IRAN: IMPACT OF REVOLUTION AND WAR ON AGRICULTURE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP09-00438R000101150001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 5, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 1, 1981
• Content Type: REPORT

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Foreign
Assessment 25X1
Center
Iran: Impact of Revolution
and War on Agriculture
An Intelligence Assessment
25X1
Secret
GS 81-10220
September 1981
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National
Foreign
Assessment
Center
Iran: Impact of Revolution
and War on Agriculture
An Intelligence Assessment
Information available as of 22 September 1981
has been used in the preparation of this report.
This assessment was produced in the Foreign
Agriculture Branch of the Environment and Resource
Analysis Division, Office of Geographic and
Societal Research. It was coordinated with the Offices
of Economic Research and Political Analysis and
with the National Intelligence Officer for the Near
East and South Asia. Comments and queries may
be directed to the Chief of the Foreign Agriculture
Branch, OGSR,
Secret
GS 81-10220
September 1981
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Figure 1
I I
Main agricultural area
= Rainfall in millimeters
??? Province boundary
629919 6.81
\.
? in
?
HOR G N
AN
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40,L
BALOCHESTANc.
VAMSTAN
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Iran: Impact of Revolution
and War on Agriculture
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Because of unusually good weather this year, Iranian farmers will harvest a
grain crop about equal to the average of the past six years. Nevertheless,
domestic chaos and?to a lesser extent?the war with Iraq have seriously
impeded Iran's agricultural performance and are pushing the country still
further from food self-sufficiency.
Domestic food production is inadequate for many reasons, among them:
? Agricultural development took a back seat to industrialization during the
Shah's reign, leaving the country poorly prepared to cope with rising food
demand.
? Despite an announced intention of emphasizing agricultural develop-
ment, the revolutionary turmoil in Iran has prevented the current
government from adopting?much less implementing?effective and
coordinated agricultural policies. Conflicting views about what ought to
be done, the complex, volatile political situation, and a lack of adminis-
trative experience and agricultural knowledge among government leaders
will probably prevent the development and implementation of such
policies for some time.
? Although most of the fighting with Iraq has occurred in regions
unimportant to agriculture, the war drains manpower from the agricul-
tural sector and has led to a 15-percent reduction in the area sown to
crops.
? A domestic marketing system that allows middlemen to reap most of the
benefits of rising food prices provides little incentive for Iran's farmers to
increase output.
? Even when crop surpluses are generated, the underdeveloped transporta-
tion and distribution systems cannot bring much of the extra food to the
cities where it is needed.
In the face of these constraints, rapid population growth?especially in the
cities?has resulted in an increasing demand for food that can only be met
through rising imports. During 1981 Iran is expected to import a record
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GS 81-10220
September 1981
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$3.3 billion in agricultural products, including more than a million tons of
US grain, which Iranian consumers prefer to grain from other foreign
sources. Next year, Iran is likely to import some $3.8 billion in agricultural
products, as much as 15 percent of which might come from the United
States. As long as the country's oil revenues continue at their present
levels, Iran can afford to pay for these imports, but only at the cost of for-
going imports of other goods the country also needs.
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Iran: Impact of Revolution
and War on Agricultur.
The call for revitalization of agriculture, a major
theme in Iran since the overthrow of the Shah, is an
outgrowth of discontent with the Shah's faltering
agricultural policies and Iran's growing dependence
on food imports. A net food exporter in the 1960s,
Iran became a major importer by the mid-1970s. The
increase in grain imports was especially pronounced,
reflecting burgeoning demand and slow growth in
production. With population increasing at a rate close
to 3 percent annually, agricultural growth must accel-
erate if a continuing rapid increase in import require-
ments is to be averted
AIthough the Iranian revolution was rimarily an
urb n-based mov,eme t, it drew aVentio to thepoliti-
cal plications Of Iran's agriculfural problems'. On-
der th Shah, a ricultu al growth lagged Iar bi'ehind
that of dustrj, resultin in a 4,idening in lone gasp
between he tvfo sectors. 1his ?sparity contributed to
a rural ex , estimated a 0,000 annuaiq in the
early 1970se
thszaaact
dcpanst.r.ation
'Background
Th 'e environmental conditions in most of Iran are not
favorable for farming. Less than a quarter of the
country has the potential to produce crops, and less
than 10 percent of the land is in crops at any one time.
Each year40 to 75 percent of the total cultivated
area is left Okiw to permit the soil to absorb moisture
and regain fertility. Only the Caspian coast and the
western mountairranges receive enough rainfall to
support nonirrigated\agriculture. The most productive
croplands are in the riir.thern and western provinces.
