THE NEAR EAST CRISIS: THE SOVIET ROLE AND SOVIET MEDIA REACTIONS SINCE THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP08S01787R000100010012-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 14, 2012
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: June 28, 1967
• Content Type: REPORT

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CRD 367/67
Munich, Jun* 28, 1967
THE.NEAR'EAST CRISIS THE SOVIET ROLE AND SOVIET MEDIA REACTIONS
SINCE THE OUTBREAK OF. HOSTILITIES
By Jean Riollot
4
Three weeks after the eruption of the current or in the
Near East, as tension and confusion mounted, an Izvestia commentator,
looking at the sky for premonitory signs, saw' TiVirol?ccrows circling"
(1). How justified his apprehensions were then was,shOwn two days
later. Fighting broke out along the DAR-Israeli border at dawn on
June 5.,
Recoveting from their?initial surprise, Soviet propagandists
soon realized that their first task was to prepare the public for
the, possibility of an Arab defeat. On June,6 in the afternoon,
Radio Moscow began broadcasting reports based upon Israeli as well
as -Arab communiques. At the same time, commentators were careful
to avoid treating the statement issued by the Arab High.COmmand
that it had proof of interference on the side of Israel by. US. and
British aircraft. In this connection it is interesting to note
that the statement was apparently mentioned only once by.Radio
Moscow's home service (2), a few times by Moscow's Arabic and ?
other foreign services, but never by the English services for
Britain a.o.d. the DS. Subsequent references to the alleged -Anglo-US
backing of 'Israel were in general terms. Did anyone blunder in
mentioning the matter at all? It is not possible to say, but it
was noticeable that Soviet media in the days that followed - perhaps
as a precaution against repeating the error 7 adopted a strikingly
colorless tone. The only exception was Pravda, in which it was
still.podsible to gleald some useful, if faint, indications of what
was passing in the minds of Soviet propagandists and those who
advised them during the second act of the Near East crisis
While full of vituperation for the Israelis and their alleged
AngloUS protectors, Soviet propaganda media were careful to remind
't4epublic the first day of the conflict in the Arab world that the
USSR government, in its statement of May 23, had stressed that, the
organizers of'aggression would face "not only the Imited strength
of the Arab countries but also a firm riposte to aggression from the
Soviet Union and all other peace-loving states" (3). At the same ?
time, Arab ambassadaors in Moscow held a prose' conference for Soviet
correspondents at the Algerian embassy, where the Moroccan ambassador,
in the nate of his colleagues, read a. statement "expressing the
gratitude of the Arab countries for the support given .by the Soviet
government and people in the jut cause of the Arabs" Only the
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TASS service in English reported this strange gathering (4). How-
ever, the real feelings of the Arabs, which had been carefully
concealed from the Soviet public up to this point, made it increasingly
urgent for Moscow to state its attitude more precisely.
It now set out in earnest to explain why. Nasser's discomfiture
had not caused it to wince.' This it did to the adcompaniment'af
taxiliatm pubIi6ity for the marathon performance' of-Fedetenko 'in the
Security Council and.for otest meetings througliautethe'faSSR,"desigtmd
15timarily,At seems, to rally support for SoietXpalicy
A statement issued by the Soviet government in the afternoon of
June 5 (5) had not revealed any, substantial departure from the line
taken since the beginning of the crisis. In fact, it limited itself
to stating explicitly what was already implicit in the statement of
May 23. Until June 5, the Soviet Union had been actively seeking
in the Security Council the recognition of the status quo created
by Nasser's unilateral action. Now it indicated that Soviet action
in the UN would aim first at a return to the status quo ante. To
this end, it demanded an immediate and unconaitional.cease fire and
the withdrawal of Isreali troops to the positions they occupied
before June 5. In addition, it demanded the condemnation of Isreal
as an aggressor. For the rest, it stated: "The Soviet government
reserves the right to take all steps that may be required by the
situation." Next day Soviet media reported warm support from
Damascus and Beirut for the "just position" of the Soviet government.
