THE STRAIT OF HORMUZ: A VULNERABLE LIFELINE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP09-00438R000100140001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 28, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 1, 1979
• Content Type: REPORT

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Fo7eign; 25X1
Assessment
Center
The Strait of Hormuz:
A Vulnerable Lifeline
An Intelligence Assessment
Secret
GC 79-10085
July 1979
Copy 1 0 3
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National Secret
Foreign 25X1
Assessment
Center
The Strait of Hormuz:
A Vulnerable Lifeline
An Intelligence Assessment
Research for this report was completed
on 26 July 1979.
This paper was prepared by
the Office of Geographic and Car-
tographic Research, with contributions from OER,
OPA, OSR, and the Naval Intelligence Support Center. It
was coordinated with the NH) for the Near East and
South Asia.
Secret
GC 79-10085
July 1979
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SELECTED MAJOR OIL PIPELINES
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Iraq - Turkey Line
Suez - Mediterranean Line (SUMED)
Trans-Arabian Pipeline (TAPLINE)
LENGTH
(Miles)
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613
207
1000
CAPACITY
(Million B/D)
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504253 7-79
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Key Judgments
The Strait of Hormuz:
A Vulnerable Lifeline
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Recent Palestinian threats to attack shipping in the Strait of Hormuz, the
strategic waterway that connects the Persian Gulf with the Indian Ocean,
have focused international attention on this key chokepoint in the world's oil
commerce. About 19 million barrels of crude oil?a third of the world's
daily production?funnel through this channel on an average day. Japan
and many West European countries are almost totally dependent on this oil,
and the United States relies on it for a third of its annual imports. 25X1
Sinking one or more tankers?even supertankers?would not block the
Strait, which nearly everywhere is at least 45 meters deep and even at its
narrowest point is still 50 kilometers wide. Attendant oil slicks, however,
especially if on fire, could impede maritime traffic until the prevailing
currents carried them out of the Strait.
Since the February revolution, Iran's military capabilities have
deterioriated to the point where it can no longer assure the security of the
Strait of Hormuz. Moreover, the new provisional government of Iran has
announced it will no longer play the role of policeman of the Persian Gulf.
Oman, the other country bordering the Strait, lacks the capability to patrol
even its own waters adequately.
Considering the inadequate security in the area, there are many options for
imaginative, resourceful terrorists contemplating an attack on shipping in
the Strait. The main shipping channels lie close to the rugged, barren Omani
coast, which offers good concealment to small craft, making it a more likely
staging area for a terrorist attack than the more heavily populated and more
distant Iranian shore.
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While an attack on shipping in the Strait could, if successful, have a
decided?if short term?physical effect, over the longer term the psycho-
logical effects on the oil-consuming nations and on the owners of the tankers
and the oil would probably be more serious. A mere demonstration that the
Strait was unsafe for shipping might do more to interdict the flow of oil than
any number of supertankers lying on the bottom. 25X1
Under a threat of interdiction, the Gulf states could be expected to cooperate
with the oil-consuming countries in taking whatever steps are necessary to
ensure safe passage of shipping through the Strait. 25X1
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The Strait of Hormuz:
A Vulnerable Lifeline
The vulnerability of oil shipments passing through the
Strait of Hormuz?the strategic waterway between
Iran and Oman connecting the Persian Gulf with the
Indian Ocean?is a subject of increasing concern
among major oil-consuming countries. A recent report
that Palestinian terrorists plan to attack US ships in
the Strait of Hormuz sharpens that concern. Oil
tankers carry 19 million barrels of crude oil?fully
one-third of the world's daily production?through the
Strait daily; nearly all of these shipments are destined
for the United States, Western Europe, and Japan.
Regional Geography
Strait of Hormuz
Limits of Strait
Bathymetry
0
10
30
50 fathoms
I
I
0
18
54
92 meters
The Strait
The Strait of Hormuz is about 275 kilometers long and
an average of 80 kilometers wide. At its narrowest
point, between Ra's Sharitah on Oman's Musandam
Peninsula and the Iranian island of Jazireh-ye Larak,
the waterway is about 50 kilometers wide. Nearly
everywhere the Strait is more than 45 meters deep; off
the Omani coast, depths range from 75 to 225 meters.
The main inbound and outbound shipping channels
traverse this area.
There are several islands in the Strait. The largest are
close to the Iranian shore and of little concern to vessels
transiting the main shipping channels. The remaining
islands lie off the northern coast of the Musandam
Peninsula, and, while they are important in the
demarcation of the shipping channels, they offer no
impediment to vessels. They could, however, provide
concealment for seaborne terrorists in the channel
area.
