URBAN GROWTH IN IRAN: ONE MORE PROBLEM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP09-00438R000100130001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 23, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 1, 1979
• Content Type: REPORT

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National contrttential?_
Foreign
Assessment
Center
Urban Growth in Iran:
One More Problem
A Research Paper
ThfrdentiaL
GC 79:10052
May 1979
Copy
n
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1141.11,11141
>
(4krz-S4
Foreign
Assessment
Center
Urban Growth in Iran:
One More Problem
A Research Paper
Research for this report was completed
in December 1978.
The author of this paper is
Geography Division, Office of Geographic and
Cartographic Research
Confidential
GC 79-10052
May 1979
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(...onnaentiai
Summary
Urban Growth in Iran:
One More Problem
Almost unnoticed in the heat of revolution during the past year has been the
evolution of Iran from a rural to an urban-based society. The redistribution
of popuration from rural to urban environments occurred within one
generation, beginning after World War II and picking up momentum during
the oil-financed expansion of the 1970s. Half of all Iranians now live in
towns, and at the present rate of urbanization more than two-thirds will be
town dwellers by the 1990s.
Urban migration in Iran is primarily a movement of the young, mostly
males. in searc=er employment opportunities and iThare in the
country's new prosperity. Migrants are attracted to two major growth
regions: the plateau cities of the old Persian heartland, especially Tehran,
and the cities of the Khuzestan plain and Persian Gulf coast. The most rapid
growth is occurring in cities with more than 100,000 population, with
attendant structural and environmental problems?not the least of which
are growth limits imposed by finite local water resources.
Iran's new status as an urban-based society?a dramatic change from
thousands of years as a rural society?has important implications for the
new "Islamic republic." The new urbanite is young and materialistic, and
politically a member of a demanding and impatient constituency. A test of
the concepts of government expounded by the new regime will be the ability
of its administrators to create new job opportunities in the cities and to deal
with the urban environmental problems aggravated by large concentrations
of population.
iii Confidential
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Urban Growth in Iran:
One More Problem
The transformation of Iran within a few decades from
a predominantly rural to an urban-based society is one
of the major social and economic changes in that
country. Half of all Iranians now live in towns, and
over 60 percent of the urban core lives in cities with
more than 100,000 population. If urbanization contin-
ues at the present rate?and demographic projections
indicate that it will?more than two-thirds of the
people will be city dwellers by the 1990s. Whatever the
changes in development priorities decreed by the new
Islamic republic, the increasingly urban nature of
Iranian society will be a significant factor in future
plans.
Demographic Indicators
According to the 1976 census, the population of Iran
was 33,391,875. At present, there are close to 37
million people, half of whom live in towns with more
than 5,000 population. Most of the other half, classi-
fied as rural dwellers, live in some 55,000 villages;
individual farmsteads are common only along the well-
watered Caspian Sea coast. Populations in these rural
villages range from several thousand to fewer than 100.
Approximately 1.5 million Iranians are members of
nomadic tribal groups. Generally herdsmen, their
numbers are declining because of permanent settle-
ment and outmigrati7rTurThe young.
Comparisons of birth and death rates, infant mortality,
family size, and data on health, literacy, and income
verify that demographically there are two Trans?one
urban and one rural. For the Iranian with a choice,
urban is better. The overall population growth rate of
Iran is about 3 percent per year. Rural areas register a
3.3-percent rate of natural increase (births over
deaths), but a population gain of only 1.9 percent per
year, as a result of rural to urban migration. The inflow
from rural areas augments the lower urban natural
increase rate to produce an annual urban population
growth rate of 4.8 percent.
1
Confidential
Urban Migration
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Internal migration in Iran has involved about 1.6
annua amounting to a net urban
increase of approximately 387,000 persons each year.
Migration patterns are reflected in comparisons of the
varying growth rates of individual cities and towns over
several censal decades. Gains and losses of population
based on estimated annual growth rates indicate that
step-migration (rural people moving first to small
towns and small-town dwellers in turn moving to large
towns) must be a significant factor in shifts of urban
population. Data suggest that 60 percent of the 25X1
population movement in Iran is interurban, and only
40 percent is rural to urban. 25X1
Migration in Iran is primarily a movement of the
young (one- a o is17'r-'-1.-i71'?r-3uation'Bt'?i-7.-.M'ier years
of age), and a high proportion of the migrants are
males 15 to 24 years old. In rural areas migration
begins at age 10 and peaks at under 20, while urban
youths begin to move in large numbers at age 15.
