USSR-IRAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP09-00997R000100350003-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 15, 2013
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: August 20, 1986
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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FBIS TRENDS
20 August-1986
USSR-Iran
Soviet and Iranian treatment of recent visits to Moscow by Iranian.
officials suggests that both sides are trying to improve the
atmosphere in relations and widen the basis for bilateral
cooperation. Moscow used the visits to emphasize its desire for
closer political and economic ties and to reiterate a plea for a
negotiated settlement of the Iran-Iraq war. Tehran eschewed
criticism of Moscow's cooperation with Iraq and its occupation of
Afghanistan, focusing instead on prospects for improved economic
relations.
Moscow Accents Positive Prospects From Iranian Visits
Despite its long association with Iraq, cemented by a 1972 friendship and
cooperation treaty, Moscow over the past year and a half has sought to
establish a dialogue with Tehran in an apparent effort to widen the basis for
bilateral cooperation. The 4-6 August visit of Iranian Deputy Foreign
Minister Mohammad Javad Larijani was the third high-level Soviet-Iranian
Foreign Ministry contact since April 1985, continuing the dialogue established
then by Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Kazempur-Ardabili's trip to
Moscow, which was reciprocated by then-First Deputy Foreign Minister
Korniyenko in February 1986) Moscow gave Larijani a high-level reception:
he met with two full Politburo members, President Gromyko and Foreign
Minister Shevardnadze, as well as with Lev Tolkunov, chairman of the
Council of the Union of the Supreme Soviet. In 1985, Kazempur-Ardabili met
with only one Politburo member?Foreign Minister Gromyko.
Soviet media coverage of Larijani's visit seemed designed to underline
Moscow's interest in improved bilateral relations. A 4 August TASS report,
published on Pravda's front page the next day, said that Larijani gave
Gromyko a message from President Khamane'i, "which speaks of the Iranian
leadership's desire to develop good-neighborly relations with the Soviet
1
' Kazempur-Ardabili's visit was the highest level Soviet-Iranian contact since the 1979
revolution. That visit and Korniyenko's trip are discussed in the Trends of 17 April 1985,
pages 7-10, and 26 February 1986, pages 13-19, respectively.
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FBIS TRENDS
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Union." According to TASS, Gromyko "emphasized that the Soviet Union is
a proponent of good relations with Iran and favors their development in both
political and economic fields."
Consistent with broader Soviet foreign policy strategy, Moscow appears to be
trying to bypass persisting bilateral differences with Iran in order to establish
common ground on international issues. According to TASS, Gromyko
asserted that "opportunities for cooperation" would expand if Iran "occupies a
position of peace" and comes out against nuclear war. TASS also reported
that both Gromyko and Shevardnadze briefed Larijani on Gorbachev's speech
of 28 July 1986 in Vladivostok, which addressed matters of security in the
Asian-Pacific region and announced the withdrawal of six regiments from
Afghanistan. Soviet media have criticized Iran in the past for supporting the
antigovernment rebels in Afghanistan, but there was no indication that
Gromyko or Shevardnadze raised this subject.
Despite the continuing differences registered by Moscow's characterization of
the Shevardnadze-Larijani meeting as having been "frank and business-
like"?the same phrase used to describe Korniyenko's February talks in
Tehran?Soviet media also sent more positive signals. TASS reported on
5 August that the meeting with Tolkunov was held in a "frank and friendly
[dobrozhelatelnyi] atmosphere," and Moscow radio on the 1 1 th reported
Larijani's remarks at a Tehran press conference assessing his talks as "positive
and constructive" and his opinion that there were no "serious obstacles to
extending relations between Iran and the USSR." 'Moscow had been more
reticent about publicizing positive signs during Korniyenko's visit.
Oil Minister Visit Soviet-Iranian dialogue was further bolstered when
Petroleum Minister Aqazadeh made what TASS
described as a "short business visit" to Moscow. Like Larijani, Aqazadeh was
received at a high level, meeting on 19 August with Premier Ryzhkov, and
TASS accentuated the positive in its report on this meeting as Well. Describing
their, conversation as "businesslike," the report said that the two men had
agreed that "the difference in social systems" of the USSR and Iran "should
not act as an impediment to fruitful relations" and that they both advocated
developing bilateral ties "along the road of strengthening trust and good-
neighborliness." In an indication of Soviet willingness to expand trade with
Iran, TASS added that "it was noted that the current level of Soviet-Iranian
commercial and economic ties does- not correspond to the potential of the two
countries.
