CHERNOBYL': A YEAR LATER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP08S01350R000401290002-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 35
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 2, 2013
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: August 1, 1987
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of ---
Intelligence
1
4
Chernobyl': A Year Later
A Research Paper
6 r-
--Secret-,
SOV 87-10047
SW 87-10033
EUR 87-10022
August 1987
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Chernobyl': A Year Later
A Research Paper
This paper was prepared by members of the
Chernobyl' Task Force from the Office of Soviet
Analysis, the Office of Scientific and Weapons
Research, the Office of European Analysis
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Economic Performance
Division, National Issues Group, SOVA,
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Reverse Blank Secret
SOV 87-10047
SW 87-10033
EUR 87-10022
August 1987
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Scope Note
Reverse Blank
Chernobyl': A Year Later
This paper provides a broad assessment of the effects of the Chernobyl' nu-
clear power plant accident of 26 April 1986. It examines the political as
well as physical aspects of Soviet responses to the accident, the safety
aspects of the basic design and post-Chernobyl' modifications of the Soviet
RBMK reactors, and the human toll from radiation released by the
accident. It also examines implications for Soviet nuclear power programs
and agriculture, social and political reactions within the USSR, and
consequences for Eastern and Western Europe.
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SOV 87-10047
SW 87-10033
EUR 87-10022
August 1987
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Summary
Information available
as of 15 July 1987
was used in this report.
Chernobyl': A Year Later
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A year after launching a massive and largely effective effort to cope with
the world's worst nuclear accident, the USSR has managed to contain most
of the political and economic fallout. Moscow defused Western government
criticism by cooperating with the International Atomic Energy Agency in
detailing the accident and outlining safety enhancements for RBMK
(Chernobyl'-type) reactors. Even today, however, the regime's credibility
remains tainted by its initial, futile attempt to conceal the full scope of the
accident and its reluctance to discuss the safety of the USSR's remaining
nuclear power plants.
The sharp international criticism brought on by Moscow's initial silence
embarrassed General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, who had been promot-
ing a new policy of openness (glasnost), and he distanced himself from the
crisis to minimize his personal responsibility. Although the Chernobyl'
accident has made it difficult for Gorbachev to portray the leadership in
Moscow as reasonable and accountable, the break in his political momen-
tum appears to have been temporary. After several weeks, he mounted a
public relations campaign to limit damage to his regime's reputation, and
his subsequent domestic reform measures have largely deflected public
attention from Chernobyl'. The accident gave impetus to Gorbachev's drive
for openness by showing that suppressing information about domestic
problems can backfire. But, while the leadership has been able to overcome
the initial credibility gap to some extent, public apprehension about the
long-term consequences of radiation on human health, the safety of nuclear
power facilities, and the environment continues at a heightened level.
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After a brief period of bureaucratic bungling and disorganization immedi-
ately after the accident, the Soviets mobilized both civilian and military
assets to effectively control the radioactive releases and evacuate about
135,000 persons, as well as livestock. By December 1986 they had
entombed the destroyed reactor and decontaminated most of the Cherno-
byl' environs sufficiently to permit shift work, though not habitation.
Efforts to return the Chernobyl' power plant to service and to resettle the
displaced populace continue.
Two of the three surviving Chernobyl' reactors are generating electricity,
and the third is being decontaminated. The partly built Chernobyl' units 5
and 6, however, have been canceled?a writeoff of roughly 500 million
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rubles. Soviet statements place the cost of the accident in a range of 2 to 25
billion rubles. The minimum estimate probably accounts only for the
entombment, immediate site cleanup, compensation paid to evacuees, and
population relocation expenses. The higher estimate probably includes the
indirect costs of cleanup and recovery (possibly including safety enhance-
ments to RBMK reactors) through 1990.
The human toll of the accident will not be known for decades. In addition
to the 31 known fatalities, radiation exposure could cause cancer deaths to
increase by as many as 10,000?estimated by statistical extrapolation?in
the European USSR over the next 70 years (an increase of about one-tenth
of 1 percent in the number of cancer deaths) and by as many as 4,000 in af-
fected portions of Eastern and Western Europe (an increase of less than
one-hundredth of 1 percent). These estimates are subject to large uncer-
tainties, however, and the outcome will depend partly on the type and
extent of medical attention given to those exposed. Nevertheless, concern
about the possible consequences of exposure and psychological reactions,
even among those who have no identifiable health effects from radiation,
will continue.
The turmoil and costs of the recovery will make it harder for the regime to
act on Gorbachev's initiatives for social programs, including more housing
and better health care throughout the USSR. The resources diverted to
Chernobyl'-related medical problems?for example, the purchase of West-
ern radiation detection equipment?are likely to further strain the Soviet
health-care delivery systems, at least in the short term. These systems have
proved inadequate to deal with many medical problems associated with
contemporary industrial society and have been the subject of recent
criticism from the top leadership.
The impact on Soviet agriculture is likely to be too small to measure. The
Chernobyl' plant is not in a major farming area, and most radioactive
material passed largely over forests and swamps. Levels of contamination
sufficient to affect crop growth or to raise the radioactivity in products to
potentially carcinogenic levels were local, and health-threatening damage
to farming regions beyond the immediate area of the accident has not been
evident. Even in affected farming areas, the potential loss of agricultural
output can be limited if the Soviets adopt measures to reduce the radiation
exposure of workers, shift from sensitive crops such as beans and peas to
less sensitive ones such as wheat and oats, and lime the soil to reduce
uptake of the long-lived cesium-137 isotope.
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Disruptions to the Soviet nuclear power industry through 1990 will be
minor and will not derail Soviet intentions to increase reliance on this
energy source. For the 1986-90 period, for example, the cumulative
reduction in electricity production resulting from damage to the Cherno-
byl' plant and related slowdown at the other nuclear power plants will be
about 100 billion kilowatt hours, or about 1 percent of projected total
electricity production. From a Western viewpoint, the Soviets face a
dilemma:
? They can continue operation of the RBMK reactors, which pose a
continuing, if remote, safety hazard because of fundamental deficiencies
that no reasonable modifications can eliminate.
? They can shut down the RBMKs, losing nearly half the USSR's nuclear
power capacity.
Moscow's decision to keep its existing RBMK reactors on line reflects
economic necessity and a belief that the safety threat can be dealt with ad-
equately by a combination of hardware modifications and better manage-
ment of reactor operations.
Safety improvements to RBMK reactors so far have centered on proce-
dures, operator training, and a few hardware modifications. Even the main
modifications planned will not address key safety concerns such as the
RBMK's lack of full containment. These concerns, as well as escalating
costs, probably were major factors in the decision to stop construction of at
least six RBMK reactors.
Beyond 1990 some changes to the nuclear program are likely; a few could
set back the timetable by several years. These changes would probably
involve the design and location of future plants and a shift in emphasis re-
sulting from the competition of coal and oil interests for investment
resources.
In Eastern and Western Europe, fears about the near-term environmental
and political consequences of the accident have eased, and the focus has
shifted to concern about their own nuclear energy programs. The Cherno-
byl' accident bolstered antinuclear sentiment, focusing regime and popular
attention on environmental issues in Eastern Europe and making nuclear
power a more salient political issue in many West European countries.
Eastern Europe remains committed to an ambitious nuclear program based
largely on Soviet technology; most of these countries, however, are seeking
safety equipment and expertise from Western?including US?firms.
Most West European governments are conscious of the potential of nuclear
energy for reducing dependence on imported energy. France and, to a
lesser degree, the United Kingdom and West Germany remain committed
to continued production of nuclear power; but a long debate is expected in
many countries, particularly in Italy.
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Contents
Page
Scope Note
iii
Summary
V
Coping With Disaster
1
Phase I?Controlling Radioactive Releases
1
Phase II?Site Decontamination and Entombment
4
Phase III?Recommissioning Other Chernobyl' Units
6
Safety Modifications to RBMKs: Progress and Implications
9
Administrative Actions and Operational Improvements
9
Equipment and Design Improvements
9
Disadvantages of Safety-Related Changes
10
Impact on Weapons-Material Production Potential
11
Radiological Consequences
12
The Human Toll From Exposure
12
Contamination of Water Supply
13
The Potential Risks of Cancer in Eastern Europe
14
Economic and Social Consequences in the USSR
15
Impact on Energy Production
15
Impact on Nuclear Power Industry Goals
15
Impact on Agriculture
16
Social and Political Fallout in the USSR
18
Consequences for Eastern Europe
20
Economic Costs Bearable
20
Political Costs Fleeting
21
The Future of Nuclear Power
21
Consequences for Western Europe
23
Heightened Domestic Political Tension
23
International Repercussions
25
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Finland
The United States Government has not recop
the incorporation of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania
into the Soviet Union. Other boundary representation
is not necessarily authoritative.
Sweden
Gulf of
Finland
Leningrad
ESTONIAN
S.S.R.
Gulf ?
of
Riga
LATVIAN
S.S.R.
Baltic
Sea
R. S. F. S. R.
MOSCOW
LITHUANIAN
S.S.R.
Ignalin
BELORUSSIAN
S.S.R.
Amer
Chernobyl=
Zelanyy Mys
Czechoslovakia
UKRAINIAN
S.S.R.
Hungary
MOLD
S.S.
