RECONCILIATION OF SOVIET AND WESTERN FOREIGN TRADE STATISTICS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 122
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 26, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 1, 1977
• Content Type: REPORT

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
Reconciliation of Soviet and Western
Foreign Trade Statistics
ER 77-10132
May 1977
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
This publication is prepared for the use of U.S. Government
officials. The format, coverage and contents of the publication are
designed to meet the specific requirements of those users. U.S.
Government officials may obtain additional copies of this document
directly or through liaison channels from the Central Intelligence
Agency.
Non-U.S. Government users may obtain this along with similar
CIA publications on a subscription basis by addressing inquiries to:
Document Expediting (DOCEX) Project
Exchange and Gift Division
Library of Congress
Washington, D.C. 20540
Non-U.S. Government users not interested in the DOCEX
Project subscription service may purchase reproductions of specific
publications on an individual basis from:
Photoduplication Service
Library of Congress
Washington, D.C. 20540
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
Page
Introduction ................................................. 1
The Problem: Comparison of Total Trade Reported by the USSR and by
Western Countries ......................................... 3
Soviet Exports .............................................. 3
Soviet Imports .............................................. 4
The Soviet Balance of Trade ................................ 5
Sources of Discrepancies Between Soviet and Western Trade Statistics ... 6
Survey of General Causes of Differences in Soviet and Western
Reporting ................................................. 6
Valuation of Exports and Imports ............................ 6
Differences in Coverage ..................................... 7
Method of Identifying Partners .............................. 12
Framework for Reconciliation ................................. 12
Comparison of Western Imports and Soviet Exports ........... 14
Comparison of Western Exports and Soviet Imports ........... 14
Reconciliation of Soviet-Western Trade Statistics, by Country .... 16
United States ............................................... 16
Soviet Exports and US Imports ............................. 16
Soviet Imports and US Exports ............................. 21
Belgium-Luxembourg ......................................... 25
Soviet Exports and Belgian-Luxembourg Imports .............. 25
Soviet Imports and Belgian-Luxembourg Exports .............. 30
Canada .................................................... 30
Soviet Exports and Canadian Imports ........................ 30
Soviet Imports and Canadian Exports ........................ 32
France ..................................................... 36
Soviet Exports and French Imports ........................... 36
Soviet Imports and French Exports ........................... 39
Italy ........................................................ 43
Soviet Exports and Italian Imports .......................... 43
Soviet Imports and Italian Exports .......................... 46
Japan ....................................................... 48
Soviet Exports and Japanese Imports ........................ 48
Soviet Imports and Japanese Exports ........................ 50
Netherlands ................................................. 54
Soviet Exports and Netherlands Imports ...................... 54
Soviet Imports and Netherlands Exports ...................... 59
United Kingdom ............................................ 61
Soviet Exports and UK Imports ............................. 61
Soviet Imports and UK Exports ............................. 64
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
Page
West Germany .............................................. 67
Soviet Exports and West German Imports .................... 67
Soviet Imports and West German Exports .................... 69
Conclusions .................................................. 74
Soviet Exports and Western Imports ........................... 74
Soviet Imports and Western Exports ........................... 76
Which Statistics To Use? ..................................... 77
Estimates of Soviet Trade Based on Western Statistics ......... 77
Appendix A. Allocation of SITC Categories to 1-Digit CTN Categories A-1
Appendix B. Linkage of SITC Categories With CTN Categories . B-1
Appendix C. Regression Results ................................ C-1
1. Ratio of Western Imports to Soviet Exports for Soviet Trade With
Nine Western Countries ................................
3
2. Ratio of Western Exports to Soviet Imports for Soviet Trade With
Nine Western Countries ................................
4
3. Soviet Balance of Trade With Nine Western Countries .....
5
4. Soviet "Unspecified" Export Residuals as a Share of Total
Exports, by Country ...................................
11
5. Soviet "Unspecified" Import Residuals as a Share of Total
Imports, by Country ..................................
11
6. Guidelines for Identification of Trading Partners ...........
13
7. Summary of Possible Reasons for Discrepancies Between Soviet
and Western Trade Statistics ...........................
15
8. Comparison of Soviet Exports and US Imports on a 1-Digit CTN
Level ................................................
17
9. Comparison of Soviet Exports and US Imports in CTN 2 .
18
10. Analysis of Unidentified Soviet Exports to the US .........
19
11. Comparison of Soviet Imports and US Exports on a 1-Digit CTN
Level ................................................
23
12. Difference Between Soviet Imports and US Exports ........
24
13. Comparison of Soviet Exports and Belgian-Luxembourg Imports
on a 1-Digit CTN Level ...............................
26
14. Belgian-Luxembourg and Soviet Unit Prices for Selected Soviet
Exports: Belgian-Luxembourg Unit Prices as a Percent of
Soviet Unit Prices .....................................
27
15. Analysis of Unidentified Soviet Exports to
Belgium-Luxembourg ....................................
29
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
Page
16. Comparison of Soviet Imports and Belgian-Luxembourg Exports
on a 1-Digit CTN Level ............................... 31
17. Comparison of Soviet Exports and Canadian Imports on a 1-
Digit CTN Level ..................................... 33
18. Analysis of Unidentified Soviet Exports to Canada ......... 34
19. Comparison of Soviet Imports and Canadian Exports on a 1-Digit
CTN Level ........................................... 35
20. Comparison of Soviet Exports and French Imports on a 1-Digit
CTN Level ........................................... 37
21. French and Soviet Unit Prices for Selected Soviet, Exports: French
Unit Prices as a Percent of Soviet Unit Prices .......... 38
22. Analysis of Unidentified Soviet Exports to France .......... 40
23. Comparison of Soviet Imports and French Exports on a 1-Digit
CTN Level ........................................... 42
24. Comparison of Soviet Exports and Italian Imports on a 1-Digit
CTN Level ........................................... 44
25. Italian and Soviet Unit Prices for Selected Soviet Exports: Italian
Unit Prices as a Percent of Soviet Unit Prices .......... 45
26. Analysis of Unidentified Soviet Exports to Italy ........... 46
27. Comparison of Soviet Imports and Italian Exports on a 1-Digit
CTN Level ........................................... 47
28. Comparison of Soviet Exports and Japanese Imports on a 1-Digit
CTN Level ........................................... 49
29. Japanese and Soviet Unit Prices for Selected Soviet Exports:
Japanese Unit Prices as a Percent of Soviet Unit Prices .. 51
30. Analysis of Unidentified Soviet Exports to Japan .......... 52
31. Comparison of Soviet Imports and Japanese Exports on a 1-Digit
CTN Level ............................................. 53
32. Comparison of Soviet Exports and Netherlands Imports on a 1-
Digit CTN Level ..................................... 55
33. Netherlands and Soviet Unit Prices for Selected Soviet Exports:
Netherlands Unit Prices as a Percent of Soviet Unit Prices ..... 57
34. Analysis of Unidentified Soviet Exports to the Netherlands . 59
35. Comparison of Soviet Imports and Netherlands Exports on a 1-
Digit CTN Level ..................................... 60
36. Comparison of Soviet Exports and UK Imports on a 1-Digit CTN
Level ................................................ 62
37. UK and Soviet Unit Prices for Selected Soviet Exports: UK Unit
Prices as a Percent of Soviet Unit Prices ............... 63
38. Analysis of Unidentified Soviet Exports to the UK ........ 65
39. Comparison of Soviet Imports and UK Exports on a 1-Digit CTN
Level ................................................ 66
40. Comparison of Soviet Exports and West German Imports on a 1-
Digit CTN Level ..................................... 68
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
Page
41. West German and Soviet Unit Prices for Selected Soviet Exports:
West German Unit Prices as a Percent of Soviet Unit Prices ..... 70
42. Analysis of Unidentified Soviet Exports to West Germany ... 71
43. Comparison of Soviet Imports and West German Exports on a 1-
Digit CTN Level ..................................... 72
44. USSR and West Germany: Comparison of CTN 2 Trade Data ... 74
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
Reconciliation of Soviet and Western
Foreign Trade Statistics
Central Intelligence Agency
Directorate of Intelligence
Summary
1. Discrepancies between Soviet and Western trade statistics lead to balance of
trade figures that differ substantially. Western data put the cumulative Soviet deficit
with the nine Western countries covered in this study' at US $2 billion in 1960-75.
Soviet statistics, on the other hand, show the Soviets in the red by nearly $8 billion.
The immediate cause of this anomaly is that Western imports generally exceed the
USSR's exports by a wide margin, while the value of Soviet imports has usually been
quite a bit higher than the value that the nine countries report for exports to the
USSR. A detailed examination of the trade statistics and reporting practices shows
that reasons for these differences can be found and that the Soviet statistics are a
reliable guide to the USSR's hard-currency position.
2. Discrepancies of this sort can be explained by differences in valuation,
in coverage, and in the method used to identify trading partners. The valuation
differences are important, at least with respect to Western imports from the USSR.
? The Western countries-except for the United States and Canada-value
imports c.i.f. (cost, insurance, and freight) while the USSR reports exports
f.o.b. (free on board).
? Western exports usually are valued f.o.b. at the frontier of the exporting
country as are Soviet imports, so the match is better on this part of
Soviet-Western trade.
3. Soviet and Western coverages-of foreign trade do not mesh because of
(1) differences in definitions of commodity trade, (2) variations in the systems
used to record trade flows, and (3) omissions.
? Soviet data include the sale or purchase of "know-how and services of
a productive nature," while Western data cover only merchandise trade.
1. The countries are the United States, Belgium-Luxembourg, Canada, France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands,
the United Kingdom, and West Germany.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
? The Western countries-except for the US, Japan, the United Kingdom,
and Canada-use the special trade system, which excludes reexports. Soviet
imports, meanwhile, reflect reexports, since the USSR reports its trade
under the general system. The USSR, moreover, employs a broader
definition of reexports than the West by defining as imports goods bought
abroad on Soviet account and exported to other countries before entering
the USSR.
? Although Soviet and Western data seem to be free of omissions on the
aggregate level, the commodity breakdown of trade reported by the USSR
is not exhaustive. Goods, such as diamonds and precious metals, are
reported only as part of "unspecified" trade residuals.
4. Many of the Western countries differ from themselves as well as the USSR
in the rules that they use to identify trading partners. As a result, bilateral balances
of trade are affected profoundly. Imports can be assigned according to the country
of first consignment (the country from which the goods are first shipped to the
reporting country without an intervening commercial transaction), the country of
production, or the country from which the goods were last shipped. For exports,
either the country of last consignment (the last country to which the goods were
shipped by the exporting country without any intervening commercial transactions)
or the country of consumption is used to identify trading partners.
? The United Kingdom, Belgium-Luxembourg, and the Netherlands use the
system of first consignment for imports and last consignment for exports.
Canada employs the same system for identifying the definition of its
exports, but assigns its imports to the country from which the goods were
shipped directly to Canada.
? The USSR-like the US, West Germany, and Italy-identifies imports with
the country of production and exports with the country of consumption.
In some cases, however, the producing and consuming countries are
unknown, so trade is recorded according to first and last consignment.
5. Reconciliation of Soviet export statistics on a disaggregated basis with the
import statistics of each of the nine Western countries in 1970-74 shows that:
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
? C.i.f. valuation of imports largely explains why French, Italian, Japanese,
UK, and West German imports exceed corresponding Soviet exports to
these countries.
? The imbalance is offset somewhat when countries use the special reporting
system, which excludes imports of Soviet goods that are subsequently
reexported. Evidence for France and Italy strongly suggests that since
1973, reexports of Soviet goods-particularly petroleum products-have
played a prominent role in narrowing the gap between their imports and
Soviet exports. In fact, Italian imports from the USSR fell short of Soviet
exports to Italy in 1975.
? Sharp price increases for Soviet raw materials beginning in 1973 led to
a relative decline in transport and insurance costs, eroding the relative
difference between Western c.i.f. valuations and Soviet f.o.b. valuations.
? Acquisition of Soviet fuels, minerals, and metals for reexport are, not
counted by the Netherlands and Belgium-Luxembourg as imports, so
exports by the USSR are larger than corresponding Dutch and Belgium-
Luxembourg imports, despite the c.i.f.-f.o.b. margin.
? The USSR's failure to identify the US as the final destination for all
Soviet goods that find their way to the United States is the reason that
imports from the Soviet Union reported by the United States outstrip
exports to the United States reported by the USSR.
? Soviet exports to Canada exceed Canadian imports from the USSR
because Canada identifies the country of last consignment as the
exporting country. Canada therefore designates third countries as the
source of some imports originating in the USSR.
6. Turning to Soviet imports and Western exports:
? The USSR counts technology costs associated with machinery and
equipment deliveries as imports. This practice is the major factor tending
to make Soviet imports larger than corresponding French, Italian, UK,
and Japanese exports.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
. The broader definition of reexports used by the USSR is responsible
for Soviet imports from the US and Canada being larger than US and
Canadian exports to the USSR in recent years. American grain bought
on Soviet account and shipped to other countries-probably Eastern
Europe-appears as imports from the US in Soviet foreign trade books.
As for Canada, Soviet purchases of Canadian grain and wheat flour for
delivery to Cuba are recorded as Soviet imports and then Soviet exports;
Canada defines them as exports to Cuba.
? West German exports to the USSR, on the other hand, generally are
larger than Soviet imports, mainly because the USSR reports other
countries as the source of some German machinery and equipment.
7. The findings of the study demonstrate that, all things considered, Soviet
trade data are a far better guide to the USSR's hard-currency trade position than
Western data. Taken in the aggregate, Western imports overstate Soviet exports
while Western exports understate Soviet imports. Imports reported by the nine
Western countries in 1970-72 inflate Soviet export earnings by roughly 18 to 19
percent because of transport and insurance costs. Actually, the effect of these costs
is partially offset by the exclusion from Western imports of Soviet goods that
are bought and then reexported-4 or 5 percent of Soviet exports to these nine
countries. The net upward bias is thus only about 14 percent. In 1973-74, the
percentage gap between Western imports and Soviet exports narrowed. The
c.i.f.-f.o.b. difference in the valuation of Soviet exports declined to about 9 percent
owing to a sharp jump in Soviet export prices, and the relative importance of
reexports of Soviet goods-particularly oil products-rose slightly. Consequently, the
actual difference between Western imports and Soviet exports fell to 3 percent
of Soviet exports.
8. Western statistics also fail to record the total hard-currency cost of Soviet
imports. Reexports of Western goods that are missing from Western data but appear
in USSR statistics account for roughly 2-3 percent of Soviet imports. USSR data,
meanwhile, must be adjusted downward by roughly 2 percent because of the
inclusion of technology imports, assuming their costs are included in the service
account.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
9. Soviet data, even after discounting the technology imports, show a USSR
hard currency trade deficit for 1970-74 with the nine Western countries of $2.5
billion, compared with a Soviet deficit of only $0.6 billion tallied from Western
data.
10. Looking at the USSR's trade balance with US in 1970-74, Soviet data
place the deficit at $2.3 billion (adjusted for technology imports), while the United
States has the Soviets short by only $1.8 billion. The difference stems from US
imports generally exceeding Soviet exports and USSR imports overshadowing US
exports. As already mentioned, the USSR's failure to identify the US as the country
of final destination for all Soviet goods reaching the US-especially petroleum
products-is largely responsible for the imbalance between Soviet exports and US
imports. The gap, which was relatively small before 1973, jumped to $28 million
in 1973 and in 1974 shot up to $116 million-equivalent to one-half the value
of USSR exports to the US. Roughly three-fourths of the $116 million difference
can be explained by US imports of Soviet oil not appearing as exports to the
US in USSR trade accounts. The remaining $26 million probably is accounted
for by Soviet platinum and platinum group metals and diamond exports.
11. On the other side of the balance, Soviet imports traditionally have
exceeded US exports because all US goods ultimately reaching the USSR have
not been identified in US trade books as exports to the USSR. The broader
definition of Soviet reexports and the inclusion of technology imports in Soviet
trade data have helped to inflate the value of USSR imports in recent years. Roughly
5 percent of US grain bought on Soviet account in 1972 was shipped to other
countries-most likely Eastern Europe. In 1974, Soviet grain purchases were higher
than US exports by more than 25 percent, while technology imports totaled $18
million. Consequently, Soviet imports exceeded US exports by $137 million.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
Reconciliation of Soviet and Western
Foreign Trade Statistics
... statistics on foreign trade and gold movements are exceedingly poor, and
as a result large parts of the theory of international trade are open to doubt. This
presents a real dilemma: economic theory has unquestionably postulated a fine
structure in the international field; yet we cannot describe this structure adequately
by relying on the data with which we are confronted. "
Oskar Morgenstern,
On the Accuracy of Economic
Observations
12.. There are significant differences between official Soviet foreign trade
statistics and those of the USSR's hard-currency trading partners.2 Soviet export
values traditionally have fallen short of Western import values while Soviet imports
have exceeded Western exports. Understandably, ' questions have arisen concerning
the use of Soviet data, especially for obtaining USSR hard-currency balances. Critics
of Soviet data, such as Marshall Goldman, claim the data are misleading and
minimize the hard-currency earning ability of the USSR. According to Goldman,
"most of those who have been warning about the Soviet trade imbalances have
been using Soviet figures, which ... tend to understate Soviet trade surpluses and
overstate the trade deficit."3 Goldman places the blame for the discrepancies on
Soviet data, since "for its own special reasons, the USSR omits from its statistics
the export of several important items, including diamonds and gold. Consequently,
calculations which rely instead on the statistics published by the countries that
trade with the USSR show the Soviet Union in a much more favorable light."4
13. At first blush, the evidence indeed seems to support these conclusions.
Soviet data put the cumulative USSR hard-currency deficit with its major Western
trading partners for 1960-75 at $8 billion, whereas Western data show the USSR
short by only $2 billion. Previous studies have uncovered probable explanations
for the discrepancies between Soviet and Western trade data-for example, treatment
2. Soviet hard-currency trading partners are those countries-more than 90-that have multilateral trading
arrangements with the USSR.
3. Marshall I. Goldman, "Who Profits More from US-Soviet Trade?" Harvard Business Review,
November-December 1973, p. 84.
4. Marshall I. Goldman, "Letters to the Editor," New York Times, 17 April 1975.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
of exchange rates, reexports, and valuation methods-but have not measured their
influence. Nor have they reconciled Soviet and Western trade data by country or
on a commodity basis.
14. This paper attempts to measure the relative importance of the various
factors responsible for the differences between Soviet and Western trade statistics,
and, when necessary, the analysis is carried out in some detail. The justification
for the effort spent on the problem is simple: we wish to know how, in fact,
to determine the USSR's hard-currency position. The paper itself is divided into
three major sections and a set of conclusions. The first major section of this paper
compares Soviet trade data on an aggregate level with trade statistics of the USSR's
major Western trading partners-West Germany, France, Italy, the United States,
Japan, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Belgium-Luxembourg, and Canada.5
These countries account for 86 percent of the USSR's hard-currency trade with
the developed West and 73 percent of its total hard-currency trade.6 The next
section discusses the sources of the discrepancies, evaluates their influence, and
introduces a framework for reconciliation. In the following section, Soviet and
Western data are reconciled by country. Finally, the country detail provides the
basis for conclusions regarding the nature of the discrepancies in the trade data
and the appropriate way to look at the Soviet trade balance.
15. A major share of the analysis is based on two concordances that were
developed linking Standard International Trade Classification (SITC) categories with
the appropriate Common Foreign Trade Nomenclature (CTN) codes (see
Appendixes A and B). One of the concordances is on a 1-digit CTN level, while
the other is more detailed and covers the commodities reported in the Soviet foreign
trade handbook.' The concordances convert SITC to CTN codes, instead of from
CTN to SITC, to focus on Soviet data and overcome deficiencies in USSR
reporting.' In addition, by using the 1-digit CTN concordance, one can explore
the completeness of Soviet reporting on a single-digit level, something not possible
with a concordance that links CTN to SITC codes.
5. Western data are from UN or OECD sources. Soviet statistics are from annual USSR foreign trade
handbooks. Under the terms of the Belgium-Luxembourg Economic Union, the trade statistics of the two
countries are reported as those of a single customs territory.
6. About 40 percent of the USSR's trade with less developed countries is in hard currency.
7. These concordances differ from the ones developed by the UN and Paul Marer, Soviet and East European
Foreign Trade, 1964-69. The latter concordances convert CTN codes to SITC codes.
8. 'Commodity data usually are not given at the lowest level in Soviet trade handbooks: consequently,
the difficulty of assigning CTN codes to corresponding SITC codes is increased. For example, exports of
tools (CTN 174) to West Germany cannot be allocated among the appropriate SITC categories 71953, 7296,
and 86193, since the Soviets do not publish a more detailed breakdown of CTN 174.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
The Problem: Comparison of Total Trade Reported
by the USSR and by Western Countries
Soviet Exports
16. Soviet figures on the value of exports have often fallen far short of
corresponding Western imports. A comparison of Soviet and Western data for
1960-75 (see Table 1) shows that for five of the nine countries-West Germany,
US
Belgium-
Luxembourg
Canada
France
Italy
Japan
Netherlands
UK
West
Germany
Total
1960
93
98
63
128
122
114
91
109
135
116
1961
95
105
55
123
114
129
84
105
120
112
1962
92
100
65
130
126
130
87
111
137
120
1963
85
92
62
136
129
131
112
118
123
122
1964
106
92
50
133
110
138
69
114
135
118
1965
125
91
68
132
123
130
82
114
144
121
1966
107
90
74
132
123
126
61
106
130
114
1967
105
95
94
129
118
129
61
112
136
118
1968
135
75
102
133
123
117
63
103
136
114
1969
85
70
97
145
107
129
39
111
146
111
1970
113
94
105
145
148
127
38
114
133
118
1971
95
94
91
121
115
118
38
111
125
109
1972
103
80
68
126
118
129
43
125
131
114
1973
115
67
82
118
106
128
37
111
110
105
1974
150
67
55
112
102
119
45
102
105
101
1975
Mean percent
133
87
63
112
97
126
71
108
101
104
deviation'
Standard
9
-13
-25
28
18
26
-36
11
28
14
deviation2
18
11
17
10
12
6
22
6
13
6
1. The average percentage difference between Western imports and Soviet exports.
2. Measures the dispersion of annual percent differences (the square root of the sum of the squared deviations about the mean, divided by the
number of observations).
France, the United Kingdom, Japan, and Italy-Soviet exports are less than the
corresponding Western imports in at least 15 of the 16 years examined. French
and West German import data differ most from USSR statistics-averaging 28
percent more than Soviet exports-while the UK figures are the closest to Soviet
figures for this group of countries. The most notable departure from past trends
is the decrease in the percentage gap between Soviet export data and West German
and Italian import statistics beginning in 1973. Indeed, Italian import figures for
1975 were no longer greater than Soviet exports, as they had been for the past
15 years.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
17. For the remaining countries, Soviet exports are:
? Greater than corresponding US imports in 6 of the 16 years.
? Greater than corresponding imports from Canada and Belgium-
Luxembourg in 14 of the 16 years.
*Greater than corresponding Netherlands imports in 15 of the 16 years.
The disparity between Netherlands imports and Soviet exports-36 percent-has been
the largest and the least consistent.
Soviet Imports
18. The comparison of Western exports and Soviet imports reveals a much
greater consistency among countries and over time than does the comparison of
Western imports and Soviet exports. Western export figures are less than Soviet
import data in at least 13 of the 16 years for all countries except West Germany
(see Table 2). Netherlands exports, on the average, differ most from Soviet imports,
US
Belgium-
Luxembourg
Canada
France
Italy
Japan
Netherlands
UK
West
Germany
Total
1960
63
86
85
89
87
98
57
96
93
89
1961
91
81
53
91
93
98
68
95
114
94
1962
74
77
115
89
100
102
66
100
99
95
1963
82
46
79
91
84
96
64
119
101
92
1964
90
67
90
93
93
94
57
103
96
92
1965
70
73
72
63
96
95
98
86
108
84
1966
64
67
86
47
94
95
65
82
94
81
1967
96
63
85
82
81
95
70
90
112
88
1968
102
61
65
87
86
97
56
92
113
89
1969
90
64
28
82
91
102
65
97
116
93
1970
104
64
75
86
98
99
57
94
113
94
1971
113
84
83
82
102
95
59
93
95
92
1972
98
93
84
80
94
96
78
95
100
93
1973
86
91
89
95
86
96
61
98
115
95
1974
82
87
28
92
87
107
73
97
101
93
1975
Mean percent
90
84
66
103
93
93
102
91
104
95
deviation'
Standard
-13
-26
-26
-16
-8
-2
-31
-4
5
-9
deviation'
13
13
22
13
6
4
13
8
8
4
1. The average percentage difference between Western exports and Soviet imports.
2. Measures the dispersion of annual percent differences (the square root of the sum of the squared deviations about the mean, divided by the number
of observations).
