REJUVENATING THE SOVIET PARTY APPARATUS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP08S01350R000200620002-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 7, 2012
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: February 1, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/12 : CIA-RDP08501350R000200620002-6
olc-'7,1gt4t, Directorate of LIM
Intelligence 25X1
Rejuvenating the Soviet
Party Apparatus
An Intelligence Assessment
.ifidentla
SOV 86-10011
February 1986
Copy
399
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/12 : CIA-RDP08501350R000200620002-6
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/12 : CIA-RDP08501350R000200620002-6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/12 : CIA-RDP08501350R000200620002-6
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/12 : CIA-RDP08501350R000200620002-6
Directorate of Confidential
Intelligence 25X1
Rejuvenating the Soviet
Party Apparatus
An Intelligence Assessment
This paper was prepared by the
Office of Soviet Analysis, with contributions from
SOYA, and
OCR. Comments and queries are
welcome and may be directed to the Chief,
Domestic Policy Division, SOYA,
Confidential
SOV 86-10011
February 1986
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/12 : CIA-RDP08501350R000200620002-6
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
LOA I
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/12 : CIA-RDP08501350R000200620002-6
Confidential
Key Judgments
Information available
as of 18 February 1986
was used in this report.
Rejuvenating the Soviet
Party Apparatus
Mikhail Gorbachev is counting on a revolution in leadership style?not
systemic reform?to accomplish his priority objectives, accelerating eco-
nomic growth and repairing a frayed social fabric. In the classical Soviet
manner, he has assigned to the party apparatus the task of seeing to it that
his program is successfully implemented.
To this end Gorbachev has instituted a wide-ranging purge of the
apparatus. He has moved quickly to bring the central party apparatus
under his control?placing an ally, Yegor Ligachev, as second-in-command
of the Secretariat, adding three of his own choices as junior secretaries,
purging political rival Grigoriy Romanov from its ranks, and naming nine
new heads of key Central Committee departments.
He also has made a good start in rejuvenating the regional leadership,
sacking three republic first secretaries and roughly a third of the provincial
leadership?the most drastic overhaul of the leadership since Khrushchev's
time.
Gorbachev's purge is designed to produce a cadre of officials with the
political loyalties, technical competence, and leadership skills necessary to
implement his program. He has installed new procedures for selecting and
promoting party officials, moreover, that are evidently designed to ensure
that future party leaders meet these requirements:
? He is reducing the average age of party leaders in an effort to get a better
mix of experience and new blood.
? He is cross-posting regional leaders to block the development of
"localist" sentiments and to ensure that they remain wedded to central
policies.
? He has revived a practice used by both Stalin and Khrushchev, replacing
many local leaders with officials who have spent a stint in the central
party apparatus as "inspectors."
The evidence is too sparse to assess the temperament and policy inclination
of the new party leaders, but at a minimum they will not be beholden to the
entrenched bureaucracies and traditional procedures they have been
assigned to oversee. At least for now, they will be unable to use these
institutions as entrenched power bases to challenge the Moscow leadership.
They are likely to be more open to innovative solutions to problems and
iii Confidential
SOV 86-10011
February 1986
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/12 : CIA-RDP08501350R000200620002-6
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/12 : CIA-RDP08501350R000200620002-6
Confidential
more enthusiastic implementers of new policies. Gorbachev has made it
clear that they will be held more strictly accountable for their performance
than their predecessors.
But even these new leaders will be hard pressed to achieve the turnaround
in solving the country's political and economic problems that Gorbachev is
hoping for:
? They face the same formidable problems and obstacles as their predeces-
sors and, barring more radical reforms than we have seen to date, they
will have to work within the same institutional constraints.
? While it has been relatively easy for Gorbachev to remove ineffective
veterans, most of whom were at retirement age, the real test of his
revolution will be his willingness and ability to sack his own appointees
should they founder.
Although he has presided over the greatest change in the party apparatus
since Khrushchev, much remains to be done before Gorbachev will have
turned it into a reliable tool for implementing his policies:
? He needs to beef up the Secretariat, name a new secretary to oversee
economic matters, and appoint allies to take over important portfolios
that are still in the hands of Brezhnev-era holdovers. He will also want to
name additional senior secretaries with full Politburo status to dilute
Ligachev's political strength.
? The recent reelections of Ukrainian party chief Vladimir Shcherbitskiy
and Kazakh party chief Dinmukhamed Kunayev signal to Soviet officials
that there are limits to Gorbachev's power to push his purge of the
regional apparatus.
