ENTERPRISE-LEVEL COMPUTING IN THE SOVIET ECONOMY

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• Publication Date: August 1, 1987
• Content Type: REPORT

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,,~ Intelligence
Enterprise-Level Computing
in the Soviet Economy
SOV C 87-10043
August 1987
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Directorate of
Intelligence
Enterprise-Level Computing
in the Soviet Economy
This paper was prepared by an external contractor
for the Office of Soviet Analysis.
SOV C 87-10043
August 1987
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Summary
Information available
as of 26 May 1987
was used in this report.
Enterprise-Level Computing
in the Soviet Economy
Since 1966 the Soviets have undertaken a massive program to introduce
computer-based information and control systems (ASUs) into all manage-
ment levels of the economy. ASU is a generic term used by the Soviets to
designate a wide variety of computerized data-processing systems, from
simple automated bookkeeping to complex systems for the collection,
processing, and distribution of economic data throughout the economy.
ASUs applied to enterprise management (ASUPs) are intended to foster
more rapid and extensive information exchange within and outside the
enterprise and, ultimately, the routine use of optimization techniques in
enterprise management decisions. Dynamic management outside the enter-
prise requires interactive access to data, or at least the ability to request
and receive data in machine-readable form. Ministries and central plan-
ning authorities need accurate, timely information to deal with bottlenecks
in the economy and to create achievable plans that reflect policymakers'
preferences.
After two decades ASUPs have been introduced in less than 10 percent of
all enterprises, and these ASUPs generally are limited to information
collection and processing for accounting applications. Soviet industry has
provided slow, unreliable, and sometimes obsolete computer equipment to
enterprises, usually in insufficient quantities. Technical service, software,
and employee training also have been inadequate. These factors exacerbate
the disruption to enterprise operations associated with computerization,
which jeopardizes enterprise fulfillment of production goals. Even if
successfully installed, computerized systems threaten the managerial abili-
ty to control and manipulate information. Overall, the enterprise manager
has had little incentive to install an ASUP system.
Progress in linking ASUPs with other organizations by using ministry and
regional networks has been hampered by deficient telecommunications
technology and investment. Networking relies on the general purpose
phone network, the general and special-purpose telegraph networks, a
"subscriber" telephone network for data transmission, and new-technology
media. The Soviets have built some impressive isolated networks, such as
the KONET local area network developed by the Estonian Academy of
Sciences. Overall, however, relatively few enterprise computers have been
directly connected to ministry and regional networks, and many that are
use expensive dedicated lines that provide somewhat better services than
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the regular phone system. Most of the linkages are hierarchical and use as-
pects of the teleprocessing designs embodied in IBM's Systems Network
Architecture. These systems provide for data transmission but do not
include such capabilities as interactive sessions on remote computers or
load balancing.
The Soviets have only begun to create distributed processing systems for
optimal planning, an extension of the ASUPs. These "integrated automat-
ed management systems" (IASUs) are supposed to: (1) integrate subsys-
tems of autonomous ASUPs; and (2) link traditional ASUP functions and
automated manufacturing functions, either for continuous processesing
(process control) or discrete manufacturing (robotics, flexible manufactur-
ing). Three IASU models are being explored:
? One being developed and implemented by the Minsk Central Scientific
Research Institute of the Technology of Management (TsNIITU) is
restricted to linking production automation with the ASUP.
? A more comprehensive Leningrad system resembles Western Manufac-
turing Resources Planning (MRP-II) systems. It develops a production
plan on the basis of demand forecasts and makes it possible to adjust
more quickly to changing delivery requirements.
? The most ambitious system under development at the Academy of
Science's Computer Center in Novosibirsk embraces true decentraliza-
tion of management relying on interactive processing and distributed
data bases, and restricting upward data flows.
IASUs make greater demands than ASUPs on suppliers and the infra-
structure and so are seriously hampered by current Soviet deficiencies. For
example, few industrial local area networks, a critical ingredient, have been
built. IASUs are also likely to face even greater resistance from managers,
since tight integration leaves little room for error or obfuscation. If upper
management fears that distributed processing will reduce its controls too
much, lower-level management may worry that it will actually lead to
greater centralization.
The majority of enterprises without ASUPs obtain limited computing
services from tabulators and sorters operated by regional Central Statisti-
cal Administration (TsSU) offices; a variety of small, special-purpose
accounting machines used internally; branch computer centers; and large
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collective-use computer centers. Only the last two options give enterprises
the ability to undertake complex ASUP tasks, such as those connected with
material technical supply, production management, accounting, and plan-
ning. Even then data processing usually is not integrated, meaning that
data must be entered for individual operations, even if sequential. These
limitations have meant that computerization has mainly led to the
automation of some existing practices, without leading to substantive
changes in management practice.
Gorbachev has taken initiatives to step up and change the character of
enterprise computerization:
? Interbranch scientific technical complexes (MNTKs) have been estab-
lished to further development of personal computers and industrial
automation. MNTKs group research and production facilities into a
single organization and are designed to accelerate the introduction of new
technology. They will undoubtedly make progress, if only because of their
priority, but they are encountering problems such as insufficient funding
and organizational confusion.
? Production of computers, and especially microcomputers, is being in-
creased and new mechanisms are being introduced to shore up the
performance of the computer industry. The new State Committee for
Computing and Informatics (GKVTI) has been directed to improve
computer hardware, stimulate better computer usage, create a new
system of computer servicing, coordinate the implementation of the party
directive on computing, and oversee new training programs. The
GKVTI's effectiveness will depend on how well it fares against the large
bureaucracies of the dozens of ministries that participate in computer
hardware and software production.
? Enterprise managers are also being given some increased autonomy, and
encouraged to take greater initiative. Microcomputers in distributed
processing systems in particular represent a major departure from the
top-down imposition of control, giving lower-level managers a powerful
tool for their own data processing. They bring significant computing
resources right to the workplace of bookkeepers, economists, and statisti-
cians. Nevertheless, changes in the Soviet planning and management
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system have not yet been sufficient to sustain widespread managerial
enthusiasm for rapid computerization-that is, assuring adequate sup-
plies of reliable equipment and support, and incentives to use optimiza-
tion techniques and to maintain realistic data in enterprise computers.
Some managers will probably find innovative ways to improve production,
while others will find new ways to beat the system. The challenge for the
Politburo is to reap the efficiencies of the microcomputer without losing too
much control.
In any case, it is clear that the mid-1980s mark the real beginning of the
computerization of Soviet society. Until now, the centralized form of
service provision, even in ASUP, has led to few changes in the way that
management functions. The task is immense, involving the mass produc-
tion of huge numbers of personal computers, education of millions of users,
and reorganization of the whole centralized accounting system.
One of the key issues for success is the extent to which the Gorbachev ad-
ministration will be able to free up the enterprises from the heavy hands of
their ministries. The less data collected, the harder to exert specific control.
Yet ministries and regional agencies are in the process of building networks
which will give them even greater access to all sorts of data. For the first
time, the use of personal computers is giving smaller organizations a means
to avoid this centralized processing. If enterprise directors are convinced
that there will be less direct oversight, they may be more willing to use op-
timization routines and do more analysis with computers. The extent to
which less data is being collected is one way to measure the success of Gor-
bachev's decentralization drive.
On balance, computerization of management is likely to proceed slowly.
The key factors that helped spur the use of computers in the United
States-the pressures of the marketplace, corporate autonomy, and mar-
keting pressure from the major vendors-are generally absent in the Soviet
centrally planned economic system. Because ASUP, IASU, and other
computing applications involve so many aspects of the external operation of
the enterprise and the surrounding social-political system, management-
oriented computing will remain one of the hardest technologies for the
Soviet enterprise to absorb.
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Contents
Summary
iii
Introduction: The ASU Program
1
The Roots of Enterprise Computing
1
Overview of Results to Date
3
Providing Computing Services to Enterprises: The ASUP Program
3
The Role of the Computing Infrastructure
4
Integrating ASUPs into the Soviet Management Milieu
6
Material Technical Supply
6
Production Management
8
Planning
11
Providing Computing Services to Enterprises: Other Options
12
Overall Automation of the TsSU System
13
The Evolution of Bookkeeping Computers
15
Replacing Punch Card Computers
18
The Growing GSVTs System
20
Other Sources of Computer Services
23
The Challenge of Integrating Microcomputers
24
Future Directions of Enterprise Computing
26
Networking to External Entities
26
The Networking Infrastructure
27
Ministry Networks
31
Regional Data Links
32
IASUs and Distributed Data Processing
33
Functional Extensions of ASUPs
34
Infrastructure Support for Distributed Processing
35
Challenges for IASU in the Soviet Environment
37
Gorbachev's Reforms and Enterprise Computing
38
Changes in the Computing Infrastructure
38
Changes in the Surrounding Environment
Conclusion
43
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Appendixes
A. Acronyms Involving ASU
B. Selected Organization Acronyms Used in This Study 49
C. References Cited
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Enterprise-Level Computing
in the Soviet Economy
In 1966, the Soviet Union launched what would
become an ambitious program to reform economic
management by installing computers at all levels of
the economy. Automated management systems
(ASUs) were designed, implemented, and introduced
at the state committee level, at the ministry level, at
the regional and city levels, and at the enterprise level,
including systems for management dubbed "organiza-
tional-economic" ASUs and systems for process con-
trol, called ASUTPs.'
Financial appropriations for ASUs have been huge
and have risen steadily. They totaled one billion
rubles in 1966-70, 3-5 billion in 1971-75, 6 billion in
1976-80, and a projected 11 billion in 1981-85
(Sots72; Veli78b; Yers75). Between 1966 and 1985,
total expenditures on computing in the Soviet econo-
my were expected to be 24.5 billion rubles (Simc84).
The Roots of Enterprise Computing
The ASU program is the result of a number of trends
in Soviet society dating back to the mid-1950s
(Thom83). Numerous Soviet researchers became en-
amored with cybernetics, which rose from the ashes of
Stalinist denunciation and became a highly acclaimed
theory that received wide application in a number of
fields (see (Grah72). Cybernetics is defined as the
science of control (upravleniye), reception, transmis-
sion, and transformation of information in any sys-
tem, including systems of a technical, biological,
economic, social, or administrative nature (Glus79). It
held out the promise of restoring central control of the
increasingly unwieldy economy (Thom83). In the late
1950s, A. Berg and a group of proponents of cybernet-
ics first began arguing that the entire national eco-
nomic planning process could be computerized
(Cave82). Conyngham believes that this has been the
principle organizing concept of Soviet management
'The various acronyms in use for a large number of types of ASUs
are given in Appendix A.
science for the past two decades. However, even
among Soviet cyberneticians such as Berg and V.
Glushkov, there was considerable disagreement over
the extent to which it could play this role (Cony82).
Somewhat later a movement was started to make
management science an independent.scientific disci-
pline that would link cybernetics, operations research,
and economic reform. At the same time, purposeful
study of Western management science began.
Through the efforts of D. Gvishiani, who was Kosy-
gin's son-in-law, Western management concepts were
widely discussed among scholars and researchers in
various disciplines. In 1966, it was finally recognized
as an independent discipline. Throughout the rest of
the decade, sometimes bitter disputes continued be-
tween the various disciplines over the nature of man-
agement science and its place in the academic com-
munity (Beis82; Thom83).
Meanwhile, the ASU program was officially started
by an important resolution of the Central Committee
of the CPSU and the USSR Council of Ministers in
1963 (Losk66; Makh74). This resolution laid out plans
for the first experimental applications of computers to
enterprise management. In addition, plans were made
for a state network of computer centers (GSVTs). The
initial analysis of the GSVTs was carried out from
1964 to 1966, but the necessary hardware was simply
not available (Maks82). The program was plagued
with bureaucratic conflict. Both the Central Statisti-
cal Administration (TsSU) and Gosplan vied for
predominance, but their interests were perceived as
being too narrow to meet the needs of all users,
including enterprises, ministries, Gosplan, Gossnab,
the TsSU, and other bodies (Bart72).
The introduction in 1966-70 of about 400 ASUs at all
levels in the Soviet economy laid the groundwork for
the great expansion of the ASU program which took
place in the early 1970s. At the XXIVth Party
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Congress in 1971, the GSVTs idea was subsumed by
an even grander plan to create OGAS, the All-Union
System for the Collection and Processing of Informa-
tion For Accounting, Planning and Management of
the National Economy. OGAS was supposed to bring
about the complete linkage of all major units in the
Soviet economy through a huge network of computers
(Cave83; Cony80). The approval of the OGAS con-
ception gave the ASUP program an even greater top-
down emphasis.
Although the development of ASUs continued apace
in the 1970s, the trio of operations research, cybernet-
ics, and management science did not provide the
hoped-for unified conceptual foundation of ASU.
There was widespread agreement, however, that
ASUs could become the foundation of a qualitatively
new form of management in which the computer
would somehow suggest or even make optimal deci-
sions. This quotation from Nikolay Fedorenko, Direc-
tor of the Central Economics Mathematics Institute
(TsEMI), and one of the leading proponents of the
ASU program, is typical:
An ASU is not created in parallel with, or next to, an
"ordinary" management system ... The process of
designing an ASU is the sequential and step-by-step
introduction of improved methods and hardware into
the existing management system. The new methods
and means must naturally grow into the structure of
management, becoming its foundation, and the means
by which it will function on a higher level. In such a
way, standardization and automation of the design
and creation of ASU is a most important direction of
improving management systems at enterprises ...
ministries and departments, on a nationwide basis.
This path will guarantee the fastest transfer of the
best practical experience from one organization to
others, the use of well-designed and well-tested mod-
ules in management systems, and the choice of
optimal decisions of the basis of using a greater
quantity of information ... (Emm74, pp. 1202-1203).
ASUs were seen as an integral part of the scientific
technical revolution, a Soviet concept that included
the belief that only under socialism can the fruits of
technological innovation be fully realized. These views
of ASU were widespread (Dani86). In order to foster
sharing of experience and to mandate the widespread
usage of the best techniques, various ASU design
guidelines were introduced (Ormm72; Ormm77;
Ormm8O; Ormm86).
ASUs represent the most sophisticated forms of com-
puter usage in the economy. Most enterprises, howev-
er, go elsewhere for computing services they use.
These services are rooted in the drive for the central-
ization and mechanization of accounting, which be-
gan in the late 1950s. In 1960, after several years of
initial experimentation with what the Soviets call
punch card computers, or simple tabulators and sort-
ers, the TsSU was given a mandate to set up a
network of machine calculating stations in all the
major regions and cities of the country (Isak8O). A
drive began to create centralized bookkeeping opera-
tions on the basis of various forms of calculating
organizations. By 1965 the number of these had
grown to 6,100 (Isak65). By the early 1970s almost all
bookkeeping operations were centralized within enter-
prises (Isak8O). Organizations in the service sphere,
kolkhozes and sovkhozes, and small local enterprises
of the same type lost their bookkeeping departments
and began to use central bookkeeping shops in city
and regional (rayon) centers.
The proposals to create the State Network of Com-
puter Centers (GSVTs) and OGAS should be seen as
a natural outgrowth of the centralization of account-
ing drive which began a decade earlier. In addition to
the GSVTs, OGAS would be supported by the cre-
ation of a Unified Automated System of Communica-
tions, an All-Union Data Transmission System, and
numerous computerized management information
systems. Subsequent analyses showed that the GSVTs
would have to consist of 200 territorial collective use
computer centers (VTsKPs), 2,500 collective use com-
puter centers subordinated to branches (KIVTs), and
22,000 other computer centers (Maks82). The collec-
tive use computer centers were to become the counter-
parts of the machine calculating stations set up in the
1960s for mechanization of accounting. Roughly 40
percent of all production takes place at small- or
medium-sized enterprises; the vision for the GSVTs
included building ASUPs for these enterprises based
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on its computers (Gune77). With the same intention of
standardizing and thereby improving management
throughout the economy, guidelines and standard
software packages have been issued for centralized
accounting tasks (Pusp86).
Overview of Results to Date
ASUs have been introduced into the Soviet economy
at a rather measured pace which has yet to exhibit the
typical S-curve tendencies of the diffusion of many
technologies (table 1). After an initial quick start in
the early 1970s, the rate of introduction of ASUPs
(automated enterprise management systems) has re-
mained about the same. The average yearly introduc-
tion of ministry ASUs has fallen off, reflecting the
saturation of parts of this market segment. The
biggest growth area in the ASU program at present is
in the area of process control. The average yearly rate
of introduction of ASUPs during the 11th Five-Year
Plan was just 180, while the average rate for ASUTPs
was 520 (Nark85b). At the end of 1985, according to
official statistics, 4,651 ASUTPs had been built ver-
sus 3,672 ASUPs. Almost three-quarters of the sys-
tems introduced in the 11th Five-Year Plan period fell
into this category. This trend apparently will contin-
ue: over 5,000 ASUTPs are scheduled to be installed
during the 12th Five-Year Plan (Prav860304), while
the rate of introduction of ASUPs is likely to decline
(Emm85b).
By both qualitative and quantitative measures, the
ASUP program has fallen short of its ambitious goals.
Of the approximately 44,000 industrial enterprises
now in the USSR, only 8.4 percent have ASUPs. At
current rates of introduction of about 200-300 ASUPs
per year, less than one quarter of all Soviet industrial
enterprises will have them by the year 2000. However,
since about one third of Soviet enterprises with more
than 500 employees have ASUPs, they cover a dispro-
portionately large percentage of overall production.
Nonetheless the number of ASUPs appears minuscule
when compared with the approximately 580,000 en-
terprises, organizations, and institutions that the Sovi-
ets say have a need for computing in management
applications (Simc84).
For the most part, ASUPs have failed to significantly
alter the way that Soviet enterprises are managed and
thus have failed to bring about the desired improve-
ments in effectiveness. A head of a laboratory at the
Academy of the National Economy, V. I. Danilov-
Danil'yan, points out that "The recent period has
demonstrated, probably to all, that the main reserve
of raising the quality of management is not automa-
tion" (Dani86, p. 905). As the following section will
explain in much greater detail, the main achievements
have been in increasing the efficiency of the data
processing part of the management information sys-
tem, although in some cases overall efficiency has
actually been reduced (Birb86). Basic data processing
systems have been built in areas such as scheduling
and tracking of production status, calculation of the
annual plan, production engineering, and manage-
ment of sales and inventory. Other ASUP functions
have included: quality control, management of auxil-
iary production, personnel, finance, long-range plan-
ning, wages and labor, order execution, dispatching,
and norms (Mche85).
Because the ASUP program was nurtured in the
cradle of cybernetics, operations research, and eco-
nomic reform, the goals were elevated to an impossi-
bly high level given existing hardware and software
capabilities and the ability of the economy to absorb
change. The vast majority of enterprises were strug-
gling with mechanization of accounting at a time
when ASUPs were being portrayed as a panacea for
all management difficulties. It was inevitable that
disillusionment would set in. According to Danilov-
Danil'yan, the concept of "ASU ... (as) a system of
economic management" has been abandoned in prac-
tice over the last decade (Dani86, p. 906). Instead,
designers stuck to automating existing management
functions (Emm85c). Many managers are now more
reluctant to assimilate ASUPs than they were 20
years ago (Emm85).
Providing Computing Services to Enterprises:
The ASUP Program
The successful integration of computing technology
into an enterprise requires both sufficient technical
support in the form of an infrastructure which can
provide reliable hardware, software, and service and
an environment which is amenable to computeriza-
tion. One of the theses of this paper is that, while the
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Table 1
Growth in the Number of ASUs in the 1966-85 Period
1,485
339
4,651
8,662
61
19
170
414
48
11
36
198
48
12
36
200
110
22
115
425
162
21
195
637
263
102
182
849
69
8
130
295
78
24
200
408
83
20
265
459
86
9
316
515
138
31
395
697
46
6
320
463
59
2
376
531
62
6
527
681
53
15
605
795
119
31
783
1,095
Average
Percentage
19
6
100
1965-70
36
3
15
5
41
100
1971-75
36
5
28
7
24
100
1976-80
16
6
19
4
55
100
Notes: ASUTP for 1971-75 slightly revised to reflect TsSU
revisions. 1971 and 1972 are averages based on number of systems
created in 1971-72. ASUt is ASU of a territorial organization.
ASOI is an Automatic Data Processing System. ASUt, ASOI, and
ASUP comprise the ASUP category discussed in this paper.
deficiences of the infrastructure played a significant
role in hindering the effective diffusion of manage-
ment information technologies, the role of the sur-
rounding social-economic milieu was more decisive.
The following sections give an overview of the role of
the infrastructure and examine four major areas of
application of ASUP. These sections show that de-
spite continued improvement in available computers,
the incentives to incorporate ASUP have remained
ambiguous.
The Role of the Computing Infrastructure
In the early stages of the ASUP program, Soviet
industry provided second-generation transistor com-
puters without direct access storage devices. Over the
past 15 years the Soviets have chosen functional
duplication of foreign computer models in order to
follow a low risk technology development plan and use
Western software (Davi78; Hamm84). A network of
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institutes under the USSR All-Union Ministry of
Instrument Building, Means of Automation, and Con-
trol Systems (Minpribor) is tasked with writing ASUP
software in conjunction with institutes from other
branches. When available, hardware maintenance
services have been provided by national organizations
run by the computer producers, by local organiza-
tions, or by in-house groups. Software maintenance is
largely done in-house. The effects of problems with
the infrastructure include:
? A reduced scope of applications that could be
implemented and longer development times because
of slow, unreliable hardware, small main memory
sizes, small disk sizes, and absence of peripherals.