In the west, most of the i.recipitation falls in the
winter and early spring, in a attern advantageous to
winter grain production.
Staple Crops. Iran's principal cropsNare wheat and
barley, predominantly winter varieties. These grains
are usually grown on three-fourths of th ,available
1
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lAnd and account for approximately two-fifths of the
tiAtal value of crops produced. Wheat is the country's
bAic food, accounting for at least half of the energy
value in the diet; of late, it has become even more
important because shortages and higher prices of
other foods are increasing the demand for bread.
Bar'ley is the major feedgrain 25X1
Live tock The livestock industry plays an important
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role in the Iranian economy, normally contributing
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approixmately 40 percent of the value of total agricul-
tural Output. Historically, the wealth of many peas-25x1
ants was primarily in the form of animals, and Iran
exportea many sheep products. Animal products con-
tributed nly 8 percent of the energy value in the
Iranian d'et in 1975-77, compared with 12 percent in
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Pakistan and 10 percent in Turkey, but demand has
been risir4 sharply, especially in the cities. Production
of meat?kher than poultry?has not kept up, and
Iran has ba\ome a net importer of meat. Poultry
production expanded rapidly in the 1960s and 1970s,
and by 1979 accounted for about a third of total meat
production. 1 25X1
The performance of the livestock sector in recent
years reflects poor feeding and shelter conditions,
which make the ai4mals susceptible to disease. By the
mid-1970s, 80 perce\nt of the pasturage in Iran was
overgrazed, reflecting the fact that it was supporting
more than twice the livestock population that proper
range management Would dictate. Former nomads
who had been encour4ed to settle in permanent
locations increased thesanimal density on the lower,
better quality rangelands. The remaining nomadic
herders were forced to use the more marginal land at
higher, drier altitudes ancl\to take longer treks with
their animals?factors that\caused higher mortality
and lower breeding rates. T maintain production 25X1
levels, these herders increasel the size of their flocks,
accelerating the deterioration \of the range.
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Figure 2
Iran: Simplified Grain Crop Calendar
Wheat.
Winter
Spring
Barley
Winter
Spring
Rice
Unclassified
Jan
Feb
Mar
Apr May Jun Jul
Aug .Sep
Oct
Nov
Dec
Fallow'
Planting
Growth
Harvest
Dormancy
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44^--
Table 1
Iran: Production of Selected Crops
Thousand Metric Tons
4
Average
1970-75
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
(estimated)
Wheat
4,081
5,500
5,000
5,300
5,000
4,750
Rice, paddy
1,173
1,276
1,051
1,288
1,212
1,163
Barley
933
1,150
1,100
1,000
970
1,000
Cotton
183
155
180
150
100
100
Sugar, raw
606
687
633
630
640
600
This table is Unclassified.
Agricultural Practices. Mechanized equipment is
concentrated on larger farms and in agricultural
cooperatives. Elsewhere, most Iranian farmers use
primitive methods. Traditional animal-drawn and
hand-operated tools are common, and much of the
grain is planted, harvested, and threshed by hand.
Fertilizer and pesticides are not widely available
Except in the northern and western provinces, agricul-
ture depends mainly or exclusively on irrigation.
Much of the surface water used for irrigation is
obtained from rivers and reservoirs built in the late
1960s and early 1970s during the Shah's third and
fourth five-year plans. In many areas, however, irriga-
tion water is still supplied by the traditional qanats?
subterranean conduits leading from a well or spring
located at the base of a mountain to the fields
surrounding a village. During the last two decades
many qanats fell into disrepair while the government
emphasized development of surface water supplies.
