CHINA'S POLICY TOWARD KOREA: A DELICATE BALANCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP08S02113R000100170001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 8, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 15, 1980
• Content Type: REPORT

/5" 4444:4 ro
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/08: CIA-RDPO8S02113R000100170001-0
OPA
China's Policy Toward Korea: A Delicate Balance
In talks with Americans., Japanese, and others, the
Chinese have sought to convey a message that they share
the interest in maintaining stability on the Korean
peninsula and that North Korea does not pose a threat
to South Korea. The current round of talks between Pyongyang
and Seoul serves Beijing's interests, but the Korean
question presents delicate problems for the Chinese in
managing their relationships with North Korea and the
United States.
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Both Beijing and Pyongyang have begun to , 25X1
acknowledge the strains in the Sino - North Korean relation-
ship. In March, 'North Korean diplomats conveyed their
government's belief that, although the Chinese officially
support Korean reunification, they actually oppose it.
The Chinese have not been as
willing to acknowledge that the relationship has deteri-
orated to this extent,
A Change of Emphasis
The friction between China and North Korea has arisen
from Beijing's moves toward increasingly expanded relations
with the United States and Japan. In the face of strong
US and Japanese ties with South Korea, the Chinese have
felt compelled to ;e:..-"?-t_Anterests regarding the
Korean peninsula. Consequently, Chifis moderated its
previous strident propaganda backing for North Korea and
has sought to portray a propitious atmosphere for promoting
peace and stability on'the peninsula through talks between
Pyongyang and Seoul. Stability in Korea is vital to the
Chinese interests in expanding relations with the United
States and Japan; it also allows the Chinese leadership to
concentrate on economic modernization.
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/08: CIA-RDPO8S02113R000100170001-0
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For the Chinese, however, an improvement in Soviet -
North Korean relations remains a worrisome prospect,
especially given Pyongyang's deep suspicions of Beijing's
closer relations with Washington and Tokyo. The North Koreans
still stress that the United States--not the Soviet Union--
is "the number-one enemy of world peace" and view China's
expanding relations with the United States and Japan as
threatening to traditional Sino - North Korean ties. It has
thus been necessary for China to try to strike a balance
between continued support for North Korea and assurances
to the United States and Japan that Pyongyang will not
cause trouble.
The Reunification Issue
Beijing has welcomed Pyongyang's recent initiatives
that resulted in the current North-South contacts, as they
serve China's interest in mitigating the mutual hostility
that endangers stability on the peninsula. With this ovef-
riding interest in stability, Beijing has moved toward
accepting the status quo in Korea and even tacitly approv-
ing "two Koreas." As a result, the Chinese,
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have emphasized 25X1
that China perceives reunification as a long-term develop-
ment.?
15 April 1980
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/08: CIA-RDPO8S02113R000100170001-0
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While maintenance of the Korean status quo serves
China's interests regarding relations with the United
States and Japan, the relaxation of tensions also enables
Beijing to pursue other interests. The Chinese are not
totally unreceptive to contacts with South Korea, as its
more industrialized economy offers opportunities in terms
of technology and markets.
In light of North Korean sen-
sitivities, however, the Chinese at present cannot openly
pursue diplomatic or economic relations--or even admit
the desire to do so--with South Korea.
There are limits to how far China can reorient its
Korean policy given Beijing's interest in maintaining
leverage in Pyongyang. The Chinese will continue to
encourage the Korean reunification talks, publicly
supporting North Korean statements and positions but
muting the more inflammatory rhetoric that could impair
relations with the United States, Japan and, indirectly,
South Korea. As long as the North - South Korean talks
serve both Pyongyang's and Beijing's interests, China
should be able to maintain a balance between support for
North Korea and continued development of Sino-American
and Sino-Japanese relations. If, however, tensions on the
Korean peninsula threaten the uneasy stability there, the
Chinese will be fa:ER-With difficult choices in pursuing
their Korean policy.
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Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/08: CIA-RDP08502113R000100170001-0