From July through September the currents in the
Strait of Hormuz generally flow westerly into the
Persian Gulf, under the influence of the summer
monsoon. These currents average about 1 knot. The
tidal currents are much stronger, however?about 4
knots off the Musandam Peninsula, and 2 to 3 knots off
the Iranian coast. These tidal currents sometimes pose
problems to shipping in the Strait.
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On the other hand, winds in the Strait are rarely
hazardous to shipping. The winds are variable except
from July to September, when southeasterly winds
prevail. Over much of the year winds seldom exceed 17
to 21 knots, but during the winter months stronger
winds from the west and north occasionally reach 40
knots. The winds tend to follow the coastline; they are
southwesterly west of the Strait, westerly in the Strait,25X1
and northwesterly east of the Strait. 25X1
The main shipping channels through the Strait of
Hormuz are the shortest practicable route around the
rugged Musandam Peninsula of northern Oman. Both
the inbound (westbound) and outbound (eastbound)
channels provide ample clearance for deep-draft
vessels. )(1
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The inbound channel traverses either side of the Quoin
Islands. It varies between 31 and 35 kilometers in
length, depending on the route chosen, and from 3.2 to
almost 10 kilometers in width. Depths range from 75 to
100 meters except in the immediate vicinity of the
islands. Several oil companies strongly advise their
inbound ships to pass north of the islands, to avoid both
the congestion of the shorter southern route and the
stronger tidal current there.
The outbound channel passes 3.6 kilometers south of
Little Quoin Island. It is 25 kilometers long and 3.2
kilometers wide. This is the deeper of the two channels
with depths ranging from 85 to 225 meters. There are
submarine cables under this channel, but they pose no
hazard to navigation.
Most shipping passes through these main channels.
However, a broad, slightly shallower, alternate pas-
sageway (50 kilometers wide and 45 to 80 meters deep)
lies between the Quoin Islands and Iran. Vessels
calling at the Iranian port of Bandar Abbas use this
part of the Strait.
As is clear from these dimensions, the sinking of one or
even several supertankers would not block the Strait of
Hormuz, although attendant oil slicks might hamper
shipping for a while.
Oman
The rugged coast of northern Oman, with its scraggy
Musandam Peninsula and its numerous offshore is-
lands, borders the Strait of Hormuz on the south and
could provide concealment for potential terrorists.
Northern Oman is mountainous and largely void of
vegetation. Elevations generally range between 1,000
and 2,000 meters, but the highest peak, Jabal al
Harim, reaches 2,087 meters. The coastline is charac-
terized by high cliffs that drop almost straight into the
sea. There are many deep, sheltered coves and
embayments, some with small sandy beaches. During
the summer the climate is one of the hottest and most
humid on earth.
Separated from the rest of Oman by the United Arab
Emirates, the peninsular region is isolated and deso-
late; probably no more than 10,000 people live in the
area. Most of them are non-Arab fishermen and
nomads who speak a language akin to Farsi. Until
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recently the Omani Government had very little contact
with these backward people, who live near the bare
subsistence level. They are alleged to be hostile toward
intruders. The largest village in northern Oman is
Al Khasab, on the Persian Gulf coast just west of the
Strait. There are currently no roads in northern Oman,
only a few small, dirt airstrips
There are several islands off the Musandam coast,
most of which are uninhabited and could be used for
launching terrorist operations in the nearby channels.
The As Salamah wa Banatuha (Quoin Islands), which
lie about 14 kilometers off the tip of the peninsula, are
of particular importance because of their location
amidst the inbound shipping channel. This small
archipelago consists of three islands?As Salamah
(Great Quoin), Fanaku (Gap), and Didamar (Little
Quoin). The last named houses a navigation beacon, as
does Bu Rashid Island, across the shipping channel
from the Quoin Islands and 5 kilometers from the
coast.
Iran
Across the Strait, some 50 kilometers from the
Musandam Peninsula and about 35 to 40 kilometers
from the main shipping channels, lies the Iranian
coast. The shoreline north of the Strait consists largely
of mudflats and salt marshes, interspersed with a few
sandy beaches. There are no sheltered bays such as
those along the northern Omani coast
This region is much more densely populated than
northern Oman. According to the 1976 census
Hormozgan Province, which encompasses the coastal
stretch along the Strait, had 463,491 inhabitants.
Nearly one-fourth of them lived in the coastal city of
Bandar Abbas, the largest city in the province, and the
site of Iranian air and naval bases. A dredged channel
about 10 meters deep leads from the Strait into a
major, new, deepwater, general-cargo port
The coastal area is inhabited mainly by Arabs of
Iranian origin, although Persians predominate in and
east of Bandar Abbas. There are also small numbers of
Africans of Somali, Sudanese, and Ethiopian origin.