The party congress will provide an important test of the residual strength
of resistance to Gorbachev's personnel and policy agenda within the party
apparatus. There are indications that Gorbachev may be planning initia-
tives to give a new boost to his efforts to rejuvenate the party leadership:
? He is likely to seek the removal of more veteran party secretaries?
possibly Boris Ponomarev and Mikhail Zimyanin?and their replace-
ment by Vadim Zagladin, Konstantin Katushev, or Aleksandr Yakovlev.
A successful last-minute move against Shcherbitskiy or Kunayev would
be a particularly brazen and ruthless move.
Confidential iv
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/12 : CIA-RDP08501350R000200620002-6
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/12 : CIA-RDP08501350R000200620002-6
?AIIIIIUCIILlill
.
25X1
Gorbachev plans to launch a direct assault on 25X1
the corruption and mistakes of the Brezhnev years, giving the General
Secretary a club to further discredit those?such as Shcherbitskiy and
Kunayev?associated with Brezhnev's regime.
? He may try to change the draft party statute to insert provisions limiting
the tenure in office of party officials?provisions that he reportedly
pushed for but failed to achieve in the initial draft. These provisions
would provide Gorbachev a means to institutionalize turnover and ensure
the continued vitality of the apparatus.
? Gorbachev now appears likely to achieve almost a 50-percent turnover of
the Central Committee at the upcoming Congress?the greatest change
in its composition since the 22nd Congress in 1961.
At a minimum Gorbachev needs to advance some of his allies into the
leadership at the Congress in order to avoid a political setback. An
endorsement of provisions limiting party officials' tenure, while not as
essential to Gorbachev, would send a strong signal to the bureaucracy that
the pace of change will not flag in the months ahead. Gorbachev can
probably postpone efforts to remove Kunayev or Shcherbitskiy, but a
successful move against either would indicate Gorbachev's resolve to act
now against the last vestiges of the old guard.
v Confidential
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/12 : CIA-RDP08501350R000200620002-6
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/12 : CIA-RDP08501350R000200620002-6
Rejuvenating the Soviet
Party Apparatus
The Brezhnev Legacy
When Leonid Brezhnev seized the position of General
Secretary from Nikita Khrushchev in 1964, the party
apparatus gained respite from the job insecurity that
Khrushchev had purposefully manipulated in order to
ensure that it remained responsive to his directives.
Under Brezhnev the criteria for measuring party
leaders' performance became lax and merit came to
play a minor role in the selection and promotion of
party leaders. Few officials were removed from their
positions because of incompetence. Fertile soil was
created for the growth of nepotism and abuse of
position for personal gain. By the time Brezhnev
finally departed the scene, the effectiveness of the
apparatus in implementing central social and econom-
ic policies had been badly degraded.
Gorbachev Breaks With the Past
Mikhail Gorbachev, renewing a process begun by his
mentor Yuriy Andropov, has made a sharp break with
Brezhnev's personnel policies. He has quickly acceler-
ated the pace of turnover among party officials?from
the Secretariat to the local leadership.
Gorbachev's attempt to step up the pace of change is
designed to accomplish simultaneously his political
and policy objectives. Promotion of officials who will
be beholden to Gorbachev and removal of his oppo-
nents are the most direct way to consolidate power.
But Gorbachev also seems driven by the need to
install a cadre of vigorous, innovative, and technically
competent officials whom he can count on to carry out
his program for rejuvenating the Soviet system. He
has said that those not up to the challenge will have to
"get out of the way," and the scope of personnel
changes he has forced through to date in the party's
1
The Secretariat's Crucial Role
Mastery of the CPSU Secretariat has been since
Stalin's time the key to Soviet leaders' success in
consolidating power and successfully pursuing policy.
Gorbachev's control over this apparatus gives him a
bureaucratic edge over his colleagues on the
Politburo:
? The Secretariat provides the General Secretary
great political leverage through the control that it
exercises over the selection and placement of per-
sonnel in all key party and government posts.
? Through the Secretariat the General Secretary
controls the organization of the Politburo's agen-
da?a key factor in gaining and keeping the policy-
making initiative.
? Mastery of the Secretariat also gives the General
Secretary the power to oversee the execution of
policy by governmental and other institutions
through the Central Committee departments.
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Gorbachev recognizes the importance of the Secretar-
iat as his base of political operations. He indicated at
the Supreme Soviet session last July that he had
declined the Presidency in order to concentrate his
energies on the "central party organs."
Secretariat, the Central Committee departments, and
the regional party leadership shows that he means
business.