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FBIS TRENDS
20 August 1986
Iran-Iraq. War Moscow used both visits to reiterate its call for a
negotiated settlement to the six-year-old Iran-Iraq
war, but it avoided assigning any blame for the continuation of the conflict.
Gromyko's remarks to Larijani, as reported by TASS, were typical of how the
Soviets handled the issue: "Both sides would be showing wisdom if they ended
the war and commenced talks," Gromyko said, asserting that "one day of war
is worse than three years of talks."
Soviet commentary during and after the Larijani visit has been slightly less
favorable to Iran, criticizing Tehran's pursuit of military victory. A Persian-
language commentary broadcast to Iran on 5 August implicitly rebuked
Iranian President Khamene'i for "categorically" rejecting a recent proposal by
Iraqi President Saddam Husayn for ending the war, recalling Gromyko's
remark that "one day of war is worse than three years of talks." Similarly, on
13 August lzvestiya reported favorably on the Iraqi peace initiative but said
that Khamene'i had "flatly rejected" it and that he had asserted that the "war
can be ended only after the 'aggressor has been punished.'" (u/Fouo)
Tehran Evinces Optimism on Broadening of Ties
In contrast to their low-key treatment of Korniyenko's February visit to
Tehran, Iranian media have given wide play to Larijani's warm appraisal of
his talks in Moscow and his optimism regarding improved relations. Larijani
characterized his talks with Soviet officials as successful and spoke
enthusiastically of the likelihood of expanded economic and political
cooperation with the Soviet Union. He termed the visit "positive and
constructive" during a 10 August press conference reported by the official
Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA). Adding that "Tehran-Moscow
relations look to the future," he asserted that there are "no major
impediments" to relations with Moscow and announced that Foreign Minister
Velayati has been invited to visit Moscow "in the current Christian year."
Officials other than Larijani have eschewed public comment on the results of
his trip. In the only other leadership reference to Larijani's Moscow talks,
IRNA reported on 11 August that President Khamene'i had discussed "the
latest developments in Tehran-Moscow relations" with Iran's new ambassador
to the USSR, noting that relations "must be expanded on the basis of mutual
respect." The absence of high-level leadership comment on the talks, however,
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is consistent with the extreme sensitivity Iran has shown regarding the
possibility of improved relations with the USSR, particularly in light of
MOSCQIN's support for Baghdad in the Iran-Iraq war and its occupation of
Afghanistan. .
Media comment on the visit has been sparse, but a 9 August Tehran radio
commentary entitled "The Outlook for Soviet-Iranian Relations" cautiously
noted that "overall" there would be "a better future" for bilateral relations.
The commentary cited the need for "good-neighborliness" because of Iran's
long border with the USSR, a justification that has frequently been used by
Iranian leaders for holding meetings with Moscow.
Minimizing Larijani indicated that the major political obstacles
Impediments dividing the two countries?the Soviets' support for
Iraq and their occupation of Afghanistan?would not
be allowed to stand in the way of improved economic ties. According to a
Tehran radio report on his press conference he was careful not to criticize the
USSR on either issue. When asked about the possibility of Iran's ending its
support for the Afghan rebels in return for Moscow's stopping its assistance to
Baghdad in the Gulf war, Larijani noted only that his delegation had "talked
extensively about regional issues" with Soviet officials and had "made our
views known to them."
Larijani said Iran welcomed the recent announcement of the withdrawal of
some Soviet forces from Afghanistan. Rather than condemning the Soviet
occupation, he said only that the presence of Soviet troops there is "a
mistake," explaining that it is "damaging to the interests of the region since it
will increase American influence there." His statements comport with a
31 July statement by an Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman that welcomed
the Soviet plan to withdraw some of its forces on the grounds that after a full
withdrawal the United States "would have no excuse to continue its growing
interference in the region."?
Progress on Larijani reported further progress on "commercial,
Economic Issues transportation, industrial, scientific, and technical"
issues in connection with preparing the agenda of the
10th session of the standing commission on Iran-Soviet joint economic
cooperation. His visit was thus a continuation of talks on economic and
commercial cooperation held during the 11-18 June visit to Tehran of a Soviet
delegation of economic experts. An agreement to revive the commission, which
has not met since 1980, was made during the Korniyenko visit to Tehran. The
commission is expected to meet at an as yet unannounced date later this year.