Some of these constraints have been relaxed as
Soviet industry has continued to produce new mod-
els and upgrade old ones. At present, large disk
drives, terminals, data communications peripherals,
and the largest mainframe models are still in short
supply (Bukh86; Chum84b; Emm85; Skac86). N.
Moiseyev, who is Deputy Director of the Academy
of Sciences Computer Center and a full member of
the Academy's Department of Information, Com-
puter Technology, and Automation, recently dis-
cussed this problem. He noted that:
There is another problem about which I cannot fail to
speak. Neither the variety nor the number of comput-
ers produced satisfy today's requirements. During
this five year plan their output is supposed to increase
2-2.3 fold. But we should note for comparison that in
certain countries that kind of growth in the produc-
tion of personal computers was achieved during the
80s in just one year (In the US, for example, a million
computers in this class were produced back in 1980).
No one can fail to be uneasy about the acute shortage
of terminals, especially color displays and plotters.
This reduces the capabilities of the computers to a
fraction. Because of the insufficient assortment of
computer hardware produced there are typical situa-
tions today in which an institution could solve eco-
nomic problems if it had a computer worth 10,000-
15,000 rubles, but it must use a computer in the ES
series and pay tens of thousands of rubles per year for
computer time. In such cases can there be any
question of computers showing a return? This gives
rise to a paradoxical situation-although there is an
acute shortage of computers, the present stock of
computers is being used at a level of less than 50
percent (Nemo86, p. 2).
Only this year have the Soviets started to cross the
threshold into larger capacity sealed disk drives.
? The inability to totally rely on the computer be-
cause of hardware failures and difficulty of obtain-
ing service. The mainframe models that are in
widest use still break down about once a week
(Seme84). It has been estimated that to bring about
the massive introduction of microcomputers
throughout the economy, models that are at least
two orders of magnitude or 10-20 times more
reliable 2 than these mainframes will have to be
created (Grom85; Mikh86d). There are no signs that
the newest ES models are any more reliable. N.
Moiseyev again explains:
Why is the problem of quality such an acute one?
Well because serious complaints have been presented
to computer manufacturers, they have immediately
passed them on to their plants which are the manu-
facturers of the various components, and they in turn
pass the buck to suppliers from another ministry, and
so on. There seem to be many at fault and no one to
call to account. The experience of the largest foreign
firms which manufacture computers shows that the
quality of the individual components must be checked
out not by the plants producing them, but by enter-
prises which stand at the end of the chain of computer
manufacturing. They bear full responsibility for the
finished product (Nemo86, p. 2). One of the major
goals of the newly created State Committee on
Computers and Informatics (GKVTI) is to improve
the provision of hardware and software maintenance
services (Deni86b). In 1985, it was said that the
Ministry of the Radio Industry provided service on
' The Soviets have published very little data about the reliability of
any computers. In 1984, data were reported for five mainframe
models (M-4030, ES-1022, ES-1033, ES-1040, ES-1055) used
between 1977 and 1983 by Minenergo. The mean time between
failures for these computers ranged from 53.3 hours (ES-1022,
1977) to 1,030.2 hours (ES-1040, 1983), with a mean of about 200
hours. More information about the reliability of machines used in
ASUP can be found in [Mche85, pp. 239-245].
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less than 40 percent of the computers it produced,
Minpribor provided it on less than 12 percent, and the
Ministry of the Electronics Industry offered no such
service whatever (Eg85d).
? Increased costs due to the necessity to maintain
hardware and software locally, and to fill in the
gaps left by the infrastructure.
? The difficulty of obtaining new machines and help
in migrating from old ones, leading to a tendency to
hang onto the old system longer than necessary.
? The inability to procure packaged software, leading
to increased local development of relatively poorly
tested and documented programs.
? Poor relations with software providers, leading to
incorrect specifications and the delivery of unusable
products.
? Poor user training and difficult-to-use systems
which alienate users. It is hoped that the new State
Committee on Computer Technology and Informat-
ics (GKVTI) will be able to signficantly improve the
infrastructure performance. The GKVTI is sup-
posed to establish a new nationwide chain of service
organizations which may considerably shore up this
part of the infrastracture (Deni86b).
The shortcomings of the infrastructure continue to
constrain ASUP to a certain extent. There are un-
doubtedly some managers who are unwilling to risk
having an ASUP primarily because of worries about
the computer industry's ability to deliver workable
systems. But over the past few years, users have
ceased citing hardware and software problems as their
primary concerns. As a recent participant in an
important roundtable discussion of ASU remarked,
sufficient hardware is available; now the problem is to
overcome the residual attitudes or so-called psycho-
logical barriers (Emm85). These attitudes are the
result of the way that the economic system structures
enterprise incentives.
Integrating ASUPs into the Soviet Management
Milieu
Four of the most widely implemented functions in
ASUP, using the Soviet names and acronyms, are
material technical supply (MTS), operational manage-
ment of basic production (OUOP), accounting, and
planning. Together they account for almost all of the
basic operations in the production cycle: constructing
initial and corrected five-year and yearly plan esti-
mates, estimating needs for supplies and keeping
track of inventories, scheduling and tracking produc-
tion, and accounting for all the activities of the
enterprise. Each of these ASUP functions has met
with a particular set of environmental problems which
has limited its usefulness.
Material Technical Supply. The chief characteristic
of the supply system in the USSR for producer goods
is the pervasiveness of shortages brought about by
taut plans and weak enterprise budget constraints.
Shortages lead to a climate of uncertainty, changes in
output mixes, poorer quality goods, the use of expedit-
ers to obtain goods, and a host of other practices that
generally fall outside the bounds of legitimate mana-
gerial activities.
Applications of computing to supply problems can be
divided into those concerned with formulating the
yearly supply plan and those dealing with mainte-
nance of inventories. Traditionally, the enterprise has
had direct control only over the requirements state-
ment drawn up by its purchasing department
(Ber176). Negotiations with the ministry for sufficient
supplies to ensure that plan targets can be met are
therefore of great importance (Linz86).
On the one hand, calculating supply needs would seem
to be an ideal ASUP application. In enterprises
without significant data processing capabilities, the
MTS department can be overburdened with informa-
tion leading to errors, delays, and the inability to
carry out calculations for optimization, more than one
scenario, and daily or short-horizon use. Require-
ments must be defined well in advance because of the
tremendous calculations involved (Soko80b). Recent
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evidence indicates that technical oversight of enter-
prises at the ministry level is becoming more sophisti-
cated, so that only through well-supported calcula-
tions can an enterprise succeed in negotiating higher
allocations (Linz86). Because of the symbolic legiti-
macy attached to computer output and the conve-
nience of doing multiple calculations during the plan-
ning process, the incentives to use this part of the
ASUP would seem to be large.
On the other hand, the standard methodology of
formulating supply requests in ASUP, which uses lists
of goods which comprise every product to produce
total estimates of supply needs, presents definite
problems for the enterprise. First, most enterprises do
not receive their portfolios of orders until about a
month before the next year. However, they must
submit requests for metals 125 days in advance and
requests for all other materials 45 days before the
beginning of the year (Stos86). Enterprises must
therefore use estimates of what they think the final
plan will be, which undoubtedly throws off the com-
puter calculations of needed parts, subassemblies, and
raw materials.
Second, enterprise directors would like to pad the
requests in order to include a safety factor. In a
computerized environment, this could entail systemat-
ically falsifying data, e.g. for how much material is
required to produce a certain good, or altering select-
ed computer outputs (Buni85). The former solution
would result in inconsistent data in various parts of
the data base or in the propagation of errors to other
calculations. The latter solution might be easy to
detect. Currently, enterprises that are caught falsify-
ing data can sometimes use "calculating errors" as an
excuse; presumably this would be more difficult to
pull off in a computerized environment (Linz86).
Planning from the achieved level, which is still the
principle planning technique, may render computer
calculations irrelevant or unnecessary. Here the min-
istry faces a dilemma because if it does ascribe
greater legitimacy to computerized requests, enter-
prises would be given an effective license to pad. In
the case of Barnaul Radio Factory, which has one of
the most widely publicized ASUPs, the ministry
continued to cut allocation requests even when accu-
rate computer reports were supplied (Podk79). In
other cases, the ministry insisted on plans that were
proven by computer to be unfulfillable. Soviet enter-
prises reportedly have a good deal of success in hiding
their true production capacities (Rume86).
Once the yearly plan has been defined, the computer
can be used for inventory maintenance tasks. In the
West, a major goal of manufacturing resources plan-
ning (MRP-II) systems is to combine information
about demand, goods on hand, and production capaci-
ty to minimize inventory carrying costs while ensuring
smooth production processes. Such applications re-
quire accurate databases. Many of the reports which
are produced by the MTS subsystem in ASUP con-
cern current stock levels, but even here there are often
substantial discrepancies between the database and
actual stock (Emm85b).
More importantly, MRP-II assumes an environment
in which orders can be placed at will in order to
respond to changing conditions. Soviet inventory lev-
els are "basically defined by the lot size of the
delivery, which depends on the producer and the
transportation system" (Soko80b, 230). At the L'vov
TV Plant, which has one of the premier ASUPs in the
Soviet Union, a computerized production monitoring
system was set up which was designed for supply
precision calculated in minutes. However, supplies
would be planned with a precision of three to four
months. Consequently, work time losses, which were
supposed to be significantly reduced by the ASUP,
barely changed (Glus81). In any case, norms for
enterprise stocks of production goods are established
by directive from above rather than being determined
on the basis of many dynamic factors (Golo80c,
Soko80b). Managers have a greater desire to fulfill
basic plan targets than to meet targets for reducing
inventories. The lack of enterprise autonomy excludes
the most sophisticated inventory planning and mainte-
nance techniques.
Some Soviets hoped that the computer could be used
to overcome some of the difficulties with the supply
system. S. Golobokov, for example, hoped that includ-
ing transportation costs in calculations for optimal
delivery sizes, formulating a computer-generated
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graph that could nail down an hourly delivery sched-
ule, and keeping track of suppliers' shipments would
provide a means of forcing suppliers to be more
responsive to producers' needs (Golo80c). In 1983,
Golobokov wrote a scathing assessment of the supply
situation in metallurgy, reaching the conclusion that
"under (current supply) conditions, electronic comput-
ers will not help at all" (Golo83). Both the suppliers
and the railroad, who could fulfill their plans without
regard to the final result, were at fault for wide
variations in regularity of supplies. Golobokov
concludes:
The slow renovation of organizational fundamentals
of administration of the enterprise provides rich soil
for the development of false methods of solving
problems. Certain managers still place great hopes in
the utilization of electronic computers for strengthen-
ing of economic ties. This is partially explained by the
considerable number of technical specialists who are
engaged in economic and administrative problems.
These ideas are quite common among specialists of
information and computer centers in nonferrous met-
allurgy. But the solution to organizational and eco-
nomic problems cannot be reached by technical and
economic-mathematical methods alone (Golo83).
Despite various changes in economic incentives, fun-
damental disruptions in supplies are likely to continue
as long as the plan is taut and supplies are planned
centrally (Ber176; Dyke85b; Schr82). The 12th Five-
Year Plan is one of the most taut in recent history.
Starting with the "Kosygin" reforms in 1965, at-
tempts have periodically been made to introduce
direct supplier-consumer contract relationships in or-
der to short-circuit the supply bottlenecks. However,
these contracts have always been planned in some
fashion from above (Ber176; Ryav75; Sohr7l). The
provisions of the contracts are supposed to be enforced
by state arbitration, but enterprises are unwilling to
risk their relationships with their suppliers by taking
them to court (Prav84h).
In the early 1980s the trend in supply was toward
more centralized control of goods by Gosplan, Goss-
nab, and specially designated organizations (fund-
holders) in goal-directed programs (Sohr82). Phil
Hanson has reported that the wholesale trade system
is to be expanded, not through free trade, but through
greater control of Gossnab (Hans86g). It is possible, of
course, that some direct ties will be permitted free of
interference, and there is some evidence that steps in
this direction are being taken (Moze86; Moze86b).
But even the proponents of these steps admit that
central control cannot be dismantled entirely and that
an "optimal" center-periphery relationship must be
found (Moze86b). A more intriguing possibility, which
requires further research, is that the computers used
in Gossnab will permit more efficient supply alloca-
tions and redistributions (for example, Stos86).
Production Management. Many Soviet authors con-
sider production management in general, and the
operational (or short-term) management of basic pro-
duction (OUOP) subsystem in particular, to be of
greatest importance in ASUP (Siny83b; Soko80b). A
survey of a number of Soviet enterprises showed that
about 40 percent of production losses were due to lack
of synchronization of production and poor coordina-
tion and incomplete organization of supply. The
OUOP subsystem is said to be able to reduce produc-
tion losses by 50-60 percent (Mami8lb). Experts
surveyed in 1983 used results from a survey of 103
enterprises as a starting point. They concluded that
savings such as a 7.35-percent reduction in waste and
reductions of 3, 7 and 4 percent for equipment, shop,
and enterprise outlays, respectively, are possible
(Kruc83). The evidence that such gains have been
realized, however, is inconclusive. Most of it is based
on formal calculations of "economic effectiveness"
which are at best problematical, and at worst, deliber-
ate distortions (Mche85).
Unlike Western production management systems-
which integrate functions spanning order entry, inven-
tory management, accounting, purchasing, and ship-
ping-Soviet operational management systems have
been concerned for the most part with only two of
these functions, planning and accounting. ASUPs in
the 1970s were often delivered with a number of
discrete subsystems, each of which contained a rela-
tively small number of applications. A great deal of
the old work scheduling system remained intact,
precluding the use of capacity planning and optimiza-
tion techniques (Mche85).
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The planning tasks which were considered typical for
operational management in the early 1980s included
taking production targets and translating them into
specific targets for subassemblies and parts, and
creating calendar plans for production, assembly,
release, and acceptance of parts and assemblies
(Kruc83). Optimization was still excluded because
capacity planning and inventory modules were not
integrated. Only within the last two years have de-
scriptions of multi-level, multi-machine, on-line man-
agement information systems appeared in the Soviet
press (see page 33). It is only when sufficient terminals
are located on the shop floor that sufficient data can
be collected to make detailed planning models possi-
ble. Thus, it appears that Soviet operational manage-
ment systems have not reached the level of sophistica-
tion of the Western MRP systems that have been
adopted in many corporations since the late 1970s
(Hoar8 1).
Generally, one of the major advantages of MRP-II is
considered to be the ability to quickly recalculate
plans based on changing conditions. Soviet enterprises
have some ability to negotiate changed monthly tar-
gets, but yearly targets are rather firm (Linz86). If
supplies are late, a recalculated plan may be of no
value because it does not match up with the (un-
changed) official plan. Optimal operational plans cal-
culated in the oil industry, for instance, bore no
relationship to the official targets set from above, so
that in practice workers followed the plans handed
down from above in order to obtain bonuses (Bere82).
Planning calculations are based on a huge number of
norms which are in the database. In addition to the
fact that the norms may be set externally, and thus
reflect branch-wide standards or levels of perfor-
mance which are unobtainable in practice (Podv84;
Rut184), it is doubtful that norms are changed to
reflect temporary environmental changes. For exam-
ple, a foreman may choose to use less metal in a good
than the norm calls for in order to produce more and
fulfill the output plan. Unless the norms are changed,
the computer can only schedule the production of the
lower number of goods. In almost all ASUPs, the vast
majority of processing is not interactive, so that
foremen would have no ability to make such a change
without clearing it through the bureaucracy. There is
no evidence to suggest that ASUPs have any ability to
take into account other frequent "shocks" to the
production process such as brown-outs; absenteeism,
alcoholism, and shirking; and equipment breakdowns
and the poor quality of maintenance services (Schr85;
Trem82).
The second major function of the operational manage-
ment subsystem is to collect accounting information.
The accounting data that are collected are geared to
show the movement of goods throughout the produc-
tion process, the amount of unfinished production,
and the degree of plan fulfillment (Kruc83). The more
data available on-line for cross-correlation, the harder
it becomes for a manager to hide quasi-legal or illegal
practices. For example, managers must pay workers
even if there is no work to do because of supply
shortages (Feof85). However, an integrated MRP
system could easily leave an audit trail showing that
undeserved wages were paid. This may explain why
most of the reports which are generated are straight-
forward listings of basic quantities rather than analyt-
ical comparisons. These reports duplicate the output
of the previous manual systems and therefore do not
pose a great threat.
The relative absence of direct collection sensing de-
vices, which could be viewed as a function of the
failure of the instrument building industry, should
also be viewed as the result of lack of demand. Both
upper and lower level management have an incentive
to "cook the books" if necessary in order to show plan
fulfillment. The magnitude of this "simulation" is not
often large, but it can be critical, for instance, when it
is necessary to borrow output from next month to
cover shortfalls this month (Linz86). Data collected
directly from the shop floor will reveal the true state
of affairs in the enterprise to any and all auditors.
Accounting. Accounting is one of the most widely
implemented functions of the ASUP. In the 1970s,
40-50 percent of the calculations in ASUP were
devoted to it (Mche85). The latest evidence is based on
a 1984 survey of enterprises with ASUPs in Lithua-
nia. More than 70 percent of the tasks were consid-
ered to be of the "regulation" type, which may be
construed as accounting (Birb86).
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Enterprises can realize two important benefits from
computerizing accounting operations. The first is
eliminating hordes of clerks operating abacuses and
primitive data tabulation machinery. The second is a
streamlining of the entire accounting operation, in-
cluding the ability to put together timely new reports
which improve managerial decision making. In the
1970s, neither of these goals were fully realized.
Although some enterprises reported labor savings due
to ASUP, others reported that procedures became
more complicated and labor-consuming because of
partial automation (for example, see Balt79).
The traditional accounting system in enterprises con-
sists of three parts. Statistical accounting is geared
towards reporting plan fulfillment data in accordance
with requirements of the Central Statistical Adminis-
tration (TsSU), the State Planning Committee (Gos-
plan), and the ministries. Bookkeeping accounting, or
simply, bookkeeping, is oriented towards the needs of
financial organs such as the USSR Ministry of Fi-
nance (Minfin). Both of these types of accounting fall
under the control of the planning and economic
departments and the main bookkeeping office. Opera-
tional accounting, such as the operations included in
the production management and inventory subsys-
tems, arose because neither statistical accounting nor
bookkeeping could meet the expanding need for oper-
ational data that has been generated over the past two
decades by growing enterprise autonomy, the increas-
ing complexity of production, and the centralization
of bookkeeping functions.
Although there was a debate about redesigning the
entire accounting system to accommodate computing,
and some enterprises did reorganize document flows
(Gune77), the traditional accounting system remained
intact. Despite the presence of the computer, statisti-
cal and bookkeeping accounting continued to produce
the reports required by superiors while operational
accounting was built into other functional subsystems.
Analytical tasks, which might have integrated and
reconciled these data, fell through the cracks.
Since the late 1970s, there have been several initia-
tives to improve the bookkeeping subsystem in ASUP
and, more generally, the accounting services available
to enterprises. The All Union State Design Engineer-
ing Institute (VGPTI) of the Central Statistical Ad-
ministration has been assigned the development of
designs and software packages for enterprise account-
ing. The automation of accounting received a major
push from a resolution of the USSR Council of
Ministers "On measures for improving the organiza-
tion of bookkeeping accounting and raising its role in
the rational and economic use of material, labor and
financial resources (Jan. 24, 1980)." The resolution
turned over the task of organizing programs to create
a standard bookkeeping subsystem for enterprises to
the State Committee on Science and Technology
(GKNT), working with TsSU, Minfin, and other
organizations. This expanded program included the
creation of a special guidelines document specifically
for accounting (ORMM-uchet), due in the first quar-
ter of 1983, and the completion of a number of
software packages by the second quarter of 1985
(Polk83).
The ORMM-uchet guidelines, which were not ap-
proved until 1984, represent an attempt to impose
orthodox accounting methods on enterprises from
above. The fact that branch ministries and the TsSU
are reportedly working on improving primary ac-
counting forms in conjunction with the development
of these designs and software will make them more
palatable for enterprises (Po1k84). In the past, the
continued use of old forms negated many of the
advantages of using the computer (Shen86). The new
packages are supposed to include analytical tasks that
encompass all of the economic activity of the enter-
prise. Interactive data entry and analysis are included
for the first time (Mche85).
The impact of the new designs and software is likely
to be limited for a number of reasons. First, enter-
prises may be unwilling to adopt it if it entails major
reorganizations and modifications of existing soft-
ware. Second, the ORMM-uchet guidelines appear to
be directed at the centralized parts of the bookkeeping
system only. Discrepancies between operational and
other forms of data may persist if old methods of data
collection are continued. The use of keypunching and
data entry from paper tape is still widespread, leading
to numerous errors (cf. Blan84).
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Third, enterprises have a stake in maintaining some
discrepancies in any case. A manual or partially
automated system is more attractive because:
? Discrepancies are not discovered immediately, or
are never discovered.
? Calculations can only be done once.
? It is virtually impossible to respond to queries for
non-standard types of information due to the labor
intensity of calculations.
? Inaccurate results can be blamed on the use of
manual calculations.
? Bookkeepers have direct access to records. Account-
ing can be done by functional departments and
thereby remain under their control.
