HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP09K00541R000700100001-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 11, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Content Type: MISC

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HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE CENTRAL T~T?T?IGENCE AGEBCY
This paper, a study of the history of the Central Intelligence Agency,
including pertinent materials on World War II intelligence organizations and
plans for the postwar era, has been prepared by the Office of General Counsel,
Central Intelligence Agency, as an aid to the better understanding of the
present structure and functions of the Agency. While the United States has
engaged in intelligence activities since its Pounding, it was not until the
events of the early 1q~+0's showed the need for an efficient, fast moving
intelligence service, that such an organization on a gover~nentwide basis
was conceived and developed. The results of this effort culminated in the
formation of the Central Intelligence Agency.
Coordinator of Information
The events which foretold the advent of the second world war provided
the impetus for forming a number of Government organizations which later
served as the foundation for the United States intelligence activity during
the war. By an Executive Order dated 8 September 1939, President Franklin ~
Roosevelt provided for an office for emergency management "in the event of a
national emergency" or the ,threat of one. Such an office was subsequently
established on 25 May 190. By an administrative order of 7 January 19+1,
the functions of the office were modified and further defined and included
advising and assisting the President in time of emergency, coordinating
emergency activities of the Government and informing the President as to the
various agencies' progress in emergency matters.
Six months later, the forerunner of a centralized intelligence service
was established under the Coordinator of Information. William J. Donovan
was named to the position. He had authority from President Roosevelt to:
"Collect and analyze all information and data, which may bear upon
national security; to correlate such information and data, and to
make such information and data available to the President and to
such departments and agencies as the President may determine,
and to carry out, when requested by the President, such supplemen-
tary activities as may facilitate the securing of information
imleortant for national security not now available to the Govern-
ments" a,
The Coordinator of Information was to have access to information and data within
the various departments and agencies but he was not~to interfere with or impair
the duties and responsibilities of the President's regular military and naval
advisers. To assist him, the Coordinator could. appoint committees of represent-
atives of the various departments and agencies. Colonel Donovan was to receive
no compensation but was entitled to transportation subsistence .and other
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identical expenses. Under his broad mandate, the Coordinator of Information
began to build an organization capable of producing intelligence necessary for
the successful carrying out of the war effort.
In less than a year, on 13 June 1942, by a military order, the President
abolished the Office of Coordinator of Information and established the Office
of Strategic Services (OSS) which operationally came under the jurisdiction
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. OSS's mandate was toe
"a. Collect and analyze such strategic information as may be
required by the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff; and
~, -
"b. Plan and operate such special service as may be directed
by the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff."
William J. Donovan was appointed by the President as Director of Strategic
Services "under the direction and supervision of the United States Joint
Chiefs of Staff."
OSS was allowed certain privileges in conducting its operations such as
entering into contracts "without regard to the provisions of law relating to
the making, performance, amendment, or modification of contracts."~
"~ ~ ~~'~ - ~ ~ ~~'
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Also it was imperative in performing cert
in
of the wartime functions of OAS that latitude be granted in the expenditure of
funds. It was announced policy of OSS to employ ordinary vouchered moneys
whenever practicable. When, however, such use would have gravely impeded the
effective prosecution of the program directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
OSS had the authority to resort to funds expendable without regard to laws
relating to the expenditure of Government funds. For example, it would have
been most difficult to have performed many of the peculiar functions of OSS
under mandatory compliance with laws or regulations concerning employment
procedures, annual and sick leave, dual compensation, the purchase of motor
vehicles, the employment of aliens, the retaining of investigators, or the
securing of laborers or other personnel in various foreign countries.