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
while Japanese exports are the closest to the corresponding Soviet imports. In terms
of variation over the years, the ratio of Western exports to Soviet imports has
fluctuated least for Japanese trade and most for Canadian trade with the USSR.
For West Germany, Soviet imports are less than FRG exports-on the average by
5 percent-in 11 of the 16 years.
The Soviet Balance of Trade
19. Because of the discrepancies between Soviet and Western trade data, the
Soviet hard currency balance of trade in Soviet statistics is very different from
balances estimated from the statistics of the USSR's Western trading partners (see
Table 3). Using Soviet data for 1960-75, the USSR has a trade deficit with the
1960
671.9
776.7
701.8
621.5
-29.9
155.2
1961
777.8
872.5
749.8
707.3
28.0
165.2
1962
786.7
946.2
835.2
790.7
-48.5
155.5
1963
831.5
1,012.4
922.3
844.4
-90.8
168.0
1964
901.9
1,067.5
1,201.2
1,105.0
-299.3
-37.5
1965
1,044.1
1,262.6
1,060.6
896.1
-16.5
366.5
1966
1,251.1
1,428.5
1,280.8
1,043.8
-29.7
384.7
1967
1,437.1
1,693.4
1,245.1
1,099.3
192.0
594.1
1968
1,583.5
1,802.1
1,548.3
1,372.6
35.2
429.5
1969
1,713.7
1,910.7
1,809.3
1,680.7
-95.6
230.0
1970
1,737.2
2,052.0
2,008.7
1,894.0
-271.5
158.0
1971
1,990.0
2,159.5
2,158.0
1,995.6
-168.0
163.9
1972
2,177.2
2,492.3
3,248.3
3,028.2
-1,071.1
-535.9
1973
3,839.1
4,016.4
4,860.0
4,595.7
-1,020.9
-579.3
1974
5,778.8
5,842.0
6,065.6
5,666.1
-286.8
175.9
1975
5,619.1
5,870.9
10,438.7
9,883.4
4,819.6
-4,012.5
Total
32,140.7
35,205.7
40,133.7
37,224.4
-7,993.0
-2,018.7
nine countries in 13 of the 16 years; the cumulative deficit is nearly $ 8 billion.
On the other hand, the USSR has a trade surplus in 12 of the 16 years according
to Western statistics. As a result of the large 1975 deficit, the cumulative trade
balance is in deficit by $2 billion-much less than that recorded in Soviet foreign
trade accounts.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08SO135OR000602080001-1
20. The difference is the result of Western imports exceeding Soviet exports
by roughly 10 percent and an 8-percent gap between Soviet imports and Western
exports. Seven of the nine Western countries credited the USSR with a larger
cumulative trade balance in 1960-75 than the USSR itself shows. The largest margin
occurred in Japanese and Soviet statistics-$1.7 billion; the balance according to
French data was $1.3 billion more than the Soviet figure. US statistics show a
Soviet trade deficit of $3.7 billion, nearly $1 billion less than in Soviet data. In
contrast, USSR trade balances calculated using Dutch and Belgium-Luxembourg
data are less than the balances obtained from Soviet foreign trade handbooks.
Sources of Discrepancies Between Soviet and Western
Trade Statistics
21. Before the Soviet trade-and-payments position can be assessed with
confidence, the reasons for the discrepancies-presented in Tables 1 and 2 have to be
unraveled. This section of the report discusses some of the underlying factors at
work and then introduces a framework for reconciliation.
Survey of General Causes of Differences in Soviet
and Western Reporting
Valuation of Exports and Imports
22. Differences in how traded goods are valued are the most obvious causes
of disparities between Soviet exports and Western imports. Western
countries-except for the United States and Canada-record imports c.i.f. while the
USSR reports exports f.o.b.9 The US generally reports imports based on the
"transaction value at the foreign port of exportation"; the cost of loading the
goods on the carrier is omitted, and the transport cost to the point of exportation
may or may not be included. The value of Canadian imports is based on the selling
price f.o.b. point of shipment.
9. The f.o.b. value for exports is the value at which goods are sold by the exporter, including export
duties, internal taxes, and similar charges plus the cost of transportation and insurance to bring the goods
on to the transporting vehicle at the frontier of the exporting country. The c.i.f. value for imports is the
value at which the goods are purchased by the importer plus the cost of transportation and insurance to
the frontier of the importing country.
Although valuation discrepancies can also arise when exchange rates are used to convert trade statistics
in national currencies to a single currency, they are not addressed in this paper. The UN's conversion of
Western trade data to dollars by trade weighted average exchange rates is accepted. (The UN computes an
average annual dollar exchange rate for a foreign currency by weighting the monthly rates-or the simple
average of the rates in effect during a month-by the trade for that month.) Soviet trade in rubles is converted
to dollars using the official Soviet annual ruble/dollar rate prevailing before 1972 and the average of the
monthly ruble/dollar rates announced by the USSR since 1972. This computed rate matches the rate reported
by the UN for the USSR.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
23. Valuation problems encountered in the case of Western imports do not
arise on the export side. Western exports-aside from Canadian and US exports-are
valued f.o.b. At the frontier of the exporting country, while Soviet imports are
valued f.o.b. border of the country of shipment. The US values its exports f.a.s.
(free alongside ship), which is equivalent to f.o.b. less the cost of loading the goods
on the carrier. Canadian exports are valued either f.o.b. At the point of
consignment-where they are loaded aboard a carrier for export-or valued f.o.b.
at the port of export, in which case the value would include transport charges
to the port.
24. Summing up the effect of these valuation procedures in isolation:
? West German, French, UK, Italian, Netherlands, and Belgian-Luxembourg
imports should be larger than Soviet exports.
?US and Canadian imports should be slightly less than Soviet exports.
? West German, French, UK, Japanese, Netherlands, and Belgian-Lux-
embourg exports should equal Soviet imports.
? US and Canadian exports should be slightly less than Soviet imports.
Differences in Coverage
25. Disparities between trade statistics also stem from differences in the
coverage of foreign trade data caused by differences in (1) the definition of
commodity trade, (2) the systems used to record trade flows, and (3) omissions,
conscious or otherwise.
26. Definitions. Western data, for the most part, include only merchandise
trade-goods that add to or subtract from the stock of material resources in a
country as a result of their movement into or out of the country. The USSR,
on the other hand, includes the sale and purchase of patents, licenses, repairs,
and "services of a productive nature" in its trade statistics. Payment for these
kinds of services and "know-how" are treated as invisibles by the West rather than
as part of the merchandise account.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
27. Reporting Systems. The comprehensiveness of data on trade flows
depends upon the reporting system-general or special-that the countries use. Under
the general trade system, all goods entering a country-except for transit trade-are
considered imports. The special trade system, in contrast, accepts as imports goods
entering bonded processing establishments but does not count goods entering
bonded warehouses or free zones unless and until they are withdrawn from such
warehouses or free zones for domestic use. The general trade system counts all goods
leaving the country, across the national frontier, as exports. The special trade
system, on the other hand, records trade that is cleared through customs and goods
leaving bonded processing plants but excludes reexports from bonded warehouses
and free zones (Figure 1).
28. West Germany, France, Italy, Belgium-Luxembourg, and the Netherlands
use the special trade system, while the United States, Canada, Japan, and the United
Kingdom use the general system. The USSR also records trade under the general
system but employs a broader definition of reexports than the West. It includes
commodities that physically enter or leave the USSR (with the exception of transit
goods) and goods of foreign origin acquired by Soviet foreign trade organizations
abroad and exported to other countries without shipment to the USSR.
29. The implications of the various combinations of trade reporting systems
for USSR-Western statistics are as follows:
? West German, French, Italian, and Belgian-Luxembourg exports should
be less than Soviet imports by the value of their reexports from bonded
warehouses and free zones and the value of goods bought abroad by
the USSR and then delivered to other countries.
?US, Japanese, UK, and Canadian exports should be less than Soviet
imports by the value of goods that do not enter the USSR.
? West German, French, Italian, Netherlands, and Belgian-Luxembourg
imports should be less than Soviet exports by the value of Soviet goods
entering bonded warehouses and free zones and the value of goods
originating in other countries but bought and sold by the. USSR in transit.
? US, Japanese, UK, and Canadian imports should be less than Soviet
exports by the value of goods that the USSR buys abroad and delivers to
these countries (counted by the USSR as Soviet exports but by these
countries as imports from the country of origin, or last consignment in the
case of Canada).
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
Special and General Trade Reporting Systems
Special lmports=A+B+G
Special Exports=C+D+H
General lmports=A+E+G
General Exports=C+D+H+F
Where Domestic Exports=C+H
and Re-exports=F+D
Nationalized
Goods*
'Nationalized goods-goods included in special
imports that are exported without transformation.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
30. Omissions. The only noticeable omission from aggregate Western statistics
is the exclusion in UN statistics of United Kingdom imports of Soviet diamonds,
textile fibers, and ferroalloys since 1970. OECD and country sources show these
deliveries.
31. On the Soviet side, figures for total exports to and imports from Western
trading partners are believed to be free of omissions; at least there is no evidence
to the contrary. The commodity breakdowns of exports and imports reported in
Soviet handbooks are not exhaustive, however; there are "unspecified" export and
import residuals (see Tables 4 and 5). In addition, only the trade involving
machinery and equipment (CTN 1) is reported on a 1-digit level. (Even then,
there is a residual since the subcategory breakdown in CTN 1 is incomplete.) Three
2-digit codes along with their subcategories are completely omitted from exports
and imports reported by the USSR: precious metals and precious metal goods for
industrial purposes (CTN 28), isotopes and amorphous chemicals (CTN 36), and
metal storehouses, structures, and tubing (CTN 42). Furthermore, the Soviets
traditionally have excluded several 3- and 4-digit subcategories-in particular,
diamonds-from their trade statistics.
32. The "unspecified" residuals in Soviet statistics on exports to the Western
countries (Table 4) are accounted for largely by the commodity categories that
are omitted from the USSR handbooks-diamonds and other precious stones; silver,
platinum, and platinum group metals; silver and platinum ores; jewelry of gold,
silver, and platinum; nickel; and isotopes and amorphous chemicals. Other
commodities comprising the residual vary by country. (Gold, unlike other precious
metals, is omitted entirely from Soviet trade data. This is consistent with Western
reporting, however, which excludes monetary and nonmonetary gold from
merchandise trade. Consequently, gold does not play a role in reconciling Soviet
and Western data.) Unspecified residuals in Soviet statistics on imports from Western
countries (Table 5) generally are smaller than the export residuals and also are
of little importance.
33. Trade in a commodity reported in the breakdown of exports to one
country may not be reported in the breakdown for another country, although
trade in the given commodity takes place in both cases. To some extent, the reason
for the USSR's omission of commodities in its trade reports is innocent enough.
Goods may be included in a country residual one year and reported explicitly
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
Exports to
Soviet "Unspecified" Export Residuals
as a Share of Total Exports, by Country
US
58.0
60.7
74.2
88.8
74.6
Belgium-Luxembourg
14.0
15.7
16.2
24.4
17.9
Canada
18.7
46.3
48.7
56.2
25.3
France
5.9
6.2
13.2
10.7
8.7
Italy
2.6
2.9
3.5
2.8
2.7
Japan
17.1
12.4
14.6
15.2
12.8
Netherlands
33.8
10.8
13.6
8.4
8.1
UK
58.0
54.1
51.8
56.5
46.8
West Germany
8.2
7.8
10.6
11.1
8.1
Imports from
Soviet "Unspecified" Import Residuals
as a Share of Total Imports, by Country
US
0.6
11.9
8.2
8.7
4.6
Belgium-Luxembourg
10.3
20.3
13.7
16.9
8.9
Canada
0.4
0.8
0.2
0.2
3.1
France
4.6
5.0
5.8
5.3
5.2
Italy
4.1
3.9
4.8
5.6
5.4
Japan
5.0
6.8
4.2
5.9
4.9
Netherlands
8.7
3.4
14.8
9.0
3.3
UK
5.3
4.2
5.6
4.8
7.9
West Germany
3.7
3.6
3.7
6.8
9.8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
the next. This generally occurs when the statistical authorities deem that trade
in the commodity has become large enough to include in the distribution of trade
by commodity.
Method of Identifying Partners
34. Lack of uniformity in identifying the country of origin for imports and
the country of destination for exports also results in differences between Soviet
and Western trade data. The various procedures are set out in Table 6. The United
Kingdom, Belgium-Luxembourg, and the Netherlands use the system of first
consignment for their imports and the country of last consignment for their
exports.' ?Canada also assigns its exports to the country of last consignment but
identifies imports with the country from which the goods are last shipped to
Canada. France and Japan report their imports by country of production and their
exports by country of last consignment.'' The USSR, like the United States, West
Germany, and Italy, identifies its imports with the country of production and its
exports with the country of consumption.' 2
35. Reconciliation of Soviet and Western trade statistics is especially difficult
when countries of first and last consignment or production and consumption are
unknown to statistical agencies. Imports then are usually identified with the country
from which they are shipped and exports with the country to which they are
addressed. Consequently, countries tend to overstate their trade with partners that
are heavily involved in transshipping and reexporting, such as the Netherlands and
Belgium-Luxembourg.
Framework for Reconciliation
36. Proceeding from this general survey of potential problems in comparing
country trade statistics, the chief reason for discrepancies between the trade
10. The country of first consignment is the country from which the goods are first shipped to the reporting
country without a commercial transaction intervening between that country and the importing country. For
exports, the country of last consignment is the last country to which the goods were shipped by the exporting
country without any intervening commercial transactions.
11. The country of production is the country where the merchandise was grown, mined, or manufactured, either
wholly or partly.
12. The country of consumption is the ultimate destination or the country where the goods will be further
processed. If the ultimate destination is unknown, the country of last consignment is used.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
Western Countries: Identifi- USSR: Identification
Exports by: cation of Export Destination of Source of Imports Effect on Comparison of Western Exports and Soviet Imports
Belgium-Luxembourg
Canada
France
Japan
Netherlands Country of last
UK consignment
US
Italy
West Germany Country of consumption
Western Countries: USSR: Identification
Identification of Source of Export Destination
Imports by: of Imports
Belgium-Luxembourg
Netherlands
UK Country of first Country of consumption
consignment
Canada Country from which shipped
(last stop)
US
France
Italy
Japan
West Germany
Western exports should equal Soviet imports if the exports are
domestically produced goods that are shipped to the USSR
without intervening commercial transactions. Soviet import
figures should be less than Western values, on the other hand, if
the exports are nationalized goods or reexports-the US,
Japan, the UK, and Canada use a general reporting
system-and the Soviets can identify the country of origin. If
the country of origin is unknown, however, the goods are
credited to the Western country from which they are shipped,
and Soviet and Western values would match.
Western exports of domestically produced goods to the USSR
should be identical to Soviet imports, assuming that the
countries of consumption and origin are known to the Western
country and to the USSR.
Effect on Comparison of Western Imports and Soviet Exports
Western imports should match Soviet exports if the
goods-excluding reexports-are shipped to the Western
country from the USSR without intervening commercial
transactions. When reexports are included in the trade flow,
imports for the Netherlands and Belgium-Luxembourg would
equal Soviet exports data, assuming that the USSR can
identify the country of final consumption. If not, some Soviet
exports would be credited to these countries, tending to make
Soviet exports larger than imports by the Netherlands and
Belgium-Luxembourg. UK imports would be expected to
exceed Soviet exports since the UK includes reexports as
imports under its general reporting system.
If goods shipped from the USSR to Canada for final
consumption go directly to Canada without intermediate
stops, then Canadian imports should equal Soviet exports.
Otherwise, Canadian data would be less than Soviet data.
Canadian imports could exceed Soviet exports, on the other
hand, if Soviet goods were reexported by Canada and the
USSR knew the country of consumption.
French, Italian, and West German imports should equal Soviet
exports. US and Japanese imports, on the other hand, should
exceed Soviet exports-assuming the USSR can identify the
country of consumption-because the US and Japan count
reexports as imports.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
statistics of the. USSR and its Western trading partners can be determined on a
case-by-case basis by examining trade on aggregate, 1-digit CTN, and commodity
levels. 13
Comparison of Western Imports and Soviet Exports
37. Western imports that are recorded on a c.i.f. basis should be greater than
the corresponding Soviet exports at all levels if valuation problems-c.i.f. versus
f.o.b.-are the only sources of discrepancies or outweigh other reporting differences
(Table 7). On a 1-digit level, the incomplete commodity breakdown published by
the Soviets further adds to the imbalance. If imports, on the other hand, are less
than Soviet exports (or the discrepancies between Western imports and Soviet
exports are too small to fully reflect c.i.f: f.o.b. differences), then omissions from
Western data on an aggregate and 1-digit level or problems in defining trade partners
probably are important.
38. When Western countries value their imports on an f.o.b. basis, the
aggregate value of imports should compare closely with the value of Soviet exports.
If Western imports are greater than Soviet exports, however, then coverage and
country classification problems presumably account for the discrepancies on an
aggregate as well as a 1-digit and commodity level. Furthermore, the lack of an
exhaustive breakdown for 1-digit categories other than machinery and equipment
(CTN 1) add to the disparities in data on a 1-digit level.
Comparison of Western Exports and Soviet Imports
39. Turning to Western exports, Soviet import statistics should be slightly
larger than Western export figures at the aggregate level and for CTN 1. The
imbalance stems largely from the Soviet inclusion of the cost of "know-how" in
the machinery and equipment category (CTN 1) and the USSR's broader definition
of reexports. The c.i.f.-f.o.b. problem does not arise, since both Western exports
and Soviet imports are recorded f.o.b.
40. If Western exports are greater than Soviet imports at the aggregate or
the CTN 1 level, then the disparities can be accounted for by reexports and country
13. Disparities in trade statistics stemming from differences between shipping and receiving times are washed
out for the most part when trade is considered over a 5-year period. i
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
Summary of Possible Reasons for Discrepancies Between
Soviet and Western Trade Statistics
Western c.i.f.
imports
Western imports Aggregate C.i.f.-f.o.b. valuation problem
greater than I
Soviet exports 1-digit C.i.f: f.o.b. valuation problem
Incomplete Soviet commodity breakdown
Western imports Aggregate Omissions in Western data
less than Soviet
exports Reexport problem
1-digit Omissions in Western data
Reexport problem
Difficulty in defining trade partners
Commodity Reexport problems
Difficulty in defining trade partners
f.o.b. Western imports Aggregate Reexport problem
greater than Difficulty in defining trade partners
Soviet exports
Western imports
less than
Soviet exports
less than
Soviet imports
Western exports
greater than
Soviet imports
1-digit Incomplete Soviet commodity breakdown
Reexport problem
Difficulty in defining trade partners
Commodity Reexport problem
Difficulty in defining trade partners
Aggregate Reexport problem
Difficulty in defining trade partners
1-digit Reexport problem
Difficulty in defining trade partners
Commodity Reexport problem
Difficulty in defining trade partners
Aggregate Definition of trade problem
Reexport problem
Difficulty in defining trade partners
I -digit Definition of trade problem (CTN I only)
Reexport problem
Difficulty in defining trade partners
Commodity Definition of trade problem (CTN I only)
Reexport problem
Difficulty in defining trade partners
Aggregate Reexport problem
Difficulty in defining trade partners
I-digit Incomplete Soviet commodity breakdown
Reexport problem
Difficulty in defining trade partners
Commodity Reexport problem
Difficulty in defining trade partners
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
classification difficulties. For the remaining 1-digit categories, Western statistics
should be greater, since the USSR's breakdown is not exhaustive, and the Soviet
1-digit CTN totals represent the sum of reported subcategories within a given CTN.
Reconciliation of Soviet-Western Trade Statistics, by Country
41. The reasons for the differences between Soviet and Western values of
bilateral trade can be found mainly in the general circumstances described above.
Nonetheless, statistics recording each bilateral connection have their own
peculiarities, so reconciliation must be carried out on a case-by-case basis. In the
following country sections, detailed trade data for 1970-74 provide the raw material
for such a reconciliation.
42. Soviet exports and imports are examined first at the 1-digit CTN level, in
both USSR and partner country versions. For shorthand purposes, the tables in the
country sectors refer to Soviet exports and imports and the imports and exports of
the individual Western countries. Soviet exports and imports are the values reported
in Soviet statistics; Western imports and exports are the comparable values reported
in Western statistics. Average unit prices are calculated when they might be
illuminating with regard to f.o.b.-c.i.f. and other problems. For each country, an
attempt is also made to define the content of the Soviet export residual. Within
1-digit trade categories, Soviet and Western reporting are matched insofar as possible
to help explain discrepancies. The results are a mixed bag of rather firm conclusions,
reasonable inferences backed by some evidence, and unconfirmed hypotheses.
43. Much of the country analysis is detailed and somewhat tedious. Because
of the questions that have arisen concerning Soviet-US trade, the US section is
particularly long. The general reader, however, can move directly to the conclusions
or sample just one or two of the country sections to obtain a better idea of the
approach and the bases for the conclusions.
United States
Soviet Exports and US Imports
44. The USSR's failure to identify the US as the country of final destination
for all Soviet goods that ultimately reach the US is largely responsible for the
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
Comparison of Soviet Exports and US Imports
on a 1-Digit CTN Level
CTN I
USSR
58
63
701
1,168
1,618
3,608
US
549
1,464
1,438
2,644
3,564
9,659
USSR as percent
of US
11
4
49
44
45
37
CTN 2
USSR
13,329
14,328
10,618
6,916
13,861
59,052
US
61,737
46,630
81,730
193,282
319,612
702,991
USSR as percent
of US
22
31
13
4
4
8
CTN 3
USSR
660
344
1,330
1,655
30,094
34,083
US
551
833
1,058
1,429
9,691
13,562
USSR as percent
of US
120
41
126
116
311
251
CTN 4
USSR
900
1,108
1,558
1,571
911
6,048
US
1,498
1,629
2,144
3,289
1,683
10,243
USSR as percent
of US
60
68
73
48
54
59
CTN 5
USSR
3,933
2,327
3,890
4,495
5,555
20,200
US
4,304
3,451
4,562
5,941
9,475
27,733
USSR as percent
of US
91
67
85
76
59
73
CTN 6, 7
USSR
4,918
2,488
1,614
0
0
9,020
US
6
25
20
27
468
546
USSR as percent
of US
81,967
9,952
8,070
0
0
1,652
CTN 8
USSR
585
223
458
431
560
2,257
US
620
264
715
852
711
3,162
USSR as percent
of US
94
84
64
51
79
71
CTN 9
USSR
2,582
2,888
3,706
4,692
6,733
20,601
US
3,046
3,304
3,868
6,489
5,019
21,726
USSR as percent
of US
85
87
96
72
134
95
Total CTN 1-9
USSR
26,964
23,768
23,875
20,928
59,332
154,866
US
72,311
57,600
95,535
213,953
350,223
789,622
USSR as percent
of US
37
41
25
10
17
20
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
fact that US imports generally have been larger than corresponding Soviet exports
(see Tables I and 8). The gap, which had been relatively small, jumped to $28
million in 1973 and in 1974 shot up to $116 million-equivalent to one-half the
value of Soviet exports to the US.
