NORTH KOREAN STRATEGY AND TACTICS: AN APPRAISAL

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP08S02113R000100120001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 20, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 1, 1978
• Content Type: REPORT

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National YlI WIO -r
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Foreign
Assessment
Center
INS COI AS
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North Korean Strategy and
Tactics: An Appraisal
A Research Paper
? Kin /1. -5ciA/6
1;106,0t.
Secret
RP 78-10127
April 1978
Copy N2 1 8 5
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North Korean Strategy and Tactics:
An Appraisal
Central Intelligence Agency
National Foreign Assessment Center
April /978
Key Judgments
A study of North Korean strategy and tactics suggests that Kim Il-song's
policy toward the South has been most heavily influenced by external
factors?changes in US, Soviet, and Chinese policy toward Korea and political
developments in South Korea. Internal factors, however, have acted as a
restraint on North Korea's reunification policy at times when Kim has been
preoccupied with economic problems or political friction within the North
Korean leadership, as in the mid and late 1950s.
Eight factors' can be identified as the major influences that have shaped
Kim's policies since 1950:
? The US commitment to defend South Korea against an attack from the
North.
? Soviet and Chinese support for reunification on Kim's terms.
? The attitude of the South Korean Government toward negotiating
reunification with the North.
? Political stability in South Korea.
? North Korean military capabilities.
? Pyongyang's economic situation.
? Kim's power position in the North Korean leadership.
? North Korea's international position relative to South Korea.
In Kim's view, optimum conditions for an attack on the South would be:
no US military commitment to defend South Korea; strong Soviet and Chinese
support for North Korean military action; political instability in the South,
with strong indigenous support for military intervention from the North; a
clear-cut military advantage on the part of the North over the South;
satisfactory economic progress in the North; and no challenge to Kim's
authority.
For a graphic presentation of Kim's assessment of these factors over the past 30 years, see the
Appendix.
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Given Kim's past behavior, the next five years are likely to be a period in
which internal economic problems and military development will take
precedence over aggressive pursuit of reunification. This does not mean that
reunification will be abandoned as a long-term goal?at least while Kim
lives?but that it will be relegated to a secondary position, as it was from 1961
to 1965. Kim's tactics will be suited to his immediate objective of improving
relations with the US and solving North Korea's foreign trade problems. He
will keep his options open, however, by maintaining a subversive capability?
one of the best in the world?and building up his conventional military forces
as well.
The one development?however unlikely?that could alter this general
outlook would be the sudden emergence of widespread political instability in
the South. In that case, or in the even more unlikely event of an armed
uprising against Pak, Kim might switch to the -revolutionary- tactics of the
late 1960s, without regard for the effect this would have on North Korea's
relations with the US, Japan, and the rest of the non-Communist world. He is
not likely to risk the diplomatic gains of the past five years, or, the possibility of
improved relations with the US and Japan, unless the odds of overthrowing
Pak appear high.
In the meantime, he will continue to exert pressure for Pak's removal by
an active diplomatic campaign against Seoul and incessant calls for Pak's
overthrow. He is not likely to consider any softening of his position toward
Pak, such as the resumption of North-South talks, while strains are apparent in
the US-ROK relationship over US troop withdrawals, the Tongsun Park case,
US human rights policy, and US-ROK trade differences.
Although North Korea has registered its dissatisfaction with the gradual
and partial nature of scheduled US troop withdrawals, Pyongyang is likely to
continue to court the Carter administration in hopes of opening a dialogue
with Washington. Kim seems sincerely interested in negotiating a peace
treaty, mutual force reductions on the Korean Peninsula, the establishment of
diplomatic relations with the US and Japan, and trade and aid agreements.
Beyond that, he would relish the effect that US - North Korean bilateral talks
would have on South Korea and on US-ROK relations. He is likely to persist in
his bid for talks with the US even in the face of official US denials of any
interest in bilateral contacts.
Whether this period of relative calm, like the 1961-65 interlude, will be
the quiet before the storm, as in 1967-68, depends largely on US actions and
South Korea's response. Kim is already planning for the day when US troops
leave Korea. It is almost inevitable, at that point, that South Korea will face a
stepped-up subversive threat from the North?assuming that Kim lives that
long. If Kim dies within the next five years or so, the struggle for power that
would probably ensue would tend to be a restraining factor that over the near
term would weigh against a militarily aggressive policy.
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CONTENTS
Page
Key Judgments
The Korean War: A Disastrous Miscalculation
1
Bitter Lessons and Limited Opportunities
1
The Emergence of a Revolutionary Strategy
2'
New Directions in the 1970s
3
The US Troop Withdrawal
5
Kim's Various Options
6
Prospects
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Appendix
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Kim II-song
President of North Korea
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North Korean Strategy and Tactics: An Appraisal
The Korean War: A Disastrous Miscalculation
Kim's decision to attack South Korea in June
1950 seems to have been based on his assessment
of three external factors: the US response to an
invasion by the North, the political situation in
South Korea, and Soviet and Chinese support for
North Korea's actions.
Given the international situation in 1950, Kim's
calculation that the US would not intervene,
though quickly proven wrong, was not irrational
or even unreasonable.
? The US had withdrawn its troops from
Korea in June 1949.