Moldavia
Romania
Sea
of
Azov
Yugoslavia
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Black
Cer sod Sea 0 200 Kilometers
0 200 Miles
710955 (B00316) 8-87
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Chernobyl': A Year Later
Coping With Disaster
At 0123 hours, on the morning of 26 April 1986, the
Soviets faced the world's worst nuclear reactor disas-
ter?the Chernobyl' accident. The accident resulted
from a series of improper actions by the power plant
operators in handling a reactor of inherently flawed
design (see inset).' The area immediately surrounding
the destroyed reactor was contaminated with danger-
ous quantities of radioactive materials. The graphite
reactor moderator was burning and discharging high-
ly radioactive material from the fuel. Thousands of
plant workers and their families in the vicinity were in
jeopardy from this radiation. The Kiev region, with
over 2.5 million inhabitants, was less than 100 kilome-
ters (km) away.
Phase I?Controlling Radioactive Releases
Hot fragments of nuclear fuel and graphite expelled
in the explosion at the Chernobyl'-4 reactor started
more than 30 fires at the plant (see figure 1). The
immediate response by on-site personnel was to fight
the fires in the buildings in order to minimize damage
to the rest of the plant. According to the Soviets, an
early attempt to use water from the reactor's cooling
system to prevent the graphite from igniting proved
ineffective because the accident had severed critical
pipes. This left two options?let the fire burn itself out
or attempt to smother it Soviet press
accounts confirmed the latter choice. Beginning on 27
April, the Soviets used helicopters to drop a mixture
of sand, boron, lead, clay, and dolomite onto the
reactor to extinguish the burning nuclear core, reduce
the release of radioactive material, and prevent a
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chain reaction from occurring in the core. This mix-
ture was well suited for the task. The melting lead
acted as a heat sink and provided some radiation
shielding. The boron absorbed neutrons to reduce
fissioning, and the dolomite decomposed to form a
carbon dioxide blanket over the core to smother the
fire.
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Potentially serious errors were made by local authori-
ties in responding to the accident. The report to the
Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) headquarters in
Kiev that initiated the emergency situation plan was
only about the fire. Even after it was known that high
levels of radioactivity were present, the accident was
handled for many hours only as a site emergency.
Moreover, there was no contact between the organiza-
tion responsible for radiation safety of the site and the
organization responsible for radiation safety of the
surrounding area.
High-level response was delayed initially because
Moscow did not believe the kind of accident reported
by site personnel to be possible. It was not until a
group of experts arrived at the scene and saw parts of
the reactor core lying on the ground that Moscow
appreciated the scope of the disaster.
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One of Moscow's first acts was to establish a govern-
ment commission and dispatch it to the site. This 25X1
commission took over direction of the emergency
response and recovery efforts shortly after arriving in
Chernobyl' on the evening of 26 April. The success of
subsequent efforts was clearly due to that group's
ability to mobilize both military and civilian resources
and to make decisions quickly.
By the morning of 27 April, the necessity for evacua-
tion became apparent, and planning probably had
begun for the use of buses from Kiev to evacuate the
people. The situation in the city of Pripyat', some 3
km west-northwest of the destroyed reactor, deterio-
rated sharply
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The Chernobyl' Accident: A Capsule Account
The events leading up to the accident began with a
test of a reactor safety subsystem during a scheduled
maintenance shutdown. Soviet power reactors, like
most others, depend on auxiliary diesel generators to
supply emergency electrical power to the reactor in
the event of a loss of normal supplies of electricity.
The Soviets were concerned, however, about the
period of up to hall a minute between the loss of
normal power and the beginning of power supply from
the diesel generators. The fatal test involved a
scheme to use the rotational inertia of the turbogen-
erators, which are operated by steam from the reac-
tor, to generate electricity to bridge this interval.
The turbogenerator test had been performed previ-
ously but was not successful, and a modification to
the turbogenerator was to be tried this time. The
modified test was submitted to safety authorities for
approval. The authorities took no action, and?since
the request was not disapproved?the operators of
Chernobyl-4 decided to proceed with the test on the
date of the scheduled shutdown.
The experiment began to deviate from its planned
course almost from the beginning. Instead of being
decreased as scheduled from a full power level of
3,200 megawatts thermal (MWt) to a level of 700 to
1,000 MWt (at which the experiment was to be
performed), the power level was held at about 1,600
MWt for several hours on request from the regional
electricity dispatcher. When continuation of the pow-
er decrease was authorized, operator mistakes and
accumulation of a neutron-absorbing isotope of xenon
caused the reactor to become unstable, and the power
level collapsed. After several hours of struggling, the
operators managed to bring the reactor back up to a
level of about 200 MWt?but in an extremely unsta-
ble condition. The operators bypassed a number of
safety procedures to achieve this power level, and at
that juncture the number of control rods in the core
was far below the allowable minimum. Very little
steam was being produced in the core?a dangerous
condition in RBMKs because an increase in the steam
content of the reactor coolant in the core can, in that
circumstance, cause a rapid increase in power. Al-
though the reactor was in a dangerous condition not
foreseen in the test program, the operators decided to
proceed.
To begin the test, the operators shut off steam to the
turbogenerator. As the turbogenerator began to run
down, the main coolant pumps connected to it began
to slow. This led to slower coolant waterflow in the
core and to increased boiling. As the steam content of
the coolant increased, power began to rise, causing
more boiling. This process continued, feeding on
itself, and became uncontrollable before the opera-
tors' efforts to shut the reactor down could take
effect. The combined effects of heat and pressure
ruptured the fuel channels, and the resulting release
of steam ruptured the core vault and destroyed the
reactor building. Pieces of fuel and graphite from the
core were carried for several hundred meters, and
radioactive particles were literally transported
around the world.
the
decision to evacuate was made at 1000 hours on the
morning of 27 April, and some 47,000 persons were
evacuated from the Pripyat' area beginning that
afternoon. Academician V. A. Legasov told a visiting
American delegation in January 1987 that earlier
evacuation was not possible because intense radiation
blocked the evacuation route.
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In the first few days of May the situation appeared to
be worsening. The material that was dropped on the
reactor initially reduced emissions but also contained
the heat. The temperature of the reactor's core started
to rise, leading to an increase in the amount of
radioactive material being released. In addition, the
wind was shifting toward the city of Chernobyl' some
15 km away. Given this situation and political pres-
sure from Politburo members visiting the area, some
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44,000 people were evacuated from the city of Cher-
nobyl' and environs beginning on 4 May (see figure 2).
Subsequently, more people were removed from a 30-
km radius of the damaged plant, bringing the official-
ly reported number of evacuees to 135,000. Fear of
contamination from fallout of radioactive material
from heavy rain was apparently such a concern that
the Soviets used intensive cloud seeding to help
prevent rain at the reactor site.
In addition, fears intensified that the material in the
nuclear core would "melt through" into water pools
under the reactor and cause a steam explosion that
could damage or destroy the unit 3 reactor and
disperse more radioactive material from unit 4. On
4 May the Soviets began recovery efforts on the
ground in the area immediately surrounding unit 4.
They began pumping out the water pools under the
damaged reactor and pumping liquid nitrogen into the
core region to help reduce the heat buildup (see figure
3). These actions proved effective, and by 12 May the
Soviets announced that the fire was under control and
that the emissions of radioactive material had ceased.
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Technical problems, however, continued to mount.
The weight of the material dropped by the helicopters
(5,000 tons by Soviet claims) added to fears that the
building support, which had been weakened by the
accident, might collapse.
Phase II?Site Decontamination and Entombment
As the Soviets sensed they were gaining control of the
situation, they began to turn their attention to decon-
taminating the site and the surrounding area, as well
as devising a method to permanently entomb the
damaged reactor. It was apparent through both Soviet
statements and actions that they pursued parallel
approaches to solving problems at Chernobyl'. For
example, at an August 1986 meeting of the Interna-
tional Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on the incident,
they openly discussed the various techniques being
considered for the entombment of unit 4, especially
the problem of controlling air flow through the en-
tombment. In addition they had
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Figure 3
Cross-Sectional View of RBMK
Reactor building
Generator hall
gi&AMOM.P""Malria
91, v
Water pools
_ _ . _
Man infigovortimr-1111111ININIIIIMINftlocomunivolie
constructed an octagon-shaped cap configured to cov-
er the stack of the damaged reactor. We also observed
them practicing moving the cover; however, it was
never used. Apparently the Soviets were so committed
to finding a solution quickly that they were willing to
fund various efforts in order to select the "best" one.
We believe that the emergency measures?including
tunneling under the unit 4 reactor to reinforce its base
and decontaminating the site and surrounding area?
required contingents of miners and construction spe-
cialists, as well as the use of more than 20,000 to
30,000 troops, many from units specially trained for
chemical, biological, and radiological warfare. The
use of such large numbers of troops was dictated by
5
3138718-87 25)(1
the need to limit individual exposure to radiation. The
activity also entailed considerable costs in terms of
equipment, fuel, and materials. The Soviets, however,
probably gained valuable experience in decontaminat-
ing equipment and facilities on a large scale.
