ESTABLISHMENT OF FBID WEST AFRICAN BUREAU

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP08T00376R000100130001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 39
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 18, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 27, 1959
• Content Type: MEMO

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SECRET
27 Odtober 1959
MEMORANDUM FOR: Projects Review Committee
THROUGH : Deputy Director (Intelligence)
SUBJECT : Establishment of FBID West African Bureau
The attached project to cover the cost of the establishment
of an FBID West African Monitoring Station in Nigeria is forwarded
for consideration.
ATTACHMENT
Assistant Director for Operations
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PROJECT OUTLINE
Project
West African Monitoring Station
Identification: FBIS - Kaduna
Amendment No. NA
Originating Division: FBID/00
a. Division Chief:
b. Staff Chief:.
Target Area: West Africa, south of the Sahara as far east
as the Chad Basin and the Cameroons, and the
Congo Basin of Central Africa.
Type of Project:
Financial Mechanism:
Funds Requested:
Current Status: New
Broadcast Monitoring
Project
funds for operation through FY 1961 and
budgeted funds thereafter.
.S-E-C-R-E-T
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1. OBJECTIVE:
To establish an FBID African monitoring station to cover West and
Central African broadcasts.
2. ORIGIN:
FBID, as a Service of common concern under a mission assigned to CIA
by NSCID-21 meets requirements for intelligence information through
monitoring of radio broadcasts. Lack of facilities within the range
of West and Central African broadcasting stations prevents FBID from
meeting the requirements of its mission in this increasingly important
area.
3. SITUATION:
Background: In late 1956 FBID conducted a field survey of reception
of African broadcast stations from various points, which indicated
that Accra, Gold Coast was the best technical location for a West
African monitoring station (Tab A). It also showed that the best
monitoring site for North Africa would be the west Mediterranean
island of Mallorca, and that the most practical East African location
would be Asmara. Southern Africa was not surveyed. As it became
clear that each sector constituted a distinct monitoring area not
satisfactorily covered by another, a poll was made in 1957 of potential
consumers within the intelligence community to determine their need
for increased information from the various African areas. Results of
the poll showed that, at that time, interest was too scattered among
the areas to justify the establishment of a station. On the recom-
mendation of several consumers, the community was polled again in
1958. Results of this poll (Tab B) indicated that the trend toward
independence of the West African colonies had created a strong demand
for increased information through monitoring of that area.
Concurrently FBID began to pressure the BBC Monitoring
Service to investigate the possibility of establishing a BBC East '
African monitoring station. The 1956 FBID survey had indicated the
Nairobi area might be an optimum location for East Africa, and the
BBC displayed considerable interest in the matter, pleading only lack
of funds. In late 1958 BBC advised informally that H.M.G. looked
favorably upon the project and authorized a field survey at Nairobi.
In early ally 1959 the Head of the BBC Monitoring Service informally
advised FBID that the composition of the East African Unit had been
decided upon and actual site selection was imminent.
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4. PROPOSAL:
It is proposed that FBI) establish a West African Bureau at Kaduna
Nigeria, as an adjunct to the American Consulate, Kaduna.
5. OPERATIONAL OUTLINE:
a. A tentative timetable has been established for the project to
enable the proposed goal:
* It is illegal for foreigners to own land in Nigeria; however
foreigners are permitted to engage in long-term leases of 40 and 99
years. The U.S. Consulate at Kaduna, established during the past
year in rented space, is currently constructing permanent quarters
under a 99 year lease.
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30 October 1959
Submission of construction specifications
by MD to RE&CD/OL.
15 November 1959 Formal request to Departmeht of State.
15 December 1959 Completion of building plans by RE&CD/OL.
January 1960 Begin planning of Materiel procurement.