Enterprises need to be able to conceal true production
capacity, hoard stocks, pay overtime to workers dur-
ing storming periods, etc. In earlier ASUPs, the fact
that separate files were maintained for each subsys-
tem allowed the enterprise to continue its practices
relatively easily, while realizing gains based strictly
on replacing labor. The ORMM-uchet programs
would give enterprises far less control over their own
accounting practices. The new analytical tasks in
these software packages might easily reveal falsifica-
tion. An ASUP which used direct collection devices to
continuously monitor all important parameters and
included easily-used analytical tasks to process all this
data would leave an enterprise director naked before
his critics. Previous attempts to impose reform on
enterprise management through computerization have
more or less failed (Mche86i).
Planning. Besides accounting, the most frequent ap-
plication encountered in ASUP is planning. About 40
percent of ASUP calculations were devoted to it
according to data of the 1970s. [In Lithuania in 1984,
a survey of 15 enterprises showed an average of only
8.5 planning tasks per ASUP (Birb86).] Most of these
fall under the category of technical economic plan-
ning, or the creation of yearly plan targets in accor-
dance with the figures handed down by the ministry.
Savings from computerizing planning can come di-
rectly from replacing current procedures with auto-
mated ones and from using optimization.
In large Soviet enterprises, a tremendous amount of
effort goes into creating yearly plans. For example, at
the Moscow Electro-Mechanical Factory imeni Vladi-
mir Il'ich, more than 8,000 documents in the yearly
plan include about 400,000 lines and 4,000,000 data
items (Gord78). It can take six months of effort by the
enterprise planning-economic department to develop
the plan. Added to inevitable inaccuracies due to the
long lead times involved, the not infrequent changes in
plans by the ministry rapidly cause the plan to become
unbalanced (Dyke85b). Its recalculation takes 3-4
months, which means that complete recalculations are
more or less out of the question using manual
methods.
Thus, the savings from computerizing planning come
from: replacing manual labor, repeated use of con-
stant data, ability to check consistency and calculate
several options, and the ability to recalculate the plan
in response to changing conditions. It is undoubtedly
becoming harder and harder for Soviet enterprises to
continue calculating the plan manually, if only be-
cause of the shortage of labor which will grow more
acute during the next two decades. An important
criticism leveled against the new normative net pro-
duction indicator (which is replacing profits as a
prime indicator of enterprise performance) is that it is
much more difficult to calculate than previous indica-
tors were. If the enterprise plan remains in its present
form, some means of automating its calculation will
become indispensable to most large Soviet enterprises.
Optimal planning has been one of the key concepts
behind the widespread introduction of computers.
Isolated reports in the press suggest that some enter-
prises have been able to reap large benefits from its
use. The Barnaul Radio Factory was able to increase
production by 7 percent based on optimal planning
(Bobk78; Emm85b). According to the head of the
Central Economics and Mathematics Institute, N.
Fedorenko, optimization models reduce unit costs 5-7
percent, capital expenditures 8-10 percent, and oper-
ating expenses 6 percent (Fedo85).
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Nevertheless, the percentage of optimization applica-
tions being solved in ASUP has remained quite low.
Part of the problem is that optimization models have
been developed in isolation from the other tasks,
which meant that data had to be re-entered for their
use (Fedo85; Mikh83b; Solo79). But the main prob-
lems are environmental. If an enterprise runs an
optimization model which is unconstrained by direc-
tive targets from above, it is likely to come up with a
plan for which supplies will be unavailable. Enter-
prises have little incentive to produce close to maxi-
mum capacity (Fedo85). The central planning process
cannot be accomplished without "planning from the
achieved level" (Birm78), which is likely to render
unconstrained optimization irrelevant in any case.
Once the plan targets have been handed down from
above, enterprises have a greater incentive to use
optimization. However, targets are numerous. Very
few models use more than one optimality criterion,
and a feasible solution may not exist (Emm85c). In the
oil industry, for example, the ministry had to divide its
targets among its enterprises even though none of the
enterprises could actually fulfill them (Bere82). Mod-
els do not reflect the realities of the Soviet system:
The effectiveness of optimization calculations turned
out to be significantly less than expected because
designers have frequently underestimated the com-
plexity of the economic mechanism in general, and
the process of working out the plan, in particular.
Putting together the plan is a creative act, in which
an important role is played by difficult-to-formalize
information; the mechanism of combining the re-
quirements of optimality and reliablity (safety) is not
very clear; the practice of planning sharply differs
from the official instructions, and one may therefore
talk about two planning mechanisms - the real and
the normative. In ASU everything is built according
to the latter, and the results turn out to be inapplica-
ble in practice (Emm85, 551).
Out of 22 models created for the construction industry
only two had found practical use a decade later
(Golu8 1.) Many construction organizations wound up
rejecting the use of models after finding them inade-
quate (Mche85).
What happened to attempts to reduce metal content
in pipes illustrates how economic realities interfere
with optimization. The economic indicators of the
enterprises worsened, Gosplan did not consider the
plan to be acceptable, and even the consumers were
not interested because the optimal plan did not reflect
the necessary assortment mix. "In summary, it
(turned) out that reducing the metal content (was)
profitable only for the branch institute which pro-
posed the methodology and (dragged) the planners and
producers into a worthless affair which they (didn't)
need" (Emm85b, 752-753).
As optimization models become more flexible and
permit suboptimal solutions which are consistent with
Soviet conditions, enterprise managers will be more
willing to use them. At the Ministry of the Fish
Industry, higher officials permit trawler captains to
choose plans which are a 3-4 percent improvement
over traditional means, but another 7-8 percent worse
than the optimal. "When the economic mechanism is
improved, and the enterprise and the higher-up orga-
nization turn out to be interested in making decisions
which are closer to the absolutely optimal, we will be
ready for those changes, inasmuch as the technology
of forming trip assignments already contains the
corresponding optimization task" (Emm85b, 749).
The models that have had the most success have given
enterprise directors the ability to mimimize deviations
from the plan. The involvement of high level manag-
ers is paramount for success (Emm85b).
Providing Computer Services to Enterprises:
Other Options
The statistics on the number of ASUPs make it clear
that most enterprises are getting whatever calculating
services they use elsewhere. The number of organiza-
tions which have independent bank balances and are
in need of computing services for accounting and
planning is almost 600,000 (Myas82f). Perhaps many
actually have computers, but are not being counted in
the official statistics on ASUP? Perhaps the magni-
tude of computer usage by Soviet enterprises is being
grossly underestimated?
It seems clear that the answer to the first question is
no. First, multiple uses of ASUPs are rarely reported,
and when they are, authors are careful to explicitly
indicate them. The creation of libraries of software
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has been given much attention, yet it is very difficult
to put together a complete ASUP on the basis of the
available software (Deni86b; Emm85c; Mche85). Sec-
ond, ministries and design institutes would certainly
have an incentive to put their accomplishments in the
best light by counting each ASUP separately. Third,
because of the very high cost of most Unified System
machines, it is almost certain that enterprises who
acquired them would be compelled to develop an
ASUP or at least say they had. Less expensive SM
minicomputers have been directed mainly towards the
engineering community until the last few years and
have not shown up as the main computers for enter-
prise ASUP. Fourth, the official statistics are proba-
bly counting some ASUPs that are barely functioning
in any case.
Thus, these two questions can be boiled down to one,
which is: how are most Soviet enterprises getting their
calculations done? The present state of the computing
services industry is a result of the somewhat chaotic
thirty-year history of the introduction of computing
equipment in the USSR. Over the past 30 years the
bureacracy has been striving to achieve the goal of
mechanization of bookkeeping and other enterprise
calculating operations.
The success of this drive has not been complete,
however. As of 1986, for example, labor and wage
calculations were mechanized at only 73 percent of
enterprises. Only 22 percent have "integrated mech-
anization," meaning that all operations from data
collection to final printing involved some form of
mechanization with results from one stage directly
usable at the next (Budy86; Isak8O). In the largest
republic, the RSFSR, one quarter of the data pro-
cessed by the TsSU is done on the "bookkeeping"
class of machines, which consists mainly of adding
machines or adding machines with text printing capa-
bilities (Guzh86). In Georgia, only 10 percent of
accounting and reporting information is produced
using mechanization (Basa86), and the degree of
mechanization in the Turkmen and Armenian repub-
lics is also low (Budy86).
The following sections examine in greater detail the
services which are being offered for users that do not
have ASUPs. They discuss the overall automation of
the TsSU system, which is a major supplier of
computing services; the evolution of the small book-
keeping machines into microcomputers; the regional
level of the TsSU system, where punch card tabula-
tors are still in use; the growth of the State Network
of Computer Centers; other options for obtaining
computing services; and finally, the challenge of
integrating microcomputers into the overall data pro-
cessing strategy.
The sections show that the computing infrastructure,
when faced with the task of providing equipment to a
much larger number of organizations than were im-
plementing ASUPs, did not perform as well as it did
in producing large mainframes. The problems caused
by the surrounding milieu are not as visible because in
many cases Soviet managers have yet to confront
them.
Overall Automation of the TsSU System
Although one might expect that by the middle of the
1980s, the chief data processing organization in the
most centrally controlled economy in the world would
have totally replaced the use of punch cards, table top
adding machines, and other obsolete devices with
computers, this is not the case. By 1980, only 60
percent of the total work carried out by the TsSU was
performed on computers (table 2).' Almost all of this
work was concentrated in a few large centers: in
Moscow, in regional capitals, and in oblast' capitals.
Regional and city computation organizations carried
out almost 40 percent of the TsSU work without using
computers at all.
Table 2 shows the rate distribution of TsSUs in total-
work and work using computers in the late 1970s. The
data imply that about 2.6 percent of the work was
transferred to computers per year. Data for the
RSFSR, which must represent a substantial fraction
of the total work, show that the same rate of comput-
erization took place in the 1981-86 period (Guzh86).
The percentage of calculations carried out on com-
puters in 1980 in the RSFSR TsSU system was 41
' In this paper the term computer refers to electronic, digital, stored
program computers. The Soviets call other forms of calculating
devices computers, for example, as in a "punch card computer"
which is a tabulator, sorter, and so forth.
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Table 2
Hierarchical Work Distribution and
Work Using a Computer, TsSU
All Computer Centers
Union Level, TsSU
Republic Level, TsSU
Autononous Republic,
Kray, Oblast' Level
Regional and City Infor-
mation Computer Centers
Machine Calculating Sta-
tions of Autonomous Re-
public, Kray, Oblast'
Regional and City Informa-
tion Computing Stations
and Machine Calculating
Stations
Total
Work (%)
Work With
Computer (%)
1977
1980
1977
1980
52.0
60.2
100.0
100.0
3.1
3.6
6.8
6.9
7.2
8.3
19.4
17.2
24.5
28.4
51.8
53.0
17.2
19.9
22.0
22.9
0.2
0.2
47.8
39.6
percent, rising to 57 percent in 1986. The rate of
introduction of Complexes of Economic Data Process-
ing (KEOI), which are part of the Automated System
of State Statistics (ASGS) and which automate the
processing of a particular important indicator, also
shows a slow, gradual increase over the last decade
(Bush83b; Gorb8lc; Koro86b; Maty86). If this gradu-
al rate of introduction continues, it will take roughly
until the year 2000 to totally re-equip the TsSU
system with computers. This goal of total elimination
of the obsolete equipment has been articulated, but
without a completion date. A more modest goal has
been selected for the 1986-90 period: eliminating
punch card and paper tape entry data technology
(Arzh86).
The way that any particular enterprise gets comput-
ing services depends on its size and its departmental
affiliation. A 1984 textbook on mechanization of
accounting describes three basic types of computing
organizations. The Machine-Calculating Bureau
(MCB) usually has the so-called "keyboard" ma-
chines ` and carries out simple work for calculations,
arranging primary accounting data and putting to-
gether single-and multiple-column tables and mone-
tary-related documents. MSBs handle less than
200,000 document-lines per month. The next class
consists of Machine-Calculating Stations (MSS) and
Information Computing Stations (IVS). These organi-
zations have at least two tabulator sets and a full
complement of keyboard machines. (Machine-Calcu-
lating Stations probably become Information Com-
puting Stations as their equipment is upgraded.) They
carry out full accounting operations and process
200,000 to 2 million document-lines per month. Infor-
mation Computer Center (IVTs) are equipped with
one or more universal computers and other equip-
ment, including punchcard and keyboard machines.
They handle more than 2 million document-lines per
month (Oshe84).
Each of these organizations may be created for one
enterprise, may belong to a branch and service only
enterprises in that branch, or may belong to the
TsSU. Enterprises and affiliated organizations which
do not have separate financial status from their parent
organizations must use centralized bookkeeping ser-
vices (Marg79). For medical, educational, and agricul-
tural organizations, these services are provided by the
Central Statistical Administration itself. Table 3 pre-
sents partial information on the distribution of com-
puting centers in the TsSU system. There were almost
10,000 computation centers as a whole in 1978 in the
USSR, so the TsSU system comprises about 30
percent of the total (Dubr83). By 1984 there were
about 4,000 computation centers throughout the
USSR equipped with computers (Mikh84). Even with
consolidation and upgrading, there still must be a
rather sizeable number of calculation centers that still
use punch card and "bookkeeping" technologies.
? A "keyboard" machine ranges from a desktop calculator to a
small microprocessor-based computer. These devices are examined
in detail below. The Soviet word for computing also carries over
into the term "computer center", although there may be no
computer present. In this work the term computer center means
that computers are present. Computational center is the used as the
more generic term. The Soviets also sometimes use the word
network to mean a system, where no network is actually implied.
Here the word system will be used as appropriate.
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Table 3
Number of Computing Establishments in the TsSU System
Total Computing Establishments 2,966
Total Computer Centers 410
Computer Centers (union, republic, oblast') 167
Computer Centers (regions, cities) 243
Total Computing Stations 2,556
Machine Calculating Stations (regions, cities) 596
Information Computing Stations (regions, cities) 1,960
2,911 2,862 2,868
502 510
The TsSU provides computer services for about
91,000 organizations. In 1982, only 13 percent of the
information coming from these organizations was
actually processed using a computer (Bush83b). By
1982, the TsSU had introduced integrated mechani-
zation of accounting at 3,184 agricultural enterprises,
676 central bookkeeping establishments, and 820
enterprises of "user cooperation" (Bush83b). Integrat-
ed mechanization of accounting has been introduced
at about 400 agricultural organizations per year over
the last decade (Bush83b; Gorb8lc). Central book-
keeping establishments usually handle the bookkeep-
ing chores for as many as seven or eight organizations
in the same field, such as child care centers.
The extent to which the central bookkeeping organi-
zations (TsB) rely directly on the TsSU is illustrated
by data from the Poltava region. There are about 600
TsBs serving 5,739 budget organizations and 54 TsBs
for 483 self-financed enterprises and organizations in
the region. Only 143 TsBs are considered large
enough to be amenable to mechanization. Of these,
131 use the services of the regional TsSU (Bukh86).
These data provide one measure of the extent to which
organizations in the economy have access to comput-
ing services.
Despite the drive to bring computers into the TsSU
system, a rather substantial number of the organiza-
tions it serves still receive services that are based on
older technologies. The next section examines one of
these, the small "bookkeeping" computers, and the
following section examines the replacement of punch
card devices.
The Evolution of Bookkeeping Computers
Over the past two decades, the Soviets have produced
or imported over 50 types of electromechanical and
electronic devices which have been specifically geared
towards bookkeeping and statistical operations. These
machines are usually divided into three classes. "Key-
board" machines include desk-top adding machines
and "factographic" machines, which do some mathe-
matical operations and also allow printing of text.
"Punch card" machines are tabulators, sorters, and so
forth that do data processing with large sets of
punched cards. Electronic digital computers range
from large mainframes to microcomputers. A review
of the most widely used machines shows the very
limited capabilities for data processing which have
been present in the Soviet Union over the last decade.
According to a 1984 textbook on data processing,
various types of adding machines are finding greater
and greater application for processing accounting and
planning information by workers right at their work-
places. They are also used for checking the results of
other forms of processing involving punch cards and
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computers. The machines include a number of the
Askota series, imported from the GDR, and the Iskra-
108 which is an adding machine with a paper tape
(Aver79; Oshe84). In addition to these adding ma-
chines the Soviets have a number of calculators, both
of the table top size and microcalculators. One gets
the impression that unlike in the United States, where
hand-held calculators have replaced just about all
other forms, the Soviets are still using a much greater
variety of equipment.
The next class of machine is the keyboard computer,
which can be broken down into two subclasses. These
are machines which have been specifically designed
for a limited range of bookkeeping operations. (We do
not think that they have counterparts in the West.)
Bookkeeping machines can perform addition and sub-
traction and have full typewriter keyboards for insert-
ing text. The East German Askota-170 series is
considered to be one of the best examples of this
machine class. It has up to 55 registers for holding
intermediate calculations and can be connected to
devices to perform multiplication and to punch paper
tapes. Bookkeeping machines are used in small enter-
prises for putting together multi-column reports and
for general data processing operations. They may also
be used, when there is an ASU, as devices for local
data collection and punching of paper tapes which are
sent to the computer center (Oshe84).
Electromechanical "factographic" machines print
text and carry out calculations, so they can be used to
formulate specific reports. The report format is pro-
grammed, the data are typed in, and then the report is
automatically produced. Each electromechanical
model produces only one type of report. These ma-
chines are being widely replaced by electronic facto-
graphic machines (Oshe84). The Zoemtron 380 series
has been one of the most widely used in the USSR,
with thousands of machines imported yearly; it has
been one of the main machines used at MSBs
(Bobr7l; Mikh8lb; Yaro8lb). The Zoemtron 385
prints at a speed of 14 characters per second and takes
from four to 500 milliseconds for the basic mathemat-
ical operations. It has 100 slots for program com-
mands; each slot corresponds to a space on the
typewriter carriage (Tikh77). Even though the Zoem-
tron can be programmed, the types of programs that
can be written revolve around doing mathematical
operations in columns. Thousands of these machines
have been exported by the GDR to the USSR, and
replacements for them were just beginning to be
produced in the early 1980s (Mikh8lb). In addition to
the Zoemtron machines, the Iskra 23 series is also
widely used. Production of this machine, which in-
cluded 512 ferrite core bytes of memory and had no
ability for error checking ceased only in 1982
(Term83). Production of yet another electronic facto-
graphic machine (the EFM-1-6446) began in 1982
(Term83).
The most powerful of the keyboard machines are now
reaching the capabilities of general purpose micro-
computers. However, they are still highly oriented
towards bookkeeping operations and represent an
evolutionary process of design. The first models of the
Iskra series appeared in the early 1970s (Yaro8lb).
The Iskra 525, for example, was intended for stand-
alone data processing in small organizations. Unlike
the Zoemtron series, it could accept input from
magnetic tape, had an 8 KByte read-only memory,
and could accomodate up to 99 columns in the output
document (Alek76; Oshe84). The Iskra 534 entered
series production in 1978 (Bbsw83j). This machine
had a ferrite core main memory of at most 8,912 bits
(in practice this may have been only 1 Kbit)
(Yaro8lb). It had 253 registers, could handle 31-
column tables, and had a magnetic card memory on
which programs could be stored (Kach78; Koro83;
Oshe84). The Iskra 534 was the first to use a "lan-
guage for bookkeeping machines" (YaMB), which is a
combination of assembly language-like operators for
manipulating registers and higher level commands for
control such as loops (Yaro8lb; Zavo84). While it
may be completely general for producing bookkeeping
documents, it would be extremely difficult to use as a
general programming language.
On the heels of the Iskra 534 came the Iskra 554, the
Iskra 555, the Iskra 2106, and the Neva 501. The first
production runs of the Iskra 554 appeared in 1979
(Yaro8lb). The Iskra 554 was the first machine of
that class to use semiconductor memory. One configu-
ration was intended primarily for replacing the Iskra
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534, but others included a casette tape storage device.
It performed about 1,000 operations per seoond
(Yaro8 1 b). Production of the Neva 501 and its stand-
alone version, the Iskra 2106, began in 1981, although
it was not until modernized versions started coming
out in 1983 that the full main memory amounts
became available. They are now in series production
(Gold85). The Neva 501 and Iskra 2106 are both
implemented using the K580 chip, which is a copy of
the Intel 8080 chip (Stap85d). The Neva 501 can be
connected to a floppy disk drive, while the Iskra 2106
is more like an intelligent terminal. Obtaining service
for both these machines has apparently been quite
difficult, as it can be done only at the plant in Ryazan'
(Vest86h). The Neva-501 will not be sold without the
user sending someone to be trained for maintenance
at the factory (Term83).
The larger Iskra 555 uses the K589 series chip set (see
Stap85d). It entered production in 1983 (Bbsw83j),
and according to another author is now in mass
production (Gold85). This machine can use both flop-
py and hard disk drives, and can run up to eight of the
smaller machines in a local terminal configuration
(Koga85b; Zavo84). Some Iskra 554 and 555 models
can communicate with SM minicomputers, making it
entirely possible to use them in hierarchical data
processing systems (Koga85b). In 1986, it is intended
to produce the Iskra 556 and Neva 502 "third-
generation" electronic bookkeeping machines and ter-
minals. Both the Iskra 555 and Neva 501 currently
have small operating systems which are stored in read
only memory; the new models will include .more
complete OS software (Koga85b). In 1986-1990, all'
regional centers of the TsSU are supposed to get at
least two "modern microcomputers" (Vest86i).