Among female migrants the peak migration years are
between the ages of 15 and 19, with a higher
proportion of urban females migrating than rural. Age
groups above the age of 30 and below 10 years are 25X1
relatively sedentary; migrants in these age groups are
evenly divided between male and female, suggesting
movement as families. 25X1
Some migrants are students, but most?particularly
those in the high-mobility years of 20 to 24?are
workers seeking better employment opportunities and
a share iritTiranintrity. One in four of
the urban male youths entering the job market is
illiterate or has only a minimal primary school
bac_1=?Z?oun , one to three years; the majority, however,
have at least some secondary or high school education.
Many of the rural youths are illiterate, and among
both- rural and urban groups, the lack of marketable
s ? _is a roblem. Although an increasing minority of
females, about 5 percent, are jobseekers like their 25X1
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Confidential
male counterparts, marriage is their primary reason
for migrating. Even during the present political crisis
and economic disruption, Iranian youth may continue
to migrate to the larger cities, if for no other reason
than to be more directly involved in the Islamic
movement.
The rural exodus and the migration from smaller
urban communities will cause political and manpower
pyoblems for the new government. Complaints already
have been made about rural labor shortages, particu-
larly at harvesttime. A new concern will be the core of
young, illiterate, and unskilled urban unemplo ed in
the urban centers. Consumed by religious zeal and
revolutionary fervor, this group could quickly become
isenc ante wi a regime a may no ea e ec-
tively with its expectations. Should this happen, the
alienated youth may turn to leftist groups such as the
hanks (an organization derived from earlier Marxist
urban guerrilla groups) for leadership
Urban Distribution
The migratory influx has been gravitating toward the
larger Iranian cities, those with more than 100,000
population. Most of these cities are provincial
capitals?the governmental, social, and economic
centers of their respective regions. Some are of recent
origin, but most are centuries old, and a few, such as
Kermanshah, Mashhad, and Hamadan (Ectatana in
Alexander's time) were thriving cities 2,000 years ago.
Metropolitan Tehran, now with close to 5 million
inhabitants, constitutes more than a quarter of the
urban population of Iran. Data, however, suggest that
migration into the older built-up parts of Tehran may
have slowed, beginning in 1974. In fact, during the
decade 1966 to 1976 most of the urban growth in Iran
took place on the fringes of the larger cities, and the
rapid expansion of satellite communities has tended to
further concentrate growth in high-density urban
metropolitan areas. Most of the growth in Esfahan
Province, for example, is in towns within a 50-
kilometer radius of the city of Esfahan. Thus, the
dislocations and environmental constraints associated
with the expansion of metropolitian Tehran are now
being duplicated on a smaller scale in other urban
districts.
Confidential
Migrants have been lured to urban areas in two high-
gm-WE-1700ns, one centered on the plateau cities of
the old Persian heartland and the other on the
Khuzestan plain at the head of the Persian Gulf.
Tehran, which dominates th71ateau cities, has always
been the ultimate goal of most migrants in Iran. The
attraction is partly economic and partly cultural. As an
expanding commercial and industrial center, the area's
em-15W?tnen opportunities have lured large numbers of
people from all levels of -Iranian society. The capital
city as the traditional decisionmaking center of power
draws the upper and middle classes, which tend to
concentrate there, and the amenities of a large
international metropolis attract those who dislike the
conservative life in provincial capitals. In the past, non-
Muslim minorities?the Tabrizi and Esfahani Arme-
nian Christians, the Esfahani and Shirazi Jews, and
the Yazdi and Kermani Zoroastrians?have migrated
to Tehran to escape the confines of segregated quarters
and growing provincial intolerance. Religious intoler-
ance has also forced Baha'i families, members of a
dissenting Islamic sect, to desert provincial towns for
Tehran. Many of these minorities, especially the Jews,
are now frightened and apprehensive of their future
under an Islamic government. Some have been bullied
by local Khomeini committees, and most "foreign"
churches or offices have been placed under guard and
are now being investigated.
In contrast to the centuries-old plateau cities, the
urban centers in Khuzestan are of recent origin,
literally boomtowns that mushroomed after World
War II. They owe their existence tcz oil and gas
processing plants, to locations as transfer points for
seaborne commerce, or to prominence as administra-
tive centers for agro-inaus
economically, the Khuzestan plain, which developed
rapidly in recent years, is one of the most important
regions in Iran. Economic opportunities abound, but
Iranians migrate there reluctantly. For them,
uzestail part o the Arab cultuial
wor?fataiiTTarirriate is too hot, humid, and enervat-
h....Z.-Similar reservations surround the developing
Persian Gulf ports of Bushehr and Bandar-e Abbas,
which make those cities seem remote and unattractive
to many Iranian workers.