15 January 1960 British-Nigerian approval.
1 February 1960 Advance party to Nigeria.
1 March 1960 Deadline for land procurement.
1 April 1960 Begin construction.
1 May 1960 Begin recruiting of staff.
1 June 1960 Begin training of staff.
30 June 1960 Beneficial occupancy.
1 July 1960 Begin on-the-job training.
1 August 1960 Deadline for arrival of regular U.S. staff.
1 September 1960 - Commence service to Washington and London.
1 October 1960 Commence service to Govt. of Nigeria.
b. Key Personnel - To be selected from FBID classified roster.
c. Indigenous Personnel - Nigerians will be recruited to the extent
they qualify for monitoring and support positions. French monitors
will in all likelihood be imported, and it maybe necessary to import
other foreign nationals as keymen around whom can be developed indigenous
English and vernacular monitoring staffs. As the bulk of monitoring
will be in English and French, competency in these languages is most
Important. An indigenous radio technician will also be needed, but
other indigenous types will be clerical and ancillary.
d. Targets - All broadcasting stations in the area of Map I, Tab C.
e.. Duration - Permanent.
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b. Training: Bureau will conduct own monitor training course
along established FBIS lines.
c. Material: All technical equipment will have to be procured in
the U.S. and shipped to site. Only basic construction materials are
available locally.
d. Communications: Commercial facilities will be employed to London,
and existing FBIS facilities from London to Washington. The full file
will be dropped to BBC Caversham.
f. Support required from other U.S. agencies:
(1) Negotiations with Governments of United Kingdom and Nigeria
by the Department of State. This support has been verbally
assured by Department of State officials.
(2) Contracting and liaison service with contractors in Nigeria
and with Nigerian Government by the American Consul General,
Lagos. This is standard service upon certification of avail-
able funds.
11. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS:
a. Current status: A proposal, established by consumer demand and
based on specific field survey work in the operating area. Technical
tests and political soundings assure its feasibility. Approval and
funding will enable immediate steps toward implementation.
b. Commitments: It is understood by the host Government and by the
British that the full unclassified product of the bureau would be
made available to them
c. Effectiveness: N.A.
C- R- E- T
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d. Anticipated results: The bureau would fill a significant existing
gap in coverage of Africa. Approximately 80% of transmitters in the
West and Central African area Nap I, Tab C) will be monitorable at
one time or another, according to test results.
e. Evaluation: The project will be evaluated by annual consumer
survey and by monthly production analyses in the same manner as all
FBIS field operations. No special support is required.
f. Policy questions: No new or unrefined policy questions.
g. Congress: No known Congressional implications.
j. Special considerations: N.A.
k. Liquidation: N.A.
-ATTACHMENTS.:
Tab A - Summary of 1956 West African Survey
? Tab B - 1957 & 1958 Consumer Poll on Africa
Tab C - Summary of 1959 West African Survey
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TAB A
SUMMARY OF PART II: WEST AFRICA MONITORING SURVEY
Conducted September 1956
FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
Washington 25, D. C.
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PART TWO: WEST AFRICA
I. Objective:
To assess (1) the nature of the coverage problem and (2) the
technical potential of Accra as a site for monitoring broadcasts
originating in the West African area.
II. Definition:
West Africa as referred to in this report includes those areas
falling into a natural zone of regional radio conditions consonant
with the objective of this study; specifically, that portion of
Africa bounded more or less by longitudes 20?W and 20?E, by the
Tropic of Cancer on the north and by latitude 50 S. This includes
West Africa south of the Sahara, offshore islands, and portions of
French Equatorial Africa and the Belgian Congo.
III. The Facts:
A. Geographic
1. Accra has two distinct and important advantages as a
potential monitoring site for West Africa. First it is as close,
from a practical standpoint, as one can get to the geographic
center of a natural target area, political, linguistic and radio
receptionwise. Secondly it has an atypical climate unique to the
area, characterized by favorable habitability for white people and
by a lack of the frequent severe local electrical disturbances
which hamper monitoring at many other West African points. Rain-
fall between 100 and 200 inches per year and 100 days per year with
numerous thunderstorms is the rule along the Guinea Coast, but at
Accra the average is respectively only 27 inches and 11 days per
year, minimum for the inhabited area. Temperatures run in the 70's
and 80's normally, with high humidity.