In competition with these four machines is a new
generation of bookkeeping and office machines from
East Germany. The Robotron 1355 and 1711 were
introduced in the early 1980s as replacements for the
Askota and Zoemtron series (Krak82; Mikh8lb). The
Robotron 1720 and 1840 are more powerful, general
purpose machines which still fall into the bookkeeping
class. By 1981, at least 120 Robotron 1840s had
already been imported (Mikh8lb). The TsSU in par-
ticular chose the Robotron 1720 (along with the Iskra
2106) to replace the electromechnical machine stock
(Bush83b). By 1985, 10,000 Robotron 1720 devices
had already been exported to the USSR (Pole85).
Three office computers, the A5110, A5120, and
A5130, are also being exported. They apparently have
some compatibility with the YaMB language.
Over the last few years, most of the attention of
Western analysts who are following enterprise level
computing has been focused on the assimilation of
large, general purpose computers in ASUP (Cave83;
Mche85). ASUPs were built in many large, important
enterprises, but the vast majority of enterprises did
not have access to large mainframe computers. For
the most part they were using bookkeeping machines.
It is safe to say that, at least until 1980, almost all of
these users had to make do with glorified calculators
that could print multi-column reports, or carry out the
operations by hand with adding machines or abacuses.
In 1982, it could still be said that the Central
Statistical Administration had "a large stock of small
electromechanical and keyboard machines" (Bush83b,
42). Sometimes the data could be punched onto paper
tape for later use, but in many instances accounting
was being done in a fashion that made further use of
the data extremely difficult. When it was necessary to
compare data from a previous period, it all had to be
re-entered (Pars86). The range of information avail-
able to enterprise managers was limited to those
standard reports which could be produced on these
kinds of machines by the data processing staff. When
one considers the staggering number of indicators
which go into the tekhproniinplan alone, one appreci-
ates the magnitude of the tasks faced by these
departments.
The new generation of electronic bookkeeping ma-
chines have the potential, according to the staff of a
Ministry of Construction computer center, to "radi-
cally alter the way accounting is done" (Yavs83, 3).
Although the Iskra-534 came out near the beginning
of the 1980s, it is only within the past three years that
applications using all of these machines have started
to appear (e.g. Baby86; Lady86; Levi86c; Koga85b;
Mukh86; Seme86; Vlas85c; Vest86h; Vest86j;
Yako86d). The TsSU has been working on standard
designs for bookkeeping which will make use of the
Iskra 555 and the Robotron A5110 (Baby86; Nefe86;
Polk84).
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One of the most important advantages of using micro-
computers is the fact that the bookkeepers will finally
have a machine with which they can interact directly
(Daga84). A tremendous amount of time is spent on
"primary accounting," or collecting and preparing
data for other stages of processing. Even at enterprises
with ASUPs, primary accounting is often performed
manually or with the use of the low-capability facto-
graphic machines. The sad state of primary account-
ing has continued to be a great concern, being blamed
in part for the numerous errors and exaggerations
that often occur in enterprise data (Baby86; Doma86;
Koro86b; Vest86d). Delays in collecting data on-site
also lower the effectiveness of centralized bookkeep-
ing, the next level of accounting using computers
(Yego86).
Replacing Punch Card Computers
It is not an exaggeration to say that the foundation of
calculations in the Soviet Union from the late-1950s
to at least the mid-1970s consisted of punch card
devices: tabulators, sorters, etc. The following account
from the textile industry is probably typical:
The application of these machines did not give a
significant effect, since their operational capabilities
did not make it possible to check for arithmetic
mistakes and the balance between indicators; it only
slightly speeded up the control calculation and re-
duced the labor-intensiveness of the process of entry.
Errors in the associated reporting indicators were
revealed in the old way-by hand, and it was not
always possible to check all economic relationships.
At the time of receiving reports many highly qualified
specialists almost fully switched over to checking
reporting indicators, in as much as the quality of the
checking depended on qualified checkers. Much time
was spent analyzing the results of the activity of the
enterprise (B1ok82).
In the late 1960s and early 1970s the TsSU moved in
two directions to replace punch card machines. For
the very largest computer centers-at the union,
republic, and oblast levels-Minsk-22 and Minsk-32
computers were used along with Unified System (ES)
computers. In the 11th FYP the process of replacing
Minsk-32 computers with ES machines continued
(Bush83b). The main computer center of the TsSU
was slated to get an ES-1060 and an ES-1055, the
republic level centers were to be equipped with ES-
1045 and ES-1035 machines, while the oblast level
centers were to get ES-1035, ES-1033, and ES-1022
machines. In the 12th FYP, every oblast level com-
puter center is supposed to receive at least two more
ES mainframes (Vest86i).
The hardware and software limitations of the ES
machines have been discussed elsewhere (Davi78;
Hamm84; Mche85). Some of these problems include
too little main memory in the initial configurations,
insufficient disk space, lack of terminals and other
peripherals, low reliability, missed shipping dates for
the newer and larger models, inability or unwilling-
ness to use the computers in multiprogramming mode,
and software which was not tailored to meet users'
needs. These problems probably affected the Central
Statistical Administration less than other users be-
cause in its KEOIs it had a standard way of process-
ing certain indicators and because interactive process-
ing was not all that important for crunching large
volumes of statistics. However, the KEOIs are said to
be inflexible and do not necessarily automate all parts
of the data processing cycle (Doma86). It has proven
economical to use M 5000 computers in separate
phases (Ivan83k; Yaku8lc).
The second direction was the development of the M
5000 as a replacement for punch card machines at the
regional (rayon) level, a process which began in the
mid-1970s (Lerm8l). The M 5000 is a general pur-
pose 16-bit minicomputer that has an operating sys-
tem and translators for languages such as COBOL,
RPG, and PL/I (Mits81). It has been said to be based
on the DEC PDP-8. The M 5010 differs only in the
addition of more peripherals, while the M 5100 has a
faster processor (Litv8l). Production of the M 5100
began in 1980 (Sov180), and installations of them
continued at least until 1985 (Karu85).
The M 5000 was also intended for use in ASUPs of
small and medium sized enterprises, but this does not
seem to have taken place to any great extent (Grin73;
Mche85; Novi80). In the 1976-80 period, the M 5000
series computers began to replace the punch card
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machines in the TsSU system (Bush82). In Lithuania,
where the M 5000 is produced, it comprised 2.5
percent of the computer stock in 1976, and 26.3
percent in 1980, more than all other types of comput-
ers (Novi83). At least by 1980, essentially all of the
regional and city computer centers of the TsSU were
equipped with M 5000 computers (Belo80d; Table 3).
As already noted, the All-Union State Design and
Engineering Institute (VGPTI) was assigned the de-
velopment of standard designs and software packages
for accounting subsystems in ASUP and for account-
ing at other organizations making use of the TsSU
system. The TsSU launched a program in the late
1970s to develop packages for 10 sectors of the
economy: industry, construction, agriculture, automo-
bile transportation, centralized bookkeeping at budget
organizations, trade and food supply, supply and sales,
housing, daily services, and scientific-research and
design-engineering organizations (Bart80; Dolg80;
Grin73; Neme82b; Polk8l; Voro83b; Yaku8lc). The
initial designs that were developed were based on the
M 5000. By 1981, 150 agricultural organizations had
installed an accounting system worked out by
VGPTI I based on this computer (Polk8l b).
Examples of successful regional use of the M 5000
show that the M 5000 accomplished the objectives set
for it (Neme82b; see also, Pili86; Rabo86). It auto-
mated the processing of accounting and reporting
data for numerous enterprises that could not have or
were too small to have their own computers (Avde86;
Neme82b). However, it is also true that in using the
M 5000 series, a decision was made to continue the
batch-oriented remote processing of data. Accounting
data processing was automated, but not in a fashion
that gave managers access to anything but predeter-
mined reports (Mali86). It was still necessary to
physically transport the primary data to the computer
centers, costly manual or partially automated book-
keeping practices remained at user enterprises, and
the reports went no further than a standard list of
values for the basic accounts of the enterprise (for
example, see Sido86b). Other reporting forms and
analytical tables had to be prepared manually
'The VGPTI was renamed VNIPIuchet (The All Union Scientific
Research and Engineering Institue of Accounting) in 1985.
(Polk8 1; Polk81 b). The need to use account codes
which were suitable for the computer led to many
mistakes (Polk84b).
In addition, it is hard to believe that any kind of
extensive databases could be built up with such small
disk sizes (1.3, 2.56, and 5.1 MBytes (Vasi86b)).
Moreover, serious complaints have been registered
about the quality of the M 5000 disks (Zhuy86). For
example, the SGR package, which has been widely
used on the M 5000 series, does not pre-sort the data
but accesses each piece randomly, presumably be-
cause of limited space (Avde86). In 1979 the M 5010
was being delivered with only 16 removable disk
packs, whereas the information for one medium-sized
agricultural enterprise required five or six (Belo80d).
Apparently because computer centers have tried to
stockpile as many of this and other expensive re-
sources as possible, norms have been derived for the
TsSU which link the number of disk packs allocated
to the number of tasks and the number of hours the
machine is used (Vasi86b).6
In 1980 it was decided that the M 5000 series should
move into the SM line. One reason for this was that
production of the SM-4 was three to four times as
large as that of the M 5000 machines (Gold85). In
addition, the disk sizes available for the M 5000 line
were small. The solution was to develop a computer
with two processors: one to execute the M 5000 line
commands, and the other an SM 1420, which is an
upgraded version of the SM-4 (Popk84). The SM
1600 passed state testing in 1981 and entered series
production in 1983 (Bbcw831; Neme82b). Experimen-
tal use of the SM-1600 in TsSU applications was
begun in 1983 and 1984 (Bush83b; Bush84; Ivan83k),
but full scale production of the SM 1600 did not occur
until 1984 (Greb86). Modernizations were planned for
1985 (Bbcw85r). The Soyuzschettekhnika Associa-
tion, which is TsSU's Main Administration for
6 Vasi86b gives a table showing what is apparently the number of
disk drives allocated by machine types. ES machines get four 29
MByte drives and one 7.25 MByte drive. M 5000 class machines
get four 5.1 MByte drives, two 2.56 MByte drives, and one 1.3
MByte drive. Another table shows the actual norms for ES
machines, which depend on volume of work and number of tasks.
The norms range from 65 to 193 disk packs.
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Accounting Equipment, was scheduled to put 70 SM-
1600 configurations in operation in 1985 (Gold85). In
Lithuania the replacement of the M 5000 line has
begun (Ivan86).
Is the SM 1600 an improvement? On the one hand,
its technical characteristics are much better than the
M 5000 series. It can have up to three 14 MByte disks
attached, for instance (Brus85). Main memory is 256
KBytes (four times greater than the M 5000), and is
expandable to 1 MByte (Neme82b). It can run DEC
operating systems, including TSX-Plus (Tsem85), and
can easily be tied into other SM machines. On the
other hand, according to one writer, use of the SM-
1600 will lead to few changes in the way that
accounting data are processed, since it does not have
sufficient terminal capabilities to allow a lot of inter-
active processing (Mali86).
Throughout the 11th FYP, VGPTI continued to work
on standardized systems of accounting using Unified
System machines. The main results have been for
state budget organizations in the health, education,
and "social-cultural" spheres (Yego84c). The design
developed by the Belorussian affiliate of VGPTI has
now undergone an extensive testing period. After
being test run at one institution in each field, many
changes were made; additional tests were performed
in other cities, and finally, the packages were turned
over to an interbranch software library (Tuz86). It is
estimated that this package could be used at 1,000 to
1,500 centralized bookkeeping organizations through-
out the country (Yego86). These standard designs
notwithstanding, only 11 percent of those organiza-
tions in the health field considered suitable have even
switched over to centralized bookkeeping. Another
4,000 are too small or for some other reason cannot
use centralized services (Zapo85).
Despite all of the progress made with the M 5000, SM
1600, and Unified System machines, there still ap-
pears to be a rather large complement of punch card
machines in use in the Soviet Union. In the Lithua-
nian TsSU system in 1979, for example, there were
just 16 computers, but 254 punch card configurations,
and around 4,000 keyboard calculators (Belo80d). It
was not expected to finish moving all the agricultural
enterprises in Lithuania to accounting using punch
card machines until 1980 (Belo80d; Bart8l). In the
early 1980s the Belorussian affiliate of VGPTI devel-
oped a new standard design for accounting which was
based on 45- and 80-column punch card machines.
This standard has been successfully assimilated by a
number of organizations; accounts of punch card
computer uses were considered newsworthy in 1985
(Buld85; Zhuk85d). In 1986, it was said that the
expenditures on both punch card and keyboard ma-
chines were going down slowly (Gorb86).
The Growing GSVTs System
Since the beginning of the 10th FYP, the TsSU, the
State Committee on Science and Technology, and
other organizations have been building up a series of
collective-use computer centers (VTsKPs) which
would become the backbone of the State Network of
Computer Centers (GSVTs) (Tg82). The VTsKPs
differ from the regional TsSU centers in that they
offer more services to their users. For instance, a
small enterprise can sign a long-term contract for a
complete ASUP using the VTsKP resources. The
VTsKPs are the means by which users can get more
services than standardized, batch-oriented accounting
on an M 5000 or SM 1600 machine.
The VTsKP are an outgrowth of the development of
the design for the State Network of Computer Cen-
ters (GSVTs) which was worked out in 1973
(Zhim76c). In the early 1970s, the All-Union Scientif-
ic Research Institute for Problems of Management
(VNIIPOU) advanced a plan for VTsKP which envi-
sioned 200 territorial centers serving 600,000 enter-
prises and organizations by 1990 (Kurg84; Zhim78b).
VTsKP may belong to the TsSU or to another
ministry or organization (Trud82d). Some offer ser-
vices within their own branches only. The TsSU
would probably like to have the entire GSVTs under
its direction, but that does not appear to be happening
(Tg82).
The VTsKP program was established as a key nation-
al problem in the plan for 1976-80 (Teri8O). Under
VNIIPOU's oversight, at least seven VTsKPs were
created in this period, four belonging to the TsSU
(Dubr81; Makh8O; Teri8O; Teri81). The intent seemed
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to be to take computer centers of any affiliation which
were already operating effectively, add resources, and
turn them into time-sharing centers that could sup-
port regional processing requirements (Kima84;
Lerm8l). In the 1981-85 period, the liquidation of
ineffective computer centers was planned, along with
the transfer of small users to VTsKP (Myas82e).
Because of the emphasis on the ability to handle
remote job entry, the presence of multimachine con-
figurations, multiprogramming, and DBMS, the ag-
gressive pursuit of full loads, and the services offered
to users, the VTsKP are among the best run and most
effective computer centers in the USSR (Gorb86).
One service planned, for example, was the develop-
ment of software engineering tools which could then
be used to more easily build software for users (Tg82).
In 1979, the State Committee for Science and Tech-
nology was working on selecting 45-50 computer
centers that could be upgraded to VTsKPs (Zabo79).
Originally it was intended to create 45 (Naus79;
Sed181), or 22 (Myas82e; Tg82) VTsKPs in the 1981-
85 period. Ten of these were within the TsSU system
(Taga83). It appears that somewhat less than 22
centers were built (probably about 17) (Baub84;
Bayz85; Bbc85c; Bele86; Bozi86; Ivan83k; Kalm84;
Khod85; Levi86c; Lvov85; Maks82; Myas82f;
Nesh86; Samo84; Shur86; Sult85; Telk84). The new
VTsKPs created in the 10th FYP were to use ES-
1035, ES-1045 and ES-1060 computers. Each center
was to be connected to 16-32 subscribers and have an
overall capacity of 0.9 to 1.5 millions of operations per
second (MOPS). (Subscribers sign long term contracts
with the VTsKP as opposed to users, who make use of
the VTsKP irregularly (Kvas84).) The data presented
in Table 4 show that the goals for number of subscrib-
ers have been met, but the overall computing power
has been less than intended.
In 1981-85, the second phase of the development plan
for the VTsKP in Minsk, Tallinn, Tomsk, and Tula
was to be implemented as well. This phase included
using mini- and microcomputers as remote processing
stations, doubling the processing capacity of the cen-
ters, and expanding to 40-60 remote job entry stations
per VTsKP (Dubr83). The Vil'nyus VTsKP has now
Table 4
USSR: Performance of First Collective
Use Computer Centers
Total
KOPS a
in Cen-
ter
Number
of Sub-
scribers
Number
of Tasks
Number
of Re-
mote
Users
Tula
800
33
460
22
Leningrad
310
30
239
9
Belorussian SSR
TsSU
420
26
122
18
a Thousands of operations per second (KOPS). The VTsKP in the
TsSU system are now located in Alma-Ata, Brest, Frunze, Kiev,
L'vov, Minsk, Samarkand, Saratov, Tallinn, Tomsk, Tula, Vil'nyus,
Vinnitsa, and Voronezh.
gone into operation with a dual ES-1045 configura-
tion and 26 initial user organizations. It has worked
on using the SM-4 and SM-1600 as remote processing
stations (Baub84).
Goals for creating more VTsKPs in the 12th FYP
have not been clearly articulated. As part of the
Intensification-90 program in Leningrad, it has been
planned to create a total of 45 VTsKPs by 1990;
however, the author's claim of 10 VTsKPs already
there in 1985 does not fit with the other statistics and
one wonders what definition of VTsKP is being used
(Lipk85). One author claims that by the year 2000,
the TsSU system will include 177 VTsKPs, and that
many other ministries and departments are developing
specialized VTsKPs (Cher86e).
Have the goals of the VTsKP program been met? The
number one goal was to put an end to inefficient
usage of computers at small computer centers. A
source of great concern to Soviet officials has been the
mean daily load of computers, which fluctuated from
9-10 hours a day to 12-14 hours per day in the 1973-
80 period (Mche85). In 1981-85 many ministries and
agencies continued to open new computer centers,
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despite these low loads (Khod85; Pere84c). A 1985
Pravda editorial stated: "Apparently the time has
come to restrain the unbridled growth in the number
of low-output computer centers and to decide the fate
of those that are not performing up to acceptable
productivity levels" (Prav85k). This is not the first
time that such statements have appeared, yet very
little progress has been made to shut down ineffective
computer centers. In 1986, the chairman of the new
state Committee on Information and Computer Tech-
nology stated that ES machines were being used, as a
whole, 11 hours every work day, and of those only 3-4
hours could be said to be useful calculations (that is,
running production jobs) (Deni86b).
The overall ES usage in the TsSU was only 13.6 hours
per day, or little better than the overall rate, but in
1985 it shot up to 20.3 hours, perhaps because this
was the last year of the FYP (Gorb86; Kost86).
Similarly, the average daily load in 1984 at VTsKP
was a little over 15 hours (Kvas84), but in 1985 it
climbed to 21 hours (Kvas85). This form of organiza-
tion was praised by the Pravda editorial (Kvas85;
Prav85k). The answer, therefore, is a qualified yes:
the VTsKPs do seem to make more efficient use of
computer time. But the number of them is still so
small that they cannot have made much of a dent in
the problem. The qualification is that the mean daily
load says little about whether or not useful calcula-
tions are being performed.
And what of providing services to users? Table 4
shows that the number of subscribers in the first
phases of VTsKPs has been quite low. With an
average of 30 subscribers per center, it will take a
huge number of centers to meet the demands of
600,000 organizations (Kvas85). There are three main
reasons why the number of subscribers is low.
First is the hardware base. With the exception of the
Novosibirsk center, which included three BESM-6s,
an ES-1052, an ES-1060, and various mini- and
microcomputers, these VTsKPs were built on the
basis of the ES-I upgrades, the ES-1022 and ES-1033
computers. At first, they were all equipped with 512
MBytes of memory (Teri80). The Tallinn center,
which was the largest of those controlled by the
TsSU, included a total of 739.5 MBytes of on-line
disk storage shared between three ES-1033 main-
frames, all of which were upgraded to include one
megabyte main memory (Myas82f; Kima84). This
hardware base reflects what was available in the
second half of the 1970s when design work on the
centers began. Throughout most of the 11th FYP, the
VTsKPs ran mainly on ES-1033s (Kvas84). In addi-
tion, the VTsKPs did not receive sufficient peripheral
devices and had to contend with integrating much
hardware and software (Mche85).
How much processing power do the VTsKPs need?
According to two researchers from VNIIPOU, each
center needs to have a total throughput of 100 MOPS
(Maks84). Another account related the goal of in-
creasing the processing power at VTsKP to 20 MOPS
in the 11th FYP (Myas82e). This was not met accord-
ing to the statistics in (Kvas85). At a similar center in
East Germany, 236 users, or about 10 times the
number of users at the Soviet VTsKPs, have their
work done on five ES-1055s, an ES-1040, and an
ES-1022 (Nort85). The plans for 1986-90 envision
giving each TsSU oblast center an additional two ES
mainframes (Vest86i). It is reasonable to assume that
the VTsKP will get at least this, but even this may not
be enough to serve the 1,000-1,500 users that were
originally projected for these centers (Zhim77). One of
the explicit goals of the joint CEMA "electroniza-
tion" program is to build a computer that can execute
10 billion operations per second. Such a computer
would be used for huge collective use centers
(Popo86b). In the meantime, the VTsKP will be
outfitted with whatever large Soviet ES mainframes
are available, including ES-III machines (Dani84b).
The second reason for the low number of subscribers
is the way the incentive system for the VTsKPs works.
Computer centers, including VTsKPs, are evaluated
on the basis of their mean daily load (MDL), or how
many hours the computer is running either production
or development jobs during the day (Bush83b). Natu-
rally, this gives computer centers little reason to care
whether or not those jobs have any value (Kany83).
