COMMUNIST AID TO LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES OF THE FREE WORLD, 1975

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP08S01350R000602020001-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 38
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 10, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 1, 1976
• Content Type: REPORT

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Communist Aid to Less Developed Countries
of the Free World, 1975
ER 76-10372U
July 1976
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In this report the term Communist countries refers to the USSR, the People's
Republic of China, and the following countries of Eastern Europe - Bulgaria,
Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Romania.
The term less developed countries of the Free World includes the following:
(1). all countries of Africa except the Republic of South Africa;
(2) all countries of East Asia except Hong Kong and Japan;
(3) Malta, Greece, Portugal, and Spain in Europe;
(4) all countries in Latin America except Cuba; and
(5) all countries in the Near East and South Asia.
The term extension refers to a commitment to provide goods and services
either on deferred payment terms (five or more years with maximum 8% interest)
or as grants. Assistance is considered to have been extended when accords are
initialed and constitute a formal declaration of intent. The term drawings refers
to the delivery of goods or the use of services. Estimates of the value of Communist
military agreements and deliveries are in Soviet trade prices.
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The Military Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Arab States Still Moscow's Prime Customers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
USSR Upgrades Inventories of Border States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Stepped-Up Arms Supplies to Southern Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Military Technicians in LDCs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Military Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Soviet Aid-Broader Agreements with Old Clients . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
East European Aid: Limited in Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
China: An African Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
The Communist Technical Presence Rose . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Academic Training: Investment in the Future . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Appendixes
A. Country Sections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
B. Statistical Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
1. Communist Military Agreements with and Deliveries
to Less Developed Countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
2. Communist Military Technicians in the Less Developed
Countries, 1975 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Military Personnel from the Less Developed Countries Being Trained
in Communist Countries, as of December 1975 . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. Communist Economic Aid to Less Developed Countries, Extensions
and Drawings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
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5. Communist Economic'Technicians in Less Developed Countries . . . . . . 8
6. Academic Students from Selected Less Developed Countries Being Trained
in Communist Countries, as of December 1975 . . . . . . . . . . . 10
7. Military Personnel from the Less Developed Countries Trained
in Communist Countries, 1955-75 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
8. Communist Economic Credits and Grants Extended to Less Developed
Countries, 1954-75 and Years 1974 and 1975 . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
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Communist Aid to Less
Developed Countries
of the Free World
1975
Soviet military assistance dominated Communist relations with the LDCs in
1975. Arms aid was especially important in supporting Moscow's political objectives
in the Middle East and the African countries of Angola and Somalia. Communist
economic programs meanwhile continued as a low-key effort. Highlights of the
Communist military and economic programs were:
? A cutoff of major Soviet military deliveries to Egypt at midyear.
? A heavy infusion of Soviet military support for the Marxist faction in
the Angolan struggle.
? A signing of large new Soviet economic and military accords with Somalia.
? A large increase in Soviet economic aid commitments to the border
countries of Afghanistan and Turkey (see Appendix A). These two
received more than 85% of 1975 Soviet commitments. Moscow also signed
its largest military agreement ever with Afghanistan.
? A sharp rise in the number of Communist technicians in LDCs. About
a 20% larger contingent of military advisors followed new equipment
into areas where Soviet interest was high, especially Syria, Libya,
Mozambique, and Uganda. The number of economic technicians increased
more than 15%, mostly in North Africa and the Near East.
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1. Communist countries signed arms accords totaling $925 million with the
Third World in 1975 and delivered $1.5 billion worth of equipment (see Table 1).
Table 1
Communist Military Agreements with and Deliveries to Less Developed Countries
Million US $
Total
USSR
Eastern Europe
China
Agree-
ments
Deliv-
eries
Agree-
ments
Deliv-
eries
Agree-
ments
Deliv-
eries
Agree-
ments
Deliv-
eries
Total
16,600
14,375
14,350
12,475
1,675
1,375
575
525
1955-65
4,750
3,675
4,025
3,075
625
575
100
25
1966-75
11,850
10,700
10,325
9,400
1,050
800
475
500
1966
525
625
450
500
25
50
50
75
1967
675
550
525
500
100
25
50
25
1968
575
600
500
500
50
75
25
25
1969
450
525
350
450
100
50
Negl.
25
1970
1,150
1,100
1,025
1,000
50
75
75
25
1971
1,625
1,000
1,450
850
100
75
75
75
1972
1,150
925
925
800
150
50
75
75
1973
2,025
2,225
1,900
2,075
100
75
25
75
1974
2,750
1,600
2,475
1,450
200
125
75
25
1975
925
1,550
725
1,275
175
200
25
75
Deliveries were less than the emergency assistance of 1973 and 1974 in the
aftermath of the Arab-Israeli war but still were a peacetime record. Soviet arms
agreements again accounted for about 80% of Communist arms supplied LDCs,
with Eastern Europe providing small amounts of support equipment to Soviet clients
and China's military aid continuing as a marginal program.
2. Although 1975 Communist agreements were less than 10% of global
military sales to the Third World, Communist arms deliveries accounted for 22%
of the total delivered. The small Communist share in military sales reflects the
continuing large orders the West has received from Persian Gulf countries as well
as the drop in Communist orders from the record 1973-74 levels. On the other
hand, Communist deliveries were a larger share of total deliveries to LDCs because
the Soviets were able to fill orders mainly from inventories while new Western
orders are taking years to produce and deliver.
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3. Moscow still concentrates its military program in the strategic Middle
Eastern area. In 1975 Moscow also used its military program to promote political
and military objectives elsewhere. It provided arms to Angola, Mozambique, and
Somalia in Africa and continued to strengthen the armies of the LDC border states,
such as India and Afghanistan. Moscow's efforts were not always successful,
however. Its attempt to force Egypt to resolve outstanding difference by denying
spare parts and other essential military items backfired.
4. Most Soviet military sales to the LDCs were in the Near East, where
about two-thirds of Soviet military technicians continued to be stationed. Deliveries
to the area also remained high, reaching a peacetime peak despite reduced deliveries
to Iraq and Syria, which dropped from record 1973-74 levels. They reflected a
winding down of the Near East crisis and the need to assimilate the advanced
hardware already received. Large deliveries to Libya are resulting in a buildup of
modem equipment that is giving Tripoli arsenal status among Arab belligerants.
5. Moscow's withholding of arms supplies as a weapon in its debt
negotiations with Cairo contributed to the deterioration of Soviet-Egyptian
relations. Moscow lost its largest arms customer in the Third World as Cairo shopped
for alternative supply sources and early in 1976 abrogated its Friendship Treaty
with the USSR.
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USSR Upgrades Inventories of Border States
6. Moscow reaffirmed its support for its Asian neighbors in 1975, with
agreements to modernize Afghanistan's armed services and to provide India with
a continuing stream of sophisticated equipment. The USSR continues as
Afghanistan's major supplier of military goods and India continues to be almost
entirely dependent on the USSR for military equipment.
