SOVIET PROPAGANDA DISCORDANT WITH COEXISTENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP09-02295R000100170001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 1, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 28, 1960
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/01 : CIA-RDP09-02295R000100170001-7
CONFIDENTIAL
Radio Propaganda Branch
FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION DIVISION
OFFICE OF OPERATIONS
SPECIAL MEMORANDUM
SOVIET .PROPAGANDA DISCORDANT WITH COEXISTENCE
28 March. 1960
CONFIDENTIAL
Prepared fon
Information Copy for;
Staff Asst.
, S/B
50X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/01: CIA-RDP09-02295R000100170001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/01 : CIA-RDP09-02295R000100170001-7
CONFIDENTIAL 00/FBID
28 Uarch 1960
SOVIET PROPAGANDA DISCORDANT WITH COEXISTENCE
There is little in Moscow's propaganda that can be cited as direct,
indisputable evidence of behavior belying the USSR's protestations of
a desire for peaceful coexistence. Xhrushchev has made it clear that
by coexistence the USSR means mexistence between states, with the.
"ideological struggle" going on unceasingly. Technically, Soviet pro-
pagandiats could argue that their denunciations of colonialism, attacks -
on imperialism, and publicity for progressive" and "national libera-. .
tion" movements simply lend support to the "ideological struggle." They
could argue that their praise of Soviet and denigration of Western aid .
simply foster the "peaceful competition" that is also to go on together,
with state-to-state coexistence.
XOMMUNIST, No. 16, 1959, states that coexistence "means a refraining
from intervention in the internal affairs of other countries with the
aim of changing their governmental structure or Way of life or for any,
other reason.." /et bore again, it would be difficult to make out a
clearcut case against Soviet propaganda. Unlike Peking, and unlike the
bloc clandestine radios with which the USSR would disclaim any connection,
Soviet media are careful to stop short of explicit appeals to the people
of any country to oppose their government's policies, let:alone subvert
or overthrow their government. The appeal is always indirect?for
example, publicity for antiregime sentiment in a nonbloc country (tech-
nically reportage), descriptions of poor economic conditions in the
country (again, technically, .reportage), or warnings that military
alignment with the United States is dangerous because it could involve
the country in a nuclear war (purportedly not threats, but reminders
of the facts of life, motivated by friendly concern). None of these
approaches, it could be argued, is "intervention" because none calls
directly for action.
It is, however, possible to point to a number of instances in which
Soviet propaganda has violated the spirit (though not the letter) or its
avowals of a policy of peaceful coexistence. Part I of this report
lists under five categories the Soviet propaganda efforts, lines, or
themes that seem most susceptible to interpretation as being discordant
with a policy of coexistence; examples are cited roughly in descending
order of usefulness (the best examples first) within each'category.
Part 11 cites some of the USSR's own statements about what coexistence
means and does not moan.
CONFIDENTIAL
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/01 : CIA-RDP09-02295R000100170001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/01 : CIA-RDP09-02295R000100170001-7
CONFIDENTIAL 00/FBID
28 March 1960'
SOVIET PROPAGANDA DISCORDANT tani COEXISTENCE
Contents ?
PTL
A. Interference in Internal Affairs
Iran
Greece
Iraq
B. 'Taking Sides in Disputes Between Countries
Pushtunistan
Shatt al-Arab,Dispute
Arab-Israeli Disputes
Kashmir and Goa
C. War of Nerves Against U.S. Military Allies 6
D. Efforts to Undercut U.S. Relations with Other Countries. 9
Latin America
U.S. Aid
E. Atrocity Stories About U.S. Troops 11
ART
II
No Lessening of "Ideological Struggle" 13
"No Third Way" Can Merge Capitalism and Communism 14
CONFIDENTIAL
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/01 : CIA-RDP09-02295R000100170001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/01 : CIA-RDP09-02295R000100170001-7
? :CONFIDENTIAL
PART-I
A, INTERFERENC'E IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS
1. RIA.N
Radio Nbscow's.sustained denunciations of the Iranian Shah add
up to the clearest instance of a propaganda effort to stir up
popular rebellion against an existing regime.