2. Accra lies about 1100 miles southeast of Dakar and the
same distance northwest of Brazzaville-Leopoldville, the extreme
regional targets. Most of the targets fall in the range 200-800mi.,
just beyond the limits which most of these tropical band trans-
missions are designed to cover. For the frequencies involved the
propagational cut-off of reception is very sharp around the
periphery of the area, and more distant African broadcasters are
not normally audible.
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B. Linguistic
1. Since West Africa has been almost entirely under the
control of the principal West European powers, the development
of broadcasting in its first decade (1935-1945) emphasized
service to the European settlers and local literates in the
European languages; this served mainly as a supplement to the
not always reliable reception from the mother country. In the
past decade (1946-1956) such factors as enlightened colonial
policy, increased education, nationalist aspirations, and Islamic
expansionism have created a need for broadcasting to the indigenous
populations. Where ten years ago there was no vernacular broad-
casting in West Africa, today there are broadcasts in 45 indigenous
languages and dialects.
2. This rapid development has nevertheless only scratched the
surface, for the bulk of the area population still lacks access to
radio receivers, wired outlets, or public distribution speakers.
Furthermore, there remain millions of inhabitants speaking more
than 300 additional languages and dialects for whom programming as
well as technical facilities need be developed before they are ade-
quately reached. Broadcasting problems, which are already complicated,
are potentially far more so.
3. The total population of this West African area is estimated
to be at least 77,000,000. It is estimated that the 45 vernaculars
already employed in broadcasts are spoken by 43,000,000 persons.
In contrast the 5 European languages employed are spoken by less
than 2,000,000 persons. Although the long-range implications seem
clear, the fact remains that the ratio of languages used is nine
vernaculars for one European; the program output ratio is five
hours European for every one of vernacular. There seems little
doubt the European languages will dominate broadcasting for some
years simply because-there are no better linguistic common denomi-
nators in the area.
C. Technical
1. Domestic wireless broadcasting in West Africa has developed
?ou short-wave as is traditional in the tropics. High static levels
which normally prevail make use of medium-wave impractical for distance
coverage, although in the past few years use of low power medium-wave
transmitters for local urban coverage has become increasingly popular.
The skip phenomenon, which usually negates the usefulness of short-wave
for regional broadcasting, has been circumvented by the use of special
antenna designs with 3 and 4 megacycle band transmissions, providing
a continuous strong signal blanket over a relatively limited area.
These bands are so much lower than the tropical MUF and OWF for
international transmission that interference normally does not occur
between them nor among the several tropical broadcast zones around the
world.
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2. Almost every country and territory broadcasting in West
Africa has adopted this system, totally or in part. This is one
important reason why monitoring of the area cannot be accomplished
satisfactorily outside of the area, and why some transmitters are
not easily monitored even within the area. Tropical band broad-
casting seems to be a firmly established pattern in West Africa,
and there is every indication that it will remain so for some con-
siderable time.
3. Locations of the,verious broadcasting stations in the
target area are shown below, along:with statistics on their output
and average monitorability in the Accra area.
("Bulletins" refers to news, comment, press reviews, etc. including
regional or local information.)
No. of
No.'Daily
No. Bulletins
Bloc
Source Languages
Bulletins
Monitorable Reception
Independent
Accra
7
15
15
Excellent
Monrovia
7
3
3
Very good
British
Lagos
4
8
8
Excellent
il
Ibadan
5
2i
2i
Very good
it
Enugu
4
3
3
Good -
1,
it
Kaduna
Freetown
6
3
2i
4*
2i
3
Good
Fair/Good
French
Dakar**
7
15
12
Very good
U
St. Louis
4
3*
0
nil
tl
Conakry
1*
2
0
nil
II
Abidjan
4
8
7
Good
ft
Lome
3
4*
3*
Fair/Good
n
Cotonou
5
7
6
Good
t,
te
n
Douala
Yaounde
Brazzaville
3
3
4
3i
1
3.-
1
li
2-1-
Fair
Good
Good
"
Fort Lamy
4
3
2
Fair
Belgian
Leopoldville***9
10
10
Very good
Portuguese
Bissau
1
2
2
Fair/Good
Cape Verde**
1
Fair
Sao Tome
1
2
2
Fair/Good
Spanish
Fernando Po
4
0
Very poor
Bata
1
1
0
Poor
* unconfirmed
** two stations
*** three stations
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Logistics
1. There is ample space around Accra suitable for a monitoring
operation; avoiding interference sources as the airport and the rela-
tively few local radio transmitters presents no great problem. On
recommendation of the American Consulate no time and effort was wasted
in seeking specific potential sites during the survey. Because of
land title problems, the appropriate time to do this is after a de-
cision is made to act.