Washington had no stated commitment to
defend South Korea; indeed, a number of
indicators, including comments by Secretary
of State Acheson, suggested that Korea was
outside its defense perimeter.
? US troops had left Korea just as the Chinese
Communists were consolidating their control
over the mainland. The US had not become
militarily involved in the Chinese civil war,
and it seemed even more unlikely that it
would intervene in Korea.
The Soviets and Chinese had concurred in
Kim's assessment. Despite some initial doubts
about US intervention, Stalin reportedly agreed
that if the war were fought swiftly?and Kim
was sure it could be?US intervention would be
avoided. Mao, also, felt that the US would not
intervene.
In a second miscalculation, Kim overestimated
the extent of domestic opposition to the South
Korean Government and the potential for revolu-
tion in the South. Here, too, his calculations were
not unreasonable.
? The Rhee government was very weak. In
fact, Rhee's party had retained only 22 of
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210 seats in the May 1950 elections for the
National Assembly.
? The Communist movement was the most
powerful single political force in the
country.
? North Korea's calls for reunification had
struck a responsive chord in the South.
Kim must have expected, therefore, that the
Seoul government would collapse in the face of a
direct military invasion and that the Communist
party could then organize popular support for a
new government. Instead, the country rallied in
support of Rhee's determined stand against the
Communist aggressors, and the North Korean
invasion produced no internal uprising.
Bitter Lessons and Limited Opportunities
Ever since the war, Kim has repea y
stressed the serious consequences of another mili-
tary confrontation with the US?a theme that
North Korean propaganda reinforces by recallin
the staggering devastation caused by the war. In
addition to the destruction of North Korea
facilities?more than 8,700 industrial plants wer
destroyed according to North Korean estimates?
the North lost 1.3 million people out of a prewar
population of some 12 million.
From Kim's perspective, the war had th
trous result of formalizing the US commitment to
defend South Korea by the signing of the US-
ROK Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954 and the
stationing of US ground forces in South Korea.
Moreover, the Soviets and the Chinese had be-
come thoroughly disenchanted with Kim's war,
while the Communist party in the South had
been -totally destroyed.- The few scattered
agents left in the South had little chance of
resurrecting a Communist movement in the
climate of anti-Communism that the war had
produced.
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On the home front, Kim faced pressing prob-
lems of economic reconstruction and political
survival. By 1956, prewar production levels had
been restored in all major sectors of the economy,
and by the late 1950s a groundwork had been
laid for future industrial development. North
Korea's economic gains during these years were
impressive by any standard but particularly
impressive in comparison with South Korea,
where economic stagnation, trade imbalances,
and spiraling inflation were major problems.
was also working hard to consolidate his
political power during these years. After a
methodical purge of the South Korean faction of
the Communist party in 1953-55, the pro-Soviet
faction in 1956, and finally the pro-Chinese
faction in 1956-58, Kim succeeded in establishing
the predominance of his -Kapsan- faction, com-
posed mainly of fellow veterans of his guerrilla
days in Manchuria. The creation of a new Politi-
cal Committee of the Korean Workers Party in
1961?nine of whose 11 members owed their
positions solely to Kim?legitimized one-man
rule in North Korea.
Despite the war and his problems at home,
Kim's commitment to eventual reunification was
undiminished. In August 1953, he enunciated a
policy of -peaceful reunification- as a way of
sustaining his cause during the early postwar
years. The emphasis on peaceful tactics made
sense during this period since it seemingly called
upon the North to do little more than seek
negotiations.
Even before the war, Kim had tried to negoti-
ate reunification with the South; in April 1948, he
had sponsored a conference of political leaders
from North and South Korea to discuss steps
toward reunification. Kim renewed the effort
after the war, and at the Geneva Conference in,
April 1954 he offered the first of over 100'
proposals that North Korea has since made on
reunification. Despite some differences in detail,
these proposals have all called for a peace treaty,
the withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea,
mutual force reductions, and negotiated arrange-
ments for either a federal government or some
form of confederation of the two Koreas.
2
Kim seems to have been serious about negotiat-
ing reunification, on his terms, of course. All his
proposals were, however, rebuffed by the Rhee
government, which passed them off as mere
propaganda ploys.
The Emergence of a Revolutionary Strategy
In committing himself to a policy of -peaceful
reunification--meaning no war between North
and South Korea?Kim had clearly not ruled out
the use of limited force. He describes his policy as
both -peaceful- and -revolutionary,- acknowl-
edging an element of force basic to Communist
theory. Thus, the policy of -peaceful reunifica-
tion- allows for a variety of tactics, which Kim
has used in accordance with changes in Korea
and abroad.
In the early 1960s, domestic trends in North
and South Korea, rather than external factors,
seem to have set Kim's thinking about reunifica-
tion on a different tactical course. At the begin-
ning of the decade, the North successfully com-
pleted its first Five Year Plan (1956-61) under
Kim's firmly entrenched leadership. Meanwhile,
South Korea was unraveling politically, a trend
that seemed likely to aggravate South Korea's
already critical economic situation. In little more
than a year, the Rhee government had fallen, an
ineffective parliamentary government had been
overthrown, and a military junta installed under
a little known major general, Pak Chong-hui.
