war against a great nation; it
isn't against a small nation."
"I can't give him that."
"I know you can't, but that's the answer."
from Felix Frankfurter Reminiscences
Reynal & Company, ? 1960 by Harlan B. Phillips
THE NEw REPUBLIC
CIA spent eight million dollars in Chile between 1970
and 1973 to prevent Allende, in effect, from governing
efficiently. He also said that three million dollars had
been expended in 1964 to keep Allende from winning
in that election. This is how Mr. Ford explained these
pre-coup activities: "In a period of time, three or four
years ago, there was an effort being made by the
Allende government to destroy opposition news me-
dia, both the writing press as well as the electronic
press. And to destroy opposition political parties. And
the effort that was made in this case was to help and
assist the preservation of opposition newspapers and
electronic media and to preserve opposition political
parties. I think this is in the best interest of the people
in Chile, and certainly in our best interest."
The President's statement is inconsistent with
reality in these respects:
1) The- US, through authorizations issued-.-by the 40
Committee, embarked on undercover support of the
anti-Allende press and opposition parties nearly four
months before Allende took office. Former CIA, Direc-
tor Richard Helms testified last year that $400,000 was
approved for media support in Chile on June 27,1970.
After Allende won a plurality, but not a majority in
the elections on September 4, 1970, the US, according
to Colby's testimony, invested $350,000 to bribe Chil-
ean congressmen to vote against Allende in the run-
off in the Congress on October 24. So there was no
question of saving opposition pities and press at that
time from persecution by Alle..
2) After Allende became.',President, h}s,..minority
Marxist regime, the Unidad Popular, did precious little
to "destroy opposition news media." El Mercurio, the
principal anti-Allende newspaper in Santiago, was
closed down only once for several days, after' publish-
ing an editorial calling, in. effect, for insurrection.
When 'its owner, Augustin Edwards, fled Chile_ im-
mediately after Allende took office (Edwards came
to the US and became a member of the board of di-
rectors of the Pepsi-Cola'comiany, which is headed by
Richard Nixon's close friend, Donald Kin l all) the new
government began tax and antitrust litigation against
the Edwards empire. While El Me`reurio remained the
voice of the opposition (it could be read in the waiting
room of the Chilean embassy in Washington, along
with pro-regime leftist publications), the Edwards
family was divested of its bank and other nonpress
holdings: A right-wing newspaper, Le Tribuna, ran into
some trouble after charging in print that Allende had
been expelled from medical school for raping a 14-
year-old girl. -
The Allende regime did refuse to authorize the
Catholic university in Concepcion to go on the air
with a new radio station. The university thereupon
set up a relay from the Catholic university's station
in Santiago. After the regime began jamming these
broadcasts, persons believed to be linked to rightist
militant groups blew up the jamming facility.
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3) There is no evidence that Allende was out to
"destroy opposition political parties," unless we are
willing to say that the Nixon administration was out
to destroy the Democrats here. The Chilean Senate
and the Chamber of Deputies, both with anti-Allende
majorities, functioned until the day of the coup.
Allende resisted pressure from the extreme left of his
coalition to call a?plebiscite to abolish the existing
Congress and replace it with a hand-picked unicam-
eral parliament. There were few political prisoners in
Chile under Allende. Today there are over 20,000.
If the opposition was not in that much trouble
(Allende failed to win a majority in the Congress in the
1972 parliamentary elections), the question arises why
the CIA needed might million dollars to preserve
the "best interest' !c of the Chilean people. Colby, who
is more precise.inahis statements, told a conference
on the CIA. and -Covert-Actions in Washington, DC
earlier this .month that alLthat money went to Chile
to help "our democratic friends;' to survive until 1976,
so that they could then vote the Marxists out of office.
Addressing -specialists, Colby knew better than to
argue. that the CIA was ;saving the opposition from
destruction by Allende.
4) Mr. Ford asserted that the 40 Committee keeps
the appropriate congressional committees informed
of its, plans;.for covert intrigue. This is, not so. The 40
Committer,s such ha$ tourer briefed the Congress
and,-.as far #s, it ;sknvn, Kissinger, who runs the
secret group, never cq.ided in congressmen on its be-
half. There is an oversight authority in four subcom-
mittees over the CIA's activities, but these bodies meet
seldom and their members rarely ask searching ques-
tions. Colby has acknowledged that the congressional
subcommittees are told of CIA activities post facto
rather than before the fact as Mr. Ford claimed.
The day after the President spoke, the Senate For-
eign Relations Committee voted unanimously to
reopen its investigation of the US role in the Chilean
events. Its staff recommended that perjury or con-
tempt citations be considered against former CIA
Director Richard Helms and former senior CIA and
State Department officials for misleading the Senate
in earlier testimony. And the senators want to hear
again from Kissinger, who heads the 40 Committee.
The question I find so puzzling is why Mr. Ford is
so misinformed about the history of our involvement
in Chile-and about the Chilean situation in 1970-
1973-and why the 40 Committee approved the eight
million dollars for covert operations, a rather large
sum to keep Chilean newspapers going and "our
democratic friends" in pocket money. If, in the name
of democracy, the US was aiding the opposition in
Chile against an elected government, was it also aid-
ing the press and the opposition under dictatorships
in Brazil, Greece and Spain or the Soviet Union? It
would be interesting to know. Is it helping the new
opposition in Chile, where a police state has been
constructed by.the military junta? Kissinger claims
that the US must not interfere in the internal affairs of
others-even to encourage Soviet dissidents.
If the issue was the nationalization by Chile of US
foreign investments with inadequate indemnification
or none, why not admit it instead of sermonizing
about the opposition press and parties? Why doesn't
this "open administration" come clean?
c
... And, being a non-Communist junta, we can count on automatic US support."
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