The effort has been carried on at several levels--in official
notes and statements, in commentaries in Persian from Radio
Moscow, and in openly incendiary propaganda from the clandestine
"National Voice of Iran," which broadcasts in Persian and
Azerbaijani from within Soviet borders.
Moscow has left the most inflammatory material to the "National
Voice," over which it would technically disclaim any control.
The "National Voice" was particularly vituperative against the
Shah personally during. November and December--the period of his
engagement and marriage--when it called him small-brained, stupid,
miserable, useless, sinister, bestial, cowardly, idiotic, las-
civious, and debauched.
The "National Voice" has openly incited to rebellion: "Death
to /The Shah's7coup d'etat regime& quisling of colonialism!
Death to the foreign-propped-4p Shah!" (19 January 1960, in
Persian).
The cloSest Radio Moscow itself has come to inciting to revolt
has been in comment forecasting (as distinct from urging) an
end to the Shah's regime at the? hands of an outraged people:
The fury and indignation of the Iranian people
against the rotten and hated. monarch will) like
a'sweeping fire, reduce to ashes all abomina-
tions, egotismand immorality which now prevent
the Iranian people from prospering. (Moscow in
Persian, 19 February 1960)
Major elements of Radio Moscow's comment on Iran (essentially
the same elements that predominate in "National Voice" com-
ment, but more carefully woided) are (1) descriptions of dire
results of the Shah's rule--poverty, unemployment, absence of
civil rights, and absence of adequate health and educational
CONFIDENTIAL page 1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/01 : CIA-RDP09-02295R000100170001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/01 : CIA-RDP09-02295R000100170001-7
CONFIDENTIAL
facilities; (2) publicity for an allegedly rising popular op-
position, as well as military and political scheming, against
the Shah's regime; and (3) warnings that the United States
sees Iran as a base for "atomic attack" against the USSR and
hence that the Shah's policy of cooperation with the United
States endangers his people.
The Iranian audience hears 90 to 100 percent of Moscow's com-
ment on Iran--a much larger percentage than most countries hear
about their own affairs, and clear evidence of a propaganda
effort aimed directly at the Iranian people.
Although the USSR professes concern over a threat to its
security from Iranian-U.S. military cooperation, its propaganda
behavior makes clear that this is not a serious immediate
concern: The alleged threat to the USSR's interests is scarcely
mentioned in Moscow's negligible home service comment on Iran.
The most authoritative ful1-le201 commentary assailing the
Shah's policies to be broadcast by Radio Moscow was a PRAVDA
Observer article, carried seven times in Persian on 14 Feb-
ruary 1960. PRAVDA said:
The conclusion of the Iranian-American military
agreement is an act of teachery by the Shah and
the Eebal pwernment.. The Shah's assurance that
Iran had never assumed, now would ever assume,
any commitments against the USSR--that is, his
'word of a soldier and a man' in 1956--has burst
like a soap bubble.
A strong anti-Shah commentary, was broadcast by Moscow in Persian
on 20 February:
Day in and day out, the Iranians are told that an
indissoluble tie exists between the Iranian people
and the Shah. But what ie this tie? This is the
tie between the jailkeeper and the prisoner. Had
it been otherwise, would the Shah have needed to
build prisons all over the country with such speed,
to trample underfoot freedom of speech, suppress
decent newspapers and open fire on demonstrators?
Reports that the Shah is in imminent danger of being overthrown
by a rightwing cabal figure in the most recent broadcasts of
both Moscow and the "National Voice of Iran." 'Quoting the
CONFIDENTIAL page 2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/01 : CIA-RDP09-02295R000100170001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/01 : CIA-RDP09-02295R000100170001-7
CONFIDENTIAL
Italian PAESE SERA, Moscow reported in Persian on .4 *arch
that "several influential leaders" had termed an underground .
group to prepare a coup d'etat against the Shah. The "National
Voice" charged more specifically, on 1 March, that the "royal
court!s scorpions"--Bakhtiar and Nasiri-?-were in a."final
struggle" for powerveach-seeking the principal role in the
"intrigues and troubles brewing around, the Shah."
