THE COSTS OF SOVIET INVOLVEMENT IN AFGHANISTAN

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• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
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• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 1, 1987
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
in Afghanistan
The Costs of Soviet Involvement
SOV 87-10007
February 1987
COPY 369
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
in Afghanistan
The Costs of Soviet Involvement
This paper was prepared by
Office of Soviet Analysis,
South Asian Analysis;
Office of Global Issues
SOVA
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Defense Economics Division,
Reverse Blank Secret
SOV 87-10007
February 1987
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The Costs of Soviet Involvement
in Afghanistan 25X1
Key Judgments Soviet leaders continue to express frustration over the protracted war in
Information available Afghanistan. This was evident at the party congress in February 1986
as of 31 October 1986 when General Secretary Gorbachev referred to the war as a "bleeding
was used in this report.
wound." Soviet involvement in Afghanistan has led to periodic censure
within the United Nations, become a stumblingblock to improved Sino-
Soviet relations, and complicated Soviet policy toward nations in the
nonaligned movement. At home, pockets of social unrest related to
Afghanistan, the diversion of energies from pressing economic problems,
and dissatisfaction in the political hierarchy over the failure to end the war
also probably worry the leadership.
The war has not been a substantial drain on the Soviet economy so far, al-
though the costs of the war have been rising faster than total defense
spending. We estimate that from their initial invasion in December 1979
through 1986 the Soviets have spent about 15 billion rubles on the conduct
of the war. Of this total, about 3 billion rubles would have been spent over
the seven-year period even if the USSR had not occupied Afghanistan.
Our estimate of total costs is more likely to be high than low. In calculating
the total, we used the high side of a range of estimated aircraft losses; use
of the low estimate for aircraft losses would reduce our estimates of the to-
tal cost of the war by nearly 2 billion rubles.
the United States in the peak year of 1968.
Measured in dollars-what it would have cost the United States to
procure, operate, and maintain the same force in Afghanistan-we esti-
mate that the total cost through the seven years of the war has been less
than $50 billion. This is only 75 percent of what the war in Vietnam cost
? They have increased the commitment of troops only gradually. Manpow-
er levels have risen from 80,000 in 1980 to the present in-country
strength of approximately 120,000.
Secret
SOV 87-10007
February 1987
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? The Soviets have used conservative tactics to minimize human and
materiel losses. We estimate they have suffered 30,000 to 35,000 combat
casualties, a third of whom died. Much of the equipment and expenda-
bles has been drawn from old stocks.
? Soviet supply lines to Afghanistan are relatively short, often shorter than
some that serve Soviet troops within the Soviet Union.
? The Afghan Government has been required to pay for most arms and
some of the economic assistance it receives from the USSR with natural
gas transfers. The total value of this aid-3.5 billion rubles-is, there-
fore, excluded from our 15-billion-ruble estimate of the total cost of the
war.
Soviet costs, although relatively low, have been growing steadily. In both
1985 and 1986, Moscow spent nearly 3 billion rubles on the conduct of the
war, or some 2 to 2.5 percent of total defense spending, compared with an
average of about 2 billion rubles over the previous five years. While this is
still low in relative terms, as an increment to the total defense budget it is
beginning to take on increasing significance. Much of the rising cost of the
war is traceable to increases in Soviet air operations and the resulting
higher aircraft losses. During 1984 and 1985 the Soviets may have lost
more than 300 aircraft from all causes. Nearly 90 percent of these were
helicopters. In 1985 the replacement cost of the helicopters estimated to
have been destroyed in Afghanistan amounted to 35 percent of total Soviet
military helicopter procurement costs in that year. These factors have more
than offset the savings from the substantial reduction in ground forces
combat activity that occurred in 1986 as part of the Soviet policy of
turning more of the combat burden over to the Afghan army.
The costs of the war appear likely to continue their gradual rise.