45. A comparison of Soviet and US data suggests that Soviet. fuel, mineral,
and metal (CTN 2) exports account for nearly all of the anomaly. The difference
between Soviet exports, which include the CTN 2 commodities reported in the
USSR trade books plus the "unspecified" export residual (adjusted to exclude
non-CTN 2 commodities), and' US fuel, mineral, and metal imports tracks closely
with the differences between total Soviet exports and US imports in 1970-74
(Table 9).
Comparison of Soviet Exports
and US Imports in CTN 2
Reported CTN 2 exports
13.3
14.3
10.6
6.9
13.9
"Unspecified" residual
adjusted for non-CTN 2
exports'
35.4
34.7
66.9
163.0
174.1
US CTN 2 imports
61.7
46.6
81.7
193.3
319.6
Difference between Soviet
CTN 2 exports and US
CTN 2 imports
Difference between
total Soviet exports
and total US imports -8.1 2.8 -3.1 -28.0 -116.2
1. The following CTN 2 exports are contained in the "unspecified" export residual for Soviet-US trade:
diamonds and other precious stones, platinum and platinum group metals, and petroleum and petroleum
products.
46. Furthermore, the commodities that the US reports as imports and that
the USSR does not report as exports seem to be normally included in Soviet export
residuals (Table 10). In 1970-74, at least, the difference between the Soviet export
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
Table 10
Analysis of Unidentified Soviet Exports to the US
Diamonds (SITC 6672)
Other precious stones (SITC 6673)
Platinum and platinum group
metals (SITC 6812)
Silver and platinum ore (SITC 285)
Jewelry of gold, silver, and
platinum (SITC 8971)
Nickel (SITC 683)
Isotopes and amorphous chemi-
cals (SITC 515)
Petroleum, crude and partly
refined (SITC 331)
Petroleum products (SITC 332)
Imports identified by US
but not by USSR
Unspecified Soviet export residual
Value reported by US
as share of unspecified
Soviet export residual
13,262
11,225
13,435
17,260
11,875
67,057
170
17
51
19
39
296
22,887
19,515
44,708
75,955
134,183
297,248
0
0
0
0
16
16
1,869
1,973
1,690
1,961
400
7,893
5,480
53
262
10,538
39,939
56,272
0
0
1,952
20,730
24,941
47,623
2,807
652
5,510
54,850
78,495
142,314
46,493
33,444
67,609
181,486
290,078
619,110
37,258
36,676
68,569
165,102
174,705
482,310
residual and the value reported by the US for imports of the commodities usually
omitted from the Soviet breakdown of. US-Soviet trade closely matches the
discrepancy between Soviet exports and US imports on an aggregate level:
Difference between the
Soviet export residual
and assumed US imports
in the residual
Difference between total
Soviet exports and total
US imports
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
47. In 19 73-74, when there was a substantial difference between Soviet
exports and US imports, only part of the Soviet oil reaching the US was identified as
an export to the US in Soviet trade books, and these shipments were lumped in the
"unspecified" export residual. US imports of Soviet oil in 1974 totaled $103.4
million, while the USSR reported exports of only $14.3 million to the US.' 4 Thus,
$89.1 million of the total discrepancy of $115.4 million can be accounted for. The
remaining $26.3 million probably reflects Soviet exports of diamonds or platinum
and platinum group metals not credited as an export to the US but recorded by the
US as an import from the USSR. The oil, diamond, and metal exports presumably
were shipped initially to a third country-for example, the Netherlands in the case of
oil-and then on to the US.'s Similarly, Soviet oil, diamond, and metal exports not
identified as exports to the US in 1973 amounted to $16.4 million-the difference
between the Soviet export residual and the corresponding residual calculated from
US data.
48. Besides oil, diamonds, and precious metals, several other Soviet CTN 2
exports-totaling $17.7 million in 1974-appeared in US data as imports from the
USSR but not in Soviet export statistics: nonferrous scrap, coke, iron and steel,
copper, zinc, and $11 million worth of other nonferrous metals. Consequently,
Soviet exports reaching the US in 1974 but not recorded as exports to the US by the
USSR amounted to roughly $136.1 million. This imbalance was partially offset by
Soviet urea exports (CTN 30412) of $17.4 million to the US in 1974. These were
not included in US trade statistics, so Soviet rubber, chemical, and fertilizer (CTN 3)
exports exceeded corresponding US imports on a 1-digit level (Table 8, page 17).
49. Soviet exports and US imports in 1973-74 therefore can be reconciled
in the following manner:
14. Although the 1974 foreign trade handbook did not report Soviet exports of oil to the US, the 1975
trade book did.
15. The USSR reported petroleum exports to the Netherlands of $183 million in 1973 and of $267 million
in 1974, while the Netherlands reported imports of only $48 million and $130 million, respectively.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
Soviet exports less 1973
1974
US imports of:
Petroleum and petroleum
products (SITC 33)
-89.1
Platinum and platinum group -16.4
metals or diamonds (SITC
6812 and STIC 6672)
-26.3
Nonferrous metal scrap
(SITC 284)
-1.1
Coke (SITC 3218)
-2.4
Iron and steel (SITC 67) -0.1
-1.4
Copper (SITC 682) -0.3
-1.9
Zinc (SITC 686) -2.8
-0.3
Miscellaneous nonferrous
base metals (SITC 6895) -4.3
-10.6
Chrome ore (CTN 24004) 0.9
4.4
Urea (CTN 30412)
17.4
Other -4.5
-3.0
Total -27.5
-114.3
Total difference between
Soviet exports and US
imports -28.0
-116.2
Soviet Imports and US Exports
50. On the other side of the balance, Soviet imports generally ran larger than
US exports before 1970 because all US goods delivered finally to the USSR were not
identified in US trade books as exports to the USSR (Table 2). Apparently shipped
to Western Europe and then on to the USSR, these goods appear in US data as
exports to a third country and not to the USSR (the US records exports according
to the country of last consignment if the country of consumption is unknown). In
1970-71, however, the usual discrepancy was more than offset by the Soviet failure
to identify the US as the exporter of all US machinery and equipment (CTN 1) that
the US reported as shipped to the USSR. In 1972-74, Soviet imports again were
larger than US exports. The broader definition of reexports used by the Soviets
largely accounted for the bias; as noted above, in its imports the USSR includes
goods bought on Soviet account and shipped directly to a third country from the
exporting country.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
51. Reported Soviet imports of machinery and equipment (CTN 1) were $22
million less than corresponding US CTN 1 exports to the USSR in 1970 and $36
million less in 1971 (see Table 11). These imbalances were large enough to outweigh
the positive differences in other categories-in particular, Soviet imports of raw
materials of vegetable and animal origin (CTN 5).
52. In 1971, the increase in the difference between recorded Soviet machinery
imports and US CTN 1 exports pushed the aggregate discrepancy up to $18 million
compared with $4 million in 1970 (see Table 12). Although Soviet imports of
raw materials for the manufacture of foodstuffs (CTN 7) were $14 million less
than US exports, the USSR apparently included the remainder of CTN 7 imports
(mainly wheat, corn, and unmilled cereal) in an "unspecified" import residual,
totaling $17 million. When the differences between Soviet imports and US exports
in CTN 1-9 are added to the value of Soviet imports that are not allocated by
CTN category (Table 12), the sum very nearly equals the difference between total
reported Soviet imports and total reported US exports.
53. In 1972-74, US grain bought on Soviet account for shipment to third
countries-probably Eastern Europe-was chiefly responsible for the excess of Soviet
imports over US exports. The Soviets reported the grain as an import from the
US and then as a Soviet export, while in US trade statistics the shipments appear
as exports to the country of consumption or last consignment.
54. Roughly 5 percent of the US grain purchased by the Soviets in 1972
and recorded as an import from the US apparently was shipped to third countries.' 6
In addition, the difference between Soviet machinery and equipment imports and
US exports dropped sharply in 1972 to one-fifth its 1971 level. The $43 million
difference between Soviet imports and US exports of raw materials of vegetable
and animal origin (CTN 5)-stemming from US exports of soybeans that did not
appear as imports in the Soviet commodity breakdown-was more than covered
by the "unspecified" import residual, which jumped to nearly $46 million.
55. The excess of Soviet CTN 6-7 imports over US exports soared to $116
million in 1973; Soviet imports of US grain were nearly 15 percent larger by weight
16. The Soviet import figure possibly includes US grain sold to Western Europe and then resold by the
Europeans to the USSR. The Soviets would credit the US with the export if they knew the origin of the
grain.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
Comparison of Soviet Imports and US Exports
on a 1-Digit CTN Level
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
Total
CTN 1
USSR
23,994
29,247
57,644
227,610
249,151
587,646
US
45,974
65,447
65,334
208,908
230,808
616,471
USSR as percent
of US
52
45
88
109
108
95
CTN 2
USSR
25,974
31,299
16,924
29,619
17,485
121,301
US
25,767
26,994
13,365
17,280
12,937
96,343
USSR as percent
of US
101
116
127
171
135
126
CTN 3
USSR
11,747
17,825
13,357
21,916
56,745
121,590
US
5,393
16,218
9,328
17,692
35,567
84,198
USSR as percent
of US
218
110
143
124
160
144
CTN 4
USSR
0
0
0
0
0
0
US
273
249
634
444
1,698
3,298
CTN 5
USSR
46,746
42,907
34,241
23,483
30,731
178,108
US
33,821
30,804
77,529
87,037
29,226
258,417
USSR as percent
of US
138
139
44
27
105
69
CTN 6, 7
USSR
62
67
385,720
954,023
348,667
1,688,539
US
10
14,264
368,920
837,550
278,037
1,498,781
USSR as percent
of US
620
Negl
105
114
125
113
CTN 8
USSR
3,163
2,702
1,849
2,198
5,002
14,914
US
2,284
2,456
3,286
10,692
9,137
27,855
USSR as percent
of US
138
110
56
21
55
54
CTN 9
USSR
2,180
2,460
2,755
2,593
3,951
13,939
US
4,694
5,188
8,096
8,035
10,393
36,406
USSR as percent
of US
46
47
34
32
38
38
Total CTN 1-9
USSR
113,867
126,508
512,491
1,261,443
711,732
2,726,040
US
118,216
161,620
546,492
1,187,638
607,803
2,621,769
USSR as percent
of US
96
78
94
106
117
104
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
1
Machinery and equipment'
Of which:
-22.0
-36.2
-7.7
18.7
18.3
SITC 712-agricultural machinery
-10.9
-7.0
SITC 714-office machinery
-3.6
SITC 715-metalworking machinery
6.2
-2.5
SITC 718-machinery for special industries
SITC 719-machinery and appliances?
5.2
other than electrical
-8.6
-24.5
Other SITC 71 commodities
-3.5
SITC 732-road motor vehicles
-3.3
2
Fuel, minerals, and metals
Of which:
0.2
4.3
3.6
12.3
4.5
SITC 33-oil products
-0.4
1.7
SITC 51365-aluminum oxide
7.3
11.8
SITC 67-iron and steel
-2.2
3
Chemicals, fertilizers, and rubber
Of which:
SITC 58-plastic materials,
regenerated cellulose and
6.4
1.6
4.0
4.2
2,1.2
artificial resins
SITC 5992-insecticides, fungicides,
13.3
disinfectants, and the like
Building materials and construction
4.4
4.4
parts
-0.3
-0.2
-0.6
-0.4
-1.7
5
Raw materials of vegetable and
animal origin
Of which:
12.9
12.1
-43.3
-63.6
1.5
SITC 21-hides
2.5
3.2
2.5
3.2
SITC 2214-soybeans
-52.1
-67.3
SITC 25-pulp and waste paper
6.5
5.1
1.3
2.0
SITC 26-textile fibres
SITC 6517-yarn and thread of
2.0
0.6
1.3
1.3
artificial fibers
1.0
1.8
3.7
6, 7
Live animals not for slaughter;
raw materials for production of
foodstuffs
Of which:
0.1
-14.2
16.8
116.5
70.6
SITC 041-wheat
-0.7
-16.8
89.2
11.5
SITC 043-barley
10.9
SITC 044-corn
-11.7
22.6
23.9
52.6
SITC 045-cereal, unmilled
-1.8
3.4
6.5
9
Industrial consumer goods (other
than food)
Of which:
SITC 893-articles of artificial
plastic materials
-5.3
SITC 896-works of art
Soviet imports not allocated
-0.7
by CTN category
Total difference between Soviet
0.7
17.0
45.8
119.9
33.9
imports and US exports
-3.6
-18.0
11.6
193.7
137.8
1. The commodity breakdown for machinery and equipment is not as reliable as the breakdown for nonmachinery trade
because the SITC and CTN systems do not permit an exact concordance for machinery.
2. Mainly, mechanical handling equipment.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
than. corresponding US figures. In addition, Soviet imports of US machinery and
equipment (CTN 1) outweighed US exports by roughly $ 20 million. The cost of
imported US technology associated with the purchase of US machinery presumably
accounted for a large share of the difference. Again, US CTN 5 exports were larger
than Soviet imports because of US exports of soybeans, which were probably
counted in the Soviet import residual as they were in 1972.
56. The factors accounting for the discrepancy between Soviet imports and
US exports in 1973 were also at work in 1974. Soviet grain imports exceeded US
exports by more than 25 percent and the inclusion of technology raised Soviet
machinery imports above US exports by $18 million. In addition, Soviet imports of
chemicals, fertilizers, and rubber (CTN 3) were $21 million larger than US exports,
primarily because the USSR credited the US with exports of plastic materials,
regenerated cellulose, and artificial resins (SITC 58) that were not reported in US
exports, Very likely, these products reached the USSR via a third country.
Belgium-Luxembourg
Soviet Exports and Belgian-Luxembourg Imports
57. The treatment of reexports explains why Soviet imports exceed
Belgian-Luxembourg imports (see Tables 1 and 13)." Belgium-Luxembourg
records its trade flows under a special system that does not count reexports in
its trade. The value of reexports, which has been large enough to offset c.i.f.-f.o.b.
valuation differences, has increased in recent years-particularly in CTN 2 (fuels,
minerals, and metals).
58. Comparisons of a weighted average of unit prices for selected
Belgium-Luxembourg imports for 1970-74 with Soviet export unit prices suggest
that Belgium-Luxembourg imports would have exceeded Soviet exports in at least
4 of the 5 years because of c.i.f.-f.o.b. differences if reexports had not been a
factor (see Table 14). Nonetheless, in 1974 the disparity between Soviet exports
17. Transshipments also play a role. If the final destination of Soviet exports passing through
Belgium-Luxembourg were unknown to the USSR, the Soviets would incorrectly identify Belgium-Luxembourg
as the importing country. This is more of a problem for Belgium-Luxembourg than for other countries because
of its geographic position.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
Comparison of Soviet Exports and Belgian-Luxembourg imports
on a 1-Digit CTN Level
CTN 1
USSR 2,166
2,137
6,880
20,488
10,400
42,071
Belgium-Luxembourg 2,086
1,915
4,047
4,980
9,747
22,775
USSR as percent of
Belgium-Luxembourg 104
116
170
411
107
185
CTN 2
USSR 29,676
47,314
56,137
108,681
199,160
440,968
Belgium-Luxembourg 34,729
55,916
48,590
106,254
165,989
411,478
USSR as percent of
Belgium-Luxembourg 85
85
116
102
120
107
CTN 3
USSR 6,451
7,725
8,906
14,269
36,077
- 73,428
Belgium-Luxembourg 6,517
8,043
10,303
13,904
28,817
67,584
USSR as percent of
Belgium-Luxembourg 99
96
89
103
125
109
CTN 4
USSR 50
0
0
0
0
50
Belgium-Luxembourg 70
73
54
43
62
302
USSR as percent of
Belgium-Luxembourg 71
17
CTN 5
USSR 21,742
22,637
24,735
42,890
62,427
174,431
Belgium-Luxembourg 25,603
22,041
33,005
43,108
54,789
178,546
USSR as percent of
Belgium-Luxembourg 85
103
75
99
114
98
CTN 6, 7
USSR 406
1,358
47
0
362
2,173
Belgium-Luxembourg 561
2,969
1,184
1,533
345
6,592
USSR as percent of
Belgium-Luxembourg 72
46
4
105
33
CTN 8
USSR 5,649
7,381
8,925
9,482
14,009
45,446
Belgium-Luxembourg 6,760
11,024
6,618
6,855
7,858
39,115
USSR as percent of
Belgium-Luxembourg 84
67
135
138
178
116
CTN 9
USSR 4,545
3,566
4,587
6,452
8,134
27,284
Belgium-Luxembourg 535
896
1,204
1,489
2,991
7,115
USSR as percent of
Belgium-Luxembourg 850
398
381
433
272
383
Total CTN 1-9
USSR 70,686
92,118
110,217
202,259
330,568
805,848
Belgium-Luxembourg 76,861
102,877
105,005
178,166
270,598
733,507
USSR as percent of
Belgium-Luxembourg 92
90
105
114
122
110
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
Belgian-Luxembourg and Soviet Unit Prices for Selected
Soviet Exports: Belgian-Luxembourg Unit
Prices as a Percent of Soviet Unit Prices
Commodity'
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
CTN 19501: passenger cars
USSR exports
553
637
657
767
1,125
Bel-Lux imports
549
680
777
931
1,244
Percent
99
107
118
121
111
CTN 20001, 20002: coal
USSR exports
11.83
19.14
15.69
14.95
29.60
Bel-Lux imports
13.20
22.54
21.36
20.82
28.77
Percent
111
118
136
139
97
CTN 21, 22: petroleum products
USSR exports
15.20
16.81
17.18
55.36
87.55
Bel-Lux imports
16.69
23.04
21.23
39.42
96.24
Percent
110
137
123
71
110
CTN 25001: asbestos brands
USSR exports
108.11
106.12
113.10
124.45
143.11
Bel-Lux imports
108.10
158.95
124.27
136.62
158.47
Percent
100
ISO
110
110
111
CTN 25013: apatite concentrate
USSR exports
13.66
12.94
12.86
16.06
78.54
Bel-Lux imports
17.34
19.28
18.44
22.14
77.86
Percent
127
1 50
143
138
99
CTN 26001: pig iron
USSR exports
62.39
61.22
60.17
71.76
121.71
Bel-Lux imports
68.05
67.93
65.95
78.63
109.55
Percent
109
111
110
110
86
CTN 34101: potassium salts
USSR exports
14.56
17.02
19.68
24.07
33.15
Bel-Lux imports
29.01
30.56
33.91
39.23
51.23
Percent
199
180
172
163
I SS
CTN 50004: beams
USSR exports
20.34
23.65
22.93
24.14
49.46
Bel-Lux imports
27.32
28.50
30.62
31.79
50.35
Percent
134
121
134
132
102
CTN 50101: coniferous sawn lumber
USSR exports
76.58
79.59
76.66
119.01
254.15
Bel-Lux imports
89.66
101.87
103.58
125.05
186.02
Percent
117
128
135
105
73
CTN 84109: sunflower seed oil
USSR exports
283
362
314
355
979
Bel-Lux imports
280
365
327
403
795
Percent
99
101
104
114
81
Weighted Average of
Bel-Lux unit prices as
a percent of Soviet
unit prices2
123
134
132
99
105
These commodities account for one-half to two-thirds of Belgium-Luxembourg imports from the USSR.
2. The percentages are weighted by the corresponding values of Belgium-Luxembourg imports.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
and Belgian Luxembourg imports grew to $132 million-nearly one-half of
Belgium-Luxembourg reported imports from the. USSR. The difference between
Soviet fuel, mineral, and metal exports (CTN 2) and corresponding
Belgium-Luxembourg imports corresponds closely to the overall differences:
Soviet CTN 2 exports
"Unspecified" export
residual'
Total
Belgium-Luxembourg
CTN 2 imports
Difference between Soviet
exports and Belgium-
Luxembourg imports in
CTN 2 category
Difference between total
Soviet exports and total
Belgium-Luxembourg
imports
29.7
47.3
56.1
108.7
199.2
11.5
17.2
21.3
65.3
72.3
41.2
64.5
77.4
174.0
271.5
34.7
55.9
48.6
106.3
166.0
6.5
8.6
28.8
67.7
105.5
5.1
6.1
26.2
89.0
131.8
1. CTN 2 commodities are assumed to account for nearly all of the"un-
specified" export residual for Soviet trade with Belgium-Luxembourg.
59. Soviet deliveries of petroleum products (CTN 21, 22) were nearly twice
reported Belgium-Luxembourg imports in 1970-74 and account for more than
one-half the discrepancy in CTN 2 trade. In 1974, the difference between Soviet
oil exports and Belgium-Luxembourg imports . jumped to $91 million compared
with $47 million in 1973 and $11 million in 1972. Some of the imports of
commodities such as diamonds, platinum, and silver probably are reexported and
account for the rest of the discrepancy between reported Soviet exports of fuels,
minerals, and metals (plus the "unspecified" export residual) and
Belgium-Luxembourg imports (Table 15).
60. The Soviet and Belgium-Luxembourg data also indicate that. the import
and then reexport (or transshipment) of Soviet goods affect trade in several other
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
Analysis of Unidentified Soviet Exports to Belgium-Luxembourg
Diamonds (SITC 6672)
Other precious stones
(SITC 6673)
Jewelry of gold, silver, and
platinum (SITC 8971)
Nickel (SITC 683)
Isotopes and amorphous chemi-
cals (SITC 515)
Copper and alloys (SITC 6821)
Imports identified by
Belgium-Luxembourg
but not by USSR
Unspecified Soviet export
residual
1,550
6,160
7,221
23,147
37,797
75,875
0
0
2
0
11
13
1
1
2
1
9
14
486
0
80
0
1,842
2,408
10
0
17
6
75
108
4,582
4,599
121
6,199
1
15,501
Value reported by
Belgium-Luxembourg
as percent of unspecified
Soviet export residual 57 62 35 45 55 50
1. The USSR began reporting copper and alloy exports to Belgium-Luxembourg in its 1974 foreign trade
handbook.
1-digit CTN categories (Table 13). Soviet exports of industrial diamonds (CTN
17501) are 12 times larger than reported Belgium-Luxembourg imports in 1970-74
and account for most of the discrepancy in CTN 1 (machinery and equipment).
In addition, exports of vessels and equipment totaling $7 million in 1973 appeared
in the Soviet commodity breakdown but were not reported as imports by
Belgium-Luxembourg. The excess of Soviet exports of chemicals, fertilizers, and
rubber (CTN 3) over Belgian-Luxembourg imports in 1973-74 arises chiefly in CTN
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
34101 (potassium salts)-$6 million in 1973 and $7 million in 1974. In CTN 5
(raw materials of vegetable and animal origin), a higher Soviet unit price for
coniferous sawn. lumber (CTN 50101) combined with larger volume figures for
Soviet exports produced an $8 million discrepancy in 1974. Soviet exports of canned
fish (CTN 813) and sunflower seed oil (CTN 84109) also exceeded
Belgium-Luxembourg imports in 1972-74; Soviet deliveries of canned fish and seed
oil were more than twice Belgium-Luxembourg imports. Finally, Soviet deliveries
of cotton fabrics exceeded Belgium-Luxembourg imports in 1970-74, accounting for
the imbalance in consumer goods (CTN 9).
Soviet Imports and Belgian-Luxembourg Exports
61. Turning to Belgium-Luxembourg exports, reexports (or transshipments)
again are the major factor in reconciling Soviet and Belgium-Luxembourg trade
data. Chemical and consumer goods that are reported as imports by the Soviets
but not as exports by Belgium-Luxembourg are responsible for the gap between
Soviet exports and Belgium-Luxembourg imports (Table 2). Unlike the situation
in trade with several other Western countries, Soviet CTN 1 imports were less than
Belgium-Luxembourg exports in 1970-74 (Table 16).
62. Soviet imports of caustic soda (CTN 30101), sodium carbonate (CTN
30102), and accelerators for the rubber industry (CTN 30980) that are not recorded
by Belgium-Luxembourg largely explain why USSR CTN 3 (chemicals, fertilizers,
and rubber) imports exceed Belgium-Luxembourg exports. In the consumer goods
category (CTN 9), the USSR identified Belgium-Luxembourg as the source of
clothing and linen (CTN 91) and leather shoes (CTN 930), which do not appear
in Belgium-Luxembourg trade. data as exports to the USSR. Moreover, Soviet
imports of rolled ferrous metals. (CTN 246) in 1973-74 were larger than
Belgium-Luxembourg exports, further stretching the overall gap.