At the same time Igor Belyayev in Pravda reminded the "UAR and the
other Atab nations" that the USSR firmly stood on their side. But
he added: "Nobody can doubt it one minute" (6) - the first veiled
hint of disagreement between Cairo Eind Moscow.
In fact, Soviet policy was already being judged with increasing
severity, in many parts of the Arab world. On 9.6.67 Boumedienne
came out publicly against the Soviet attitude. In this grave
situation any course of action chosen by Moscow was fraught with
far-reaching consequences .for the whole socialist camp in its
relations with Arab countries. Considerations of this sort may
have prompted the Soviet leaders to seek the approval of other
ruling Communist parties for their policy. A meeting of rtling
parties took place in Moscow on 9.6.67. Brezhnev, whose predilection
for "unity of action" and an "agreed line" was made very plain at
the recent conference at Karlovy Vary, must have derived some satis-
faction from the results of the Moscow meeting. The generally un-
cooperative attitude of Ceausescu was, perhaps, compensated by Tito's
eagerness to approve the Soviet line lock, stock and barrel. The
meeting quickly produced a declaration. It confirmed a reference to
"unity of action", and stressed that "today more than ever" this had
to be shown "by all peace-loving and progressive forces" (7). Other-
wise the document said little that was new. The ?sociarist
countries fully and completely backed the "just struggle" of the
Arab countries and would "help them to repel aggression and defend
their material independence and territorial integritr." It would be
unrealistic to suppose that far-reaching decisions-were taken at this
hastily convoked conference. The declaration suggests only that
"views were exchanged concerning the measures required to halt the
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CRD 367/67 June 289 1967
(Israeli) attack and to avert consequences endangering general
peace." These measures may have included a decision to send Egypt
new planes - 200, according to some reports - to boost the morale
of the Egyptian population, which was said to be in a panicky state
at that time (8). However, the possibility cannot be excluded that
the new planes were already due to be delivered when the crisis was
developing and had been held back out of a sense of caution.
Although it did not contain anything basically new, the
declaration was a clear indication of a marked escalation of the
Near East crisis up the scale of Soviet priorities. Pravda on
11.6.67 devoted its lead article to the declaration - the first of
its kind to discuss the Near East situation since the beginning of
the crisis. This article affirmed that the declaration was an
expression of the USSR's faithfuliness to its "international duty."
Next day, Yuri Zhukov, Pravda's chief political observer, developed
this theme, possibly for the benefit of Peking and Hanoi as much
as for Cairo and Algiers. Zhukov recalled the role of the Soviet
Union and of the socialist countries in the Near East, which, he
said, was a "noble" one, adding that the USSR "has given, is giving
and will give all necessary material assistance to Arab countries.
He went on: "The declaration.., again confirms the unflagging
fidelity of the socialist countries to Lenin's principle of solidarity
with people struggling against imperialism.... Fraternal solidarity
finds its expression in the aid given by socialist countries to the
Vietnamese people struggling against US aggression. Fraternal soli-
darity finds its expression in the declaration of the socialist
countries which indicates that they will do everything necessary
to help'the people of the Arab countries deal a decisive blow at
the aggressor and to preserve their legal rights-1i (9) , Zhilkov's
reference to Lenin - the first apparently in a Soviet panic
pronouncethent'abottt the 'crisis- g'are added weight
to this statement which contrasted so forcefully Soviet assistance
to Vietnam with pledges of help to Arab countries, leaving no doubt
any more on the nature of Moscow's policy in the Near and Middle
East at this stage of the crisis. .At the same time, it showed.
clearly that Vietnam, remained at the head of the list of Soviet
priorities. To dissipate any doubt on this point, Zhukov in a
Pravda editorial a few days later warned that the crisis in the
Near East served only to create favorable conditions for an US
blitzkrieg against the DRV.