Infrastructural Problems. Inadequate transport ham-
pers Iran's agricultural output and the marketing of
what is produced. In 1976 two-thirds of Iran's villages
were not in the transport network used by trucks or
trains, and more than a third were rarely accessible to
any wheeled vehicle. Iranian farmers unable to sell
their surplus output beyond their own isolated villages
have little motivation to produce surpluses; they can-
not even take advantage of guaranteed minimum
prices by selling to the government. Even farmers who
3
can get their products to urban markets, however,
receive little of the money urban consumers pay for
food, for on their way to the cities agricultural
products pass through many levels of traders, and
each middleman gets his cut. Thus both the rural
economy and the urban economy are losers: the rural
sector does not benefit from rising demand?met 25X1
instead by imports?while rural stagnation limits the
market for products of the urban sector 25X1
Agriculture Under the Shah
The Shah's government gave priority to industrializa-
tion over agricultural development. Agricultural in-
vestment fell short of goals, and measures designed to
modernize the sector did little to improve overall
agricultural performance. Agriculture remained
largely traditional, with subsistence farm families
composing most of the farm population. Fewer than
15 percent of the families owning farms produced
most of the marketed surplus. The number of tractor25X1
in use expanded \rapidly after 1975, but by 1978 there
were still only eigjit tractors per 1,000 hectares of
harvested grain area, compared with 27 in neighbor-
ing Turkey. At the\me the Shah was overthrown,
half of the Iranian population lived in rural areas and
40 percent of the labcA? force was employed in the
agricultural sector, but \t contributed only 9 percent
of the gross national pro 'duct. 25X1
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Figure 3
Iran: Traditional Irrigation System (near Tehran)
Uplands
Water Table
in RiverValley
Water
Production-.-
Section
Qanat
Mother Well
Shafts
Water
Transportation ?.-
Section
Spoil Heaps
Canat
Outlet
Surface
Canal Irrigated
Fields
Village
, 411
Bedrock
Nt.
'Water Table
on Alluvial Fan
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Functioning qanat in operation. Water is flowing out of
the conduit into a canal which leads to the fields. The
abandoned qanat, adjacent and parallel to the active one,
probably taps the same mother well. The diagram gives a
cross-section of the qanat irrigation system.
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Slow GroW(h. During the Shah's rule, growth in
agriculture 'was heavily concentrated in industrial
crops, tree crops, and intensive poultry production.
The overall rale of growth apparently was consider-
ably lower thari\ the official figures and probably lower
than the rate of\population growth. The return to
most farmers from selling their surplus was not
1
sufficient to encoprage adoption of improved technol-
ogy. Grain yields \fontinued to compare unfavorably
with those of other Middle Eastern countries, and
increases in outpuwere due largely to increases in
land under cultivatkp. The government did encourage
development of agribusiness enterprises to take ad-
vantage of the econoTies of large-scale commercial
agriculture and to attract foreign investment and
technology. By the tine of the revolution, however,
most of these projects hacd folded, mainly because they
were mismanaged, but also because they were un-
suited to local physical a\nd labor conditions
Under the Shah, more tlwi a dozen large reservoir
dams were constructed. Most of the land developed
below these dams was lease\d to domestic and foreign
agribusiness for the production of industrial crops.
The dams were used primarijy to generate electricity
for industrial purposes, however, and in any conflict
irrigation needs were secondary. Normally, water was
released through the dams during the peak electrical
seasons of midsummer and midinter, rather than in
spring and early summer when the farmers most
needed water for irrigation
Construction of grain storage facilities did little to
improve the linkage between typical \f\ armers and the
urban sector. A number of grain elevators were built,
but most of them were located in or near large cities; a
lack of roads and high transportation Costs precluded
use of these elevators by most farmers. \There were
few government storage facilities in the villages. (In
arid areas, it must be noted, grain and dkier storable
produce may be kept in relative safety for long periods
in primitive storage facilities.
Land Reform. The Shah's government sought to
achieve a major impact in the agricultural slector with
the land reform program of the 1960s and early
1970s. During the 10 years of the program, \large
5
Table 2
Iran and Neighboring
Countries: Wheat Yields
100 Kilograms Per Hectare
1961-65
1975
1976
1977
Iran
8.0
7.6
9.1
8.0
Afghanistan
9.5
11.9
12.3
11.3
Iraq
7.0
6.0
8.8
8.1
Pakistan
8.3
13.2
14.1
14.3
Turkey
10.8
15.9
19.2
17.8
USSR
9.6
10.7
16.3
14.8
Armenian SSR
9.7
19.8
21.2
Azerbaijan SSR
8.4
15.3
18.1
Turkestan SSR
5.9
17.5
a
13.7
a Unknown.
This table is Unclassified.
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amounts of land owned by the Iranian Crown or
Government-or acquired by compelling large land-
owners to sell-were turned over to private families
under long\ term mortgages at low interest rates.
1
Although successful in reducing the social and politi-
cal power of\the semifeudal landlord class, which was
viewed as obstructing modernization and economic
development, \the reforms disrupted agricultural out-
put. By the mid-1970s many peasants had become _
small landowners or leaseholders, but the institutional
framework was inadequate. Implementation of meas- 25X1
ures intended to complement land redistribution by
fostering rural cooperatives, credit and extension serv-
ices, and increased. supplies of inputs, was haphazard
and largely ineffective, partly as a result of a dearth
of qualified administrative and technical personnel.