The Soviets used a variety of decontamination tech-
niques. ln addition to removing 25X1
the topsoil in the immediate area of the reactors, they
also were covering the ground with solutions and
slurries that would chemically immobilize the radio-
active material or simply keep radioactive dust from
blowing into cleaned areas. The military units estab-
lished a series of decontamination sites on the major
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roads leading to the damaged reactor and made
extensive use of helicopters for decontamination. As a
final step, the reactor site area was paved with
concrete blocks and covered with earth. In addition,
the Soviets spent considerable effort to prevent radio-
active material from contaminating local sources of
drinking water. They built runoff trenches, dammed
stream channels to create catch basins, and construct-
ed an underground wall to prevent seepage into the
Pripyat' River of ground water from the power plant's
highly contaminated cooling basin.
As decontamination efforts progressed, the number of
workers at the site was increased substantially in
order to entomb the damaged reactor. Beginning in
June, a four-level stairstep or "wedding cake" struc-
ture was constructed over the damaged nuclear reac-
tor (see figure 4). Each level was constructed by
building a retaining wall on the level below, then
filling the space between the wall and the reactor
building with concrete and earth. On top of this the
Soviets created a fifth level consisting of ventilation
and instrumentation tubes to monitor the status of the
reactor. These tubes formed the floor of a "garret"
upon which the final roof was placed. The entomb-
ment was completed in early December 1986.
The Soviets have claimed that, although it is 95
percent decontaminated, Pripyat' will not be suitable
for permanent habitation for more than 10 years. The
pitch-coated roofs of the town's buildings acted as a
trap for the radioactive particles blown from the
reactor, and decontamination of these roofs began in
the spring of 1987. The Soviets have created the
"great wall" of Chernobyl'?a fence surrounding a
zone with restricted entry. From the power plant site,
this amoeba-shaped zone extends about 30 km to the
north and west and about 15 km to the south and east
(see figure 5). Radiation levels at the fence in January
1987 were reported to be about 0.7 milliroentgens per
hour?a significant decrease from earlier levels but
still 12 times the Soviet standard for unrestricted
access. statements by Western
experts who have visited the area indicate that decon-
tamination procedures have worked well. Indeed,
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habitation and many preaccident activities are being
resumed in some areas outside the fenced exclusion
zone.
Phase III?Recommissioning Other Chernobyl' Units
Several months after the accident, the CPSU Politbu-
ro announced a decision to return the other reactors at
the site to full operation. At first glance, this did not
appear to be a problem since these units were not
damaged in the explosion of unit 4. The Soviets,
however, eventually revealed that the operators did
not immediately shut down the other units when the
accident occurred, and their ventilation systems
sucked significant amounts of radioactive material
into operational areas. Cleanup of these units proceed-
ed concurrently with the entombment of unit 4. By
late September the Soviets were in
the final phases of checking out unit 1 before its
restart. The Soviets announced restart of the unit on 1
October, and we confirmed this from Landsat imag-
ery of 6 October. Unit 2 restarted on 8 November,
according to the Soviet press.
Subsequent Landsat imagery of the reactor site
showed that at least two unannounced reactor shut-
downs occurred between October and early Decem-
ber. It is still unclear if the Soviets experienced
maintenance problems compounded by some of the
new fixes and the high levels of radioactivity in the
cooling pond or if the observed shutdowns were part of
a thorough checkout/recommissioning program.
Since early December, both units have appeared to be
operational, although they apparently did not reach
full power until early March.
the Soviets have exchanged some of the water in the
cooling basin with clean river water in a gradual,
controlled manner. Apparently they are still con-
cerned about the effects of radioactive materials in
the basin water on power plant operations, and they
feel that the exchange can be accomplished without
increasing contamination of the Pripyat' River to an
rin7table level
work in progress in the area around the
uncompleted reactors for units 5 and 6, the cancella-
tion of these units was announced?without elabora-
tion?in April 1987.
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Figure 5
Fenced Exclusion Zone Around Chernobyl' Nuclear Power Plant
Minsk
Boundary representation is
not ecessarily authoritative.
Poland
Sovi t Union
Chernobyl'.
Kier
Gomel:,
0
Romania
0 200 Kilometers
ssian S.S. R.
Soviet Union
kilometer-radius
cuation zone
Ukrainian
S. S. R.
Kiev Vdkhr.
(reservoir)
- Fence line
000000 Suspected fence line
20 Kilometers
20 Miles
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Safety Modifications to RBMKs: Progress and
Implications
In the aftermath of the Chernobyl' accident, the
Soviets are rethinking their nuclear power safety
philosophy and are clearly concerned about the possi-
bility of other serious accidents.'
From a Western viewpoint, the Soviets face a
dilemma:
? They can continue operation of the RBMK reactors,
which pose a continuing, if remote, safety hazard
because of fundamental deficiencies that no reason-
able modifications can eliminate.
? They can shut down the RBMKs, losing nearly half
the USSR's nuclear power capacity.
Moscow's decision to keep its existing RBMK reac-
tors on line reflects economic necessity and a belief
that the safety threat can be dealt with adequately by
a combination of hardware modifications and better
management of reactor operations.
The Soviets' response to the situation thus far has
been largely cosmetic. They have asserted that the
Chernobyl' accident was the result of "unimaginable"
operator errors of a sort now foreclosed by adminis-
trative changes and hardware modifications to the
reactor. Some of the RBMK safety improvements
proposed by the Soviets at the August 1986 IAEA
meeting have been implemented, but serious safety
concerns remain. There is no feasible solution, for
example, to the problem of the RBMK's lack of a full
containment system.
The safety improvements implemented thus far have
centered on procedural changes, upgraded operator
training, and a few hardware modifications. More
comprehensive hardware changes, such as increasing
the fuel enrichment, will be incorporated over a period
of several years. These changes probably will decrease
the RBMK's vulnerability to the specific type of
A review of reactor safety has been alluded to in the Soviet press.
Specific areas of concern and possible fixes have been discussed by
Soviet nuclear specialists with their Western counterparts
The All-Union Nuclear Safety Com-
mittee has been reorganized and apparently has been given in-
creased authority with respect to implementation of safety mea-
sures.
9
accident that occurred at Chernobyl', but they may
adversely affect other aspects of reactor operation.
The changes also will increase the operating cost of
RBMKs.
Administrative Actions and Operational Improvements
The Soviets have taken a number of steps to prevent
the sort of improper operator actions that caused the
accident. A new Ministry of Atomic Energy has been
created to oversee the operation of nuclear power
plants. Studies of reactor operations also have been
conducted since the accident, focusing on problems
such as the level of operator education. Operator
training has been stepped up, and an RBMK training
school and simulator, which had been under construc-
tion at the Smolensk nuclear power plant before the
Chernobyl' accident, has been completed. Regulations
and procedures governing reactor operation have been
tightened to guard against dangerous actions by oper-
ators. The Soviets have also installed limit switches on
the control-rod drives to prevent the complete removal
of the rods and have planned modifications to make it
harder for a single operator to disable the reactors'
emergency protection systems. Instrumentation also
will be upgraded: plans call for the installation of
meters to display margins of reactivity and warn of
main-coolant-pump cavitation.' The improved instru-
mentation will alert operators when potentially dan-
gerous situations arise.
Equipment and Design Improvements
There is little doubt that the proximate cause of the
accident was the actions of the operators, but the
accident would not have been possible except for a
number of dangerous RBMK design characteristics.
These features make the RBMK vulnerable not only
' In order for a nuclear reactor to operate, a chain reaction
involving some steady rate of nuclear fissions (criticality) must be
maintained. Reactivity is the measure of the reactor's potential to
depart from that steady rate of fission, that is, to increase or
decrease power. A display of reactivity provides operators with
information needed to prevent dangerous power surges that could
result if the critical level is greatly exceeded.
Coolant-pump cavitation occurs when the pressure of water
entering a pump falls to the point where the pump cannot move
water. When this happens, coolant flow is interrupted and the
reactor core will overheat unless the problem is corrected.
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Dangerous Characteristics of RBMK Reactors
Positive Void Coefficient of Power. One of the most
dangerous features of the RBMK is that the release
of energy increases as more of the water in the fuel
channels boils and forms steam. This characteristic
(called a positive void coefficient of power) is a
function of the materials and geometry of the
RBMK's core. The primary effect of the RBMK's
cooling water on the nuclear processes is to absorb
neutrons; the absorption decreases the efficiency of
the fission process in the reactor. Thus, a loss of
water from the core results in increased fissioning
and power increases. In an emergency situation, when
more steam is formed because of fuel overheating or
a drop in coolant pressure, the power will increase,
compounding the situation. This is the mechanism
that led to the destruction of the Chernobyl'-4
reactor.
Increasing the ratio of fuel (uranium-235) to modera-
tor (graphite) in the core will ameliorate this condi-
tion. The Soviets are investigating a number of
options to change the ratio, including increasing the
enrichment of uranium-235 in the fuel of all RBMKs
and increasing the number of holes in the graphite
cores of RBMKs under construction. Replacing the
current fuel with fuel of higher enrichment will be a
gradual process taking place over a number of years;
meanwhile, the positive void coefficient will continue
to be a concern. The Soviets have issued regulations
raising the minimum number of control rods that
must be in the core from 30 to some 70 to 80 as an in-
terim safeguard. This lowers fuel burnup, thus rais-
ing the average enrichment level of the fuel. These
modifications should reduce the positive void coeffi-
cient, though it is not clear whether it can be
eliminated entirely.