Stepped-Up Arms Supplies to Southern Africa
7. Turmoil in sub-Saharan Africa provided opportunities for Soviet arms
support. The Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola received Soviet
military supplies and military advisers, accompanied by Cuban equipment and
personnel.
8. Elsewhere in Africa, Moscow focused on clients that have offered
facilities for Soviet military forces, especially Somalia and Guinea. Somalia's
willingness to provide military facilities to the USSR led to heavy Soviet support,
and Moscow has developed the port at Berbera for Soviet and Somali use. Guinea,
which has provided air and naval facilities for Soviet reconnaissance units and a
stopover point for the Angolan airlift, received additional military equipment.
Military Technicians in LDCs
9. The number of Communist military advisors and technicians in LDCs
increased about 20% to 9,300 in 1975 (see Table 2). Advisors followed new
equipment into Communist-supplied areas and were concentrated in the countries
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Communist Military Technicians'
in the Less Developed Countries, 1975
Total
USSR and
Eastern Europe
China
Total
9,300
8,090
1,210
Africa
3,745
2,605
1,140
Latin America
35
35
Near East and South
Asia
5,520
5,450
70
1. Rounded to the nearest five persons. Data are minimum estimates of the number of persons present
for a period of one month or more. Persons engaged solely in commercial activities are excluded.
where Soviet military activity was high. Syria received the largest share of the
increase. Iraq, Somalia, Algeria, and Afghanistan (in that order) employed almost
a third. Somalia had 1,000 technicians in residence, the same number as in 1974.
Most of China's 1,200 technicians abroad were in Tanzania, the second largest
recipient of Chinese military aid.
Military Training
10. LDC personnel receiving military training in Communist countries rose
almost 30% in 1975. Most of the 4,400 trainees were in the USSR (see Table 3*).
Military Personnel from the Less Developed Countries
Being Trained in Communist Countries, as of December 1975
Total'
USSR'
Eastern Europe'
China'
Total
4,400
3,575
200
625
Africa
3,025
2,325
100
600
Latin America
50
50
....
Near East and South
Asia
1,325
1,200
100
25
1. Rounded to the nearest five persons. Data refer to the number of persons departing for or in training but
not necessarily completing training.
* For further details on military training, see Appendix B, Table 7.
4
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Libya, Somalia, Tanzania, and a number of African countries that have received
small amounts of Soviet aid were responsible for most of the increase.
11. Communist economic aid to LDCs has remained approximately constant
since 1971. Commitments in 1975 amounted to almost $1.9 billion with Moscow's
share unusually high because of sizable credits to Afghanistan and Turkey (see
Table 4*). China's contribution was well below that of the early 1970s, and East
European commitments reached a new low. Aid deliveries of about $680 million
in 1975 dropped below the yearly shipments since 1971, mainly because of the
sharp decline in China's outlays as its major project - the Tan-Zam Railroad -
was virtually completed in 1975.
Table 4
Communist Economic Aid to Less Developed Countries, Extensions and Drawings
Million US $
Eastern
Total USSR Europe China
Ex-
tended
Drawn
Ex-
tended
Drawn
Ex-
tended
Drawn
Ex-
tended
Drawn
Total
20,529
9,282
10,859
5,900
5,830
1,722
3,840
1,660
1954-65
6,295
2,657
3,833
1,915
1,719
487
743
255
1966-75
14,234
6,625
7,026
3,985
4,111
1,235
3,097
1,405
1966
1,699
500
1,241
335
294
75
164
90
1967
473
520
291
305
132
115
50
100
1968
638
495
379
305
205
120
54
70
1969
933
520
494
350
426
100
13
70
1970
1,101
570
198
375
175
125
728
70
1971
2,171
770
1,125
430
484
150
562
190
1972
2,188
735
802
370
828
110
558
255
1973
1,569
805
657
435
484
140
428
230
1974
1,610
1,030
575
665
764
145
271
220
1975
1,852
680
1,264
415
319
155
269
110
12. Communist economic aid, which has never bulked large in the global
aid picture, contributed less than 10% of all official aid agreements with LDCs
in 1975 and only 2%-3% of global aid deliveries. Communist aid shipments lag
commitments by a much longer time than do those of the West, in part because
* For further details on individual economic agreements, see Appendix B, Table 8.
5
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the Communists provide a higher share of project aid in contrast to greater Western
emphasis on balance-of-payments assistance.
13. When aid repayments by LDCs are included, the Communist share of
net global aid is less than 2%. For some recipients, there was actually a net outflow
of goods in 1975 as repayments topped new aid receipts.
14. Iran offered Moscow its first credits from the Third World to finance
a paper plant in the USSR. East European nations, which had received commercial
loans from OPEC countries before, also accepted project credits from the LDCs
for the first time as Bulgaria and Poland received commitments from Iran.
15. In 1975, Mexico and Iraq signed general agreements with CEMA, its first
with countries of the Third World.
Soviet Aid - Broader Agreements with Old Clients
16. Some Soviet economic aid patterns that have emerged in recent years
became clearer in 1975. The USSR provided larger individual credits, and broad
agreements-were signed with Turkey and Cyprus that are similar to the "framework"
agreements concluded with Argentina and Indonesia in 1974.
17. These give Moscow greater flexibility in implementing project proposals.
Follow-on negotiations will be required to set credit terms for each project or
elements thereof under these open-ended credits. The result will likely be a mix
of terms, including commercial-like trade credits as well as aid loans with repayment
periods exceeding 10 years and interest rates of 2-1/2%-3%. These more flexible
agreements appear to be a compromise between the concessional umbrella credits
common during the 1950s and early 1960s and the well-defined allocations with
harder terms often used since then.
18. More than 80% of the $1.3 billion in 1975 Soviet pledges went to two
already large clients - $437 million to Afghanistan and $650 million to Turkey.
These credits were the largest Moscow had ever extended to LDCs.
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19. Continuing its emphasis on expensive, eye-catching heavy industrial public
sector projects, Moscow's new assistance to Turkey included expansion of
Soviet-built steel and aluminum plants. In Afghanistan, where Soviet development
aid is pervasive, the new assistance includes 20 major projects in agriculture,
irrigation, electric power, natural gas and petroleum development, mineral and metal
processing, and transportation.
20. Somalia, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh also received Soviet aid in 1975.
Sri Lanka's $57 million credit will assist hydropower development, and Bangladesh's
$46 million credit will be used for additional commodity assistance and several
new industrial projects. Somalia, a continuing major Soviet target, received its largest
commitment ($62 million) from Moscow, of which $60 million went toward port
and fisheries development.
East European Aid: Limited in Scope
21. East European donors reduced their aid commitments in 1975. The $319
million of East European aid was less than half the 1974 level because of large
reductions in the amounts provided Latin America and the Near East. Almost a
third of the aid went to Africa for expanding commercial ties with Algeria and
Tunisia. Romania remained the largest donor despite a 50% cut in aid, accounting
for 54% of the East European total. Bucharest's aid included a $150 million credit
to the steel industry in Brazil and the first Communist credit to the Philippines
($30 million for a powerplant).