2. GREECE
Radio Moscow has spoken out? openly in behalf of Nhnolia Glezos,
a leftist Greek resistance hero who was convicted on espionage
charges in July 1959. AL recently as 15 March 1960, Moscow
broadcast in several European languages (including Greek) a
commentary which claimed that the prosecution failed to establish
any proof of Glezos espionage activities and asserted that
the trial was staged to undermine the reputation of "the Greek
peoples' movement."
At the time of the trial, during the week ending 12 July 1959,
Radio Moscow's comment on the Glezos case rose to 17 percent
of total comment on all subjects, featuring an appeal by Marshal
Voroshilov to the Greek Ring in Glezos' behalf. Although
Voroshilov stopped short of drawing a direct connection between
the trial and Greece's acceptance of U.S. missile bases, several
Moscow commentators charged that the real reason for the trial
was that Glezos had led the "popular opposition" to the bases.
3. IR
Moscow 4s just beginning to,propagandize in behalf ofthe
orthodox faction of the Iraqi C? and against the faction led by
Daud as-Sayigh. Inasmuch as the propaganda consists of re-
prints and rebroadcasts of articles from the orthodox faction's
paper, ITTIHAD ASR-SRA, it cannot be called direct interference
in internal Iraqi affairs; rather it amounts to veiled hints'
of the Soviet Union's displeasure over Premier Qasim's actions.
On 13.February,*after the orthodox faction's application for a
license was rejected, PRAVDA, IZVESTIA, And. TRUD all carried
the explanation of the faction's position that appeared imite
application, and Radio Moscow broadcast the explanation ex- '
elusively in Arabic. The papers.failed to point out that the
application had already been turned down.
A PRAVDA article on 18 Fsimuary reported that a group led by
Zaki Kharyi had reapplied for a license,for the orthodox faction.
PRAVDA quoted 'from an ITTIHAD ASH-SHAB article, by Kharyi
CONFIDENTIAL -page -3
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/01 : CIA-RDP09-02295R000100170001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/01 : CIA-RDP09-02295R000100170001-7
CONFIDENTIAL
criticizing the,as-Sayigh faction.as opportunistie and anti-
progressive. Excerpts from the Khayri article were broadcast
in Arabic on 20 February, including Khayri's warning that Iraqi
communists, while preferring legal status, would allow "nothing"
to prevent them from exercising their political rights.
B. TAXING SIDES IN DISPUTES BETWEEN COUNTRIES
1. PUSHTUNISTAN
Soviet support for Afghanistan against Pakistan on the Push-
tunistan issue, first publicly asserted in 1955, was restated
in the joint Soviet-Afghan communique of 5 Nhreh 1960 (following
Khrushchev's Kabul visit) and was developed at some length
by Khrushchev the same day in his Luzhniki stadium speech.
The communique stated:
The sides exchanged opinions concerning the late
of the Pushtu-peoplei and expressed their agreement
that for Solution of this questiOn the application
of the principle of self-determination as based on
the United Nations ehatter is the reasonable way
of easing tension and enSuring peace in the Middle.
East.
When he returned to NobscowlIbrushchev declared:.
Historically, Pushtunistan-has always been part of
Afghanistan...It demandathatPuShtunistan bel
granted the right to self-determination in condi-
tions of freedom and noninterference.1.1h consider
Afghanistan's demands that the Pathan people be
granted an opportunity to express their will by,
means of a plebiscite in free conditions and
decide whether they:wish to remain within the
Pakistani nati9naiboundariee, forma new. indee-
pendent state, or unite with Afghanistan, to be
correct. .
Such explicit Soviet, statements on Pushtunistan have been
rare. Bulganin supported Afghanistan during his 1955 Asian
tour with KhruShchev? as well as in his subsequent report to.
the Supreme Soviet on 29 December 1955. In the intervening.
four years, there have been no references to Pushtunistan_in.