Kim may well have regretted the fact that
North Korea was so ill prepared to take ad-
vantage of the political turmoil in South Korea in
1960-61. Several years later, he was reported to
have said that -had there had been 50 hard-core
Marxist-Leninists to properly plan and direct the
riots, revolution in South Korea could have been
accomplished in either April 1960 or May 1961.-
At the time of Pak's takeover, or shortly there-
after, Kim seems to have made up his mind that
Pyongyang would never again be so unprepared
to support a revolutionary situation in the South,
whenever that might occur. After the events of
1960-61, he began the long-term process of build-
ing a subversive political organization in the
South that could be activated whenever future
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political events warranted. At the same time, the
North also began training special forces within
the North Korean military that could be infil-
trated into the South to engage in acts of terror
and sabotage, including guerrilla operations.
By early 1967, Pyongyang's subversive efforts
began to feature a new element of terror and
sabotage. Although Kim had earlier envisaged the
change to guerrilla tactics as taking place in late
1968 or early 1969, he advanced his timetable. By
late 1966, some 20,000 special forces trained in
infiltration, sabotage, assassination, and guerrilla
tactics were available for deployment to South
Korea. High-ranking military leaders, who were
purged after the unsuccessful attempt to assassi-
nate President Pak and to land armed guerrillas
on the east coast of South Korea, reportedly
convinced Kim that chances for sparking a revo-
lution in South Korea were good. Between 1967
and 1969, hundreds of ROK troops were killed
and many more wounded in almost daily small-
scale skirmishes along the DMZ and in clashes
with North Korean commando teams well inside
South Korea.
The disastrous consequences for North Korea
of the Blue House raid (January 1968) and the
landing at Ulchin (November 1968) are well
known: the loss of all but one of the North Korean
agents involved, the blow to North Korea's inter-
national prestige, and the strengthening of the
-antirevolutionary- rather than the -revolution-
ary- forces in South Korea. Instead of exacerbat-
ing tensions in South Korea, North Korea's tactics
united the country even more firmly around the
Pak government.
North Korea's seizure of the USS Pueblo in
1968 and the downing of a US EC-121 a year
later?incidents that were tangential to Pyong-
yang's confrontation with Seoul?further tar-
nished North Korea's image in the US and led to
negative reactions in other countries as well.
Moreover, Soviet cooperation with the US in
searching for survivors of the EC-121 in the Sea
of Japan made Kim painfully aware of the
changes emerging in great-power relations. By
late 1969, the failure of the North's confrontation
policy, combined with the changes on the inter-
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national scene, led to another major policy
reassessment in Pyongyang.
New Directions in the 1970s
The speed and extent of international changes
from 1969 to 1971 were major factors underlying
subsequent distinctive shifts in North Korean
policy. In particular, US retrenchment in Asia
and improving US relations with both the USSR
and PRC provided a different great-power back-
drop against which the North would have to
pursue reunification in the future.
During the mid- and late 1960s, Moscow had
supplied Pyongyang with essential?though
limited?military and economic assistance, while
China, engulfed in the Cultural Revolution, had
contributed relatively little. By mid-1969, how-
ever, Peking began to emerge from its self-
imposed isolation. Premier Chou En-lai's trip to
Pyongyang in April 1970?one of his rare foreign
trips during this period?signified a major Chi-
nese effort to restore amicable relations with
Kim. Frustrated over perceived Soviet parsimony
and annoyed at the Soviet response to the EC-121
incident, Kim quickly chose to emphasize the
Chinese connection. Since then, Pyongyang has
supported Peking's position on most international
issues; in return, Kim has received Chinese politi-
cal support for -peaceful reunification,- as well
as military and economic assistance. At the same
time, the North's relations with Moscow have
cooled and Soviet military assistance has declined
to a minimum.
The poor prospects for major Soviet assistance
inclined Kim toward two basic decisions: to at-
tempt to increase Pyongyang's contacts with the
non-Communist world both diplomatically and
economically and to make a major investment in
domestic military production.
The Domestic Scene: Economic Failure and Military
Success
The North's most conspicuous failure in the
1970s has been in the economic sphere. Modern-
ization of the economy as envisaged in the new
Six Year Plan (1971-76) was contingent upon
modern industrial equipment and technology be-
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ing imported from the West and, most important,
on grants of credit. In 1971-72, Pyongyang
placed orders for large amounts of machinery
and equipment (including some 10 whole plants)
valued at $1 billion, to be delivered in 1973-74.
Instead of seeking long-term financing that
would have eased the financial strain, Pyongyang
opted for medium-term credits repayable in five
years.
The North Koreans' inexperience in interna-
tional trade and financial practices was not the
only reason for their balance-of-payments prob-
lems in 1975-77. The country's limited port facili-
ties, inadequate transportation networks, and
poorly trained labor force all contributed to
excessive delays in plant construction.2
Adding to Pyongyang's economic troubles
were a series of disastrous harvests caused by bad
weather and the recession-induced drop in world
demand for nonferrous metals, North Korea's
main export. In 1973-74, the North was forced to
import unprecedented amounts of grain from
Canada and France. Again, the North Koreans
compounded their troubles by negotiating these
imports on a one-year credit. By mid-1974 they
had begun to default on the grain payments?the
first Communist country ever to do so.