2. Poles are locally available for antenna masts, but virtually
all other construction materials and equipment must be imported.
3. Action moves leisurely in Ghana and maximum leadtime is
usually necessary. Labor costs tend to look deceivingly low if
allowance is not made for the larger labor force required for most
operation than is the rule in certain other areas in which FBIS
operates. Housing for new residents is very scarce and for transient
visitors most difficult. The Ambassador Hotel, completed for Inde-
pendence Day this month, is the hotel of Accra; the Ringway, a small
older hotel, is also acceptable. Reportedly reservations must still
be made well in advance, the earlier the better.
4. Construction costs in general run slightly lower than in
the United States. Figures vary with type, size and standards of
construction and furbishing, but the most commonly applied figure
for an acceptable class of structure appropriate to this problem is
3 pounds per square foot, equal to 0.50 per square foot. Reliable
electric power (230v.) is available at many locations.
5. A vehicle for transportation of personnel must be provided
any new operation. All principal necessities and 'amenities are avail-
a11e in Accra.
6. Satisfactory telegraphic communication exists to London and
New York. The regular, government and press rates to New York are
$0.23, 0.115 and 0.065 respectively and to London $0.181 0.09 and
0.045 respectively. Good air service to West Europe exists via BOAC,
Safari, Air France and PAA. Although port conditions at Accra limit
handling to small freight, anything else can be handled through
Takoradi or the nearby new port of Tema. Shipping is relatively
frequent and expeditious.
IV. Discussion:
A. The physical advantages of Accra are evident. Comprehensive
regional monitoring of West Africa would be Very difficult without
feivorable climatic features. Even so, monitoring, =eh of which
needs be done after darkness, is by no means an easy task. The
"tropical band" transmissions are within the high frequency spectrum
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affected by unstable ionospheric layer conditions prevalent at night
over tropical Africa and causing the ubiquitous flutter-fade which
chops most signals in varying degrees.
B. Ideally, to realize maximum return from the monitoring effort,
diversity reception should be employed. This would at least double
the cost of antennas and equipment, would increase operating expenses,
and would inherently complicate technical and operational require-
ments. The extra investment might not in practice yield a suffici-
ently better product to justify the cost and effort. Therefore it
would seem best to install a conventional facility, planning it with
a potential for developing to a diversity basis if later required.
The fade condition should receive technical study, as other means of
combatting it may be learned or developed experimentally.
C. A five-position monitoring station, with an added position for
cruising (search) operations and another for press intercept, should
be adequate to handle coverage in the immediately foreseeable future.
Two-shift operation, 0530-1330 and 1630-0030 GMT, with a few people
bridging the gap by working a standard day shift, would enable cover-
age of everything-of-possible interest and value. The small, compact
monitoring staff is achieved because no great vernacular versatility
seems required at this time.
D. The 45 indigenous languages still constitute a minor portion of
the total output when compared with the time devoted to the several
European languages. Projecting curves of the development of verda-
cular versus European programming into the next decade, it would
appear that vernacular programming will overtake European language
programming. However certain factors may increasingly tend to slow
the vernacular trend, particularly the cost of multiple-language
services and the indispensability of the European language programming.
The past, present and future dominance of the latter should strengthen
the position of both English and French as a lingua franca, for which
the need will become greater as regional intercourse develops. Thus
it is considered that the next decade will tend to approach a balanced
situation between European and vernacular output by total volume,
though not by individual language importance.