CONFIDENTIAL. page 4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/01 : CIA-RDP09-02295R000100170001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/01 : CIA-RDP09-02295R000100170001-7
CONFIDENTIAL
elite pronouncements, even during the visits to the USSR of
the King of. Afghanistan in 1957 and Premier Daud in 1956 and
1959. Thus'eupport for the Afghan position has been expreased-
by,Soviet leaders only during and just after visits to Kabul.
A 'rare "monitored routine propaganda item referring to an.
aspect of the Pushtu issue was a 6 July 1959 TASS dispatch
from Kabul reporting that the Afghan press had criticized
Pakistan's suppression of the Pushtu "and other" tribes.*
2. SHATT AL-ARAB DISPUTE
Moscow has been exploiting the Shatt al-Arab dispute between
Iran and Iraq as a means of criticizing the Iranian Govern-
ment in broadcasts to Iran. Commentators accuse Iran of "pro-
vocative actions" and 'war hysteria" against Iraq. Iran is
said to be encouraged in this venture by U.S. "cold war circles."
Such comment has been broadcast in Persian alone. Only news
reports have been broadcast in Arabic, conveying Soviet sympathy
with Iraq by publicizing Iraqi versions of the dispute.
ARAB-ISRAELI DISPUTES
Contrary to Western newspaper. reports, Moscow has not switched
to a more neutral position on the, Arab-Israeli quarrels. It
still attributes to Israel the general blame for the troubles
and takes at face value statements from Arab 'sources. Al-
though the issue has been dormant in recent propaganda, IZVESTIA
said on 6 March 1960 that "the air in Israel is poisoned by
a war psychosis." It added that with the full blessing of
Western leaders, Israel showed "unwarranted zeal" in border
clashes with the UAR and Jordan.
KASHMIR AND GOA
The Soviet Union IS on record as supporting Indian claims to
Kashmir and Goa, although neither question was mentioned by Khrush-
shev during the February 1960 visit to India and both issues
are dormant in routine propaganda.
* Moscow broadcasts in Pushtu are not monitored by FBIS at
present.
CONFIDENTIAL page 5
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/01 : CIA-RDP09-02295R000100170001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/01 : CIA-RDP09-02295R000100170001-7
CONFIDENTIAL
Speaking in Srinagar in December 1955, Khrushchev said that the
people of Kashmir had already decided that they wanted to be
part of India:
The Soviet Union has alwap held that the decision
on the political statue of Kashmir, must be 'a matter
for the Kashmir people themselves, in conformity
with the principles of democracy and the interests
of strengthening friendly relations between the
peoples of this area...The facts show that the
,population of Kashmir does not want Kashmir to
become a pawn in the hands of the imperialist
forces...The question of Kashmir as one of the
states of the Republic of India has been settled
by the Kashmir people themselves. This is the
business of the people themselves.
When Mukhitdinov and Andreyev. visited Kashmir in January 1959,
Abakhitdinov blamed the United States for dissension over
Kashmir and Goa, charging that the United States was backing
Portugal on the Goa question with the dual aim of exerting
pressure on India and establishing a base for the U.S. Fifth
Fleet on the island. Nnkhitdinov also said the United States
was considering setting up an atomic dumping ground in Coa.
C. VAR OF NERVES AGAINST U.S. MILITARY ALLIES
tt.ie Soviet Union has made obvious propaganda efforts to intimidate
Members of NATO, CENTO and SEATO and other Countries
tarily to the United States. . On occasions when such countries have
been reported contemplating acitions which the Soviet Union'tonsidered
detrimental to its welfare, Moscow has issued carefully phraeed,
warnings about nuclear retaliation it the event of war, cautioning
of the devastation nuclear boMbs.can cause. In his Supreme Soviet
Speech of 14 January 1960, Khrushchev said: "Any sober-minded
person Understands full well that atomic and hydrogen weapons
constitute the greatest.threat to those countries, which have a
great density of population."
In the context of attacks on German remilitarization, Moscow has
bitterly denounced Chancellor Adenauer. These denunciations have
not been part of a campaign to incite rebellion against his govern-
ment, as in the case of the Persian-language attacks on the Shah of
Iran, but have been couched in abusive language hardly in harmony
with an atmosphere of detente.