The General Accounting Office was willing to accept vouchers showing the
expenditure of funds by OSS for such purposes providing that it was stated
that such expenditures were necessary in the performance of its peculiar
functions in disregard of existi~ law and regulation. The National War
Agency Appropriation Act of 1945 ~ as it pertained to OSS read as
follows:
"Salaries and expenses: For all expenses necessary to enable
the Office of Strategic Services to carry out its functions and
activities, including salaries of a Director at $10,000 per annum,
one assistant director and one deputy director at $9,000 per annum
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each; procurement of necessary services, supplies and equipment
without regard to section 3709, Revised Statutes; travel expenses,
including expenses outside the United States without regard to the
Standardized Government Travel Regulations and the Subsistence
Expense Act of 1926, as amended (5 U.S.C. 821-833), and any general
provision-for the fiscal year 1945 to the contrary; preparation and
transportation of the remains of officers and employees who die
abroad or in transit, while in the dispatch of their, official duties,
to their former homes in this country or to a placenot more distant
for interment, and for the ordinary expenses of such interment;
rental of newsreporting services; purrchase of or subscription to
commercial: and trade reports; the rendering of such gratuitous
services and the disposition, free or otherwise, of such materials
as the Director deems advisable; purchase or rental and operation
of photographic, reproduction, duplicating and printing machines,
equipment, and devices and radio-receiving and radio-sending equip-
ment and devices; maintenance, operation, repair, and hire of motor-
propelled or horsedrawn passenger-carrying vehicles and vessels of
all kinds; printing and binding; exchange of funds without regard
to section 3651, Revised Statutes (31 U.S.C. 543); purchase and
free distribution of firearms, guard uniforms, special clothing,
and other personal equipment; the cost of a compartment or such
other accommodations as may be authorized by;~`the Director for
security when authorized personnel are required to transport
secret documents or hand baggage containing highly technical and
valuable equipment; $57,0009000 of which amount such sums as may
be authorized by the Director of the Bureau of the Budget may be
transferred to other departments or agencies of the Government,
either as advance payment or reimbursement of appropriation, for
the performance of any of the functions or activities for which
this appropriation is made: PROVIDED, That $37,0009000 of this
appropriation may be expended without regard to the provisions of
law and regulations relating to the expenditure of Government
funds or the employment of persons in the Government service, and
$35,000,000 of such $37,000,000 may be expended for objects of a
confidential nature, such expenditures to be accounted for solely
on the certificate of-the Director of the Office of Strategic
Services and every such certificate shall be deemed a sufficient
voucher for the amount therein certified.1t `S'~
The Director of OSS~en~oye the confidence of the Congress in.managing the
disposition of confidential funds'
Plans for a Postwar National Intelligence Agency
Over a year before the war?s end,~studies were undertaken within OSS
concerning the concept of a permanent, centralized intelligence ervice for
the United States Government. After several months of study, a document
entitled "The Basis for a Permanent United States Foreign Intel igence
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Service," was drafted which General Donovan presented to President Roosevelt
around 10 October 19~. The President returned the paper on 31 October with
the comment that an adviser had informed the President that a better and
cheaper intelligence system than General Donovan had devised was possible.
The President, however, asked that General Donovan continue his work on a
post war intelligence organization. Several days before his death, Mr.
Roosevelt requested General Donovan to call a meeting of interested agencies
for their suggestions "to the proposed centralized intelligence service,." b,
.The 10 October document contained much of the basic scheme which
eventually was accepted for the Central Intelligence Agency. General Donovan
wrote that an organization was needed "which will procure intelligence both
by overt and covert methods and will at the same time provide intelligence
guidance, determine national intelligence objectives and correlate the
intelligence material xollected by all Government agencies."
Based on his experience; General Donovan advised that the establishment
of a United States intelligence agency be governed by ten principles:
"l. That it should be a central overall Foreign Intelligence
Service which (except for specialized intelligence pertinent to
.the operations of the Armed Services and certain other Government
agencies) could serve objectively and impartislty the needs of the
diplomatic, military, economic and propaganda service of the Govern-
ment.
"2. That such a Service should not operate clandestinely
within the United States.
"3. That it should have no policy function and should not
be identified with at~y law-enforcing agency either at home or
abroad.
"~+. 'That the operations of such a Service. should be primarily
the collection, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence on the
policy~or strategy level.
?"5. That such a Service should be under a highly qualified
director appointed by the President and be administered under
Presidential direction.
"6. That; subject to the approval of the President, tie
policy of such a Service should be determined by the Director
with the advice and assistance of a board on which the Department
of State and the Armed Services should be represented.
"7. That such a Service charged with collecting intelligence
affecting national interests and defense should have its own means
of commun3'cation and should be responsible for all secret activities
such as:
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(a) Secret intelligence.
(b) Counterespionage.
(c) Crypto-analysis.
(d) Clandestine subversive operations.
"8. That such a Service be operated on both vouchered and
unaouchered funds.
`~9? That such a Service fle~ae a staff of specialists profes-
sionally trained in analysis of intelligence and possessing a
high degree of linguistic, regional or functional competence to
evaluate .incoming intelligence, to make special reports, and to
provide guidance for the collecting branches of the Government.
"10. It is not necessary to create a new agency.' The
nucleus of such-an organization already exists in the Office of
Strategic Services."