Positive Reactivity Effect of Control Rods. Initial
emergency insertion of a fully withdrawn control rod
(a procedure called a SCRAM) causes a power
increase in an RBMK. When a control rod in an
RBMK is fully withdrawn, there is a water-filled
space about I meter long below the tip of a graphite
displacer that is attached to the bottom of the rod to
improve neutron economy. Since the primary effect of
water on neutron processes in the core of an RBMK is
to absorb neutrons, displacement of water by the
graphite tips of the control rods will cause an initial
to the accident sequence that occurred at Chernobyl'
but also to other accident scenarios. Because many of
these deficiencies cannot be remedied, the RBMK
will continue to be considerably less safe than other
types of reactors. The Soviets are, however, attempt-
ing to rectify some of the problems (see inset).
Disadvantages of Safety-Related Changes
All of the stated modifications will improve the safety
of RBMKs to some extent, though none will raise
these reactors to Western safety standards. The
RBMK is a particularly difficult reactor to control,
and its cooling system is very complex and relatively
delicate. For example, the rupture of more than two
or three of the nearly 1,700 coolant channels in the
core would be sufficient to overpressurize the com-
partment containing the core, causing the same type
of catastrophic accident as occurred at Chernobyl'.
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The proposed modifications may also produce side
effects that will reduce safety margins somewhat.
Increasing the enrichment of the fuel, for example,
will increase power peaking in fresh fuel, reducing
heat-transfer margins and making power control more
difficult. Additional neutron-absorbing rods also must
be installed in the core to compensate for the in-
creased average enrichment, thus reducing the total
number of channels available for fuel rods and de-
creasing thermal margins in the remaining fuel. The
disadvantages of the modifications, however, must be
balanced against the benefits of reducing immediate
safety hazards such as the positive void coefficient.
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increase in reactivity; that is, a tendency to increase
power. The Soviets have confirmed that the sudden
insertion of all the rods when an emergency shutdown
was attempted during the initial part of the Cherno-
byl' accident caused an increase in reactivity that
aggravated the rapid power increase. The Soviets
have effectively solved this problem by placing limit
switches on the control rod drives to prevent opera-
tors from removing the last 1.2 meters of the control
rods. We believe this modification has been imple-
mented on most, if not all, RBMKs.
Slow SCRAM Speed. Another deficiency of the
RBMK design is the slow speed of its emergency
protection system, or SCRAM system, which auto-
matically inserts all control rods into the core to stop
the nuclear chain reaction as rapidly as possible. The
time required for insertion of fully withdrawn rods
into an RBMK is about 20 seconds, compared with
only a few seconds for actuation of the SCRAM
systems of Western reactors. The RBMK's control
rods are withdrawn by cables, and redesign of the
control-rod drives to increase insertion speed would
be difficult, if not impossible. The Soviets stated in
their report to the IAEA in August 1986 that,
instead, a special high-speed control system is to be
developed for use in a few control-rod channels. No
further information has been provided on progress in
implementing this system. Unless the Soviets develop
an effective SCRAM system capable of significantly
reducing reactor power within a few seconds, the
RBMK will continue to be vulnerable to rapidly
developing accidents.
Lack of Containment. All Soviet-designed reactors
built before the mid-1970s, including RBMKs, lack
systems to contain the consequences of a major
accident. Later RBMKs have a form of pressure-
suppression system, but it is not equivalent to the full
containment systems on Western reactors. The sheer
size and complexity of the RBMK probably would
make a Western-style containment infeasible.
the only planned
measure to limit the consequences offuture accidents
at RBMKs is to stockpile lead, sand, and boron?the
materials initially used to cover the destroyed Cher-
nobyl' reactor?at the reactor sites in order to expe-
dite the response to a serious accident.
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All of the proposed changes will make RBMKs more
expensive to operate. Fuel cycle costs will be consider-
ably increased as a result of the increase in fuel
enrichment and nonoptimal burnup, which are neces-
sary to reduce the positive void coefficient. If power-
peaking problems force the Soviets to operate their
RBMKs at less than their full design capacity, costs
will be even greater. This may be a more severe
problem for the RBMK-1500s, which operate at 50
percent more power than the RBMK-1000s with
essentially the same core.
Impact on Weapons-Material Production Potential
The RBMK is the technological descendant of the
USSR's reactors that produce military weapons mate-
rial, but RBMKs have not been used for weapons-
grade plutonium production. The proposed modifica-
tions to the RBMKs will, if anything, decrease their
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potential for such production. RBMKs do have a
potential for producing some tritium at little cost,
however, and the proposed modifications to decrease
the positive void coefficient will significantly enhance
this potential. The neutron-absorbing rods that must
be used to compensate for the increased fuel enrich-
ment could be made of a lithium compound that
produces tritium when irradiated. Incorporating these
absorbers in the core will increase the RBMKs' fuel-
cycle cost, but this increase must be borne for safety
reasons in any case. The additional cost of processing
the tritium would be small.
The amount of tritium that the modified RBMKs
could produce has not yet been determined, but it is
likely to be substantial. We judge that if the Soviets
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choose to fully utilize this potential, they could easily
satisfy their tritium needs for nuclear weapons for the
foreseeable future.
Radiological Consequences
The Human Toll From Exposure
According to a report compiled by the US Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, the release of radiation from
the Chernobyl' explosion and fire may cause about
10,000 more cancer deaths than would otherwise
occur in the European USSR over 70 years.4 This
number is about one-tenth of 1 percent of the Soviet
prediction for normal occurrence of fatal cancers
during the period. Individual risks may, of course, be
higher?especially for some residents of the area
spanning the headwaters of the Pripyat' River in the
northern Ukraine and southern Belorussia west of
Chernobyl'. The occurrence of some 4,000 more
cancer deaths over 70 years in affected portions of
Eastern and Western Europe would be completely
masked by the 70 million or so cancer deaths predict-
ed in that population over that time (it would be an
increase of less than one-hundredth of 1 percent).
At the Accident. So far, official reports of the accident
list 31 fatalities, 29 of which were attributed to acute
radiation sickness.' The condition of the victims?as
was the case with the survivors?was complicated by
trauma from burns suffered fighting the reactor fire.
Radiation exposure suppresses the production of blood
cells that fight infection; it also suppresses the body's
immune-response system. In conjunction with severe
burns (in which the integrity of the skin as a natural
barrier against external infection is lost), radiation
'Estimating the number of fatal cancers that may result from
radiation released by the Chernobyl' explosion and fire is necessar-
ily speculative. Studies of the consequences for human health must
rely to a large extent on parameters (such as rates of radiation
exposure to the population and the effects of low radiation doses on
health) for which the appropriate values are uncertain.
One additional fatality has been reported by the Soviet newspaper
Nedelya?Soviet filmmaker Vladimir Shevchenko. His death in
March 1987 was attributed to radiation exposure received while
filming a documentary on the Chernobyl' accident.
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exposure causes a much more serious course for the
victim, and the risk of death by infection is high.
Dr. Robert Gale, who performed 13 bone marrow
transplants on the most serious cases in this group,
told the American Association for the Advancement
of Science on 15 February 1987 that 500 people had
been hospitalized with acute radiation sickness and
that 461 had been released. The Soviets reported on
24 April 1987 a total of 237 casualties from acute
radiation syndrome in four radiation injury classes.
The nature of these exposures was diagnosed and
treatment provided according to clinically derived
dose estimates.
The Soviets used at least two separate methods to
determine individual dose. First, they used cytogenet-
ic dosimetry, a technique in which the body's own
chromosomes are used as biological dosimeters. How-
ever, this is a labor-intensive process. According to
Dr. Gale, a second common method was used because
of the large number of casualties; it was more timely,
and its prediction tracked well with the clinical course
of the patients. This method used a computer model to
track and predict the rate of decline of certain key
blood components. Western studies have shown that
the rate of this decline correlates well with actual
radiation dose. The Soviets treated the patients by
administrating antibiotics to fight infection and plate-
lets to promote blood clotting.
Over the long term, the survivors will incur a substan-
tial increase in their individual risk of cancer (on the
order of 5 to 20 percent). To some extent, the
consequences of this may be partially offset by the
sharply increased level of medical surveillance these
persons will receive. Some of the survivors of high
radiation doses (about 300 to 400 rem) are likely to
experience a more immediate effect?sterility for up
to several years. The Soviets reported that several of
the survivors received doses in this range. (Doses of
approximately 500 or more rem reportedly cause
permanent sterility.)
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Evacuees, Recovery Workers, and General Popula-
tion. The 135,000 evacuees from the region around
the Chernobyl' nuclear power plant are at high risk
from radiation exposure (see inset). Having been
exposed to an average dose of about 12 rem, according
to Soviet calculations, these individuals are subject to
an increase in the statistical probability of cancer of
less than 2 percent. For the group as a whole, the risk
for cancer has risen to 12.7 percent from a natural
incidence of 12.5 percent.6
The Soviets almost certainly are understating the
effects of radiation on recovery workers. They an-
nounced that the recovery workers were being exposed
to 25 rem. According to international standards, the
25-rem guideline is correct for accidents of this
kind?in an emergency situation. But the number of
persons is to be kept small, volunteers are recom-
mended, and they should not be in their primary years
of procreation. Contrary to this intent, the Soviets
have applied the guideline in the recovery operation to
relatively young workers and to very large numbers of
people. We believe that many of the Soviet troops
used in the recovery operations probably received 25
rem (roughly double the average dose to the individual
evacuees). The risk of cancer is, therefore, proportion-
ately higher for these recovery workers than for the
evacuees.