Soviet Exports and Canadian Imports
63. The Canadian practice of associating its imports with the country from
which the goods were last consigned to Canada is the main reason for Canada's
understatement of imports from the USSR. Because Soviet goods shipped to Canada
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
Comparison of Soviet Imports and Belgian-Luxembourg Exports
on a 1-Digit CTN Level
CTN 1
USSR
10,284
5,127
6,580
12,956
22,552
57,499
Belgium-Luxembourg
11,568
7,435
9,230
16,182
26,989
71,404
USSR as percent of
Belgium-
Luxembourg
89
69
71
80
84
81
CTN 2
USSR
3,862
17,123
37,066
128,074
274,255
460,380
Belgium-Luxembourg
11,528
25,870
46,856
124,268
252,707
461,230
USSR as percent of
Belgium-
Luxembourg
34
66
79
103
109
100
CTN 3
USSR
24,668
15,520
23,762
20,796
41,554
126,300
Belgium-Luxembourg
5,277
6,564
10,452
8,578
20,595
51,466
USSR as percent of
Belgium-
Luxembourg
467
236
227
242
202
245
CTN 4
USSR
0
0
0
0
0
0
BelgluimLuxembourg
10
61
29
55
29
184
CTN 5
USSR
15,694
8,519
6,052
22,958
26,860
80,083
Belgium-Luxembourg
18,445
17,412
12,670
27,261
42,858
118,646
USSR as percent of
Belgium-
Luxembourg
85
49
48
84
63
68
CTN6,7
USSR
0
0
0
0
0
0
Belgium-Luxembourg
10
20
4,826
10,146
452
15,454
CTN 8
USSR
0
0
0
0
0
0
Belgium-Luxembourg
1,047
2,729
2,037
19,819
15,694
41,326
CTN 9
USSR
20,531
16,599
11,276
9,397
20,405
78,208
Belgium-Luxembourg
6,043
5,885
5,020
5,583
8,611
31,142
USSR as percent of
Belgium-
Luxembourg
340
282
225
168
237
251
Total CTN 1-9
USSR
75,039
62,887
84,735
194,179
385,627
802,467
Belgium-Luxembourg
53,928
65,970
91,120
211,893
367,935
790,852
USSR as percent of
Belgium-
Luxembourg
139
95
93
92
105
101
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
via a third. country are reported as imports from the third country in Canadian
trade books, Soviet export data exceed Canadian imports (Tables 1 and 17).
Differences in valuation-e.g., c.i.f.-f.o.b.--are not a factor in reconciling Soviet.and
Canadian. . data since Canada, unlike other Western countries, records imports on
an f.o.1 basis.
64. A close look at Soviet and Canadian data shows that much of Soviet
chrome ore (CTN 24004) reaches Canada via the US. Therefore, the US and not
the USSR is credited with these exports.' 8 Similarly, reported Soviet exports of
petroleum products (CTN 21, 22) to Canada totaling $10 million in 1974 and
$16 million in 1975 are not found in Canadian trade books. The Soviet oil most
likely is shipped first to the US and then on to Canada. In CTN 4, Soviet exports
of wood tiles (CTN 41202 and 41203) are greater than Canadian imports while
Soviet exports of furs and fur materials (CTN 52) are larger than corresponding
Canadian imports. Soviet deliveries of industrial consumer goods-especially watches
(CTN 97011 and 97046)-also exceed Canadian figures. Again these commodities
probably are last consigned to Canada from a country other than the USSR. In
some 1-digit categories, Soviet data fall short of Canadian figures. The commodities
not reported in the USSR trade handbook are for the most part in the "unspecified"
export residual. Isotopes and amorphous chemicals, in particular, account for an
increasing share of the residual in recent years (Table 18).
Soviet Imports and Canadian Exports
65. Because the USSR includes goods that are reexported as imports while
Canada designates the country of last consignment as the importing country, Soviet
imports are consistently above Canadian exports (Table 2). For some reason, the
USSR's inclusion of the cost of technology as part of its machinery and equipment
(CTN 1) imports does not produce the same result as in other Western countries;
Soviet CTN 1 imports are generally less than Canadian exports (Table 19).
66. Much of the discrepancies in 1970-74 can be traced to the treatment
of Canadian exports of wheat (CTN 70001), barley (CTN 70003), and wheat flour
(CTN 82001). Differences between Soviet . imports and Canadian exports of these
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
Comparison of Soviet Exports and Canadian
Imports on a 1-Digit CTN Level
CTN 1
USSR
276
224
486
1,422
3,622
6,030
Canada
516
690
837
2,622
4,354
9,019
USSR as per-
cent of Canada
53
32
58
54
83
67
CTN 2
USSR
1,045
1,356
1,851
97
11,958
16,307
Canada
1,815
3,260
3,460
6,897
573
16,005
USSR as per-
cent of Canada
58
42
54
1
2U9
102
CTN 3
USSR
0
0
0
0
1,056
1,056
Canada
53
3,832
3,448
5,120
4,850
17,303
USSR as per-
cent of Canada
22
6
CTN 4
USSR
213
342
463
589
1,039
2,646
Canada
52
45
72
119
279
567
USSR as per-
cent of Canada
410
760
643
495
372
467
CTN 5
USSR
2,252
1,613
2,698
3,675
6,276
16,514
Canada
1,943
1,098
1,934
2,602
6,995
14,572
USSR as per-
cent of Canada
116
147
140
141
90
113
CTN 6, 7
USSR
0
0
0
0
0
0
Canada
1,635
0
0
0
0
1,635
CTN 8
USSR
110
112
201
286
420
1,129
Canada
177
205
332
393
569
1,676
USSR as per-
cent of Canada
62
55
61
73
74
67
CTN 9
USSR
2,876
3,754
5,915
6,303
4,112
22,960
Canada
2,487
3,397
5,271
5,232
3,302
19,689
USSR as per-
cent of Canada
116
111
112
120
125
117
Total CTN 1-9
USSR
6,771
7,402
11,615
12,371
28,483
66,642
Canada
8,678
12,527
15,354
22,985
20,922
80,466
USSR as per-
cent of Canada
78
59
76
54
136
83
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
Analysis of Unidentified Soviet Exports to Canada
Diamonds (SITC 6672)
Jewelry of gold, silver,
and platinum (SITC 8971)
Nickel (SITC 683)
Isotopes and amorphous
chemicals (SITC 515)
Imports identified by
Canada but not USSR
Unspecified Soviet export
residual
Value reported by Canada
as percent of unspecified
Soviet export residual
734
2,251
2,467
1,853
0
7,305
8
0
0
1
0
9
0
0
0
4,195
0
4,195
9
3,451
2,620
4,763
4,133
14,976
751
5,702
5,087
10,812
4,133
26,485
1,562
6,376
11,012
15,844
9,665
44,459
48
89
46
68
43
60
three commodities are equal to or greater than the difference between Soviet
imports and Canadian exports on an aggregate level:
Soviet imports less
Canadian exports of:
Wheat
Barley
Wheat flour
Total
Difference between total
Soviet imports and
total Canadian exports
17.1
7.2
23.3
9.7
45.8
0
0
3.7
-0.2
3.7
21.9
24.4
25.7
28.2
40.1
39.0
31.6
52.7
37.7
89.6
33.2
26.4
54.6
37.3
78.2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
Comparison of Soviet Imports and Canadian
Exports on a 1-Digit CTN Level
CTN 1
USSR
1,304
4,369
7,087
1,311
2,129
16,200
Canada
1,417
4,093
8,474
2,981
3,399
20,364
USSR as per-
cent of Canada
92
107
84
44
63
80
CTN 2
USSR
4,767
307
6,273
2,345
2,063
15,755
Canada
4,063
897
3,448
1,974
697
11,079
USSR as per-
cent of Canada
117
34
182
119
296
142
CTN 3
USSR
1,837
2,580
3,803
1,998
939
11,157
Canada
568
1,305
951
621
9,010
12,455
USSR as per-
cent of Canada
323
198
400
322
10
90
CTN 4
USSR
0
0
0
0
0
0
Canada
32
1
67
72
401
573
CTN 5
USSR
0
537
0
0
0
537
Canada
7,735
7,511
3,173
949
4,802
24,170
USSR as per-
cent of Canada
7
2
CTN6,7
USSR
100,495
117,881
296,606
295,132
59,696
869,810
Canada
83,013
110,463
268,445
284,782
10,415
757,118
USSR as per-
cent of Canada
121
107
110
104
573
115
CTN 8
USSR
21,951
24,390
25,728
28,162
40,084
140,315
Canada
222
231
301
646
1,150
2,550
USSR as per-
cent of Canada
9,888
10,558
8,548
4,359
3,486
5,503
CTN 9
USSR
42
40
45
38
53
218
Canada
114
106
119
134
236
709
USSR as per-
cent of Canada
37
38
38
28
22
31
Total CTN 1-9
USSR
130,397
150,103
339,542
328,986
104,964
1,053,992
Canada
97,164
124,607
284,978
292,159
30,110
829,018
USSR as per-
cent of Canada
134
120
119
113
349
127
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
A large share of these commodities is purchased in Canada on Soviet account
and shipped directly to a third country. In Soviet trade books they appear first
as an import from Canada and then as a Soviet export. Canada, on the other
hand, reports the commodities as exports to the country to which they are shipped.
For example, wheat flour bought by the USSR for delivery to Cuba is considered
as an export to Cuba by Canada.
67. On a 1-digit level, the discrepancies related to wheat and barley explain
why Soviet imports of raw materials for the production of foodstuffs (CTN 6
and 7) exceed Canadian exports, while the handling of wheat flour shipments is
responsible for the huge difference in CTN 8. Discrepancies between Soviet and
Canadian reporting with regard to several other products probably originate in
country identification difficulties caused by intermediate commercial transactions.
Canadian exports of sulfur (CTN 25006) are less than one-half the reported Soviet
imports by volume in 1970-74 and largely account for the anomaly in CTN 2-fuels,
mineral raw materials, and metals. Reported Canadian shipments of synthetic rubber
(CTN 35002) over the 5-year period are only one-fourth of recorded Soviet imports.
Soviet Exports and French Imports
68. France values its imports c.i.f., so French import figures consistently
exceed Soviet exports (Tables 11 and 20). The difference has narrowed somewhat
because of a jump in Soviet export prices for raw materials in 1973-74 and, quite
probably, French reexports of Soviet petroleum and petroleum products. As a result
of the price increases, transport and insurance cost declined as a percent of Soviet
export prices. The ratio of weighted French unit prices to Soviet unit prices for
selected French imports dropped from 147 percent in 1970 to 116 percent in
1974 (Table 21). Divergent price trends for petroleum and petroleum products
(CTN 21 and 22) were largely responsible; French unit prices for CTN 21 and
22 imports were below Soviet unit prices in 1974.' 9
19. Unit prices for French imports of Soviet sunflower seed oil also are less than Soviet unit prices. Since
most of the Soviet oil exported to the West is bought by middlemen-in particular, Unilever-and then resold
to Western countries, the unit price the Soviets receive for their oil does not necessarily match the unit
price paid by the West. This is especially true during periods of large price changes. In addition, the quantity
of sunflower seed oil reported by the USSR as exported to France since 1972 is less than the amount recorded
by the French as imported from the Soviets. Again, this stems from the way in which sunflower seed oil
is bought and sold. A change in the destination of a shipment is not uncommon-especially when middlemen
are involved; consequently, the Soviets do not always know the country of consumption of their exports.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
Comparison of Soviet Exports and French
Imports on a 1-Digit CTN Level
CTN I
USSR
6,837
6,800
9,945
17,951
19,238
60,771
France
7,770
8,759
9,915
16,252
21,385
64,081
USSR as per-
cent of France
88
78
100
110
90
95
CTN 2
USSR
74,512
119,650
92,374
161,410
209,229
657,175
France
123,121
156,023
157,271
237,109
255,655
929,179
USSR as per-
cent of France
61
77
59
68
82
71
CTN 3
USSR
1,821
3,518
4,057
6,457
21,495
37,348
France
3,122
3,849
5,135
13,159
44,819
70,084
USSR as per-
cent of France
58
91
79
49
48
53
CTN 4
USSR
0
0
0
0
0
0
France
6
40
36
96
63
241
CTN 5
USSR
32,021
47,394
70,558
108,065
149,532
407,570
France
50,744
58,604
86,678
124,857
177,310
498,193
USSR as per-
cent of France
63
81
81
87
84
82
CTN6,7
USSR
2,349
2,311
3,773
4,885
4,604
17,922
France
1,081
2,015
3,172
1,739
687
8,694
USSR as per-
cent of France
217
115
119
281
670
206
CTN 8
USSR
11,519
19,749
16,998
21,647
66,318
136,231
France
11,563
24,854
22,445
27,826
73,391
160,079
USSR as per-
cent of France
100
79
76
78
90
85
CTN 9
USSR
2,712
3,171
6,072
7,667
9,014
28,636
France
3,492
3,678
6,596
8,901
11,323
33,990
USSR as per-
cent of France
78
86
92
86
80
84
Total CTN 1-9
USSR
131,769
202,593
203,777
328,082
479,428
1,345,648
France
200,899
257,822
291,248
429,939
584,633
1,764,541
USSR as per-
cent of France
66
79
70
76
82
76
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
French and Soviet Unit Prices for Selected
Soviet Exports: French Unit
Prices as a Percent of Soviet Unit Prices
Commodity'
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
CTN 20001, 20002: coal
USSR exports
16.16
17.75
18.02
19.32
25.88
French imports
27.49
27.78
28.42
31.25
40.46
Percent
170
157
158
162
156
CTN 21,22: petroleum products
USSR exports
13.42
16.87
16.92
23.17
81.73
French imports
17.29
23.68
23.94
26.92
73.28
Percent
129
140
141
116
90
CTN 23002: liquefied gas
USSR exports
19.68
20.61
21.76
23.61
79.01
French imports
34.33
40.62
48.25
52.43
116.91
Percent
174
197
222
222
148
CTN 24004: chrome ore
USSR exports
41.23
52.97
44.77
39.62
48.08
French imports
43.56
58.33
50.44
44.82
52.24
Percent
106
110
113
113
109
CTN 25001: asbestos brands
USSR exports
102.00
98.32
108.81
117.78
142.34
French imports
111.40
114.15
122.36
140.67
143.49
Percent
109
116
112
119
101
CTN 50004: beams
USSR exports
20.49
23.80
21.11
32.90
55.23
French imports
37.64
43.03
42.41
48.11
74.31
Percent
184
181
201
146
135
CTN 50101: coniferous sawn lumber
USSR exports
77.11
82.21
83.41
124.08
223.23
French imports
105.73
108.51
109.27
154.42
268.02
Percent
137
132
131
124
120
CTN 50502: cellulose sulfite
USSR exports
139.17
152.26
146.54
179.78
272.44
French imports
141.66
154.11
151.44
182.36
283.29
Percent
102
101
103
101
104
CTN 50503: cellulose sulfate
USSR exports
105.52
128.38
142.83
173.62
293.63
French imports
122.77
136.71
136.97
164.44
282.31
Percent
116
106
96
95
96
CTN 84109: sunflower seed oil
USSR exports
311
368
324
413
886
French imports
316
384
316
409
862
Percent
102
104
98
99
97
Weighted average of
French unit prices as
a percent of Soviet
unit prices2
147
142
143
126
116
1. These commodities account for one-half to two-thirds of French imports from the USSR.
2. The percentages are weighted by the corresponding values of French imports.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
69. Comparison of Soviet and French data for Soviet. oil and oil product
deliveries. suggests strongly that some of these imports have been reexported recently
by France.20? Since -1973, Soviet exports have been .consistently larger than French
imports; by volume, imports were only 86' percent of reported Soviet deliveries.
This discrepancy in CTN 21 and 22. trade has narrowed the gap between Soviet
CTN 2 exports and French imports and, of course, the overall difference between
Soviet exports and French imports.
70. French imports usually have a higher value than Soviet exports on a
1-digit CTN level because of c.i.f.-f.o.b. differences and incomplete Soviet reporting.
Reexports of Soviet machinery and equipment by France most likely account for
Soviet CTN 1 exports being larger than French imports in 1972 and 1973. As
a case in point, Soviet exports of cars are greater in number than that reported
by the French.
71. Although the USSR did not publish a commodity breakdown for CTN
4, French statistics show that improved or reconstituted wood (SITC 6314) and
lime, cement, and fabricated building materials (SITC 661) account for the bulk
of the trade. The Soviets apparently lump these exports in the "unspecified" export
residual.
72. Nevertheless, the largest share of the export residual consists of Soviet
shipments of platinum and platinum group metals, nickel, and in recent years
isotopes and amorphous chemicals; the latter accounted for one-fourth the residual
in 1974 (Table 22). In addition, Soviet exports of iron and steel (SITC 67), refined
copper (SITC 68212), and zinc (SITC 686) were excluded from the Soviet
breakdown before 1974. The Soviets reported copper and zinc exports to France
in 1974 but continued to omit iron and steel shipments.
Soviet Imports and French Exports
73. The inclusion of imported technology in Soviet trade data together with
the reexport (or transshipment) of. fuels, minerals, and metals (CTN 2) by France
and the reexport of French raw materials for the production of foodstuffs (CTN
20. France has the capacity to refine imports of crude oil in bonded refineries and then export the output.
Oil imported for this purpose is included in special trade statistics as an import and the refined product
is considered an export. Consequently, any crude imported from the USSR and processed in French bonded
refineries would be included in French trade statistics.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
Analysis of Unidentified Soviet Exports to France
Diamonds (SITC 6672)
Other precious stones
(SITC 6673)
Silver (SITC 6811)
Platinum and platinum group
metals (SITC 6812)
Silver and platinum ore
(SITC 285)
Jewelry of gold, silver, and
platinum (SITC 8971)
Nickel (SITC 683)
Isotopes and amorphous chemi-
cals (SITC 515)
Iron and steel (SITC 67)
Refined copper (SITC 68212)
Zinc (SITC 686)
Imports identified by France
but not by USSR
Unspecified Soviet export
residual
Value reported by
France as percent of
unspecified Soviet export
residual
134
98
429
101
0
762
0
1
0
0
12
13
0
0
0
4
0
4
1,960
1,868
4,706
11,721
12,910
33,165
0
0
0
83
0
83
20
20
1
2
1
44
12,520
1,592
3,453
6,819
11,037
35,421
160
172
178
6,156
12,165
18,831
2,888
934
3,367
853
792
8,834
0
1,062
6,668
24,129
1
31,859
0
392
1,955
4,178
1
6,525
17,682
6,139
20,757
54,046
36,917
135,541
8,232
13,296
30,963
39,388
45,800
137,679
215
46
67
137
81
98
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
6 and 7) to third countries explain why Soviet imports exceed. French exports
in 1960-74 (Table 2).. The difference between Soviet machinery and equipment
(CTN 1) imports and French exports is equivalent to more than one-half the
aggregate discrepancy in 1970-74 (Table 23). The remainder is largely explained
by the amounts by which Soviet CTN 2 and CTN 6 and 7 imports exceed French
exports and, in some years, by Soviet "unspecified" import residuals:
Soviet imports less
French exports of:
Machinery and equip-
ment (CTN 1)
Fuels, minerals, and
metals (CTN 2)
Live animals not for
slaughter and raw
materials for the pro-
duction of foodstuffs
(CTN 6, and 7)
Total
Difference between total
Soviet imports and
total French exports
21.9
28.4
33.7
12.8
48.6
6.1
2.1
-1.9
0.5
0.8
2.1
20.8
23.0
9.1
13.1
30.1
51.3
54.8
22.4
62.5
45.5
56.7
83.4
32.8
60.8
74. French deliveries of rolled ferrous metals (CTN 264)-especially sheet and
transformer steel-were 15 percent less than reported Soviet imports from France
in tonnage over the 5-year period. The difference probably stems from reexports
(or transshipments) that are credited to France by the USSR. The discrepancy
in CTN 6 and 7 is largely accounted for by the treatment of imports of wheat
and barley. Soviet imports of French wheat are twice French exports in terms
of value and quantity, and barley imports are 20 percent greater. The missing grain
presumably was bought by Soviet foreign trade enterprises and shipped directly
to third countries, with the bulk of the wheat going to Africa and the barley
probably to Eastern Europe or Cuba.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
Comparison of Soviet Imports and French Exports
on a 1-Digit CTN Level
CTN 1
USSR
173,359
173,178
159,297
190,643
356,481
1,052,958
France
151,419
144,788
125,632
177,820
307,895
907,554
USSR as per-
cent of France
114
120
127
107
116
116
CTN 2
USSR
52,893
30,328
45,455
127,185
134,534
390,395
France
46,882
28,269
47,387
126,674
133,707
382,859
USSR as per-
cent of France
113
107
96
100
101
102
CTN 3
USSR
14,998
12,390
22,624
23,492
38,899
112,403
France
15,276
17,437
24,050
37,342
44,193
138,298
USSR as per-
cent of France
98
71
94
63
88
81
CTN 4
USSR
990
824
635
987
1,287
4,723
France
1,439
2,704
4,146
3,489
7,932
19,710
USSR as per-
cent of France
69
30
15
28
16
24
CTN 5
USSR
21,326
23,979
36,693
42,109
37,944
162,051
France
19,787
18,262
26,407
46,263
41,803
152,522
USSR as per-
cent of France
108
131
139
91
91
106
CTN 6, 7
USSR
2,675
24,630
76,986
92,115
25,606
222,012
France
540
3,794
53,968
83,044
12,523
153,869
USSR as per-
cent of France
495
649
143
111
204
144
CTN 8
USSR
5,434
3,631
5,718
52,682
67,225
134,690
France
7,607
4,412
8,372
49,154
79,341
148,886
USSR as per-
cent of France
71
82
68
107
85
90
CTN 9
USSR
32,477
28,520
51,824
45,217
17,938
175,976
France
29,863
36,712
50,328
49,918
28,300
195,121
USSR as per-
cent of France
109
78
103
91
63
90
Total CTN 1-9
USSR
304,154
297,480
399,230
574,430
679,915
2,255,209
France
272,753
256,378
340,290
573,904
655,694
2,098,819
USSR as per-
cent of France
112
116
117
100
104
107
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
Italy
Soviet Exports and Italian. Imports
75. As in France, c.i.f.=f.o.b. valuation differences drive a wedge between
the value of Italian imports and the reported value of Soviet exports (Tables 1
and 24). But the imbalance began to right itself in 1973. By 1975 the scale had
tipped in favor of Soviet exports
76. Rising prices of Soviet raw material exports in 1973 may have had the
same effect on Soviet-Italian trade as they did on Soviet-French trade. The higher
prices narrowed the margin between Soviet exports and Italian imports. The effect
of rising prices for Soviet raw materials petered out in 1974, however. A weighted
average of ratios of Italian to Soviet unit prices for selected Italian imports fell
from 123 percent in 1972 to 111 percent in 1973. The following year, the average
ratio climbed to 114 percent (Table 25). In any event, divergent price trends do
not explain why the average ratio dropped so sharply in 1971.
77. Italian reexports of Soviet petroleum and petroleum products (CTN 21
and 22) in 1973-74 seem to have had a key role in reducing the discrepancies
between the values of USSR exports and Italian imports. Before 1973, the value of
Soviet exports in CTN 21 and 22 was less than Italian imports, as expected, but
in 1973 Italian import figures dropped below Soviet exports by nearly $5 million
and by roughly $45 million in 1974. Apparently a share of Soviet exports of oil
and oil products bypassed Italian customs and were reexported to a third country
without Soviet knowledge of the country of final consumption.