If Soviet reports can be believed, the response in Arab capitals
to the USSR's endeavors was by-no means uniform; The damage caused
to Soviet prestige in the Arab world had been great and to Pravda
fell the task of cautiously lifting one corner of the curtain to
reveal'the extent of the setback to the Soviet public. We learn
that anti-Soviet feelings had spread in the UAR, Syria, Algeria
and also Lebanon. On 13.6.67 Primakov, the Cairo correspondent of
Pravda, mentioned for the first time that "enemies of the people"
had been feverishly busy in the UAR "sowing doubts about the support
offered by socialist countries to the Arab people'." For the first
time also, Primakov spoke of the "dirty role" played in this by
Chinese representatives in Cairo as well -as by Chinese and Albanian
radio stations. On the following day Primaiov, trespassing on the
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'territory of his colleagues in Damascus, quoted a Syrian newspaper
for a report of activities of a "fifth column" in Syria which was
allegedly engaged in fanning distrust of the USSR. On 16.6.67,
Pravda quoted a Lebanese paper for the view that one of the main
aims of imperialist plots in the Near East was to undermine.Soviet-
Arab friendship. In the same issue, Pravda carried a report from
its correspondent in Algiers, Yu; Potemkin, saying that local
reaction there had tried to use demonstrations of support in favor
of the UAR on 9.6.67 for provocations against socialist countries.
But reports appearing in Pravda went further than this and by
implication suggested that, in7717e-Tase of Egypt, anti-Soviet
feelings had also spread widely in ruling circles. Once again
heavy reliance was placed upon Syrian and Lebanese press commentaries
which showed Soviet initiatives in a favorable light. .This contrasted
vividly with an absence of quotations from Cairo commentaries. This
absence is all the more surprising in view of the fact that the
press is tightly controlled in all three coxittries. On 11.6.67 the
nuances became more explicit. From Damascus, for instance, TASS
reported thatthe-June 9 declaration had been received with "great
enthusiasm" whereas Primakov in Cairo reperted that it had been
treated with "great attention." Primakov also reported, that Nasser
had expressed his gratitude in very general terms to " eace-lovin
countries" for their support; 'bUt another dispatch in e same
issue of Pravda indicated that newspapers in Beirut were stressing
the significance of the support .fro' "socialist countriee (10).
The final development in this episode occurred in mid-June.
A dispatch from Primakov, which Pravda carried on 14.6.67, recounted
a curious story about an article-TraT-was said to have appeared in
the demi-official newspaper Al Akhbar. This article had criticized
the Soviet Union and, according to Primakov, a. leader of the Arab
Socialist Union (Egypt's sole legal political party) had told him
.that the author had been. bribed to write it by reactionaries. In
the same dispatch Primakov mentioned that an Al Ahram article had
tressed that the USSR had always "stood for the fulfillment Of the
Arab coutries' rightful demands" and that this represented the
Egyptian view on the question. Primakov also reported that, at a
recent meeting, the Egyptian government had expressed its high ?
appreciation of the "position of friendly countries, governments
and peoples which stood and are still standing by us and which
support us materially and morally.'" The 'Osenee".pf.:an,.-explicit'e
referenbei;ta:sobialistebountrits in thiseekpression-Of:!appreciation
woulcrbeem'Ao .iMplythat,:theviewbcfAleAhr-ae?e dtillfar7from ?
being sharea. by ail'Auemberb,of.theEgyptian government..-.i.At:.an
rate, .wehat is important is that Al Ahram's was .the first article
to appear in an Egyptian newspaper that set,the Soviet position in
a favorable light that Primakov could report home. The article was
given great prominence by Soviet news media. And it is also pertinent
to note that from .this point on implied criticism of the Soviet
Union's position appears no longer to-have presented a problem to
Soviet correspondents.