Construction, force augmentations, and Soviet employment tactics all
indicate that the increased emphasis on air operations observed since 1983
will continue for at least another year:
? Analysis of improvements occurring at airfields in Afghanistan suggests
that they are probably intended to support new aircraft deliveries, expand
logistic capabilities, and improve security.
? The number of Soviet helicopters in Afghanistan is increasing, and air
operations during 1986 exceeded those of 1985.
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? Helicopters are being used more extensively in support of Soviet special
forces to seek out and attack insurgent groups.
Despite the increasing trend, however, the economic costs resulting from
these operational developments are unlikely, in our view, to be of sufficient
magnitude to constitute a significant counterweight to the political and
security implications the Soviets would attach to withdrawal under circum-
stances that could be seen as a defeat. Indeed, we believe the recent rising
trend in economic cost is more a reflection of determination in Moscow to
counter a better armed insurgency and thus shows continued willingness to
incur whatever burden is necessary
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The Soviet Commitment of Manpower and Materiel
The Costs of Military Operations in Afghanistan
5
Organizational Equipment
9
Soviet Military Manpower in Afghanistan, 1980 and 1986
Soviet Equipment Losses in Afghanistan, 1980-85
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Scope Note
in Afghanistan
This pa-
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per presents the results of a comprehensive review of the methodology and
data used to generate the manpower, materiel, activity levels, and costs
associated with the Afghan war. It traces the trend in, and the costs of,
Soviet involvement during seven years of the war from 1980 through 1986;
briefly describes the findings of new research into activity levels, expendi-
tures of supplies and equipment, construction of facilities, and personnel
costs; and measures the impact of these costs on the military as a whole.
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The Costs of Soviet Involvement
in Afghanistan
years.
In 1979, against a background of slowing economic
growth and military spending, the Soviet Union in-
vaded Afghanistan to support a fledgling Marxist
government threatened by civil war and imminent
collapse. Moscow's basic goal was to ensure the
continuation of a pro-Soviet Communist regime that
could rule the country on its own without a large
Soviet military presence. At the time, the Soviets
referred to the invasion as "limited" and "tempo-
rary," hoping that the accession of a more moderate
regime in Kabul under Babrak Karmal, coupled with
the Soviet military presence, would intimidate the
insurgents, bolster the Afghan army, and enable most
of the Soviet troops to withdraw within a couple of
istan.
Seven years later, the Soviets find themselves bogged
down in a guerrilla war, the Soviet-installed regime in
Kabul remains weak and ineffective, and the Afghan
military remains incapable of quelling a resistance
that has grown substantially in numbers, effective-
ness, and popular support. Soviet officials now pri-
vately concede that their leadership miscalculated the
difficulties of achieving their goals and underestimat-
ed the long-term costs of their involvement in Afghan-
In estimating the ruble cost to the Soviets of their
involvement in Afghanistan, we first estimated the
costs that are common to all military forces. These
include outlays for military personnel, normal opera-
tions and maintenance, construction, and the procure-
ment of equipment and supplies. We then estimated
the incremental costs-those unique to a wartime
situation such as the replacement and repair of large
quantities of equipment destroyed and damaged; the
expenditure of ammunition; and extraordinary medi-
For manpower and order of battle, we have
high confidence in our estimates. We have much less
confidence in our estimates of equipment losses and of
consumption of petroleum, oil, lubricants (POL), and
ammunition
Our estimates of the cost of Soviet military activities
in Afghanistan for 1986 are preliminary. F_
These estimates, therefore, are less certain than
those for the period 1980-85
Since the invasion in December 1979, the Soviets
have increased the number of troops and the quantity
and quality of weapons deployed in Afghanistan.
Concurrent with the increases, the Soviets shifted
their tactics from massed combined-arms sweeps to
increasing reliance on small-unit operations, depopu-
lation of key resistance areas, and control of insurgent
access through the border provinces. Though this shift
was probably driven by military and political consid-
erations, it has kept the war a relatively low-cost
effort.