On 18 November 19~+~+, General Donovan submitted a memorandum to the
President which emphasized that "intelligence control be returned to the
supervision of the President," and that the "establishment of a central
authority reporting directly to you ~he Presiden]~-with responsibility to
frame intelligence objectives and to collect and coordinate the intelligence
material required by the Executive Branch in planning and carrying ont
nations]. policy and strategy."
A draft directive was also. to the Presidents~~i~~i~ile3 the
principles set out in the 10 October doctanent and added several nor proposals
as functionsland duties of the proposed agency includings "Coordination of
the functions of all intelligence agencies of the Government .; collection,
either directly or through existing Government Departments and agencies, of
pertinent information .; procurement, training and supervision of its
intelligence personnel; subversive operations abroad, and determination of
policies for and coordination of facilities essential to the collection of
information." The Donovan plan also recognized the element of secrecy neces-
sary to the. successful operat~,on oP an intelligence organization in that the
Director was to have authority "to employ necessary personnel and make pro-
vision for necessary supplies, facilities, and services" and he "may provide
for the internal organization and management ... in such manner as he may
determine."
The Donovan proposal was sent to various officials and the Joint Chiefs
for comment. Various counter proposals were made and on 2~~Janilary, the Joint
Strategic Survey Committee submitted a report~'to the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
which was b ally the P n with revisions and efinements . Thies n~4...?.a?~
,r`-~ rep?rt ?` D~~~n~~efs of Staff repor~which was dated
over a month after the war had ended.
The draft directive, submitted by the Joint Chiefs, called for a National
Intelligence Authority c{~omposed bf the Secretaries of State, War and Davy Fend.
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representative of the Joint Chiefs of Staff which was to be responsible for
overall intelligence planning and, development, inspection and coordination of
all federal intelligence activities and was to assure the most effective accom-
plishment of the intelligence mission related to the nati
l
ona
security. A
central Intelligence Agency with a director appointed by the President was to
`~ be responsible to the NIA and assist it in its mission. An Intelligence Advi-
` "~ sory Board made
f th
h
up o
e
eads of the principal military and civilian agencies
~ having functions-related to the national security was to advise the Director
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Chiefs even though they criticized it because the organization he proposed
would "overcentralize the national intelligence service" without co ,nsati
. ~ advantages .and "n1AC~P it A+ a?nl, ~ ~,{ nt, i e,,.e, +~,.,~ ~~ _~._, ~ _ _ _-- mpe ~
41VU vi aepai'timenT.81 lntielllgence agencies, without responsibility, either
ndividually or collectively, to the heads of departments:.conceraed:"
V Various proposals by the Joint Chiefs indicate that the organization
~-~ hey envisaged would not be an undertaking which would result in a "too
~.~ radical reorganization with the attendant disturbance of the present intel-
ligence set-up." While accepting coordination by a National Intelligence
Authority, the Joint Chiefs recommended that the existin8 intelligence agencies
should continue to function. Their products, however, were to be free],y
available to the Central Intelligence Agency for synthesis, and the operations
of the departmental intelligence agencies were to be open to inspection b
the
y
Agency in support of its planning function. In this connection, the interesting
"
h
ra
p se protection of intelligence sources and methods" was used, In the draft
directive im-nediately following the statement that operations of the depart-
~ mental intelligence agencies were to be open to the Agency, the following sen-
t
"
d
ence appeared;
In the interpretation of this paragraph, the National Intel
_ ligence Authority and the Central Intelligence Agency will be res ibl f
ons
p
a or
Sofully protecting intelligence sources and methods, which due to their nature,
have a direct and highly important bearing on military operationse"
tl ~ ryl ^-Secretary of the Navy, James Forrestal, considered the Joint Chiefs of
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~; on 13 October 19k5 suggested that the proposal for a federal intelligence agency
---, ---~ ...~-~ ~~+ auu ri V ~ 1LL~ re`~mmenaatiions wnlca could be used as a basis for
discussions with the Secretaries of State, War and Navy who had already infor-~
orally discussed a national intelligence organization. ,~
After considering tge views and opinions of a great manyl:people experi-
enced in wartime intelli ence Q the Lovett Committee submitted~a report ~o the
-Secretary of War which
resented th
p
e case for a centralized national intel-
~libgence organization very similar to that in the Joint Chiefslbf Staff report
t
su mu
ed six weeks previously. The Lovett Committee report served as a basis
intelligence organization which was submitted on 7 January 196-by the-Secre~-
w r ~~.
arses o~ State, War and Navy. A State Department proposal~~~hat the intel-
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ligence agency draw its funds from the departments participating in the
National Intelligence Authority rather than from an.~independent budget was
the only mayor change incorporated in the Lovett Committee report.