Changes in the Secretariat
Gorbachev was faced with the immediate task last
March of bringing the CPSU Secretariat under his
control (see inset). Two of his close political associates,
Confidential
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/12 : CIA-RDP08501350R000200620002-6
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/12 : CIA-RDP08501350R000200620002-6
Yegor Ligachev and Nikolay Ryzhkov, held key
positions on the Secretariat that he inherited from
Konstantin Chernenko, overseeing personnel appoint-
ments and the economy. But Gorbachev was forced to
deal with five holdovers from the Brezhnev era re-
sponsible for heavy industry, light industry and con-
sumer goods, foreign affairs and the media, and one
potentially dangerous competitor?Politburo member
Grigoriy Romanov, whose responsibilities included
supervision of the military, the KGB, and the defense
industries.
Since his election, Gorbachev has made a good start
in reshaping the body (see table 1). While four
Brezhnev holdovers remain, he has:
? Installed Yegor Ligachev in the key "second secre-
tary" slot, where he not only supervises his own
special portfolios?personnel policy and ideology?
but also oversees the work of the other members of
the Secretariat.
? Purged Romanov, replacing him with Lev Zaykov,
the former first secretary in Leningrad. Zaykov's
recent activities indicate that his portfolio may be
expanding into other areas of heavy industry.
? Placed two other colleagues in important economic
oversight positions: former Sverdlovsk party chief
Boris Yel'tsin?a contemporary of Premier
Ryzhkov, who graduated from the same engineering
school?was made secretary in charge of the con-
struction industry.' Former RSFSR Agriculture
Minister and Gorbachev coworker Viktor Nikonov
was made agriculture secretary.
? Removed Konstantin Rusakov, veteran secretary in
charge of relations with ruling Communist parties.
The Central Committee Departments
Yuriy Andropov made a strong start at rejuvenating
the leadership of the 23 Central Committee depart-
ments charged with overseeing the implementation of
' With his recent election as chief of the Moscow city party
organization, Yel'tsin has given up this portfolio and his position on
the Secretariat.
Confidential
Table 1
Gorbachev's Secretariat
Age Portfolio
Date of
Appointment
Mikhail Gorbachev 54
General
Secretary
11 March 1985
Yegor Ligachev 64
Personnel, 23 April 1984
ideology
Vladimir Dolgikh 61
Heavy
industries
24 May 1982
Boris Ponomarev
71 Relations with 19 May 1972
nonruling Com-
munist parties
Ivan Kapitonov
69 Light industry, 1965
consumer goods
Viktor Nikonov
56 Agriculture
23 April 1985
Lev Zaykov
62 Security or- 5 July 1976
gans, defense
industry
Mikhail Zimyanin 70 Propaganda,
ideology
5 March 1976
the party's policy on a day-to-day basis. He retired
eight elderly chiefs, replacing them with men whose
average age was 57. After a period of stagnation
under Chernenko, Gorbachev has once again stepped
up the pace of change (see table 2). He has named
nine new department heads since his election:
? Taking advantage of Ligachev's assumption of
greater responsibilities, he put former Krasnodar
party chief and protege Georgiy Razumovskiy in
charge of the Organizational and Party Work
Department?the party's powerful "personnel
department," which oversees the selection and pro-
motion of candidates to fill leading party posts.
? First, Boris Yel'tsin from Ryzhkov's provincial base
of Sverdlovsk and, subsequently, Ligachev protege
Aleksandr Mel'nikov from Tomsk were brought in
to head the Construction Department, a sector to
which Gorbachev has paid particular attention.
2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/12 : CIA-RDP08501350R000200620002-6
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/12 : CIA-RDP08501350R000200620002-6
OIII tuctitaaa
Table 2
Leadership of the
Central Committee Departments
Appointee
Date of
Appointment
Appointee
Date of
Appointment
Andropov's changes
Administration of Nikolay Kruchina (58) December 1983
Affairs
Cadres Abroad Stepan Chervonenko January 1983
Department (70)
Chemical Industry Veniamin Afonin a
Department
February 1983
General Department Klavdiy Bogolyubov July 1983
(76)
Economics
Department
Nikolay Ryzhkov (56) November
1982
Organizational Party Yegor Ligachev (65)
Work Department
April 1983
Propaganda
Department
Boris Stukalin (62)
December 1982
Science and Educa-
tional Institutions
Department
Vadim Medvedev (66) August 1983
Chernenko's change
Heavy Industries Ivan Yastrebov (75) March 1984
Department
Gorbachev's changes
Construction
Department
Boris Yel'tsin (55)
Aleksandr Mel'nikov a
April 1985
January 1986
Defense Industry
Department
Oleg Belyakova August 1985
Economics Boris Gostev (59) October 1985
Department b
General Department Anatoliy Lukyanov December 1985
(55)
Light Industries and
Consumer Goods
Department
Leonid Bobykin a
January 1986
Machine Building
Department
Arkadiy Vol'skiy a May 1985
Organizational Party
Work Department
Georgiy Razumov- June 1985
skiy (50)
Trade and Domestic
Services Department
Nikolay Stashen- July 1985
kov
Propaganda Depart- Aleksandr Yakovlev
ment (62)
July 1985
Holdover department
heads
Administrative
Organs Department
Nikolay Savinkin February 1968
(73)
Agricultural
Machine Building
Department
Ivan Sakhnyuk (63) June 1980
Agricultural and
Food Industry
Department
Vladimir Karlov (71) May 1976
Culture Department
International
Department
Vasiliy Shauro (73) November 1965
Boris Ponomarev (82) 1955
International Infor- Leonid Zamyatin March 1978
mation Department
(63)
Transport and Com-
munications Depart-
ment
Kirill Simonov (68)
June 1962
a Age unavailable.