CONFIDENTIAL page 4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/01 : CIA-RDP09-02295R000100170001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/01 : CIA-RDP09-02295R000100170001-7
CONFIDENTIAL
The attack on Adenauer has been led by Khrushchev himself. Speak-
ing at the 21st CPSU Congress,'Khrushchev pictured AAnauer as
holding the Christian cross in one hand and an atomic bomb in the
other, and said that "according to the gospels" he was certain to
go to hell; on 19 June 1959 he described the Chancellor as apmeipao-
maniac"; and on 5 August he referred to Adenauer's "senile prejudice."
In his speech to the Supremo, Soviet on 14 January 1960, Khrushchev
compared Adenauer directly with Hitler and said he had "failed to
? draw a conclusion from the lesson given the German fascists and is
embarking on their road."
Although there have been moratorium on Adenauer for long periods
in routine comment, Moscow broadcasters have picked up and ampli-
fied Khrushchev's statements. A commentary in several EUropean
languages on 22 March 1960 said that the Chancellor's speeches in
the United States were "malicious hisses richly spiced with dirty
inventions and impertinent cursing."
Moscow propaganda, both elite and routine, has directed its most
graphic and detailed retaliatory threats at Germany. Khrushchev
told a group of SPD editors on 8 May 1959 that it would take only
eight hydrogen bombs to put Germany out of action if it started a
war against the Soviet Union.
Warnings to other countries, while less graphic and not entailing
such personal abuse of their leaders, have left no doubt that in the
event of an "imperialist" attack they would be the targets of a
devastating blow. Such warnings have sometimes been coupled with
a brief statement of the particular vulnerability of the country
concerned.
As indicated in the two examples below, there has been little change
in the nature of even elite threats or this kind since Khrushchev
visited the United States.
An official note to Greece on 13 Mhy-1959 said that if U.S. bases
were installed .there "Greece would be subjected to grave danger from
retaliatory atomic blows,. Since its entire population a::4 well as
its material and cultural wealth are concentrated in a compara
tively small area."
In its protest against the establishment of a U.S. missile base
in Turkey in the fall of 1959, the Soviet Union warned that it
would take steps to protect its: own territory. PRAVDA said on
CONFIDENTIAL page 7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/01 : CIA-RDP09-02295R000100170001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/01 : CIA-RDP09-02295R000100170001-7
CONFIDENTIAL
13 November that "rockets can fly in either direction," and
IZVESTIA warned on 18 November that in the event of war, Turkey's
military base would inevitably draw upon itself the "most catastrophic'
consequences of modern warfare."*.
-?
The Soviet Union has also used the nuclear retaliation yarning in
its effort to obstruct revision of the U.S. -Japanese security pact.
A note dated 2 December 1958, urging Japan not to proceed with the.
revision, said that with the existence of nuclear-rocket weapons,
war posed -a "veritably mortal danger to states with a dense popula-
tion and a great concentration of material and other resources on
-
a relatively small territory." A later note--dated 27 January 396Q, '
while ratification of the revised pact was pending--asked:
Is it not clear to everyone today that in the conditions
of a modern nuclear-rocket war all Japan, with her
small and thickly populated territory--dotted, moreover,
with foreign war bases--risks sharing the tragic fate of
Hiroshima and Nagasaki in the very first minutes of
hostilities?
(Yet Moscow's current last-ditch propaganda effort to obstruct
ratification of the U.S.-Japanese security pact is kept carefully
within semantic limits. Mbscow has explicitly denied to the
Japanese that it "threatens to use nuclear weapons against anybody."
Despite its criticisms of Premier Kishi's policies, its nuclear-
retaliation warnings, and its threat to renege on its promise to
return Habomai and Shikotan to Japan, the Soviet Union holds out
the prospect of better relations with Japan. Itexplicitlydisavows
any intent to interfere in Japan's affairs and is careful not to
associate itself directly with the domestic Japanese opposition to
the pact.)