E. Fortunately vernacular broadcasting in West Africa is still in a
relatively early stage of development, and there is extensive dupli-
cation and repetitiveness between it and European programming. An
efficient, comprehensive monitoring operation can be conducted in
the European languages, mainly English and French, and may be expected
to remain the nucleus of effort for at least the next decade, and
undoubtedly for longer. This does not preclude the possible value of
some vernacular monitoring, but demonstrates that staffing can be
essentially uncomplicated and economical. Development of verna-
cular monitoring may proceed on a conservative basis without Quixotic
effort and expense being wasted jousting what superficially appears
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to be a burgeoning challenger. Nevertheless, development of verna-
cular broadcasting must be kept under careful surveillance and needs
for it reviewed periodically.
V. Conclusions:
A. West Africa comprises a distinct radio broadcasting zone, both
in terms of reception and vernacular languages.
B. Successful comprehensive monitoring of West Africa can be
accomplished only within the area, and Accra appears to have the
best potential among practicable sites.
C. ?A small but specific body of broadcast local and regional
information flowing with reasonable regularity is available for
monitoring.
D. A productive and economical monitoring operation can be based
on principal effort in the several European languages. The compli-
cated vernacular situation will not pose an early threat to the
efficiency of this operation.
E. If the Goysrnment of Ghana is going to undertake international
broadcasts to Africa, as is presently intended, it will have a need
for West African monitoring.
VI. Recommendation:
From a technical and non-political viewpoint the Accra area should
be considered not only an adequate location but also the most practi-
cable and desirable for basing a West African monitoring operation,
provided appropriate caution is exercised with respect to location of
local radio transmitting facilities.
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Office Memorandum ? UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
TO : Chief, FBID
FROM : Chief, Field Operations Staff
DATE: 14 January 1959
SUBJECT: African Broadcast Monitoring
REF : Memorandum dated 17 October 1958 from the Assistant Director for
Operations to selected U.S. Government Offices, Subject: African
Broadcast Monitoring.
1; The reference memorandum was transmitted to 17 potential con-
sumers of African Broadcast Monitoring. This was the second such con-
sumer survey, the first having been completed 21 October 1957. At
that time a twofold decision was reached: 1) the degree of interest
among potential users of African coverage did not warrant the estab-
lishment of new monitoring facilities in the face of existing budget-
ary and other practical limitations; and 2) operational planning for
this project would be suspended for one year. Also, a series of
inquiries to the BBC during the year pressed the British as to their
African interests and plans, and the reply has been included with
survey results.
2. The responses to the 17 October 1958 survey have been
encouraging and generally have indicated a more intense, more posi-
tive, and more enlightened interest in the project. To assist eval-
uation of the replies, strong indications have been tabulated as A
priority, moderate indications as B priority and weak or minor indi-
cations as C priority; negative interest as N. (See attachments A
and B.) By combining A and B priorities into a single unit we find
the following significant changes in respect to interest in target
areas as gauged by the number of preference for Zone I (North Africa),
II (West Africa) and III (East and Central Africa):
Zone I Zone II Zone III
----Number of Preferences)
1958Survey
1957 Survey
7
13 8
5 5
Considering the A priority alone, the difference between the two
surveys are as follows:
Zone I Zone II Zone III
--Number of Prefere'ETWT---
1958 Survey 5 6 4
1957 Survey 7 2 1
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3. From either of the above comparisons the increased interest
in Zone II as the primary target in three possible areas is quite
apparent -- a 240% increase, using the first basis for comparison,
and 300% using the other. A slightly decreased interest in Zone I
is apparent from the second comparison. Interest in broadcasts from
and to East Africa has increased almost to the level of North African
interest.
4. Not only has the reaction been altered quantitatively, but
the substantive comment has also been more meaningful. In some cases
this more positive approach has served to alter preferences made by
some offices in the first survey; in other cases the comment clearly
strengthened preferences which remained unchanged from the first
survey. A sampling of these excerpted comments follows:
Assistant Director for Current Intelligence
"Primary attention should continue to be devoted to North Africa...