China: An African Program
22. Chinese commitments of $270 million dropped below the
unprecedentedly high levels of the early seventies, when China mounted its new
aid offensive, but it demonstrated China's continuing effort to project itself as
a stable source of cheap development financing for poor countries.
23. The Chinese program again emphasized Africa, where Peking has become
a source of well-organized aid projects for poorer countries. About 55% of China's
1975 commitments went to Africa. Nepal, a longstanding client, received most
of Peking's non-African aid to extend a road system.
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Implementation
24. Aid deliveries dropped almost a third in 1975 because (a) the huge 1974
Soviet emergency wheat shipments to India were not repeated and (b) China's
major project - the Tan-Zam Railroad - was completed. Soviet deliveries were
highly concentrated, with more than half for major industrial plants under way
in Egypt, Iran, and Turkey and for oilfield and pipeline construction in Iraq. These
projects employed almost 40% of the nearly 18,000 Soviet technicians in LDCs.
Egypt received the largest deliveries despite political strains from their military
supply relationship. East European deliveries remained at about the level of the
past two years and again were concentrated in the Near East and South Asia,
with Egypt, India, and Syria receiving the largest amounts.
25. Communist economic technicians in the Third World rose by a fourth,
bringing the total number to 55,290 (see Table 5). The East European contingent,
Communist Economic Technicians in Less Developed Countries'
Total
24,010
35,050
39,295
43,960
47,355
55,290
China total2
8,110
18,600
22,165
23,540
22,945
23,590
Africa
6,960
17,200
20,275
22,010
20,675
21,325
East Asia
150
....
30
40
75
35
Europe
....
....
....
....
1203
703
Latin America
....
....
30
50
75
70
Near East and South
Asia4
1,000
1,400
1,830
1,440
2,000
2,090
USSR total
10,600
11,025
11,200
13,095
14,685
17,785
Africa
4,010
4,200
3,760
4,590
6,000
5,930
East Asia
100
150
25
25
10
25
Latin America
35
75
190
185
300
330
Near East and South
Asia
6,455
6,600
7,225
8,295
8,375
11,500
Eastern Europe total
5,300
5,425
5,930
7,325
9,725
13,915
Africa
3,150
3,300
3,805
5,075
7,450
10,290
East Asia
60
75
20
10
25
30
Latin America
140
150
130
165
175
225
Near East and South
Asia
1,950
1,900
1,975
2,075
2,075
3,370
1. Minimum estimates of persons present for a period of one month or more.
2. Including laborers in some countries, especially Tanzania, Zambia, and Somalia.
3. Malta.
4. Excluding the large number of Chinese personnel reported working on the Karakoram Highway in Pakistan.
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up by 4,190 in 1975, saw the largest increase. Soviet and East European technicians
were concentrated in Algeria, Libya, Morocco, Egypt, India, Iran, Iraq, and Syria.
The largest East European group was in Libya, working under commercial contracts.
26. Moscow expanded its program in 1975 by 3,100 technicians, mostly in
Iran and Iraq. Tehran now hosts the largest number of Soviet technicians.
27. China increased its already huge technical force to 23,590. They surpassed
both the Soviet and the East European teams, which together totaled 31,700. Some
90% of the Chinese were working in Africa on major projects such as the Tan-Zam
Railroad and road construction in Somalia and Sudan.
28. The Chinese provide technical services without charge, equivalent to more
than a $100 million grant in 1975. The USSR usually allows LDCs to defer payment
of project technicians' salaries, although LDCs must pay cash for administrative
services.
Academic Training: Investment in the Future
29. LDC students resident in Communist educational establishments rose to
27,275 in 1975 (see Table 6). The USSR still hosted about two-thirds of the LDC
students. Acedemic training has provided entree to some countries that have refused
other forms of cooperation with the Communist world. Spanning two decades,
the program has reached more than 72,000 Third World students and has cost
Communist countries only $70 million a year. Graduates of Communist universities
are beginning to move into influential positions in their home countries, especially
in Africa.
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Academic Students from Selected Less Developed Countries
Being Trained in Communist Countries, as of December 1975
Total
27,275
Zambia
295
Africa
14,895
Other
615
Algeria
1,750
East Asia
335
Angola
300
Indonesia
50
Botswana
25
Laos
190
Burundi
145
Other
95
Cameroon
180
Latin America
2,940
Central African
Bolivia
240
Republic
305
Brazil
140
Chad
190
Chile
245
Congo
885
Colombia
460
Dahomey
115
Costa Rica
320
Equatorial
Ecuador
385
Guinea
85
El Salvador
165
Ethiopia
920
Guatemala
25
Gambia
55
Mexico
35
Ghana
315
Nicaragua
60
Guinea
365
Peru
190
Ivory Coast
30
Venezuela
60
Kenya
Malagasy
300
Other
Near East and South
675
Republic
425
Asia
9,105
Mali
585
Afghanistan
895
Mauritania
185
Bangladesh
1,105
Mauritius
180
Cyprus
990
Morocco
270
Egypt
815
Nigeria
1,140
India
545
Rwanda
245
Iraq
650
Senegal
215
Jordan
650
Sierra Leone
415
Lebanon
465
Somalia
600
Nepal
100
Sudan
1,575
North Yemen
410
Tanzania
655
Pakistan
180
Togo
150
South Yemen
470
Tunisia
350
Sri Lanka
175
Uganda
290
Syria
1,125
Upper Volta
215
Other
530
Zaire
525
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Algeria
While no new movement was perceptible in Algeria's longstanding economic
ties with the USSR, Algeria has been expanding its relations with Eastern Europe.
In 1975 East European countries committed nearly $70 million in new aid, and
for the first time their technicians outnumbered the Soviet contingent (3,100
compared with 2,500).
Hungary's $70 million November credit for industrial equipment underlined
Algeria's continuing success in attracting East European development financing. The
new aid brings Eastern Europe's total commitment to $414 million.
East European nations had responded quickly to Algeria's requests for aid
for its first four-year plan (1970-73), and after 1970 Algeria became the second
largest East European aid client. Credit use is expected to accelerate under recent
contracts. Most important is a contract signed in June 1975 for Czech and East
German collaboration on a $57 million pump manufacturing plant at Medea.
Rapidly rising trade with Eastern Europe provides Algeria with needed
industrial equipment and services at moderate prices. For Eastern Europe, Algeria
is an important market and a source of oil and phosphates. By 1974, trade had
risen more than six times the 1970 level, to an estimated $215 million, and it
continued upward in 1975.
Moscow's most important contribution to Algerian development is $300
million in credits for a 2-million-ton steel mill at Annaba, which on completion
will be the largest in Africa. The plant now is operating near its initial capacity
of 400,000 tons annually. Plagued by continuing construction delays, its expansion
is running several years behind the 1977 scheduled completion date. Soviet
personnel still are conducting extensive minerals and metals prospecting that began
in 1969 and have drawn up long-term plans for petroleum development.
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Algerian-Soviet trade increased about 75% between 1970 and 1974 to $225
million. Imports have outrun exports because of the sharp rise in Soviet commodity
prices while Algerian wine prices rose marginally. Machinery and equipment have
accounted for one-fourth of Algerian imports while cement, building materials,
edible oils, steel, coal, and other raw materials also were important. Wine accounted
for 90% of Algeria's exports to the USSR.