b Gostev has since been promoted to Minister of Finance, leaving
the department vacant again.
? He has also replaced several elderly chiefs of
departments overseeing other specific economic
sectors.
On the foreign policy side, Gorbachev installed an
apparent protege, Aleksandr Yakovlev, as head of the
key Propaganda Department, sending the incumbent
off to be ambassador to Hungary. Yakovlev, who
3
Note: Konstantin Rusakov's recent removal leaves the liaison with
Communist and Workers' Parties of Socialist Countries (Bloc)
Department vacant.
previously headed the important World Economics
and International Relations Institute, has a reputation
for being tough minded on East-West relations, but
also is said to be capable, like Gorbachev, of being
flexible in his approach to foreign policy where it suits
Soviet interests.
Confidential
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/12 : CIA-RDP08501350R000200620002-6
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/12 : CIA-RDP08501350R000200620002-6
The Regional Leaders
The General Secretary's ability to rule the country
effectively rests on the competence and loyalty of the
approximately 170 regional leaders who serve as party
chiefs in the republics and major provinces. As imple-
menters of central policy, they can act as enthusiastic
enforcers or as effective roadblocks to the execution of
the leader's will in the regions. Accounting for more
than 40 percent of the Central Committee, they
represent an important constituency whose loyalty
and support are essential for implementing policy and
maintaining political control.
Brezhnev was very solicitous of this group during
most of his tenure, slowing the rate of turnover among
them to a fraction of that which had prevailed during
the turbulent Khrushchev times when the average
tenure in office was only three years. Andropov made
a good start in revitalizing the regional leadership
before he died in February 1984, filling vacancies in
three of 12 republics?Belorussia, Uzbekistan, and
Azerbaijan?and replacing 34 of the 155 leaders in
the provinces (the country's major territorial divisions
below the republic level). Chernenko, however, mark-
edly slowed the pace of change among regional lead-
ers, replacing only 13 of them.
Gorbachev came to power stressing the need to get the
economy moving again. Regional leaders were imme-
diately put on notice that heavy demands would be
put on them, and that changes in their ranks were in
the offing if they did not stand up to the test. In a
show of strength, Gorbachev has made good on his
threat to force recalcitrant leaders out of their
positions:
? Four more of the 14 republic first secretaries have
been replaced. Eduard Shevardnadze departed his
post as head of the Georgian Republic's party
organization to become Foreign Minister. The
Central Asian republics have been singled out by
Gorbachev for especially harsh treatment, with first
secretaries being unceremoniously purged from
their positions in Kirgiziya, Tadzhikistan, and
Turkmenistan (see table 3).
? More than 50 of the 155 provincial party chiefs
have been replaced. Some of these, like Leningrad
leader Zaykov, were advanced to higher posts. The
Confidential
Table 3
Changes of Leadership in the Republics
Date
New Leader
Replaced
Georgian
July 1985
Dzhumbar
Eduard
SSR
Patiashvili
Shevardnadze
(46)
(57)
Kirghiz
November
Absamat
Turdakun
SSR
1985
Masaliyev
Usubaliyev (66)
(52)
Tadzhik
December
Kakhar
Rakhman
SSR
1985
Makhkamov a
Nabiyev (55)
Turkmen-
December
Saparmurad
Mukhamednazar
istan
1985
Niyazov
Gapurov (63)
a Age unavailable.
majority of them, Brezhnev holdovers of retirement
age who had been in their positions for years, were
pensioned off.