There is however increasing need for monitoring the broadcasts of West
Africa where rapid political evolution is taking place... more coverage
of the East African area is recommended."
Assistant Director for National Estimates
"We continue to believe that an increase of FBIS reporting on
Africa could provide a significant amount of intelligence on the area.
The expansion of-radio facilities in West Africa, and increased emissions
from Cairo lead us to believe that the net gains to be obtained from
additional monitoring activity in Africa south of the 'Sahara are
becoming increasingly important. This, when considered with the generally
low coverage given African developments by the intelligence community
as a whole, provides further justification for the extension of
monitoring facilities in this area."
Director, Office of Intelligence Research and Coordination/State
"Inasmuch as North African Coverage is now adequate, is appears
that West Africa should be given priority in any plan for extending
radio monitoring operations in Africa.
"In view of the forthcoming inauguration of the Ghana External
Service (scheduled for 1959) and the rapid pace of political develop-
ments, especially in the French territories, the Intelligence Bureau
of the Department feels there will be a definite need for increased
radio monitoring of Zone II (West Africa) within the next year.
Moreover, since expansion of Foreign Service posts will probably not
be able to match the scope and speed of political activity in this
area in the foreseeable future, FBIS monitoring would offer the only
suitable means available for covering a complex area."
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- Director, Office of Research and Intelligence/USIA
"We mould now assign equal secondary priority to Zone II (West
Africa) primarily because of the rapid political evolution of the area
specifically French Africa - which suggest that independent trans-
missions, no longer under French control, will soon be forthcoming
from much of this area, i.e., Guinea and Sudan. The development of
the Pan-African movement presently centered in Accra emphasizes the
previously stated necessity of monitoring the proposed external trans-
missions of Ghana. Monitoring of Nigerian transmissions will increase
in importance as independence nears."
Operations Coordinating Board
"...00B's interest in Africa has been intensified in a number of
concrete ways during the Past year. We now have a fulltime senior staff
member, who works on that area. OCB has or shortly 25X1
will have papers covering every country in Africa... . With the actual
inception of work on these papers OCB's interest in African Broadcast
monitoring has naturally increased. In areas where your material is
available it is most valuable... ."
Assistant Director for Research and Reports
"...developments in the Near East and adjacent areas during this
period have led to a quickening of interest in certain African areas in
some important elements of the Office. For example, the rapid economic
and political developments since 1957 have led to a steadily increasing
interest in the nature, extent, and probable impact of Soviet economic
penetration activities upon selected areas of Africa, especially West
Africa. In terms of geographic intelligence needs, the increasing
number of independent entities in East and West Africa suggests that
there will be a greater need for studies involving one or more aspects
of unconventional warfare. Some of these would include assessment of
local feelings, and political activities and aspirations. There appears
to be a trend toward "neutralism", and in some cases, animosity, toward
the west, which will probably lead to a reduction in the ability of
field personnel to obtain and to report significant information. In
light of these developments, any improvement in FBIS coverage which
might add to our knowledge or compensate for deficiencies in conventional
reporting, mould be most helpful."
Head of BBC Monitoring Service
"After much consideration our official consumers here have at last
expressed intense interest in monitoring (East Africa), particularly in
the African 'languages... ."
S-E-p-R-E-T
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S-E-C-R-E-T
- 4 -
...North Africa in particular is an area in which we feel...there
could be some development (in monitoring)."
4. Aside from monitoring transmitters located within the several
coverage areas, potential users have also indicated specific interest
in external transmissions beamed to specific areas throughout the African
continent. This is especially true of State's Bureau of African Affairs
which is particularly interested in propaganda broadcasts from Egypt,
India, other Middle Eastern or Soviet bloc areas directed toward countries
of Africa south of the Sahara. and Radio Cairo broadcasts to the Maghreb
and to the Horn.