YJnder section 17 of the original State Department plan, funds for the
conduct of intelligence operations by the National Intelligence Authority,
as distinct from those operations conducted by the- individual agencies, would
be provided by the departments and agencies participating in such operations.
The amounts. and proportions to be agreed to by the participating agencies
would be based on the responsibilities and ca bilities of those agencies.
The State Department submitted a revised p].an~later in December in which it
was stated that "the State Department strongly believes . . .that an
independent budget for the Central Agency should be avoided for security
reasons. Since passage of the Independent Offices Appropriations Act, 195
(Fublic Law 358, 78th Congress), a nondepartmental agency without an inde-
pendent budget appears to be impossible1Ay~
1
In their final recommendations?~to the President, the Secretaries of
State, War and Navy apparently agreeing with the State Department proposal
suggested that funds for the National Intelligence Authority be provided by
the participating departments in .the amount and proportions agreed upon by
members of the Authority. The Director oP the Central Intelligence Agency,
under the Authority, would be able to "employ necessary personnel and make
provisions for necessary supplies, facilities and services" within the limits
of the ft~ds made available. ~y,
The Central Intelligence Group
The National Intelligence Authority and the Central Intelligence Group
were formally authorized by a Presidential Directive dated 22 January 19+6.
Two differences between the recommendations of the Secretaries and the
Presidential Directive are of significance. Paragraph 9 limited CIG to
investigations .outside the continental limits of theitJnited States and its
possessions except as provided for by law and Presidential Dix?ectives. Para-
graph 10 broadened the responsibility of NIA and the Director of Central
Intelligence toward protecting intelligence sources and methods. As originally
contemplated,. the responsibility in this field was confined to protecting
so4~x?ces and methods with which the Central Intelligence Director became famil-
iar in inspection agencies especially those bearing on military operations.
7.?he Presidential Directive touched upon the question of appropriations only
in the first sentence of Paragraph 2~.
.`Text of Directive - 22 January 19+6
"l. It is my desix?e, and I hereby direct, that all federal
foreign intelligence activities be planned, developed and coordina-
ted so as to assure the mast effective accomplishment of the intel-
ligen::e mission rei_ated to the national security. I hereby designate
i3, a
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you, secretaries of State, War and Nav~ together with another person
to be named by me as my personal representative, as the National Intel-
ligence Authority to accomplish this purpose.
"2. Within the limits of available appropriations, you shall
each, from time to time, assign persons and facilities from your
respective departments, which persons shall collectively form a
Central Intelligence Group and shall, under the direction of a
Director of Central Intelligence, assist the National Intelligence
Authority. The Director of Central Intelligence shall be designated
by me, shall be responsible to the National Intelligence Authority,
and shall sit as a nonvoting member thereof.
"3. Subject to the existing law, and to the direction and
control of the National Intelligence Authority, the Director of
Central Intelligence shall:
"a. Accomplish the correlation and evaluation of
intelligence relating to the national security, and the
appropriate dissemination within the Government of the
resulting strategic and national policy intelligence. In
so doing, full use shall be made of the staff and facil-
ities of the intelligence agencies of your departments.
"b. Plan for the cc}ordination of such of the activities
of the intelligence agencies of your departments as relate to
the national security and recommend to the National Intelligence
Authority the establishment of such over-all policies and
objectives as will assure the most effective accomplishment of
the national intelligence mission.
"c. Perform, for the benefit of said intelligence
agencies, such services of common concern as the National
Intelligence A~xthority determines can be more efficiently
accomplished centrally.
"d. Perform such other functions and duties related to
intelligence affecting the national security as the President
and the National Intelligence Authority ma,y from time to time
direct.
"~+. No police, law enforcement or internal security functions shall
be exercised under this,direetive.
"5. Such intelligence received by the intelligence agencies of your
departments as may be designated by the National Intelligence Authority
shall be freely available to the Director of Central Intelligence for
correlation, evaluation or dissemination. To the extent approved by the
National Intelligence Authority, the operations of said intelligence
agencies shall be open to inspec~~ion by the Director of Central Intel-
ligence in connection with planning Functions.
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"6. The existing intelligence agencies of your departments
shall continue to collect, evaluate, correlate and disseminate
departmental intelligence.