The MDL has retarded the introduction of multipro-
gramming, although VTsKPs have done better in this
regard (Gorb86). The VTsKPs are self-financing orga-
nizations, which gives them a strong incentive to
operate in the black. However, it turns out that they
can charge outrageous prices for their services be-
cause state standards mandate that charges are by
hour of computer use, regardless of how the machine
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is actually being used during that time or whether or
not time sharing is being used. The pricing of services
at computer centers has long been problematical
(Golo86; Kute85; Kute86; Maka86). An article about
some students who were using the VTsKP in Tallinn
but then had to quit because of a price increase
provides the following interesting perspective:
Outside users at the TsSU pay the hourly rate for
machine time even during that time when a person at
a terminal is only engaged in data preparation and
input. While the person is really only using minutes or
even seconds of machine time, payment is for an
entire hour, from 90 to 135 rubles. True, last year
they started dividing these hours by the number of
people simultaneously using the machine, reducing
the costs. All the same, this is nothing but eyewash,
thanks to which VTsKP's taut financial plan is easily
fulfilled and overfulfilled. All VTsKP users know
this, and criticize it in the hallways, but do not want
to spoil their relationship with the management.
Anyway, the money is not out of their pockets, so it's
no bother. Referring to USSR TsSU instructions, the
VTsKP management claims some sort of "legal"
right to take this 12 fold price from users. However,
other computer centers (for example Gosstroy ESSR)
based upon the same country wide price list, have
been able to introduce programs which take into
account the actual use of machine time with a high
degree of accuracy. Above all, they exclude handwrit-
ten entries into logs, that is, make impossible exagger-
ation and wide ranging arbitrary action authorized by
"instructions" (Shur86, 2).
A third problem faced by the VTsKPs is actually
attracting users. The first results showed that few
industrial users signed on for complete ASUPs. One
of the reasons for this was the incentives the enter-
prises faced. At least until 1981, enterprises that
wanted to buy outside computer services had to do so
out of their budget allocations for the management
apparatus. Since decreasing the size of this apparatus
is one of the plan targets, increased expenditures for it
run counter to enterprise incentives (Myag8l). More-
over, prestige is still an important reason for acquiring
one's own computer center.
More importantly, it is doubtful that enterprises want
to put their primary data onto a computer that is
controlled by another organization. It is no secret that
one of the motivations for developing regional VTsKP
is to provide local and superior bodies with much
better information. At the present stage those organi-
zations have to settle, for the most part, for receiving
processed data from enterprises in the form of reports.
In 1986 the head of the RSFSR, P. Guzhvin, contend-
ed that "We will no longer tolerate such violations of
the principles of centralized accounting" (Guzh86).
The VTsKP will allow the TsSU to make direct use of
the enterprise data, which is already in machine-
readable form, for other purposes (Chum84b;
Emm85c; Many86; Vana86).
Other Sources of Computer Services
Enterprises have two other options for obtaining
computing services. In addition to using the comput-
ers of the TsSU, they may turn to computers in their
own branch, or to outside computers for time rental.
Branch computer centers (KVTs) share much in com-
mon with VTsKP, including organizational problems.
The overall conception is the same: to provide central-
ized computing services to a localized group of users.
The main difference is one of scale and subordination.
The KVTs are intended to serve no more than 10-20
users, all in the same branch (Maks78b). They com-
mand fewer resources than the VTsKPs, but are not
expected to do as much.
In 1978, more than 120 KVTs already existed in the
Soviet economy (Maks8O). The 1976-80 plan called
for the creation of 100 of them (Maks78b). No
information is available about whether these centers
were created from scratch or whether they were
already performing tasks for other users and were
given the name KVTs when it came into vogue. What
was once considered a KVTs at Glavtyumen'neftegaz-
stroy is now called a VTsKP (Maks78b; Myas82f).
Other examples of KVTs can be found in the litera-
ture (Agan8l; Aref82; Keri82; Miro79; Stro82d).
Particular success is claimed for KVTs in light indus-
try in the Belorussian republic. Seven centers operate
20 computers for 27 ASUs, so that 80 percent of the
information processed in ASUs is done at KVTs.
"From the moment they were put into operation,"
writes Ye. Volyanskiy, the director of the republic-
wide computer center for light industry, "the load was
greater than that planned, and in some cases is
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achieving more than 16 hours daily with three-shift
operation." The average cost of a machine hour in
1982 was about 50 rubles for ES machines and 29
rubles for Minsk-32s, which is said to be eight to 12
percent lower than at corresponding individual com-
puter centers. The republic branch computer center
has been able to run its ES-1035 under MVT for a
significant portion of the time (Voly83).
Unlike the VTsKP, which in some cases are installing
dedicated communications lines for their subscribers
(Bush83b), the KVTs are supposed to be limited to a
single city. Volyanskiy explains that telecommunica-
tions costs are too high for transmission of large
amounts of data, and that using a courier to transmit
the data outside of a city is "ineffective" (Voly83).
The departmental orientation of KVTs appears to be
an important advantage over the VTsKP. Specializa-
tion can allow the KVTs to better meet the needs of
its clients.
Over the last few years, the amount of computer time
rented has increased greatly thanks to the prolifera-
tion of computer centers and the need to fulfill the
mean daily load targets. According to one author,
something akin to competition for clients between
ministries and departments is taking place. In 1977
the majority of centers rented time, although the
amount rarely exceeded 25 percent (Ruvi75; Kvas77).
Eighty-five percent of computer centers in Moscow
served only one organization, probably reflecting the
fact that Moscow has been supplied with more com-
puters (Mosp82c). Statistics for the Lithuanian SSR
show a considerable fluctuation in the percentage of
rented time and a steady increase in the number of
renters over the period 1971-79 (Novi83). The greater
number of computer centers that have time to offer
has aroused considerable concern (Sido82b). Because
of the competition for clients, the tasks may actually
have no value (Kvas77; Sido82b).
Renting time has been facilitated in a few cities by
the establishment of a centralized dispatcher service
for unused time. The first was created in Kiev in
1977, followed by services in Alma-Ata and Tbilisi in
1978. Ten centers, including ones in Dnepropetrovsk,
Donetsk, Khar'kov, Kishinev, L'vov, Minsk, Moscow,
Odessa, Voroshilovgrad, and Zaporozh'ye were
planned for 1981-82 (Koro79b; Vedi8l). According to
VNIIPOU, they have won great popularity among
users and have done a big business. The dispatcher
agency at the computer center of the statistical
administration in Kiev sold 2 million rubles worth of
machine time annually during the years of the 11th
FYP (Pans86). Another benefit of the dispatcher
services was that they offered additional services to
the users. These include providing consultation to
users on formulating problems, finding standard soft-
ware packages as well as free machine time, storing
the user's data and programs in computer center
libraries, leasing hardware, transmitting data, and
checking data for correctness.
The dispatcher services were not without initial prob-
lems. One was gaining the participation of the city's
computer centers (Koro79b). Many ministries and
departments were not forcing their computer centers
to make time available, even though a resolution of
the interdepartmental council on problems of the
improvement of management of the national economy
required them to do so. A related problem is that the
computer centers only sent data on time availability
once every six months in accordance with a TsSU
form, which, of course, inhibited effective matching of
demand and supply (Vedi8l). The dispatcher services
ran into further roadblocks from the way payments
were handled, from Ministry of Finance regulations,
and the lack of exclusive control over time distribution
(Koro79b; Sido82b; Vedi8l). Now that the GKVTI
has begun emphasizing the use of computer time as a
high priority task, the role of dispatcher services may
increase (Pans86).
Of all the types of computer services available to an
enterprise, renting time provides the least support to
users (Kvas77). The main drawback of renting time is
that the renter is not responsible for the tasks solved.
Dispatcher services exist in no more than a handful of
cities, and the organizational questions attending their
creation have yet to be fully solved. Despite the
enthusiastic announcements related above, there is no
further evidence that the additional centers have been
created or that the others are still working. If no
agreement could be reached on paying for the basic
service, then it is doubtful that the other services have
gotten off the ground. An additional drawback is that
most computer centers do not have the capability of
offering remote processing services, causing users to
have to hand-carry their data across town (Ruvi75).
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The Challenge of Integrating Microcomputers
Unlike in the United States, where computers in large
corporations rapidly replaced older punch card tech-
nologies in the late 1950s and early 1960s, the
introduction of computers in Soviet society has oc-
curred at a much slower, steadier pace. Two of the
reasons for this are the production rates of large
computers and the costs associated with running
them. Installing computers in regional and city statis-
tical operations has not been possible because there
was not enough work to justify the large machines.
Conservatism is bred by a system that rewards yearly
quota fulfillment. Once a punch card or bookkeeping
machine is in place with all the associated mainte-
nance and supply channels established, it is hard for a
manager to replace it with a technology that may be
riskier. This is one of the reasons why even the
republic and oblast centers continue to use the older
technologies side by side with computers.
The most important consequence of the equipment
used is the style of management it engenders. Ac-
counting collects statistics about what has already
happened, often with significant time lags. Managers
submit data to computer centers which are often
located off-site and get back reports, having very little
influence over the quality of data entry or the presen-
tation of the results. Some types of equipment just
produce the reports without storing the data for
further analysis. The result can be nothing more than
speeding up the conventional way that Soviet enter-
prises are managed, rather than introducing new,
quantitative management techniques.
For the first time, terminals connected to minicom-
puters or microcomputers offer the possibility of
bringing significant computing resources right to the
workplace of bookkeepers, economists, and statisti-
cians. In the 1986-90 period, for example, every
administration in the central management of the
TsSU is to receive a minicomputer-based multi-termi-
nal configuration for local use (Vest86i). For the first
time in three decades, the trend towards centralized
processing of accounting data may be reversed. In the
1960s it was thought that the amount of data being
sent over telephone and telegraph lines would grow
very rapidly. The main source of all of this traffic was
to be VTsKPs (Shva86). However, by the 1980s it
became clear that the microprocessor would make an
entirely new strategy possible. According to members
of VNIIPOU, the GSVTs are now expected to carry
out only 20 percent of all calculations in the region.
The rest will be done on small computers or at local
user computer centers (Maks84). VTsKPs will be used
in conjunction with microcomputers, perhaps with
some of the micros being supplied by or rented
through the VTsKP (Levi86c; Maka86). This may
partially explain why it seems as if the rate of
introduction of VTsKPs has not lived up to expecta-
tions and why they have recently received less cover-
age in the press.
The challenge for the Politburo is to reap the efficien-
cies of the microcomputer without losing too much
control. One way to do this is to supply machines
which are highly oriented to specific tasks, such as the
Iskra-555 with its highly specific bookkeeping lan-
guage. The danger of samzidat being spread through
these Iskra machines or other automated workplaces
of bookkeepers is slight. These are machines which
are located in public places; their use can easily be
monitored. More threatening is probably the prospect
that the machines will be used for economic functions
which effectively hide problems in enterprise perfor-
mance much better than cooking the manual books
could. The advent of microcomputers marks the first
time that users, who actually know how to do such
things, will also be in control of their machines. The
TsSU is trying to impose standards for micro-based
accounting, but it is hard to tell to what extent they
have been successful so far (Baby86). The central
organizations must find more effective, sophisticated
ways to audit how microcomputers are being used
(Doma86).
In any case, it is clear that the mid-1980s mark the
real beginning of the computerization of Soviet soci-
ety. Until now, the centralized form of service provi-
sion, even in ASUP, has led to few changes in the way
that management functions. The task is immense,
involving the mass production of huge numbers of
personal computers, education of millions of users,
and reorganization of the whole centralized account-
ing system. Regardless of how fast this is pushed from
above, it will take a substantial amount of time.
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Over the past few years, it has often seemed as if the
ASUP program has withdrawn from view, and the
question has arisen, where will the Soviets go from
here? The program is apparently being extended in
three directions. The first is simply dropping the
ASUP title and using computers for data processing
tasks which will support management in various
concrete ways. These services are provided by the
TsSU or by microcomputers, and have already been
discussed.
The second direction is enhancing ties with external
organizations. This is being done under the auspices
of the OGAS program, which has continued to receive
approval from the highest authorities. Links are being
built hierarchically (to ministries) and horizontally (to
regional bodies).
The third direction is the continued expansion and
development of existing ASUPs, including attempts to
make them more applicable to the existing social-
economic conditions. If Western experience can serve
as a guide, and it often can, the next large item on the
Soviet agenda should be distributed processing, where
data processing is spread over a variety of computers
of differing sizes at various levels in the enterprise
hierarchy, all joined together by a local area network.
Distributed processing addresses the problem of the
so-called "accounting approach" and the incorpora-
tion of microcomputers in enterprise management.
All of these developments come against the backdrop
of significant real and potential changes in both the
infrastructure of computing and in the surrounding
social-political environment which are being initiated
by the Gorbachev administration.
Networking to External Entities
So far in this study we have evaluated the internal
impact of data processing on enterprises. In the US
economy, where corporations are largely independent
units which have to do a relatively small amount of
reporting to governmental agencies in comparison
with their Soviet counterarts, this would be enough.
However, if the full potential of ASUPs and non-
ASUP-based computing is to be realized, the Soviets
must find ways of linking various machines and
various levels together. Soviet leaders have always
recognized this fact and have, since 1971, continually
promoted the development of the All-Union System
for the Collection and Processing of Information for
Accounting, Planning, and Management of the Na-
tional Economy (OGAS).
It became clear in the previous sections that most data
processing at the enterprise level is subject to what
may be called "the accounting approach." Data pro-
cessing is a separate function, carried out by the
ASUP department or an external computing service
bureau and not integrated into the daily work of
managers. The reports that are provided to managers
and exchanged among levels, either inside the enter-
prise or with higher-level organizations, are static
windows which permit only a glimpse of the state of
these organizational entities at any given time. Even
when massive amounts of data are provided to other
organizations, their presentation in the form of static
reports makes their usage problematical.
Dynamic management outside the enterprise requires
interactive access to data, or at least the ability to
request and receive data in machine-readable form.
The overall performance of the Soviet economy de-
pends on the soundness of the centrally created plans.
Ministries and central planning authorities need accu-
rate, timely information to deal with bottlenecks in
the economy and to create achievable plans which
reflect policymakers' preferences. The data which are
collected and processed are the working material for
the whole management system of the economy. Re-
gardless of how well Soviet enterprises are using
computers internally, if the data cannot easily be
transmitted to other levels, a considerable part of the
benefit of computerization is lost. In addition, high-
speed telecommunications can improve efficiency by
speeding transmissions, and by eliminating the re-
entry of data by various organizations inside and
outside the ministry hierarchy, leading to labor sav-
ings, greater accuracy, and greater speed.
At the same time, networking presents some difficult
challenges for the organization of the Soviet economy.
Enterprises are naturally protective of their data
because it gives them a certain amount of leverage in
negotiating for the most favorable production condi-
tions every year. Networking may open the informa-
tion floodgates for information collection by all sorts
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of organizations. Before telecommunications, the min-
istries, the TsSU, Minfin, Gosplan, Gosstandart, and
regional Party committees were more or less limited
in the amount of information that they could request
by the available set of prearranged reports, but tele-
processing could conceivably permit direct access to
data by any of these organizations.
So far, it appears that enterprises have little to worry
about in this regard. Most of the remainder of this
section will demonstrate that the extent of direct
connections to enterprise data sources is limited.
The Networking Infrastructure. Data are transmitted
in the USSR by a variety of media, including the
general purpose phone network, the general and spe-
cial purpose telegraph networks, a "subscriber" tele-
phone network for data transmission, and new tech-
nology media such as fiber optics, microwave, coaxial
cable, and satellite.
The usefulness of the general purpose switched tele-
phone network (TF-OP) for data transmission is limit-
ed by statute, quality, physical design, and size. Only
nine minutes out of every hour may be used for data
communications (Levi85; Mikh86h). The quality of
the lines also leaves a great deal to be desired. The
error rate on switched lines may be no better than one
error per 1,000 characters with substantial variations
in individual line quality (Gavr85b; Kry185;
Myas820. Errors tend to be grouped in bunches,
increasing the likelihood of the termination of a
connection. As speeds go up, the error rate gets worse
(Dmit85c). Establishing a connection can take a min-
ute, and the lines are down two to five percent of the
time with slow repairs (Myas82f). Three hundred
bits/second is the practical limit without using sophis-
ticated error compensation equipment (Mikh86h).
Although steady progress has been made over the past
few years towards increased direct dialing of long
distance calls, intercity links are weak; in 1985 only
65 percent of the public network had direct dial
(Camp87). Many calls must be made from the central
post office. In 1984 over 214,000 orders that were
taken for long-distance telephone calls were not filled.
"The quantity of statements and complaints connect-
ed with ... the long delays in repairing telephones and
radio outlets was 40 percent higher in 1984 than in
1980," the First Secretary of the Pskov Province
Party Committee reported in 1985 (Petr84b). By 1990
it is planned to have automatic exchanges which allow
direct inter-city dialing in 85 percent of the country's
3,600 rayon centers (Bbcw85d).
The size of the existing phone network is indicated by
the statistics. In 1985, there were approximately 25
million to 30 million phones in the USSR connected
to the public network. The majority of these were in
urban areas: 23 percent of urban families and 7
percent of rural families had phones. The 12th Five-
Year Plan (1986-90) calls for the addition of 12.1
million numbers by 1990, 75 percent of which will be
for private citizens. With demand estimated to be 100
million phones and a current waiting list of 10 million,
it is clear that the Soviets have a long way to go to
reach the level of saturation of the developed Western
nations, but the telecommunications sector is receiv-
ing higher priority and significant progress is likely to
be made over the next five years (Bbcw85d; Camp87).'
In addition to the general phone system, there is an
extensive switched telegraph network, known as the
AT-50, which can transmit data at 50, 100, or 200
baud. "Practically all" organizations have the East
German T-63 teletype machines which works with
this network at 50 baud (Levi85). In recent years the
USSR has produced devices for 100-200 baud use,
and new computerized switching centers are being
installed with greatly improved results (Golu85;
Tver86; Zhev84). The AT-50 can only be used 12
minutes per hour for data communications (Mikh86h).
In the early 1970s it was recognized that the general
purpose phone system and telegraph lines were insuf-
ficient means for transmitting data. Under the um-
brella of programs for an All Union State network of
Computer Centers (GSVTs) and a Unified Automatic
Communications System (YeASS), the first design of
the All-Union System of Data Transmission
(OGSPD) was completed by 1977 (Myas82f). Five
years later, 129 main automatic switching nodes and
substations had been installed throughout the country
(Makh82). These nodes are part of the PD-200 net-
work, which is the first stage of the OGSPD and
which is only now being completed (Tver86). One
'The excellent analysis of Robert Campbell examines the Soviet
telephone network in much greater detail. See (Camp87).
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major advantage of the PD-200 is that it provides
automatic circumvention of lines that are down. How-
ever, the only intelligent terminal available for this
network is Hungarian; this and the absence of multi-
plexers or adapters for use with SM machines (DEC-
and PDP-like minicomputers) limit its applicability
(Kuzm84c; Levi85; Makh82). Each PD-200 connec-
tion is limited to 18 minutes per hour (Mikh86h).
Work is going on to upgrade the system to 1200 baud
and raise the quality of transmission, but the first
2400 baud link on the system is not expected until
sometime during the 12th FYP (Camp87; Tver86).
The OGSPD is eventually supposed to become the
backbone network for most data communications in
the USSR, but its predominance is being threatened
by the creation of independent ministry networks
(Mikh84; Myas82f; Yaku86).
A fourth option, which can be quite expensive, is
leasing lines from the Ministry of Communications
(Minsvyazi). Within a city, the cost is about 1,000
rubles per year (Levi85). A Moscow-Leningrad line
can cost 50,000 rubles per year, and a Moscow-
Novosibirsk line, about 80,000 rubles (Nest84b).
Lines cannot be rented in units of less than 24 hours
(Gusy86). The installation of connections between a
large time sharing center in Yerevan and approxi-
mately 40 other cities was recently studied using a
simulation. The remote nodes would be connected
with 1200 baud leased lines, at an installation cost of
2,800 rubles per kilometer per channel. The cost of
the entire network would be 73,654,000 rubles
(Ogan85). Delays of at least two months can be
expected before leased lines are available (Butr83).
The quality of leased lines is generally said to be one
to two orders of magnitude better than the switched
lines (Butr83; Chug85; Myas82f).
Minsvyazi has begun work on the Unified Automatic
Communications System (YeASS), which represents a
massive upgrading of the entire Soviet communica-
tions infrastructure. It will adhere to international
standards and follow a well-trodden path from cross-
bar mechanical switching equipment to all-electronic
and then computer-controlled switching (Seli85c).
This architecture will span the other CEMA coun-
tries, who are participating heavily in the development
of the "Unified System of Switching Technology" and
in other parts of the program (Fran83; Mas184;
Popo86b). The ultimate goal is an all-digital long
distance network (Seli85c). According to placards on
display at the Svyaz'-86 exhibition in June, 1986 in
Moscow, the YeASS will eventually offer a wide
variety of user-oriented services including teleconfer-
encing, videotext, and facsimile.
Ivan Selin feels that the YeASS program is moving
apace, that extensive use is being made of satellite and
coaxial cable (for secure communications) in the new
network, and that the Soviets will be able to obtain
any technologies they need in the West, particularly
through non-COCOM countries (Seli85c). However,
it appears that the Soviets have a very long way to go
before the YeASS becomes a reality.
Technologies under development or already deployed
include quasi-electronic exchanges and integrated an-
alog digital dial exchanges (Moni85). Several million
numbers will be covered by quasi-electronic and
electronic exchanges in 1986-90 (Ales85; Bbcw85d).