The one clear-cut advantage that the North has
achieved over the South since 1970 is in the
military balance. The North Koreans have devel-
oped large, well-balanced ground and naval
forces with much better offensive capabilities
than those of the South. Since 1970, North
Korea's inventory of tanks has tripled, giving
Pyongyang more than a 2 to 1 advantage over
South Korea; the number of combat aircraft has
increased by 25 percent, a 2 to 1 advantage for
the North; and the production of naval craft
(mainly submarines and missile attack and tor-
pedo boats) has roughly doubled the size of the
Navy, providing North Korea with significant
new offensive capabilities on the sea. Although
the SAM program has slackened, the North's
extensive air defense system now covers the
entire country. Pyongyang also commands one of
2 In fact, none of the plants contracted for in 1972-73 are yet in
production.
4
the largest and best trained guerrilla forces in the
world today?a commando force of 40,000 men
ready to infiltrate the South on quick notice. It is
estimated that North Korea's advantage over
Seoul will continue to grow for another year or
two before the South Koreans' Force Improve-
ment Plan (1976-81) begins to show results.
Although his current economic difficulties
argue strongly in favor of an increased allocation
of resources to the civilian sector, Kim is faced
with an increase in South Korean military ex-
penditures that will press him to move in the
opposite direction, seriously complicating his al-
ready difficult choices for the future.
The International Sphere: Mixed Results
From 1972 to 1976, North Korea made impres-
sive gains on the international front, as well as in
domestic military production. On the advice of
President Tito and perhaps others, Kim had made
a decision some time in 1971 or 1972 to seek the
support of the nonaligned nations on the issue of
Korean reunification. With the backing of Yugo-
slavia and Algeria, Kim succeeded in gaining the
support of the nonaligned movement, something
the South Koreans had tried but failed to accom-
plish. North Korea's diplomatic gains were also
reflected in the growth in the number of coun-
tries recognizing Pyongyang. By the end of 1977,
a total of some 90 countries had diplomatic
relations with Pyongyang, compared to only 35 in
1970.
North Korea had invested substantial time,
money, and effort in its diplomatic campaign.
Kim, who had traveled only to the USSR, China,
Indonesia, and Burma prior to 1972, visited
China, Mauritania, Algeria, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria,
and Romania in one year-1975. During 1972-
76, Foreign Minister Ho Tam visited 28 different
countries, some of them more than once; Pak
Song-chol had traveled to only nine countries
during his 11-year stint as foreign minister (1959-
70). Fifteen heads of government made state
visits to North Korea during 1972-76, and another
seven in 1977. Over the previous 23 years, only
11 heads of state had visited Pyongyang.
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By 1974, North Korea was ready to contest its
case at the UN; a resolution calling for the
withdrawal of all foreign troops from South
Korea came within one vote of passing the Gen-
eral Assembly. A year later, the resolution passed
over the strong opposition of the US and South
Korea.
The North's diplomatic campaign had been
given an early boost by the development of a
dialogue with the South. In August 1971, shortly
after the announcement of President Nixon's
forthcoming trip to Peking, Kim repeated his call
for talks -with all interested parties in South
Korea.- This time, Seoul responded positively.
The talks, however, only served to highlight
the fundamental differences separating the North
and the South. They did not induce US troop
reductions as North Korea had hoped, nor open
up the South for political subversion from the
North. By late-1972, they had become stalemated
and were broken off by Pyongyang a year later.
At this point, North Korea shifted its emphasis
to the US. Having concluded that the ROK was
not interested in negotiating reunification, a
peace treaty, or mutual force reductions, Kim
incorporated the idea of a peace treaty into his
bid for improved relations with Washington.
Foreign Minister Ho Tam first proposed bilateral
talks with the US with the stated purpose of
signing a peace treaty in March 1974; since then
North Korea has repeatedly proposed US - North
Korean bilateral contacts.
Kim's handling of the Western Island crisis of
October 1973 and the Panmunjom crisis of
August 1976 also suggests that he has been
anxious to avoid a military confrontation with the
US. Neither incident seems to have been planned
by Pyongyang as a military provocation against
the US. In the first instance, Kim's primary
concern was apparently to establish North Korean
sovereignty over a 12-mile territorial sea at a time
when that issue was receiving major attention
from China, Japan, and South Korea in the
controversy over the continental shelf. When the
US took a firm stand in support of Seoul, Kim
quickly backed down rather than risk a confron-
tation at sea.
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Kim seems immediately to have recognized the
disastrous consequences of the killing of two
American officers at Panmunjom in August 1976
for North Korean foreign policy. As he suspected,
the negative worldwide reaction to the slayings
all but destroyed the chances of a favorable vote
at the UN on North Korea's resolution calling for
the withdrawal of US troops. The momentum of
North Korea's diplomatic offensive had been lost
in the events of those few hours at Panmunjom.
The US Troop Withdrawal
Kim may have been worried that the Panmun-
jom incident would delay consideration of further
US troop withdrawals; however, the election
three months later of President Carter, who had
pledged during the campaign to withdraw US
troops from Korea, probably eased his concern.