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Iran:
Cities of 100,000 or More Population
City
1956 Census
1966 Census
1976 Census
Annual
Growth (%)
1966-76 -
Tehran
1,512,082
2,719,730
4,496,159 '
4.2
Tajrish
NA
157,486
Shahr-e Rey
NA
102,828
Esfahan
254,708
424,045
671,825
4.7
Mashhad
241,989
409,616
670,180
5.1
Tabriz
289,996
403,413
598,576
3.9
Shiraz
170,659
269,865
416,408
4.4
Ahvaz
120,098
206,375
329,006
4.8
Abadan
226,083
272,962
296,081
0.8
Kermanshah
125,439
187,930
290,861
4.5
Qom
96,499
134,292
246,831
6.3
Rasht
109,491
143,557
187,203
2.7
Reza'iyeh
68,000
110,749
163,991
4.0
Hamadan
99,909
124,167
155,846
2.3
Ardebil
66,000
83,596
147,404
5.8
Khorramshahr
44,000
88,536
146,709
5.2
Kerman
62,000
85,404
140,309
5.1
Karaj
NA
44,243
138,774
12.1
Qazvin
66,000
88,106
138,527
4.6
Yazd
64,000
93,241
135,978
3.8
Arak
59,000
71,925
114,507
4.7
Dezful
52,000
84,499
110,287
2.7
Khorramabad
39,000
59,578
104,928
5.8
Borujerd
49,000
71,486
100,103
3.4
NA Data not available.
Tajrish and Shahr-e Rey are included in the 1976 figure for Tehran.
Other urban growth areas center around Tabriz in the
northwest, Mashhad in the northeast, and the southern
oasis cities of Kerman and Shiraz. Of the latter two,
Shiraz, in particular, is attracting more tribal people.
Mashhad is the destination of many seasonal migrants
from the earthquake-prone southern districts of
Khorasan Province and from the desert areas of
Baluchestan and Sistan. Tabriz is the focal center of
the populous Azarbaijan-e, where dialect differences
inhibit immigration from other Iranian regions
As an index of the quality of life, vital statistics
indicate that if urban is better than rural in Iran, the
3
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urban areas of some regions are better than others.
There are significant regional variations in vital
statistics for the urban population of Iran, although
data for the rural population are fairly uniform
throughout the country. Birth rates reflect such factors
as age at marriage, education, and use of contracep-
tives; death rates mirror the general level of develop-
ment, including sanitation, public health, and nutri-
tion. Among urban areas, birth and death rates are
lowest in the highly urbanized north-central part of t125X1
country on the plateau and along the more naturally
favored Caspian Sea coast; they are highest in eastern
Iran and in the west-central mountain provinces.
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Contidentuu
Iran: ,Urban Demographic Patterns, 1979
Turkey\
U.S.S.R.
48
u .
54 Boundary representacon IS
not necessarily authoritative
Krasnovodsk
U. S. S. R.
Astara
Caspian
Sea
Chardzho
Ashkhabad
Rasht
Mashhad
Kushk
Baghdad
?30
jBO tt"rd
fia ib d
Esfahan
fit
Abviz
Birjand
anistan
orraznshabr
Zarand
Keratin
--30?
hag-Saudi Arabia
Neutral Zone
Cishehr
s Quality of Urban Life
high 111medium iow
Based on crude birth rate and
crude death rate by urban residence
Cities with Population over 100,000
* Over 1,000,000
? 500,000 to 1,000,000
0 100,000 to 500,000
Railroad Road
Bandar-e 'AbbRs
Doha
United
Arab n sp 100 15(,) Kilometers
1
Gulf of Oman T
54 Emirates en 0 63 .1 oo 160 Miles
504027 1-79
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The negative aspects of rapid urbanization were
recognized by planning authorities in Iran prior to the
recent revolution. Some preliminary efforts were made
to curb the growth of Tehran, to decentralize educa-
tional, medical, and industrial facilities in the capital
to provincial centers, to restrict the influx of expatriate
workers, and to deal with deteriorating conditions in
the physical environment. The new Islamic govern-
ment may or may not continue these efforts.