The USSR Ministry of the Communications Equip-
ment Industry (Minpromsvyazi) was recently excoriat-
ed for continued series production of obsolete labor-
intensive and bulky crossbar and step-by-step
switching equipment that foreign countries had
ceased producing by the 1970s (Petr85b). Minsvyazi
has not succeeded in mastering the necessary technol-
ogies for high-speed, high-capacity switching. The
Kvarts system, which went into series production in
1985, is 1960s-style analog technology (Camp87). The
cable products supplied by the Ministry of the Electri-
cal Equipment Industry (Minelektrotekhprom) were
said to be substantially inferior to their foreign coun-
terparts and in addition were still in extremely short
supply (Petr85b).
After years in which only a small fraction of the
satellite capacity was used for telephony, the installa-
tion of the needed equipment is to be expanded
(Camp85b; Kuzn85b). But "the managers of the
system have been extraordinarily dilatory in moving
to capture the potential benefit to the operation of the
economy of satellite links for two-way communica-
tions" (Camp85b, p. 324). Large scale fiber optic
cable use is to begin in the 1986-90 period. In 1986, a
new inter-branch scientific technical complex was
formed to do research and development on fiber
optics. Two reports indicate that the work of this
MNTK is proceeding very slowly; practical results
should not be expected soon (Prok86; Tara86b).
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The poor quality and use limitations of the regular
lines, the high cost of leased lines, the assignment of
the PD-200 network for specialized industrial users,
and the inaccessibility of other media has left most
institutions electronically isolated. The main forms of
data transmission have been the telegraph network
and magnetic tape. New capabilities are becoming
available in the general purpose telephone system,
including better switching centers, higher transmis-
sion speeds, and radio-relay, cable, or satellite links,
but the restriction on usage of this system for data
transmission apparently remains. Leased lines seem to
be available, but are quite expensive. Thus, the state
of the telecommunications infrastructure does not
make networking impossible, but makes it quite diffi-
cult, especially if a large-scale network is desired. In
apparent recognition of this fact, several large minis-
tries have turned to the Hungarians for substantial
help in upgrading their networks (Odor85).
The ability of ministries and other organizations to
build computer networks has also been hindered by
the available hardware and software. The fact that
the Soviets decided to copy the IBM S/360 and
S/370 series computers (in the Unified System ma-
chines) has had a marked effect on the solutions
chosen for networking. The IBM S/360 machines
were not initially oriented towards interactive process-
ing and telecommunications. IBM's strategy resulted
in a confusing multiplicity of terminals and protocols,
so that by the early 1970s it was necessary to
introduce the Systems Network Architecture (SNA)
to provide interconnectibility.
A fairly large percentage of the activity of the Soviet
networking community has been directed towards
mastery of SNA in the industrial and governmental
sphere. In 1981, the basic outline of the ES telecom-
munications strategy was published as the Open
System of Network Teleprocessing (OSST). The pro-
gram for creating OSST generally followed the stages
of development through which the various stages of
SNA have passed, while including the goals of opera-
tion with X.25-access packet switching networks and
eventual compatibility with the CCITT Open Systems
Interconnection (OSI) model (Bogd81; Sand81). Soft-
ware which fulfills the functions of comparable SNA
components has appeared in various releases of ES
operating systems, one of the most recent being the
TCAM/NF access method (Baum84d). A recent arti-
cle of the branch-wide MIS for the Ministry of
Instrument Building, the Means of Automation, and
Control Systems (Minpribor) all but states directly
that SNA is being used to build the network, and says
that "SNA may become the goal-oriented program of
the development of hardware and user software in the
coming decades" (Kaza86).
A key component of SNA is the IBM 3705 telecom-
munications processor. Bulgarian and Polish versions
of this machine apparently had been debugged by
1982 (Myas82f). Supplying a machine of this class is
part of a new networking agreement that the Soviets
have signed with the Hungarians, and the East Ger-
mans are apparently working on a microprocessor
version (Odor85; Samo85). Minpribor is using a dual
ES-8371 configuration in its network (Kaza86). How-
ever, in the USSR, the wide availability of SM
minicomputers and the very limited availability of the
3705-class machines has led to the development of a
variety of other networking solutions involving SM
machines in the front end processing role (for exam-
ple, Zama86).
One of the major problems in bringing networking
into the general economy is the current hardware and
software stock. A. S. Kazak, the assistant director for
science of the All-Union Scientific Research and
Design Institute for Branch Management Information
Systems (VNIPI OASU) explains:
In the majority of computer centers there still exists
"task by task" data processing, which corresponds to
the single-user computer use that was characteristic
of first and second generation computers ....
Improving data processing for the user has been
braked by the absence of hardware and systems
software standardization. At the beginning of the
1980's in the majority of large computer centers there
were at least two to three types of large computers, a
minimum of at least two operating systems, two to
three teleprocessing monitors and several database
management systems (Kaza86, p. 12).
Smaller computer centers are equipped with lower-
end ES machines with limited main memories and
disk storage, the turnover of equipment there is much
slower, and allocations of new machines to organiza-
tions that already have machines are few and far
between (Mche85). Multiprocessing is difficult
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Table 5
General Economy Computer Networks in the USSR
Minpribor
1984
Hierarchical connection
1986
Use of ES-8371 front-end
UkSSR VUZes
1984
Three or more computers, hierarchical design
Ministry of Maritime Fleet
1981
Plans for networking
1986
Plans for regional network of ports, shipping lines, satellite
links, DECNET
Baltic Shipping Fleet
1986
Plans for satellite links to shipboard computers
Ministry of Railroads
1985
Hierarchical data collection
Ukranian Ministry of Automobile Transport
1986
ES/SM star network with communication
Civil Aviation
1972
Hierarchical time-sharing reservation system (Moscow)
1985
Packet switched, ES/SM, being expanded from test zone, now 8
hosts, 1,000 terminals
Moscow Savings Bank
1983
Hierarchical, ES/SM 3000 terminals
Leningrad Stroybank
1986
Plans for regional network in 12th FYP
UkSSR Gosstroy
1986
Small part of planned "distributed database" for design infor-
mation implemented
TsSU Statistical Data Processing
1983
Hierarchical Processing System
Tyumen' Gas Industry PO
1985
Partially hierarchical, partially ring, ES/ASVT
Ministry of Petroleum and Gas Industry
Construction
1985
Network to be built by Hungarians
Ministry of Gas Industry
1985
Work on distributed databases, hierarchical design
1985
Network to be built by Hungarians
1986
Planned packet switched link on some gas pipelines
Moscow Energy Administration
1984
Hierarchical data exchange
Ministry of Energy
1985
Introduction of Hungarian equipment into network
Petroleum Industry
1985
Hungarians to build ring net
Ministry of Agriculture
1985
Hungarians to build ES-8534 terminal to include image
transmission
Ministry of Agricultural Machine Building
1985
Hungarians to build intelligent terminal systems
Lithuanian State Committee
1985
Hierarchical master-slave of Television and Radio
TASS
1985
Further development of worldwide network by Hungarians
Elektronika PTO, Voronezh CPSU oblast'
committee, urban economic management
1982
Local area network based on Elektronika-60s
Sources: (Bach85b; Bond8lb; Buly85; Butr83; Bych85; Fion85;
Gazo84; Ginz85; Ivan83k; Ivan86; Izve84e; Kaza86; Khat82;
Kry185; Kuzm84c; Odor85; Roma85; Simo86; Step85; Zama86)
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enough on these machines, let alone networking using
IBM's BSC protocol, which uses a lot of the resources
of the central processing unit. Apparently, users do
not want to make the conversions that would be
necessary to use new hardware (Yaku85). A large
number of modems, multiplexers, and terminals have
gone into production, but as noted above, these peri-
pherals are often cited as being in short supply, of
poor quality, or not completely compatible with each
other (Hamm84; Iskr83; Kere85b; Mche85; Sosi83;
Yaku86; Yevs83).
Thus, it is more accurate to say that while the Soviets
have embraced SNA as a standard for wide area
networks, they have only begun to reach the necessary
hardware and software levels to use it. In teleprocess-
ing applications, for example, pre-SNA equivalents of
CRJE (DUVZ), CICS (KAMA), and TSO (SRV)
have been used widely. As explained in the next
section, most of the networks that have been built in
the USSR have been in specific industrial applications
using these facilities.
Ministry Networks. A number of important minis-
tries have now begun to construct what might be
called computer networks. A listing of some of these
ministries, along with characterizations of the nature
of their networks, is presented in Table 5. (It should
be noted that Table 5 is not intended to be an
exhaustive listing of all networks in the economy.)
As Table 5 suggests, most ministries are putting
together hierarchical applications. The network being
constructed by Minpribor can serve as an example of
what hierarchical means. The designers used only
series-produced equipment which has passed official
testing. The production system configuration includes
one East German ES-1055 and one ES-1055M, which
are each connected to two ES-8371 front end proces-
sors. The two large mainframes are connected to 29,
100, and 200 MByte disk drives. The front end
processors are linked to intelligent terminals, dumb
terminals, and telegraph terminals at enterprises. The
Minpribor configuration also includes a mirror con-
figuration for software development and testing, a
stand-alone ES-1055 for a batch processor, and a data
preparation center including some key-to-disk devices
(Kaza86). The PD-200 system is used for data trans-
mission (Kuzm84c).
The software in the network distinctly follows IBM.
A. S. Lazak relates the names of well-known packages
which are in use in the network and are given along
with their IBM counterparts in parentheses (Kaza86).
These include: OS ES 6.1 SVS (VS/1); NCP (network
control program), BTAM, TCAM, and VTAM com-
munications protocols; the OKA/VP (IMS/VS) data-
base management system, and the KAMA/VP
(CICS/VS) conversational monitor. The network is
given the label "industrial teleprocessing," which
seems to indicate that little more than remote dial-up
access has been achieved. This remote access gives
enterprises the ability to communicate with the minis-
try. Software has been developed so that they can
send and receive "messages" by using files. But it
does not allow the ministry to directly access the
computers of its enterprises, and the enterprises ap-
parently must move data from their machines to the
remote entry stations which connect to Minpribor,
perhaps on a storage media, perhaps by hand. "Net-
work teleprocessing," which more closely resembles
SNA and would at least allow for direct interaction
between the computers, is a possibility for the future.
While many of the listings in the table show only
hierarchical connections like Minpribor's, some minis-
tries are building networks in the full sense of the
term, i.e. including at least two co-equal hosts. The
network of the Ukrainian Ministry of Automobile
Transportation uses ES and SM machines as equal
hosts in a packet-switched network. Because no such
software was available, it was custom built by the
Institute of Cybernetics of the Ukranian Academy of
Sciences. A "fragment" of the network went into
service in 1985 (Zama86). The network of the Sirena
ticketing system in 1985 comprised eight SM-2M
hosts servicing about 1,000 terminals through a
packet-switched, Electronika-60-based subnetwork
(Pest85; Zhoz85).
If nothing else, these latter two examples show that
the Soviets have the capability of building reasonably
sophisticated networks (see also Mche86h). To date,
however, it is very difficult to find any examples of
ministries which have real network connections to the
computer centers of their enterprises. The one piece of
evidence which suggests that ministries are collecting
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a lot of data from the enterprises are the complaints
about too much information collection through
branch automated management systems (OASUs)
(Guzh86; Koro86b; Vest86d; Vest86g; Vest86k). The
Minsk Tractor Plant, whose ASUP has received
massive publicity over the years, is an example: it is
supplying five times as much data as is approved by
the TsSU (Vest86d). It appears that most of the data
exchange is either by paper, by magnetic tape, or by
teletype. Departmental networks are apparently high-
ly underutilized. The load 8 is said to be only one to
four percent of capacity (Meli86).
Why are there so few direct connections to enter-
prises? Although there may well be resistance from
enterprise officials, it appears that the main bottle-
necks have been in the infrastructure. As noted
earlier, it can be quite difficult to ensure that telecom-
munications lines are available given the state of the
telecommunications network. The available hardware
and software also create obstacles to successful net-
work applications. In addition, the enterprise ASUPs
have been built as stand-alone systems. Enterprise
computers do not have a lot of spare capacity for
participation in networks. Finally, because so many
enterprises do not have data processing systems of
their own, the old system of the ministry must
continue functioning as before. This is why a large
portion of the data that comes into OASUs is un-
doubtedly sent in on the standard report forms and
keypunched by the ministry or is transmitted by
telegraph.
In conclusion, it should be noted that the OASUs are
a uniquely Soviet creation in that they have the
potential of linking together all the enterprises in any
given ministry. In comparing them with US corpora-
tions, however, it becomes apparent that they fall well
short of the sophistication of US corporate networks.
Regional Data Links. Regional data collection is
another means by which the value of enterprise
computing can be enhanced. For example, if the
regional Gossnab organization is able to collect infor-
mation on all of the goods going in and out of the
' The author who provided this statistic is the director of the
Armenian branch of the All-Union Scientific Research Institute for
Problems of the Organization of Management. He appears to be
heavily involved in developing a regional automated management
system and the corresponding network, which may explain why he
is so negative about department networks.
republic, it can become a broker for shifting around
supplies to where they are needed most and can
monitor enterprises to ensure that above-norm re-
serves are not accumulated (Stos86).9
Most regional collection seems to be based on two
directions which are coming together in some repub-
lics. First, data collection can occur as a by-product of
the processing performed by the TsSU for budget
organizations and for some enterprises. Second, Gos-
plan, Gossnab, and the TsSU have divisions in each
republic that are building their own data processing
systems. It is envisioned that these systems will be
unified into regional automated management systems
(RASUs), and work is proceeding on RASUs in all 15
republics (Meli86).
The developers of RASUs must contend with prob-
lems that stem from the poor infrastructure of
networking already described. In addition, a very
significant barrier is that the data of enterprises that
are subordinated to outside ministries have all of their
data coded in various formats (Meli86). The solution
to this problem is to collect the data which appeared
on standard reporting forms, i.e. the data that has
always been collected. This kind of data is being
supplied to the TsSU on tape and via some data
tranmission channels from the ASUPs of large enter-
prises (Vest86i). If only the usual data are collected,
then some of the benefits of computerization will be
lost, although improvements will come from collecting
the data in machine-readable form.
In the original plans for OGAS, more emphasis was
given on building OASUs than on RASUs; RASUs
were seen as data processing systems which would
involve only the strictly republic enterprises and orga-
nizations (Pyar85). Enterprises subordinated to union
organizations were developing their own, incompatible
systems. However, in some republics the goal has now
been formulated of trying to link together all the
ASUs in the region. In the 11th FYP, seven republics
were given the mandate to investigate the subject of
' The purpose of this section is not to give a comprehensive review of
the potential for regional or branch level management systems.
That would be the topic of an entire study. This section views the
branch and regional systems only to the extent that they connect
with enterprises.
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republic-wide data networks (Meli86). At the present
time, the Armenian republic has developed a standard
design which has been approved in principle by nine
republics, including Armenia. But the transfer of this
technology is being delayed by bureauratic problems
(Meli86).
Other networking approaches have been developed
elsewhere. In Lithuania, the TsSU is unifying com-
puter centers and machine calculating stations into a
collective use computer network (Ivan86). In the
Ukraine, a "three-terminal" network has been created
linking the regional Gosplan, Gossnab, and TsSU
(Glus80c).
In the Belorussian republic, a hierarchical network
has been implemented with the republic Gosplan at
the top, branch and oblast executive committee com-
puter centers next, and TsSU centers and individual
remote job entry stations at the bottom. The descrip-
tion of this network given by (Mart85c) leaves little
doubt that it is based on the concepts of SNA.
Because it includes both branch computer centers and
the computer centers of the TsSU, the network is
poised to capture data from almost all of the enter-
prises in the region. However, there are no direct
connections to the enterprise computer centers.
In Latvia, a design has been developed for the auto-
mated data processing system (ASOD) of a region.
This ASOD, which is centered in the Valmeira dis-
trict in Latvia, is supposed to supply information to
higher-level regional computerized subsystems for
Gosplan, the TsSU, and other organizations (Vana86).
Here there appears to be the possibility of direct links
to enterprise computer centers, including enterprises
of union subordination. "In administrative districts of
the republic, as a rule, computer centers of other
ministries and agencies are not being created, which
means that there are favorable conditions for combin-
ing automated systems of all (TsSU) regional informa-
tion computing centers into a unified territorial sys-
tem" (Vana86, p. 31). The Latvian network also
includes participation by the CPSU regional executive
committees.
The ability to improve the management of the econo-
my through the usage of RASUs depends on two
factors. First, the telecommunications network is ca-
pable of providing lines for specific applications but is
not capable of handling the kind of traffic that would
occur in a region if all of the enterprises were
transmitting substantial amounts of data. Second, as
the second section of this study made clear, a substan-
tial portion of data processing will continue to follow
the "accounting approach" for quite some time; much
work must be done before the regional organizations
can easily collect machine-readable data from all the
enterprises of the territories. In most of the regions
surveyed, it is mainly the rigid accounting data that is
being collected. Thus, while the first steps are being
made towards linking up enterprise computer centers,
the realization of integrated regional management
systems will not occur for several years. The Soviets
will gradually reap the benefits of linking these
organizations.
A third kind of link, which is gaining more and more
currency in the United States, is the direct linkage of
heterogeneous corporations. We have seen no in-
stances of such links in the USSR.
IASUs and Distributed Data Processing
In the late-1970s, the term "integrated automated
management system" (IASU) began to appear in the
ASU literature. An integrated enterprise manage-
ment system is defined by V. Glushkov as "a system
of management which solves interrelated tasks of
management of the production processes of an enter-
prise and tasks of its organizational-administrative
management in order to get the maximum economic
effect from the work of the enterprise. (It) is an
organic union of ... ASUP and ... ASUTP"
(Glus79,p. 207).10 Hence, the formal conception of
IASU embraces the optimization framework devel-
oped for previous types of ASUs, but extends the
production management capabilities of the ASUP all
the way down to the level of using process control
computers. IASUs represent the first attempts by the
Soviets to adopt distributed processing."
'? IASUs have also been given the name ASUOT, or "organization-
al-technical automated management systems." It is under this
name that specific guidelines for constructing ASUOT have been
issued (Ormm8O). These guidelines do not provide particular details
about the nature of the subsystems of IASU, but talk mainly about
the way that organizations should interact when building ASUPs
and ASUTPs together.
" A distributed data processing system is characterized by having
both the processor and storage facilities physically dispersed and
interconnected by a network. This allows users to perform most of
their data processing work locally but allows them to access the
central computer when needed.
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Functional Extensions of ASUPs. One of the chief
characteristics of ASUPs that were built in the 1965-
80 period was that their many subsystems were poorly
linked together (More83). In many cases, specific
tasks and specific subsystems accessed their own,
separate files, which led to a great deal of information
redundancy and inconsistency. The absence of inte-
gration was due partially to small capacity disk drives,
small main memories, and the absence of data base
management software. But it was also a result of the
desire of enterprise managers to avoid changing the
organizational structure of management and imple-
menting integrated analytical tasks which might dis-
close certain management practices. Implementing
primarily accounting functions did not require large
organizational changes. Despite the fact that econom-
ic-social factors were hindering the assimilation of
ASUPs, designers seized on the absence of integration
as an explanation for why the ASUPs results did not
meet expectations, predicting that as soon as ASUP
subsystems and ASUTPs could be integrated, their
impact would be much greater.
In October 1985, an all-union conference was held in
Novosibirsk on the subject of IASUs (Glus86). Al-
though not all details are known about how IASUs
work, a record of this conference and several recent
articles provide a broad overview of what IASUs are.
At least three major organizations have been heavily
involved in building IASUs, and the designs which
have been created by them will serve as the examples
for this discussion.
The first of these is the Computer Center of the
Siberian Department of the Academy of Sciences.
This organization has been involved in the ASUP
program from the mid-1960s on, and is the creator of
the well-knowm Barnaul and Sigma ASUPs. The
Barnaul ASUP, which was implemented on a second
generation computer and installed at the Barnaul
Radio Factory, was the first ASUP to explicitly
address problems of the surrounding social-economic
system as part of the design. In the transition to third
generation computers, the Barnaul ASUP became the
Sigma ASUP. It has been installed in as many as 60
enterprises. The Sigma designers are now emphasiz-
ing four key ideas for its further development
(Bobk86).
The first principle is decentralization of management.
It embraces the idea that this is needed in order to
bring about the "intensification of production." In
theory, autonomous units can be treated as black
boxes with management through goals and incentives.
Unlike almost all other ASUPs, Sigma has always set
up its system so that each shop could have its own
computer or at least so that the data processing would
be divided along production divisions rather than
trying to build the system for the whole enterprise as a
single entity. This principle recognizes that each
ASUP user subgroup has different needs and inter-
ests, and that these are best served by hierarchically
coordinated, autonomous units. Once this kind of
hierarchical information system is in place, the next
step is to ensure the autonomy of lower levels by only
allowing aggregrated data to flow upwards. This will
also increase efficiency by drastically reducing data
flows. A multi-level system of models is being devel-
oped for Sigma which consists of long range forecast-
ing, annual planning, and calendar planning for pro-
duction management (Glus86).
The second principle is the introduction of interactive
computing. This is the best way to support decision
making, especially through the use of interactive,
multi-criteria optimization models. The third princi-
ple is the use of sound software engineering methods.
It is recognized that the software needs to be adapt-
able to the conditions at other enterprises, and that it
will also be in a continuous state of modification and
improvement. The last principle is the use of a
distributed database scheme which flows naturally
from the way that the ASUP is divided.