The Kindia bauxite mine - Moscow's major aid undertaking in Guinea -
approached its annual capacity production rate of 2.5 to 3 million metric tons
by the end of 1975. The project was initiated in 1970 with $92 million in Soviet
aid. About 90% of the output is shipped to the USSR, 55% for repayment of
Guinea's debt and 35% on barter account. Guinea has demanded renegotiation of
the 20-year 1970 agreement, hoping Moscow will raise the price it pays for bauxite,
which has been about $10 a ton below the market price.
Libya
USSR - Focus on Military Sales
Libya views its large modem arsenal of Soviet equipment as a prestige symbol
and as a possible warehouse for equipment needed by other Arab nations. Moscow
has delivered T-62 tanks, SA-2 missiles, and TU-22 bombers. Soviet Premier
Kosygin's May visit to Tripoli underscores the importance Moscow attaches to this
relationship.
Outside the military program, the most important development was a June
agreement for a Soviet 2-megawatt (MW) nuclear reactor and a nuclear research
center in Tripoli.
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East European Countries Still Major Contractors
East European countries are more deeply involved than Moscow in Libyan
development projects, on a commercial basis. Under the auspices of recently formed
joint economic commissions for planning and development, East European countries
concluded large new contracts in 1975. Hungary and Romania agreed to study
the feasibility of three major rail lines, to assist in oil exploration, and to aid
in the construction of refineries and petrochemical and fertilizer plants. Poland
will assist with several new roads and water resources development.
An estimated 5,000 East Europeans were employed in virtually all sectors
of the Libyan economy, under commercial contracts. Poland was most active with
3,000 technicians working on road and bridge construction, urban development,
port modernization, agriculture, and geological exploration. Romania's largest
project, a housing complex, depended on the services of more than a thousand
Romanian technicians.
Libya pays for these goods and services in cash or oil. Barter agreements to
exchange petroleum for goods and services were signed with Bulgaria, Hungary,
Poland, and Romania in 1974.
Rabat, irritated by Soviet support for Algeria in the western Saharan dispute,
stalled decisions in 1975 on new long-term Soviet economic programs in Morocco.
Existing economic relationships with the USSR continued, and relations with most
East European countries remained cordial.
Economic Relations: Setbacks for Moscow
By October, Soviet-Moroccan relations had undergone a severe deterioration
as the Moroccans felt the Soviets were supporting Algeria's position on the Sahara
question. The agreement on phosphate development at Meskala was not signed.
The draft on Meskala called for Soviet financing and construction of a
phosphate mine, processing facilities, and a 20-mile railroad to the port of Essouira.
Moscow also was to install phosphate handling equipment at the port. In return,
the USSR was to receive 2-5 million tons of phosphate rock a year during 1980-90
and 10 million tons annually over the next 15-20 years. The phosphate deal could
reach $5 billion and is the largest the USSR has ever proposed to a Third World
country.
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The Meskala project was to be the linchpin of Soviet economic policy in
Morocco. Until now Soviet economic activity had focused on implementation of
$100 million in Soviet credits provided during the past ten years. Moscow already
has constructed dams, irrigation facilities, cold storage plants, and powerplants.
In spite of political frictions, commercial relations proceeded normally.
Moscow agreed in December 1975 to increase its 1976 oil exports to Morocco
in exchange for citrus fruit.
Eastern Europe
During 1975, more than 500 East European technical personnel, mostly
Bulgarians and Romanians, were working in Morocco. Poland made its first deliveries
under an agreement to provide two sulfuric acid plants, while Romania was involved
in mineral and metal prospecting, copper mine development, and water resources
management. Early in the year, Bulgaria signed an agricultural agreement with
Morocco, but its terms were not revealed.
Mozambique
The major Communist aid commitment to Mozambique was a $55 million
Chinese credit for development projects and $4 million worth of wheat as a gift.
East Germany agreed to send technicians to train Mozambicans in agriculture,
animal husbandry, industry, education, and health. In December, Bulgaria signed
an agreement for cooperation in geology and mining.
Nigeria
Communist China, under a technical assistance program begun in 1974,
completed a three-month survey of small-scale industry in Nigeria. By the end of
the year a 22-man team was training Nigerians in metal, wood, and leather
fabrication. The terms of Chinese involvement in these enterprises have not been
disclosed.
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Somalia's strategic Red Sea location and political orientation have made it
a focal point of Soviet affairs in Africa. In 1975, Moscow took further steps to
tie Somalia's fortunes even closer to its own. The USSR provided Somalia the
largest economic aid package it had given sub-Saharan Africa since the late 1960s,
and the two countries signed a new arms accord. In return for port facilities and
the pervasive Soviet presence in its military establishment, Somalia has received
support to build one of the largest military inventories in Africa.
The number of Soviet advisers remained at about 1,000 and were spread
through all levels of the military. The number is expected to grow with additions
to Soviet facilities at Berbera.
The USSR in 1975 provided $62 million in economic assistance to Somalia,
which included $14 million in grant aid for refugee resettlement. Most of the
remaining aid is for developing Somalia's fishing industry.
About 1,000 Soviet personnel worked on ongoing aid projects and refugee
resettlement in 1975. Construction continued, though far behind schedule, at the
USSR's largest project - the Giuba River Dam and associated hydropower and
agricultural facilities.
China has implemented its somewhat smaller program in Somalia far more
rapidly than the USSR. Chinese technicians completed a hospital and began
construction of a sports complex in Mogadiscio and continued to work on the
Belet Uen-Burao road.
China and Romania have the most active Communist aid programs in Sudan.
In 1975, work neared completion on China's major aid undertakings - the 145-mile
Wad Medani-Gedaref road and a textile plant, which together have absorbed almost
half of China's $82 million aid program in Sudan. Romania pushed ahead with
construction of an assembly hall under a 1971 line of credit. The USSR concluded
two small agreements with Sudan in 1975 as relations slowly recovered from the
events of June 1971, when Moscow was suspected of complicity in the attempted
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Communist takeover. A small military agreement negotiated in 1975 still awaited
Sudanese ratification at the end of the year. Moscow also agreed to build a military
hospital and to extend the activities of a 25-man Soviet team conducting geological
surveys in the Red Sea hills.
China and Romania are Sudan's major Communist trading partners. This trade
accounts for about 10% of Sudan's global trade. Khartoum signed agreements with
East Germany, Poland, and Romania in 1975 calling for hard currency settlements
instead of previous barter arrangements.
The first shipment of Zambian copper transited Tanzania in September over
the Chinese-built Tan-Zam Railroad. Although the line is not scheduled for full
commercial operations until late 1976, the event marked the successful completion
of China's largest construction project in the Third World. China is now turning
to developing an iron ore mine and coal deposits, which will be made accessible
by a new rail link with the Tan-Zam Railroad. Under a $75 million 1974 credit,
Peking will pursue these activities and also expand a clothing mill built originally
with Chinese aid.