Diplomatic sources, foreign visitors, and Soviet media
report that many citizens continue to believe that
radioactivity released during the accident will present
a serious threat to life and the environment for many
years to come. The psychological consequences may
extend to many who have no identifiable health
effects from radiation. Because of continuing rumors
about Chernobyl', citizens as far away as Leningrad
worried during the winter of 1986-87 about an in-
crease in diphtheria and other diseases due to lowered
resistance, which they are attributing to radiation.
6 The risk values on which these estimates are based are derived
from the epidemiological data on persons exposed to radiation from
the atom bombs at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Inadequacies exist in
these data. In particular, for radiation doses below about 10 rem,
any excess risk of cancer is too small to be detected directly in the
exposed populations?therefore, at lower doses, risk estimates
represent extrapolations from theoretical models.
13
Letters in the press indicated that some women were
electing to have an abortion rather than risk an
abnormal child. Responding to continued popular
anxiety, the Ukrainian party newspaper announced
the formation of special information centers to answer
questions on radiation throughout the affected re-
gions. The creation of such centers eight months after
the accident indicates regime recognition that public
trust had eroded.
Providing Care. A new All-Union Radiation Medical
Center has been established in Kiev under the direc-
tion of Anatoliy Romanenko, the Ukrainian Health
Minister. According to Romanenko, the center has
established an all-union registry to monitor the radia-
tion effects and cancer development in the population
exposed to radiation. But it is not clear whether the
medical center is receiving enough resources to do its
job.
The resources diverted to Chernobyl'-related medical
problems are likely to further strain the Soviet health-
care delivery system, which has proved inadequate to
deal with many medical problems associated with
contemporary industrial society and has been the
object of recent criticism from the top leadership. One
of the shortages exposed was an acute lack of
radiation-detection equipment for medical use, and
the Soviets have been buying Western equipment to
fill the gap.
Contamination of Water Supply
The Chernobyl' power plant is located roughly 25
kilometers north of the Kiev reservoir, which supplies
the bulk of the drinking water for the Ukraine's
capital. Some radioactive particles were undoubtedly
carried to the reservoir by winds and by the two major
rivers feeding it from the north?the Pripyat' and the
Dnepr. Soviet officials took prompt measures to con-
tain any contaminated runoff or ground-water seep-
age from the Chernobyl' plant and have continued to
monitor the Kiev reservoir and the rivers. They report
that levels of radioactivity are below established
norms. As a preventive measure, however, Kiev was
provided with a reserve water-supply system that
draws from the Desna River (which flows from the
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Evacuation and Relocation
New homes built for Chernobyl' evacuees, Buda-
Koshelevskiy Rayon, northwest of Gomel'.
Moscow announced the evacuation of 135,000 per-
sons from the regions surrounding the Chernobyl'
nuclear power plant: approximately 30,000 from
Belorussia's Gomel' Oblast and the remaining
105,000 from the Ukraine. The total number of those
who left the area is probably much larger, since many
fled on their own from cities such as Kiev, Chernigov,
and Gomel'.
All the children from Kiev, along with
58,000 children evacuated from the northern
Ukraine, were dispersed among Young Pioneer camps
and summer resorts in other republics. Gomel' Oblast
evacuated over 60,000 additional children to summer
camps.
By the end of the summer of 1986, it was clear that
most of the evacuated population would not be
returning for the winter, and more permanent
resettlement would be needed. Belorussia resettled
10,000 families in hastily constructed prefabricated
houses in the northern rayons of Gomel' Oblast. A
few more thousand have recently returned after de-
contamination of their homes.
The Ukrainian government planned to replace about
12,000 abandoned homes in the villages surrounding
the Chernobyl' plant by this summer; 8,000 have
already been built. Plant personnel have been allocat-
ed 14,000 apartments in the Kiev-Chernigov region.
More than 27,000 people have been resettled in the 52
new villages built since the accident. About 1,000
plant workers at the recently restarted reactor units 1
and 2 live in Zelenyy Mys, a partially completed
settlement about 40 km from Chernobyl' originally
planned to house 10,000 station workers. It has since
been downgraded to house only 5,000 workers.
To date, most of the Pripyat' evacuees have not been
permitted to return to their former homes. Radiation
levels in the city are apparently still considered too
high for permanent habitation, but the city's adminis-
trative buildings are currently being occupied. Yev-
geniy Velikhov, vice president of the USSR Academy
of Sciences, told a US Senate committee in January
1987 that 120,000 evacuees had settled elsewhere,
along with their possessions and livestock.
northeast) and from a number of artesian wells. In
October 1986, a US radiation team visiting Kiev was
told that, even though water from the Dnepr was safe,
it was not being supplied to Kiev for "morale rea-
sons."
The Potential Risks of Cancer in Eastern Europe
One of the most uncertain of the long-term costs of
the Chernobyl' accident is the additional risk of
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cancer in Eastern Europe as a result of radioactive
releases. Estimates of the effects on health of small
increases in radiation from background levels are
highly sensitive to assumptions relating to a wide
range of factors. Moreover, among nonspecialists,
these effects are poorly understood. The highest radi-
ation doses in Eastern Europe probably occurred in
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northeastern Poland and northeastern Romania. Al-
though the increased risk of cancer in the region is
very slight, uncertainties about the cause of future
cancer cases will breed rumors implicating Soviet
handling of the accident. Although
Polish physicians already are attributing
increased numbers of liver and intestinal diseases
around Warsaw to the Chernobyl' fallout, we believe
that the cited increase in health problems more
probably is related to anxiety about the consequences
of the Chernobyl' accident than to radiation effects.
(Radiation in small doses is unlikely to affect the
liver.) Moreover, local regimes' attempts to counter
rumors of continued radiation hazard by issuing ill-
conceived rebuttals can fuel popular fears, as occurred
in Bulgaria in the spring of 1987. Lingering health
concerns are unlikely to foster more open protests, but
they will deepen still further East European resent-
ment of the USSR.
Economic and Social Consequences in the USSR
The cost of cleaning up after the accident and the loss
in electricity production probably will result in some
diversion of resources away from General Secretary
Mikhail Gorbachev's economic modernization effort
and will make it harder for the regime to deliver on its
promises of better health care, more housing, and
safer work conditions. Moscow announced in Decem-
ber that 800 million rubles had been set aside for
direct compensation in housing and short-term subsi-
dies for the Chernobyl' victims. The rest of the
cleanup operation?entombing the damaged fourth
reactor, decontaminating the remaining reactors and
the plant environment, and protecting the water and
soil from contamination?was initially projected by
Moscow to cost 2 billion rubles, but
this estimate was too conservative. A Soviet
engineer
estimated the cost
of cleanup would eventually total 25 billion rubles.
Some of the expenses have been offset by the Cherno-
byl' Aid Fund, which collected over 500 million rubles
through the "voluntary" contribution of one day's
wages by every Soviet worker.
15
Impact on Energy Production
The energy program of the USSR, and to some extent
the energy programs of its partners in the Council for
Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA), will bear a
variety of short-term and long-term costs related to
the Chernobyl' accident. These costs will be associat-
ed with reduced electricity generation, reactor write-
offs, and nuclear-plant safety modifications.
The loss of electricity generated by the Chernobyl'
reactors and the consequent increase in fossil-fuel use
by replacement power-plant capacity are key short-
term consequences. Eastern Europe probably was
forced to bear some of the burden of the electricity
cuts during the 1986/87 winter period of peak power
demand. During 1987 enough power-plant capacity
probably will be restored at Chernobyl' or brought on
line elsewhere to alleviate this problem. For the 1986-
90 period, the cumulative reduction in electricity
production resulting from damage to the Chernobyl'
plant and related slowdowns at other nuclear power
plants will be about 100 billion kilowatt hours. This
amount is equivalent to roughly 10 percent of the
nuclear-generated electricity production, or 1 percent
of the total electricity production, projected for the
period. Longer term consequences for the Soviet
civilian nuclear industry include investment writeoffs
at Chernobyl' and the costs of modifications to im-
prove the safety of other Chernobyl'-type reactors.
These capital costs roughly total the equivalent of two
or three years' investment in the industry.'
Impact on Nuclear Power Industry Goals
The primary effects of the Chernobyl' accident on the
Soviet nuclear power program through 1990 will be a
somewhat slower growth of generating capacity and
electricity production. Before the accident we project-
ed that by 1990 nuclear power capacity would in-
crease to about 50,000 megawatts (MW) and electric-
ity production to about 285 billion kilowatt-hours
(kWh) per year. This outcome?though short of Soviet
goals?would have been consistent with the industry's
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past performance. Now we estimate that the capacity
will rise to 48,000 MW and electricity production will
reach only 260 billion kWh by 1990. We expect that
the direct effects of the Chernobyl' accident and the
turmoil caused by the recovery effort will postpone
the completion of three or four reactors until after
1990. Although Chernobyl'-induced bottlenecks are
likely to have some effect on other power plant
construction, the additional delays to most projects
will probably not be serious.
We believe that the Soviets will be largely successful
in limiting the impact of Chernobyl' on their long-
term plans for nuclear power. Beyond 1990, modifica-
tion of some portions of the program is likely. In-
creased concern with safety will probably not cause
significant delays in the construction of the VVER-
1000 pressurized-water reactors that are to become
the mainstay of the nuclear power program. The
greatest potential for change lies in plans for the use
of nuclear energy in centralized heat supply for cities.