It is not clear to what extent all of these principles
have already been realized in the Sigma ASUP and
whether or not there are any factories at which they
are all in use. Previous innovations in the ASUP, such
as providing incentives for workers to enter accurate
data into the database, led to some marked successes
at the Barnaul Radio Factory and elsewhere. As
noted above, it ultimately ran up against difficulties
because of the connections with the external environ-
ment (Podk79). In any case, the ASU Sigma probably
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represents the most radical extension of the ASUP
program because of the amount of autonomy for sub-
enterprise units that it presupposes.
The IASU which has been implemented at the Lenin-
grad Turbine Blades Factory Production Association
imeni 50th Anniversary of the USSR (LTB) is a
hierarchical distributed data processing system. It
probably is an example of the work which is being
done at the Leningrad Electrical Machines Plant
(Lenelektronmash), which is one of the biggest devel-
opers of ASUPs in the USSR (Mche85). It uses an
ES-1035 at the highest level, an SM-1420 at the next
level, and an SM-1800 at the lowest level, and uses a
fair amount of off-the-shelf software, which is a
cornerstone of the Lenelektronmash approach.
The LTB system conceives of management as consist-
ing of a number of layers, each carrying out certain
production management functions. The top layer is
production planning and accounting, followed by lay-
ers for calculating parts and assemblies requirements,
capacity planning for work centers, and tasks de-
signed for actual management of production. Data is
collected from the fifth level, which is a series of
robotized flexible production complexes (Melt83).
Rather than dividing up management tasks along
functional lines, as in previous ASUPs, the LTB
system takes an approach which is similar to the
MRP-II concept in the West. The MRP-II philosophy
says that production needs should drive everything
else that happens in the corporation, which is quite
consistent with the Soviet system. Interactive process-
ing is built into some of the packages that form the
basis of this system (Melt86).
A different approach has been taken by the Minsk
Central Design Engineering Scientific Research Insti-
tute of the Organization and Technology of Manage-
ment (TsNIITU) (Mikh86f; see also Iasu85).
TsNIITU is also one of the largest developers of
ASUPs. In the Sigma and LTB cases, considerable
management reorganization was necessary in order to
incorporate the IASUs. In the TsNIITU scheme, the
existence of an ASUP is taken as a given, and the
emphasis is placed on developing the lower levels of
production management. As in the LTB system, the
lowest level controls the operation of particular pieces
of production equipment. The next level performs
regulation, accounting, and reporting functions. The
third level carries out daily shift planning and
accounting, maintains data bases of production norms
and production processes, and interfaces with the
traditional ASUP.
The IASU program is primarily directed at linking up
previously isolated subsystems and extending the use
of computers all the way down to the shop floor.
Other IASU developers have spoken about a horizon-
tal broadening of functions as well, integrating the
processing of information from computer-aided design
and manufacturing to sales (Akho77; Glus86). It is
germane to note that the number of IASUs reported
in the literature remains quite small. Moreover, cer-
tain large enterprises where ASUPs were already in
effective use probably were chosen for test implemen-
tations of IASUs. Nevertheless, the fact that an all-
union conference on the subject was held indicates
growing interest. It is likely that the ASUP program
will move forward under the banner of IASU or its
equivalent, ASUOT (Glus86).
Infrastructure Support for Distributed Processing. As
in the case of ASUPs, the success or failure of IASUs
will hinge both on the ability of the infrastructure to
deliver the necessary hardware, software, and services
and on the ability of enterprises to make effective use
of IASUs under the current social-economic con-
straints. The key IASU areas that need development,
according to the recommendations of the 1985 all-
union conference, are: "using modern database man-
agement systems that are oriented toward the end
user; inclusion of optimization and simulation models;
expansion of the use of off-the-shelf software; (and)
computer networking with flexible architecture and
software compatibility" (Glus86, p. 376).
The Soviets have made some progress in at least three
of these areas. A number of database management
systems are currently available in the USSR, and an
integrated set of tasks has been built for IASU using
the SETOR-SM DBMS (Melt86; Stoy86). Most
DBMSs use either the hierarchical or network mod-
els, which make them considerably more problemati-
cal for end users, and using a DBMS is sometimes
constrained by limited amounts of main memory and
disk storage. Other DBMS weaknesses can be pin-
pointed, but from a technical standpoint, this is not
nearly as much as a barrier as it was a few years ago.
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The incorporation of optimization and simulation is
much more difficult, because it involves the surround-
ing economic situation, as will be discussed below.
Expansion of the use of off-the-shelf software is an
area where the new GKVTI is expected to play a
significant role. Until now, the main broker of soft-
ware in the USSR has been the Tsentrprogrammsis-
tem Production Association (TSP) in Kalinin. As
originally conceived, TSP would house a national
fund of algorithms and programs, maintaining the
programs there and providing vendor services for
them to users. In practice, TSP has had a hard time
maintaining high quality standards for the software in
the library. Ironically, TSP has now been given
responsibility for national quality testing of software,
including operating systems; the application programs
for economic, engineering, scientific and technical
and information retrieval functions and general-pur-
pose application programs; as well as service programs
for technology, control and processing programs, and
software expanding the capabilities of operating sys-
tems (Kise86c). It is often hard to build composite
systems using TSP packages. N. Gorshkov (head,
GKVTI) remarks:
In the past 10 years we have developed more than
700,000 different variations of programs but not more
than 8,000 are registered in the all-union fund and
only a few hundred titles are disseminated throughout
the country in the norm of products. This is in part
because our computer owners, be it an enterprise or
an association, do not share their programs with
others. These others, in effect, repeat the effort at
colossal costs. Furthermore, it is still quite difficult to
obtain a program ready to go because there are no
legal rules or economic norms (Deni86b, 2).
Gorshkov has also stated that most of the programs
have not been registered in the libraries because of
their low quality (Mikh86d). The GKVTI is now
poised to establish its own nationwide organization of
computer associations which will be responsible for
everything having to do with computing in a region
(this is discussed at greater length in the next section).
It is too early to say whether or not GKVTI will do a
better job than TSP in disseminating and servicing
software.
In the meantime, certain packages are available that
can be used for building an IASU. When the LTP
IASU was being constructed, about 70-75 percent of
the functions were implemented using off-the-shelf
software. The remainder of the software was coded by
the production association itself (Melt86). Some of the
IASU software is the result of a joint CEMA program
that was started in 1980 to develop these packages.
The USSR was assigned the most important subsys-
tems at the production association and enterprise
levels, amounting to putting the traditional ASUP
subsystems in a hierarchical context. At the lowest
level, assignments were made for control of mechani-
cal processing lines, integrated-automatic sections,
and mechanized warehouses (Sede80). The SM-Satel-
lite program, developed by the Bulgarian-Soviet In-
terprogramm organization, is one of the products of
this agreement (Melt86; Stoy86).
Some progress has been made in the field of local area
networks, but this is most likely to be a bottleneck.
Unlike wide area networks, which must generally use
telephone lines and are characterized by relatively low
transfer speeds, local area networks have the advan-
tage of small distances, which translates into high
speeds and transfer rates. A number of the largest
scientific research centers have built local area net-
works of various sorts, but most would be considered
rudimentary by Western standards. Many of the
connections would not even be considered local area
networks, because they consist only of hierarchically
subordinated computers. Some do use more sophisti-
cated protocols, but have slower transmission speeds.
This is a function both of the lines they are using and
of the speeds of the computers used in the networks
(Mche86h). The Hungarians have actually done con-
siderably more work in this area than the Soviets
(Kova86e).
To date, the number of industrial enterprises which
have even simple, hierarchical, low-bandwidth con-
nections between mainframes at a computer center
and mini- or microcomputers on the shop floor re-
mains small. One network that has been created is
called Estafeta ("relay"), and is a product of the State
Design Engineering Institute of ASU in Ivanova.
Estafeta has a ring architecture, uses regular twisted
pair wires at distances of more than one kilometer,
and can link up to 125 devices. It is in use at the
International Center of Scientific Technical Informa-
tion. "On its basis it is planned to create an office
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automation system, use it for flexible manufacturing,
and of course, for collective use information"
(Kash85, p. 4).
The KONET LAN was developed at the Institute of
Cynernetics of the Estonian Academy of Sciences in
collaboration with the Hungarians. At one megabyte
per second, this is one of the highest speed LANs in
the country. In 1984 it passed international testing at
the Institute of Electronic Control Machines (IN-
EUM) (Mart85b; Tava84). Because it uses a 34-bit
frame, it may be suitable for industrial control appli-
cations. Another LAN intended for industrial use is
based on fiber optic cables and is a development of the
Institute of General Physics (Mosp85e; Mu1a85). The
new Interbranch Scientific Technical Complex for
personal computers may be involved in this (Mosc86).
These examples show that the Soviets have been able
to begin putting together most of the right pieces for
industrial LANs. It is hardly true that one can buy an
off-the-shelf network in the USSR, and the most
noticeable missing piece is firmware which imple-
ments network protocols. In collision detection net-
works, for example, the overall speed can be reduced
tremendously if the chips which sense the state of the
line are too slow. There are still shortages of termi-
nals, and certainly the production rates of personal
computers are not high enough to support a large
number of LANs for the time being. Nevertheless,
hardware and software are not the significant hin-
drances they once were. Whether or not building
distributed processing systems is considered desirable
is another question.
Challenges for IASU in the Soviet Environment.
Most people, including managers, think of the first
stage of computerization, when bookkeepers are
forced to turn in their abacuses, as the hardest stage.
In fact, this is the stage where applications that will
directly save money are most obvious, where the
algorithms are simplest, where the design is least
complicated. The more sophisticated an information
system, the harder it is to integrate into an organiza-
tion unless that organization has both designed the
information system it will use and gone through the
organizational development and learning necessary to
assimilate it.
The use of IASU has several consequences for the
organizational structure of enterprises. First is decen-
tralization. As noted in the review of IASU designs
above, upper level management is conceived of as
exercising only a long-range planning function; no
longer are top-level managers to interfere in opera-
tional management. One of the obstacles to ASUPs,
however, has been the fact that upper level managers
insist on making so many decisions themselves. The
result is that highest priority decisions are delayed
while secondary ones are made by subordinates
(Mche85). Changes in information flows naturally
lead to changes in the organization of work and
distribution of responsibilities. Many managers have
formed a "psychological barrier" against ASUP be-
cause they do not want their situations to be changed
(Mche85; More83). When tasks were only partially
automated and the existing management system was
mirrored in the ASUP design, there was not such a
great threat.
If upper management fears that distributed process-
ing will reduce its control too much, lower-level
management may worry that it will actually lead to
greater centralization. As in the relationship between
enterprise and ministry, subunits of the enterprise also
have incentives to hide their true production capaci-
ties, hoard supplies, etc. The designers of the Sigma
ASUP recognize this danger and have apparently
explicitly designed the system so that the subunits
have control over their information. In the LTB
system, however, the distribution of processing serves
only to link all of the levels even more. If information
flows are changed in such a way that subordinates can
no longer feel safe about engaging in illegal or quasi-
legal practices, the burden of carrying out such
activities will be shifted upward, potentially putting
enterprise directors at greater risk.
Finally, the integrated ASU may put the enterprise as
a whole at greater risk of not fulfilling its plans.
Consider the case of a computer-aided design and
manufacturing system. The CAD system designs a
part so that the amount of metal that is used is
minimized. The planning subsystem of the integrated
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ASU pulls out the derived metal norms, multiplies by
the number of parts that are to be produced according
to plan targets given from above, and submits a
request to Gossnab for just the right amount of metal.
This leaves no reserve whatsoever for the enterprise,
because once the metal allocation is made, it becomes
quite difficult to arrange for more metal. The inte-
grated ASU leaves the enterprise at greater risk.
The rhetoric of the IASU drive sounds like the
rhetoric of the ASUP campaign. The goal is still
optimizing the performance of the enterprise, and the
model in use is still the desired formal system of
management which does not recognize the realities of
the Soviet social-economic situation. The whole de-
sign methodology of the ASUP program has been
carried over, and IASUs are still being built in a top-
down manner. This is not like the idea of bookkeepers
being allocated microcomputers and discovering on
their own how best to use the machine under their
circumstances, as foreseen in an earlier section. Only
if the enterprises with IASUs are given high enough
priority that they can be isolated from the shocks of
the surrounding economy are IASUs likely to bring
about large benefits for those enterprises. Most enter-
prises will have little incentive to pursue them. One of
the tasks given the GKVTI is to figure out how to get
a lot more organizations interested in using
computers.
Gorbachev's Reforms and Enterprise Computing
The Gorbachev administration no doubt sees comput-
erization as one of the keys to the so-called "intensifi-
cation" of the economy: increased labor productivity
without substantial new capital investment (e.g.,
Mikh86d). Gorbachev has so far attacked the comput-
erization problem largely from the supply side. A set
of reforms have been introduced in order to improve
the performance of the computer industry. The broad-
er reforms may have a limited effect on how enter-
prises perceive computing.
Changes in the Computing Infrastructure
The four parts of the Gorbachev strategy with respect
to computing are increasing production, reorganizing
the management of industry, creating new inter-
branch organizations for computing R&D, and in-
creasing the quality of production.
Investment in the computer industry is to rise sub-
stantially in the 12th FYP. During this period, the
computer industry as a whole is to grow anywhere
from 100 to 140 percent, including the production of
1.1 million personal computers (Akhm85; Lepi86;
Naum86; Prav860304; Tryb86m; Tryb86n). Disk
storage capacity is scheduled to increase by a factor of
three, along with substantial increases in printer
throughput and new peripherals to go along with the
personal computers (Kolo86). The number of ASUTPs
is to almost double, as is the stock of industrial robots
(Prav860304). Eight thousand automated work sta-
tions are to be introduced for technical and white
collar workers (Akhm85). In 1987, the output of the
computer industry is to increase by 19.5 percent (as
opposed to 16 percent previously announced), and
mass production of personal computers is to begin
(Sots86d).
This growth represents an unprecedented expansion of
the Soviet computing industry. In the past, it has
seemed that Soviet industry was not up to such
changes. Given the rates at which countries in the
Pacific Rim have managed to master the production
of clones, however, it is not inconceivable that the
Soviets will satisfy a large part of this target by the
end of the FYP. If they do not, and if Gorbachev is
still in power, he will have no choice but to introduce
even more sweeping reforms in the organization and
incentive system of the computer producing
ministries.
The second part of the strategy is the creation of the
new State Committee for Computing and Informatics
(GKVTI). The committee is a result of a resolution
from the Central Committee and Council of Ministers
called "On Improving the Coordination of Work in
the Field of Computer Technology and on Heighten-
ing the Effectiveness of Its Utilization" (Izv860422).
According to this resolution, the main tasks of
GKVTI include:
? Radically raising the technical level of computer
hardware and improving its use in the economy.
? Defining the main directions of development of
computer technology and computerized information
processing and overseeing the fulfillment of
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decisions of the Party and government on questions
of development, production and utilization of com-
puter hardware.
? Ensuring the integrated development of the produc-
tion of computer technology and solving inter-
industry problems.
? Coordinating and overseeing targeted computer
technology programs.
? Conducting and coordinating the training and re-
training of specialists in this field.
Perceptions of what the GKVTI will do vary. N.
Moiseyev, of the Academy of Sciences Division of
Information, Computing, and Automation, describes
the GKVTI's responsibilities in the following manner:
According to the decree of the Communist Party
Central Committee and the USSR Council of Minis-
ters, the GKVTI has been given the responsibility for
coordinating the entire effort of creating, manufac-
turing, using, and maintaining computers in the
country's economy. Performing these tasks, of course,
requires a structural reorientation and this will affect
more than one ministry and department. Fundamen-
tal changes have long been necessary, since the low
quality of domestic computers and the inability (or
reluctance) to include them in the appropriate organi-
zational structures is holding back scientific-technical
progress and has become a barrier preventing man-
agement of the economy from moving to a new level.
The resolution also gives GKVTI the ability to make
binding policy in its areas of authority (Izv860422).
N. Gorshkov, the committee's head, does not go as far
as Moiseyev in implying that a structural reorganiza-
tion will take place, however. He merely says that the
"main purpose of the committee is to unify the efforts
of ministries and agencies for the creation and effec-
tive use of modern, high-throughput and reliable
computers, and also to carry out a unified scientific-
technical policy in this area" (Mikh86d, p. 2). He does
affirm that some organizations under ministries, de-
partments, the GKNT, Gosplan, and Gossnab will be
transferred to the GKVTI.
What is the policy to which Gorshkov refers? "We
have been called to take upon ourselves the leadership
(rukovodstvo), coordination, and monitoring of the
realization of the program of "electronization" of the
national economy in all spheres" (Mikh86d, p. 2). The
work of the GKVTI is therefore linked with the
decree on the "nationwide program of creation, devel-
opment of production and effective use of computer
technology and automated systems to the year 2000"
which was approved by the Politburo in early 1985
(Eg85d; Prav85; Yasm86). It has yet to be published
in full and may not even exist as a single document.
But it apparently calls for better service; more hard-
ware standardization and specialized computers; new
training measures; the integration of process control,
computer-aided manufacturing, and ASUP; and the
introduction of computer workstations at the sub-
enterprise levels. The program also endorses OGAS
and the GSVTs, confirming both of the trends out-
lined earlier. Goals for the GKVTI as outlined by
Gorshkov include (Mikh86d, p 2):
? An information industry which relies on automated
technology and means for the creation, production,
and effective use of software.
? The creation and wide introduction of data bases
and knowledge bases for various categories of users
with the possibility of broad access for all categories
of users.
? The development of local, territorial, and a state
network of computer centers, including supercom-
puters to microcomputers and data transmission
devices.
? A system of computerized education of all levels of
society.
The GKVTI is setting up computer service centers
(TsVU) on the basis of service subdivisions of Min-
radioprom, Minpribor, and the TsSU. Two hundred
of them are already in existence (Deni86b). Along
with the "local organs," which probably means the
local Party committees, these centers are to be the
"law givers" (zakondatel) in the region. The exact
meaning of this phrase is unclear, but it seems to
imply that they are slated to play a similar role to
Gossnab territorial organizations as brokers of the
supply of computer services. The TsVUs will perform
maintenance, repair, education of specialists, and
distribution of software (Mikh86d). They will serve as
a means to collect comprehensive information about
how computers are used and what is needed where
(Deni86b). Another possibility is that the TsVUs will
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Further Tasks Outlined for the GKVTI
By N. Gorshkov, August 1986
Regulation
? Create new normative documents for development
and use of computers.
? Require ministries and departments to do a total
software inventory.
? Require ministries to create branch-wide databases
accessible to those who need to have access within
the branch.
? Create new legal documents to increase personal
responsibility for the information delivered by in-
formation service personnel.
? Set up an inspection office to check on the quality
of scientific research and experimental design deci-
sions at computer plants.
Provide Hardware Services
? Revamp the entire system of servicing computers.
Provide Software Services
? Create state system of software.
? Offer software engineering tools at TsVUs which
include all "hardware and software instrumenta-
tion, mathematical models and systems of model-
ing, workbenches for debugging and testing. finished
products, and the consultation of highly qualified
specialists. "
? Register all programs in the national library, ad-
vertise them, and distribute them through software
factories.
Provide Computing Services
? Possibly eventually take over the TsSU computing
system.
? Possibly take over rental dispatching services which
function in a few cities now.
Promote Computer Usage
? Create a new educational system for computer
specialists and train others to have a real desire to
use the computer in their work.
? investigate new user-vendor relations-e.g. users
would rent machines and only pay for time the
machine was actually working.
cooperate with or absorb dispatcher services for the
rental of computer time (Pans86). The TsVUs will be
part of large production associations which will also
include factories for computer repairs, software pro-
duction, scientific-educational centers, and territorial
libraries of algorithms and programs.
Scientific-production associations, which will cooper-
ate with the Academy of Sciences, will also be a part
of the committee's system (Mikh86d). The GKVTI
will head a new center for Informatics and Electron-
ics, which may be the lead organization of an Inter-
branch Scientific-Technical Complex (MNTK)
(Deni86b; R l rb86d). No further information about
this has yet surfaced.
Gorshkov has made several other statements about
the kinds of changes that GKVTI will introduce
(inset). But it is difficult to distinguish between what
has been implemented, what is definitely the responsi-
bility of GKVTI, and what is posturing by Gorshkov
to try to gain turf. Nonetheless, Gorshkov's state-
ments offer an intriguing vision of how the Soviet
"informatics industry" might work.
It is significant that Gorshkov himself is a former
deputy Minister of Minradioprom. His portfolio there
was computer service, where he oversaw the expansion
of the SoyuzEVMkompleks service organization,
which was founded in 1976 to service ES computers.
SoyuzEVMkompleks can hardly be called an unmiti-
gated success, but it was a marked improvement over
what existed before. The original charter for Soyuz-
EVMkompleks provided for the establishment of re-
gional centers and repair services in all cities with
more than five ES computers (Myas77b). By 1978,
centers and repair stations existed in 43 cities (Ples78).
In some areas, however, its penetration has been
minimal, as in Western Siberia (Nest84b).