Manpower
In mid-1980 the Soviets had approximately 80,000
troops in Afghanistan. By mid-1986 this figure had
increased to about 120,000 (see table 1). Those Soviet
military personnel in the USSR who support the
fighting full-time are estimated to have increased
from 20,000 to 40,000 during the period 1980-86
cal, operating, and construction costs.
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Table 1
Soviet Military Manpower in
Afghanistan, 1980 and 1986
1980
1986
Percent
Increase
Combat personnel
49,000
74,500
52
Rear services and
support personnel
21,500
30,000
40
Combat personnel
Rear services and
support personnel
Of the 120,000 Soviet troops in country, less than half
are available for offensive action because of the need
to deploy some units semipermanently to defend
major bases and lines of communication. We estimate
that the current in-country troop strength is inade-
quate to neutralize the insurgency and gain control of
the country. The Soviets clearly have the capability to
increase substantially their forces in Afghanistan.
Instead, they have increased their troop strength only
moderately over the years. This approach has kept
Soviet combat casualties low. We estimate that over
the seven-year period 1980-86, the Soviets suffered
30,000 to 35,000 casualties, a third of whom died.
Largely as a result of their changed tactics, the
Soviets have been somewhat more successful since
1985 in accomplishing those missions necessary to
cope with the insurgency, including:
? Reducing the flow of outside aid to the insurgents.
? Actively seeking out and engaging insurgent groups
rather than waiting for them to strike.
? Detecting movement in advance of an attack and
moving troops rapidly enough to intercept and en-
gage insurgent units.
? Undermining the insurgents' civilian base of
support.
? Building up the ability of the Afghan military to
uncertainty is inherent in these data, especially with
respect to aircraft losses. Often, no distinction can be
made between Soviet and Afghan equipment or be-
tween destroyed and damaged equipment. F_
These unknown data are needed for calcula-
tions o replacement costs, so they must be estimated.
During the period 1980-85 the USSR slowly in-
creased and modernized its equipment holdings in
Afghanistan, partly in response to the stepped-up
tempo of the insurgency and partly in line with the
policy of overall force modernization he
Soviet fighter/fighter-bomber aircraft order of battle
increased by about 65 percent during this time and
the number of helicopters by about 20 percent. The
greatest total increase in aircraft (both fixed and
rotary wing) occurred in 1984 and 1985 as a result of
stepped-up air attacks on Mujahedin forces. The air
force was also modernized as older MIG-21s and
MI-8s were replaced by newer, more capable
MIG-23, SU-17, and MI-24 aircraft. In 1981 the first
squadron of SU-25s-the Soviets' newest ground at-
tack aircraft-appeared in Afghanistan (see figure 2).
The pace of introduction of newer, more capable
equipment for the ground forces in Afghanistan was
slower than that for the air forces. From 1980 through
1985 the number of major items of equipment in-
assume a more active role in the fighting.
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The Soviet
forces' need for tanks in Afghanistan is relatively
small, and the opportunities for their use are limited.
Much larger numbers of armored personnel carriers
(APCs) are used, principally for escort duty and
perimeter patrol. BTR-50 and BTR-60 armored per-
sonnel carriers were replaced with BTR-70s, which
provided greater protection for convoys that were 25X1
under more frequent attack by the insurgents as the 25X1
war progressed. The BMP-2 with its 30-mm automat-
ic cannon is better suited for convoy protection than is
the old BMP with its 73-mm smoothbore gun, and the25X1
Soviets added more than 500 BMP-2s between 1980
and 1986. Self-propelled artillery holdings increased
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Figure 2
Soviet Aircraft in Afghanistan
MI-24 Attack Helicopter.
Provides fire support with a mixture of 12.7-mm
and 30-mm guns, 57-mm and 80-mm rockets,
and A T-3 and A T-6 antitank missiles.
MI-6 Heavy Lift Transport Helicopter With
BMD-1 Airborne Combat Vehicle.
The MI-6 is the largest helicopter used in
Afghanistan. However, its poor performance at
higher altitudes and temperatures and its
vulnerability to attack keep it from being used as
an assault troop carrier.