Gorbachev's Strategy
Gorbachev is counting on a revolution in leadership
style?not systemic reform?to accomplish his pri-
ority objectives of accelerating economic growth and
repairing a frayed social fabric. In the classical Soviet
manner, he has assigned to the party apparatus the
task of ensuring that his program is successfully
implemented. Regional party leaders installed under
Gorbachev have made clear that the apparatus they
supervise will be expected to crack the whip over the
government bureaucracy and hold economic officials
to exacting performance standards (see inset).
Gorbachev appears to be relying on a fundamental
change in procedures for selecting and promoting
party leaders to ensure that his new cadre will have
the political commitment, technical competence, and
4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/12 : CIA-RDP08501350R000200620002-6
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/12 : CIA-RDP08501350R000200620002-6
Republic Leaders on the Party's Economic Role
At republic-level party congresses in January and
February, new leaders installed under Gorbachev
have called for party organizations to keep a tight
rein on the economic bureaucracy:
? New Turkmen Republic party leader Saparmurad
Niyazov criticized the republic's Central Commit-
tee departments for failing to ensure that economic
decisions were actually executed and demanded an
"end to such incompetent practices."
? Kirgiz first secretary Absamat Masaliyev com-
plained that the republic's party organization got
"carried away" by lengthy conferences?adopting
hundreds of decisions on economic matters and
then failing to make sure they were fulfilled. He
called upon the Central Committee, its bureaus,
and secretaries to exercise "day-to-day" leadership
of economic development.
? Tadzhik first secretary Kakhar Makhkamov criti-
cized the republic's agriculture secretary and sever-
al other party leaders by name for failure to ensure
that decisions adopted by the leadership were im-
plemented in their respective sectors.
management skills necessary to carry out his pro-
gram. He is using the process to consolidate his
political power, but he is emphasizing selection crite-
ria that appear calculated in the first instance to build
an apparatus with the leadership skills necessary to
get the job done. In many cases, he has passed up the
opportunity to advance candidates with clear personal
ties to himself. Several party officials have alluded to
the equivalent of a five-year plan for cadre renewal
that was apparently approved by the March 1985
Central Committee plenum that elected Gorbachev as
General Secretary.
The general principles he appears to follow in
choosing the new party leadership and the rationale
behind them were spelled out most clearly in the
5
authoritative party journal Komrnunist last March by
the new head of the Central Committee department
that oversees personnel appointments, Georgiy Razu-
movskiy. As described by Razumovskiy, the principles
include:
? Reducing the average age of party leaders in an
effort to achieve a better mix of experienced manag-
ers and new blood.
? Ensuring that party officials possess sufficient tech-
nical competence by having them serve a stint in
economic management positions.
? Developing procedures to block the development of
"localist" sentiments and to ensure that regional
party leaders remain wedded to the goals and
policies of the center.
Personnel actions since he took over in March make
clear Razumovskiy was speaking for the General
Secretary. Gorbachev has been transferring leaders
laterally more often than promoting them from within
their own local party organizations. Reviving a prac-
tice used by both Stalin and Khrushchev, Gorbachev
has also in many cases been replacing local leaders
with officials who have first spent a stint in the central
party apparatus, where they work as "inspectors" in
the Organizational Party Work Department before
being sent back to their home districts. Alumni of this
school for regional party leaders have been named to
head almost 25 percent of the local first secretary
posts vacated since Gorbachev came into office.
this "corp of in-
spectors" numbers about 100 officials. With their
selection personally approved by Ligachev, they are
brought in from provincial party organizations for six
months of instruction in Soviet domestic and foreign
policy and a thorough exposure to the work of the
Central Committee. They are closely scrutinized by
Ligachev and his aides, and those who pass the test
provide a pool of carefully selected talent for advance-
ment to key provincial leadership posts. Ligachev
reportedly selects these candidates for promotion,
while Gorbachev signs off on the choices.
25X1
25X1
Confidential
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/12 : CIA-RDP08501350R000200620002-6
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/12 : CIA-RDP08501350R000200620002-6
Unfinished Business
Against the backdrop of the decade of near paralysis
at the top that preceded Gorbachev's reign, the scope
of changes he has wrought to date in the staffing of
the party apparatus is remarkable. At the same time
he has a long way to go before he can be confident
that he has a reliable and effective tool for implement-
ing his policy agenda. Given the short time since his
election and the need to ensure he is choosing quali-
fied replacements, Gorbachev has only begun to
tackle the rejuvenation of the middle and lower levels
of the party apparatus. As the continuing political
health of some of those he has targeted?such as
Shcherbitskiy?would suggest, he still faces en-
trenched resistance to his personnel strategy.