OBE and USIA also
indicated strong interest in the pressures exerted by Cairo Radio in
s cific areas of the African continent. In addition, State 25X1
expressed interest in monitoring coverage of Zone IV South 25X1
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Africa .
5. Of the 18 "consumers" solicited, two of whom are not regular
users of FIS service, five (2&) produced entirely negative responses:
OBI, OCR, OSO (Defense Department), AFCIN, and NSA.
6. The foregoing summarizes the reaction of potential consumers
of African coverage solicited in the second survey. Aggregately, they
have evinced a far stronger interest than in 1957. The turn of political
events, the persistent clamor for independence on the part of African
colonies, the growing solidarity of African blocs, and plans for increased
radio broadcasting services throughout the African continent, notably
Ghana, have all left their mark in the thinking being done among U.S.
intelligence agencies. These circumstances have also led to a definite
shift in emphasis from North Africa to West Africa in respect to area?
coverage priorities. A requirement for action in West Africa is clearly
indicated.
(s)
ATTACHMENTS:
A. Tabulation of Zones and Priorities - 1958 Survey
B. Tabulation of Zones and Priorities - 1957 Survey
S-E-C41,E-T
25X1
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S-E-C-R-E-T
1958 Survey
Organization
CIA OBI
ATTACHMENT A
Zones and Priorities
I II III
North Africa West Africa East Africa
OCI A
oaR
OHE
ORR
A
A
DEFENSE
OSO
ACSI
AFCIN
ONI
STATE NE/A A
OIRC
OTHER NSA
? OCB
USIA A
BBC
A - 5
B - 2
C - 5
N- 6
S-E-C-R-E-T
A- 6
B- 7
e - 0
N- 5
A
A
A
A - 3
B - 6
C - 4-
N - 5
25X1
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S-E-C-R-E-T
ATTACHKENT B
1957 Survey Zones and Priorities
I II III
North Africa West Africa East Africa
Organization
CIA OBI
OCI
OR
ONE
ORR
A
A
A
DEFENSE OSO
ACSI
AFCIN
ONI
STATE NE/A A
OIRC
Otitite NSA A
OCB A
USIA A
BBC
A - 7
B - 1
c -
N- 8
S-E-C-R-E-T
A
A - 2
B - 4
C-2
N- 9
A
A
A - 2
B - 3
C - 3
N- 9
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S-E-C-R-E-T
TAB C
TAB C - SUMMARY OF WEST AFRICAN TRIP- JULY 1959
During the month Of July 1959, FBIS conducted a survey of
NOrthern 'Nigeria and Liberia, areas Which are considered politically
and technically suitable for the establishment of a monitoring station.
Cities. visited in Northern Nigeria included Jos, Kaduna, Zaria,
and Kano, and in Liberia, the Rbbertsfield area.
Reception results generally indicate that any one of the areas
tested is suitable for monitoring the main transmitters of West and
Central Africa after dark.
Atmospheric disturbances were fever during the test period in
Liberia than Nigeria, and because of Liberia's location, the most
Western African transmitters are received better there. This fact .
will become less important, however, when Guinea, the most important
target in the area, completes the planned installation of high power
transmitters. Good reception of Conakry should then be possible
from Nigeria.
Nigeria is a better area from Which to cover Central African
broadcasts, not only because of its proximity, but because reception
of the tropic band frequencies is best after dark, and darkness arrives
In Nigeria more than an hour before it does in Liberia.
Serious interference to broadcast monitoring in Liberia could
be caused bythe large Voice of America; . relay station planned for
installation near Monrovia in 1961. Other considerations which make
Liberia a less favorable location for a monitoring station than Nigeria
are: the absence of any rental quarters in the Robert afield area,
which necessitates the outlay of a large sum for construction of hous-
ing for both African and U.S. personnel; employment of a Special staff
for housing and operations building maintenance; high communication
rates between Liberia and U.S., and poor, costly communications to
London (communications between Nigeria and London benefit from Common-
wealth preference rates); and the morale problem which might .arise from
the isolation of the Rbbertsfield area.