* An earlier good example of Moscow's war of nerves against coun-
tries that might harbor U.S. atomic units was a succession of single
radio commentaries in April 195?, each tailored specifically for
individual audiences, warning each country in unusually graphic
terms of the devastation that could be wrought by Soviet retaliatory
blows. The Dutch, for example, heard that an atomic bomb dropped
on the U.S. base at Soesterberg would "obliterate Amsterdam, The
Hague, Utrecht, Amersfoort, and the entire area between those
cities." The Arabs were told that a single nuclear bomb dropped
on the Habbaniya base in Iraq would wipe out Baghdad.
CONFIDENTIAL page. 8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/01 : CIA-RDP09-02295R000100170001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/01 : CIA-RDP09-02295R000100170001-7
CONFIDENTIAL
' ? .
D. EFFORTS TO UNDERCUT U.S. RELATIONS WITH OTHER COUNTRIES
1. LATIN AMERICA
Soviet propaganda has made a sustained effort to aggravate U.S.
tension ever since Fidel Castro came to power on 1 Janu-
ary 19,9. Beginning in the very first days of the new regime,
Mbscow broadcasts beamed preponderantly to Latin American au-
diences have ohaiged U.S. "imperialist circles" with efforts to
counter Castro's'revolutionary program and make Cuban policy
more tractable to U.S. monopoly interests.
This propaganda effort has gone beyond what could be considered
an expression of sympathetic interest in the new Cuban regime.
Cuban critics of the Castro regime have been branded traitors
plotting revolution, and foreign critics have been labeled
imperialists plotting intervention. Each new development in
U.S.-Cuban relations has been publicized exclusively from the
Cuban viewpoint; Castro's attacks on the United States have been
magnified and elaborated in Moscow commentaries, while U.S.
statements have been assailed as intervention and as an indica-
tion that "another Guatemala" is being planned.
Moscow has become more circumspect since Khrushchev's U.S.
visit, but the essence of its anti-U.S. charges has remained
the same. The main difference is that active hostility to
Castro is now imputed implicitly rather than directly to the
U.S. Government.
2. U.S. AID
Soviet propaganda on economic aid to underdeveloped areas
draws a wholly favorable picture of Soviet and other bloc aid
alongside an almost completely black picture of the purposes,
value, and extent of Western--primarily U.S.?aid. This
type of comment, beamed most heavily to the underdeveloped
areas, constitutes as much as three to four percent of total
comment broadcast. (The theme is played down in the Soviet
home service, which broadcasts little more than accounts of of-
ficial Soviet aid agreements and attacks on the military
aspects of U S. aid.)
On his tour of Southeast Asia in February 1960, Xhrushchev
repeatedly expressed bitterness toward Western economic aid.
Addressing the Indian parliament on 11 F.bruary, he argued that
CONFIDENTIAL -page 9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/01 : CIA-RDP09-02295R000100170001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/01 : CIA-RDP09-02295R000100170001-7
I
CONFIDENTIAL
the West's economic prosperity resulted from its "looting" of
underdeveloped,countries, and that repayment of "at least a
portion" would be only proper. Expanding on this theme at
Bilhai on 14 February, he declared:
Many W stern economists maintain that countries
such as India would do better to renounde in-
dustrial development and concentrate on the pro-
duction of agricultural goods and minerals, sell-
ing them cheaply abroad and importing manufactured
goods and equipmbnt at exorbitant prices. These
"theories" reflect and seek to substantiate the
striving of monopoly capital toyerpetuate the
warped international division of labor which is
pVroducedoolozndwichdoomshundreds
of millions of peoEle to poverty...
? Not just any assistance to countries that have
Ulan the road of fighting for economic inde-
? pendence can be regarded as genuine assistance.
The experience of past years clearly shows that
there are two different approaches in the world
to the problem of aid. In the West, some people
use their "aid" as a tool of new colonial domina...