16
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Despite the military takeover that brought a leftist government to power late
in 1974, Communist relations with Ethiopia did not change appreciably during
1975. An Ethiopian delegation that visited East European countries to seek
development assistance received only assurances of political support. Soviet
initiatives were confined largely to donations of $600,000 for drought relief and
$100,000 worth of equipment for the Soviet-built polytechnic institute at Bahr
Dar.
Gambia received its first economic aid from a Communist country in 1975,
a $17 million credit from China. The credit, following establishment of diplomatic
relations in late 1974, probably will finance agricultural development.
The Soviets made their first major effort to reestablish economic cooperation
with Ghana since the overthrow of the Nkrumah regime in 1966. Soviet. specialists
resumed work on several Soviet-aided plants whose construction was suspended
in 1966, including a concrete panel factory.
China pledged $17 million to Guinea-Bissau for agricultural equipment and
rice cultivation. Peking also donated 2,000 tons of rice to the new government.
The USSR provided a $500,000 refrigerated fishing trawler as a gift in June and
reportedly will deliver four additional trawlers.
China stepped up aid to Malagasy in 1975 with $55 million in new credits,
which bring China's total aid to $66 million. They will go for roads, agricultural
development, and light industrial plants.
The USSR promised technical assistance for a merchant marine academy,
mining surveys, and a cement plant study.
Moscow continued its assistance to Mali for exploitation of gold at Kalana
under $12 million in credits previously extended. Peking continued work on rice
projects and an $8 million expansion of a textile complex at Segou.
China reinforced its position as the most active aid donor in Mauritania
outside the Arab world. Work on a health center, a sports stadium, a powerplant
in Nouakchott, and preliminary studies on a deepwater port project were part of
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the Chinese $85 million aid initiative. The USSR continued a small fisheries program
under a 1973 agreement and was preparing to build a fisheries research center.
No substantive commitments emerged from aid discussions with Bulgaria, Romania,
and Poland during the year.
Togo received a $500,000 gift of agricultural equipment from Peking. China
also sent survey teams to study a sugar plantation and refinery and political party
center to be financed under a $45 million 1972 credit. In November, Romania
announced that it will provide assistance for mining, agriculture, and industry, but
terms were not revealed.
Tunisia received its first aid from Hungary in November 1975 - $10 million
for agricultural development and food processing facilities. Negotiations with China
continued for implementing the largely unused $40 million credit extended in 1972.
Soviet Premier Kosygin's good-will visit to Tunisia in May produced a Soviet
agreement to study Tunisian requests for aid for its new five-year plan. Some new
Soviet projects may be financed under the $34 million in aid already extended
to Tunisia.
China began work on several agricultural projects and a conference hall in
Zaire under a $100 million 1973 credit agreement.
Plans for road construction and agricultural projects went ahead under Peking's
$51 million 1974 credit to Zambia. Some Chinese personnel working on the
Tan-Zam Railroad probably were transferred to the road construction effort.
China, anxious to restore closer relations with Burma, tried to expedite use
of economic credits reextended in 1971. During the visit of Burma's president
to Peking - his first since 1971 - China may have reallocated some outstanding
industrial credits for commodity assistance.
Indonesia still has not normalized relations with Peking, but it continued its
two-year-old policy of improving economic relations with the USSR and Eastern
Europe. Project negotiations continued under a 1974 agreement with the USSR.
Moscow and Indonesia have agreed in principle to proceed with two power projects
and the Soviets are studying Indonesian requests for aid to the aluminum industry.
Jakarta signed economic agreements with Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and Romania
early in the year.
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Malaysia's economic relations with China cooled somewhat in 1975 as the
rapid growth expected for its exports to China failed to materialize. Exports instead
fell, and Malaysia's trade deficit probably exceeded the $200 million annual level
of recent years.
The Philippines' relations with Communist countries expanded markedly in
1975. Diplomatic relations were established with China and restored with Cuba, and
trade contacts were expanded with East European countries. Romania became the
first Communist country to extend economic development credits to Manila - $31
million for a thermal powerplant.
Thailand established trade and diplomatic relations with China in 1975. In
August, the two countries signed a $100 million agreement to barter 200,000 tons
of Thai rice for Chinese crude oil and petroleum products.
Argentina
Communist countries continued to deliver modest amounts of economic aid
to Argentina under agreements valued at more than $535 million. Moscow signed
new contracts in 1975 to provide generators for the Lujan de Cuya and San Nicolas
thermal powerplants now under construction. Although several contracts were
signed, activity under Eastern Europe's $283 million in 1974 credits was limited.
Almost all Communist aid to Brazil is incorporated in trade agreements
encouraging larger equipment sales. The $150 million trade credit extended by
Romania in 197 5 was the largest Communist credit to Brazil. The credit will finance
Brazil's steel plant purchases from Romania, including rolling mills, sinter plants,
plate heating furnaces, and steel structures. Bucharest also agreed to $30 million
in additional commercial financing for a petrochemical plant.
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Communist countries have continued to run large trade deficits with Brazil
that must be settled in hard currency. To help correct this imbalance, Poland signed
a $1 billion contract to exchange coal for Brazilian iron ore over a 10-year period.
Soviet oil sales to Brazil are helping to reduce the USSR's deficit.
Late in 1975, Colombia announced plans to promote new economic and
commercial ties with Communist countries. The Soviets offered Colombia 10-year
credits at 5% interest to buy Soviet equipment. Previously, Moscow had extended
credits for trolley bus purchases. At year's end, Moscow was still studying Bogota's
request for Soviet participation in electrification, oil and gas exploration, and
transportation projects.
Hungary will sell Colombia $9 million worth of buses under a 1975
commercial agreement, and Czechoslovakia signed contracts for two powerplants.
At the end of the year, Romanian technicians were studying joint ventures involving
a gas pipeline, coking coal, petroleum, and agriculture.
Peru is still drawing on $229 million in economic aid extended by Communist
countries in the early 1970s. The aid is heavily concentrated in hydropower
development. Moscow signed contracts for studies on a power project in
northeastern Peru and for the installation of oil storage tanks for Peru's Andean
pipeline project. At the end of the year Lima was considering a Soviet offer of
further equipment credits. There were unconfirmed rumors at midyear that East
Germany had agreed to provide $200 million in industrial equipment credits.
Other Latin America
The People's Republic of China agreed to renew the line of credit pledged
to the Allende regime, under which some $50 million is still available. China wants
to ensure continued supplies of copper and nitrates from Chile, the value of which
fell in 1975 to $12.5 million compared with $117 million in 1974.
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In March China provided Guyana with $10 million in economic credits, in
addition to the $26 million it extended in 1972. Romania signed its first economic
agreement with Guyana to participate in mineral exploration, hydropower
development, agriculture, and wood processing. The terms of the agreement are
not known.
China - the only Communist country to offer development assistance to
Jamaica -- sent a team to Kingston in mid-July to study several textile projects
discussed in March 1974 when diplomatic relations were established.