There is no question that Kim views the US
troops in Korea as an important though not
crucial element in the US deterrent, not only
because of the added strength they provide in
terms of the combined US-ROK military force
level?particularly in terms of command and
control capabilities and intelligence and com-
munications functions?but also because of the
-tripwire- effect of their automatically involving
the US in a ground war in Korea.
Kim seems to believe that the stabilizing effect
of the US troop presence on the internal political
situation within South Korea is even more impor-
tant. When Kim addresses the US military deter-
rent, he almost always talks about US air and
nuclear power. When he has talked about US
ground troops in Korea, he has repeatedly de-
scribed them as -the single greatest obstacle to
peaceful reunification.-
Kim believes that, at a minimum, the large US
presence in the South lends legitimacy to the Pak
regime and acts as a constraint on the coalescence
of political opposition to Pak. Although US mili-
tary forces have never been directly involved in
civil disturbances in South Korea, even during the
period of extreme stress and instability in South
Korea in 1960-61, Kim is probably persuaded
that the US would not stand by and watch the
overthrow of Pak, certainly not by unknown
elements of questionable political reliability.
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The North Korean Reaction
The promise of US troop withdrawals by the
Carter administration elicited an immediate re-
sponse from North Korea. After more than 25
years of attacking the US without letup, Pyong-
yang suddenly stopped all propaganda attacks on
the US and the new Carter administration. Kim
publicly expressed his hopes for a speedy and
complete troop withdrawal, improved relations
with the US, and a favorable response from
President Carter on his longstanding proposals for
bilateral talks and a peace treaty. After the
announcement in July 1977 of the US decision on
a partial and gradual troop withdrawal subject to
review and a compensating military aid package
to South Korea, however, Kim returned to the
attack, characterizing planned US troop with-
drawals as -token withdrawals- and nothing
more than a -smokescreen" for a military build-
up in South Korea.
Kim has been careful, however, to differentiate
between US policy on troop withdrawals and his
policy on other matters, such as bilateral talks
with North Korea, a peace treaty, and US - North
Korean diplomatic relations. He has also spoken
hopefully of possible trade and aid arrangements
with the US. Kim obviously does not want to
prejudice the US decision on these matters with
the kind of across-the-board attack on the US that
was standard North Korean propaganda fare for
almost 30 years.
Whether the US decision to withdraw troops
will prove to be something of a turning point in
Korean affairs, as were events in 1961 and 1971,
will depend in large measure on developments in
South Korea. Although Kim is clearly dissatisfied
with the gradual pace of US troop withdrawals, as
currently planned, he probably still has some
hope that any withdrawal will prove unsettling to
South Korea. The real test will be the political
and psychological effects of a US withdrawal on
the morale, determination, and stability of the
Pak government. Kim is clearly hoping for a
collapse of willpower, self-confidence, and deter-
mination on the part of the Pak government as
strains in the US-ROK relationship develop over
the troop withdrawals and other issues like the
6
Tongsun Park case, human rights, and trade. A
crisis in confidence?similar to that in South
Vietnam in 1975 after the US departure?would
open up a new range of opportunities for the
revolutionary- forces of the South and new
options for Kim.
Kim's Various Options
All-out War
Some have suggested that as he grows older,
Kim may feel that time is running out and that
he must act quickly to reunify Korea. Given the
combination of North Korea's military superior-
ity over South Korea and the country's grave
economic problems at the moment, he might
decide to risk all in a desperate gamble to reunify
Korea by force.
The North Koreans have not been in as favor-
able a military position vis-a-vis the South since
1950. They are capable of launching an invasion
of many times the strength of their attack at that
time. Their tank inventory is almost 14 times
larger, their army is now more than five times
stronger, and their combat aircraft inventory is
almost seven times greater than in 1950.
The US Military Deterrent
The argument that Kim might attack now
presumes, however, that the North-South military
balance is the key factor in Kim's military calcu-
lations?which it is not. Kim cannot afford to
assume that the US would not become involved in
a major war in Korea. He must include the US
factor in any realistic equation of the military
balance. In that total picture, the US deterrent is
clearly the determining factor. So long as the US
commitment to defend South Korea is credible in
Kim's eyes, he is not likely to risk major military
aggression.
Of the various elements in the US deterrent,
the crucial one, in Kim's eyes, seems to be US air
power. Having experienced the devastating re-
sults of US bombing, Kim has never again taken
lightly the serious consequences of another mili-
tary confrontation with the US. After 25 years, he
still speaks in emotional tones of the damage
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wrought by US bombing during the Korean War.
The fact that Kim has gone to unprecedented
lengths to strengthen North Korea's air defenses,
including the construction of numerous under-
ground facilities, is further testimony to his fears.3
The threat of nuclear war also looms large in
Kim's thinking. While he apparently is not cer-
tain that the US would use nuclear weapons, he
cannot rule out the possibility. Kim certainly
remembers the impact of the US threat to use
nuclear weapons in the late days of the Korean
War. North Korea's lack of nuClear weapons and
the absence of any pledge from the USSR or
China to defend North Korea with nuclear weap-
ons must add to his concern.
Kim cites nuclear war and a permanently
divided Korea as the two greatest dangers facing
North Korea today. This suggests, probably better
than anything else, the priority of the US nuclear
threat in Kim's thinking.