If new safety concerns force postponement or even
curtailment of nuclear heating plant construction, the
cumulative impact of these changes would require the
addition of heating facilities burning gas or coal?a
setback to Soviet hopes to reduce use of fossil fuels.
Impact on Agriculture
The Chernobyl' nuclear plant is not located in a major
agricultural area, and the initial plume of radioactiv-
ity passed largely over forests and swamps. Moreover,
Soviet data show that the 30-km-radius evacuation
zone accounts for only a minuscule share of Ukrainian
agricultural output. Levels of contamination sufficient
to affect the growth of crops or to raise their radioac-
tive content to potentially life-threatening levels ap-
pear to have been concentrated within the fenced
exclusion zone. Visible damage to vegetation has not
been evident more than a few kilometers from the site
of the accident.
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The farm sector of the region was seriously disrupted.
The evacuation meant abandonment of a number of
farms and thus of the private plots of farm employ-
ees?a major source of potatoes and other vegetables
for the local market. It also meant moving large
numbers of livestock, with the consequent stress-
related reduction in productivity. The Soviet press
cited a Ukrainian official as saying that more than
50,000 cattle, 9,000 hogs, and the animals from
private plots?perhaps another 10,000?were re-
moved from contaminated areas.
large numbers of livestock were also
removed from Belorussia's Gomel' Oblast. Indeed,
contrary to early Soviet reports that some livestock
were slaughtered, Moscow radio reported on 29 May
1986 that all cattle from the accident zone were "fully
preserved." large numbers of
animals were successfully moved to farms outside the
evacuation area and revealed no major slaughter or
animal-disposal sites.
Despite all the disruption, the local press continued to
report during the months after the accident that plans
for the production and sale of all livestock products
were being achieved and even overfulfilled in the
Chernobyl' rayon and in neighboring rayons. In addi-
tion, supplies of food generally were maintained at
accustomed levels for the evacuees as well as through-
out the Ukraine, Belorussia, and the Baltic republics.
The authorities quickly set up monitoring systems to
prevent contaminated food from entering trade chan-
nels, but there was some uncontrolled use of milk
from privately owned cows that may have contained
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radioactive iodine. Similarly, the French Embassy
reported that some contaminated meat reached the
market in Moscow, but that the degree of contamina-
tion was not harmful.
The USSR's official report on the accident noted that
irradiation levels outside the 30-km zone around the
nuclear plant cannot dramatically affect the composi-
tion of plant and animal communities. The same
report outlined the extent and degree of radioactive
contamination, and it became clear that the affected
area was highly irregular in shape, as had been
expected. Soviet press reports had noted that the area
contaminated was largely restricted to about 1,000
square km and a few outlying pockets. This tallies
17
fairly closely with the area outlined in the official
report as encompassing radiation levels of 5 millirems
per hour as of late May 1986?a boundary that has
been followed closely by the fence subsequently con-
structed to keep people and animals from straying into
potentially dangerous areas.
Outside the evacuated area, field work on farms and
private plots continued as usual. Targets for spring
plantings reportedly were met throughout the Ukraine
and Belorussia. Apparently the small area of land
taken out of crop production was easily replaced by
expanding cultivated areas on farms in other parts of
both republics.
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By late May 1986 some evacuees had returned to
their homes, and, in June,
farmwork under way within the 30-km zone but
outside the fence enclosing the area of heavy contami-
nation. Aided by favorable rainfall through most of
the summer and fall, the Ukraine and Belorussia
harvested near-record or record quantities of vegeta-
bles, potatoes, and grain. Production of meat, milk,
and eggs reached new highs in both republics.
The 1986 performance of the agricultural sector in
both the Ukraine and Belorussia confirms that the
impact of the Chernobyl' accident on agriculture was
minimal and, despite the persistence of radioactive
contamination, will not be significant in the future.
Moreover, the continued Soviet reports that the water
in the Kiev reservoir remains safe suggest that earlier
fears of heavy contamination downstream in the
Dnepr were baseless.
In the long run, radiation effects on agricultural
production will depend on many variables, including
the types and quantities of isotopes dispersed, soil
types and quality, topography, and drainage. In addi-
tion, some plants do not take up radiation through
their roots and thus can be grown in lightly contami-
nated soils. Careful monitoring and decontamination
procedures substantially reduce the danger to field
workers
In contaminated areas, the presence of longer lived
isotopes such as cesium-137 will require continued
attention to special agricultural practices and radia-
tion monitoring. At this time, our lack of precise data
on the composition of the radioactive fallout and on
soil types and differentials in the affected area pre-
clude detailed assessment of future effects on farm
output.
The potential loss of agricultural production, more-
over, will be affected by the extent and nature of
active measures taken by the Soviets. Liming, for
example, reduces the uptake of cesium-137. Shifting
from sensitive crops such as beans and peas to less
sensitive ones such as wheat and oats can also help. In
late December 1986, authoritative Soviet officials
commented that resumption of farm activity over
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most of the 30-km zone would be possible. As of mid-
June 1987, however, no general farming activity
within the fenced area had been reported or observed.
Social and Political Fallout in the USSR
The Chernobyl' nuclear accident presented a serious
problem for Gorbachev and his efforts to portray the
new leadership in Moscow as reasonable and account-
able. Moscow's initial failure to report the accident
left it open to charges of disregard for human life and
eroded public confidence in the regime. The break in
Gorbachev's political momentum appears to have
been temporary. He rebounded to mount a public
relations campaign to limit the damage to his regime's
reputation, and his subsequent reform measures have
deflected public attention from Chernobyl' to a con-
siderable extent. By demonstrating that suppressing
information about domestic problems can backfire,
the accident gave added impetus to Gorbachev's drive
for openness (glasnost) in the Soviet media. Yet
Chernobyl' awakened public interest in nuclear safe-
ty, heightened concern about environmental and
health issues, and increased discussion of these issues
in the intellectual community. These concerns are not
likely to evaporate, and the population will probably
be more attentive to future regime performance in
these areas.
The initial Soviet response to the Chernobyl' nuclear
accident was similar to that of the shootdown of the
Korean airliner in 1983. In each case an information
blackout was imposed until international pressure
forced a grudging admission of the event followed by
a propaganda counterattack. Gorbachev sought to
distance himself from the crisis and remained silent
until 14 May, almost three weeks after the accident.
The Soviet people and the world at large were only
belatedly informed of the disaster on 28 April at the
angry insistence of Sweden, which recorded radioac-
tive fallout from Chernobyl' that morning.
Once the leadership realized the story was out, Mos-
cow employed several tactics to minimize its responsi-
bility for what happened and to regain credibility at
home and abroad. The authorities have:
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? Blamed lower-level officials for mishandling the
situation in order to insulate top leaders from
criticism.
? Insisted that Chernobyl' was the USSR's first nu-
clear accident and alleged that reactor safety prob-
lems have been more common and serious in the
West.
? Depicted the mishap as a failure of a handful of
people rather than of the system and highlighted the
courage and self-sacrifice of the Soviet people in
dealing with it.
? Denounced Western media for making political
capital from the accident and used the nuclear
mishap to push Soviet arms control proposals.
? Minimized the long-term health risks and exagger-
ated progress in decontamination and reconstruction
operations.
The initial public relations debacle strengthened Gor-
bachev's argument for greater media openness in
discussing domestic shortcomings. Several articles in
Pravda, for example, pointed out that a lack of
complete information had encouraged harmful ru-
mors. Supporters of Gorbachev's openness policy, like
Soviet journalist Fedor Burlatskiy, criticized the do-
mestic media's early silence as costing the regime
credibility. The public relations effort that was finally
launched bore the imprint of Gorbachev's policy. On
several occasions the Soviet media have promptly
reported on accidents causing loss of life and publi-
cized punitive measures taken against the officials
responsible.
The heavy play given to the theme of foreign overre-
action to the catastrophe had some success in shifting
the focus of Soviet public criticism to the West. Many
citizens accepted Soviet propaganda that the West
was responsible for the panic and hysteria surround-
ing Chernobyl' and that the accident presented less
public danger than the accidents at Three Mile Island
in 1978 and at the Union Carbide plant in Bhopal,
India.
From the outset, the top leadership was able to some
extent to avoid becoming the target of public anger by
making scapegoats of local authorities. According to
Soviet media, 27 Communist Party officials already
have been expelled from the party. Six Chernobyl'
19
nuclear plant officials, including the former plant
director and chief engineer, went on trial in July 1987
for safety violations that allegedly caused the acci-
dent
Nevertheless, Soviet citizens continue to blame the
top officials for initially concealing the accident, and
some think the regime's response to the disaster put
the lie to Gorbachev's openness policy. Letters from
Chernobyl' workers recently published in a Soviet
journal have demanded an investigation of city offi-
cials in Kiev and Pripyat' for failing to properly
protect the population from the effects of radiation
fallout and for delaying the evacuation.
Faced with the initial information blackout, some
Soviet citizens turned to Western radiobroadcasts,
and some relied on connections to party and govern-
ment officials who had more complete information or
on personal contacts with foreigners. Many residents
of Kiev and other Soviet citizens especially resented
the lack of precautions taken in the affected areas, in
part because they learned that neighboring countries
such as Poland and Finland were warning their
populations and instituting preventive measures
against radioactive iodine.