78. On a 1-digit level, c.i.f.-f.o.b. valuation differences, and to a lesser extent,
the incompleteness of the USSR's commodity breakdown, cause Italian imports
to outstrip Soviet exports in all categories except CTN 6 and 7 and CTN 9 in
1970-74 (Table 24). For 1970-74 as a whole, nearly one-half of the "unspecified"
export residual (3 percent of Soviet exports to Italy) consists of commodities
omitted from USSR foreign trade books-especially platinum and platinum group
metals and nickel (Table 26). Nonetheless, in 1971-72 and 1974, most of the
residual remains unidentified. In CTN 9, Italian imports were reduced by the
reexport of cotton and cotton fabrics (CTN 900) originally imported from the
USSR; Soviet CTN 900 exports were nearly three times greater than comparable
Italian imports in 1970-74.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
Comparison of Soviet Exports and Italian Imports
on a 1-Digit CTN Level
CTN 1
USSR
5,184
3,077
6,061
12,408
17,535
44,265
Italy
5,461
3,264
6,238
13,377
16,007
44,347
USSR as per-
cent of Italy
95
94
97
93
110
100
CTN 2
USSR
163,767
204,568
203,568
315,424
647,621
1,534,948
Italy
219,554
243,871
257,508
334,480
637,464
1,692,877
USSR as per-
cent of Italy
75
84
79
94
102
91
CTN 3
USSR
4,036
3,786
4,946
9,998
22,417
45,183
Italy
4,138
4,168
5,510
9,947
24,784
48,547
USSR as per-
cent of Italy
98
91
90
101
90
93
CTN 4
USSR
296
299
374
405
422
1,796
Italy
492
600
473
837
1,780
4,182
USSR as per-
cent of Italy
60
50
79
48
24
43
CTN 5
USSR
25,867
25,160
45,228
59,235
69,804
225,294
Italy
38,179
29,742
49,113
74,266
110,230
301,530
USSR as per-
cent of Italy
68
85
92
80
63
75
CTN 6, 7
USSR
4,813
11,772
1,625
3,272
3,374
24,856
Italy
9,361
11,361
1,033
571
252
22,578
USSR as per-
cent of Italy
51
104
157
573
1,339
110
CTN 8
USSR
1,295
1,453
1,321
1,963
1,622
7,654
Italy
1,574
1,590
2,347
2,787
4,924
13,222
USSR as per-
cent of Italy
82
91
56
70
33
58
CTN 9
USSR
918
1,378
3,031
3,359
5,047
13,733
Italy
591
812
1,201
1,862
4,016
8,482
USSR as per-
cent of Italy
155
170
252
180
126
162
Total CTN 1-9
USSR
206,176
251,493
266,154
406,062
767,843
1,897,728
Italy
279,350
295,408
323,423
438,127
799,457
2,135,765
USSR as per-
cent of Italy
74
85
82
93
96
89
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
Italian and Soviet Unit Prices for Selected
Soviet Exports: Italian Unit
Prices as a Percent of Soviet Unit Prices
CTN 19501: passenger cars
USSR exports
1,095
712
752
788
1,271
Italian imports
836
855
1,168
871
981
Percent
76
120
155
111
77
CTN 20001, 20002: coal
USSR exports
8.40
16.71
15.57
16.34
21.55
Italian imports
12.18
20.97
19.63
20.70
31.68
Percent
145
125
126
127
129
CTN 21, 22: petroleum products
USSR exports
10.54
14.53
15.70
23.75
76.79
Italian imports
13.26
17.02
18.31
24.73
84.62
Percent
126
117
117
104
110
CTN 24001: iron ore
USSR exports
4.93
5.33
4.80
5.10
4.94
Italian imports
7.81
9.44
7.44
8.33
9.89
Percent
158
177
155
163
200
CTN 24004: chrome ore
USSR exports
34.42
48.17
44.91
39.52
52.71
Italian imports
44.13
55.63
52.47
44.75
56.28
Percent
128
115
117
113
107
CTN 24901: iron pyrites
USSR exports
5.95
4.73
3.74
3.09
6.64
Italian imports
12.67
12.74
12.08
12.04
15.53
Percent
213
269
323
390
234
CTN 25001: asbestos brand
USSR exports
116.12
131.24
151.58
149.39
167.08
Italian imports
130.00
138.61
162.71
157.32
107.99
Percent
112
106
107
105
65
CTN 26001: pig iron
USSR exports
62.59
49.02
40.98
55.96
131.80
Italian imports
59.10
62.31
49.58
66.06
130.56
Percent
94
127
121
118
99
CTN 261: ferrol alloys
USSR exports
165.48
193.62
133.37
175.03
313.19
Italian imports
198.60
247.31
166.76
171.00
464.57
Percent
120
128
125
98
148
CTN 26201: ferrous metal scrap
USSR exports
50.44
34.22
35.31
76.09
133.00
Italian imports
53.91
42.73
41.06
75.29
137.06
Percent
107
125
116
99
103
CTN 50502: cellulose
USSR exports
131.29
155.06
164.97
169.57
338.61
Italian imports
138.28
166.44
180.59
168.37
307.88
Percent
105
107
169
99
91
Weighted average of
Italian unit prices as
a percent of Soviet
unit prices2
129
118
123
111
114
1. These commodities account for three-fourths of Italy's imports from the USSR.
2. The percentages are weighted by the corresponding values of Italian imports.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
Analysis of Unidentified Soviet Exports to Italy
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
Total
Diamonds (SITC 6672)
0
0
0
0
0
0
Other precious stones
(SITC 6673)
8
8
22
177
100
315
Silver (SITC 6811)
3,380
771
255
4,400
0
8,806
Platinum and platinum group
metals (SITC 6812)
203
126
1,259
2,007
1,645
5,240
Jewelry of gold, silver, and
platinum (SITC 8971)
0
32
34
34
30
130
Nickel (SITC 683)
2,695
1,457
222
1,972
3,600
9,946
Isotopes and amorphous chemi-
cals (SITC 515)
1
0
0
1
0
2
Imports identified by Italy
but not by USSR
6,287
2,394
1,792
8,591
5,375
24,439
Unspecified Soviet export
residual
5,491
7,507
9,726
11,763
20,989
55,476
Value reported by Italy
as percent of unspecified
Soviet export residual
114
32
18
73
26
44
Soviet Imports and Italian Exports
79. Italian exports to the USSR fell short of Soviet imports from Italy in
1960-75 in all but two years (Table 2). The treatment of machinery and equipment
(CTN 1) accounts for most of the difference, although Italian reexports to the
USSR or-less likely--Soviet purchases for shipment to a third country have added
to the imbalance since 1972.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
Comparison of Soviet Imports and Italian Exports
on a 1-Digit CTN Level
CTN 1
USSR
199,366
151,542
145,734
199,099
207,833
903,574
Italy
190,548
149,657
133,712
159,413
176,981
810,311
USSR as per-
cent of Italy
105
101
109
125
117
112
CTN 2
USSR
2,107
17,460
31,794
90,185
252,427
393,973
Italy
7,525
29,748
36,504
100,244
253,285
427,306
USSR as per-
cent of Italy
28
59
87
90
100
92
CTN 3
USSR
23,237
25,075
28,010
33,688
122,984
232,994
Italy
28,707
28,048
28,162
30,440
98,281
213,638
USSR as per-
cent of Italy
81
89
99
111
125
109
CTN 4
USSR
0
6,319
4,333
11,298
15,055
37,005
Italy
1,965
4,169
551
940
1,078
8,703
USSR as per-
cent of Italy
152
786
1,202
1,347
425
CTN 5
USSR
15,530
20,230
20,730
30,242
49,770
136,502
Italy
19,638
21,737
27,523
38,359
57,180
164,437
USSR as per-
cent of Italy
79
93
75
79
87
83
CTN 6,7
USSR
0
0
500
1,473
3,122
5,095
Italy
0
0
0
0
5,007
5,007
USSR as per-
cent of Italy
62
102
CTN 8
USSR
8,471
7,841
6,332
2,079
4,089
28,812
Italy
10,581
9,695
8,710
3,404
7,664
40,054
USSR as per-
cent of Italy
80
81
73
61
53
72
CTN 9
USSR
51,212
50,769
33,745
19,281
18,506
173,513
Italy
48,904
52,435
33,424
18,586
18,184
171,533
USSR as per-
cent of Italy
105
97
101
104
102
101
Total CTN 1-9
USSR
299,925
279,236
271,178
387,346
673,786
1,911,471
Italy
307,868
395,489
268,586
351,386
617,660
1,840,989
USSR as per-
cent of Italy
97
95
101
110
109
104
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
80. The Soviet inclusion of technology costs associated With imports has
played an . important part. in the overall. discrepancy. In 1970-71, .the difference
between Soviet. imports and Italian exports was more than accounted for by the
discrepancy in CTN 1. Since 1971, however,. the difference in CTN 1 values has
been a declining share of the aggregate discrepancy, probably because the USSR
could not identify the origin of Italian reexports of plastic and materials for plastic
production (CTN 266) to the USSR. Soviet imports in both commodity categories
exceed Italian exports in 1973-74. Reexports, probably are also a factor in trade
involving building materials and construction parts (CTN 4) and consumer goods
(CTN 9). Soviet imports exceed the comparable Italian exports in nearly all years,
despite the fact that the Soviet commodity breakdown is incomplete (Table 27).
Difference between Soviet
imports and Italian exports
of machinery and equipment
(CTN 1)
Difference between total
Soviet imports and total
Italian exports
Japan
Soviet Exports and Japanese Imports
81. C.i.f. valuation of Japanese imports stands as the predominant reason for
Japanese imports exceeding Soviet exports on both an aggregate and 1-digit CTN
level (Tables 1 and 28). Reexports of Soviet goods are not an offset-as they were in
the case of France and Italy-because Japan uses a general system to record its trade
flows, thus including reexports. Indeed, reexporting can have the effect of increasing
the gap between Soviet and Japanese figures if the USSR credits the goods
reexported by Japan to the country receiving them and not to Japan.
82. Soviet price increases for a number of key raw material exports in
1973-74 seem to have had some impact on the gap between Soviet and Japanese
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
Comparison of Soviet Exports and Japanese Imports
on a 1-Digit CTN Level
CTN 1
USSR
3,449
5,796
6,425
5,972
6,241
27,883
Japan
7,406
10,148
8,042
8,737
11,145
45,478
USSR as per-
cent of Japan
47
57
80
68
56
61
CTN 2
USSR
119,595
134,120
99,723
208,611
314,577
876,626
Japan
213,915
219,173
245,963
468,198
580,810
1,728,059
USSR as per-
cent of Japan
56
61
41
45
54
51
CTN 3
USSR
9,194
11,916
13,575
21,876
38,134
94,695
Japan
10,291
12,274
12,778
20,405
37,427
93,175
USSR as per-
cent of Japan
89
97
106
107
102
102
CTN 4
USSR
112
212
167
176
326
993
Japan
5
1
20
159
214
399
USSR as per-
cent of Japan
2,240
21,200
835
111
152
249
CTN 5
USSR
172,455
206,329
266,862
458,723
658,581
1,762,950
Japan
238,312
243,973
315,920
551,058
745,400
2,094,663
USSR as per-
cent of Japan
72
85
84
83
88
84
CTN 6, 7
USSR
1,672
2,052
1,707
3,627
6,607
15,665
Japan
91
108
55
135
252
641
USSR as per-
cent of Japan
1,837
1,900
3,104
2,687
2,622
2,444
CTN 8
USSR
4,810
4,106
3,601
9,700
13,270
35,487
Japan
8,218
7,445
7,829
21,684
37,176
82,352
USSR as per-
cent of Japan
59
55
46
45
36
43
CTN 9
USSR
3,145
2,933
2,519
3,015
5,267
16,879
Japan
2,841
2,803
3,296
5,855
6,337
21,132
USSR as per-
cent of Japan
111
105
76
51
83
80
Total CTN 1-9
USSR
314,430
367,465
194,579
711,700
1,043,003
2,831,177
Japan
481,079
495,925
593,903
1,076,231
1,418,761
4,065,899
USSR as per-
cent of Japan
65
74
66
66
74
70
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
data. By 1975, their influence had dissipated, and the margin was restored. A
weighted average of the ratios. of Japanese to Soviet unit prices for selected Japanese
imports does not track well with the percent differences on an aggregate level
(Table 29). The weighted average steadily declined from 1971 through 1974: A
comparison of Soviet and Japanese data-even on a commodity level-offers little,
however, in the way of an explanation.
83. As expected, Japanese imports on a 1-digit CTN level generally exceed
Soviet exports (Table 28). One of the exceptions (Soviet chemicals, fertilizers, and
rubber-CTN 3--exports are greater than Japanese imports) results from USSR deliv-
eries of chemical products (CTN 30) being substantially larger than recorded Japa-
nese imports in 1972-74. With regard to Soviet exports of building materials and
construction parts (CTN 4), the difference probably stems from the difficulty in
matching the appropriate SITC category with magnesite powder (CTN 4040401),
which is the sole commodity reported under category 4 in the Soviet trade
handbook. Similarly, because of a concordance problem, Soviet exports of CTN
6 and 7 (animals not for slaughter and raw materials for the production of
foodstuffs) are larger than Japanese imports. The USSR reports whale meat under
CTN 7, but in Western data this commodity cannot be broken out from meat,
fresh, chilled, or frozen. Consequently, it is included in CTN 8 (foodstuffs).
84. The commodities traditionally omitted from the USSR's commodity
breakdown along with Soviet exports of zinc more than exhaust the "unspecified"
export residual associated with Soviet-Japanese trade (Table 30). USSR shipments
of platinum and platinum group metals account for more than four-fifths of the
residual in 1970-74.
Soviet Imports and Japanese Exports
85. The margin between Japanese exports and Soviet imports in large part
represents the inclusion of the cost of technology in Soviet machinery and
equipment (CTN 1) imports (Table 2). Beginning in 1972, however, there is some
evidence that this upward bias may have been offset by the USSR's crediting goods
reexported by Japan to a third country, presumably the country of origin. By
1974, when Soviet imports of machinery and equipment fell below corresponding
Japanese exports by $21 million, total Soviet imports dropped below total Japanese
exports by more than $75 million.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
Table 29
Japanese and Soviet Unit Prices for Selected
Soviet Exports: Japanese Unit
Prices as a Percent of Soviet Unit Prices
Commodity'
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
CTN 20001: coal
USSR exports
12.11
14.86
15.77
16.85
29.90
Japanese imports
15.34
18.35
19.48
20.76
33.38
Percent
127
123
124
123
112
CTN 21, 22: petroleum products
USSR exports
12.39
15.05
18.66
27.48
75.91
Japanese imports
17.91
23.88
23.37
27.57
84.75
Percent
145
1 59
125
100
112
CTN 24001: iron ore
USSR exports
3.78
4.21
4.24
4.32
5.16
Japanese imports
10.35
11.44
11.78
12.34
13.89
Percent
274
272
278
286
269
CTN 24002: manganese ore
USSR exports
5.44
5.02
6.36
8.53
15.36
Japanese imports
20.86
19.49
18.77
20.45
33.48
Percent
383
388
295
240
218
CTN 24004: chrome ore
USSR exports
21.59
37.60
36.46
26.97
49.27
Japanese imports
38.74
52.60
52.38
49.32
61.30
Percent
179
140
144
183
124
CTN 25001: asbestos brands
USSR exports
114.67
112.37
123.18
134.44
159.13
Japanese imports
119.84
118.81
130.31
147.42
164.33
Percent
105
106
106
110
103
CTN 26001: pig iron
USSR exports
59.51
34.21
32.56
60.90
115.75
Japanese imports
74.82
56.70
47.78
74.74
123.46
Percent
126
166
147
123
107
CTN 26201: ferrous metal scrap
USSR exports
54.97
36.87
31.59
77.73
158.95
Japanese imports
60.86
45.36
40.39
84.63
178.78
Percent
111
123
128
109
112
CTN 27008: aluminum
USSR exports
523
444
405
453
757
Japanese imports
509
468
412
455
673
Percent
97
105
102
100
89
CTN 500: round timber
USSR exports
20.53
21.39
21.47
37.21
53.84
Japanese imports
27.67
27.62
28.29
45.82
62.34
Percent
13S
129
132
123
116
Weighted average of
Japanese unit prices as
a percent of Soviet
unit prices2
139
140
135
124
117
1. These commodities account for one-half to two-thirds of Japanese imports from the USSR.
2. The percentages are weighted by the corresponding values of Japanese imports.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
Analysis of Unidentified Soviet Exports to Japan
Diamonds (SITC 6672)
648
837
2,619
11,141
7,098
22,343
Other precious stones
(SITC 6673)
81
64
22
350
170
687
Silver (SITC 6811
0
0
123
0
0
123
Platinum and platinum group
metals (SITC 6812)
41,689
55,246
91,149
150,945
168,453
507,482
Jewelry of gold, silver, and
platinum (SITC 8971)
12
2
2
534
366
916
Nickel (SITC 683)
20,041
13,270
12,813
14,503
17,036
77,663
Isotopes and amorphous chemi-
cals (SITC 515)
16
31
13
54
150
264
Zinc (SITC 686)
192
0
0
2,772
7,428
10,392
Imports identified by Japan
but not by USSR
62,679
69,450
106,741
180,299
200,701
619,870
Unspecified Soviet
export residual
64,903
51,868
67,278
128,000
152,521
464,570
Value reported by Japan
as percent of unspecified
Soviet export residual
97
134
159
141
132
133
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
Comparison of Soviet Imports and Japanese Exports
on a 1-Digit CTN Level
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
Total
CTN 1
USSR
118,973
139,830
240,554
215,769
247,335
962,461
Japan
117,902
125,068
208,929
193,422
267,987
913,308
USSR as per-
cent of Japan
101
112
115
112
92
105
CTN 2
USSR
51,650
73,520
86,241
131,272
455,293
797,976
Japan
54,728
84,346
95,993
154,487
507,876
897,430
USSR as per-
cent of Japan
94
87
90
85
90
89
CTN 3
USSR
35,317
37,080
34,598
29,130
83,617
219,742
Japan
43,391
52,474
52,337
41,564
124,092
313,858
USSR as per-
cent of Japan
81
71
66
70
67
70
CTN 4
USSR
2,608
3,310
4,204
3,244
4,697
18,063
Japan
3,047
3,525
11,204
7,703
10,786
36,265
USSR as per-
cent of Japan
86
94
38
42
44
50
CTN 5
USSR
40,175
44,296
60,885
28,125
71,406
244,887
Japan
40,833
43,720
64,258
34,675
78,707
262,193
USSR as per-
cent of Japan
98
101
95
81
91
93
CTN 6, 7
USSR
0
0
0
0
0
0
Japan
1
282
27
21
0
331
CTN 8
USSR
481
194
154
494
417
1,740
Japan
380
340
315
986
914
2,935
USSR as per-
cent of Japan
127
57
49
50
46
59
CTN 9
USSR
78,848
70,809
76,078
64,901
112,906
403,542
Japan
80,676
67,993
71,114
51,732
111,339
382,854
USSR as per-
cent of Japan
98
104
107
125
101
105
Total CTN 1-9
USSR
328,053
369,039
502,714
472,935
975,670
2,648,411
Japan
340,958
377,748
504,177
484,590
1,101,701
2,809,174
USSR as per-
cent of Japan
96
98
100
98
89
94
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
Difference between Soviet
imports and Japanese
exports of machinery and
equipment (CTN 1)
Difference between Soviet
imports and Japanese
exports of consumer
goods (CTN 9)
Total
Total differences between
Soviet imports and
Japanese exports
Possible Japanese reexports
not credited to Japan
by the USSR
1.1
14.8
31.6
22.3
-20.7
-1.8
2.8
5.0
13.2
1.6
-0.7
17.6
36.6
35.5
-19.1
4.4
18.1
20.8
18.1
-75.4
-5.1
-0.5
15.8
17.4
56.3
86. The possible reexports not credited to Japan in Soviet import statistics
are probably in the CTN 1, CTN 2, or CTN 3 categories-especially iron and steel
products (SITC 67) and plastic materials (SITC 58). Soviet imports are less than
reported Japanese deliveries in the respective 1-digit categories, and the
export-import differences have increased steadily (Table 31).21?
Netherlands
Soviet Exports and Netherlands Imports
87. In the Netherlands, as in Belgium-Luxembourg, the treatment of reexports
explains why Soviet exports exceed Dutch imports (Tables 1 and 32).22. Because
21. The Soviet CTN 1 residual of $75 million in 1974 for machinery imports from Japan-the difference
between the reported CTN 1 total and the sum of the commodities reported by the USSR-makes it impractical
to identify the Japanese machinery exports that account for the discrepancy between Soviet and Japanese
data.
22. Transshipments also play a role, as in Belgium-Luxembourg. If the final destination of Soviet exports
passing through the Netherlands were unknown, the Soviets would incorrectly identify the Netherlands as
the importing country. This is more of a problem for the Netherlands than for most other countries because
of its geographic position.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
Comparison of Soviet Exports and Netherlands Imports
on a 1-Digit CTN Level
CTN 1
USSR
1,509
1,718
2,257
4,788
6,225
16,497
Netherlands
2,098
1,749
2,493
4,976
6,273
17,589
USSR as percent
of Netherlands
72
98
91
96
99
94
CTN 2
USSR
73,880
109,633
129,476
267,600
403,373
983,962
Netherlands
21,059
23,235
42,945
77,626
159,547
324,412
USSR as percent
of Netherlands
351
472
301
345
253
303
CTN 3
USSR
6,408
4,567
4,559
7,475
11,091
34,100
Netherlands
2,899
3,304
2,918
4,011
6,711
19,843
USSR as percent
of Netherlands
221
138
156
186
165
172
CTN 4
USSR
374
407
477
1,023
1,535
3,816
Netherlands
8
6
7
8
13
42
USSR as percent
of Netherlands
4,675
6,783
6,814
12,788
11,808
9,086
CTN 5
USSR
14,421
12,188
14,314
30,647
39,581
111,151
Netherlands
19,551
15,774
18,250
30,766
45,990
130,331
USSR as percent
of Netherlands
74
77
78
100
86
85
CTN 6, 7
USSR
7,120
8,790
3,028
1,744
1,698
22,380
Netherlands
2,761
5,948
2,816
2,150
1,759
15,434
USSR as percent
of Netherlands
258
148
108
81
97
145
CTN 8
USSR
4,655
12,196
4,693
4,596
10,386
36,526
Netherlands
7,783
13,728
8,567
5,558
11,806
47,442
USSR as percent
of Netherlands
60
89
55
83
88
77
CTN 9
USSR
2,906
2,741
2,776
4,317
4,545
17,285
Netherlands
1,568
1,106
1,388
3,020
2,889
9,971
USSR as percent
of Netherlands
185
248
200
143
157
173
Total CTN 1-9
USSR
111,272
152,239
161,577
322,191
478,437
1,225,716
Netherlands
57,727
64,850
79,384
128,115
234,988
565,064
USSR as percent
of Netherlands
193
235
204
251
204
217
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
the Netherlands records trade flows under the special system, a large share of Soviet
deliveries--particularly of fuel, minerals, and metals-goes unreported. The value of
reexports not only has offset c.i.f.-f.o.b. Valuation differences but has created the
widest gap between Soviet exports and partner country imports for any of the
nine Western countries examined in this study.
88. In this connection, comparisons of a weighted average of unit prices for
selected Netherlands imports in 1970-74 with Soviet export unit prices suggest
that Netherlands imports would have exceeded Soviet exports at least in 1970-72
because of c.i.f.-f.o.b. differences if reexports were not a factor (Table 33). The
average of Netherlands unit prices dropped below the average of Soviet unit prices
in 1973-74, however. When the Netherlands withdrew Soviet oil from bonded
storage tanks in 1973 and 1974 for domestic consumption, it was presumably valued
at older, lower prices. At the same time, the Netherlands reexported higher priced
petroleum products. This reinforced the discrepancy stemming directly from
reexports, particularly in 1973 when the difference between Soviet exports and
Netherlands imports was more than one and one-half times larger than reported
Netherlands imports. The differences between Soviet fuel, mineral, and metals (CTN
2) exports and Netherlands CTN 2 imports correspond closely to the overall
differences.