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Tankers in the Strait of Hormuz
Quoin
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0 Tanker
Direction of movement
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Kilometers
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Globtik Tokyo (480,000 DWT) unloaded. One of the world's largest
supertankers, it was built in Japan for the United Kingdom.
Length 379 meters, beam 62 meters.
Norwegian supertanker Berge Emperor (414,000 DWT) fully loaded.
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?
Four large islands are located close to the Iranian
shoreline in the Strait of Hormuz?Qeshm, Jazireh-ye
Hengam, Jazireh-ye Larak, and Jazireh-ye Hormoz.
Unlike the small, rugged Omani islands, all of the
Iranian islands are inhabited, mainly by Arabs of
Iranian origin. There are navigation beacons on each
of the islands, as well as on a floating buoy southeast of
Jazireh-ye Hormoz.
Economic Significance
The seven countries bordering the Persian Gulf have a
combined population of only 58 million, but because of
oil they enjoy a combined gross national product of
$200 billion and per capita incomes among the highest
in the world
The economic importance of the Strait of Hormuz is
twofold: first, one-third of the world's oil supplies exit
through this passage; second, most of the raw materi-
als, manufactures, and food critical for economic
development of the Persian Gulf states enter through
this passage. About 19 million barrels of crude oil a
day pass through the Strait of Hormuz in tankers.
Another 2.0 to 2.5 million b/d can be exported directly
to the Mediterranean via pipelines?the Tapline, Iraq-
Syria Line, and Iraq-Turkey Line. These lines will be
supplemented by a trans-Arabian pipeline now under
construction between the Red Sea and the eastern oil-
producing provinces of Saudi Arabia, which is de-
signed to carry 2 million b/d.
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Recent studies by Lloyds of London indicate that on an
average day seven loaded supertankers 'exit the Strait,25X1
each with cargos of up to 3 million barrels of oil
currently worth $50 to $60 million. The largest of the
tankers measure some 400 meters in length, 70 meters
in beam, are 45 meters high (from keel to superstruc-
ture), and draw 30 meters of water. Overall, about 24
tankers arrive or depart daily, as well as about 28 cargo
ships. 25X1
Nearly all of the oil is destined for the United States, 25X1
Western Europe, and Japan. While about one-third of
US oil imports come from the Persian Gulf, Western
Europe and Japan are much more dependent on oil
from this region. 25X1
Although the movement of oil from the region remains
the major concern to the Western world, the surge in
'Very large crude carriers (vt.ccs) and ultra-large crude carriers
(uLccs).
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imports of consumer and industrial goods from the
West in recent years is important to the development
plans of the Gulf states, and to the economies of the
Western nations and Japan which find lucrative
markets there.
All of the governments of the Gulf are trying to
improve the lot of the citizenry and to prepare for the
day when their oil resources are depleted. Providing
social services and an industrial infrastructure to
countries that 25 years ago were little more than sleepy
fishing villages visited occasionally by wandering
nomads means starting from scratch in most cases.
Since most of the area has a low level of industrial
sophistication and little land suitable for agriculture,
much of the raw materials and building equipment and
much of the food must be imported from outside the
area. The capacity of the present overland transporta-
tion system is small, imported goods, therefore, have to
come in by sea through the Strait of Hormuz. Saudi
Arabia with its access to the Red Sea is the only
exception.
Imports of the Gulf states through the Strait of
Hormuz came to $45 billion in 1977. Western Europe,
Japan, and the United States supplied more than 80
percent of these imports, which consisted mainly of
hi h technology, finished manufactures, and weapons.
Vulnerability of the Strait
Ever since the Palestinians started talking about
sinking supertankers there, the vulnerability of oil
shipments passing through the Strait of Hormuz has
become a matter of increasing concern not only to the
oil-importing nations, but to the producing nations as
well. The fact that one, or even several, sunken
supertankers would not block the Strait does not rule
out the possibility that terrorists might try to sink one
anyway, for any attack on an oil tanker?whether
successful or not?would have a serious psychological
effect on both oil-exporting and oil-importing coun-
tries.
Preserving the security of the Persian Gulf region, in
particular preserving unimpeded maritime traffic
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through the Strait of Hormuz, was a responsibility
gladly shouldered by the Shah of Iran, who recognized
that this role would justify Iran's acquisition of
sufficient military power to make it preeminent in the
region. The United States, Western Europe, and Japan
cooperated, for the Shah's pro-Western orientation
ensured the Soviet Union would not gain control over
this strategically vital area.
The provisional government of postrevolutionary Iran,
however, suspicious of both the United States and the
Soviet Union, has announced it is relinquishing its role
as the policeman of the Persian Gulf and will no longer
accept responsibility for the securit of the Gulf and
the Strait of Hormuz.