SU-25 Frogfoot Ground Attack Aircraft.
Used to attack insurgent positions, it has a
payload of 10,000 pounds. It is armed with
30-mm cannon, 57-mm and 80-mm rockets, and
assorted bombs.
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as part of their table of equipment
in 1984 and 1985 as part of the modernization effort
occurring throughout the Soviet forces. At the same
time, the Soviets began to expand their inventory by
placing artillery in units that normally did not have it
The Costs of Military Operations in Afghanistan
Figure 3
Soviet Costs for Afghan War: Distribution
by Resource Category, 1980-86a
Construction
2
and maintenance (O&M).
We estimate that, from late December 1979 through
December 1986, the Soviets spent about 15 billion
rubles on the direct conduct of the war (to put these
outlays in perspective, we estimate that in 1982, the
Soviet military spent 8-9 billion rubles for aircraft
procurement alone).' Figure 3 shows the distribution
of these costs by the major resource categories of
procurement, construction, personnel, and operations
A dollar valuation of the Soviet activities in Afghani-
stan for 1980-86 is about $48 billion in 1984 prices
or an average annual
year (1968) outlay of $65 billion.
cost of about $7 billion. This amount is calculated by
applying prevailing US prices and wages to the Soviet
activities in Afghanistan: the US cost of procuring the
same supplies and equipment, maintaining the same
military force in Afghanistan, and operating that
force in the same manner as the Soviets. Over the
13-year period 1964-76, the United States spent the
equivalent of nearly $330 billion (in 1984 prices) on its
involvement in Southeast Asia. On an average annual
basis, US outlays were four times greater than those
of the USSR for its involvement in Afghanistan. The
dollar value of the Soviet peak-year (1986) outlay in
Afghanistan is less than 15 percent of the US peak-
Since the invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, the war
has become increasingly costly to the Soviets. Over
the past seven years they have built up their weapons
inventories, experienced greater aircraft and equip-
ment losses, and sharply increased their use of ammu-
nition. In 1980 the USSR spent about 1.5 billion
rubles, or 1.5 percent of its total defense budget, on
Afghanistan. Outlays grew at an average annual rate
Operations and
maintenance
30
Personnel
19
Procurement
49
Ammunition
24
Equipment
replacement
19
Organizational
equipment
6
of 12 percent, so that by 1985 total expenditures
amounted to 2.7 billion rubles and took about 2.5
percent of the total. Combat activity by Soviet ground
forces in 1986 was substantially reduced as part of the
Soviet policy of turning more of the combat burden
over to the Afghan army. In terms of ruble outlays,
the cutback by the ground forces has been more than
offset by increased air forces activity and related
expenditures. These increases do not extend to air-
craft losses, however, where we estimate the Soviets
suffered fewer losses in 1986 than in 1985. Our
preliminary estimate of costs for 1986 shows only a
slight increase over those for 1985.
Of the 15 billion rubles of total estimated costs
through 1986, about 12 billion rubles are expenses
directly incurred by the war for such things as
equipment losses, ammunition expended, shipping
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costs, and out-of-country pay. The remainder repre-
sents the peacetime costs of the forces that are
deployed to Afghanistan-costs that would have been
incurred even without the war.
Our estimate of total costs through 1986 is more
likely to be high than low. In calculating the total, we
used the high side of a range of estimated aircraft
losses
Use of the low
estimate for aircraft losses would reduce our estimate
of the total cost of the war by nearly 2 billion rubles.
Together, these lower estimates amount to one-half a
Figure 4
Soviet Expenditure of Ammunition in
Afghanistan, 1980-86
percent of cumulative a Soviet defense spending for the 40
The estimate of total expenditures is subject to other
uncertainties. Given the varying rates of uncertainty
among the many components of the estimate, we
calculate that a worst case-where all individual
components of the estimate are either understated or
overstated to subjectively derived limits-would result
in an error of ? 4 billion rubles, or about 25 percent
of the total through 1986. Because of the tendency for
errors to be partially offsetting, however, the uncer-
tainty of our estimate probably is more in the range of
? 2 billion rubles or less.