Economic Constraints
The argument that its severe economic prob-
lems would induce North Korea to attack now is
not supported by the evidence. Far from en-
couraging Kim to undertake risky adventures,
current difficulties are likely to keep his attention
at home. Kim seems to be making a determined
effort to see his economic difficulties through.
The North Koreans have cut imports signifi-
cantly 4 and have tried, with much less success, to
expand exports. They have also tried in vain to
obtain additional loans and to renegotiate existing
loans.
Recent appointments in both the party and
government suggest the priority of economics at
this time. In late 1976 and early 1977, three
economic experts were promoted to the political
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committee of the KWP central committee. The
reorganization of the government, announced
at the Sixth Supreme People's Assembly in
December 1977, also featured the promotion of
economic specialists. Yi Chong-ok, a veteran
economist who was personally associated with
North Korea's quest for foreign machinery and
equipment in the early 1970s, was made premier.
A Further Constraint: the USSR and China
Since the Korean War, Kim has faced a chang-
ing international situation; one constant, how-
ever, has been the desire of all four of the major
powers in the area?the US, Japan, China, and
the USSR?to avoid war. While the USSR and
China publicly support Kim's cherished goal of
reunification, neither places as high a priority on
it as they do on the avoidance of war and, more
recently, on the improvement of relations with
the US and japan.
Moscow has reportedly made its -opposition to
the use of force to seek the reunification of
Korea- quite clear to Kim. The Soviets have
indicated that -this is one matter on which both
the USSR and China agree?by coincidence, not
by design." The Chinese have also made it clear
that they favor only the peaceful reunification of
Korea. Kim is thus under no illusions as to the
lack of Soviet and Chinese support for a North
Korean military attack on the US and South
Korea.
The Final Deterrent: The Lack of a "Revolutionary"
Situation in South Korea
In 1950, Kim was apparently convinced that
the -first poke of a bayonet into South Korea
would touch off an internal explosion.- In 1978,
he can have little hope of a revolutionary up-
heaval in the South in the short run, because
there is no broad, popular movement in South 25x1
Korea actively opposed to the Pak government.
Confrontation Tactics
Since the failure of North Korea's confron-
tational tactics in 1967-68, Kim has continued his
efforts to subvert the Pak regime by overt propa-
ganda and political subversion, but there has been
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no hint of a return to the aggressive tactics of the
late 1960s when North Korea had no equity in
good rflations with the non-Communist world.
Unless the odds of overthrowing Pak by such
tactics were very good, Kim would be reluctant
to jeopardize his diplomatic gains of the past five
or six years?and the possiblity ,of improved
relations Ivith the US and Japan?by a return to
violent tactics.
Moreover, a return to armed tactics might well
be counterproductive in the South, as it was in
1967-68, when Kim's guerrilla methods had a
galvanizing effect in rallying support for Pak.
This, of course, is the last thing Kim wants.
Kim is still keeping open the option of -revolu-
tionary- tactics, however. Today, there are some
40,000 paramilitary troops ready to provide co-
vert military support, at quick notice, should
anti-Pak elements make a determined bid for
power.
Political Subversion
Since the collapse of the North-South talks,
civilian agents of North Korea's Liaison Bureau
have continued the long process of building a
subversive apparatus within South Korea in the
face of mounting difficulties. The reorganization
and improvement of South Korea's security
forces, an effective registration system, and the
strong anti-Communism of the South Korean
people have made agent operations so risky,
however, that seasoned agents, with a long record
of successful missions, are now defecting to the
South. During the past three years, there have
been fewer than 10 encounters with civilian
infiltrators in the rear areas of South Korea
(excluding military infiltrations across the DMZ
for intelligence purposes). Current reports indi-
cate that the North is nevertheless making a long-
term investment in agent training. Pyongyang
now has some 1,200 agents trained and ready to
infiltrate into South Korea, as soon as more
favorable conditions permit, and the number of
agents is likely to increase.
In a change from the 1960s, the South Korean
military is now the major target of North Korea's
subversive operations, suggesting that Kim be-
8
lieves that a military coup, like that in Indonesia
in 1965 and the recent military takeovers in
Portugal and Ethiopia, is the most plausible
means of removing Pak from power. Agents have
been told that -a coup could be accomplished
with only a few intelligent battalion and com-
pany commanders. In Portugal, a battalion com-
mander aided by six company-level commanders
succeeded in a coup d'etat."
There is no way of knowing what assets the
North Koreans have in the South Korean military,
which is generally thought to be a pillar of
support for the Pak government. The discovery in
March 1974 of an 18-member spy ring directed
by a North Korean agent in Japan, whose contacts
included a South Korean major in the Army
Chief of Staff's office and a civilian employee in
the Army's central reporting office, was a shock
to Pak and the military. It suggests vulnerabilities
that the South Koreans may be reluctant to
acknowledge.
Diplomatic Competition With Seoul
North Korea is likely to continue?if not step
up?its efforts to weaken the Pak regime through
propaganda and diplomatic means. In a 180-
degree turn from the days of the North-South
talks, when North Korean propaganda singled out
the US as the main enemy and refrained from
attacks on Pak, North Korea now openly courts
the Carter administration and calls for the
overthrow of Pak.