? Similarly, the cause of making Soviet propaganda
and ideology more interesting, plausible, and ap-
pealing?an apparent Gorbachev priority?is not
likely to be advanced under the tutelage of the aging
present ideology and propaganda secretary, Mikhail
Zimyanin.
Although Ligachev is a political ally of Gorbachev's,
his control of personnel appointments gives him the
potential to build an independent power base, which
he could ultimately use to challenge his mentor.
Consequently, Gorbachev will probably soon add at
least one more member to the ranks of "senior
secretaries" in order to dilute Ligachev's authority.
The Secretariat
At present, the Secretariat is not adequately staffed to
supervise the implementation of domestic policy. With
Ryzhkov's promotion to the Premiership, only two
secretaries remain with full Politburo status?Gorba-
chev and Ligachev. In the past as many as five such
"senior secretaries" shared the task of supervising
personnel, ideology, foreign policy, agriculture, and
industry. Moreover, important sectors are still under
the control of Brezhnev holdovers:
? With Ryzhkov's transfer to the Council of Minis-
ters, for instance, Gorbachev has apparently had to
resort to putting candidate Politburo member and
secretary Vladimir Dolgikh temporarily in charge of
overall economic management (we do not know
whether Gorbachev has run into resistance on
choosing a successor, but Dolgikh does not appear to
be an ally).
? On the foreign policy side, Gorbachev must still rely
on veteran secretary Boris Ponomarev, who heads
the International Department in addition to holding
a seat in the Secretariat. Although it is unclear
whether his views are in conflict with those of the
General Secretary, it is not likely that Gorbachev
considers him the best executor of his more innova-
tive foreign policy. In addition, a successor must be
found for recently retired secretary and Bloc Rela-
tions Department chief Konstantin Rusakov.
Confidential
Ponomarev, like
Rusakov, is on his way out, and that they probably
will be replaced by two of the candidates in line for
promotion to the Secretariat:
? The International Department's first deputy head,
Vadim Zagladin, who has been Ponomarev's highly
visible "right-hand man" for a number of years,
appears to be in line for imminent promotion.
Deputy Vitaliy Shaposhnikov recently became a
second "first deputy" in the department, a move
that Embassy contacts claim is a precursor to
Zagladin's advance. A specialist in European issues,
Zagladin would be a logical successor to
Ponomarev, but some accounts suggest he might go
elsewhere.
? Propaganda Department Chief Aleksandr
Yakovlev, a close adviser to Gorbachev, is also
clearly on his way up.
? Konstantin Katushev, head of the Bloc Relations
Department and Central Committee secretary be-
fore running afoul of Brezhnev in 1977, is rumored
6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/12 : CIA-RDP08501350R000200620002-6
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/12 : CIA-RDP08501350R000200620002-6
Confidential
to be in line to resume his old position in Rusakov's
stead. Zagladin has also been mentioned as a
possible candidate for the position.
? Were Rusakov to be replaced by his conservative
first deputy, Oleg Rakhmanin, it would be a clear
signal that Gorbachev plans to keep his East Euro-
pean allies on a tight leash.
? Georgiy Arbatov and Oleg Bogomolov, the head of
the World Socialist System Institute, also have been
rumored to be in line for positions on the Secretari-
at, but both appear to be long shots at this point.
Central Committee Departments
Despite progress made by Gorbachev and Andropov
before him in refurbishing the departments, almost
half of them remain in the hands of elderly Brezhnev-
era holdovers. Moreover, the Economics Department
is once again vacant?an anomalous situation in light
of Gorbachev's concern for improving party manage-
ment of the economy
In addition to Ponomarev, there are five heads of
Central Committee departments who, by virtue of
age, long tenure in office, and their association with
the old guard, are likely candidates for replacement
soon:
? Nikolay Savinkin, 74, who has headed the Adminis-
trative Organs Department since 1968. As the
department's work is both important and sensitive?
it oversees the military and the police?Gorbachev
will want his own man at its head soon.
? Ivan Yastrebov, head of the Heavy Industry and
Power Engineering Department. Although only in
office since 1984, he is 74 and was selected by
Chernenko.
? Vasiliy Shauro, the 73-year-old head of the Culture
Department who has held the position since 1965.
? Kiri11 Simonov, the 68-year-old Transport and Com-
munications Department chief who has been on the
job for more than 23 years.
7
? Stepan Chervonenko, the 70-year-old head of the
Cadres Abroad Department, which oversees the
assignment of Soviets to foreign countries.