? tion, as a means of insuring the intereets of
monopoly capital and widening the politick divi-
sion of the world into hostile groupings... We
prefer to render genuine aid, so that every coun-
try which has freed itself of the rule of coloni-
alists may in a short period develop its economy
and produce the goods it needs.
In another speech at Bilhai the same day, which scow
did not broadcast, Khrushchev said at a dinner that capiJalists
would give aid only to gain profits or out of fear that under-
developed countries would turn communist. In a speech in
Calcutta on 15 rebruary--also unpublicized by Nbscow--Khrush-
chev chided the Indians for not sharing his bitterness:
I do not think all of you understand when we show
bitterness toward the colonialists. For some
ages. you have been oppressed by colonialists, but
still you do not feel as strongly as we do, though
we have never been, In the strictest Sense, a colony.
CONFIDENTIAL page 10
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/01 : CIA-RDP09-02295R000100170001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/01 : CIA-RDP09-02295R000100170001-7
CONFIDENTIAL
E. ATROCITY STORIES ABOUT U.S. TROOPS
Soviet media have occasionally twisted incidents involving U.S.
soldiers into atrocity stories, although such stories have been
extremely rare exceptions to a general abstinence from anything ap-
proaching "hate" propaganda.
1. Mbst recently, in reporting the incident in which two
Okinawans were injured while scavenging on a strafing range,
Radio Mbscow led off its Hindi news broadcast on 11 March
with this item:
Naha Okinawa?The newspaper ASAHI reports that
two
Naha,.
Shimabukuro and Oshiro, were
severely injured by machinegun fire from a U.S.
fighter plane yesterday on Ie Shima, about ten
miles from Okinawa. This is not the first time
the American militarists have .played a bunting
mseiga_fesw2_2p_ametohumortheiththeeoleinjaah
and Okinawa.
2. During the 1958 Lebanese crisis, Mbscow propaganda briefly ex-
ploited Damascus newspaper reports of incidents involving U.S.
soldiers in Lebanon. These reports--all on 29 July 1958---
apparently were not broadcast in Arabic. One appeared in a
Soviet home service news broadcast, and a few, were cited in
commentaries to European and non-Arab Middle Eastern audiences:
Damascus?Two drunken soldiers of the U S. invad-
ing forces in Beirut ran a tank over two children
who were playing near the doors of their homes,
AL-JUMHUR reported today. The soldiers then took
snapshots of the corpses of the two children and
opened fire on the surrounding people, killing
a man and a woman and wounding another woman.
Damascus?According to AL-JUMHUR, American soldiers
and officers have organized in Beirut a large-scale
black market in drugs as well as in several goods
which are barred from the country.
According to Al-MANAR, published in Damascus, the
U.S. soldiers ai.e violating Lebanese girls and
committing other excesses. A few days ago, a little
CONFIDENTIAL ' page 1I
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/01 : CIA-RDP09-02295R000100170001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/01 : CIA-RDP09-02295R000100170001-7
CONFIDENTIAL
band of soldiers, who had drunk more than was
wise, dashed off in a tank in chase of an auto*
mobile belonging to a Lebanese. The vehicle
and its owner were crushed.
Such incidents, one Moscow commentator (to Spain) said sarcas-
tically, showed how U.S. soldiers were defending the lives and
property of the Lebanese. The commentator concluded:
Do the Lebanese behave in this way only toward the
Lebanese people? No, the stay of U.S. troops in
Japan, South Korea/ Taiwan, and other places has
been marked by many crimes. The murders and rapes
committed by the U.S. soldiers in South Korea could
not be hushed up by the niwspapers and press agencies
in that country. According to the Korean press, *
from 27 June 1953--the date of the Korean armistice--
to April 1958, inclusive,American occupation troops
committed 20022maje crimes..