"7. The Director of Central Intelligence shall be advised by
an Intelligence Advisory Board consisting of the heads (or their
representatives) of the principal military and civilian intelligence
agencies of the Goverment having functions related to national
security, as determined by the National Intelligence Authority.
"8. Within the scope of existing law and Presidential Directives,
other departments and agencies of the Executive Branch of the Federal
Government sha~.l furnish such intelligence information relating to
the national security as is in their possession, and as the Director
of Central Intelligence may Prom time to time request pursuant to
regulations of the National Intelligence Authority.
"9. Nothing herein shall be construed to authorize the making
of investigations inside the continental limits of the United, States
and its possessions; except as provided by law and Presidential Direc-
tives.
"10. In the conduct of their activities the National Intelligence
Authority and the Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible
for fully protectipg intelligence sources and methods."
On the initiative of the Executive Department, the United States for the
first time in its history, launched a nations]. intelligence organization. Its
charter was written in broad terms, which enabled the embryonic agency to'Ifeel
its evolutionary way and handle obstacles only in such order a,s it deemed best.' ~'~~
Many of the obstacles, however, were inherent in the charter under which the
national intelligence system was to operate. The criterion of all NIA action
was 'Whether the action was necessary to the planning, development and coordin-
ation of Federal foreign intelligence activities so as to assure the most
effective accomplishment of the intelligence mission related to the national
security. The term "national security; if interpreted na~rrowl~r, was considered
by some to be an unfortunate limitation upon CIG because many national interests,
other than security, can be served by a central intelligence agency submitting
information to the policy makers within the Cwernment.~~ 1(.,
The operating agency under the National Intelligence Authority, the
Central Intelligence Group, was independent in name only because for nll
practical purposes the activities of CIG were subject to the budget heads
of the three departments - State, War and Navy. Also, the agency had no
employment rights, obtaining its personnel by assignment.
After the NIA and CIG system was in existence for about one year, as a
purely executive creature, a great deal of interest had developed in the
Congress which culminated in legislation creating a National Security Council
and a Central Intelligence Agency. Studies made r;,* the Senate Armed Services
Committee "and all testimony received by it, shows the need for closer and
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continuous coordination on a high level within the Government of our domestic,
foreign and military policies, for an appropriate intelligence
ganization to
~
serve both military and civilian agencies of security ." // ~~-
The postwar Congressional investigations into the Pearl Harbor disaster
have been cited as one of the compelling reasons for the establishment of the
Central Intelligence Agency. As a result of its investigation in December of
1946, the House Committee on Military Affairs issued "A Report On the System
Currently Employed in the Collection, Evaluation and Dissemination of Intel-
ligence Affecting the War Potential of the United States,"1'~hich recognized
the need for strong intelligence as the "nation's first line of defense."
The Committee made nine recommendations:
Recommendation l: That the National Intelligence Authority,
established on January 22 ,1946, by Presidential directive, be
authorized by act of Congress. (This is designed to give the new
authority a firmer base.)
Recommendation 2; That the Rational Intelligence Authority shall
consist of the Secretaries of State, War, and the Navy, or deputies for
intelligence. (The Secretaries are obviously too busy to give this
highly important subject the attention it deserves.)
Recommendation ~s That the Central Intelligence Group receive
its appropriations direct from the Congress. (At present the Group
receives its appropriations as grants from the State Department, War
Department, and the Navy Department, an unwieldly and sometimes
awkward procedure.)
Recommendation 4: That the Central Intelligence Group have
complete control over its own personnel. (At present the Group
receives drafts from the Departments of State, War, and Navy.)
Recommendation 5: That the Director of the Central Intelligence
Group be a civilian appointed for a preliminary term of 2 years and a
permanent term of 10 years, at a salary of at least $12,000 a year.
(A civilian would be leas subject to the control or criticism
of aa~y military establishment, lei; likely to have ambitions in
another direction, would be more in keeping with American tradition,
would be more symbolic of the politico-military nature of the
p~?oblem posed by intelligence in peacetime; furthermore, there i$
nothing to keep a qualified Army or Navy officer from accepting the
post in civilian clothes, and. there is every desire, by setting the
tenure of office at 10 years and making the salary substantial, to
make the post attractive to one who has learned intelligence thoroughly
in the Army, Navy, or Foreign Service of the State Department. Con-
tinuity of service is recognized as very important.)
Recommendation 6: That the Director of the Central In~elligence
Group be appointed by the President, by and with the consent of the
Senate.