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One economic obstacle to improved ties?the 1985 exodus of Soviet
technicians from several large-scale projects in Iran, including power stations
and a steel mill?has apparently been removed. According to Tehran radio on
the 10th, Larijani announced that after negotiations "the Soviet side expressed
the inclination to finish these projects." The departure of thousands of Soviet
technicians, ostensibly out of fear of Iraqi air attacks, had caused continuing
resentment on the part of the Iranians.
Iranian Gas Sales Larijani also noted progress on the sensitive issue of
gas exports to the Soviet Union. Reporting that his
discussions focused on "bilateral cooperation in the fields of oil, energy, and oil
exploration in the Caspian Sea," he announced at his press conference that
"Iran is interested in exporting gas to the USSR and to Europe through Soviet
pipelines." The resumption of gas exports, which were halted shortly after the
1979 revolution, has been a sensitive issue due to Tehran's persisting
dissatisfaction over the level of Soviet payments. Shortly after Korniyenko's
visit, Iran's parliament speaker, 'Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, noted in a
9 February press conference that the issue remained a major impediment to
bilateral ties: Rafsanjani explained that the Soviets "were buying our gas
cheaply and so we cut off our export of gas and said that they would have to
pay the market rate for it" (Ettela'at, 10 February).
The visit to Moscow by Petroleum Minister Aqazadeh was also a sign of
progress on the gas issue. According to a Tehran radio report, one goal of his
trip was to discuss with Soviet officials "coordination and cooperation in the
field of oil and gas," including specifically "the possibility of resuming gas
exports to the USSR."
Background The positive Iranian media treatment aecorded
Larijani's visit contrasts sharply with negative
leadership and media comment on the Korniyenko visit, when officials and
commentators played down the importance of the talks and used the occasion
to criticize Moscow's positions on regional issues. While they did not rule out
the possibility of expanding economic relations, Iranian leaders focused on
Afghanistan and the Gulf war as major impediments to enhanced ties. During
Korniyenko's visit Tehran seemed to go out of its way to express support for
the Muslim rebels in Afghanistan, and after his departure Rafsanjani, in a
9 February press conference, reiterated Iran's in-sistence on Soviet withdrawal
from Afghanistan and denounced Moscow's assistance to Baghdad. (u/Fouo)
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Korea
Pyongyang Toughens Line on Resuming Dialogue With Seoul
North Korea appears ,to be engaged in a reassessment of the stalled
dialogue with the south and has hardened its conditions for
resumption, citing political developments in the South as a factor.
At the same time Pyongyang has not abandoned its counsel to anti-
Chon forces against using unduly confrontational tactics.
For the first time in the current round ,of the inter-Korean dialogue,
Pyongyang has formally linked progress in the talks to political conditions in
the South. A 10 August joint statement, issued in the name of North Korea's
delegations to the suspended ,economic, Red Cross, and parliamentary talks,
went beyond the usual calls for Seoul to abandon its "provocative" policies and
demanded that it must stop "suppressing" South Korean students and
"immediately release those illegally arrested" before dialogue can be resumed.
Since the current round of dialogue began two years ago, Pyongyang has not
officially made Seoul's domestic policies an issue in the talks. The North has
generally confined itself to asserting that a proper atmosphere for dialogue
cannot exist in the absence of "democratization" in the South and insisting
that it has the right to comment on South Korean politics even during periods
of dialogue. It has complained less about Seoul's treatment of student
demonstrators than about South Korean charges that the students are linked
to the North, a charge Pyongyang claims further damages the atmosphere for
talks. Kim Il-song's New Year addresses in 1985 and 1986 in fact seemed to
make a special effort to tone down remarks regarding the South Korean
domestic political situation, implying that the North Koreans were prepared to
isolate that subject from the dialogue process.
The fact that the North has now linked the ROK domestic political situa,tion
to North-South talks serves to underscore Pyongyang's recent pessimistic
assessments of the prospects for dialogue, especially in the light of past
precedent. In August 1973, when an earlier round of talks began to break
down, the North began to argue that the South had to halt its "suppression" of
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