The services offered by SoyuzEVMkompleks are by
no means universal. By 1983, Minradioprom had
extended centralized servicing to 60 percent of the
computers in the country, including about 50 percent
of ES machines (Gors83; Novi83). A new program
called for fulfilling all requests by users to subscribe
in the 1983-85 period and raising the overall level of
acceptance to 80 percent by 1985 (Gors83). However,
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a 1985 article charged that Minradioprom provided
service to only 40 percent of the computers it pro-
duced (Eg85d). Services vary by distance from service
centers (Novi83). Organizations which cannot sub-
scribe to SoyuzEVMkompleks, including organiza-
tions waiting for initial debugging of their computer
after it has been installed, typically wait two months
for service calls to be answered (Vino83). Because
SoyuzEVMkompleks holds exclusive control over
spare parts for ES computers, enterprises which have
their own engineers must turn to them anyway
(Nest84b). Thus, Gorshkov's record is not fully con-
vincing, although it appears that he has at least some
of the experience and contacts necessary to perform
well in his new job.
In sum, the GKVTI is supposed to play a role similar
to what Western computer companies do to actively
promote effective usage of computers. The GKVTI
does not, however, have direct control of the produc-
tion of computers, which may lead to further difficul-
ties. Where it does not have control, it will try to exert
pressure by inspections and regulations, which are
much weaker forms of control in the Soviet system.
Although not all details about what the GKVTI will
do are known, the statements cited here present a
rather concrete agenda for the committee.
The third measure to improve the computing infra-
structure has been the establishment of at least one
MNTK for computers. The MNTK PC, for personal
computers, has been set up under the leadership of the
Institute for the Problems of Informatics, headed by
Boris Naumov.
Interbranch Scientific-Technical Complexes address
both the problem of continuity in the research and
development cycle and the problem of ministerial
"departmentalism." As mandated by a joint resolu-
tion of the TSKKPSS and SMSSSR (Prav851213),
MNTKs are to consist of scientific institutes, design
engineering organizations and experimental enter-
prises, each of which may fall under the jurisdiction of
different ministries. In many cases the lead organiza-
tion in the MNTK will be an Academy of Sciences
Institute, which is a radical departure from past
practice. They are to produce experimental models of
new machines, equipment, or material in designated
fields of advanced technology (Izv85o). The initial
plans called for creating 16 MNTKs (Izv85o;
Pank85). Since the initial announcements, several
others have been mentioned, including ones which
also have a republican basis (Deni86b; Lave86;
Sovm86b).
Some of the tasking of the MNTK PC is known. It is
working with Minelektronprom on designing school
computers. With Minelektronprom, Minradioprom,
Minpromsvyazi, and Minpribor, the MNTK PC is to
develop software for all domestically produced com-
puters, "based on a standardized system." The
MNTK PC is cooperating with other CEMA partners
in developing a program for a new generation of PCs
under the "electronization" banner. It is participating
in the drive to create production of tens of thousands
of PCs initially, then hundreds of thousands, and then
millions (Naum86).
Since the initial announcement, there has been con-
siderable publicity about the problems that have been
encountered in setting up MNTKs. Because each one
is different, it is dangerous to generalize based on a
few cases. The statement of Boris Paton in October,
1986 has held true for the MNTK PC, at least
initially. He reported that "although the status of
MNTKs has been defined and confirmed, in fact they
exist only as scattered, hard-to-manage conglomerates
of scientific research organizations and enterprises"
(Prav861018, p.3). In July, 1986 the MNTK PC was
housed in 17 buildings scattered throughout Moscow.
It was receiving almost no support from the computer-
producing ministries, who considered it to be a pass-
ing fad. Gosplan and the GKNT were also ignoring its
requests for support. No experimental or test produc-
tion facilities had been provided. Four different minis-
tries were already producing their own personal com-
puters (Naum86).
The funding of MNTKs has been something of a
problem. Organizations that are nominally subordi-
nated to the MNTK but are funded by their minis-
tries are not likely to follow the commands of the
MNTK. In June, 1986, each participating organiza-
tion in an MNTK was still funded by its own
ministry, leading to problems of coordinating their
overall work (Kono86e). In September, before he
moved to the Academy of Sciences, G. Marchuk
related that GKNT has a reserve from which it can
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furnish additional financing and manpower for
MNTKs. The MNTKs are supposed to be able to
draw funds from the bonus funds of the enterprises
themselves. Marchuk also mentioned a centralized
fund of hard-currency revenues based on sales of
licenses and products abroad (Lepi86). It should be
noted that none of the sources can be expected to
make up sizeable portions of the MNTK budget.
There is also evidence that MNTKs will be funded
from the state budget, although they are eventually
supposed to be self-financing (Moze86). Two represen-
tatives of GKNT claimed in June, 1986 that MNTKs
were receiving sufficient financing and priority supply
(Vash86). Marchuk also notes their priority status, but
also intimates difficulties because MNTKs were
formed after everything was already allocated for the
12th FYP (Lepi86). The bottom line is that funding
will probably come from a variety of sources and will
exert a negative influence on the successful integra-
tion of the MNTKs. How this will specifically effect
the MNTK PC, however, is not clear.
In addition to the MNTK PC, the Latvian Republic
MNTK "Mashinostroyeniye" (Machinebuilding) has
been created as of December 1986. It has several
responsibilities related to computing, including robot-
ics, information systems, and computer-aided design.
It is said to be planning a republic designing-system
network with central facilities located at the center,
and automated work-places located at industrial en-
terprises (Lave86). The scope of the activities outlined
for this MNTK indicate that it may be seen as a
general high-technology development center for the
republic, which could be interpreted as a creative way
to use the flexibility given by the resolution on
MNTKs.
Thus, it is still much too early to judge the impact of
the MNTKs on the Soviet computing industry. Gen-
eral problems, such as funding, abound; yet each
MNTK is different. In the case of the MNTK PC, the
high importance of the tasks and support from the
GKVTI may ensure that the necessary resources are
allocated, and some progress will probably be made
beyond what could have been expected without them.
But will this progress be enough?
A fourth change which might affect the computer
industry is a new resolution from the Central Com-
mittee and the Council of Ministers "On Measures
for Radically Raising the Quality of Products."
Developers of products and processes will now have
personal responsibility for ensuring that their work
meets the standards of the highest world levels.
Gosstandart has been setting up offices directly at
plants to monitor quality (Eg86d). The effectiveness of
the resolution is called into question by the following
factors. First, it is hard to believe that designers will
be held personally responsible when it is so hard to get
comprehensive information about what is going on in
the West.12 Second, it is hard to believe that substan-
dard products will not be accepted. The conse-
quences-for workers, enterprise managers, ministry
officials, enterprises waiting for the equipment-
would simply be too severe otherwise.
Other measures may have some bearing on the perfor-
mance of the computer industry. For example, new
organizational structures are being developed for sci-
entific-production associations. Important issues, such
as the extent to which Minradioprom should (or is
able to) continue following IBM, must be decided.
With the new profile given to computing by GKVTI
and the large investments, the computer industry is
likely to do somewhat better in the 12th FYP. The
GKVTI will face powerful vested interests in Min-
radioprom, Minpribor, and so forth, but if it can start
to fulfill its promise, the performance of the computer
industry may improve markedly. Will the economy be
able to respond by absorbing these machines?
Changes in the Surrounding Environment
It is more difficult to track the evolution of those
reforms which will affect the enterprise environment,
and consequently influence the way that enterprise
managers perceive computing. Few of the measures
will affect the fundamental incentives described in the
second section of this paper. As mentioned above,
Philip Hanson has described a planned switch to
wholesale goods under the control of the State Com-
mittee for Material Technical Supply (Gossnab)
"Over the past few years, as the Soviets have increased compliance
with international copyright laws, it has become harder to obtain
foreign publications (Alek86). On the other hand, ministries do
produce small pamphlets which cover developments in the West.
These are often issued, though, in press runs of 500 copies or less.
These booklets themselves are prepared by researchers who have
limited access to the Western press. Even if there were unlimited
access, it would be rather difficult to pinpoint a target which is
moving as fast as the Western computer industry.
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(Hans86g). Even if this reform is fully implemented,
which is doubtful given the record on wholesale
supplies from the 1965 reforms, late supplies are more
a function of taut planning and the transportation
system than who controls their distribution. Unless
Gossnab can significantly reduce supply delays, this
measure is likely to have little effect on ASUP.
A second set of measures is designed to reduce
ministry interference in enterprise affairs. The shift to
superministries, large groupings for enterprises, and
the elimination of all-union production associations
are intended to promote autonomy by severely limit-
ing the extent to which central bureaucrats can
oversee their enterprises (Hans86g). The TsSU has
recently announced that enterprises will have to pro-
vide 50 percent less information to state organs
(Rlrb86d). A provision for stable five-year plan tar-
gets, which has been on the books since 1971, would
allow enterprises to get away from the influence of
planning from the achieved level.
If enterprise directors are convinced that there will be
less direct oversight, they may be more willing to use
optimization routines and do more analysis with
computers. If one of the means envisioned for control-
ling enterprises was to collect more and more data
through the TsSU system, through branch automated
management systems, and through the automated
systems of other organizations such as Gosplan, Goss-
nab, and the Ministry of Finance, then the extent to
which less data is being collected is one way to
measure the success of Gorbachev's decentralization
drive.
The Gorbachev administration is pushing for the
collection of fewer statistics as a means to remove the
stranglehold that ministries have on their enterprises
(Koro86b). So far considerable reductions have been
announced, but a further cut of 50 percent has been
required, and all agree that much more work needs to
be done (Vest86b; Vest86d; Vest86f). The reductions
have probably not even been enough to offset the
tremendous rise in the collection of statistics in the
10th and 11th FYP periods -70 and 60 percent
respectively (Vest86d). Ministries have spent millions
of rubles to build their automated systems (OASUs)
which now collect huge amounts of data (Doma86;
Guzh86; Koro86b; Shen86; Vest86c; Vest86d;
Vest86g; Vest86k). There is a large bureaucracy
associated with building the State Network of
Computer Centers. All of these interest groups have
reason to stand in the way of further decentralization.
The Gorbachev administration has thrown down the
gauntlet: ministries and departments have been for-
bidden from assigning indicators to associations and
enterprises which have not been approved under the
management conditions which are spreading as a
result of the experiment started by Andropov a few
years ago (Maye86).
Other measures which might ensure more autonomy
are also moving slowly. Most ministries have so far
remained intact, and it seems unlikely that they will
be dismantled (in favor of any superministries) in the
near future. Only Minpribor has so far eliminated all-
union production associations. Philip Hanson is ex-
tremely skeptical about the prospects for stable plans;
they would have to contain considerable slack, which
is certainly not the case for the 12th Five-Year Plan.
Gorbachev's initial campaign for discipline, which
was "gleefully" taken up by the bureaucrats, may
lead to greater interference (Hans86g). The ORMM-
uchet program, which could lead to less enterprise
autonomy, is still being pushed.
Another set of measures will allow a select group of
enterprises to begin engaging in direct foreign trade
(Hans86g). Only 70 of the larger associations and 20
ministries had been given this right as of October
1986 (Poli86q). The lure of foreign markets and hard
currency may increase incentives for more sophisticat-
ed computer usage, although these enterprises are still
subject to the same economic incentive system at
home. Some joint ventures with Western firms may
be permitted (Eg86e), which could provide a crash
course in the management of information for the
Soviet participants.
The ASUP program failed to live up to its objectives
for two broad reasons. On the one hand, the computer
industry failed to deliver reliable hardware and robust
software. Service was poor. Technical limitations low-
ered the ceiling on the applications that could be
implemented. Even more important was the lack of
demand for computing services which went beyond
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accounting. Although it is prestigious to have a
computer, it is not wise given the current economic
incentive system to use it too well.
Several measures have been initiated by Mikhail
Gorbachev to improve the computer industry. If the
State Committee on Computers and Informatics
(GKVTI) is able to perform all of the tasks it has been
given without running into a lot of bureaucratic
interference, the performance of the computer indus-
try should pick up considerably. Producing a high
volume of personal computers is considered to be a
particularly high priority. History demonstrates that
the Soviet system is well-suited for high priority, high
resources projects. It would be hard to believe that
they could not produce at least an order of magnitude
more personal computers per year by the end of the
FYP.
Continued progress will be made in the mechanization
and automation of accounting. More and more enter-
prises will send their data out for processing, either by
the TsSU or the branch. This will facilitate storage
and use of the data for other purposes, such as by
regional authorities. But these kinds of processing
only satisfy the need for preparing reports for TsSU
and Minfin. The voluminous internal calculations of
the large majority of organizations which need com-
puting will be done in a variety of ways which do not
fit together very well. All of this perpetuates the use
of the so-called "accounting approach," whereby en-
terprises are given and use only static reports. The
accounting approach mirrors the traditional organiza-
tion of the enterprise and leads to few changes in the
way it is managed. The microcomputer offers a
means, for the first time, by which large numbers of
white collar workers can manage their own data
processing directly.
One of the key issues for the Soviet economy is the
extent to which the Gorbachev administration will be
able to free up the enterprises from the heavy hands of
their ministers. The less data collected, the harder to
exert specific control. Yet ministries and regional
agencies are in the process of building networks which
will give them even greater access to all sorts of data.
The construction of a nationwide network for collect-
ing and dissemination information through OGAS
and the State Network of Computer Centers contin-
ues. For the first time, the use of personal computers
is giving smaller organizations a means to avoid this
centralized processing, which may ultimately con-
strain the implementation of OGAS.
It is well-known that Mikhail Gorbachev is banking
on technology to implement his intensive growth
strategy. This can be done by process control, robots,
and flexible manufacturing, but ultimately the prob-
lem of the wide-spread adoption of management
information systems within enterprises must be con-
fronted. Computerizing enterprise management is
risky for managers not only because of possible
interruptions in production, but also because it threat-
ens some of the fundamental ways that the enterprise
does business under Soviet conditions. The future of
the ASUP program revolves around integration of all
sorts of functions, which is actually harder to achieve
than initial computerization of accounting. The con-
struction of these systems will continue to proceed in
enterprises that have traditionally been successful
with ASUPs and in newly constructed enterprises, but
the 12th FYP will continue to emphasize direct
automation measures.
Numerous reforms have been initiated by Gorbachev
which affect the enterprise environment. The imple-
mentation of the first reforms is uneven; others are
still being formulated. The force of some will un-
doubtedly be blunted by the bureaucracy. What is
needed most to spur the use of computers in enterprise
management is real autonomy. Enterprises must have
flexible, adequate sources of supplies, they must have
good incentives for using optimization, and they must
feel secure in maintaining realistic data in their
computers. In principle, the combination of centrally
controlled wholesale trade, stable five-year plans,
elimination of all-union production associations, and
collection of far less data might work together to
provide a better atmosphere for ASUPs. The Soviets
have a long way to go just to implement these
measures.
Given the lead times involved in designing informa-
tion systems and training personnel, the enormous
number of enterprises that still have limited experi-
ence in data processing, and the time needed for the
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economy to absorb Gorbachev's reforms, there can be
no quick, major, overall improvements from comput-
erization of management. Hundreds of thousands of
organizations are in the midst of a gradual evolution-
ary upgrading of the way their information is pro-
cessed and used. Because organizational units have so
little autonomy, the rate of change cannot be very
fast. Computerization is a long-term structural
change. It has occurred so quickly in the United
States because of the pressures of the marketplace to
keep up with the competition, because of corporate
autonomy, because of considerable marketing pres-
sure from the major vendors, because small vendors
have filled the most varied niches, and because the
vendors have generally delivered sufficient equipment
for the tasks at hand. The ASUP, the IASU, and
other Soviet computing applications, however, involve
so many aspects of the external operation of the
enterprise and the surrounding social-political system,
that management-oriented computing will remain one
of the hardest technologies for the Soviet enterprise to
absorb.
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Appendix A
Acronyms Involving ASU
ASP-ASU Automated System of Design of ASU
ASU Automated Control System or Auto-
mated Management System
ASU-GPT Automated Management System for
City Public Transportation
ASUM
ASUNE
ASUNS
ASUNT
Automated Assembly Management
System
ASU-GU Automated Management System of the
Main Administration of VUZes of the
USSR Ministry of VUZes
ASU-IP Automated Management System for
Instrument Production
ASU-MTO Automated Control System for Materi-
al-Technical Support
ASU-MTS Automated System for the Control of
Material-Technical Supply
ASU- Automated System for the Control of
NIOKR Scientific Research Work and Experi-
mental-Design Developments
ASU-NT Automated System for the Control of
the Development of Science and
Technology
ASU- Automated Management System for
PRIBOR the Instrument Building Industry
ASU-TSEN Automated Management System for
Price Formation - under Goskomtsen
ASU-VUZ Automated System for the Manage-
ment of Educational Institutions
ASUK Automated Quality Management
System
ASUKR Automated Management System for
Coordination of Developments
Automated System for the Manage-
ment of Scientific Experiments
Automated Management Systems of
the Non-Production Sphere
Automated System for Management of
Scientific-technical Progress of the
USSR State Committee for Science
and Technology
ASUO Automated Association Management
System
ASUOP Automated System for Management of
Experimental Production
ASUOT Organizational-Technical Automated
Management System
ASUP Automated Enterprise Management
System
ASUPKR Automated Management System for
Design-Engineering Work
ASUPP Automated Management System of In-
dustrial Enterprises
ASURPO Automated Management System for
Republic Industrial Associations
ASUS Automated Warehouse Control System
ASUS Automated Management System for
Construction
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ASUT Automated System for the Manage-
ment of Trade
ASUTO Automated Management System for
Territorial Organizations
IASUP Integrated Automated Enterprise Man-
agement System
KASU Integrated Automated Management
System
ASUTP Automated System for Process Control MASU
ASUTPP Automated Management System for
Production Engineering
ASUUR Automated Management System for
Accounting Operations
ASUVPO Automated Management System for
All-Union Industrial Associations
ASUVSH Automated Management for Higher
Educational Institutions
ASUZHD Automated Railroad Management
System
ASUZHT Automated Management System for
Railroad Transportation
IASU Integrated Automated Management
System
OASU
OASU-R
OASUT
RASU
International Automated Management
System
Automated Management System for a
Branch of Industry
Republic Automated Management Sys-
tem for a Branch of Industry
Automated Management System for
the Trade Branch of Industry
Republic Automated Control System
VASU Departmental Automated Control
Systems
VASU-R Republic-level Departmental Auto-
mated Control System
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Appendix B
Selected Organization Acronyms
Used in This Study
ANDRO-
Andropov Engine Building Production
INTER-
Interprogramm Bulgarian-Soviet Sci-
POV
Association
PRO-
entific Research and Design Institute,
GRAMM
Sofia
CCITT
Consultative Committee on Interna-
tional Telephone and Telegraph
LENELEK-
Leningrad Electrical Machines Plant,
TRON-
Leningrad
CEMA
Council for Economic Mutual
MASH
Assistance
LIMTU
Leningrad Institute of the Raising of
COCOM
Coordinating Committee for Multilat-
Qualifications of Industrial and City
eral Export Controls
Workers in Methods and Technology of
Management, Leningrad
CPSU
Communist Party of the Soviet Union
LTP
L'vov TV Plant, L'vov
DEC
Digital Equipment Corporation, May-
nard, Mass.
MINELEK-
USSR All-Union Ministry of the Elec-
TRON-
tronics Industry, Moscow
GKNT
USSR State Committee for Science
PROM
and Technology, Moscow
MINELEK-
USSR All-Union Ministry of the
GKVTI
All-Union State Committee for Com-
TRO-
Electrical Equipment Industry,
puter Technology and Informatics,
TEKH-
Moscow
Moscow
PROM
GOSPLAN
USSR State Planning Committee,
MINFIN
USSR Union-Republic Ministry of Fi-
Moscow
nance, Moscow
GOSSNAB
USSR State Committee for Material
MINPRI-
USSR All-Union Ministry of Instru-
and Technical Supply, Moscow
BOR
ment Building, Means of Automation,
and Control Systems, Moscow
GOSTAN-
USSR State Committee for Standards,
DART
Moscow
MIN-
USSR All-Union Ministry of the Com-
PROMS-
munications Equipment Industry
GOS-
USSR State Committee for Construc-
VYAZI
STROY
tion Affairs, Moscow
MINRA-
USSR All-Union Ministry of the Radio
IBM
International Business Machines Cor-
DIOPROM
Industry, Moscow
poration, White Plains, NY
MINS-
USSR Union-Republic Ministry of
INEUM
Institute of Electronic Control Ma-
VYAZI
Communications, Moscow
chines, Moscow
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 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/04/10: CIA-RDP08S01350R000401300001-9
MSB Moscow Savings Bank, Moscow TSKKPSS CPSU Central Committee, Moscow
ROBO- VEB Kombinat Robotron, Dresden, TSNIITU Central Design Engineering Scientific
TRON GDR Research Institute of the Organization
and Technology of Management,
SIGMA Sigma Production Association, Vil'nyus Minsk
SMSSSR USSR Council of Ministers, Moscow TSSU USSR Central Statistical Administra-
tion, Moscow
SOYU- All-Union Computer Systems
ZEVM- Association
KOM-
PLEKS
VGPTI All-Union State Design-Engineering
Institute for the Mechanization of Ac-
counting and Computer Work, Moscow
SOYUZS- All-Union Main Administration for VNIIPOU All-Union Scientific-Research Institute
CHET- Accounting Equipment for Problems of Organization and Man-
TEKH- agement, Moscow
NIKA
VNIPIU- All-Union Scientific Research Institute
TASS Soviet News Agency CHET of Accounting
TSEMI Central Economics-Mathematics Insti-
tute, Moscow
TSENTR- Tsentrprogrammsistem Scientific
PRO- Research Association, Kalinin
GRAMM-
SISTEM
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Appendix C
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