Of the areas visited in Nigeria, radio reception at Jos was best
during the test; however, it has the highest incidence of disruptive
atmospheric noise in the Northern Region. British communications
engineers who have worked throughout the Northern Region state that
atmospherics cause less interference with reception in areas north of
the Plateau, because of the shorter rainy season and lover frequency
of electrical storms. Also, Jos is dependent on vulnerable landline
communications'.
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S-E-C-R-E-T
Zaria appeared to be the most pleasant place to live among
Nigeria's limited choices, and it has more favorable atmospheric
conditions from a radio standpoint as well; however, because of
its dependence on unreliable landline communications to Kaduna, it
is not recommended. Lagos and Kano while having communication
advantages, are least suitable climatically
Kaduna has climatic and radio conditions more resembling Zaria
than Jos. Intercept as adequate of all normally significant targets
except Conakry. There follow a summary of current target broadcast
output and its monitorability in the Kaduna area:
Source
No. of
NO. Daily
NO. Bulletins
Reception
Bloc
Station
Languages
Bulletins
Manitorable
At Kaduna
Independent
Accra
8
18
18
Good
Monrovia
10 plus
plus
3 plus
Fair
Conakry
3
14. plus
0
Poor to
Nil (Intf)
British
Lagos,
ibadan
11.
14.
12
2 plus
12
2 plus
Good
Good
Enugu
3
4
4
Good
Kaduna
6
3
3
Excellent
Freetown
9
4
0
Poor to
Nil (Intf)
French
Dakar **
11
14
' 10
Very Good
St Louis
4
4
2
Fair*
Abidjan
8
10
6
Fair
Lome
. 5
6
4
Fair
Cotonou
6
9
3
Fair*
Douala
4
8
4
Fair*
Garoua
. 4?
7
3
Fair*
Yaounde
2
8
3
Fair*
Brazzaville **
8
22
18
Good
Fort Lamy
4
5
3
Fair
Bamako
5
5
2
Fair*
Niamey
3
5
3
Good*
Bangui
2
3
2
Fair*
Belgian
Leopoldville ***
9
20
15
Good
Portuguese
Bissau
1
2
0
Poor to
Nil --
Sao Tome
1
2
1
Fair *
S-E-C-R-E-T
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Source
S-E-C-R-E-T
No. of
No. Daily
No. Bulletins
Reception
Bloc
Station
Languages
Bulletins
Monitorable
At Kaduna
Portuguese
Cape Verde ***
1
3
0
Poor to
Nil
Spanish
Fernando Po
5
3
Fair *
Bata
1
2
1
Fair *
* Estimate based on limited observation
**'LTWO stations in same city
*** Three stations in same city
Kaduna, which is the capital of Northern Nigeria, has some
available African hou$ing for rental and has contractors who are will-
ing to build European-type housing for short-term lease. This would
minimize the initial cost of the station's establishment. In addition
to the housing and reception factors, Kaduna has the following unique
advantages: direct high-quality, law-cost VHF radio communications
link with Lagos, the international communications terminal; proximity
of the American Consulate, Which can provide some administrative
support; special school facilities Which are to be coMpleted in 1961;
and the ease of maintaining liaison with the Regional government,
which appeared favorably disposed to an FBIS operation.
For these reasons Kaduna is recommended as the best location for
the West African Bureau. .
ATTACHMENTS:
Map I - The West and Central African Target Area
II - Metropolitan Plan of Greater Kaduna
S-E-C-R-E-T
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\
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LEGEND
Target Transn'iitter
Area Tested
so-p.
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I if A tr4
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Aga.?M No .? oco. tbe
nook of ? ran, wes too
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GREATER
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PLAN N9
IPO 488
ILLEGIB
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S-E7C-R-E-T
TAB E
COST ESTIMATES - KADUNA
The following cost figures are based on the
building construction at Kaduna starting
1 April 1960, recruiting and training of
monitoring staff to begin 1 June and the
bureau to be in operation by early Fall.
S-E-C-R-E-T-
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