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Recommendation 7: That the Director of Central Intelligence
shall (1) accomplish the correlation and evaluation of intelligence
relating to the national security, and the appropriate dissemination
within the Goverrmnent of the resulting strategic and national policy
intelligence, and in so doing making full use of the staff and
fs.cilities of the intelligence agencies already existing in the
various Government departments; (2) plan for the coordination of
such of the activities of the intelligence agencies of the various
Government departments as relate to the national security and recom-
mend to the National Intelligence Authority the establishment of
such over-sll policies and objectives as will assure the most
effective accomplishment of the national intelligence mission;
(3) perform, for the benefit oY said intelligence agencies, such
services of~common concern related directly to coordination, cor-
relation, evaluation, and dissemination as the National Intelligence
Authority shall determine can be more efficiently accomplished
contrally; (~+) perform such other similar functions and duties
related to intelligence affecting the national security as the
Congress and the National Intelligence Authority may from time to
time direct. It is specifically understood that the Director of
Central Intelligence shall not undertake operations for the
collection of intelligenceo
(This paragraph is intended to enable the Central Intelligence
Group to concentrate on ,the analysis and evaluation of high-level
intelligence for the President and others who have to determine
national policy. One should not remove any intelligence operation
from the agencies where day-today policies and decisions have to
be made; the collection and basic analtiysis in each field of intel-
ligence should be assigned to the agency having primary responsi-
bility in that field.)
Recommendation 8s That Paragraphs 2, ~+, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and
10 of the Presidential directive of January 22, 19+6, relating to
the establishment of a Rational Intelligence Authority be enacted
into law, with such revisions in wording as may seem necessary.
(The President?s directive was carefully prepared and had at
the time of its publication, the support of the interested agencies.)
Recommendation 9: That the Army be requested sympathetically
to examine further the question of the establishment of an Intel-
ligence Corps for the training, development, and assig:nnent of
especially qualified officers.
In July 19+6, a draft of enabling legislation for a proposed Central
Intelligence Agency (CrA)`i~as sent to the White House by the Central Intel-
ligence Group. It called for a National Intelligence Authority (NIA) con-
sisting of the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy, a personal representative
of the President and the "Director of the Central Intelligence Agency" as a
non-voting membero The NIA was to supervis a the activities of CIA. It was
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provided that CYA was to be established "with a Director who shall be the head
thereof." In December a more detailed and comprehensive draft was submitted
to the White House which reflected the experience gained after 10 months of
operation under the 22 January 19+6 Executive Order.
In. proposing this legislation CIG attempted to overcome the unworkable
features of its charter, one of the most glaring of which-was the necessity
for CiG to obtain personnel from the State, War and Navy Departments. It was
not until well into the summer of 19+6 that arrangements were made for CIG
to hire personnel directly. Budgetary problems also were very difficult to
handle until agreement was reached which established a working fund at the
disposal, of the CIG. Fortunately for CIG all of the departments and agencies
of the~.Government and particularly the Bureau of the Budget, the General
Accounting Office and the State, War, Navy and Treasury Departments, were
quick to realize the special administrative problems which arose in the
administration and operations of an intelligence agency. They made possible
the arrangements which enabled the agency to operate. However, the manner
of administrative and logistical support was always considered to be of a
temporary nature pending the passage of some form of military unification
legis],.ation.
One of the drafts of enabling legislation had incorporated the term
"with a Director of Central Intelligence who shall be the head thereof."
This particular wording was the same as the terminology in the 22 January
directive. Its apparent purpose was to create a post to be filled by an
official, responsible for the centralized intelligence functions for the
entire Federal Government, with an intelligence agency to assist him.
In January 19+7, at the time this proposed legislation was being
studied at the White House, President Truman announced that the War and
Navy Departments had agreed on a legislative program for unification of
the armed services. Shortly thereafter, a serious effort was made to
draft unification legislation for submission to Congress. A team consisting
of dice Admiral Forrest Sherman, Mayor General Iauris Norstad and Charles
Murphy, Administrative Assistant to the President, was selected to write
the White House version of the National Defense Act of 19+7.
The draft which resulted made the CIA the coordinating agency for
inte111gence, apparently adapting to the intelligence field the example
made in earlier military unification proposals, which envisioned a single
defense organization to which was attached a number of coordinating
agencies, some for inter-military departmental coordination, and others
for military-civilian coordination.
The team did nod include in their draft many of the more controversial
proposals contained iri`the December CIG draft, probably because of anticipated
difficulties in~getting them through Congress. Instead, they sought simply
to lay down the broad framework of a central intelligence service upon which
the detailed organization could later be developed.
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