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The reforms also provided for establishment of farm
corporations made up ii\f farmers who had agreed to
consolidate their holdings and pool their resources to
mechanize their operati6s. These corporations 25X1
proved unpopular, howev\er, because individual farm-
ers could not retain title to their land. Those that were
formed were unable to recruit experienced managers
and were largely unsuccessful. 25X1
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Belated Emphasis. Just before the Shah's overthrow,
the government's agricultural modernization program
was revamp' ed, and new objectives were outlined in
I
the sixth five-year plan (1978-82). A major goal of the
plan was toI put the country on the road to achieving
self-sufficieIIncy in grain production by 1990. Among
other provislions, the plan gave greater emphasis to
agribusiness and tagged substantial funds for rural
road construction in the hope that a better farm-to-
market road \network would allow small farmers to
market their ?crops directly and thus receive a higher
profit.
Food Demand
Under the Shah, domestic food production was inad-
equate to meet the sharp increase in food demand
spurred by rising\ incomes in a rapidly growing urban
population. The r\Tsult was a remarkable rise in
imports of food (ad other agricultural products).
Although the Shah's overthrow was followed by eco-
nomic recession, food consumption continued at a
relatively high level; as did population growth, espe-
cially in the cities.
Higher Incomes. During the booming 1970s Iran's
per capita food supplies increased more than 5 percent
a year, rising from 2,339 calories per day in 1969-71
to 3,193 calories per day in 1975-77?only 5 percent
below the average for dpveloped countries. Rising per
capita income resulting from petroleum price hikes,
together with food subsidies and price controls on
food, helped to make posgible a substantial increase in
food consumption, at least in urban areas. Between
1970 and 1974 Iran's per capita intake of poultry and
red meat almost doubled. Higher urban incomes,
however, did not bring small farmers higher prices for
their produce; changes in the urban-rural terms of
trade during the mid-1970s?yent against the farmers,
as retail food prices were held down while rices of
other commodities were perrriitted to rise.
Population Growth. In addition to the impact of
higher incomes, food requirements increased because
of rapid population growth. After slow expansion in
the first half of this century, Iran's population dou-
bled in the past 25 years. During the same period the
urban population more than tripled, increasing from
Secret
aboti a fifth of the total population in 1900-40 to
roughly half of the present population of about 40
\
million,. Despite high fertility in rural areas, internal
migratin holds down the annual rate of increase
there to less than 2 percent, while the urban popula-
tion?theegment most dependent on food imports?
is currently\ growing about 5 percent a year. By 1985
the urban pppulation is projected to increase to 54
percent of the total population, which by then is likely
to exceed 45 million.
Rising Food Imports. During the 1970s the inability
of domestic production to keep up with the growth, of
food demand as reflected in soaring imports. Be-
tween 1970 and\ 1975 the value of food imports rose
from less than $70 million to $1.5 billion. In 1976
severe port congestion and logistical problems contrib-
uted to a temporry decline in food imports, forcing a
drawdown of stocks. After expansion of port facilities,
however, imports in\1977-78 approached the 1975
level.
The most dramatic rise\ came in grain imports, which
increased from 10 percept of total food imports in
1970 to 43 percent in 1978. In the latter half of the
1970s imports accounted\for about 18 percent of
wheat consumption, even though wheat is Iran's
primary staple crop. Overall,, Iran has come to depend
on imports for about a third\of its total food supply?
and for about half of the food supply in Tehran and
other large cities.
During the 1970s Iranian consun;iters came to prefer
grain of the types and quality supplied by the United
States. Led by grain sales, the US 'ghare of Iran's total
agricultural imports increased until it peaked at about
40 percent in 1975. Following the ov'erthrow of the
Shah, it dropped to 20 percent in 1979Nand to less
than 1 percent 'n 1980
Impact of the Revo1ition
After the overthrow \f the Shah, the new government
cut back sharply on al food imports?not just those
from the United States. he revolutionary regime
apparently assumed that, keed of the Shah's restrain-
ing hand, Iran's farmers wo ld quickly increase their
6
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Figure 4
Iran: Population Growth, 1940-85
Millions
45
40
30
%./V?
Table 3 Thousand Metric Tons
Iran: Selected Agricultural Imports
1977
1978
1979
1980
(estimated)
Total
1,277
1,206
1,200
2,000
Wheat
Wheat flour a
45
52
56
42
Rice
630
367
440
470
Barley
334
467
200
600
Corn
328
283
600
897
Other cereals
233
283
50
100
Total cereals
2,797
2,709
2,546
4,109
20 .......