Procurement
Over the seven-year period of the estimate, procure-
ment accounted for one-half of all Soviet costs. This
category includes the costs of ammunition, replacing
destroyed equipment, and procuring organizational
equipment. For purposes of this estimate we have
assumed that the Soviets replaced all destroyed equip-
ment with new equipment of the same kind and paid
the full replacement cost.
Ammunition. The Soviets' largest procurement expen-
diture was for ammunition.
I I I I I I I
0 1980 81 82 83 84 85 86
We estimate that during the period 1980-86, the
Soviets used more than 780,000 metric tons of ground
and air munitions at a cost of 3.7 billion rubles. This
includes the value of all ammunition, some of which
was stolen and some of which was captured or
destroyed, that the Soviets shipped to Afghanistan.2 In
1983 they began to rely much more heavily on air
operations as a tactical option. This resulted in a
dramatic increase in the use of air munitions (see
figure 4). Gravity bombs represent the largest catego-
ry of air munitions expended. We estimate that Soviet
aircraft stationed in Afghanistan dropped more
bombs in 1985 than the total they dropped in the first
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Artillery represented the largest category of ground
ammunition expended, accounting for nearly 45 per-
cent of total ground forces munitions costs throughout
the seven-year period. In the early 1980s the Soviets
deployed automatic mortars to Afghanistan. In
1984-85 longer range field guns and more self-
propelled artillery were brought in. These measures
resulted in increased expenditures of ammunition.
number lost in each category through 1985.
Equipment Replacement. Between 1980 and 1986 we
estimate that the Soviets replaced aircraft, armored
vehicles, ground forces weapons, tanks, and trucks
valued at 3 billion rubles. Aircraft accounted for more
than 80 percent of the total. Table 3 shows the
There is a wide range in the estimates of the number
of Soviet aircraft destroyed in Afghanistan since
1979. The cost estimates in this paper reflect the
higher numbers-750 aircraft through 1985. If we
used the lower numbers-some 320 aircraft-our cost
estimates would be reduced by nearly 2 billion rubles.'
Of the estimated 750 Soviet aircraft destroyed from
all causes during the period 1980-85, nearly 640, or
85 percent, were helicopters (see figures 5 and 6). The
value of helicopters destroyed in 1985 is estimated to
be equal to 35 percent of the value of all helicopters
procured by the military in that year. Despite the
large numbers of helicopters lost by the Soviets in
Afghanistan, we did not detect increases in production
to make up for these losses. Losses may have been
replaced out of existing stocks, delaying the introduc-
tion of new equipment into peacetime units,
In contrast, we estimate that fewer than 100 fighter
and ground attack aircraft were lost from all causes
during the period 1980-85. This six-year total is only
Table 3
Soviet Equipment Losses
in Afghanistan, 1980-85
a Includes field artillery, mortars, and multiple rocket launchers.
b Figures for air forces are the high end of a range of estimates.
c Includes transports.
slightly greater than the annual peacetime training
attrition rate of about 70 tactical aircraft for the
Soviet Air Forces. The relatively small number of
fixed-wing aircraft lost may reflect the difficulty the
insurgents have in tracking and destroying Soviet
fighters as well as the success of the countermeasures
taken by the Soviets to offset growing insurgent
capabilities. Preliminary estimates for the year 1986
indicate that Soviet aircraft losses were less than they
were in 1985.
The value of Soviet ground forces equipment losses in
Afghanistan for the period 1980-86 is estimated at
nearly 500 million rubles. Most equipment losses
occur during attacks on convoys and perimeter pa-
trols. Cargo trucks represented the greatest loss in
terms of numbers, but they accounted for only about
10 percent of the estimated total value of ground
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forces equipment destroyed. The largest loss was that
of more than 300 tanks, whose replacement cost
amounted to 45 percent of the value of all ground
forces equipment estimated to have been lost. Other 25X1
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Figure 5
Afghan Insurgents and Their Weapons
These weapons are responsible for the
destruction of the majority of Soviet aircraft lost
in combat.