Regional Party Organizations
Even with Gorbachev's unprecedented success in
turning over the leadership of the republic party
organizations, almost 50 Brezhnev-era provincial first
secretaries?out of the total of 155 up for reelection?
have been returned to office in the recent party
elections. The reelection of Ukrainian and Kazakh-
stan party chiefs Vladimir Shcherbitskiy and Din-
mukhamed Kunayev?both Brezhnev proteges?
sends a strong signal through the bureaucracy that
Gorbachev is still encountering resistance in the Polit-
buro and the republics.
With Viktor Grishin's replacement as Moscow party
chief and recent removal from the Politburo, Shcher-
bitskiy and Kunayev are the most conspicuous re-
maining Brezhnev holdovers among the regional lead-
ers. There is little doubt that Gorbachev would like to
unseat Shcherbitskiy, who seems to be out of step with
Gorbachev's foreign policy views and to be resisting
Gorbachev's cadre policy by harboring a host of
Brezhnev-era appointees in important oblast first
secretary posts. Apparently because of Shcherbitskiy's
protection, only five of the republic's 25 provincial
party first secretaries have been replaced. Recent
press attacks on some of these leaders are probably a
manifestation of Gorbachev's displeasure with the
slow pace of turnover in the republic.
The task of removing Shcherbitskiy and Kunayev will
not be an easy one. Unlike Grishin, Shcherbitskiy has
not left himself open to charges of corruption or
economic mismanagement, nor has he exhibited the
gross character flaws that served as a pretext for
Romanov's removal. The reelection of Shcherbitskiy
and Kunayev makes a quick removal from the Polit-
buro unlikely. But the unprecedented personal attack
Confidential
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/12 : CIA-RDP08501350R000200620002-6
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/12 : CIA-RDP08501350R000200620002-6
uommentuu
on Kunayev following his reelection to head the
Kazakhstan party suggests his removal is still a
possibility.
Outlook and Implications
The changes Gorbachev has made in the central and
regional leadership probably will be reflected at the
27th Party Congress in a major reshuffling of the
Central Committee, now composed mainly of the
incumbents of top party and government posts. Gor-
bachev now appears likely to replace roughly half of
the 319-member body with new appointees beholden
to him or his associates for their positions?the
highest rate at any congress since 1961. This will
make the body a more compliant servant of the new
leadership, more supportive of its goals and less likely
to offer resistance to its policies.
As a group, Gorbachev's new party leaders are not
only younger but, in many instances, also better
equipped to do their jobs. Unlike their predecessors,
most escaped the disruption of World War II and had
the opportunity to finish higher educations before
launching party careers. Although the evidence is as
yet too sparse to assess their temperament and policy
inclinations, it is likely that they will be less compro-
mised by association with past policies and practices,
more open to innovative solutions to the country's
problems, and more energetic implementers of new
policies introduced to solve them. In Moscow, for
example, new first secretary Yel'tsin?just named a
candidate member of the Politburo?brings a first-
class technical education to the solution of the city's
problems. His predecessor, Grishin, only managed to
attend a railroad technical school before being thrust
into party jobs.
Despite their evident skills, the new leaders will be
hard pressed to carry out the leadership revolution
Gorbachev hopes for:
? They face the same formidable social and economic
problems as those who preceded them in office.
Confidential
? They will have few new management tools at their
disposal, barring the introduction of more radical
reforms than we have seen to date, and will have to
work within the same institutional constraints as
their predecessors.
If failure looms, many of them will be tempted to
obfuscate the facts and will seek to protect, rather
than punish, their subordinates. Gorbachev will keep
close watch on his new appointees. The Politburo,
according to published accounts of a recent meeting,
promised to keep constant supervision of new Moscow
party boss Yel'tsin's efforts to restore the capital to
social and economic health. It has been relatively easy
for Gorbachev to remove ineffective veterans, most of
whom were at retirement age, but the real test of his
revolution will be his willingness and ability to sack
his own appointees should they founder.
Gorbachev needs to find measures to institutionalize
the higher rates of turnover of party leaders required
to make sure his renewed apparatus does not lose its
edge. He will have to perform a difficult balancing
act, establishing enough job insecurity to keep party
leaders from lapsing into the laxity of the Brezhnev
years, without generating the fear, grumbling, and
alienation in the ranks that ultimately caused Khrush-
chev's own appointees to turn against him.
Assessing Gorbachev's Momentum at the Congress
The 27th Party Congress will be an important test of
how fast Gorbachev will be able to push ahead with
his ambitious plans for rejuvenating the party leader-
ship. His evident failure to achieve all that he hoped
for during the regional party elections leading up to
the national congress makes it all the more important
that he be able to demonstrate continued momentum.