..? ... z//
Rural ....????????
.....
........
..............
10
Urban
1940 50
Unclassified
60 70
80 85
584791 8-81
output to the
In 1979 and 1
was well below
with agriculture,
sultant food shor
imports painfully
sharply as breeding
Anger over skyrocke
street demonstrations
ment relaxed its import
reached a new high in 1
however, food shortages
were rationed?or available
egree necessary to replace the imports.
80, however, domestic food production
verage as public disorder interfered
especially with harvesting. The re-
ges made Iran's dependence on
ear. Livestock numbers dropped
tock was slaughtered for food.
ng food prices erupted into
Tehran. Finally, the govern-
estraints, and food imports
80. Despite these imports,
co tinued and many items
1/43, at high prices.
F-eddeffs-Leadership.?While-ettffeet-conditions
ionced,,,lehr,anaglokm.a-mor.e-realistic-poliey-with
jsz.u_d_t? aitaacLimper4s, the,r-egime is committed to
7
a In wheat equivalent.
(1 ton of flour equals 1.39 tons of wheat equivalent.)
This table is Unclassified.
giving greater emphasis to domestic agriculture. Nev-
ertheless, strong direction and a coordinated policy
are lacking. Primary responsibility for agricultural
policymaking lies with the Ministry of Agriculture
and Rural Development. The top positions of the
ministry, however, have been taken over by mullahs
who lack agricultural expertise. For ideological rea-
sons, the mullahs support a move away from the
Shah's ideal of large centralized agricultural units
toward support of small holdings and traditional
farming. Although the Planning Authority opposes
this shift, as do many technocrats within the ministry,
agribusinesses and large capital-intensive projects
have received little government support since the
revolution, and projects under construction at the time
of the revolution have been dropped or are in disarray.
25X1
In the absence of clear national policy, confusion over
land ownership is widespread. Land tenure commit-
tees have been set up in several areas to redistribute
land that is underutilized. It is not certain whether
they are taking land only from the large landholders
who did not redistribute their land during the Shah's 25X1
land reform programs, or from medium and even
small farmers as well. Many farmers who have not yet
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lost their holdings fear their land may be expropriat-
ed, which inhibits them from trying to expand produc-
tion. Meanwhile, mullahs?many of whom lost land
as a result of the Shah's reforms?reportedly are
regaining or extending their holdings
Ineffective Programs. In contrast to previous practice,
the government has given the provinces substantial
economic autonomy, allowing them to establish their
own banks and devise independent development bud-
gets. In addition, the government has raised procure-
ment prices, made credit available to farmers, and
facilitated increased imports of seed, fertilizer, and
farm machinery. Despite these measures, commercial
agriculture is depressed. In 1980/81 output of cotton-
seed, soybeans, and sunflower seeds?produced pri-
marily by commercial farmers?dropped to less than
half of that in 1979/80, probably because of the
reluctance of farmers to invest and plant at previous
levels. The drop led to a sharp decline in Iran's
vegetable oil consumption in 1980.
The government reportedly plans to promote grain
production in rain-fed areas at the expense of expand-
ing irrigated agriculture. Such a policy will heighten
dependence on weather and aggravate the existing
problems of wide annual fluctuations in yields and
output. At the same time, the government is encour-
aging poultry and livestock production, which will
greatly expand feedgrain requirements. Breeding
stock are to be imported to replace stock killed for
food, even though shortages of fodder have already
been reported.
Finally, the government is encouraging reverse migra-
tion from the cities back to the villages, but without
much success. The population of Tehran and its
suburbs, for example, has already ballooned to an
estimated 6.7 million and is continuing to grow
rapidly. A lack of incentives for farmers to stay on the
land and the perception that they can make more
money in urban areas?even if only in illegal activi-
ties?continue to spur migration to the cities.
Impact of the War
The war with Iraq has depressed Iranian agriculture
in a number of ways. Although most of the Iraqi-
occupied region in western Khuzestan is normally not
Secret
cultivated, in areas near Abadan, Ahvaz, and Dezful
at the eastern edge of the war zone, fields usually
planted to industrial crops had to be abandoned.