Public concern has been fueled from the beginning by
Moscow's restrictions on releasing to its citizens hard
statistics about the radioactive fallout and the effects
of radiation. At a public lecture in Leningrad, for
example, citizens asked why radiation levels were kept
secret and demanded to know if Chernobyl' would
cause an increase of cancer cases among the Soviet
population. In the spring of 1987, Soviet reporters
complained that the authorities were still tightly
controlling information on Chernobyl'.
The psychological reaction to the disaster is not
limited to those who suffered measurable health
effects of radiation. Indications are that a large
segment of the Soviet population believes the public is
in danger from radiation and will continue to link
genetic abnormalities, cancers, and poor health in
general to the Chernobyl' accident. Continued popu-
lar fear and doubt over Chernobyl' may prove to be an
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ongoing irritant with potential for social tension for
decades to come. Whenever attention is focused on
the consequences of the accident, there is a resurgence
of public anxiety and anger. For example, people
worried that the 1987 spring thaw and flooding would
raise radiation levels in the Pripyat' and Dnepr River
watershed areas.
Antinuclear sentiment and consciousness of environ-
mental issues are still growing among the Soviet
public in the aftermath of Chernobyl'. Local Soviet
press accounts indicate that concern about the safety
of the nuclear industry is particularly high in areas
with Chernobyl'-type reactors, like Kursk, Leningrad,
Smolensk, and Ignalina. Soviet scientists have joined
writers in a spirited debate over the wisdom of siting
nuclear plants near large cities. In April 1987, for
example, some 60 members of the Ukrainian Acade-
my of Sciences signed a petition opposing the comple-
tion of units 5 and 6 at Chernobyl'. Reportedly, the
petition was about to be published by Literaturnaya
gazeta when Moscow decided to shelve the expansion
plans for the nuclear plant, conceivably in response to
public opposition.
Dissatisfaction with the regime's handling of Cherno-
byl' has also provoked active protest, particularly
among natives of the Baltic republics:
? A Communist youth paper reported a work stoppage
during the summer of 1986 by about 300 Estonian
conscripts who were forcibly sent to help decontami-
nate the Chernobyl' 30-km zone.
? In Lithuania, there were active demonstrations in
June 1986 against the construction of a reactor
similar to the one at Chernobyl'.
? In Latvia and Estonia, where ethnic populations
constitute only a bare majority, citizens reportedly
protested the resettlement of Ukrainian and Belo-
russian Chernobyl' refugees because they viewed
these Slavic "immigrants" as further evidence of
Moscow's desire to dilute Baltic nationalities.
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In terms of public relations, the regime clearly paid a
price for the accident. The leadership has been able to
overcome the initial credibility gap to some extent,
but not the heightened public apprehension over long-
term consequences of radiation on human health, the
safety of nuclear power facilities, and the environ-
ment. Further, the need to divert state funds into
containing the disaster may result in a reassessment of
Gorbachev's initiatives for social programs, including
better housing and health care, and undermine the
regime's ability to deliver on its promises.
Consequences for Eastern Europe
Most East European regimes remain committed to
nuclear power based on the use of Soviet-designed
nuclear plants. Heightened concern about nuclear
safety and the environment will, however, delay con-
struction programs, raise costs, and complicate the
region's efforts to solve its energy problems.' It has
already led most of the countries in the region to turn
to the West for nuclear safety technology.
Economic Costs Bearable
The immediate economic costs have proved manage-
able and temporary for the most part. The East
Europeans had to destroy some crops and dairy
products, and they lost some hard currency earnings.
The hard currency losses have not proved substantial,
apparently because fears of possible contamination of
East European products quickly subsided and the
countries were able to reestablish their former market
positions. Total costs, including losses in food exports
to developing countries and reduced earnings from
tourism, may have reached $300 million.
Soviet compensation may have reduced the losses
somewhat. Hungary
was allowed to sell some of its food exports to the
USSR for hard currency instead of rubles as partial
compensation. Moscow may have extended the same
offer to others. Also, Moscow allowed the East Euro-
pean countries as a group to run up a record trade
deficit in 1986.
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The shutdown of the Chernobyl' reactors and other
electricity-supply problems strained the intra-CEMA
electricity grid, forcing the East Europeans to operate
their thermal power stations at a high rate of capacity
utilization during the summer and fall of 1986 and to
postpone normal maintenance and repair. This heavy
reliance on thermal electricity prevented the accumu-
lation of adequate fuel inventories for the winter, and
the region's energy buffer was inadequate to meet the
demand for power during the region's harshest winter
in a decade. Hungary, which is the most dependent of
the East European economies on Soviet electricity,
used hard currency to import electricity from Austria
and Switzerland.
Political Costs Fleeting
Moscow's handling of the accident strained relations
with its East European allies for a time and damaged
the regimes' tenuous credibility with their citizens.
The USSR's failure to give a timely warning of the
release of radioactivity from Chernobyl'?despite a
CEMA agreement requiring such notification?re-
portedly angered senior regime leaders and fanned
existing anti-Soviet sentiment in East European popu-
lations. The governments were put in the awkward
position of having to calm anxious citizens and take
protective measures against contamination without
embarrassing Moscow and without raising doubts
about their commitment to CEMA's ambitious nucle-
ar program. East European anger and demands for
compensation may have prompted the unprecedented
meeting between Soviet leader Gorbachev and East
European party leaders following last summer's regu-
lar session of the Warsaw Pact's Political Consulta-
tive Committee.
A year later, the political imbroglio over the accident
is largely behind the East European regimes. These
regimes have no interest in unduly aggravating Mos-
cow and are now more concerned about the impact of
Gorbachev's new policies on them. The incident
served as another reminder to cynical populations
about the subservience of their governments to the
USSR. It also reminded the regimes of their lack of
both clout in Moscow and popular support at home.
21
The chief political consequence of the accident is the
credibility it gave to the concerns voiced by the small
but growing environmental movements in Poland,
East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Yugo-
slavia. Chernobyl' has focused popular and regime
attention on environmental problems, demonstrating
how pollution problems transcend national bound-
aries. While these nonviolent movements pose no
direct threat to Communist rule in Eastern Europe,
they are popular movements outside the party struc-
ture that challenge some regime goals such as rapid
industrial growth. The governments in most countries
are concerned about environmental problems and
tolerate limited ecological movements, but monitor
them closely to prevent them from adopting anti-
regime tactics.
The Future of Nuclear Power
We believe that the concerns raised about safety will
be the most lasting effect of Chernobyl' on Eastern
Europe's nuclear energy programs.9 Despite the acci-
dent, the regimes remain committed to nuclear power
as a means to cope with dwindling reserves of conven-
tional fuels, unreliable Soviet energy deliveries, and
increasing air pollution.'? This was confirmed at a
meeting of the CEMA nuclear working group last
November, when the region agreed to plans to in-
crease nuclear capacity from 8,000 MW to 50,000
MW by the year 2000 (figure 7). This renewed
commitment is significant because East European
nuclear construction programs were already lagging
from cost overruns and shortages of funds, key mate-
rials, and expertise.
Nevertheless, the accident embarrassed East Europe-
an governments by aggravating public anxiety about
nuclear energy and calling into question regime plans
for more nuclear plants, especially ones using Soviet
technology and supplies.
All of the region's 19 Soviet-designed reactors, as well as those
under construction, are pressurized-water reactors, as opposed to
the graphite-moderated (RBMK) reactors.
I? East German leader Erich Honecker is an apparent exception in
his qualms about nuclear power. After the accident, he publicly
stated that he did not believe that nuclear power "could be the last
word." East Germany possesses large reserves of highly polluting
lignite coal, but it also plans to triple the share of electricity
generated by nuclear power by the year 2000.
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Figure 7
Share of East European Electricity Output From
Nuclear Power: 1985, 1990., 2000.
Percent
1985 ( 11990 ON 2000
60
50
40
30
20
10
NA
Bulgaria
Czechoslovakia
Eas Germany
Hungary
a These projections by the regimes should be treated with caution. The East Sources: Press, official statistics.
Europeans have fallen short of past construction goals, and current building
of reactors is beset by delays.
Poland Romania
To alleviate public concerns, the official media have
reiterated the necessity of nuclear power, stressed the
safety of reactors, and publicized new measures to
ensure reactor safety. In particular, most countries
are seeking nuclear safety technology and consulting
services from Western?including US?firms, partic-
ularly in computer simulation, risk assessment, and
monitoring systems. Finally, some future plants prob-
ably will be sited in more remote areas and will have
cooling systems more reliable than those now in use in
the region.
In East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary,
and Bulgaria, belated interest in Western nuclear
technology will not lead the regimes to shift procure-
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312753 5.87
ment from Soviet-designed reactors to Western ones.
The regimes cannot afford the large hard currency
expenditures and extended program delays such a
shift would entail. Energy officials in these countries
generally perceive no fundamental flaws in Soviet
nuclear engineering. From the perspective of the
interested East European countries, acquiring West-
ern safety technology and services can bring Soviet
reactors up to acceptable safety standards while keep-
ing construction delays and hard currency costs with-
in tolerable bounds.