Kim is not likely to moderate his attacks on the
ROK so long as Pak remains in power. He will
continue to seek to drive a wedge between
Washington and Seoul by criticizing Pak's in-
ternal security controls, his -suppression of the
opposition,- censorship of the press, and -human
rights- policy. In contrast to North Korean propa-
ganda of the 1960s, however, Pyongyang, with its
present economic woes, will stay away from the
economic themes that were formerly the preroga-
tive of North Korea.
A Dialogue With the US
One of Kim's major objectives at this point is to
open bilateral talks with the US. He is interested
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in negotiating a peace treaty, mutual force reduc-
tions on the Korean peninsula, US-DPRK diplo-
matic relations, and trade and aid. Beyond that,
he would relish the effect such talks would have
on South Korea and US-ROK relations. For this
reason, the North Koreans are likely to tone down
their strong anti-US propaganda of recent years
and to persist in their bid for talks, even in the
face of official US denials of any interest in
bilateral contacts.
North Korean propaganda is likely to continue
to complain that US troop withdrawal plans are
less than adequate. However, Kim will probably
decide not to confront the US at the UN or at
other international meetings on the issue of troop
withdrawals. On balance, the odds are probably
against the introduction of another North Korean
resolution on troop withdrawals at this year's
meeting of the General Assembly.
Kim will be particularly careful to avoid any
actions that might slow down the pace of US
troop withdrawals. Most of all, he will try to
avoid the sort of confrontation that the Pueblo
and Panmunjom incidents represented. His will-
ingness to return the surviving crew member of
the US helicopter that inadvertently strayed into
North Korea in July 1977 demonstrated his desire
to avoid unnecessary provocation at this time.
Kim might conceivably see a tactical advan-
tage in resuming a dialogue with the South if he
thought this would entice the US into bilateral
talks. Recently, however, he has stated explicitly
what he has implied before?that he will negoti-
ate with the South only when Pak leaves the
scene. To reverse his stand at this point would
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undermine all his efforts to bring pressure in the
direction of Pak's overthrow.
Prospects
At this point Kim is watching and waiting for a
response from the US. How long he is prepared to
wait depends on a number of factors?the direc-
tion of US policy over the next two or three years,
the progress of troop withdrawals, and political
developments in South Korea.
Even if North Korea exercises restraint over
the next few years, this does not mean that it has
lessened its commitment to reunification in the
long run. Kim's tactics will be suited to the
immediate goal of improving relations with the
US and solving North Korea's economic prob-
lems, but his sights will remain set on the longer
term goal of reunification. To this end, he will
keep his options open by maintaining a subver-
sive capability and building up conventional mili-
tary forces.
Kim is already planning for the day when US
troops leave Korea. Whether this period of rela-
tive calm, like the 1961-65 interlude, will be the
quiet before the storm, as in 1967-68, depends
largely on US actions and South Korea's response.
It is almost inevitable, at that point, that South
Korea will face a stepped-up subversive threat
from the North, assuming that Kim lives that
long.
Kim's death would introduce a new element of
uncertainty about longer term North Korean
intentions. In the short run, however, an internal
struggle for power would be likely, and this
would tend to reinforce other factors that weigh
against military aggression from the North.
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APPENDIX
? FACTORS AFFECTING
NORTH KOREAN POLICY
The graphs on pages 12 and 13 depict Kim Il-song's changing assessment
of the eight factors that can be identified as major influences shaping North
Korean policies since 1959. Kim's assessment of these factors, rather than the
factors themselves, has been the key determinant of his policies. At times, he
has assessed the situation incorrectly, as he did in 1950, when he seriously
miscalculated the US commitment to defend South Korea, Soviet support for
his actions, and the degree of political support for reunification in South
Korea.
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Very Strong
Very Weak
1950
12
Kim's Assessment of:
The US Defense Commitment to
South Korea
1960
South Korea's Interest in
Negotiating Reunification
High
None
1970
Soviet and Chinese Support for
Reunification
China
Soviet
1980 1950
1960
1970
Political Instability in South Korea
1980
1950 1960 1970 1980 1950
575848 4-78
1960 1970 1980
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Very Strong
Very Weak
1950
Kim's Assessment of:
North Korean Military Capabilities North Korea's Economic Position
vis-a-vis South Korea vis-a-vis South Korea
Strong
Weak
1960
1970
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1980 1950
1960 1970 1980
North Korea's International Kim's Power Position in the
Position vis-a-vis South Korea North Korean Leadership
1950 1960 1970
575849 4-78
1980 1950
1960
1970
1980
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KIM IL-SONG'S CHANGING ASSESSMENT
OF NORTH KOREA'S SITUATION
Figures 1 through 5 employ a "multidimen-
sional scaling technique to show Kim's changing
assessment of North Korea's situation over the
years.
At any given time, certain factors that argue in
favor of an aggressive military policy have been
offset by other factors of a restraining nature. For
example, even though North Korea's military
position vis-a-vis the South may have improved
over a certain time period, overall conditions may
not be as propitious for a North Korean attack.
It is possible to quantify the mix of factors at a
particular time and compare it to the mix of
factors that existed in 1950, when Kim went to
war, or to the mix of factors that would be
considered ideal from Kim's point of view for
initiating hostilities.