Gorbachev may
plan several initiatives to give a new boost to his
efforts to renew the party leadership and consolidate
his political position.
8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/12 : CIA-RDP08501350R000200620002-6
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/12 : CIA-RDP08501350R000200620002-6
Confidential
Top Leadership Changes
Gorbachev reportedly intends to make several addi-
tional changes in the Politburo and Secretariat. Al-
though the reelection of Shcherbitskiy and Kunayev
as party chiefs in their republics makes their immedi-
ate removal unlikely, Gorbachev could move to fur-
ther outflank them in the Politburo. He has already
advanced Grishin's replacement in Moscow, Boris
Yel'tsin, to candidate membership on the Politburo,
and Vsevolod Murakhovskiy, a new first deputy pre-
mier from Gorbachev's Stavropol' bailiwick, may also
be moved up. Gorbachev undoubtedly also wants to
move now to improve his position in the Secretariat by
promoting like-minded officials such as Yakovlev and
Zagladin.
A De-Brezhnevization Campaign
There are indications that Gorbachev plans to launch
a new drive against the old guard at the congress by
delivering a forceful attack on the corruption, syco-
phancy, and mistakes of the Brezhnev years. A cam-
paign to repudiate the deceased ruler's leadership
style and discredit those?such as Shcherbitskiy and
Kunayev?associated with his regime has been pick-
ing up steam in the Soviet media. Reports of an anti-
Brezhnev campaign in the works have been lent
credibility by events at recent republic-level congress-
es in Central Asia, where former leaders from the
Brezhnev era have been subjected to humiliating
personal attacks during the proceedings (see inset).
Limiting Tenure in Office
Gorbachev reportedly fought for, but failed to
achieve, provisions in the draft of the new party
statute that would reintroduce limits on the tenure in
office of party officials?limits similar to those intro-
duced under Khrushchev but rescinded by Brezhnev.
He may try again to push through such changes at the
congress; proposals to include such limits have been
prominently featured in the officially sanctioned
"debate" of the draft statute that has been conducted
in the Soviet press.
Reorganizing the Apparatus
Gorbachev may also use the congress to streamline
the organization of the party's central apparatus?
giving him a new pretext for reshuffling senior
9
Criticism of Deposed Republic First Secretaries
Deposed first secretaries in Turkmenistan, Kirgiziya,
and Tadzhikistan have been roundly criticized by
their successors for corruption and mismanagement:
? New Turkmen party chief Niyazov excoriated his
predecessor Mukhamednazar Gap urov, who had
been in office since 1969, for fostering nepotism,
sycophancy, servility, and irrespbnsibility among
his party subordinates.
? Ousted Kirgiz first secretary Turdakun Usubaliyev
was accused by his replacement, Absamat Masa-
liyev, of "encouraging servility and intrigue" and
promoting 'Panderers" to leadership positions.
? In Tadzhikistan, incoming party chief Makhkamar
criticized both the former first secretary, Rakhmar
Nabiyev, and the second secretary, Yuriy Belov, for
tolerating irresponsibility among their subordinates
in the party apparatus, and even for overlooking
violations of the law by republic officials.
25X1
25X1
25X1
officials in the process. Such a move would be consis-
tent with his drive to tighten up management and 25X1
would complement the consolidation of government
ministries and agencies he has already begun.
A failure by the congress to ratify at least some of 25X1
these initiatives would almost certainly be perceived 25X1
in the Soviet bureaucracy as a significant setback for
Confidential
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/12 : CIA-RDP08501350R000200620002-6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/12 : CIA-RDP08501350R000200620002-6
Confidential
Gorbachev, damaging his ability to push ahead with
his agenda:
? It will be particularly important for him to advance
some of his allies into the Politburo and Secretariat.
By doing so, he can neutralize Shcherbitskiy and
Kunayev and postpone a move to remove them from
the leadership.
? An endorsement by the congress of limits on the
tenure in office of party officials is not as essential
to Gorbachev for now, but it would send a strong
signal of the new leadership's resolve to push ahead
with the process of rejuvenating the party
leadership.
? A successful last-minute move against either
Kunayev or Shcherbitskiy would be an unprecedent-
ed slap in the face to the party organizations of the
Ukraine and Kazakhstan and a dramatic gesture
demonstrating that he has no intention of letting the
remaining vestiges of the old guard slow the pace of
change.
Confidential 10
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/12 : CIA-RDP08501350R000200620002-6
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/12 : CIA-RDP08501350R000200620002-6
Confidential
Confidential
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/12 : CIA-RDP08501350R000200620002-6