Reported Soviet CTN 2
exports
"Unspecified" export
residual'
Total
Netherlands CTN 2
imports
Difference between Soviet
exports and Netherlands
imports in the CTN 2
category
Difference between total
Soviet exports and total
Netherlands imports
73.9
109.6
129.5
267.6
403.4
56.7
18.4
25.5
29.6
42.0
130.6
128.0
155.0
297.2
445.4
21.1
23.2
42.9
77.6
159.5
109.5
104.8
112.1
219.6
285.9
93.1
105.5
107.2
223.3
284.5
1. All of the "unspecified" export residual in Soviet trade with the Netherlands
is assumed to fall in CTN 2.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08SO135OR000602080001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
Netherlands and Soviet Unit Prices for Selected Soviet Exports:
Netherlands Unit Prices as a Percent of Soviet Unit Prices
Commodity'
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
CTN 19501: passenger cars
USSR exports
547
613
588
949
1,238
Netherlands imports
592
673
861
1,147
1,273
Percent
108
110
146
121
102
CTN 21, 22: petroleum products
USSR exports
18.12
19.72
20.09
56.85
89.62
Netherlands imports
18.74
21.55
21.96
32.95
80.31
Percent
103
109
109
58
90
CTN 25013: apatite
concentrate
USSR exports
13.89
13.76
14.32
17.90
56.95
Netherlands imports
16.99
17.76
18.54
21.98
67.46
Percent
122
129
129
123
118
CTN 27004: zinc
USSR exports
290
307
381
849
1,396
Netherlands imports
292
323
384
880
1,351
Percent
101
105
101
104
97
CTN 50004: beams
USSR exports
20.66
22.63
29.19
29.69
62.19
Netherlands imports
29.79
31.82
38.54
40.60
74.31
Percent
144
141
132
137
119
CTN 50101: coniferous
sawn lumber
USSR exports
77.25
85.09
81.11
126.45
218.19
Netherlands imports
102.03
114.05
107.82
152.10
281.50
Percent
132
134
133
120
129
CTN 84109: sunflower seed
oil
USSR exports
290
362
317
371
923
Netherlands imports
286
335
313
353
747
Percent
99
93
99
95
81
Weighted average of
Netherlands unit prices
as a percent of Soviet
unit prices2
114
115
115
81
97
1. These commodities account for one-half to three-fourth of Netherland imports from the USSR for 1970-74.
2. The percentages are weighted by the corresponding values of Netherlands imports.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
89. Copper reexports also figure heavily in the CTN 2 discrepancy (which, on the
Soviet side, includes the USSR's unidentified export residual). The residual after
accounting for oil and copper most likely is caused by Netherlands reexports of
diamonds, platinum, and other commodities traditionally omitted from the Soviet
breakdown of commodity exports. Some imports of these commodities appear in
the Netherlands special trade statistics, but they represent only a small share of the
total Soviet "unspecified" export residual (Table 34).
Analysis of Unidentified Soviet Exports to the Netherlands
Diamonds (SITC 6672)
Other precious stones (SITC 6673)
Silver (SITC 6811)
Platinum and platinum group
metals (SITC 6812)
Nickel (SITC 683)
Isotopes and amorphous chemi-
cals (SITC 515)
Imports identified by the
Netherlands but not by
USSR
Unspecified Soviet export
residual
0
0
0
239
0
239
0
0
0
4
95
99
0
0
566
0
0
566
170
755
113
1,955
265
3,258
3,490
364
716
998
1,033
6,601
15
5
2
13
2
37
3,675
1,124
1,397
3,209
1,395
10,800
56,728
18,428
25,489
29,619
42,039
172,303
Percent
Value reported by the Netherlands
as percent of unspecified
Soviet export residual
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
Difference between Soviet
exports and Netherlands
imports of:
Petroleum and petroleum
products (CTN 21, 22)
Refined copper (CTN
2700101, 2,4)
Zinc (CTN 27004)
Aluminum (CTN 27008)
Magnesium (CTN 27012)
Total
Difference between Soviet
exports, including Soviet
residual, and Netherlands
imports in the CTN 2
category
1970
1971 .
1972
1973
1974
13.0
15.3
17.8
135.0
136.1
25.8
61.7
51.5
28.8
61.6
1.9
5.1
10.8
20.6
14.0
6.8
0.3
2.8
0.6
19.8
3.5
0.8
2.0
1.6
10.2
51.0
832
84.9
186.6
241.7
109.5
104.8
112.1
219.6
285.9
90. Inspection of Soviet and Netherlands statistics also indicates that the
reexport (or transshipment) of Soviet goods affects trade in several other 1-digit
CTN categories. Soviet exports of chemical products-in particular, products of the
coke and petrochemical industry (CTN 303) and products used in the production
of plastics (CTN 304)-are nearly four times greater than corresponding Netherlands
imports, accounting for most of the discrepancy in CTN 3 (chemicals, fertilizers,
and rubber). In CTN 4 (building materials and construction parts), exports of
pressed wood and shavings tiles (CTN 41202 and 41203) appear in the Soviet
commodity breakdown but are not reported as imports by the Netherlands. The
excess of Soviet exports of CTN 6 and 7 (live animals not for slaughter and raw
materials for the production of foodstuffs) over Netherlands imports in 1970-72
can be traced chiefly to the handling of whale oil (CTN 72401)-more than $8
million. Finally, Soviet deliveries of cotton and cotton fabrics .(CTN 900) and
narcotics (CTN 960-2) exceed Netherlands imports for 1970-74, accounting for
the imbalance in consumer goods (CTN 9).
Soviet Imports and Netherlands Exports
91. Reexports (or transshipments) also produce large disparities between
Soviet imports and Netherlands exports. Some machinery (CTN 1), chemical
products (CTN 3), and raw materials of vegetable and animal origin (CTN 5) are
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
Comparison of Soviet Imports and Netherlands Exports
on a 1-Digit CTN Level
CTN 1
USSR
6,957
20,521
11,229
29,379
61,057
129,143
Netherlands
4,171
9,585
6,762
11,017
52,793
84,328
USSR as percent
of Netherlands
167
214
166
267
116
153
CTN 2
USSR
6,706
9
129
1,443
1,513
9,800
Netherlands
6,081
1,593
1,430
2,832
5,973
17,909
USSR as percent
of Netherlands
110
1
9
51
25
55
CTN 3
USSR
17,907
11,805
16,045
21,229
93,454
160,440
Netherlands
6,450
6,972
13,518
13,507
53,019
93,466
USSR as percent
of Netherlands
278
169
119
157
176
172
CTN 4
USSR
0
0
0
0
0
0
Netherlands
1,935
910
767
502
524
4,638
CTN 5
USSR
19,127
20,844
27,545
25,992
34,349
127,857
Netherlands
3,984
5,988
17,520
19,558
13,200
60,250
USSR as percent
of Netherlands
480
348
157
133
260
212
CTN 6, 7
USSR
3,670
2,004
4,005
11,286
23,576
44,541
Netherlands
3,435
415
4,421
11,489
18,788
38,548
USSR as percent
of Netherlands
107
483
91
98
125
116
CTN 8
USSR
7,927
8,430
2,848
25,604
2,233
47,042
Netherlands
6,370
8,736
3,757
8,962
6,065
33,890
USSR as percent
of Netherlands
124
96
76
286
37
139
CTN 9
USSR
10,419
12,068
7,997
2,649
8,879
42,012
Netherlands
9,459
6,499
7,012
4,011
3,424
30,405
USSR as percent
of Netherlands
110
186
114
66
259
138
Total CTN 1-9
USSR
72,713
75,682
69,799
117,582
225,060
560,836
Netherlands
41,885
40,698
55,187
71,878
153,786
363,434
USSR as percent
of Netherlands
174
186
126
164
146
154.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
reported as imports from the Netherlands by the Soviets but not as exports by
the Netherlands. The results are summarized in Tables 2 and 35.
92. Soviet imports of vessels and vessel-lifting equipment (CTN 192) along
with crop and plant-growing installations (CTN 162032) account for much of the
differences in CTN 1 (Table 35). Reported Soviet CTN 192 imports in 1970-73
total $25 million but are absent from Netherlands export data. In 1974, Soviet
imports of vessels and equipment exceed Netherlands exports by $5 million. The
USSR, moreover, recorded purchases of plant-growing installations amounting to
$4 million in 1973 and $12 million in 1974; no sales were reported by the
Netherlands. In chemicals, the USSR identified the Netherlands as the source of
$19 million worth of caustic soda (CTN 30101) in 1970-74, but this does not
appear in Netherlands trade data as an export to the USSR. The treatment of
caustic soda, together with a $20 million imbalance in antifreeze (CTN 30903)
imports, explains why USSR CTN 3 imports exceed Netherlands exports. Finally,
the discrepancy in the CTN 5 category stems largely from the fact that Soviet
imports of face leather for shoes (CTN 53102) are larger than Netherlands exports
by $65 million in 1970-74.
United Kingdom
Soviet Exports and UK Imports
93. As in other Western countries that value imports c.i.f., UK imports from
the USSR outstrip Soviet exports mainly because of c.i.f.-f.o.b. valuation
differences. But the changing mix of UK-Soviet trade, UK imports of Soviet goods
from third countries, and, in recent years, the abrupt increase in Soviet raw material
export prices have weakened this tendency (Tables 1 and 36).
94. UK purchases of Soviet diamonds, which account for nearly one-half of
total UK imports from the USSR, have consistently pulled down the percentage
difference caused by the c.i.f. Valuation of the nondiamond share of the trade.2 3
A weighted average of ratios of UK to Soviet unit prices for selected commodities
that account for over one-half of the nondiamond trade is considerably larger than
the difference between Soviet exports and UK imports on an aggregate level
(Table 37).
23. Transport and insurance costs for diamonds probably amount to less than 1 percent of their value.
61
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
Comparison of Soviet Exports and UK Imports
on a 1-Digit CTN Level
CTN 1
USSR
3,011
4,578
9,443
17,434
28,871
63,337
UK
4,885
7,364
12,179
23,969
29,219
77,616
USSR as percent
of UK
62
62
78
73
99
82
CTN 2
USSR
25,609
30,524
46,672
87,827
143,256
333,888
UK
318,670
286,122
350,971
517,542
527,473
2,000,778
USSR as percent
of UK
8
11
13
17
27
17
CTN 3
USSR
6,299
7,089
5,270
4,739
9,661
33,058
UK
5,092
5,981
7,639
11,972
13,628
44,312
USSR as percent
of UK
124
119
69
40
71
75
CTN 4
USSR
240
145
174
513
789
1,861
UK
208
243
372
560
822
2,205
USSR as percent
of UK
115
60
47
92
96
84
CTN 5
USSR
118,994
115,771
133,865
181,545
265,317
815,492
UK
150,796
148,827
152,707
225,124
315,233
992,687
USSR as percent
of UK
79
78
88
81
84
82
CTN 6,7
USSR
24,991
26,703
54
720
1,364
53,832
UK
28,914
27,715
19,690
415
1,436
78,170
USSR as percent
of UK
86
96
Negl
173
95
69
CTN 8
USSR
6,584
10,151
9,729
11,282
17,618
55,364
UK
7,879
11,577
9,624
10,035
14,815
53,930
USSR as percent
of UK
84
88
101
112
119
103
CTN 9
USSR
9,574
11,323
11,351
13,155
17,648
63,051
UK
7,055
9,368
12,658
17,485
18,686
65,252
USSR as percent
of UK
136
121
90
75
94
97
Total CTN 1-9
USSR
195,304
206,283
216,557
317,215
484,524
1,419,883
UK
523,499
497,197
565,840
807,102
921,312
3,314,950
USSR as percent
of UK
37
41
38
39
53
43
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
UK and Soviet Unit Prices for Selected Soviet Exports:
UK Unit Prices as a Percent of Soviet Unit Prices
CTN 19501: passenger cars
USSR exports
656
664
751
758
1,023
UK imports
792
847
848
873
1,297
Percent
121
128
113
115
127
CTN 21, 22: petroleum products
USSR exports
2
2
16.18
27.97
100.43
UK imports
24.12
35.95
118.58
Percent
149
129
118
CTN 24001: iron ore
USSR exports
5.58
6.66
6.29
6.10
6.84
UK imports
10.79
12.07
12.12
13.37
15.70
Percent
193
181
193
219
230
CTN 24002: manganese ore
USSR exports
16.71
19.15
21.08
13.57
0
UK imports
25.25
28.16
29.62
25.71
0
Percent
151
147
141
189
CTN 26051: pig iron
USSR exports
0
44.92
37.25
59.64
0
UK imports
0
58.94
57.02
93.42
0
Percent
131
131
153
157
CTN 2700101, 2,4: refined
copper
USSR exports
0
987
1,065
1,638
2,028
UK imports
0
1,010
1,039
1,799
2,029
Percent
0
102
98
110
100
CTN 27004: zinc
USSR exports
0
311
387
657
1,300
UK imports
0
315
376
654
1,635
Percent
101
97
100
126
CTN 27008: aluminum
USSR exports
506
482
420
496
692
UK imports
574
560
526
533
819
Percent
113
116
125
107
118
CTN 501: lumber
USSR exports
39.41
42.50
40.54
51.30
129.10
UK imports
53.39
58.55
59.69
74.01
155.99
Percent
135
138
147
144
121
CTN 50201: glued plywood
USSR exports
117.72
124.38
135.52
155.25
230.99
UK imports
136.52
144.51
151.75
166.70
243.62
Percent
116
116
112
107
105
CTN 84109: sunflower seed
oil
USSR exports
291
364
306
462
834
UK imports
291
387
322
376
915
Percent
100
106
105
81
110
Weighted average of UK
unit prices as a percent
of Soviet unit prices3
138
138
140
138
123
1. These commodities, as a share of UK aggregate imports from the USSR, grew from one-fourth in 1970 to
nearly two-fifths in 1974.
2. The USSR reported only exports of petroleum products (CTN 22) to the UK in 1970-71, although UK
statistics show that some CTN 21 imports were received. Consequently, for consistency's sake, unit value prices
in 1970-71 are excluded.
3. The percentages are weighted by the corresponding values of UK imports.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
95. In addition, data on the volume of Soviet. exports of several
commodities-in' particular, petroleum and petroleum products (CTN 21, 22)-have
at times been greater than UK import figures, offsetting part of the c.i.f.=f.o.b.
disparities. Soviet goods shipped . to the. UK via -a third country apparently are
credited to the other country and not the USSR. (The UK assigns imports according
to the country of first consignment rather than the country of origin.) A comparison
of Soviet and UK data on a 1-digit CTN level shows, for example, that Soviet
CTN 2 exports as a percent of UK CTN 2 imports rose sharply in 1974 (Table 36).
Oil exports account for the jump; Soviet deliveries were 40 percent greater than
UK imports in value terms and over two-thirds greater by volume.Z 4 A share of
the additional oil most likely was shipped from Belgium by Nafta-B to Nafta-GB
in the UK. Both are Soviet-controlled petroleum companies. Similarly, Soviet
exports of sunflower seed oil (CTN 84109) for 1971-74 were twice UK imports
and raised Soviet CTN 8 exports above UK CTN 8 imports after 1971.
96. The remaining 1-digit categories pretty much follow the expected pattern
because of the incomplete commodity breakdown in Soviet handbooks-UK imports
exceed Soviet exports. For example, imports from the USSR of crude rubber appear
in UK trade books but not in the Soviet breakdown. And the USSR stopped
reporting exports of potassium salts (CTN 34101) to the UK in 1973 although,
according to UK trade data, deliveries continued. These exports presumably are
in the unspecified export residual but account for a very small share since UK
imports of Soviet diamonds exhaust more than 95 percent of the residual in 1970-74
(Table 38).
Soviet Imports and UK Exports
97. Soviet inclusion of related technology costs in machinery and equipment
(CTN 1) imports is partially responsible for total Soviet imports being higher than
UK exports (Tables 2 and 39). Imbalances between USSR imports and UK exports
24. Soviet oil exports also exceeded UK imports in 1973 by the same proportions but had less impact because
of the smaller quantity shipped to the UK.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
Analysis of Unidentified Soviet Exports to the UK
Diamonds (SITC 6672)
Other precious stones (SITC 6673)
Silver (SITC 6811)
Platinum and platinum group
metals (SITC 6812)
Jewelry of gold, silver, and
platinum (SITC 8971)
Nickel (SITC 683)
Imports identified by the UK
but not by USSR
Unspecified Soviet export residual
Value reported by the UK
as share of unspecified
Soviet export residual
251,942
208,347
275,476
410,939
396,824
1,543,528
200
52
28
17
0
297
20,282
0
1,240
0
0
21,522
4,723
3,854
19,227
12,633
0
40,437
0
8
0
29
2
39
6,022
31,288
444
296
559
38,609
283,169
243,549
296,415
423,914
397,385
1,644,432
269,363
243,384
232,474
412,595
426,936
1,584,752
of fuels, minerals, and metals and raw materials of vegetable and animal origin
also have contributed in isolated years:
Difference between Soviet
imports and UK exports of:
Machinery and equip-
ment (CTN 1)
Fuels, minerals, and
metals (CTN 2)
Raw materials of vege-
table and animal
origin (CTN 5)
Total
Difference between total
Soviet imports and total
UK exports
10.2
17.5
10.0
9.2
14.3
3.8
5.8
7.4
14.5
0.7
0.2
6.1
-0.4
-3.4
18.6
6.2
5.6
3.6
-1.9
-5.0
10.3
17.5
10.0
9.2
14.6
14.3
16.2
10.4
5.5
6.6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
Comparison of Soviet Imports and UK Exports
on a 1-Digit CTN Level
CTN 1
USSR
109,817
95,371
108,560
121,395
75,272
510,415
UK
105,983
89,549
101,177
106,884
74,557
478,150
USSR as percent
of UK
104
107
107
114
101
107
CTN 2
USSR
31,660
27,664
26,271
27,684
54,879
168,158
UK
31,429
21,544
26,707
31,100
36,320
147,100
USSR as percent
of UK
101
128
98
89
151
114
CTN 3
USSR
26,254
27,137
26,054
28,888
41,092
149,425
UK
29,230
27,610
29,056
35,204
55,186
176,286
USSR as percent
of UK
90
98
90
82
74
85
CTN 4
USSR
0
0
0
0
0
0
UK
1,888
1,177
1,299
3,111
2,358
9,833
CTN 5
USSR
37,469
32,401
35,382
30,706
49,262
185,220
UK
31,204
26,819
31,763
32,594
53,987
176,367
USSR as percent
of UK
120
121
111
94
91
105
CTN 6,7
USSR
0
3,761
503
0
692
4,956
UK
0
2,902
866
292
867
4,927
USSR as percent
of UK
130
58
80
101
CTN 8
USSR
810
63
0
0
0
873
UK
1,244
582
888
845
1,631
5,190
USSR as percent
of UK
65
11
17
CTN 9
USSR
28,929
26,385
16,485
15,769
21,470
109,038
UK
32,634
35,446
23,843
20,160
32,029
144,112
USSR as percent
of UK
89
74
69
78
67
76
Total CTN 1-9
USSR
234,940
212,784
213,254
224,442
242,666
128,086
UK
233,612
205,629
215,599
230,190
256,935
1,141,965
USSR as percent
of UK
101
103
99
98
94
99
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
98. Soviet imports of refined copper, tin, and lead account for most of the
CTN 2 difference. Imports of these commodities by the USSR are nearly 2-1/2
times as large as UK export figures over the 5-year period. In CTN 5, Soviet imports
of artificial textile fibers are larger than UK exports. Most likely, these goods are
shipped to a third country and then on to the USSR, with an intervening
commercial transaction. Consequently, the third country would be identified as
the importing country by the UK, while the Soviets would credit the UK with
the exports. As for the other 1-digit categories, the incomplete Soviet commodity
breakdown explains the excess of UK exports over Soviet imports (Table 39).2 5
West Germany
Soviet Exports and West German Imports
99. Discrepancies between West German imports and Soviet exports on both
aggregate and 1-digit CTN -levels are inevitable, given that West Germany values
its imports c.i.f., and the USSR values its exports f.o.b. (Tables 1 and 40). Reexports
play a minor role. The importance of c.i.f.-f.o.b. differences in explaining the size
of the discrepancies varies, however, and is affected especially by large price changes.
100. A jump in Soviet export prices beginning in 1973 and continuing through
1974 helped offset c.i.f.-f.o.b. valuation differences and reduced the percentage
gap between FRG imports and USSR exports; discrepancies in 1960-71 had
fluctuated within a narrow range. (The decline in the relative importance of
transport and insurance costs accounts for some of the reduction.) A weighted
average of unit prices for selected West German imports in 1970-74 as a percent
of Soviet export unit prices shows the impact of price changes in recent years
(Table 41). The ratio of average German import prices to the Soviet export prices
for nine important commodities dropped from 129 percent in 1971 and 1.972 to
102 percent in 1973 and to 99 percent in 1974. For products whose (Soviet)
selling price increased gradually over the period (chrome ore and asbestos), the
ratio of export prices to import prices did not change much. But when Soviet
export prices jumped precipitously (coal, petroleum and petroleum products, iron
ore, and apatite), the increase in import prices lagged behind. West German
25. A share of UK exports of building materials and construction parts (CTN 4) possibly is included in
Soviet trade books under CTN 1 imports if the materials were used in the construction of an industrial
plant purchased in the West.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
Comparison of Soviet Exports and West German Imports
on a 1-Digit CTN Level
CTN 1
USSR
28,784
15,465
20,507
17,639
19,552
101,947
West Germany
25,744
18,126
32,185
48,753
24,203
149,011
USSR as percent
of West Germany
112
85
64
36
81
68
CTN 2
USSR
123,888
145,613
159,572
405,143
787,663
1,621,879
West Germany
205,219
218,791
254,309
465,173
880,837
2,024,329
USSR as percent
of West Germany
60
67
63
87
89
80
CTN 3
USSR
9,029
8,980
10,788
15,562
40,728
85,087
West Germany
11,158
9,131
8,942
16,407
46,744
92,382
USSR as percent
of West Germany
81
98
121
95
87
92
CTN 4
USSR
721
1,259
206
365
314
2,865
West Germany
47
274
331
926
1,028
2,606
USSR as percent
of West Germany
1,534
459
62
39
31
110
CTN 5
USSR
40,140
45,753
51,111
79,073
99,549
315,626
West Germany
60,916
65,926
71,415
116,585
130,968
445,810
USSR as percent
of West Germany
66
69
72
68
76
71
CTN 6, 7
USSR
923
3,648
241
0
0
4,812
West Germany
7,873
8,791
5,933
3,868
924
27,389
USSR as percent
of West Germany
12
41
4
18
CTN 8
USSR
26,272
40,904
35,733
46,777
101,302
250,988
West Germany
24,569
37,075
38,148
43,355
83,728
226,875
USSR as percent
of West Germany
107
110
94
108
121
111
CTN 9
USSR
6,118
7,367
9,794
13,947
18,623
55,849
West Germany
3,877
6,716
7,424
9,497
12,844
40,358
USSR as percent
of West Germany
158
110
132
147
145
138
Total CTN 1-9
USSR
235,877
268,989
287,951
578,506
1,067,731
2,439,054
West Germany
339,403
364,830
418,687
704,564
1,181,276
3,008,760
USSR as percent
of West Germany
69
74
69
82
90
81
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
withdrawals of Soviet goods-particularly petroleum products-from bonded.storage
for domestic consumption helped to narrow the gap. These goods presumably are
valued at older, lower prices in a calculation of. unit prices of West. German
imports? 6 The rule does not always hold, however. When the average price for
cellulose sulfate recorded by the USSR more than doubled in 1974, the average
import price reported by West Germany increased nearly as much.
101. FRG imports in 1970-74 on a 1-digit level-such as aggregate imports-are
consistently larger than Soviet exports in all categories except foodstuffs (CTN
8) and consumer goods (CTN 9) (Table 40). The effect of the c.i.f.-f.o.b.
confrontation is compounded by the incomplete commodity breakdown published
by the USSR. Most of the "unspecified" export residual is accounted for by the
commodities traditionally omitted from Soviet trade books (Table 42).