Multidimensional Scaling
Multidimensional scaling is a technique that
measures the change in a person's assessment of
the same set of factors over time. In the table
below, each of the factors that has shaped North
Korean policy was considered independently, and
interpretations of Kim's assessment of the factors
were coded for nine different time periods. The
coding consisted of an interval-level zero to 10
scale. Zero indicates the weakest possible asssess-
ment and 10 the strongest. For example, consider
the column -US Defense Commitment to South
Korea.- In 1950 Kim believed the US would not
come to South Korea's aid. However, from 1953
to 1960 his assessment obviously changed; thus,
the reversal in the code assigned to this factor.
If the relationship between the rows of data
were obvious, multidimensional scaling would be
unnecessary. However, it is difficult to relate one
row of numbers to a second row, and even more
difficult to see the interrelationship of all the
rows. Multidimensional scaling relates the differ-
ences among the various rows in a configuration
of dots that measures the change from one time
period to the next.
Findings
Figure 1 demonstrates the application of multi-
dimensional scaling to the data in the table. It can
be seen that Kim's assessment of all eight factors
in 1950 very nearly accorded with optimum
conditions for war. The clustering of points away
from the 1950 point and away from the optimum
point suggests that his assessment of North Ko-
rea's situation since 1953 has been very different
Kim's Assessment of Key Factors Affecting Korean Reunification by War
South Korea
Soviet and Intention for North Korea North Korea North Korea
US Defense Chinese Peaceful Political Military Economic International Kim's Internal
Commitment Support for Negotiations of Instability in Capability Position Position Political
to South Korea North Korea Reunification South Korea vis-l-vis ROK vis-?is ROK vis-a-vis ROK Power
1950
10
0
10
10
8
6
9
1953-61
10
5
0
1
5
5
3
7
1962-66
9
5
1
7
4
7
1
10
1967-68
9
5
1
5
4
7
1
10
1969-72
8
5
8
3
6
6
2
10
1973-74
8
5
6
5
4
10
1975-76
7
5
8
4
5
10
1977
7
5
1
9
3
4
10
14
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5.
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from his assessment in 1950. In 1967-68 it was
most like his assessment in 1950, and in 1977 it
was most unlike 1950. This would suggest that
times have never been so unpropitious for a
North Korean attack as they are today.
The multidimensional scaling technique can be
used to make projections into the future. Figure 2
projects each of the factors over the next five
years to arrive at the most likely measurement of
Kim's thinking in 1982. If the projections of the
various factors are correct, Kim should be even
less inclined to go to war in 1982 than he is now.
The one factor?however unlikely?that might
cause Kim to reassess the risks of military action,
even with the US commitment to defend South
Korea, would be the appearance of widespread
political opposition to President Pak Chong-hui in
the South. In Figure 3 a high level of political
instability in South Korea has been assumed to
measure the effect of a change in that one factor
on the projection for 1982. Note the movement of
the dot closer toward 1950.
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Another possibility that would significantly
increase the chances for North Korean military
action would be a change in the Soviet attitude
toward Korea, occasioned either by a perceived
change in the US commitment to South Korea,
the death of Kim, or possibly a change in the
Soviet leadership. Figure 4 illustrates the effect of
substantially increased Soviet support for Korean
reunification in response to a perceived lessening
of the US commitment of Seoul. Assuming no
change in any of the other variables, North Korea
would be much more inclined toward military
action under those circumstances than under any
other foreseeable situation, except the collapse of
political order in South Korea.
Finally, Figure 5 shows the effect that an
internal struggle for power in North Korea, after
Kim's death, would have in moving Pyongyang
even further from the optimum point for war.
The effects of an internal struggle for power are
almost inevitably to freeze policy, discourage
political initiatives, and lessen the chances for
military adventures.
(
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Figure 1
Kim's Net Assessment of Eight Selected Factors
Shaping North Korean Policy, 1950-1977
.1977
? 1973-76
? 1953-59
?
411962-66
1960-61 ?? 1969-70
1967-68
? 1950
? Optimum Conditions for War
? 1971-72
Stress=0.0057
Figure 3
Assuming Political Instability in South Korea
1973-76
?
? 1977
1953-59 0- 1982 (Projected)
1962-66?
196768.
? 1960-61
? 1969-70
? 1950
? Optimum Conditions for War
? 1971-72
Stress=0.0000
575851 4-78
16
Figure 2
1982: A Projected Scenario
? 411973-76
1982 (Projected)
1953-59 fa
19674-r
?
1962-66
? 1977
? 1969-70
? ?
1960-61 1971-72
? 1950
? Optimum Conditions for War
Stress=0.0073
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Figure 4
Assuming a Weakened US Defense Commitment to South Korea
and Stepped-Up Soviet and Chinese Support for North Korea
1982 (Projected) 0
1950
? Optimum Conditions for War
di 1977
1953-59
?
? 1962-66
1967-681 ? 1969-70
1960-61
?
1973-76 ?
1971-72 ?
Stress=0.1000
Figure 5
Assuming a Power Struggle in North Korea
01982 (Projected)
1977 10 1973-76
? 1953-59
? 1967-68
?
1969-70
1962-66 4001960-61
1971-72 ?
Stress=0.0056
? 1950
? Optimum Conditions for War
575850 4-78
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ami VI
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