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Figure 6
Soviet Aircraft Destroyed in
Afghanistan, 1980-86a
Q Transports
Ground attack
Q Helicopters
1980-85.
escort vehicles such as APCs suffered relatively high
casualties because they are among the first to be
targeted in a convoy attack. We estimate that more
than 650 of these escort vehicles, valued at 125
million rubles, were destroyed over the period
percent of the total.
Organizational Equipment. Organizational equip-
ment consists of supplies necessary for the smooth
operation of any unit. The category includes mess
gear, tents, cots, typewriters, communications sys-
tems, test equipment, repair manuals, tools, and thou-
sands of other'items. The cost of supplying organiza-
tional equipment to Soviet troops in Afghanistan
through 1986 is estimated at over 800 million rubles,
with ground forces accounting for more than 90
Construction
During the period 1980-86, Soviet expenditures for
construction in Afghanistan amounted to 350 million
rubles, or 2 percent of the total. Sixty percent of this
amount is estimated to have been spent during the
first three years.
Construction projects counted in this estimate include
pipelines and portable pumping stations; airfield run-
ways, taxiways, and parking areas; housing and sup-
port areas; and a small thermal-electric power plant.
Not included were the costs of
repairing damaged roads, pipelines, and facilities. We
assume that these repairs were made by Soviet mili-
tary personnel, for whom costs are already included in
our estimate. Thus, we believe that any additional
costs of repair were small
Most of the facilities constructed were relatively low
cost and semipermanent-for example, storage build-
ings, Quonset huts, barracks, tents, and small aircraft
hangars. The most costly facilities were 375 kilome-
ters of oil-supply pipeline with 46 portable pumping
stations, a small 12,000-kilowatt thermal-electric
power plant in Kabul, and some new airfield runways
and parking areas constructed of pierced steel plank.
The facilities that the Soviets use in Afghanistan are
barely adequate to support the present force and level
of operations. Any significant buildup of forces would
require an expansion of these facilities.
Personnel
Personnel expenditures amounted to 2.9 billion rubles,
or 19 percent of the total, during the 1980-86 period.
Personnel outlays include pay and allowances, food,
clothing, and transportation costs for the 80,000 to
120,000 Soviet troops in country over the seven-year
period (including those of the military advisory group)
and the estimated 20,000 to 40,000 support personnel
in the Turkestan Military District.
Forty percent of personnel expenditures represents the
out-of-country bonus of double base pay for Soviet
career military personnel and the additional cost of
food, clothing, and transportation in Afghanistan.F_
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We have high confidence in our estimate of personnel
costs. We believe it is correct to within ? 10 percent.
We have less confidence in other estimates, such as
the cost of supplies and equipment and the cost of
treating the wounded. If our estimate of outside
support-our least reliable manpower estimate-
should be off by as much as ? 50 percent (10,000 to
20,000 men), the effect on total costs would amount to
about ? 200 million rubles over the entire six-year
period. Thus, the impact of uncertainty in this catego-
ry is minimal.
Operations and Maintenance
Expenditures for O&M for the period 1980-86
amounted to 4.6 billion rubles, or 30 percent of the
estimated total. The biggest expense in this catego-
ry-some 3.6 billion rubles-was the cost of main-
taining ground and air forces equipment in a war
environment. In addition, some 675 million rubles
were spent to repair war damage to this equipment.
maintenance costs went up by about 150 percent, and
those of the ground forces increased by nearly 30
percent.