Sugar beet fields west of Ahvaz were intentionally
flooded. Croplands near Kermanshah suffered some
damage Overall, however, the war has caused rela-
tive y little harm to agricultural areas. Most farmland
could easily be returned to production if the war were
to end
n addition to the cropland lost or damaged, about 1
million hectares (15 percent of the total farmland)
reportedly were not planted last fall because of the
war. Many farm workers have been called into mili-
tary service, which could result in a rural labor
shortage. The war has also created fuel shortages that
may limit distribution of the harvest. Tre716"3trreof
. : ? .? - ? ? . ? - ? :14.21-4-th-e..2egsi4n
? ? - ? ? . . a .?-
6 - d to be
ed
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Current Statu of Crops
In general, the weather this year has beei favorable
for crops. In articular, precipitation has been above
normal. The am n problems' have occurred, in the
eastern provi ces of Kerman and Khorashn, which
normally pro uce about 12 /percent of the/ total grain
crop; extensi flooding in e6ly May reportedly
damaged 25 p rcent of the slimmer wheat crop and 30
to 40 percent f the winter 4/heat crop in hose areas.
Elsewhere, ho ever, Iran hals enjoyed weather condi-
tions similar to those of neighboring Turkey and Iraq,
both of which are expecting good winter grain crops.
Despite the w r, this year's winter grain production is
likely to be better than that of the last two years and
near the avera e of the past six years.\Satellite
imagery has rJealed good crop vigor levels in most of
Iran's major agricultural regions. Lodging, an indica-
tion of healthy Arain and good yields, Was prevalent
both in western knd northeastern Iran.Vlarvesting
apparently proceeded on schedule, for the most part.
8
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584794 8-81
In harrsted fields, shocks were often closely spaced,
another indication of god crops.
Outlook
Although the country's agricultural performance may
improve somewhat this-yea-F., Iran will nonetheless
continue to rely heavily on imports to meet food
requirements, since little of any increased output will
reach the cities. Ofree-the-surplus-from-this-yeitr=s
hav.test--is-ex-hatisted7ROWablii-before the winter is
over, food shortages-should again intensify.
Raving-learned its lesson, the government now gives
top priority to food imports, which currently account
for about 20 percent.ollaal-iftworts. Despite serious
port and logistic problems, total agricultural imports
9
may- reach -$1-373-triffiryn-nr-i-9?84-arrd $3.8 billion in
1982. ong-as-4-ran-con.til at
current eritaeariaffoi'd-thern7althaugh the govern-
ment's de ire to achieve-self-sufficiency--ifi food pro-
duClIon sti,l&sts it W6iild rather 'spend the money on
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qtladr g
ince the resolution of the hostage crisis, the US
share of the Iranian import market has been rising
again, despite the antipathy of the Iranian Govern-
ment and the availability of grain from other foreign 25x1
sources. US sales of white wheat are already back to
pre-1980 levels e duziag...1.98.1.414G-414444.s421-Ste4es-is---
expected-to-supply-nvarethan-1-rnillion-tonsrabout
hallof Itareotatimports-of-whrSt. In 1982 the US
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/05: CIA-RDP09-00438R000101150001-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/05: CIA-RDP09-00438R000101150001-1
3ecret
Figure 6
Iran: Good Yields Expected in 1981 (Northwest Iran)
?,1.1?,1
'.I'
The
? "
Yt
The dark red on the NOAA-6 imagery and the bright orange
on the LANDSAT show examples of the good vigor levels
seen throughout Iran. Reservoirs appeared full on the
LANDSAT imagery, an indication of more than adequate
water supplies.
584792 8-81
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/05: CIA-RDP09-00438R000101150001-1
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3ecrer
share of Iran's total agricultural imports could rise to
about 15 percent?worth more than $500 million?if
Iran imports as much as now seems likely.
Over the longer term, it is unlikely that Iran's domes-
tic production will keep up with growing food de-
mand?much less that Iran will achieve food self-
sufficiency?as long as its political and
infrastructural problems remain unresolved. Because
the growth of the agricultural labor force is slowing,
expansion of agricultural production will depend
largely on increased productivity. That would require
strong (and appropriate) policy direction in a stable
political climate. Without these conditions, farmers
are unlikely to invest in improved technology, and
agricultural development efforts will flounder. In the
livestock sector, while resolute destocking and stricter
controls on range use could at least ensure a stable (if
still inadequate) meat supply, a continued overgrazing
of the range can only result in a further diminution of
range resources and concomitant declines in livestock
production. With increases in population, an emerging
urban majority, and likely changes in diet in the years
ahead, the outlook is for even :reater dependence on
agricultural imports
Secret 12
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/05: CIA-RDP09-00438R000101150001-1 _