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Pravda on 15.6.67, for instance, reported that Moscow's demand
for a speciall session of the United Nations General Assembly had
been given wide publicity in newspapers in_Cairo as well as in
Damascus. On the following day, it reported Ryad's statement to
AFP that Egypt and the USSR were "linked by a close and very solid
friendship" - the first such favorable comment on Soviet-Egyptian
relation by an Egyptian official to be recorded since June 5.
Moreover, one senses from the pages of the Soviet press from mid-
June onward that the wave of anti-Soviet feeling among the peoples
of Egypt, Syria and Algeria was now under control. A TASS dispatch
from Damascus, printed in Pravda on 15.6.67, mentioned that the
anti-Soviet campaign had failed to mislead people, while another
dispatch, carried by Pravda on 17.6.67, suggested that the "demagogic
slanders of the imperialists and the Chinese splitters" had been
exposed by the Baath party, the CP and' the wbrking olass (11). On the
previous day, Pravda reported that attempts to fan suspicion of
the attitude of the socialist countries had failed. In the same
issue of the paper, a dispatch from Primakov in Cairo indicated
that explanatory work on the significance of Soviet aid to Egypt
was being carried out at the lower levels of the Arab Socialist
Union - an unusual revelation which points up the magnitude of the
setback to Soviet Prestige in Egypt as a result of the USSR govern-
ment's attitude during the Israeli-Egyptian conflict.
Prestige is certainly an important element of Soviet influence
in the Near East, but it is not all. This influence also depends
to a great extent on the permanence of the political and social
structures of the Syrian andgEgyptian regimes. Reports from
Damascus and Cairo published in Pravda convey the impression that
during the short period following the military collapse these
structures had been dangerously threatened by intrigues of 4!reac-
tionaries" and that anxiety had been great in Moscow about the
ultimate fate of Nasser's regime. The situation seems to have
settled quickly in Syria with the arrest of Selim Katum, the author
of the anti-government coup of September, 1966, who had returned
from exile in Jordan to form a government (12). But in Egypt 1.t.
has not been so easy. Primakov, in a dispatch published in Pravda
on 13.6.67, said that the "whole Egyptian people" had risen "in
defense of its revolutionary government." But he added: "It would
be wrong to think that the reaction has laid down its weapons and
has renounced further attempts at achieving 'changes' in the UAR."
But another dispatch in Pravda on 15.6.67, implied that.the "artful
designs of the reaction" had been smashed completely by'the Egyptian
people.
' One is struck in reading these dispatches by the role Eqtri-
buted to the masses and the working class. As Primakov explains
it: "This will, no doubt, affect all that takes place in the\
country in the near future. This is the key to an understanding
of all that has already.begun to take place in the UAR" (13).
These crucial sentences may throw some light on Moscow's current
intentions in Egypt. What, in fact, has begun to take place, one
may ask? Primakov's answer is that the military has been reshuffled,
and western reports indicate that this.may mean the end of the old
military caste in Egypt, the main obstacle to further "democrati-
zation" of the regime (14).
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Further insights into Moscow's attitude were provided in the
days following Nasser's cabinet reshuffle of June 19. The re-
shuffle was reported almost immediately by Radio Moscow with the
comment that it "was aimed at strengthening internal unity." This
remark echoed Western reports that the new government included
people of all political hues, from left to right and friends as
well as adversaries of the regime (15). But Radio Moscow added:
"Many political observers consider ?the present period as the
beginning of a new stage in the Egyptian revolution, a stage in
which the activity of the popular masses increases and in which
reliance is placed in the working forces of the people." Radio
Moscow's comment was repeated word for word in a dispatch by
Primakov, datelined Cairo 20.6.67, which appeared in Pravda on
21.6.67, and in another published by Izvestia on the same day.