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Romania is the only country in the Soviet Bloc that
reportedly has reversed its stance on using Soviet
reactors because of Chernobyl'. President Ceausescu
decided after the accident to postpone indefinitely?
or possibly cancel?plans to install three Soviet
VVER-1000 reactors at a plant in Romanian Molda-
via during the next decade, according to sources of the
US Embassy in Bucharest. Romania is now installing
five Canadian reactors at Cernavoda. Despite the
construction delays and hard currency shortages af-
fecting that project, Bucharest may order additional
Canadian reactors?possibly five?for other planned
sites.
With one US-built reactor, Yugoslavia is the only
East European country where the future of nuclear
energy has become highly uncertain. A broad-based
antinuclear movement spurred by the Chernobyl'
accident has forced Belgrade to reconsider plans to
build several nuclear plants on which US and other
foreign firms were bidding. Although bids on one
plant are being reviewed, Belgrade has postponed a
decision on nuclear power development until late
December 1987 at the earliest, pending a reassess-
ment of the country's energy needs by the federal
government. Should Belgrade decide to proceed with
its nuclear power program, doubts about Soviet tech-
nology may undercut Moscow's efforts to persuade
Belgrade to switch from Western to Soviet-designed
nuclear plants.
Consequences for Western Europe
One year after the Chernobyl' accident, West Europe-
an fears about its short-term environmental and polit-
ical consequences have eased. Despite some highly
visible opposition, West European governments re-
main committed to continued use of nuclear energy?
in no small measure because of a desire to reduce
dependence on imported energy. Nuclear energy al-
ready accounts for one-third of the electricity con-
sumption within the European Community, making
possible yearly savings of fossil fuels equivalent to 100
million tons of crude oil and reductions in the air
pollution caused by coal-burning power plants. In
23
many of the countries, reliance on nuclear energy is
much greater than that in the United States, as shown
below:
Percent of
Electricity Generated By
Nuclear Power
France
70.0
Belgium
59.8
Sweden
42.0
Switzerland
34.3
West Germany
30.0
United Kingdom
19.3
United States
16.0
Italy
2.0
In the first few months following the Chernobyl'
accident, concerns centered on protecting public
health from the fallout of radioactive material emitted
from the destroyed reactor. Food and water supplies
were examined for traces of radioactivity, and several
hundred million dollars' worth of contaminated food
was destroyed.
Concerns now center on the long-term health impact
of the radiation exposures experienced by the popu-
lace and on the safety of nuclear power plants. By
focusing attention on the potential dangers of nuclear
power plant accidents, Chernobyl' has sharpened the
debate on nuclear energy and fueled antinuclear
sentiment among various groups. The need for com-
prehensive safety programs is being stressed, and
some Western experts criticize the Soviets' continued
use of RBMK reactors and their apparent refusal to
place stronger containments around them.
Heightened Domestic Political Tension
Chernobyl' has made nuclear power a more salient
political issue in many West European countries.
Governments have sought to dampen public fears and
have looked to the IAEA to be an outlet for public
fear and anger over the accident. This approach has
had some success: the involvement of the IAEA as a
forum for international dialogue and investigation of
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the accident has enabled West European leaders to
mollify their publics somewhat. But the prospect is for
a long and acrimonious debate.
France. The Chernobyl' accident did not evoke a
particularly strong reaction in France, largely because
there is no major opposition to the French nuclear
program. The French committed themselves to nucle-
ar energy in 1980 and already generate 70 percent of
their electricity from it. This share is projected to
increase to 80 percent by 1990. Seventeen plants are
under construction. The government's success can be
explained by its ability to exploit French nationalism
in support of a program to ensure France's energy
independence. In addition, the nuclear program is not
at the mercy of local legislative bodies as it is in West
Germany. Nonetheless, Chernobyl' has cut into public
support for nuclear power; those in favor of nuclear
power have decreased from two-thirds to one-half.
This still represents decidedly more support for nucle-
ar power than in the rest of Western Europe, where
polls show roughly one-third of the people in favor of
nuclear power and a slightly larger number against.
West Germany. The environment has been a major
concern of voters for several years. The Chernobyl'
accident refocused public attention on the environ-
mental dangers of nuclear power, making powerful
new enemies for West Germany's nuclear program
and forcing the government to react. Within two
months of the accident, Chancellor Helmut Kohl
created the Environment Ministry, largely to counter
the charge that Christian Democrats?because of
their alliance with big business?were less concerned
about the environment than the other parties. Kohl
also took the lead in proposing an international con-
ference on nuclear safety cooperation, which was held
under IAEA auspices in September 1986. The opposi-
tion Social Democratic Party (SPD) has pledged to
abolish atomic energy over the next decade, even
though SPD governments in the 1970s were responsi-
ble for turning on 17 of West Germany's 20 existing
plants.
Nuclear power was not a key issue in Chancellor
Kohl's electoral victory on 25 January. The victorious
coalition almost certainly will seek to put into opera-
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tion a fast breeder plant at Kalkar and a commercial
reprocessing plant at Wackersdorf, while retaining
newly enacted nuclear safety measures. The SPD and
Greens will continue to oppose these projects at the
state and local levels, where responsibility largely lies
for implementing environmental policies and financ-
ing new energy facilities.
Overall, the prospects for expanding the nuclear
industry appear dubious. There have been no new
contracts for nuclear plants in nearly 10 years, and
three-quarters of the population favor abandoning
nuclear energy at some time, according to opinion
polls. Nonetheless, no nuclear plants were closed as a
result of Chernobyl', and construction of five new
plants continues.
United Kingdom. British public reactions to Cherno-
byl' have been strong?although less dramatic than in
West Germany?but the government remains com-
mitted to nuclear power. Polls have shown that 75
percent of Britons oppose the construction of new
nuclear plants, and the environmental organization
Greenpeace has set its sights on the planned new
Sizewell reactor 120 km from London. Despite in-
tense opposition to expansion of the Sizewell plant,
the government decided in March 1987 to proceed
with construction. This first move toward expansion
of the United Kingdom's nuclear power capacity since
the Chernobyl' accident was hailed by advocates of
nuclear power in the United Kingdom and France as
an important endorsement of the future of nuclear
power in Western Europe.
The government has been heartened by the February
1987 publication of the results of a four-year planning
inquiry. The so-called Layfield Report strongly en-
dorses the safety and economy of the planned reactor.
It also warns that any decision to get rid of nuclear
reactors in the European Community would lead to a
serious energy crisis with rapidly increased depen-
dence on foreign supplies of coal and oil. The Labor
Party, however, is pledged to cancel Sizewell and to
phase out existing nuclear stations. The future of the
nuclear program would be dim if Labor takes power.
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Italy. Until its fall in the spring of 1987, the ruling
coalition government in Italy sustained support for
nuclear energy despite the Chernobyl' accident and
despite internal divisions. The new government will
face opposition on this issue from the new "green"
party and other parties on the Italian left. The
opponents hold that nuclear power should be phased
out. Nuclear power accounts for only 2 percent of
Italy's power capacity, and the Italian debate turns
primarily on whether this share should be expanded.
Since Italy depends on foreign sources for 81 percent
of its energy needs, far more than any of its West
European industrial rivals, there are compelling rea-
sons for it to proceed with nuclear power, thus
ensuring a prolonged and acrimonious debate.
Elsewhere in Western Europe. In the wake of Cherno-
byl', the Netherlands has halted expansion of its
nuclear program. In Belgium, the construction sched-
ule for new power plants has been postponed because
of political party disputes. Finland postponed plans to
purchase its fifth reactor from the Soviet Union. In
Switzerland, the Soviet accident prompted authorities
to halt construction of new nuclear power plants; still,
it is difficult for Switzerland to close operational
plants because the country's water resources have
been fully exploited. The only alternative is increased
dependence on foreign energy sources. In Sweden, the
government has been able to resist demands from the
powerful antinuclear lobby for swifter action and is
adhering to the referendum timetable that calls for
dismantling all active reactors by the year 2010. The
Chernobyl' accident reinforced decisions not to insti-
tute nuclear power in Denmark and Greece, and to
decommission Austria's only reactor, which, as a
result of a 1978 referendum, was never placed in
service.
25
International Repercussions
The Chernobyl' accident underscored the extent to
which the nuclear energy issue transcends national
boundaries and requires international cooperation to
avoid catastrophes or to deal with their consequences
if they occur. Chernobyl' temporarily soured
Soviet?West European relations but has had little
lasting impact. Moscow's initial failure to acknowl-
edge the nuclear accident raised suspicions about the
veracity and thoroughness of subsequent Soviet dis-
closures. Nonetheless, Moscow was able to defuse the
potentially damaging impact of these suspicions
through its continued public disclosures of accident
details as well as its cooperation with the IAEA.
Within Western Europe, the new transnational per-
spective has already been manifested on borders
between Denmark and Sweden; France, West Germa-
ny, and Luxembourg; and West Germany and Aus-
tria, as demonstrators have protested plans to build,
turn on, or operate nuclear power plants in neighbor-
ing countries. As Chernobyl' demonstrated, tensions
and suspicions over nuclear accidents can be further
exacerbated when the states involved span the East-
West divide in Europe. Chernobyl' has convinced
many West and East Europeans that they are part of
an entity having many shared concerns. In the end, it
may have the effect of helping to increase West
European receptivity to proposals for East-West coop-
eration on a variety of issues unrelated to nuclear
power.
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/12/02 : CIA-RDP08501350R000401290002-0