In any case, Iran's naval capabilities were sharply
reduced by the February revolution. Though the
Iranian Navy sustained no physical damage?ships,
naval yards, and ammunition dumps were left in good
condition?a shortage of manpower and lack of
maintenance have reportedly left the Navy unable to
mount any extensive missions, or even to mount
effective patrols. The capabilities of the Iranian Air
Force have similarly deteriorated.
Although there are some indications the Iranian
Government intends to rebuild air and naval
capabilities, for the present Iran is unable to provide
for the security of the Strait of Hormuz?even if the
government wanted it to do so.
Across the Strait to the south, Oman is in no better
shape. Although Oman's own oil production is not
exported through the Strait, Oman's conservative, pro-
Western Sultan Qabus acknowledges his country's
responsibility to guard the southern portion of the
Strait. He claims, however, that Oman lacks the
capability to do so. While this claim is made partly to
buttress Oman's request for military aid, it is unfortu-
nately correct. In sum, neither Iran nor Oman?nor
any o&ier party?is guarding the Strait of Hormuz.
Sinking a Supertanker
Without a navy, sinking a supertanker is no mean feat.
There are several ways, however, in which a terrorist
group might try?and might succeed.
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An attack with a small boat is one possibility.2 The
most likely point of origin for a seaborne terrorist
attack on a tanker in the Strait is Oman, for there are
many small, isolated coves along Oman's sparsely
populated, fjordlike northern coast that would offer
concealment for such an operation. Moreover, there
are several small, uninhabited islands in the area that
could also easily conceal a small craft.
Dhow traffic, prevalent in the Strait, might be used for
cover; these lateen-rigged sailing ships (often with
auxiliary engines) range from 20 to 90 tons in size and
carry crews of eight to 30 men. It would be a rare
dhow, however, that could keep up with a supertanker.
Attackers in a small craft could try to sink a tanker by
attaching explosives to it, although this would be
difficult while the tanker was under way. Or, if they
were willing to die in the attack, they could load their
boat with explosives set to go off when it rammed the
tanker. On the other hand, they could attempt to board
the larger vessel and overpower its crew, then plant
explosive devices on board, or try to run the tanker
aground or into another vessel.
There are unconfirmed reports that Palestinian terror-
ists have access to minisubmarines, which could fire
torpedoes at a tanker from underwater. Perhaps the
most disturbing possibility is that the Strait of Hormuz
could be mined. A variety of mines?moored or
drifting, detonated by sound or contact?has long been
available to terrorists from both Communist and illicit
Western sources. Homemade mines can also be
effective. Some mines can be moored (anchored to the
bottom) in waters much deeper than the Strait of
Hormuz. With a prevailing current of only 1 knot or so,
drifting mines could remain in the vicinity of the Strait
for days, and even after drifting into the Persian Gulf
or Gulf of Oman would continue to pose a hazard to
shipping.
'In June 1971 terrorists in a speedboat armed with a rocket launcher
attacked and damaged a tanker in the Strait of Bab el Mandeb.
Local minesweeping capabilities are very limited. Iran
has five minesweepers in an unknown state of readi-
ness. Iraq also has five, which would take at least two
days to get to the Strait. South Yemen has one
minesweeper, at best three days away. None of the
world's major naval powers are known to have any
minesweeping units in the area.
An attack could also come by air or from the shore
rather than by water. Or a tanker might be sabotaged
while in port, perhaps by a suborned crewman.
Explosives could be planted on board timed to go off
when the tanker is in the Strait, or they could be set off
by signal from a nearby small craft. If terrorists were
unable to gain access to a tanker, they might still be 25X1
able to put one or more navigation beacons out of
service, which could conceivably lead to a collision in
the Strait. In other words, the task of disrupting
maritime traffic in the Strait of Hormuz is well within
the capability of imaginative, resourceful terrorists?
especially if their own survival is not a prime consider-
ation. 25X1
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While a sunken supertanker or two would not impede
traffic in the Strait of Hormuz, an attendant oil slick 25X1
might well do so, especially one on fire. The delay
would be temporary, however, for the current would
probably carry the slick out of the Strait, into the
Persian Gulf in the summertime, out to the Gulf of
Oman or toward the Iranian coast the rest of the year.
More important than any physical results of a terrorist
attack on a tanker transiting the Strait would be the
consequent reluctance of both the owners of the
tankers and the owners of the oil to send their property
through the Strait until they were assured it was safe.
While such an assurance would be difficult to arrange
quickly, the Gulf states could be expected to cooperate
with the oil-importing countries in taking whatever
action was necessary.
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