CONFIDENTIAL page 12
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/01 : CIA-RDP09-02295R000100170001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/01 : CIA-RDP09-02295R000100170001-7
CONFIDENTIAL
PART II
No Lessening of "Ideological Struggle"
The increased emphasis on peaceful coexistence in recent Soviet propa-
ganda has been, as might be expected, accompanied by increased insist-
ence that the issues of peaceful coexistence and "ideological struggle"
must never be confused. The Soviet population--and communists in
general--are told that peaceful coexistence in no way signifies any
lessening of the "struggle" against "bourgeois ideology." There have
been frequent repetitions of Khrushchev's 31 October 1959 warning that
any weakening of ideological discipline will not be tolerated:
Miltual concessions in the interest of peaceful coexistence
of nations must not be confused with concessions on matters
of principle, on what is connected with the very nature of
our social structure, our ideology. Here there cannot be
any question of any concessions or of any sort of accommoda-
tion. If there are to be concessions on questions of principle
and ideology, it will mean simply skidding onto the positions
of our opponents. That would mean a qualitative change of
policy and would be a betrayal of the cause of the working
clasa. Whoever starts out on that track is starting out on
the road to a betrayal of socialism, and the fire of merci-
less criticism should be directed against him.
The CPSU's 9 January 1960 resolution on the propaganda; the most compre-
hensive and widely ranging directive on the subject in the post-Stalin
period, enjoins party propagandists to step up the attack against the
infection of "alien" ideologies:
The peaceful coexistence of states with different social
systems does not make the ideological struggle less acute...
The leaders of some party organizations are not waging a
persistent struggle against alien ideology, are not giving
a fitting rebuff to manifestations of nationalism, cosmo-
politanism, and an apolitical attitude...
An active militant struggle must be waged against bourgeois
ideology which is hostile to Marxism-Leninism and against
the rightwing socialist and revisionist preachers of that
ideology; and the political vigilance of the Soviet people
must be unflaggingly heightened..
CONFIDENTIAL page 13
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/01 : CIA-RDP09-02295R000100170001-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/01 : CIA-RDP09-02295R000100170001-7
CONFIDENTIAL
The directive's demands for attacks on "cosmopolitanism"--a term which
began to drop out of Soviet propaganda after Stalin's death and virtually
disappeared from major propaganda media after the 20th CPSU Congress in
1956--is indicative of the regime's concern lest coexistence propaganda
encourage "improper" sentiments. Anxiety that the Soviet population
has not been adequately inoculated against "alien" influences is sug-
gested in the directive's complaint that failure to imbue the populace
with "Soviet patriotism and national pride" has been a "serious omis-
sion" in propaganda work.
The demand for unabated "ideological struggle" permeates the propaganda,
sometimes appearing in unexpected places. For example, a book review
in the January issue of PARTY LIFE (No. 2) criticizes a recent booklet
for Soviet youth on the virtue of modesty for failure to stress suf-
ficiently the need for ideological struggle:
Concerning the shortcomings of the booklet, it is neces-
sary to note that little is said in it about the ideo-
logical struggle occurring between the camp of socialism
and the camp of imperialism. As is known, problems of
morals occupy not the last place in the struggle.
Bourgeois propagandists cast aspersions on Soviet man;
they try in every way to denigrate his spiritual riches.
American imperialists lavish a chorus of praise on the
ethics of the so-called free individual.
"No Third Way" Can Merge Capitalism and Communism
Any notion that coexistence could lead to an ideological accommodation
between "socialism" and "capitalism" is vigorously condemned. A 17 Feb-
ruary Soviet home service talk--citing the party propaganda directive's
call for continued ideological struggle?denounced George Kennan and
"hundreds of revisionist preachers" who sought "ideological disarma-
ment" of the communists. Such people, the commentator said, argued
that
as relations of peaceful coexistence develop, the dif-
ferences between socialist and capitalist states will melt
away; capitalism and socialism must merge into some sort
of third system uniting the traits of these social orders,
and, because of this, ideological reconciliation is essential.
The Moscow commentator attacked this kind of reasoning as groundless.
He countered that "there is no third way." "One must choose" either
capitalism or socialism. The talk thus 'underscored Soviet propa-
gandists' awareness of the vulnerability of the peaceful coexistence
line to pressures for relaxation of ideological as well as diplomatic
tensions.
CONFIDENTIAL page 14
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/08/01 : CIA-RDP09-02295R000100170001-7 ?