This would seem to confirm that Moscow had reached the conclusion
at this point that the situation in Egypt now provided the regime
with an opportunity of evolving towards more "progressive" forms
and it is hardly surprising td learn that, according to some reports,
the Soviet government has apparently expressed views in this sense
to Cairo (16). For his part, Nasser is reported to be anxious to
seek the support of the popular masses against the so-called military
party,,but how far his views on this matter coincide with Moscow's
is not yet clear. All that is certain is that the Soviet leaders
will have been most carefully briefed by Podgorny upon his return
from Cairo.
Although during the period reviewed the attention of the Soviet
leaders has been focused mainly on the situation in Egypt, they have
also been very keen not to. let go any profit that could be derived
from the crisis elsewhere in the world. . Pravda has suggested that
it might indirectly help to. obtain the recognition of the GDR by
at least some of the Arab countries. For example, Primakov. wrote
in Pravda of 18.6.67 that the situation would "no doubt affect the
attitude of Arab 'countries toward the two German states." But Moscow
at the same time seems to be placing much hope on benefiting from
the wave of anti-US feeling that has spread among the "popular
masses" in the Arab countries in the aftermath of the conflict..
An observer trying to sum up his impressions of how Moscow
gauges the possibilities at the moment, might well come.to the
conclusion that it is overestimating them. A good example of this,
as we have seen, is pontained in the dispatch from Primakov carried
in Pravda on 16.6.67. In this, he not only toted the increasing
role of the working classes in the Arab world (as.shown in the
strikes which had taken place in US oil concession areas in Saudi
Arabia and the Lebanon) but also expressed the conviction that this
"upsurge of revolutionary mood" would influence the result ofthe
conference of Arab foreign ministers in Kuwait. But, as we know,
the conference ended without producing any results. Is it that
Moscow is witnessing with no miagivings the. slow-distUption Of:
"Arab unity" it the face of Israel's continuing "aggression" at a
moment when it is wholeheartedly.engaged on behalf of the Arab
countries to secure the condemnation of Israel at the UN? An article
by Belyayev, frontpaged in Pravda On 19.6.67 quite clearly betrays
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that it has misgivings. "A pressing need for an Arab summit meeting
in the nearest future," he says, "is stressed in Arab capitals" -
and he adds that this "would, no doubt, reflect the process of the
consolidation of the Arab states."
Miscalculation has led once to a near catastrophe in the Near
and Middle East. It is to be hoped that this same miscalculation
will not be made again.
1. See CRD 318/67.
2. RM, .6.6.67,1300.MT. Egypt seems now to have also dropped this
charge: An article by Al Ahram's chief editor on June 23 on US
collusion with Israel does not mention it.
3. REin Arabic, 5.6.67, 1500 CET; RM in French to Africa, 5.6.67,
,1700, 2100, CET.
4., 6.6.67, 1407 CET. .
5. -Text in Pravda, 6.6.67.
6. Pravda, 6.6.67.
7.. Text in Pravda, 10.6.67.
8. Monde, 20.6.67..
9. Emphasis supplied.
10. Emphasis supplied.
11. Apparently the first mention of the role of an Arab CP it -the
crisis since 5.6.67. '
12. Pravda, 12.6.67.
13. Pravda, 13.6.67.
14, It is interesting to note that General Sidki Mahmud former
chief of the Egyptian air force was the only general demoted
mentioned by Primakov in connection with the intrigues of
"reaction, and the imperialists." According to Monde (23.6.67)
Sidki Mahmud had been denounced in vain for years to Egyptian
authorities by Soviet intelligence as an agent of the British
Intelligence Service.
15. Monde, 21.6.67.
16. It is noteworthy,that the _"Declaration on the Situation in the
Near East-," said to have been adopted at a conference of Arab,
CPs sometime in May and published in Pravda on 2.6.67, stated,
inter alia, that "Communists are, and remain, a necessary and
effective force in the 'struggle against imperialism." There is
certainly nothing in the current situation which could have led
Soviet ideologists to imagine that this view does not hold true
any' more.
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