Changing Urban Structure
Modernization has had a major impact on the physical
structure of the traditional Iranian city. Foremost was
the introduction of the truck in commerce as a
substitute for pack animals. The twisting lanes and
alleys of the bazaars and residential districts were too
narrow for the truck to penetrate. Where lanes could
not be widened, new broad avenues were laid out
adjacent to the old city auarter, each beginning or
ending with the ubiquitous traffic circle. The more
aggressive, successful merchants relocated to the new
sections_ and the more affluent families who acquired
automobiles for personal use followed them. The
ultimate result of this modernization process is the
combination of urban sprawl, affluence, and the car
(initially a status symbol and eventually a necessity)
thatitac_createcl the_Tehran traffic problem. Tehran is
similar to automobile-dependent Los Angeles in its
pollution-laden air, partly from industrial effluences
but primarily from automobile emissions.
The old residential quarter of the Iranian city in which
rich and poor traditionally lived side by side, differenti-
ated only by the degree of spaciousness behind high
brick walls, has now become segregated by economic
class. The poor remain in the old quarter joined by
burgeoning numbers of migrants, and overcrowding
has produced slum conditions.
Closely spaced mud-brick buildings and narrow alleys
of the old city make installation of modern sewerage
lines extremely difficult, and sanitation conditions in
the crowded quarters continue to worsen. In Tehran,
terrain characteristics underscore a class difference in
sanitation conditions. The newer, wealthier sections of
the metropolis extend up the gravel-based slopes of the
mountains north of the city that provide good percola-
5
tion, while the bazaar and many suburbs of the lower
economic class stretch out over the level, nonporous
subsoil of the desert. Associated with the low levels of
sanitation and their implications for health standards
is the quality of the urban water supply, which is
universally poor in Iran.
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A Geographic Constraint to Urban Growth 25X1
Water is a limiting factor to concentrated urban
growth in arid Iran. Urban areas derive their water
supplies from rivers and from ground water. With
greater densities of population, the pressure on local
water resources has increased, and choices have had to
be made in allocations of water for domestic, indus-
triaj,.,_aLagricgailEaLlse.. In the Esfahan basin, for
example, industrial and domestic requirements now
consume the major share of the Zayandeh River flow,
leaving less and less for irrigation of formerly produc-
tive fields. 25X1
At the next scarcity level, urban areas pirate water
from neighboring districts. Tehran, for example, may
eventually need to take water from sources planned for
another city. Growth limits based on water supply for
the metropolitan area of Tehran are estimated at a
level of 6 million inhabitants?at present growth rates,
less than a decade away. Presently, the Tehran water
supply comes from two reservoirs on mountain streams
north of the city. A third dam is under construction,
the volume of water in the reservoir to be shared 25X1
among Tehran and the cities and agricultural areas on
the northern slopes of the Elburz Mountains. Should25x1
Tehran require more water, it would then have to
expropriate the water of a river presently destined to be
dammed to provide for expanded growth in Qazvin, a
large urban center northwest of the capital.
The ecological limits to urban growth are no less acut25X1
in smaller urban areas dependent on wells and qanats.
The Persians are believed to be the original developers
of the qanat, a system of underground conduits devised
to tap the downslope, subsoil flow of water with
minimal evaporation loss. The digging and mainte-
nance of the qanat's shafts and tunnels is a dangerous
and highly specialized craft, one which attracts fewer
and fewer Iranian workers. Deep, driven wells can
replace qanats to some extent but are limited to areas
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where ground water is available. Moreover, the eco-
logical water balance is delicate. The number of wells
that can be drilled cannot exceed the recharging rate of
thgloimd water re_seigl Ahe ground water
level womId_alssuffect the level of_the water sum:21y
tapped by the qanats. Ams)n2 rural villages, if the
qanat system failsakyillageldds_a,adjile inhabitants
migrate to the local urban center
Water is critical to urban development all along the
Persian Gulf coast except on the Khuzestan plain.
There, the remaining untapped potential in the Karun
River system is one of the factors that makes Ahvaz a
city with high industrial growth potential. Elsewhere
along the coast, desalinization plants may be the most
feasible method of supplementing meager local water
supplies.
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Outlook for Urban Development
The political, economic, and social practices of the new
"Islamic republic," along with the explosive atmos-
phere in the urban centers, could slow the rate of urban
growth. Moreover, migration motivations may be
dulled by the instability and the less cosmopolitan,
more conservative, more religious climate now prevail-
ing in urban areas. In any event, the existing urban
problems of housing, health and sanitation, pollution,
and, more important, the necessity of creating more
jobs have to be dealt with. If the Islamic government
can manage these urban socioeconomic problems
quickly and efficiently, it would dampen the abilities of
leftist forces to foment violence. On the other hand,
failure to resolve these problems could lead to further
disillusionment and impatience among the new urban-
ites, who are young, increasingly literate, and whose
appetites for change have been whetted by direct
action in the streets.
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