102. In a departure from the past, West German import data for 1973 and
1974 are not exhaustive for minerals, fuels, lubricants, and related materials (SITC
3) on even a 2-digit level; trade data on a 2-digit level for SITC 3 do not sum
to the appropriate 1-digit totals. The discrepancies for these 2 years-$7 million
and $41 million, respectively-equal the value of Soviet gas fuel exports to the
FRG that are unreported by West Germany under SITC 34.
103. West German reexports of Soviet goods lead to Soviet exports being
greater than FRG imports of foodstuffs (CTN 8) and consumer goods (CTN 9),
despite the valuation differences. The discrepancies in CTN 8 arise largely because
of the reexport of sunflower seed oil while reexports of cotton fabrics are important
in CTN 7. The USSR presumably did not know the country of consumption for
these exports and reported them as shipments to the FRG. West Germany, which
uses a special trade system, omits reexports from its trade statistics.
Soviet Imports and West German Exports
104. The USSR's assignment of a share of deliveries of machinery and
equipment (CTN 1) from West Germany to other countries probably accounts for
Soviet imports being less than FRG exports in many years (Tables 2 and 43).
26. West German imports of Soviet oil in 1970-73 were consistently less than Soviet exports by weight.
In 1974, however, West German imports exceeded reported Soviet deliveries. During the energy crisis, some
of the oil normally reexported was apparently taken out of bonded tanks for domestic use.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
West German and Soviet Unit Prices for Selected Soviet Exports:
West German Unit Prices as a Percent of Soviet Unit Prices
Commodity'
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
CTN 19501: passenger cars
USSR exports
635
700
822
1,239
1,243
West German imports
576
744
775
1,202
1,506
Percent
91
106
94
97
112
CTN 20001: coal
USSR exports
7.78
7.71
9.28
10.33
24.88
West German imports
12.13
12.08
12.74
15.87
24.37
Percent
156
157
137
154
98
CTN 21, 22: petroleum products
USSR exports
14.24
17.16
17.48
50.84
95.76
West German imports
17.04
22.15
22.35
49.53
92.15
Percent
120
129
128
97
96
CTN 24001: iron ore
USSR exports
4.90
6.87
6.76
8.02
8.78
West German imports
10.34
11.66
12.23
12.89
13.70
Percent
211
170
181
161
156
CTN 24004: chrome ore
USSR exports
41.52
55.71
46.85
37.91
54.19
West German imports
46.70
59.42
45.14
43.77
54.69
Percent
112
107
96
115
106
CTN 25001: asbestos brands
USSR exports
110.57
116.95
117.88
135.27
146.88
West German imports
120.02
127.61
129.10
150.97
167.34
Percent
109
109
110
112
114
CTN 25013: apatite concentrate
USSR exports
13.47
13.50
14.03
16.86
68.13
West German imports
17.63
19.35
19.09
24.03
73.58
Percent
131
143
136
143
108
CTN 26001: pig iron
USSR exports
59.71
46.21
35.29
58.74
68.74
West German imports
66.01
54.27
42.85
63.90
75.24
Percent
111
117
121
109
109
CTN 50503: cellulose sulfate
USSR exports
108.87
128.96
128.75
157.05
376.23
West German imports
114.23
127.98
128.82
165.56
382.52
Percent
105
99
100
105
102
Weighted average of West
German unit prices as a
percent of Soviet unit
prices2
123
129
129
102
99
1. These commodities account for one-third of West German imports from the USSR in 1970 to more than
one-half in 1974.
2. The percentages are weighted by the corresponding values of West German imports.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
Analysis of Unidentified Soviet Exports to West Germany
Diamonds (SITC 6672)
Other precious stones (SITC 6673)
Silver (SITC 6811)
Platinum and platinum group
metals (SITC 6812)
Silver and platinum ore (SITC 285)
Jewelry of gold, silver, and
platinum (SITC 8971)
Nickel (SITC 683)
Isotopes and amorphous chemi-
cals (SITC 515)
Imports identified by West Germany
but not by USSR
Unspecified Soviet export residual
Value reported by West Germany
as percent of unspecified
Soviet export residual
61
0
689
4,328
2,577
7,655
109
168
149
230
338
994
263
0
3,298
764
0
4,325
12,109
11,403
20,391
24,178
38,949
107,030
0
0
0
712
0
712
13
306
333
161
1,204
2,017
33,449
12,805
9,635
16,248
25,174
97,311
186
272
512
404
19,215
20,589
46,190
24,954
35,007
47,025
87,457
240,633
21,012
22,900
34,151
72,194
94,661
244,918
Valuation differences should not be a problem because West Germany values its
exports f.o.b. at its border and the USSR prices its imports at the frontier from
which the goods are shipped. The USSR apparently did not consider West Germany
as the country of origin for these exports. The FRG, meanwhile, viewed the
commodities as either nationalized or domestically produced goods exported to
the USSR.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
Comparison of Soviet Imports and West German Exports
on a 1-Digit CTN Level
CTN 1
USSR
136,808
198,690
376,441
523,729
737,296
1,972,964
West Germany
170,131
176,177
378,788
590,524
802,379
2,117,999
USSR as percent
-
of West Germany
80
113
99
87
92
93
CTN 2
USSR
156,936
205,644
230,935
345,046
712,043
1,650,604
West Germany
148,290
193,162
220,582
424,921
768,626
1,755,581
USSR as percent
of West Germany
106
106
105
81
93
94
CTN 3
USSR
37,593
40,789
52,322
61,711
144,261
336,676
West Germany
63,396
56,516
62,245
71,141
165,395
418,693
USSR as percent
of West Germany
59
72
84
87
87
80
CTN 4
USSR
0
0
0
0
0
0
West Germany
122
303
1,303
1,041
7,101
9,870
CTN 5
USSR
7,742
8,134
9,716
7,303
28,143
61,038
West Germany
15,117
13,422
14,323
30,188
38,307
111,357
USSR as percent
of West Germany
51
61
68
24
73
55
CTN 6,7
USSR
0
0
3,012
8,627
13,828
25,467
West Germany
115
30
5,371
8,712
19,544
33,772
USSR as percent
of West Germany
56
99
71
75
CTN 8
USSR
0
0
0
0
0
0
West Germany
483
147
194
24,507
6,039
31,370
CTN 9
USSR
22,340
13,636
11,515
14,606
21,558
83,655
West Germany
20,405
17,669
16,072
15,475
30,258
99,879
USSR as percent
of West Germany
109
77
72
94
71
84
Total CTN 1-9
USSR
361,416
466,892
683,942
961,022
1,657,130
4,130,402
West Germany
418,059
457,426
698,878
1,166,509
1,837,649
4,578,521
USSR as percent
of West Germany
86
102
98
82
90
90
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
105. Data for 1970-74 illustrate the inconsistency. Soviet CTN 1 imports from
West Germany were, greater than FRG exports only in 1971, even though the USSR
includes technology costs related to machinery imports in this category while the
FRG excludes them (Table 43). Indeed, 1971 is the only year in which Soviet
imports outweighed FRG exports on an aggregate level. The lack of an exact
concordance for machinery and equipment, together with the incomplete Soviet
commodity breakdown under CTN 1, prevents the identification of the machinery
that the West Germans count in their exports and the USSR does not.
106. As expected, West German exports in CTN 2-9 as a whole were greater
than Soviet imports in 1970-74; the USSR's commodity breakdown is not
exhaustive. The Soviets also completely omit imports of building materials and
construction parts (CTN 4) and foodstuffs (CTN 8). Clay refactory construction
materials (SITC 662) and finished structural parts and structures (SITC 691)
accounted for the bulk of West German CTN 4 exports while fixed vegetable oils
and fats (SITC 42) were a large share of the FRG's CTN 8 exports.
107. Soviet CTN 2 imports were slightly greater than West German exports
in 1970-72, with imports of pipe and petroleum products accounting for much
of the discrepancies. The difference probably represents goods either reexported
by West Germany to the USSR or purchased from the FRG by Soviet foreign
trade enterprises and shipped to a third country with West Germany reporting
them as exports to the third country. West German exports of petroleum products
were also lower than Soviet imports in 1973-74 while pipe exports were lower only.
in 1974. FRG deliveries of iron-and steel bars, rods, and angles (SITC 673)-which
the USSR does not report in its commodity breakdown-moved upward in 1971-72
and soared in 1973-74. As a result, West German CTN 2 exports climbed above
Soviet imports in these years (Table 44). Most likely, they accounted for a sizable
share of the sudden increase in unspecified Soviet imports from West Germany
in 1973-74 (from $26 million in 1972 to $70 million in 1973 and $179 million
in 1974).
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
USSR and West Germany: Comparison of
CTN 2 Trade Data
Difference between Soviet
imports and West German
exports of:
Pipe
(CTN 26601, 26604,
26605, 26606, 26607)
8,222
16,453
11,745
-61,063
41,155
Petroleum products
(CTN 22)
4,365
4,616
5,005
5,686
11,723
Iron and steel bars,
rods, and angles
(SITC 673)
-170
-3,762
-4,418
-20,490
-130,712
Total
12,417
17,307
12,332
-75,867
-77,834
Difference between Soviet
imports and West German
exports in CTN 2
8,646
12,482
10,353
-79,875
-56,583
Soviet Exports and Western Imports
108. The examination of Western and Soviet trade statistics on a bilateral and
commodity basis uncovered a good many special circumstances. Nonetheless, a few
primary factors explain most of the discrepancies between Western and Soviet
reporting. First and foremost, Western c.i.f. reporting accounts for most of the
difference between Western imports and Soviet exports. This is the case for France,
Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and West Germany-five of the seven countries
that include transport and insurance costs in the value of imports. To some extent,
these additional costs are offset in those Western countries that use the special trade
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
reporting system and therefore do not count as imports the Soviet goods that they
buy and then reexport. Moreover, the sharp increase in export prices for Soviet raw
materials in 1973-particularly prices of petroleum products-reduced the relative
importance of transport and insurance costs.
109. For the Netherlands and Belgium-Luxembourg, reexports are particularly
important, so imports of these two countries from the USSR usually fall short
of the value of corresponding Soviet exports. A substantial share of Soviet goods
delivered to these two countries-mainly diamonds and petroleum products-are
reexported and therefore missing from imports as recorded in their special trade
statistics. Since the United States and Canada report imports f.a.s. and f.o.b.,
respectively, the discrepancies between their imports and Soviet exports originate
in the methods used to identify trading partners. US imports exceed Soviet exports
because the USSR fails to identify the US as the country of final destination for
all Soviet goods that arrive in the US. These goods, mainly raw materials, are shipped
first to Western Europe and then reexported (or transshipped) to the US. But
they often appear in Soviet trade books as exports to Western Europe because
the Soviets do not know where the goods are going. The value of Canadian imports,
on the other hand, is less than the value of Soviet exports because the method
used by Canada to identify the exporting country (the country of last consignment)
understates imports from the USSR.
110. The factors at work on a bilateral basis also are evident at the aggregate
level. Thus the inclusion of transport and insurance costs in Western import statistics
drives a wedge between Western imports and Soviet exports. Abstracting from
reexports of Soviet goods by the West, Western imports would be 18 to 19 percent
larger than USSR exports in 1970-72 because of the additional costs.2 7 But the
average difference actually is only 14 percent, putting reexports in the neighborhood
of 4 to 5 percent. Beginning in 1973, however, the gap narrowed.. The rise in
the prices of Soviet raw materials (making transport and insurance costs less
important) and a slight increase in reexport of Soviet goods were primarily
responsible. The estimated average difference due to transport and insurance costs
in 1973-74 dropped to 9 percent-compared with the actual difference of 3 percent.
This change reflected the price increase and a rise in reexports to about 6 percent
27. These estimates are based on weighted averages of unit price ratios calculated in the country sections.
For the trade not included in the sample, an average ratio of 105 percent is assumed, which may be on
the low side.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
of Soviet exports. Consequently,. Western import data before 1973 grossly
overstated Soviet exports, with the upward bias for 1973-74 being considerably less.
Soviet Imports and Western Exports
111. Because of differences in trade coverage and, to a lesser degree, difficulties
in identifying trade partners, Soviet imports are larger in value than the
corresponding exports for all of the nine countries except West Germany. Soviet
inclusion of the cost of technology associated with machinery and equipment (CTN
1) in its imports accounts for Soviet imports being larger than French, Italian,
UK, and Japanese exports to the USSR. Soviet imports from the US generally
were larger than American exports before 1970 because the US did not know
the final destination of all the goods that it exported. More recently, the broader
definition of reexports used by the Soviets has added to the bias. US grain bought
on Soviet account and shipped directly to a third country appears in Soviet data
as imports from the US but in US trade books as exports to the other country.
Similarly, some Canadian grain and wheat flour exports, which the Soviets recorded
as imports from Canada, presumably were shipped directly to Cuba. Canada,
however, credited Cuba with the imports. In addition, the Canadian practice of
identifying the country of last consignment as the buyer contributed to the
imbalance in 1960-74.
112. Reexports (or transshipments)-mainly of chemicals-produced the
discrepancy between Dutch and Belgian-Luxembourg exports and Soviet imports.
West German exports, in contrast, generally have exceeded Soviet imports. A share
of machinery and equipment (CTN 1) delivered to the USSR and recorded by
the FRG as exports to the USSR was attributed to another country by the Soviets.
113. Soviet imports in the aggregate are greater than Western exports for the
reasons adduced above-the Soviet inclusion of technology imports and the broader
definition of reexports employed by the Soviets. Western trade data tend to
understate exports to the USSR--at ' least as the Soviets perceive them-because they
do not count all reexports to the USSR. In 1970-74, Soviet imports on the average
were 7 percent larger than Western exports. Of this difference, USSR technology
imports accounted for roughly 2 percentage points.2 8 Another 2 to 3 percentage
28. This estimate, which is based on the findings of the country sections, may be on the high side. It was
assumed that the difference between Soviet machinery imports (CTN 1) and Western CTN 1 exports is the
cost of imported technology. Some of the difference, however, may be accounted for by imports of
nonmachinery items, since the Soviets report the entire cost of plants purchased abroad in the machinery
and equipment category. The West, on the other hand, assigns the various plant components to the appropriate
trade categories.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
points can be traced to the Soviet practice of including in their imports goods
that are bought on Soviet. account and delivered directly to a third country.
Reexports (or transshipments) that are not reflected in Western export statistics
but which are delivered to the. USSR make. up another 2 to 3 percent of the
margin. z 9
Which Statistics To Use?
114. Soviet data are a far better indicator of USSR hard-currency trade
balances than Western data. Discounting for Soviet technology imports-while
placing these costs in the service account-puts the USSR trade deficit with the nine
countries at $2.5 billion for 1970-74. Western data, on the other hand, show a
Soviet deficit of only $0.6 billion. It is unnecessary to adjust Soviet data for Western
goods that are included in USSR trade statistics owing to the Soviets' broader
definition of reexports. These goods are bought on Soviet account and therefore
represent a hard-currency cost to the USSR. Soviet exports, in turn, need not be
adjusted if the reexports are sold for hard currency abroad.
115. To obtain a trade balance for the USSR consistent with the Western
definition of merchandise trade, however, requires adjusting Soviet imports for both
technology imports and reexports. This reduces the Soviet trade deficit to $2 billion,
which is still substantially different from the Soviet balance obtained from Western
data.
Estimates of Soviet Trade Based on Western Statistics
116. Western trade data, despite their shortcomings, can be used to estimate
Soviet trade on bilateral and aggregate levels.' ? The predictions of linear regressions
developed for this study (see Appendix C) proved to be within 5 percent of the
actual values reported by the Soviets for their exports to and imports from the nine
Western countries as a group.
117. As for trade with individual countries, estimates of USSR exports
obtained from West German, French, Japanese, and UK import data are in the
neighborhood of the actual values. The predictive power of the regression equations
29. These estimates are based on the discrepancies between Soviet and Western data computed on a bilateral
level (see the country sections of this paper).
30. The need for a method of estimating Soviet trade data has lessened, however. In 1976 the USSR began
reporting quarterly trade statistics, although there is no assurance that this will continue.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
for the remaining countries, however, is questionable-at least in 1974 and 1975.
Increased reexporting of Soviet goods by Western countries reporting only special
trade and the sharp rise in Soviet export prices largely account for the discrepancies.
As for Soviet imports, only the regression equations for the Netherlands and Canada
give poor predictions-the Netherlands because of its role as a reexporter and Canada
because of the broader definition of. reexports used by the USSR.
Comments and queries on this paper are welcome and may be directed
to the Special Assistant to the Director, Central Intelligence Agency,
Washington, D.C. 20505;
information on obtaining additional copies, see the inside of the front cover.
STAT
STAT
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
ALLOCATION OF SITC CATEGORIES
TO 1-DIGIT CTN CATEGORIES
The following concordance links all Standard International Trade Classification
(SITC) categories with the appropriate 1-digit categories of the Common Foreign
Trade Nomenclature (CTN) employed by the USSR and CEMA. The highest SITC
levels were used to ensure more complete coverage; subcategories do not always sum
to the value of the corresponding higher categories, particularly at 4- and 5-digit
SITC levels. Finally, CTN 6 and 7 were combined since the SITC classification
makes little distinction between live animals not for slaughter (CTN 6) and live
animals for slaughter (which are included in CTN 7).
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
CTN 1 Machinery, Equipment, and Transport Facilities
SITC Categories
2751 Industrial diamonds
6631 Grinding and polishing wheels and stones
6632 Abrasive cloths and papers and similar articles
6637 Refractory products other than refractory construction materials
6639 Articles of ceramic materials, n.e.s. (not elsewhere specified)
695 Tools for use in the hand or in machines
71 Machinery other than electric
722 Electric power machinery and switchgear
723 Equipment for distributing electricity
7249 Telecommunications equipment, n.e.s.
726 Electric apparatus for medical purposes and radiological apparatus
729 Other electrical machinery and apparatus
731 Railway vehicles
732 Road motor vehicles
7333 Trailers and other vehicles, not motorized, and their parts
734 Aircraft
735 Ships and boats
8124 Lighting fixtures and fittings, lamps and lanterns and parts thereof (not
including electrical parts)
8611 Optical elements
8613 Binoculars, microscopes, and other optical instruments
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
8617 Medical instruments, n.e.s.
8618 Meters and counters, nonelectric
8619 Measuring, controlling, and scientific instruments, n.e.s.
86412 Clocks with watch movements
86413 Watch movements, assembled
86414 Watch cases and parts thereof
8642 Clocks, clock movements and parts
9310 Special transactions not classified according to kind
9510 Firearms of war and ammunition therefor
CTN 2 Fuels, Mineral Raw Materials, and Metals
SITC Categories
241 Fuel, wood, and charcoal
2713 Natural phosphates, n.e.s., whether or not ground
2732 Gypsum, plasters, limestone flux, and calcareous stone used for the
manufacture of lime or cement
2733 Sand (excluding metal-bearing sand)
2734 Gravel and crushed stone (including tarred macadam)
274 Sulfur and unroasted iron pyrites
2752 Natural abrasives
276 Other crude minerals
28 Metalliferous ores and metal scrap
32 Coal, coke, and briquettes
33 Petroleum and petroleum products
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
34 Gas, natural and manufactured
35 Electric energy
5132 Chemical elements, n.e.s.
51365 Aluminum oxide and hydroxide
5997 Organic chemical products, n.e.s.
667 Pearls and precious and semiprecious stones, unworked or worked
67 Iron and steel
68 Nonferrous metals
692 Metal containers for storage and transport
693 Wire products (excluding electric) and fencing grills
694 Nails, screws, nuts, bolts, rivets, and similar articles of iron, steel, or
copper
6983 Chain and parts thereof of iron and steel
6984 Anchors, grapnels, and parts thereof of iron or steel
6986 Springs and leaves for springs of iron, steel, or copper
6988 Miscellaneous articles of base metal
6989 Articles of base metals, n.e.s.
89712 Goldsmiths' or silversmiths' wares of precious metal
89713 Laboratory and industrial articles of precious metal, etc.
CTN 3 Chemicals, Fertilizers, and Rubber
SITC Categories
23 Crude rubber (including synthetic and reclaimed)
2711 Natural fertilizers of animal or vegetable origin, not chemically treated
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
2712 Natural sodium nitrate
2714 Natural potassic salts, crude
512 Organic chemicals
5131 Oxygen, nitrogen, hydrogen, rare gases
5133 Inorganic acids and oxygen compounds of nonmetals or metalloids
5134 Halogen and sulfur compounds of nonmetals or of metalloids
5135 Metallic oxides, of kinds principally used in paints
51361 Ammonia, anhydrous or in aqueous solution
51362 Caustic soda (sodium hydroxide)
51363 Caustic potash; peroxides of potassium or sodium
51364 Oxides, hydroxides and peroxides of strontium, barium, or magnesium
51366 Artificial corundum
51367 Chromium oxides and hydroxides
51368 Tin oxides
51369 Other inorganic bases and metallic oxides, hydroxides and peroxides
514 Other inorganic chemicals
515 Radioactive and associated materials
52 Mineral tar and crude chemicals from coal, petroleum, and natural gas
53 Dyeing, tanning, and coloring materials
5542 Surface-acting agents and washing preparations
56 Fertilizers, manufactured
57 Explosives and pyrotechnics products
58 Plastic materials, regenerated cellulose, and artificial resins
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
5992 Insecticides, fungicides, disinfectants (including sheep and cattle dressing),
and similar preparations
5996 Wood and resin-based chemical products
5999 Chemical products and preparations, n.e.s.
62 Rubber manufactures, n.e.s.
862 Photographic and cinematographic supplies
CTN 4 Building Materials and Construction Parts
SITC Categories
2731 Building and monumental (dimension) stone, not further worked than
roughly split, squared, or squared by sawing
6314 "Improved" or reconstituted wood
6324 Builders' woodwork and prefabricated buildings of wood
6574 Linoleum and similar floor coverings
661 Lime, cement, and fabricated building materials, except glass and clay
materials
662 Clay construction materials and refractory construction materials
6634 Worked mica (including agglomerated mica splittings) and articles thereof
6635 Mineral insulating materials, n.e.s.
6636 Manufactures of mineral materials, n.e.s., other than ceramic
6638 Manufactures of asbestos; friction materials
664 Glass
691 Finished structural parts and structures, n.e.s.
8121 Central heating apparatus (central heating boilers (excluding
steam-generating boilers), radiators, etc.) and parts thereof
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
8122. Sinks, wash basins, bidets, baths, and other sanitary and plumbing fixtures
and fittings of ceramic materials
8123 Sinks, wash basins, bidets; baths, and other sanitary and plumbing fixtures
and fittings of iron or steel (whether or not enameled)
CTN 5 Raw Materials of Vegetable and Animal Origin
SITC Categories
08 Feeding-stuff for animals (not including unmilled cereals)
21 Hides, skins, and fur skins, undressed
22 Oil seeds, oil nuts, and oil kernels
242 Wood in the rough or roughly squared
243 Wood, shaped or simply worked
244 Cork, raw and waste
25 Pulp and waste paper
26 Textile fibers (not manufactured into yarn, thread or fabrics) and their
waste
29 Crude animal and vegetable materials, n.e.s.
43 Animal and vegetable oils and fats, processed, and waxes of animal or
vegetable origin
551 Essential oils, perfume, and flavor materials
5995 Starches, insulin, gluten; albumin n.e.s., substances; glues
61 Leather, leather manufactures, n.e.s., and dressed fur skins
6311 Veneer sheets
6312 Plywood (including veneered panels)
6318 Wood simply shaped or worked, n.e.s.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
6321 Boxes, cases, crates, complete, whether or not assembled
6322 Cooperage products (excluding staves falling within heading 631.8 (2))
6328 Manufactured articles of wood, n.e.s.
633 Cork manufactures
641 Paper and paperboard
6421 Paper bags, paperboard boxes, and other containers of paper or
paperboard
6429 Articles of paper pulp, paper or paperboard, n.e.s. (including paper and
paperboard cut to size)
6512 Yarn of wool and animal hair
6513 Cotton yarn and thread, grey (unbleached), not mercerized nor put up
for retail sale
6515 Yarn and thread of flax, ramie, and true hemp
6516 Yarn and thread of synthetic fibers
6517 Yarn and thread of regenerated (artificial) fibers
6518 Yarn of glass fiber
6519 Yarn of textile fibers, n.e.s. (including paper yarn)
655 Special textile fabrics and related products
6561 Bags and sacks of textile, awnings, sails, other made-up canvas goods
6562 Tarpaulins, tents, awnings, sails, other make-up canvas goods
CTN 6 Live Animals Not for Slaughter
CTN 7 Raw Materials for the Production of Foodstuffs
SITC Categories
001 Live animals
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
041 Wheat (including spelt) and meslin,.. unmilled
042 Rice
043 Barley,. unmilled
044 Maize (corn), unmilled
045 Cereals, unmilled, other than wheat, rice, barley, and maize
0611 Raw sugar, beet and cane (not including syrups)
0721 Cocoa beans, raw or roasted
0723 Cocoa butter and cocoa paste
075 Spices
091 Margarine and shortening
0615 Molasses
0619 Sugars and syrups, n.e.s. (including artificial honey and caramel)
121 Tobacco, unmanufactured
4111 Oils of fish and marine mammals
9410 Animals, n.e.s. (including zoo animals, dogs, and cats)
CTN 8 Foodstuffs
SITC Categories
01 Meat and meat preparations
02 Dairy products and eggs
03 Fish and fish preparations
046 Meal and flour of wheat or of meslin
047 Meal and flours of cereals, except meal and flour of wheat or of meslin
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08SO135OR000602080001-1
048 Cereal preparations and preparations of flour and starch of fruits and
vegetables
05 Fruit and vegetables
0612 Refined sugar and other products of refining beet and cane sugar (not
including syrups)
0616 Natural honey
062 Sugar confectionery and other sugar preparations (except chocolate
confectionery)
0722 Cocoa powder, unsweetened
073 Chocolate and other food preparations containing cocoa or chocolate,
n.e.s.