Mexico signed a general agreement with CEMA in August, establishing a joint
commission to promote cooperation. The terms of the agreement were not
announced. The USSR also signed scientific cooperation agreements on joint
research in energy, geology, and oceanography.
In a continuing effort to expand relations with Communist countries, Trinidad
and Tobago's prime minister led a delegation to the USSR and Romania during
July. Moscow agreed to study proposals for project assistance, and the Bucharest
visit yielded agreements for Romanian assistance for geological studies, onshore
petroleum drilling and production equipment, refineries, and a petrochemical
complex.
Afghanistan
Moscow reaffirmed its deep aid commitment to Afghanistan in 1975 by
providing the largest amount of economic assistance it has yet extended in a single
year to this border state.
New Soviet economic credits to Afghanistan totaled $437 million in 1975. The
aid was allocated to 20 major projects in agriculture, irrigation, electric power,
mineral and metal processing, and transportation. The credits will assure Moscow a
major role in the Afghani Fifth Plan.
About half of Moscow's $1.3 billion in aid to Kabul has been disbursed. Soviet
aid is responsible for construction of about two-thirds of the roads completed since
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1956, half of the electric power capacity, and the addition of at least 100,000 acres
of cultivated land. The USSR developed Afghanistan's natural gas production
facilities and constructed pipelines to transport gas to the USSR. In 1975, natural
gas accounted for a third of Kabul's total exports to the USSR, covering the debt
service due the USSR under revised payment schedules.
Peking's irrigation project in the Parwan Valley is the largest Chinese project
under way. The gift hospital being built in Kandahar is more than half completed,
and work proceeds on the expansion of the Chinese-built textile mill at Bagram.
Moscow continues as Afghanistan's most important trading partner, accounting
for about one-third of its total trade. Although data for 1975 are not available, the
value of trade probably increased over 1974 because of higher prices for
Afghanistan's natural gas and raw cotton. As in 1974, the balance was likely in
Afghanistan's favor.
Egypt
The deterioration of Soviet-Egyptian relations in 1975 was reflected in
Moscow's cessation of arms deliveries and refusal to ease debt repayment terms. East
European countries apparently were not affected by the chill in Egypt's Soviet
relations, and they concluded a number of new economic accords.
Debt talks reached a stalemate over conditions for rescheduling Egypt's $5
billion military and economic debt. Although they were put off until August 1976,
an interim arrangement is in effect through the annual trade protocol that provides
for $180 million of repayments through an Egyptian export surplus in 1976.
Strains in Soviet-Egyptian political and military relations have not directly
affected ongoing Soviet development assistance to Egypt but may have influenced
future prospects. Although cautious in supporting new aid efforts, Moscow wants to
maintain a role in Egypt. Accordingly, in 1975 the USSR continued all projects
under way and agreed to go ahead with two new projects, a cement plant at Asyut
and an addition to capacity at the Naja Hamadi aluminum plant, both to be financed
under existing credits. Until the 1973 war Moscow was Cairo's major aid source.
Since 1973 Arab aid has accounted for more than two-thirds of all external
financing available to Egypt, dwarfing the Soviet assistance program.
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In 1975 the largest Soviet project still under way was the expansion of the steel
mill at Hulwan, Egypt's only integrated steel plant. Scheduled for completion in
1976, annual capacity will climb to 1.5 million tons, about three times the current
domestic requirement for steel in Egypt. Production began in 1975 at the 100,000-
ton Naja Hamadi aluminum plant. Other ongoing projects include Soviet assistance
to Egypt's fishing industry and irrigation and rural electrification programs.
Undertaken in the late 1960s and early 1970s, these projects have proceeded slowly
and have been overshadowed in recent years by Western sponsored efforts in the
same area.
The only new Communist economic aid to Egypt was a $25 million Hungarian
credit for machinery and equipment. Other East European countries continued work
on projects under old credits. A new protocol with Romania called for further
implementation of sulfuric acid plants, the Hamrawein phosphate complex, and a
petrochemical plant under credits still outstanding.
In contrast with Egyptian-Soviet long-term debt problems, Cairo settled its
outstanding commercial debt questions with Hungary and Poland. Although
Hungary and Poland insisted on future settlements in convertible currency, both
agreed to accept Egyptian goods to settle past trade imbalances.
The static pattern of Communist aid to India, which has characterized the
relationship since 1966, continued throughout 1975. No new assistance was
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provided, work was initi-
ated only on a couple of
Czech projects, and draw-
ings on project aid remain
at the low level reached
several years ago.
Work continued on
the Bokharo steel plant,
the largest Soviet project
under construction in In-
dia, and on the expansion
of Bhilai, scheduled even-
tually to reach a 4-mil-
lion-ton capacity from the
present 2.5 million tons.
A 2,000-ton rolling mill at
Bhilai is also under con-
struction.
Moscow agreed to
undertake studies for new
coal mines under a 1966
trade credit, and signed a
$20 million contract for
equipment installation at
the Mathura refinery, for
which designs have been
completed.
East European projects also moved slowly. Czechoslovakia initiated work on a
foundry forge and a fertilizer plant under its $105 million 1973 credits. It also
provided components for plants built under earlier Czech credits. Poland continued
its decade-long effort in coal mine development work.
Soviet-Indian trade continued its upward trend. Helped by higher prices and
volume, Indian exports rose sharply, while imports rose even faster because of
increased receipts of fertilizer and petroleum.
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A February Soviet-Iranian accord calls for Iran and the USSR to undertake
projects in both countries whose eventual cost could reach $3 billion. Moscow will
continue work under its current program and will expand the Soviet-built machine
tool plant at Arak and build new powerplants and grain silos. Iran offered credits to
the USSR to finance a paper plant. Repayment will be made from the plant's
output.
Soviet aid to Iran continued to focus on the Isfahan steel mill. The plant's
current annual capacity is planned to reach 1.9 million tons by 1978. About $500
million in Soviet credits has been provided for the plant thus far. Plans to expand
Isfahan to 8 million tons over the next decade probably will be executed under
commercial contracts.
To accommodate growing Soviet-Iranian trade, Iran is improving its rail links
with Soviet assistance. Under a series of 1975 protocols Moscow will electrify a
90-mile line from Tabriz in Iran to Julfa on the Soviet border and has begun studies
on a 100-mile railroad from Mashad in Iran to Tadjhen in the USSR.
In a mutually profitable arrangement, the two sides entered a trilateral
agreement for the sale of Iranian natural gas to Western Europe. Delivery will be
made through a second pipeline to Iran's border with the USSR. For 20 years
beginning in 1981, Iran will deliver 36.8 million cubic meters of gas per day to the
Soviet border, to be consumed in the USSR. In turn, the USSR will deliver 31.1
million cubic meters of gas per day to Western Europe, the difference representing a
transit fee paid to the USSR. West European consumers will pay Iran for the gas in
hard currency.
All East European countries signed accords with Iran calling for large increases
in trade and faster implementation of aid programs. Romania and Iran signed
protocols under the $1.5 billion of reciprocal accords concluded in December 1974.