Military and Economic Aid
The value of military and economic aid deliveries
from the USSR to the Democratic Republic of
Afghanistan (DRA) has remained steady, averaging
400-600 million rubles per year.' The total-3.5
billion rubles in 1980-86-is not included in our
15-billion-ruble estimate of the cost of the war for the
same time period because, with the exception of
ammunition and some used equipment that the Sovi-
ets may provide free, the Afghan Government report-
edly pays for its arms imports and about one-third of
its economic aid from the USSR. The DRA pays for
its military and economic aid largely through the sale
of its natural gas. The Soviets take about 90 percent
of Afghanistan's annual production, which reduces its
debt to the Soviet Union by more than $300 million a
Outlays for POL during the period 1980-86 are
estimated at 330 million rubles. In 1980, Soviet forces
used an estimated 360,000 metric tons of POL. By
1986 use had increased to over 650,000 metric tons.
About 65 percent of the total value was accounted for
by air forces.
Much of the increasing cost of the war was the result
of the rising number of hours flown by more sophisti-
cated Soviet aircraft. In 1980 a MIG-21 averaged less
than 100 hours of flying time per year at a cost of
4,600 rubles per hour. Nearly 60 percent of this cost
was for the one-half metric ton of ordnance it carried
and expended during each sortie. Most of the remain-
der was the cost of maintenance. POL accounted for
slightly more than 3 percent of the cost of an hour's
flying. By 1985 the MIG-21 had been replaced by the
SU-17 and SU-25, which were flying three to four
times as often at an hourly cost averaging nearly
15,000 rubles. Larger payloads and higher mainte-
nance costs per aircraft contributed to these increas-
ing outlays. During the seven-year period, air forces
year.
Arms transfers from the USSR to Afghanistan place
that country behind only Vietnam and Cuba in terms
of value received by Marxist Third World states since
the start of the Afghan war. Most arms deliveries
consisted of.ammunition, spare parts, and some re-
placement equipment. Replacement equipment is dif-
ficult to track, but that provided to the Afghans, while
sufficient to maintain Kabul's forces at their current
size, is less sophisticated than that provided to most
other arms clients in the Third World or used by the
Soviets themselves in Afghanistan. Moreover, there
are indications the Soviets are unwilling to replace all
Afghan equipment that has been lost, stolen, or
destroyed. In some cases, armored personnel carriers
have been replaced by less expensive trucks, probably
because of the Afghan army's relatively poor record
of caring for its equipment.
' Unlike estimates for the cost of Soviet involvement in Afghani-
stan, which are in constant prices, ruble estimates for military and
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work on road and rail transport facilities.
Since the war, the USSR has largely replaced West-
ern lenders and donors in providing economic support
to the DRA. Deliveries from the USSR since 1979 are
estimated at approximately 1.5 billion rubles. They
included basic commodities such as wheat, sugar, oil
products, consumer goods, and industrial raw materi-
als under a grant aid program. Much of the economic
development that is being paid for by the DRA was
designed to support Soviet military logistic require-
ments. To this extent, the Soviets are transferring part
of the burden of the war to the DRA. This activity
includes such projects as the new bridge over the Amu
Darya, two oil-product pipelines, expansion at Kabul
airport, the construction of seven new airfields, and
the DRA.
Thus far, the war in Afghanistan has been relatively
inexpensive for the Soviets for the following reasons:
? Less than 3 percent of the USSR's armed forces is
engaged full-time in the conduct of the war.
? Activity levels of a guerrilla war are generally much
lower than those of a conventional theater conflict.
Small-scale combat operations are the norm; large-
scale offensives are the exception.
? Supply lines are relatively short, often shorter than
some entirely within the Soviet Union.
? Older, less expensive equipment was used, at least in
the early years.
? Military aid to Afghanistan is largely paid for by
At the present level of effort, Afghan-related costs
represent only 2 to 2.5 percent of total Soviet defense
spending. Costs have risen at a rate of 12 percent a
year, but there are signs they will grow more slowly or
level off in the future. Over the past several months,
Moscow has been showing some indications of at-
tempting to lower its military profile in order to
facilitate a political settlement. Gorbachev on 28 July,
for example, announced a decision to withdraw six
regiments from Afghanistan, which could have
amounted to 7,000 to 8,000 troops. In fact, the net
number of troops withdrawn was fewer than 2,000-a
reduction that will have little or no effect on Soviet
capabilities and will reduce costs associated with the
war in Afghanistan by only 50 million rubles per year.