074 Tea and mate
099 Food preparations, n.e.s.
11 Beverages
122 Tobacco manufactures
4113 Animal oils, fats, and greases (excluding lard)
42 Fixed vegetable oils and fats
CTN 9 Industrial Consumer Goods
SITC Categories .
54 Medicinal and pharmaceutical products
553 Perfumery and cosmetics, dentifrices, and other toilet preparations (except
papers)
5541 Soaps
5543 Polishes, pastes, powder, and similar preparations for polishing and
preserving leather, wood, metal, glass, and other materials
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
6327 Manufactures of wood for domestic or decorative use (excluding
.furniture)
6422 Envelopes, writing blocks, letter pads, and similar paper stationery of the
kind used in correspondence, n.e.s.
6423 Exercise books, registers, albums, diaries, memorandum blocks, and other
stationery of paper or paperboard
6511 Thrown silk and other silk yarn and thread (including schappe and
bourette)
6514 Cotton yarn and thread, bleached, dyed, mercerized, etc.
652 Cotton fabrics, woven (not including narrow or special fabrics)
653 Textile fabrics, woven (not including narrow or special fabrics), other
than cotton fabrics
654 Tulle, lace, embroidery, ribbons, trimmings, and other small wares
6566 Blankets and traveling rugs
6569 Made-up articles of textile materials, n.e.s.
6575 Carpets, carpeting and rugs, knotted
6576 Other carpets, carpeting, and rugs
6577 Tapestries
6578 Mats, matting, screens, envelopes for bottles, etc. of vegetable plaiting
materials
665 Glassware
666 Pottery
696 Cutlery
697 Household equipment of base metals
6981 Locksmiths' wares
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
6982 Safes, strong rooms, strong room fittings, and strong boxes of base metal
6985 Pins and needles of iron or steel and base metal fittings of a kind
commonly used for articles of apparel, travel goods, etc.
7241 Television broadcast receivers, whether or not combined with gramophone
or radio
7242 Radio broadcast receivers, whether or not combined with gramophone
725 Domestic electrical equipment
7331 Bicycles and other cycles, not motorized, and their parts
7334 Invalid carriages, fitted with means of mechanical propulsion
82 Furniture
83 Travel goods, handbags, and similar articles
84 Clothing
85 Footwear
8612 Spectacles and spectacle frames
8614 Photographic cameras (other than cinematographic) and flashlight
apparatus
8615 Cinematographic cameras, projectors, sound recorders, and sound
reproducers
8616 Photographic and cinematographic apparatus and equipment, n.e.s.
863 Developed cinematographic film
86411 Pocket watches, wrist watches, and other watches
891 Musical instruments, sound recorders, and reproducers and parts and
accessories thereof
893 Articles of artificial plastic materials, n.e.s.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
894 Perambulators, toys, games, and sporting goods
895 Office and stationery supplies, n.e.s.
896 Works of art, collectors' pieces, and antiques
89711 Jewelery of precious metal
89714 Articles incorporating pearls or precious or semiprecious stones
8972 Imitation jewelery (jewelery not of precious or semiprecious material)
899 Manufactured articles, n.e.s.
9610 Coin (other than gold coin), not being legal tender
9110 Postal packages not classified according to kind
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
Linkage of.SITC Categories
with CTN Categories
The following concordance matches SITC categories with corresponding CTN
categories reported in the breakdown of USSR trade with the nine Western countries
and contained in Soviet foreign trade handbooks. (This conversion key, therefore,
does not cover all CTN categories.) Owing to the differences in the construction of
the SITC and CTN classification schemes, one SITC category may be linked to more
than one CTN category. Consequently, an exact concordance for all CTN codes is
impossible. Care was taken, however, to minimize the allocation of SITC categories
to more than one 1-digit CTN category. Categories under fuels, mineral raw
materials, and metals (CTN 2) and raw materials for the production of foodstuffs
(CTN 7) are less affected by the matching problem than those of machinery and
equipment (CTN 1) and chemicals, rubbers, and fertilizers (CTN 3).
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
CTN I Machinery, Equipment, and Trans
CTN SITC
port Facilities
CTN
SITC
100 7151
130
71931
101-103 7151, 7198
13006
71931
10119 7151
13007
71931
10325 7151
13012
71931
10327 7151
13013
71931
104 7151
13015
71931
10401 7151
13021
71931
10507
133
71931
10510 No SITC
13302
71931
10514
equivalence
13309
71931
1051701
1330905
71931
110 7111, 7112, 7113,
140
71831, 71839
7115,7116,7118
142
71912, 71915
11024 86193
143
7198
111 7117, 722, 7291,
144
7171
72991, 72992,
145
7173, 89957
72995, 72998
146
7172
11102 7221
150
71911,71923,7198
11120 72992
151
7181, 71952, 71961
11123 72992
152
7181, 71952, 71961
11129 7221
153
71911, 71923, 7198
11198 7221
15311
7198
11202 72996
154
71841, 71842, 7324
11203 72996
15401
71842
11301 7231
15408
71842
11308 7231
15498
71841
11324 7231
1549909
71842
120 71842
155
71921, 71922
121 71851
15501
71921
123 71521, 71522, 71913
15598
71921, 71922
12301 71521, 71913,
15602
71962, 71965
71914, 72992
157
71822, 71829
12303 71522
15826
7293
12304 7151
15903
71852
12305 71521
15904
71852
1230509 71521
15908
71852
127 7198
15909
71852
128 71842, 86191
15911
7198
12844 86191
15914
7198
13 7193
15920
7198
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
CTN SITC
15930 7141
15982 7142
1593205 7142
15940 7142
15941 7142
15948 7141
15950 71992
15970 8615
15970 8615
1599870 8615,86169
162032 7160
170, 171 (72951,72952,86134,
178,179 86181,86195,86196,
86197
172 66391, 7261, 7262,
7324, 86171, 86172
17301 7197
174 71953, 7296
17501 2751
177 51366,66311,6632
18002 7125
18091 71299
181 7121,7122,71239,
71299
18166 71299
19101 7323
19111 73289
1911753 7324
192 7353, 73591, 73592,
73593, 86191
193 7114, 7341, 73491,
73492
19501 7321
19501 7321
19503 7321
19506 73289
19510 7321
1959801 73289
19999 7333
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
CTN 2 Fuels, Mineral Raw Materials, and Metals
CTN SITC
20001, 20002 3214
21 331
22 2761, 3321, 3322, 3323,
3324, 3325, 3326, 33291,
33294, 33295, 33296, 59975
23001 341
23002 341
24001 2813
24002 2837
24003 2837
24004 28391
24216 51365
24901 27420, 2814
25001 2764
25005 27654
25006 2741
25013 2713
25201 28393
26001 6711, 6712
261 6714, 6715
26102 6715
26103 6715
26115 51324
26201 2820
264 6725, 6729, 6731, 6732,
6734, 67353, 6741, 6742,
6743, 6748, 675, 6793,
6761,7317
26403 6725
26407 6734
26408 67321
26411 67411
26416 7317
26423 67431
26432 67433
26504 6747
26508 6750
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
CTN SITC
266 678
26601 6782
26604 6783
26605 6782
26606 6784
26607 6782
268 1677,69311,69331,6932,
69411, 69421, 6983, 6984,
69861, 69882, 69861,
69887,69891
26813 69311
2700101
2700102 68211,68212
2700104
27002 68213
27004 6861
27005 6851
27006 6871
27008 6841
27010 6895
27012 68931
27013 6895
27101 2840
2710207 68224
27201 68221,68226
2720507 68423
27211 68321
27301 69312, 69313; 69332,
69333, 69342, 69343
2730103 69342
CTN 3 Chemicals, Fertilizers, and Rubber
CTN SITC
30 2412,51212,51214,51220,
51221, 51222, 51224, 51227,
51228, 51231, 5124, 5125,
51261, 5127, 5128, 5131,
51321, 51323, 5133, 5134,
5135, 51352, 51353, 51354,
51356,5136,5141,5142,5143,
51491, 51492, 51494, 51495,
51496, 51499, 5153, 5542, 58132,
58199, 59953, 59959, 5996, 59973,
59976, 59992, 59999
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
CTN
SITC
300
51321,51331,51333,51334
51335, 51336, 51337, 51339
30009
51337
30018
51251
30101
51362
30102
51428
30105
51363
30106
51429
302
5125,51364,51369,5141,
5142, 5143, 51496, 5153
30212
51429
30213
51412
30214
51425
30228
51435
30229
51435
30258
51435
303
33292, 33293, 5211, 5214
30302
5214
30303
5214
30310
51212
30315
51285
30316
33292
304
51274, 51287, 5812,
58132, 59959
30401
58132
30409
51285
30412
51274
30413
58132
30414
5812
3041407
51252
30421
5812
3042102
5812
3042107
5812
3042106
5812
30425
51227
30436
59959
30439
5812
30444
5812
30502
51221
30503
51222
30512
51223
306
5996
30601
59965
30604
59963
30606
59964
30613
51285
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
CTN
SITC
307
51213,51214.51227,51228,
51271,
51272,
51276,
51277,
51281,
51286,
51499
30702
51271
30724
51271
30747
51231
30763
51271
30801
51364
30805
51367
30826
51364
30828
51367
30903
59999
30919
51275
30932
59999
30942
59992
30945
51324
30971
51281
30974
5542
30978
59999
30980
59976
31
29194,
2921, 51327, 51355,
531, 532, 533
31001
53101
311
51213,51327,51351,51355,
5321, 5331, 5332, 53331,
53332, 53333,
53335
31101
53332
31107
51213
31109
53332
3110711
51213
3110713
51213
31109
53332
31112
51355,51351
341
2714, 5613
34101
2714, 5613
348
5992, 51493
34819
5992
35002
2312
3511001
6291
35201
6294
3599909
62998
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
CTN 4 Building Materials and Construction Parts
CTN SITC
40001 27699;6612
40101 6643
405 63302, 65742, 66181,
66182, 6634, 6635, 6649
41202 63142
41203 63142
404 27623, 6623, 6637
40525 5812
? CTN 5 Raw Materials of Vegetable and Animal Origin
CTN SITC
500 242, 2431
50001 2422
50002 2424
50004 2421
.50015 2431
501 2432, 2433
50101 24321
50201 6312
50205 63121
50501 2512
50502 2518
50501 2512
2518
50502 2517
50504 2519
506 6411, 6412, 6413, 6414, 6415, 64191
64192, 64193, 64195, 64197, 64294
50601 6411
50632 6413
5063204 6413
50636 64191
507 6415, 6417
50702 6415
50801 64211
50803 64191
50815 58131
51001 2631, 2633
51002 2632
51004 2651
51005 2651
51007 2652
51009 65151
5101301 2651
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
CTN
SITC
511
2621, 2622, 2623,
2626, 2627, 2629
51203
2612
51301
26621
51302
26621
51304
2664
51307
2633
5140104
65161
5140105
65121
51402
65161
52
212,613
5205001
212
53001
2111,2112,2119
53102
61191,61192,61193,
61194, 61195
53199
61199
55
2925, 29269
560
29198, 5511
563
2924
56301
29291
5632301
2924
57301
51226
59001
29192
59009
29193
59014
58191,59953
59101
62104
59102
64299
59209
65583
5923504
65583
CTN 6 Live Animals Not for Slaughter
CTN SITC
601 9410
60103 9610
6090102 9410
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
CTN SITC
700 041, 043, 044, 045
70001 041
70002 0451
70003 043
70005 044
71004 0015
72005 2218
72103 07232
72104 0741
72301 0619
72302 59951
72303 0615, 0619
72401 4111, 4312
72406 01189
726 121
72905 0482
72906 1124
72916 05483
CTN SITC
80001 011
80002 0114
80101 023
802020 0222
81005 0311
811 0312
813 03201
81302 03201
81501 03202
816 03201
81601 03201
81602 03201
818 0313, 03202
82001 04601
82102 0542
82104 0542
83205 0512
83210 0514
83302 05203
83502 05172
83804 0551
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
CTN SITC
931 85101
93905 85102
94 6651, 6652, 6664,
69606, 6972, 8930
941 6664
960-962 5163, 5414, 5417
967 5411
97 5714, 6291, 63273, 63289, 64193, 6422,
84001 0612
841 421,422
84109 4216
850 111,11212,1122,
1123, 1124
85001 1124
8510302 1222
CTN 9 Industrial Consumer Goods
CTN
SITC
900
652, 65546
901
6532
902
65311, 65351, 65353
903
65331
904
6575, 6576, 6577
90904
65352
91
6566, 65691, 8411, 8413,
84121, 84142, 84143,
84144,
84151, 84153, 84159,
842
910,913
84111,84112,84113
912
84159, 842
914
84143, 84144
91504
65691
916
84142
917
84151,84152,84153
91907
65661
922
69603, 6985, 72504,
89934
9220106
69603
923
8310
930
85102
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
97006
97011, 97046
97013
97014
97017
97015
97025
97027
97028
97042
97401-97404
97405
975
976
97801
98104
98105
98908
9899901
6423, 64293, 64299, 65405, 65406, 6562,
6652, 6951, 69523, 69604, 69711,
69712, 69721, 69811, 69812, 71712, 7173,
71931, 71941, 7198, 7222, 7241, 7242, 7249,
72501, 72502, 72503, 72505, 7292, 72999,
73291, 73292, 73311, 73312, 7334, 7335,
81242, 81243, 86122, 86131, 8614, 8615,
86161, 86169, 86301, 86309, 86411, 86429,
8911,8912,89141,89142,89181,89182,
89183, 89184, 89185, 89211, 89213,8923,
89293, 89299, 8941, 89422, 89423, 89424,
89431, 89441, 89442, 89601, 89914, 89921,
89922, 89997
71231, 7173, 7241, 7242, 725, 72501, 72502,
72503, 72505, 73291, 7331, 7334, 8614, 8615,
86161, 86411, 86429, 8911, 89185, 8941
73311
86411, 86412
8614
86161
7241
7242
7242
89111
8615
89111
89211,89213
89293
8912,89-14,8918
5714, 6562, 7355, 86122, 86131, 89424,
89431, 89441, 89442
63273,0-5405,65406,89421,89422,
89423, 89914, 89921, 89922
86309
27694
89917
89932
89935
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
Simple regression models were estimated for Soviet trade with the nine Western
countries by regressing Soviet data for 1960-75 on corresponding Western data.
Parameter estimates were obtained by ordinary least squares except where the
Durbin-Watson statistic indicated the presence of serial correlation. A first-order
autogressive scheme was assumed in these cases and generalized least squares was
then used to estimate the parameters.*
The sample regression lines fit the observed data quite well. The adjusted
coefficients of determination for all the equations were greater than 0.9 except for
Soviet exports to the Netherlands, which had a value of 0.84 (see tables for the
regression equations and the appropriate statistics).
The predictive power of the model was generally good. Forecast errors for
1974-75 were obtained by comparing forecasts of Soviet trade that were calculated
by regressing the equations over a shorter sample period (1960-73) with actual data.
Because of the sharp rise. in Soviet export prices, 1974 and 1975 cannot be
considered typical years, however. The increase in prices narrowed the gap between
Deviation of Forecast from Observed Values'
Soviet Exports
Soviet Imports
Total
-4.6
-1.5
-1.6
-0.8
United States
30.1
16.5
-7.6
2.2
Belgium-Luxembourg
-2.7
25.8
-3.8
-6.9
Canada
-37.5
-28.2
-53.8
-24.0
France
-4.5
-4.3
0.5
11.2
Italy
-13.1
-16.7
-4.9
2.4
Japan
-6.2
-0.6
11.0
-3.5
Netherlands
42.6
129.9
12.3
57.6
United Kingdom
-9.3
-3.7
2.0
-5.3
West Germany
-1.1
-5.2
-7.1
-4.2
1. (Forecast values - observed values) x 100
Observed values
* See J. Johnson, Econometric Methods, 2d edition, New York; McGraw Hill Book Company, 1963, pp. 208-213.
C-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
Soviet exports and Western imports, so forecast values generally tend to be on the
low side.
Although total Soviet exports and total Soviet imports can be projected fairly
well on the basis of Western data, the forecasts of bilateral trade are sometimes poor.
In these instances the changing relative importance of reexports and special
circumstances involving grain and oil are usually at fault-as explained in the country
sections, above.
Soviet Exports to the Nine Western Countries,
Western Imports
Yi= -190.39 + 1.00 Xi
(31.49) (0.01)
Adjusted R2 0.9980
Mean Square Error 4739.8028
Durbin-Watson Statistic 1.8688
Standard Error of the Estimate 73.5997
T Statistic -6.0468 86.0722
Soviet Exports-US Imports
Yi= 12.64 + 0.69X1
(3.84) (0.03)
Adjusted R2 0.9728
Mean Square Error 111.8901
Durbin-Watson Statistic 2.0414
Standard Error of the Estimate 11.3082
T Statistic 3.2949 23.1730
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
Soviet Exports-Belgium-Luxembourg Imports
A
Yi = 1.30 Xi
(0.05)
Adjusted R2
0.9611
Mean Square Error
482.7558
Durbin-Watson Statistic
1.5657
Standard Error of the Estimate
22.6923
T Statistic
28.4798
Soviet Exports-Canadian Imports
Yi=1.30X,
(0.097)
Adjusted R2
0.9065
Mean Square Error
13.6000
Durbin-Watson Statistic
2.1007
Standard Error of the Estimate
3.8088
T Statistic
13.3832
Autocorrelation Correction Parameter
0.5718
Soviet Exports-Italian Imports
Yi = -46.85 + 1.05 Xi
(9.76) (0.03)
Adjusted R2 0.9909
Mean Square Error 430.0155
Durbin-Watson Statistic 2.0118
Standard Error of the Estimate 22.1686
T Statistic -4.8001 40.4791
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08SO135OR000602080001-1
Soviet Exports-Dutch Imports
A
Yi = 1.83 Xi
(0.13)
Adjusted R2 0.8404
Mean Square Error 3271.6070
Durbin-Watson Statistic 1.1418
Standard Error of the Estimate 59.0738
T Statistic 13.8908
Soviet Exports-West German Imports
Y1 = -66.35 + 1.03 Xi
(13.63) (0.02)
Adjusted R2 0.9966
Mean Square Error 403.3513
Durbin-Watson Statistic 2.1150
Standard Error of the Estimate 21.4703
T Statistic -4.8675 50.9434
Autocorrelation Correction Parameter 0.6103
Soviet Exports-French Imports
Yi =-27.84+0.93X1
(5.63) (0.01)
Adjusted R2 0.9977
Mean Square Error 63.1005
Durbin-Watson Statistic 2.0265
Standard Error of the Estimate 8.4920
T Statistic -4.9467 62.0188
Autocorrelation Correction Parameter 0.5749
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
Soviet Exports-Japanese Imports
Y1 = 0.81X1
(0.008)
Adjusted R2 ?0.9964
Mean Square Error 361.3969
Durbin-Watson Statistic 2.7312
Standard Error of the Estimate 19.6339
T Statistic 103.1318
Soviet Exports-UK Imports
Y1= 0.92X1
(0.01)
Adjusted R2 0.9869
Mean Square Error 613.7556
Durbin-Waston Statistic 1.7397
Standard Error of the Estimate 25.5866
T Statistic 72.9887
Soviet Imports from the Nine Western Countries
Western Exports
yi=67.83+1.05X1
(22.13) (0.005)
Adjusted R2 0.9997
Mean Square Error 1744.3965
Durbin-Watson Statistic 1.8699
Standard Error of the Estimate 44.6497
T Statistic 3.0655 191.2831
Autocorrelation Correction Parameter 0.4354
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
Soviet Imports-US Exports
Y1= 1.12X1
(0.01)
Adjusted R2 0.9975
Mean Square Error 781.9708
Durbin-Watson Statistic 1.6664
Standard Error of the Estimate 28.8808
T Statistic 91.5458
Soviet Imports-Dutch Exports
Y1 = 18.00 + 1.08X1
(6.75) (0.09)
Adjusted R2
Mean Square Error
Durbin-Watson Statistic
Standard Error of the Estimate
T Statistic
0.9141
288.7771
1.5120
18.1668
2.6656 12.6730
Soviet Imports-West German Exports
Y1 = 0.96X1
(0.01)
Adjusted R2 0.9974
Mean Square Error 1294.1192
Durbin-Watson Statistic 2.6856
Standard Error of the Estimate 37.1537
T Statistic 97.2505
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
Soviet Imports-French Exports
Y1 =42.76+0.97X1
(10.94) (0.03)
Adjusted R2 0.9882
Mean Square Error 821.5682
Durbin-Watson Statistic 1.2486
Standard Error of the Estimate 30.6420
T Statistic 3.9072 35.4598
Soviet Exports-Belgian-Luxembourg Exports
Y1= 1.17 Xi
(0.02)
Adjusted R2
0.9964
Mean Square Error
58.2631
Durbin-Watson Statistic
1.1497
Standard Error of the Estimate
7.8834
T Statistic
62.5559
Autocorrelation Correction Parameter
0.7806
Soviet Imports-Canadian Exports
A
Yl = 1.28 X!
(0.05)
Adjusted R2
0.9443
Mean Square Error
1379.1368
Durbin-Watson Statistic
1.2025
Standard Error of the Estimate
38.3547
T Statistic
25.8821
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1
Soviet Imports-Italian Exports
Y1= 1.09 X.
(0.01)
Adjusted R2
0.9955
Mean Square Error
311.0735
Durbin-Watson Statistic
1.4659
Standard Error of the Estimate
18.2157
T Statistic
84.6708
Soviet Imports-Japanese Exports
Yl = 1.03 }{~
(0.02)
Adjusted R2
0.9940
Mean Square Error
1045.6380
Durbin-Watson Statistic
2.6361
Standard Error of the Estimate
33.3968
T Statistic
68.1751
Soviet Imports-UK Exports
y1 1.07x1
(0.02)
Adjusted R2
0.9818
Mean Square Error
170.4983
Durbin-Watson Statistic
1.2186
Standard Error of the Estimate
13.4857
T Statistic
67.8946
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP08S01350R000602080001-1