New projects include engineering work on the Saveh dam, construction of
powerplants and food processing plants, expansion of a chemical plant at Shiraz, and
studies for petrochemical and other plants.
Iraq
Despite its vastly increased ability to buy Western goods and services, Baghdad
continued to depend on the USSR and East European countries for most of its
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development assistance. At the end of the year Iraq signed economic protocols with
the USSR for new project studies. In July, Iraq became the first Third World
country to sign a cooperation agreement with the Council for Mutual Economic
Assistance (CEMA).
Economic Activity Expands
Although petroleum development remains the USSR's largest and most
important program in Iraq, Moscow signed contracts in 1975 to expand its support
to other major sectors.
The Petroleum De-
velopment Program
Soviet technicians
during 1975 completed
the third-stage develop-
ment at the North Ru-
maila oilfield and the be-
ginning of oil production
at the Nahr Umar field.
North Rumaila's capacity
was raised to more than
800,000 b/d, but Soviet
technicians still are grap-
pling with pressurization
problems that have lim-
ited output.
The USSR and Iraq
also signed a contract in
1975 for exploitation of
the Luhais oilfield in
southern Iraq, expected
to produce 50,000 b/d. Although financing for the estimated $50 million program
was not announced, Moscow probably sought repayment in oil, which it has received
for other assistance to the oil sector.
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Large New Contracts in Other Sectors
Under Moscow's $220 million 1971 line of credit, assistance is being provided
for two thermal powerplants, which, when completed, will double Iraq's electric
power capacity. Moscow contracted to install four 120,000-kw turbines for the
plant, continued to build the powerplant at Nasiriyah in 1975, and conducted
surveys for the Mosul plant. In addition, under a Soviet contract whose terms are
not known, work accelerated on the ath-Tharthar irrigation and flood control
project.
Protocols were signed with virtually all East European countries and China to
speed work under outstanding credits. Baghdad signed a $17 million agreement with
an East German firm to install signal equipment on the Baghdad-Umm Qasr railroad.
China began construction of a bridge over the Mosul River, its first aid project in
Iraq under a $45 million 1971 credit.
Late in 1975 Mos-
cow began construction
of Pakistan's largest indus-
trial undertaking, a
1.1-million-ton steel mill
at Karachi; Moscow has
extended $435 million of
credits for the project.
The steel complex, on the
books since 1970, is
scheduled for completion
in 1980-81. The USSR
also agreed in 1975 to
increase petroleum explo-
ration activity at several
locations. Moscow contin-
ued work on a thermal
powerplant at Guddu and
transmission lines and
sent a team to discuss
mineral development as-
sistance in November.
China mounted no
new aid initiatives in Paki-
stan, its largest aid recipi-
ent. Work continued at a
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cotton-spinning mill at Tarbela, a textile mill at Kotri, and the expansion of the
heavy machinery plant at Taxila. China also plans to construct a small iron and steel
plant at Chilgazi to complement the heavy machinery plant and the foundry forge at
Taxila.
A $57 million Soviet economic credit to Sri Lanka, Moscow's first major aid
commitment to Colombo since 1958, highlighted Communist relations with Sri
Lanka in 1975. The February agreement, which more than doubles Moscow's
previous aid to Sri Lanka, will be used to construct the Samanawala 120-MW
hydropowerplant and to build an irrigation network.
China completed the Pugoda textile mill, under construction with Chinese aid
since 1970. Meanwhile, survey work began on flood control and irrigation projects, a
sheet glass plant, and fisheries development under a $44 million 1972 line of credit.
Late in the year, China and Sri Lanka also signed their annual rice-rubber barter
agreement for 1976.
Syria
No new aid agreements were signed between Moscow and Damascus in 1975.
The USSR and Syria signed a protocol under an old credit agreement for large-scale
oil prospecting under Moscow's comprehensive 1976-80 oil development program
for Syria.
Syria is Eastern Europe's largest Third World credit recipient with
commitments of $778 million. Romania, the largest East European donor, agreed to
allocate part of its outstanding credits to heavy industry and for oil
development-areas where Bucharest already is active. Romania also agreed to go
ahead with a superphosphate plant at Horns, and construction was begun on the
120,000 b/d refinery at Banias, which will be Syria's largest refinery when
completed in the late 1970s.
Turkey
In July the USSR and Turkey signed a "framework" agreement that may
eventually provide $650 million in new Soviet credits for Turkey's industry.
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Separate agreements will be signed to allocate the proceeds and to specify terms for
individual projects. Expansion of the Iskenderun steel complex to 4 million tons,
additional facilities at the Seydesehir aluminum complex, and two 400-MW thermal
powerplants will be financed under the new agreement.
Turkey, with half a billion dollars of earlier Soviet pledges, has become a major
Soviet aid recipient. In December, Soviet Premier Kosygin participated in the
opening of the 1-million-ton Iskenderun steel plant, one of Moscow's largest aid
projects in the Third World. Other Soviet projects include a refinery at Aliaga, a
sulfuric acid plant, a plywood factory, and an aluminum plant.
A $46 million Soviet credit and $10 million from Hungary, extended before
the August coup, highlighted Communist economic aid to Bangladesh in 1975.
Moscow also allowed Dacca to defer the first of five annual installments on its 1973
$35 million loan of 200,000 tons of wheat, although repayments continued on other
credits. Negotiations with Moscow were begun in July for more military aircraft, but
were not resumed after the coup. The Soviets did provide new economic credits
(repayable at 2% interest over 15 years, after a three-year grace period) for a
cotton-spinning mill, a gas liquefaction unit, and an experimental cotton farm. The
new agreement also provided $7.5 million for commodities to help finance local
project costs.
Hungary signed an agreement in June to furnish railway passenger cars;
payments would be made over a 12-year period in jute products and other
agricultural goods.
President Ceausescu's April visit to Jordan produced new economic accords
under which Bucharest will explore for oil and build an oil refinery on a joint
venture basis. Romania also agreed to expand the Az-Zarqa oil refinery and to
participate in agricultural projects. Financial details are not known.
China gave Nepal $80 million in grant aid for a major addition to its road
construction program. Peking will build a 250-mile road from Pokharo to Surkhet.
Chinese aid to Nepal now stands at $179 million, mostly for roads and light
industrial plants.
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 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/04/10: CIA-RDP08SO135OR000602020001-7
APPENDIX B
STATISTICAL TABLES
Table 7
Military Personnel from the Less Developed Countries
Trained in Communist Countries,' 1955-75
Total
USSR
Eastern
Europe
China
Total
44,200
37,225
3,975
3,000
Africa
12,925
9,575
650
2,700
Algeria
2,200
1,975
200
25
Burundi
75
75
....
....
Cameroon
75
Congo
800
325
50
425
Equatorial
Guinea
200
....
200
Ghana
175
175
Guinea
1,250
850
50
350
Guinea-Bissau
100
.100
....
....
Libya
925
900
25
....
Mali
250
200
Negl.
50
Morocco
150
75
75
....
Mozambique
250
200
....
50
Nigeria
500
475
25
....
Sierra Leone
150
....
....