Although the withdrawal was a sham, we think
Moscow will not want to change its posture of main-
taining that the forces on hand can control the
insurgency.
We do expect to see continued growth in the costs of
air operations for at least another year:
? Increased Soviet use of airstrikes-as well as artil-
lery support-is one of several ways of helping the
Afghan army to get on its feet and of cutting back
on direct operations by Soviet ground troops.
? Airfields in Afghanistan are being upgraded and
improved. these improve-
ments are probably intended to support more air-
craft, expand logistic capabilities, and improve
security.
? The number of Soviet helicopters in Afghanistan is
increasing, and more helicopters are being used in
support of Soviet special forces. This indicates at
least a continuation and probably an expansion of
the Soviets' successful policy of seeking out and
sometimes ambushing resistance groups. At the
same time, the insurgents are continuing to improve
marginally their capabilities for downing Soviet and
Afghan aircraft.
We expect the Soviets to continue to limit the re-
sources they are committing to ground operations as
they pursue political and military strategies for disen-
gaging their forces that include turning more of the
burden of such operations over to the Afghan army.
Over the last year the Soviet leadership has indicated
more clearly than in the past that it is frustrated with
the slow progress of the war and would like to be able
to withdraw its troops. At the February 1986 party
congress, General Secretary Gorbachev referred to
the Afghanistan war as a "bleeding wound," the
starkest description yet from a Soviet leader. Moscow
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has mounted a steady propaganda campaign to con-
vince both global opinion and its own population that
it is sincerely seeking a political solution to the war.
None of the changes in the Soviet military effort over
the past year, however, appear to stem from a need to
win the war quickly, or from a willingness to accept
significantly higher costs, even temporarily, in the
hope of a quick solution. On the political front, the
Soviets have been unwilling to make even minor
concessions that would affect their continuing mili-
tary effort-witness the sham "withdrawal" in the
fall.
In short, the Soviets do not appear ready to abandon
their fundamental goal of establishing in Kabul a pro-
Communist regime that is stable and can rule the
country without a large Soviet presence. The slow but
steady rise in the economic cost of the war reflects
Moscow's continued determination to do what is
necessary to deal with the better armed resistance,
while resisting the temptation to try to win the war
quickly. Recent changes in strategy, especially the
increase in air operations, have raised costs somewhat
more rapidly than in the past, but the leadership
apparently believes that such costs thus far have been
relatively low and have not been a substantial drain on
the Soviet economy. If the Soviets eventually decide
to withdraw, we believe that decision would be based
on political and military considerations rather than on
economic factors.
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Appendix A
Table A-I
USSR: The Ruble Cost of Involvement in Afghanistan, 1980-86 a
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
Total
Cost
Total Incre-
mental Cost b
198
226
290
358
439
470
450
2,430
59
68
84
98
122
132
115
678
678
16
18
20
19
25
29
15
142
Outside support 37 45 54 62 71 71 75 414 0
a Because of rounding, components may not add to totals shown.
b Incremental costs are defined as those that are unique to a
wartime situation.
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Table A-2
USSR: The Dollar Cost of Involvement in Afghanistan, 1980-86 a
Maintenance
995
1,036
1,039
1,102
1,164
1,332
1,400
8,068
Ground
917
944
949
999
1,027
1,192
1,190
7,219
Air
78
91
90
103
137
140
210
849
Organizational equipment
384
411
512
512
534
556
565
3,473
Ground
347
370
470
470
490
508
525
3,180
Air
37
40
42
42
45
47
40
294
Outside support 355 444 532 621 710 710 745 4,117
a Because of rounding, components may not add to totals shown.
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