150
Somalia
2,475
2,375
75
25
Sudan
525
300
25
200
Tanzania
1,900
875
Negl.
1,025
Togo
25
....
....
25
Uganda
775
650
125
....
Zaire
75
....
....
75
Zambia
50
25
....
25
East Asia
9,275
7,575
1,700
....
Cambodia
25
25
....
....
Indonesia
9,250
7,550
1,700
???.
Latin America
250
250
....
....
Peru
250
250
....
....
Near East and South
Asia
21,750
19,825
1,625
300
Afghanistan
3,550
3,300
250
....
Bangladesh
400
400
....
....
Egypt
6,225
5,675
550
....
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Military Personnel from the Less Developed Countries
Trained in Communist Countries,' 1955-75
(Continued)
Eastern
Total USSR Europe China
India 2,125 2,075 50
Iran 275 275 ....
Iraq 3,200 2,950 250
North Yemen 1,050 1,050 ....
Pakistan 350 50 ....
South Yemen 750 725 25
Sri Lanka Negl. Negl.
Syria 3,825 3,325 500
Negl.
1. Rounded to the nearest five persons. Data refer to the number of persons departing for or in training
but not necessarily completing training.
Communist Economic Credits and Grants Extended to Less
Developed Countries, 195475 and Years 1974 and 1975
Eastern Eastern Eastern
Total USSR Europe China Total USSR Europe China Total USSR Europe China
Total 20,529 10,859 5,830 3,840 1,610 575 764 271 1,852 1,264 319 269
Africa 4,609 1,435 1,063 2,111 334 17 80 237 313 73 90 150
Algeria 931 425 414 92 .... .... .... .... 70 .... 70 ....
Burundi 20 .... .... 20 .... .... .... .... .... .... .... ....
Cameroon 79 8 71 .... .... .... .... .... .... .... ....
Central African
Republic 6 2 4 .... .... .... .... .... .... .... ....
Chad 60 10 50 .... .... .... .... 9 9 ....
Congo 49 14 10 25 .... .... .... .... 10 .... 10 ....
Dahomey 44 .... 44 .... .... .... .... .... .... .... ....
Equatorial Guinea I I .... .... .... .... .... .... .... .... ....
Ethiopia 205 104 17 84 1 1 .... .... I 1 ....
Gambia 17 .... .... 17 .... .... .... .... 17 .... 17
Ghana 237 93 102 42 .... .... .... .... .... .... .... ....
Guinea 382 200 105 77 83 2 80 1 .... .... .... ....
Guinea-Bissau 18 1 17 .... .... 18 1 .... 17
Kenya 66 48 .... 18 .... .... .... .... .... .... ....
Malagasy Republic 66 .... .... 66 .... .... .... .... 55 .... 55
Mali 177 86 23 68 12 12 2 .... 2
Mauritania 89 4 .... 85 57 .... .... 57 .... .... .... ....
Mauritius 35 .... 35 .... .... .... ....
Morocco 148 98 50 .... .... .... .... .... .... .... .... ....
Mozambique 59 .... 59 .... .... .... .... 59 .... 59
Niger 53 2 51 51 1 50 .... .... .... ....
Nigeria 45 7 38 .... .... .... .... .... .... .... .... ....
Rwanda 23 1 22 .... .... .... .... .... .... .... ....
Senegal 58 9 49 1 1 .... .... .... .... .... ....
Sierra Leone 58 28 30 .... .... .... .... .... .... .... ....
Somalia 291 153 5 133 1 1 62 62 .... ....
Sudan 299 64 153 82 .... .... .... .... .... .... .... ....
Tanzania 364 20 13 331 75 75 .... .... .... ....
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Communist Economic Credits and Grants Extended to Less
Developed Countries, 1954-75 and Years 1974 and 1975
(Continued)
Eastern Eastern Eastern
Total USSR Europe China Total USSR Europe China Total USSR Europe China
Togo 45 .... .... 45 .... .... .... .... .... .... .... ....
Tunisia 157 34 83 40 .... .... .... .... 10 10
Uganda 31 16 15 .... .... .... .... .... .... .... ....
Upper Volta 61 1 .... 60 2 .... .... 2 .... .... .... ....
Zaire 100 .... 100 .... .... .... .... .... .... .... ....
Zambia 335 6 50 279 51 .... .... 51 .... .... .... ....
Europe 45 .... .... 45 .... .... .... .... .... .... .... ....
Malta 45 .... 45 .... .... .... .... .... .... .... ....
East Asia 841 156 341 344 34 .... 34 65 1 35 29
Burma 126 16 26 84 .... .... .... .... .... .... .... ....
Cambodia 134 25 17 92 .... .... .... .... .... .... .... ....
Indonesia 482 114 263 105 .... .... .... .... .... .... .... ....
Laos 31 1 4 26 25 .... 25 6 1 4 1
Philippines 68 .... 31 37 9 .... 9 59 31 28
Latin America 1,787 602 1,042 143 494 209 285 .... 166 156 10
Argentina 537 245 292 .... 483 200 283 .... .... .... .... ....
Bolivia 64 31 33 1 1 .... .... 2 2
Brazil 407 30 377 .... .... .... .... .... 150 150 ....
Chile 423 238 120 65 .... .... .... .... .... .... .... ....
Colombia 15 10 5 .... 8 8 .... .... .... .... .... ....
Costa Rica 2 .... 2 .... 2 2 .... .... .... .... ....
Ecuador 19 .... 19 .... .... .... .... .... 4 4
Guyana 36 .... 36 .... .... .... .... 10 .... 10
Peru 229 28 159 42 .... .... .... .... .... .... .... ....
Uruguay 45 20 25 .... .... .... .... .... .... .... .... ....
Venezuela 10 .... 10 .... .... .... .... .... .... .... .... ....
Near East and South
Asia 13,247 8,666 3,384 1,197 748 349 399 .... 1,308 1,190 38 80
Afghanistan 1,376 1,263 40 73 .... .... .... .... 437 437 .... ....
Bangladesh 413 300 102 11 54 28 26 .... 56 46 10 ....
Egypt 2,230 1,300 796 134 .... .... .... .... 25 .... 25 ....
Greece 84 84 .... .... .... .... .... .... .... .... ....
India 2,430 1,943 487 .... .... .... .... .... .... .... .... ....
Iran 1,288 750 538 .... .... .... .... .... .... .... .... ....
Iraq 1,013 549 419 45 .... .... .... .... .... .... .... ....
Lebanon 9 .... 9 .... 9 9 .... .... .... .... ....
Nepal 199 20 179 80 .... 80
Pakistan 1,131 652 74 405 216 216 .... .... .... .... .... ....
Sri Lanka 323 95 73 155 11 .... 11 57 57 .... ....
Syria 1,256 417 778 61 453 100 353 .... .... .... .... ....
Turkey 1,210 1,180 30 .... .... .... .... .... 653 650 3
Yemen (Aden) 91 15 21 55 .... .... .... .... .... .... .... ....
Yemen (San's) 194 98 17 79 5 5 .... .... .... .... .... ....
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